 This evening, and it's my pleasure to introduce our illustrious panel on the event in St. Catherine's tonight. My name is Neve Goller, I'm a fellow St. Catherine's College and co-convener of the future of the Island of Ireland seminar series. I'd like to invite you all to the college. The college was founded in 1473. It has been an intellectual home for many disciplines across the decades, across the centuries. And more recently it has become a home for discussion of British-Irish relations and Irish affairs more generally. The last major event we had here was in 2019, just before the pandemic, where we had a panel discussion about the Galcoz Free Friday Agreement, former secretary of the state of Northern Ireland, Paul Murphy and John Reid, and then leader of the High Command, Angela Smith. I've no doubt that that topic will pop up yet again this evening in tonight's discussion. And I'm delighted to be continuing this tradition of making St. Catherine's a neutral space for the discussion of the future of these islands and Irish affairs more generally. So with my other hat on, I'd like to say something about the future of the Island of Ireland series. As you all hopefully will have noticed when you sat down, there was a business card on your seat. It has a QR code in the back. If you don't know what that is, please do you have a password with the person inside you and they will tell you. The future of the Island of Ireland series has grown from strength to strength due to the efforts of my colleague here, Barry Colfer. We helped to bring it to Zoom life in 2020. So really, thanks to Barry, we really kicked off with this intraspeed series. I'd also like to thank Professor Eugenio Biagini, who is here. You helped to bring it to life at the beginning of those 2020 days on the centre for geopolitics who are a partner of ours. It was recently awarded a small grant by the Arts and Humanities Research Council in recognition of the good work we are doing here at Cambridge today. Today I'm delighted to launch our website, which the magic QR code and that business card will enable you to find an alternatively, that's too difficult, these are two types in the web address, which is on that business card as well. Our website contains our past conversations, we've had perhaps over 20 of them, and you can now read about them, you can rewatch them, and all future events will be advertised there as well. Please have a look, join our mailing list, and follow us on social media. We want this series to develop, right, my faith, my, my, I'm asking you a favour, please spread the word about us. We are a small team, myself, Barry, and our fabulous coordinator, Iona here doing the Zoom for us today. It is the only series connecting the public to leading figures in the political, social, economic and cultural life of these islands in conversation with expert academics. This is an inclusive space for all of you points concerning with concerned with the future. So please stay involved and help us grow. Okay, so sometimes keeping. The facilities are downstairs, do you need to use them, that we would kindly ask if you can possibly refrain from the duration of somebody's one of our panelists talk that would be great. The event is being recorded and possibly live streamed if we managed to get that working on it. So, if you could ask a question and I really hope you do, please, we're going to assume your consent right for that being recorded and streamed online. I'm going to hand over to Barry and I for the formal introductions to our panelists, and to say a little bit more about the event tonight. But can I just say that I'm really thrilled to be here in association with the Institute of International and European Affairs in Dublin, a major and very important think tank. And it's great that we can begin this collaboration so thank you very much for joining us today. And that's a nice point in which to hang over so my name is inspired called for many of you and for those I don't need to be here with you. I'm the director of research at the Institute international European Affairs in Dublin, but I'm also a fellow at St Edmunds and in Cambridge so this is nice for me that is bringing together my kind of two affiliations and two passions. And I'm really really happy to add on to what you said that this is our 21st meeting. The meetings happened initially back with the general myself in the middle of the pandemic. And it was just a kind of a thing we did to fill the time between the days and now it's something I think really nice and important and it's great to be a part of it. I'm going to just very quickly read out the biographies of our speakers but just before that I was thinking on the way over here. So those of us who follow what are interested in the future of the island of Ireland obviously and many people who have that shared passion will be thinking about the feeling I'm sure you heard today was a fairness and very important accidental campaigner who had a very strong light on controversy over unspeakable sadness in Ireland in terms of the cancer controversy. And certainly when if the series continues and people continue to write the story of Ireland, it's social history and it's a bit of history that you will be a very important figure in that so I'm thinking about it as I'm sure many people are as well. I just wanted to mention briefly before going to the Barber Feast for Irish. Yes, they go on. So tonight our first speaker is going to be Dr Andrew McCormick and it's lovely to meet you tonight in person finally. And it was the former director general of international relations to the Northern Ireland executive representative executive specialized committee on the protocol and you are the anti executives lead official on Brexit and if I may say a great voice of reason and a great resource in these times as you try to understand what it is that's happening on these islands. Our first respondent is going to be Katie Hayward also Katie so when I feel like I know, lucky to meet you in person for the first time. The first comment is the pressure of political sociology at Queen's University about the senior fellow at the UK and changing your think tank like it is a major ESRC funded project on the topic of the future status of Northern Ireland after break but thanks for being with us impressing Katie. My first respondent will be David Sullivan. David is the IA's director general formerly served as the Secretary General of the European Commission ambassador the EU delegation to the US as a chief operating officer that he used diplomatic service. Now, unfortunately, Sir Jeffrey Donaldson MP did drop out and the GDP were unable to send a substitute which is unfortunate but we didn't really try. So, without further ado, I'm going to hand over to you and then looking forward to discussion thanks everyone for being with us. Okay, so the format of today's talk, Andrew is going to speak for about 15 minutes based on the paper that he had written on this pre circulated, then each panelist will have up to 10 minutes to reflect on that to respond to that. So Andrew can then please come back and respond to some of what's been said, but then open up to Q&A for about 40 minutes. And then panellists will be invited to wrap up for about two minutes each and the Q&A will involve both yourselves and of course I consider the long line audience as well. Thank you, Andrew. Thank you. Thanks. Very great privilege to be here this evening and appreciate the opportunity to introduce a discussion which I hope will be lively and challenging. I'm very sure of that. I've been writing about these issues for a few months now, and I think there are still a few things that need to be said and explored, because six years on, finding a way forward on the implications of Brexit from Northern Ireland is still a unsolved problem. There are some good signs