 So now we can open for questions. Yes? Louis Schweitzer. One question is the scenario on total energy demand. I wondered how it was built and if there was an agreement among energy producers about the total amount of energy. I'm not speaking about the breakup between different sources of primary energy. But is this scenario coherent with, of course, demographics, I assume, but with what type of growth in the developing world, specifically Africa, Southern Asia? So as I told you, the underlying hypothesis on both rupture and momentum scenario is 3% growth of GDP. I cannot give you the detail per continent, but we have it, of course, for reference. But still, the developing world at 3% is very low for what will be the larger part of the population of the world. So I was wondering simply if it meant really a limitation of growth for all developing countries and poor countries today, which is, in my view, the major issue is the climate change. So without going into detail, this scenario do not take into account limitation of the development of, as you put it, developing countries. So in fact, we have a hypothesis regarding very low growth of GDP in developed countries. And certainly, as you have seen in the slide, a reduction of the energy needed anyway in the context of developed countries, but recognizing the fact that for developing countries, the need for energy will imply a growth of emissions. And that's factored into those simulations. So there is no limitation on the growth of the developing countries, which is one of the challenges because it's how to combine, if I may say, the legitimate aspiration of developing countries for a better lives and the fact that indeed a lot of the credit, if I may say, of how much emission we can have in the atmosphere has been used already by emitting countries. By developed countries, sorry. Can you put your mic on, please? All right. Nuclear appears on some of your slides and not on others. Obviously forecasting the future of nuclear is rather difficult from country to country. So do you, in some sort of conservative way, consider that you take it as stable, and this more or less appeared in one of these slides as an hypothesis, or are there more subtle hypotheses on this issue? I don't think it's very subtle. It's very basic. In fact, the road path, the pathway, sorry, to transition is more the one of total energies, which does not include nuclear. However, as you've seen in the slide showing the energy mix in the different scenario, rupture and momentum, and again, these are two scenarios against many others that you can have, do include nuclear, and it's a growing energy. We will need a growing contribution of nuclear to achieve somewhere around two degrees C, and even more if you want to be below two degrees C, as you can see in the two scenarios, the rupture has even a larger share of nuclear contribution. It's clearly one of the important factors into the decarbonization of the energy. Igor? I don't know any structural change of this caliber has to do something with your financial planning, right? So if total has any figures on what that would cost you and where did you get this money from? Because, you know, people say that it might cost us globally about 36 trillion at the estimate of today. Either you put it as a tax on the population of the world or you cut down the dividends of your shareholders because the taxation of that caliber is unbearable for the population. So the question is, do you have financial prognosis of what it's in for you? And how do you deal with your shareholder or with the consumer? That's a very complex question, but a very interesting one. I think there are two folds in your question if you understood well. The first fold is in relation to a company like Total Energies and how we manage in fact somehow to find our own way in this transition of energy. And we believe that with the underlying hypothesis in terms of the energy price moving forward and we take rather conservative price for oil, for example, we take $50 per barrel. This is public statement, so all of our long-term plans are based on $50 per barrel which you could argue today is relatively conservative or at least it's not excessive oil price for the future. And with that we are able to spend $13 to $15 billion every year of capital investment and we say we dedicate about half of this to low-carbon energy, $3 billion being dedicated purely to solar and wind. And with that we manage because of the cash flow generated from these activities and the selectivity we can apply on new projects. And we have a pipeline of projects that demonstrate that we can do this. I will not go into too much detail, this is not the subject of the panel, but when we run our long-term plan we see that we can continue to serve a dividend to our shareholders and we believe therefore we have a sustainable model. And as you can see on the figures we are also contributing to the transformation of the energy mix you are more or less in line with on the one hand the fulfilment of energy demand. We are saying that between now and 2030 we will grow up production energy by 30%. So it's growth proposal and at the same time we decarbonise and we want to reach net zero by 2050 for all of our products, not just about scope 1 and 2 our emissions but also the emissions of our product. When it comes to a more global question about all of this is going to cost money because indeed if you take today I will just take the example of hydrogen because it's maybe a way to relate to what it means to translate from say oil to hydrogen as a source of energy. We produce today in our refineries what we call the grey hydrogen by reforming methane. We know how to do that. The cost is roughly speaking depending on the cost of gas and the environment between 50 and 100 dollars per barrel of oil equivalent. This is equivalent of energy. So we are comparing apple and apple. So you see that grey hydrogen is not so different from oil, you could argue a bit more expensive, one to twice more expensive. If you want to go to what we call blue hydrogen which is hydrogen produced out of methane but where you take the associated emission of CO2 and you re-inject. You multiply the cost by two or three which means you are into the range of 150 dollars per barrel. If then you want to go to green hydrogen which is the hydrogen that would be produced out of electrolysis of water by say renewable production solar or wind power then the factor is four to five. So you are in the range of 200 to 250 dollars per barrel. This gives you the immediate measure of the impact on the global economy of shifting dramatically to a purely hydrogen source. So this is why we need to have a just transition. You are a very high figure of numbers. There is a cost associated with this transition. And the question is how are we going to share the cost to support in fact the developing countries in consuming these more expensive energies. And clearly we can see because when I spoke about this grey, blue and green hydrogen I mean I'm sure that mankind you know will the inventivity you know innovation will help us to reduce the cost but it will not be you know from a factor of five in a few years again all of this needs time. So that's really the subject of this transition but maybe Olivier want to comment on this subject of the cost of the transition. I would say unfortunately for the policy makers they don't count. And so the green is so attractive that you should not count. That's a pity. And it is a case in France, it is a case in Europe. You take decisions, you put targets, you don't evaluate how you will reach these targets and what will be the cost. What is the cost of a fit for 55? How it will be achieved? No, the decision will be taken. It will be taken sometime and in two or three years it will appear that we will not reach this target. So we will increase