of hope from the current discussions. That's all good. But there is undeniably an enormous gulf between the protocol as it stands, and the expectations of unions resulting from the protocol bill. Around the same time as I published the paper in August, Katie and Jill Rutter and Catherine Burrard and Jonathan Stevens and I were thinking about and exploring a few things and two points arising from that. That's the point that Jonathan made in that blog in August about the fact that all the process up to this point has not been inclusive of religions of Northern Ireland. And that actually from his long experience in the NIO, I first met Jonathan in 1992, and he and I were junior officials working in the talks under Sir Patrick Mayhew. But so he knows this backwards and knows that a process that is commands confidence and is inclusive of local interests is absolutely vital. The other point is then that Jill set out the challenge that actually an independent fact based review of the protocol might clarify the issues and identify possible ways forward. And so there was a paper then which you can change your policy on that, not so long ago. Andrew, if I ask you to sit down for our hour, which isn't getting there first. Okay, thanks. Sure. Yes. Thank you. Okay. So, there have been repeated statements from UK ministers that the outcome they're seeking. And then insist on from the negotiations is the same substance of the protocol bill so we need to look at not just the means of that they're seeking to use but what are they trying to achieve what's actually going on here. So, just to frame what I want to say. I want to highlight, first of all, self determination as an issue and concept and the relevance of that. A bit then about the interpretation of the old fast food Friday agreement. Then it's touched briefly on, there's quite a lot that could be said an immense amount that could be said about the technical aspects of both the protocol and the bill. I just want to take one aspect of that, given the time available, and then just just drop you thoughts together at the end. So, self determination is actually the link between the fundamentals of the union partition, the troubles, the good Friday agreement, and Brexit. So there are all issues of self determination. And the problem is defining what people means and we take we do what we do what's in some expectation for us, what is the people in what's the unit of determination. What, what group of people have the right to exercise self determination. So the amazing thing about the good Friday agreement is that it effectively resolve that issue for the first time in history. Based on a lot on the outcome of the 1918 general election, which in their playbook said that the whole of Ireland voted on the same day for a unitary independent republic. The majority, that's the unit of determination, and the will of that majority should be recognized. So in that period, British ministers were looking at self determination for unionists, although they didn't wrestle with all that clearly and as a matter of fact, both the principle of partition, and especially the boundary of Northern Ireland were imposed. And the plebiscites were plebiscites around the same time in Schleswig-Holstein and Silesia, but not in Cardiff-Turon or Cardiff-Romana, which have clear African majorities. So, their consent was not given. And this actually is a very, very important driver behind the republican world view. So, that's why the referendum in 1998 was so significant because the whole of the island voted on the same day to approve the good Friday agreement, and hence determine that that settled the constitutional issue in that way. But what summarized it is this, the large unit of determination to hold the island agreed that Northern Ireland would be for the future, the unit of determination. Absolutely fundamental to settlement and linked of course to all the other aspects of the agreement. And this is the consensus and compromise that emerged, the compromises, especially the significance of North-South cooperation, which reaches so heavily in the whole debate. So then Brexit is of course an act of self determination. What was not noticed at the time was the significance of the fact that Northern Ireland was part of another different larger unit of determination. And Brexit as a constitutional change was taken for without regard for the interaction between Northern Ireland as a unit of determination and the whole of the UK. So that complicated things and was never identified and is, I think, actually quite significant in the present time in that the good Friday agreement said that it was from Northern Ireland to determine its own constitutional future. So agreement comes along and this is an agreement, which gave Northern Ireland power decision on the impact of Brexit through the consent mechanism was agreed. So, then because ironically, that like the good Friday agreement to withdraw agreement gives Northern Ireland the final say on its own constitution future by simple majority. The protocol bill. The problem with protocol bill is that it that reverts to a process of imposition of a settlement rather than seeking a settlement by agreement and consent. So the reference in the bill to the active union is a demonstrable contradiction of the obligation of the UK government in the good Friday agreement to exercise as part with rigorous impartiality on behalf of the people. So evidently the active union was favored by unions and opposed by nationalists and Republicans. So, by asserting the overarching part of the UK Parliament. The bill undermines the principle of self determination of the people of my own. So carefully established in 1998. I think alongside the issues of constitutional law that have been the subject of very clear judgments by the Northern courts and will be considered shortly by the Supreme Court. I think it's also relevant to look at the fact that the two parliaments that passed the active union in 1800 did not do so with consent. There's no support at any stage for the accident from the majority of people in Ireland. The long journey from 1801 1922 began with a campaign for repeal. Is an example of the law of the strong or sovereignty is a reflection of power, rather than of rights and you could try to agree with us at the other end, the spectrum on that established sovereignty subject to consent. And, as I said, consent on the basis of simple majority. The government's case of the bill includes the argument that because the DUP is not willing to enter the executive under the present circumstances, it is urgent. Indeed a necessity in international law to act as they're currently proposing. There's several points that I think are impossible to reconcile between that that stance and the government's legal position and these points of fact. First of all, the word inherent appears a lot in the government's legal opinion checks on goods entering. No good but we were inherent in the protocol. Nothing in the operation of the protocol was not foreseen. Indeed, the basic approaches that was proposed in the Prime Minister's letter to work 2019. And all we were doing when I was working in the executive office in that period was trying to understand and explore what it would mean. There was a lot of work done in the period between 2019 during the agreement in October 2019 and the start of the implementation in 2021. So, the position is that the UK government new in detail, all the issues of the way the protocol would operate. That was well established. To intervene to ensure that quote unquote, East West connections are restored. That's actually contradictory to the whole nature of the protocol as the essence of which was proposed by the government in the October 2019 letter. One point on this is that Unionist opposition to protocol was explicitly foreseen in the terms of the concept mechanism. So the barrier or peril that they've talked about. It arises from escalation of unionist opposition specifically DEP opposition. And that results that is shown by a clear change of mind. Up to January 21. The attitude was, I would characterize it as as clear opposition but acquiescence. In February, it was changed very firmly rejection of the protocol. The third third thing there is that the UK specifically did contribute to the problem. And the paper with lots of rotations, because the claim by the UP is that new decade new approach was the basis they went back into government, along with the other parties in January 2020. And that claim that a big promise and that was not implemented. Namely, that there would be unfettered access for years going from GB to and I now. That I've never seen that question put to UK ministers said well what did you mean by the words that are there are words that are interpreted on that basis, but they're delicate words in my reading of them. No, not input is what did you mean, oh UK ministers. If, if they ask if they say yes we agree with the DEP that that's what that promises. That's a direct contradiction to the protocol. A direct contradiction of the prime minister's letter, and if the command paper of meh 2020. And they say well yes, no, that we didn't make that promise to the DEP. Then, I haven't they said so, why, why every time in parliament. That's the need argument that is brought forward. Why does no one say actually sorry that's not what it means. All of that is about clarity and candor. I'm not not commenting on the merit of the choices that are being made here. I'm commenting on the fact that that misleading contradictory statements are made. So, furthermore, and there was a very clear agreement in October 2019 that there would be no, no group would have a veto on the agreement. The consent mechanism, as discussed, was not on a cross community basis was recognized that possibly the agreement was highly desirable, but clear recognition that it was not essential. And interestingly, in the UK's declaration on the consent mechanism, they said, if in 2024, there is no cross community support for continuation of the protocol. We will commission on independent review and examine the facts, example, take views from business from civic society from the political leaders in the island, and see what could be done to secure cross community support. And just in passing them. One word in the bill that I struggle with at the more technical operational level, this word destined. So the, the bill talks about goods being destined to stay in Northern Ireland. Well, yes, to the extent that works. That's great. And the green, green channel, red channel concept is well worth pursuing and should get as much weight as possible. But if goods are in free circulation in Northern Ireland, then you don't know where they're destined for. That's, if that wasn't a problem. It wouldn't be here. We wouldn't have had to go through the journey of these last number of years. If the problem was that easy to solve it would have been solved. That's not. So I wrote paper about channels in March of 2018, and it was came out of a meeting with the task force, where they were very clear that they would not have any risk tolerance in relation to the health related aspects of controls. And of course that links to the fact that there have been controls on protect health, animal health and plant health, going back to 1847. That's not, it's not new. So it can't be unconstitutional. It's established fact. And that's why, in the paper I wrote, and then the Prime Minister's letter over 2019. It was the basis of the idea was to protect the island of Ireland as a single epidemiological unit. That's definitely the most difficult part of the application of the protocol. And the reason for the long grace periods is because of the complexity arising from that, but the scale and challenge of that issue was well known, well established in 2020. And the government knew about that and said in December 2020 that three months was enough, some supermarkets are ready. And the rest of said they will be ready. Within six weeks of that, they were saying something completely different. I wonder what happened in the meantime. So, it's essentially all about getting to the facts funny way ahead trained by the facts. I think there are very clear arguments that the protocol bill far from defending the agreement reverts to an imposed solution based on the views of one side rather than seeking consent seeking a seeking agreement. So, come back to my first few points, an inclusive process would be better. Having things done to allow politicians draw them with their engagement, finding a way for that to happen is surely worth thinking about independent review is not an original concept. Indeed, someone says tired and exhausted and tried too many times before. But it's in the UK government document as I said, in a different context but why not apply it and what better ideas are there. Okay, if the current talks lead to agreement, and that's something that can be accepted. Great, but the protocol bill sets an incredibly high bar to that's why I see great difficulty. But actually, final point is just that, whatever about where it requires leadership requires. Think back to the 90s when leaders in the world and they'll start reading here and in the Irish government and in the US and then you can even create a division and work together positively with a long term strategic view, and I would honour those who led the process, John, Jim, David, Trimble and many others. We've got us to the agreement. So, learning from how we got there matters. Great. Thank you very much, Andrew, and I'm going to kind of direct you now to Katie Hayward, who has been a very present commentator on these events since 2016. Very well known in the Northern Ireland. We're so delighted to have with us this evening, so Katie, over to you for about 10 minutes, is that okay? Yes, it's great. Please note that I'm running over. It's a great pleasure to be here. Thank you very much to Barry and to David for the invitation. It's an honor to be in this college. And it's a particular honor to be on a panel with Andrew, who, about whom could not be said enough in terms of the difference that he made behind the scenes at a really critical moment, for Northern Ireland, but for UK relations, and indeed for British Irish relations. And Andrew has very kindly participated in a Brexit witness interview that will be going on the archives. A small part of that is available for you to see in the UK in a changing Europe website. I'd really encourage you to read it, because as you've seen already, not only your experience Andrew, but your insights and analysis are second to none. And it's a, it's an honor to respond to some of your remarks this evening. And so these are very, what I really wanted to pick up on is the question of consent and consensus, I think, starting from your initial remarks with respect to the comments around this whole process needed to be as inclusive as possible and some reflections on that really. And why not begin at the beginning, and that is in relation to the impact of Brexit on ideology and identity in the very peculiar in particular place of Northern Ireland. And, and what did that mean. So fundamentally of course it disrupts the context, and many of the assumptions behind the good Friday Belfast agreement we all know that. And this is worth reflecting on the ways it does that in particular. So one is of course in relation to the salience of borders, right back to the forefront, both in ideology, ideological terms and practical terms. And on the other side, I went to Paddy Calti's borderlines show in the lyrics the other day, and he said he began his set by basically saying 100 years ago the English to border across the island of