furthermore the target and then you are sure to go below. Greta Tanberg. Maybe a last question on this session. Excuse me, you referred to a strategic scenario. These scenarios are based on model and I would say by experience a model is garbage in, garbage out. And I wonder what is garbage in the hypothesis you put in this model. You refer to one hypothesis which is the no in 2035 no more thermal engines. This is challenging but what you know the difference between challenging and totally unrealistic sometimes is very thin. So would you give us some example of the key assumptions on which are based your model? So I think the best I can do is to refer you to our presentation that is online on the Total Energy website because we presented this new Total Energy energy outlook last Tuesday. And you will see that there is a slide that will not come until today which details in fact the underlying assumptions. It was a bit more detailed than what I've just given. We believe that all of these assumptions are possible. That is there is nothing there in terms at least a momentum scenario because we are looking at essentially commitments made by countries and technology that exists today. Nothing that does not exist today and of course we are looking at a time span towards 2050. The rupture scenario differs a bit from the perspective that it does include some solution that we don't really know that will be invented somehow. But we believe it's possible as well but we don't know what. So we've refined actually those scenarios compared to last year Total Energy outlook. And what we try to do again knowing that every scenario is bound to be wrong but that trying to frame somehow the challenge that we are facing and what we can do to contribute to addressing this challenge. There was one last question. Yes, very quick question. When I look at the projections in the world primary energy demand in both scenarios clearly oil is in a very strong reduction. I was wondering what was the strategy in terms of exploration going forward for Total and how you see the same strategy for your competitors. It's an important question in the context of where we are today in Abu Dhabi because of course it's one of the country. If you look at the Middle East region where they are we say long resources in terms of reserve at the current rate of production. So first thing because you may have in mind the statement made by the head of IE Fatih Bihal not so long ago when he commented one of these scenarios saying that essentially in view of the lower demand of oil we could stop investing in exploration and developing new projects. Today we are roughly speaking the demand. I'm not speaking about the production because everything is driven by the demand. The demand for oil is just around 100 million barrel of oil per day. And he was saying that in view of the projection by 2050 you know we should no longer need to do any new investment. And he was doing a linear I would say extrapolation or interpolation between today and 2050. And this will not be like that because this one was meaning that by 2030 which is 10 years from now the world will be consuming 70 million barrel of oil per day minus 30 million. And that's not possible because when you just look at the way we use oil today there is no substitution. So there is no force in the universe that will make you know such drastic reduction. We total energies in our economic energy outlook we are not so different when you look at our rupture scenario which is maybe the most consistent with the IEA you know one degree C scenario. We are not so different when you look at the energy mix and the contribution of oil. So the endpoint in 2050 we say it's not necessarily you know it's not so wrong. I mean it's plus or minus a few million barrel but it's the trajectory. We believe that it will not be linear. In fact everything that we can learn from the past is that in this sort of situation we don't have linear phenomenon because you have some technological breakthrough. You have some market changes and you know the electrification of the light vehicle for example in net zero 2050 if you take just Europe you know this is going to happen now. So these are but it will not happen in a linear way. So what we're saying essentially when back to your question about exploration is that in fact the demand for oil and gas will continue to be significant. Gas we see a growing demand oil we see a sort of a plateau our prognosis is you know around 2030. So in the next decade we consider that we will probably get a peak and then we will slowly decline. That's our vision ending in 2050 more or less where we can see on the slide. If then you look into taking into account the fact that oil fields are it's the oil production. It's a depletion industry. So the day you start to produce you start to decline and you take the average decline of an oil fields and that's globally. You see that in 10 years you lose 40 percent of your production between 30 and 40 percent depending on the assumption. So it means that if you do nothing you get effectively to the 70 million barrel per day of fatty beryl. But since we know that we will need more you know we need still to explore for oil and we need to develop new oil fields. And if you just look at what we need to supply the three year demand as we as we can prognosis and three years is a relatively short period of time. We are short of three to five million barrel of oil per day. This is the idea by the way so it's not myself. And if you look at what we've been able to put on stream in the last three years it's 1.5 million barrel of oil per day. So you can see the immediate challenge is the risk of shortage of oil and one of the many explanation about the current oil price and energy prices due to this tension because our industry has been under investing since the last downturn in 2015. So there was under investment by the industry in 15 16 17 18 19 was the first year when we started to really get back to normal investment level. And then we got 20 and 21 again very significant. So there is an underlying shortage structural shortage of oil production coming up in your in front of us. And as you know the oil markets are always supplied but the price is the anticipation of the shortage in the coming year. So today there is a tension and indeed we need to continue to explore the strategy or the I would say the choice. The strategic choice of total energy is to focus on what we call low cost oil projects. Why because of the volatility. Look at what happened in 2020. The oil price fell below $40 per barrel. You need to be able to your projects have got to be resilient to this sort of element. And this is why by the way we have we have a big presence in Abu Dhabi and in other countries in the region because we believe this is where you can produce the low cost barrels in an effective way. And with associated greenhouse gas of course a reduction projects. Thank you very clear. Just in that case because I understand the most important part is the non linearity. But do you have a sort of approximate trajectory of if it's not linear how it is going to be distributed over time in the next few decades. We can say more or less anything we want it will be wrong. Because it depends on things we don't really understand what we're saying is that if we want to get to the net zero by 2050. And I think this is with the two scenarios we have. You can see where you're going to end but it's very difficult to to prognose exactly what will be the trajectory. But we definitely consider very definitely we think that oil production and I should say all demand again all demand should peak in the next decade and should decline after. And this is taking on into account the significant changes that are being made by car manufacturers. That's particularly in Europe who are really now shifting to electrical vehicles.