Ireland, and annoyed it wasn't the word he annoyed all the Catholics, and then 100 years later the drawn one down the Irish seed and annoyed all the Protestants. And so now we've got two borders to deal with. And I've been a racist lately, and I'll move on to my next point, which is of course, and the exacerbation and anticipation of UK divergence. That's at the heart of the Brexit process as well of course, and of course therefore it disrupts the good Friday Belfast agreements and the assumptions that are made behind that. Also of course into the Brexit process we have zero some analysis of when lose analysis competitive discourses. And in those, in those ways, which of course is extremely unhelpful in a peace process where you're wanting to get away from that binary zero some analysis. Such zero some analysis came. Let's be forget in relation to defining the problem itself and consequences of the decision, the consequences of Brexit itself, and then not just the denial of the problems and the challenges and confusion around that, making facts, but counter to each other, and therefore experiences and perceptions counter to each other, but also denial of the solutions as well and their consequences and basically the fact that they're difficult decisions to have to be made here, and there are difficult consequences to deal with another impact of Brexit of course that is extremely unhelpful for the context of the Belfast good Friday agreement is the constitutional uncertainty put into the heart of the United Kingdom. So we're talking about the relationship between the evolved regions and nations, and much of Mike Kenny here in your fantastic project on the cost of future constitutional future of the UK, but also constitutional uncertainty at the heart of the UK's constitution in other ways, including the role of officials for example indeed the role of the rule of law, and also compounding all of this is the exclusion, as has already been mentioned. The role of Northern Ireland's elected representatives and institutions in managing the fallout from all of this. And as I sort of alluded to those behind the scenes particularly officials played such a crucial part in trying to keep things as level as possible trying to prepare for just extraordinary circumstances, and such as a no deal withdrawal TCA. So bearing all that in mind. And I just want to reflect then on the challenges for any for where we are now, given all that that has meant for the good Friday Belfast agreement. And if we're all agreed that Jonathan Stevens, and others are right. That's what's what is necessary in Northern Ireland is a process that is as inclusive as possible, that does command confidence across the different community divides, and indeed connections, and how, and what does all this, what does all of this mean. I think one small challenge is of course that the decision to exclude oneself is a very effective tool in the present day. And the fact that it can completely undermine and suspend the operation of the good Friday Belfast Agreement is something that does need to be considered in all of this. So we're looking ahead where we are at the moment, and we see this from polling. The my colleague David Fenner and I conduct in Queens, and it's a very worrying situation. And so we see now for example, one of the headline findings is that 30% of our respondents, there's margin of error of 2.3% plus or minus 30% of our respondents. And say that the Northern Ireland executive should not be reformed until the protocol is scrapped. So bearing in mind that the protocol being scrapped is really not on the cards the government isn't saying that the US isn't saying that this presents profound challenge therefore to the good Friday Belfast Agreement. More to the point it suggests that there's an erosion, there's an erosion happening, not just in relation to trust in the UK government etc, but also of confidence in the institutions themselves and indeed the purpose of those good Friday Belfast Agreement institutions. And so just to reflect a wee bit on what consent and consensus might mean in this context. First and foremost, consent in the good Friday Belfast Agreement and I know, and this is subject of some debate but essentially if you read, read the text, and consent in that is in relation to majority votes and majority will with as expressed through a referendum with Northern Ireland as part of United Kingdom, or United Ireland. So that's quite clear that's what consent means, and that's what's been there, even, you know, for decades now, even pre Anglo Irish agreement about the principle of majority consent in Northern Ireland for its constitutional situation. And, but what we have in the in article 18 in the protocol is a reworking of that idea, as Andrews explained a wee bit. And the purpose of that article, putting to the text is to provide the opportunity for democratic consent in Northern Ireland. And as we know, that doesn't that that is a is a reworking of it with this idea of consent in that it's specifically about articles five to 10. And if there's a majority vote in amongst the MLA's themselves against that those articles five to 10 continue to apply, then it goes back to negotiation. And if there's a majority vote in favour then they continue to be operating cross community for four years. If it's on the basis of cross community consent operating for eight years. That's all well and good. This is a new definition of consent, not because it's bringing in the principle of majorities. And because it's making more complex but also partly because it's about the MLA's themselves as a constituency. There's been an electoral declaration that the UK government and put forward alongside article 18. There's it's much more ambitious in that regard as Andrews already said, so the objective of article 18 as UK government sees it is to seek and achieve an agreement that is as broad as possible in Northern Ireland, and where there's a process that is taken forward and supported by a power sharing executive in Northern Ireland. And interestingly enough, the UK government said it would have a process in advance of such a consent vote in the Northern Ireland assembly, that would reach out to the electorate in many ways that would include civil society, etc. And that they would participate. So in a sense trying to get social consent and consensus for the protocol before the MLA's have that particular vote which is quite interesting. However, by the time of July 2021 and the UK government's command paper article 18 was being rethought in a certain way. So, for example, it was talking about the electorate in Northern Ireland would have their say over the protocol because of article 18. So essentially, very directly saying that this protocol is actually an electoral issue, and you can vote according to your views on article 18 and five articles five to 10 in the protocol. And in our polling we've seen just quite how divisive that is and how people seem to get that. And there is a slight majority in favor of their MLA's voting in favor of articles five to 10. But it's not an overwhelming one. It's low 50s. And the majority of people say their MLA's position on the protocol influences whether they vote for them. So in that way it's been quite successful. But however, naming it as an electoral issue came on top of the UK government and creating an environment in which it was bound to be extremely divisive. So as Andrew says in his paper and in putting out the protocol early on, they didn't listen to the problems that were raised from businesses and others. And just as an aside, just to note, the Northern Ireland Business Brexit Working Group, for example, was formed in late 2019, early 2020, and they were submitting in detail the problems with the with the protocol and the issues that it that it might mean. And many of us indeed were writing about it at the time. So far from being champions of the protocol or being on questioning of his benefits. And many of us were sort of outlying the difficulties right from the beginning. Not only were they ignored. The other concerns weren't addressed. The grace peers weren't long enough, for example, but more to the point. There was not inclusion yet stakeholders there wasn't proper engagement with the stakeholders to recognize or indeed substantial engagement with officials to recognize what the difficulties might be and therefore to try and create an environment in which those concerns could be addressed. So the operation of the protocol, such as it has been over the last two years has been in a context in which the, the problems of protocol have been exacerbated. And for various reasons by the British government. And of course therefore this has had an effect of deepening concerns among some communities in Northern Ireland and polarizing the debate in Northern Ireland. And so the next steps, I think it's not too late to ask a question. And where is, where's the solid ground. And to get right to the point of the Northern Ireland protocol bill. The UK government is saying that it wants UK EU agreement to have the same outcomes as the Northern Ireland protocol bill. That's simply not possible. And partly because the Northern Ireland protocol bill is another example of the UK government wanting to have its cake and eat it and denying the difficulties of the decisions that have to be made and we'll be happy to share the details in terms of green red or in terms of your regulatory regime, whatever. But at the moment, the way that the protocol bill is presented is simply not realizable it's not realistic at all. And so, and for other matters as well, any UK EU agreement, we hope to come to which we come to cannot have the same objectives and outcomes. And if we are to get to a situation in which such an agreement would be realizable and then indeed be sellable. And even beyond that, begin to command some confidence amongst even strong unionists. We have to begin now in terms of the way that the UK government talks about the challenges and indeed the capacity of the protocol bill. And at one point with it would be for it to begin to recognize the unilateral action on the protocol in the form of the protocol bill sits very uncomfortably with a good Friday buffers agreement, not least because it's coming in objection to 52 of the 90 m a and not least because it comes with the strong objections from the Irish government. And so that that would be a starting point in terms of solid ground and I look forward to hearing what David has to think. Great. Thank you. Thank you very much. And thank you for the opportunity to have this discussion of this historic surroundings 1473 years. I mean, when was Trinity? No, 100 years later. And also I'd like to take the opportunity to thank you for the work you do on on UK Irish relations. And I think this is something on which we're going to have to work very hard if in the years to come because Brexit, frankly, has driven a stake through the heart of otherwise excellent traditions between the UK and Ireland. And as a capacity, frankly, as we, as we, as we have seen to poison those relations and the fact that we will not have the regular meetings between British and Irish ministers in Brussels in the margins of the council meetings and so on. We have to find an alternative mechanism for keeping that dialogue going. And certainly in the Institute for International and European Affairs in Dublin, we're very committed to this with the light I was joined by Dr Kelly, who's chairman of our UK Ireland working group, former new parish ambassador here in London, there horn is a member of that group where distinguished trade unionist is very active in this area and has been active in this before. So we're very committed to working and delighted to have the opportunity to cooperate with what you're doing here in here. Secondly, just to echo what Katie said about Andrew Andrew, you know, you're going to be burning. I think Andrew does fantastic work. I heard the quality of his analysis tonight. It is thoughtful. It is well researched. It is calm. He really tries to just bring people back to confront the realities, not always popular with different factions in the discussion but I think his work has been absolutely remarkable. I mean, I didn't know him when he was a civil servant in Northern Ireland, and I'm sure Katie is right, but I have seen his work since then and we were delighted to be able to publish his latest paper, which I think is a huge contribution and by the way when someone writes the history of all this I think some of the stuff that Andrew was written will be a very valuable source. Well, everything has been said but not quite yet by everybody. So I will, I will try to keep my remarks mainly to a kind of EU perspective on some of this because I think that given my background is not only that I have the many tasks that Barry has mentioned I was also director general for trade. So I actually know something about custom union I know something about goods, going across borders, and I know how the EU perceives these issues. The tragedy of the situation we're in is this this was utterly predictive. Brexit was going to produce this outcome unless managed very very carefully and it was not managed carefully because there wasn't a plan. And Brexit was I mean I leave aside what people in the room may think of this as British people seen from outside was an egregious act of self harm by the UK on itself. But unfortunately, and this is less forgivable it was also an egregious act of harm on your neighbors, and particularly on Ireland. And this was always going to be a major problem in Northern Ireland, and everyone who looked at this problem saw it immediately. Tony Blair and John major I must say to the great credit raiser during the referendum they were put food and ignored, but they were absolutely right. But sooner or later this will damage to the Friday agreement, not because it was inherently linked to joint membership of the EU but because the tensions which Brexit was inevitably going to create on on on the island about where you put a new border, because it brought the border back into the debate we had got rid of the water. The good Friday agreement effectively buried the debate about a border, because on the one hand, the Unionists had the constitutional guarantee that Northern Ireland would be part of the United Kingdom. The Irish changed their constitution to remove the constitutional claim. So for the first time, Northern Ireland was a recognized entity and had a legal, legal status. On the other hand, if you are a nationalist, because we were both in the EU, you could pretend you're living on a island right you could drive around the island you could work you could play you could you could move the only thing is somebody I think said the only thing you knew when you crossed the front across the border was a ping on your phone to say you changed a phone provider. And that was that was it. And so we've taken the border to a certain extent out of the Irish debate. Brexit brought it right back in where there had to be a border. And I do think it's very important to understand because sometimes people say to me well why does have to be bored. I mean when you leave the European Union, you create a border, there has to be a border at Calais and at Dover. And how can there have to be a border at Calais and at Dover and not not be one in Ireland on Ireland around Ireland. You had to find a solution. We spent four years discussing what this for what form this would take, because we all agreed, and everyone agreed from the very beginning that recreating a hard border on the island of Ireland was impossible. And I think the right threats of violence or anything of just materially and physically putting customs posts, having checks on a border which is anyway porous utterly porous. It was not going to work. It would also create security problems and so on but it just everyone agreed the British government, the Irish government, even people in Northern Ireland were saying it's a hard border with a very few exceptions hard border on the island of Ireland but what was your other option. The only other option was some kind of checks, I don't even like to use the word border because I'm kind of checks on trade between GB and Northern Ireland. Four years of work. Theresa May initially went for something like checks on goods going into Northern Ireland. She was told by the DUP and no uncertain terms this wouldn't work she changed her mind and she went for what was still the best deal ever on offer for the UK, which was her package to keep the UK as a whole in the custom union, unless the trade agreement, the future agreement removed the necessity for that so that was why it was called a backstop because it was hoped that the trade deal would eliminate this problem. I don't think many of us thought it could, but that was the hope but anyway there was a guarantee that if the trade deal did not fix the problem, there would be some kind of that the UK as a whole would remain in the custom union, reducing the risk of having to create some kind of border around Ireland. That was rejected rejected also by the DUP, but more particularly by Boris Johnson, and when he, when he came to power, he decided he wanted to get Brexit done. The protocol as we know it today was designed in 10 down extreme. That is how the EU sees it. I mean, yes, we negotiated a joint and every line in that protocol was negotiated with British and EU officials. Everybody knew what they were signing up to, which was that there would have to be checks on goods traveling between GB and Northern Ireland. There was debate about exactly the nature of the checks, whether you could house how invasive they would be how you could find ways of reducing them. And this is why the implementation was delegated to a joint working group to be to be worked out. A huge opportunity was lost when the protocol was agreed just after 2020. If we had engaged the UK and the EU at that point. In my view, we could, as Katie said, have figured out talking to the local communities talking to businesses. We could have found a way of addressing what we're going to be very real problems. Don't get me wrong. People in Northern Ireland are not wrong to say there are issues with the protocol. And I first heard that this solution, which was that Northern Ireland remains intimately part of the single market for goods and the UK single market. I said as a trade me goes. I've never seen this is a creature I've ever seen before. It doesn't exist anywhere in the world. So, creativity and innovation was going to be necessary to make this work, but it could be made work. And I think it was almost immediately withdrew from the process and declined to engage because clearly they were having second thoughts about the whole business and seen from an EU point of view. They have been guilty of bad faith consistently since then, starting with the internal market bill, which began to sort of unravel the protocol, and then with the utterly, frankly, you know, utterly illegal and outrageous. The Northern Ireland protocol bill, which is a complete negation of the deal which the UK signed and ratified and applauded with the EU. So seen from the point of view of the 27 member states and I even take take Ireland out and I just hit 26 member states. The UK has acted consistently in bad faith throughout this entire process. That's part of the problem because now we want to try and solve it and we have to solve it. There's a lot of distrust in the system. At the same time, enormous damage was done to the fabric of the Good Friday agreement, because we started messing with these debates about consent and and association. And here, from the EU perspective, they would have negotiated with anyone they would have been perfectly happy if representatives of the Northern Ireland executive had been or or MLA's or whatever were present in the room they would have had no problem. It's but it's up to the British government to decide who was brought into the process and they consistently said this is Westminster business not storming business. That's the answer. And that's why it was negotiated and I agree, we have to remedy that. It was done without really real engagement with the people who ultimately were going to be most affected by this. How do we now fix this. Well, and of course, sorry, a final point. Then we had the contamination of the good Friday group, the ultimate contamination when the DUP decided to use their entitlement to refuse to join the executive in order to demonstrate their, their opposition. As Andrew pointed out, we just need to note and try to avoid making cheap points. It has to be said that in the beginning the DUP sort of said we think we can work with this and actually applauded the whole deal and said it was a great deal then encouraged I think by the British government again an act of bad faith. They just they progressively hyped up their opposition and and and you know have now reached a point where they're saying it has to be scrapped. And this, I mean, just to be clear, Sinn Fein withdrew from the executive for three years. So I mean, you know, it's, it's not a tactic that the DUP invented. Like one can have criticism about it, because ultimately where does it lead you but I mean we have to acknowledge that this is, you know, as Katie said this is part of the process and and it demonstrates that there is a, there's an issue in Northern Ireland that has to be addressed. In my view, a deal is possible between the UK and the EU. I see straws in the wind that such a deal might happen. I honestly don't know I'm not privy to any of the, the, the, the talks that are going on there are cautiously optimistic because the deal is fairly easy to write any of us deal with trade issues we could write in an afternoon. But it will and it will basically involve the EU proposals from October of last year, considerably reducing the checks. We can certainly have some kind of express lane not necessarily a green or red lane we can call it green or red if that makes everybody happy. So as, as Andrew says of goods destined how do you guarantee, you know, truckloads of stuff coming to a supermarket from Tesco or Marksons box. Yes, there are things that can be done. And there are issues around the health and safety, the phytosanitary issues which the EU is extremely tough on, and by the way with justification that the history of British customs in this area, even as an EU member was never was not perfect. So there are real issues there, we could solve it with a veterinary agreement which for ideological reasons the UK is not prepared to do but okay we can still, in my view, make a lot of progress on those technical issues. We can iron out a lot of the problems that Northern Ireland business has identified, and the EU is already Marcus Sethkiewicz has been in Northern Ireland a lot of times spoke to people. The EU is in my view has ideas about how we can make this protocol work more smoothly, but it cannot be eliminated. Equally, on some of the more contentious issues like that, energy, state aides, and the most vexed issue I mean most facts, hardly the most important frankly but the most politically ideological of the Court of Justice, in my view, words can be found. Words can be found which soften some of the, some of the issues so we can, I could imagine without too much difficulty a protocol 2.0, which could be agreed. But it's going to be a long way short of the protocol bit. Now, I'm sure the British government can sell that to their own Parliament. How do they sell that to the TMP. And they're in in my view lies, the biggest problem, because they have walked the dup troops right up to the top of the hill, and they're going to have to talk them down again and honestly this is not easy. And that's why I just have to come to my final, my final. And I'm just about to finish. Which is, we have to listen to the voices of unionism and loyalism in modern Ireland. I was at the British and Irish Council, sorry, British Arts Association, not the Council. I think you were there Andrew Katie you were there. We heard several of the unionists say you're just not listening to us. You're just not listening to us. And I do understand their perspective I understand why they don't like the protocol. If I were a unionist I would be upset at this protocol. But, and so we have to but we have to find ways of talking to them of listening to them, and more generally, on the note of relations in this island. Collectively, we must not do to the unionists what they did what they did to the nationalists in 1922. If ever we're moving into I don't know whether moving towards a direct United Ireland or whatever whatever relationship we're going to have, we have to find ways of listening to and respecting the substantial body of opinion in Northern Ireland, which is sometimes contradictory which sometimes takes ridiculous positions but the fact is, they have their fears and they have their concerns and we have to find ways of bringing them into this discussion, rebuilding the good Friday agreement. I'm not saying renegotiate I'm not an expert on it but finding ways of making that work better. But firstly we have to try and solve this protocol problem because frankly and this is my absolute last point, we have bigger issues between UK and EU, which require us to take this particular piece of poison out of the equation and then we're going to look at these issues between the UK and the EU in the years to come because given all that's going on in Europe at the moment. In the grand scheme of things, we cannot let this issue poison the broader relations. I think that was slightly more than one minute. Okay, thank you very much David and I would like to come back to you for maybe five minutes. There's a wonderful moment in Tinker Taylor soldier spy, where smiley is trying to identify them all. Toby Esther has his, I'm sure he's sold or isn't it in the name somewhere and that's been a plot, but he's an art dealer. I smiley says to him, you ever buy a fake. Toby says, well, so if you. The question is, who's, who is fully in this context. You could argue that DUP bought fake, or you could argue, actually, in a triple 19 that the EU bought a fake. That's cool, because actually pinning down what the UK government actually means and what it's trying to do is, that's, that's the, the stage of the plot I'm at in this unfolding spy thriller. But seriously, so just to characterize the points based on the fact that the hard border issue did emerge very quickly, and it actually was in a seven seven Twitter week or two ago. The letter that Arlene Foster and Martin McGinnis signed in July of 2016. So that was a moment of triumph for someone who said I you see, even the DUP recognized that the hard border issue was a big problem. True. But important point of context that that is that at that time. The UK was going to leave the single markets and therefore we didn't know the scale of problem and therefore the hard border on the on the island issue which is very very real and I agree with the word impossible that they were used. It had done several laps of the course before the fact that there would be an issue about the sea border even merged. That's, that's the part of the, the dynamic of the thing and that that makes the two. I'm going to make some, some derogatory comments about both governments. No, so UK government. Two words are denial and carelessness. So, failing to accept the consequences of Brexit and the fact is Katie said that there are the brexit means means borders. I said, we're going to take back control of our borders was a bit of a clue. But the actual, even today, that's not worked out for the UK as a whole. The Irish, Irish government was at the other extreme. But even before the referendum, part of my job is to travel. And if I visited an Irish concert anywhere, the first question was, are you ready? Have you thought through the implications of Brexit. So the, the, indeed, I think it's been commented by my good friend Rory Montgomery, that actually the Irish arguments were so well marshaled and so well developed. It arguably overachieved. We got at the autumn of 2017, leading to the joint report, on which we were another time. And maybe even in 2019, in the world conversation, was that too successful. Now, sorry, how can, how can you criticize. How can you criticize them for looking after their own interests. And they did, and they did it very, very effectively, and with some very, very strong and determined arguments, but there's been an imbalance, an imbalance of understanding, and therefore, something missing in the unit, unionist engagement, unionist involvement, especially when you have contradictory stories being told by Prime Minister, indeed, I would put Michael Gove also saying things that suited at a time in a context, which then turned out actually do not stand up. So, those are just reflections back as to think the things that came to mind as Katie and David were talking. So, I look forward to the, with the new more, when actually things come through but that's what we have to all apply our thoughts and minds to is how to work out a credible fact based way forward. That moves from bakery for denial from over anxiety and over achievement into constructive resolution. Great. Thank you very much, Andrew, and thank you to a wonderful panel for now going to have a Q&A session. So please set your thinking paths on you and think of some questions to our panelists will also some coming in from the online audience as well. I'm going to abuse my position as chair and ask each of you a question to begin with, please be as brief as you can, in your responses, we can get through everybody in the room. I want to pick up on your last point Andrew about the Irish government. How far do you think that the Irish government pushed strong to a good Friday agreement, North side relations to the detriment of what's not being reframed as East West relations, the current discourse over the agreement. Well, they pushed it very hard and very well. I don't think deliberately to the document against Rory who said that the assumption was that the UK would make the arguments they needed to make to bounce off so there's an assumption of, you know, a working dialectic as it were. It didn't happen. So my good memory of the autumn of 2017 was, I wasn't an executive honest at the time saying to the colleagues who are working on the so called North side mapping exercise was this all about what was happening. It became clear when the draft text appeared. It was all demonstrating the significance of EU membership for North side relations and that's still reflected in the protocol. Part of the protocol is there to protect North side cooperation, which of course is at the very, very hard to do Friday agreement. The constitutional change was conditional on the creation of the North side institutions that trade was constitution for institutions. That's the journey of the 1990s. So it was genuinely very important. It was a slow recognition that the East West trade issue would be difficult. Even in 2019, if you read the tone of what the Prime Minister sent to President Junker, that's selling something that appears to be sellable. The assumption was this would work. So that's my interpretation. I don't go with those who say they were always deliberately consciously doing the wrong thing. My reading is that is that they signed up to the protocol on the basis that if this works, then fine, good, and if it doesn't well, we'll just start again. Great. Thank you. Katie, really enjoyed your contribution as well. And maybe you might expand on us the sort of hint that you gave us saying that UK government wants a new key EU agreement to help the CMI come as a northbound protocol bill. When the mentally you thought that was not realizable. I was wondering if you might expand a little bit more on that for us. Thanks, Steve. And just before I do, if I could just follow up just what Andrew was saying, so that argument about the yourself versus East West, I mean a lot of that context if we recall, was around trying to encourage the UK towards a soft Brexit. Right. And so an awful lot of the consequences of the protocol obviously is around as it's already been alluded to the hard Brexit. And I'm certainly excited about I think, and yes so the protocol bill. So essentially, and excluding provisions of the Northern Ireland protocol to effectively minimize the checks controls in the Irish seaboard and be able to say that have taken away the Irish seaboard. Including the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. And at the same time as protecting article two of the protocol in relation to non diminution of rights and such things as a single electricity market. And so, the reason I'm saying it's a sort of have your paper needs it is because all of these things go together also the state aid and the etc. And it's essentially trying to imagine that the EU will allow enable the UK government to rework its single market. And so we had a lot of this in the whole Brexit process of course, and about which bits you can take and leave of EU membership. For example the original position being about minimizing or stopping your immigration but still being able to have free movement. So that's happening a lot. I think fundamentally though, and even UK officials. I'm not sure whether they'd say this publicly, but obviously recognizing even for green and red channels to operate, you will need to have some checks and controls, most particularly you'll need to have border control posts in place to be able to operate the red channel in the first instance and also to have intelligence and lead or risk based checks on green channel movements. So that's a that's a key point that has never been addressed. So there's something fundamental around if we're getting to that point of fact based discussion to say actually any working up even this dream of the protocol bill operating will study to have these things in place you'll study how border control person. And so, I think, as long as the discussion of the bill. And I know there's been intense discussion of it, but as long as the presentation of it is still to emphasize this idea that the dp seven points will be met in some ways. And although they've been very broadly interpreted and dangerous to the dp seven points. Yes, the tests, the tests. Yeah. And which are very ambitious. And I think what we're long missing is, as I say, sort of a reality check on what's possible, most particularly given the consequences of the protocol bill, specifically in relation to the bill for the justice fee. Thank you. And David, drawing on your former experience of working in trade, I want to ask a depth of depth like question. And you really made clear about how important it was to ensure that foods are properly placed and controlled as a crossover to Northern Ireland. But I want to talk about the flip side of where that border might be somewhere like Albania, for example, is it you as vigorous and all of its borders that is currently trying to be in Northern Ireland. Yes, actually, I mean, I mean, I'm probably with, you know, with flaws with with with issues, but the EU is in a customs control is one area where the EU is pretty vigorous and sets high standards. And that is not an area where people are prepared to compromise. And you need to understand this is not the commission. It's not bureaucrats in Brussels, it's the member states who are absolutely determined that they will not allow a situation where there is a gaping hole in our customs and checks. And it's all very well to say, oh trade north south is miniscule trade, you know, GB to to know around his, of course it's miniscule at the moment. The minute smugglers and organized crime discover that there is a loophole, I can assure you the issues will be of an industrial scale. Because it's not just about the current trade, it's about how that trade could develop if it's not properly controlled and monitored. And that is why that the big issue, which has been a debate is about access to real time data, which was an integral part which would give the EU customs officials access to real time data, so that you would know exactly what was getting on a ferry in Scotland or in England, and moving to Northern Ireland you'd have several hours in which time you could check. You know these products where they're coming from what do we know other risks. We've suddenly seen a massive increase in this kind of trade that offers opportunities and that has been something which the UK government has denied to the EU officials for the last two years. I gather it's on the verge of a breakthrough and that is a game changer in terms of how the checks which are required, but to answer your question. Yes, we, I'm not saying there are not weaknesses, you have to be found elsewhere in the system. But we invest heavily in not only about customs controls, but also in verifying customs control. Yeah, thank you. Thank you David. Okay, right and I like to open up to the floor. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. And leadership and it's important that one figure in particular in the politics of this country is associated with such a huge willful press situation, and will the departure of Johnson may be a difference to expectations. Well, that depends. Yes, there's this book, but the proof of putting will be in whether whether the current minister and government face up to the implications of what they've agreed and work out working the basis of what is actually possible. I think it all reminds ideology and we preordained positions. To be to be proven. Shouldn't have too long to wait. You yourself. Thanks. And it's been a two-volume effort on our FVF, and then it will be around the instant date. On FVF, David and I did a big date sharing agreement which is supposed to be possible now on the side of your own screen now. What's been looked at that data sharing arrangement if it was agreed, allow the commission to take a risk, take more risk approach, and then it will be a two-volume type of thing and by the client and the partnership in such a bit, going in mind the branch of the data. An all-easy day question. And into the David case, I'm sure that we'll soon after sell that to his party. I agree to the frost, chuck that in late in July, come on David, never listen to your friends, that was all that content. But nonetheless, I have two questions on that. One, I don't really think that the ECJ, the strong enough that they could get the quality ECJ pill forward words that David mentioned. And is it correct what we're always told in Marielle England people like me that the ECJ don't really care about the ECJ correctly? Is that correct? Thank you. If you'd like to answer once. Maybe I'll just take on the risk-based approach. Yes, the access to real-time data reduces the checks which could be necessary. It doesn't eliminate them, but it reduces them, because it enables you to have a more surgical picture of the trade on an hourly basis, which enables you better to identify anomalies and risks. It doesn't eliminate on the health and safety side, there will still have to be checks. But the objective is you can reduce them considerably and make them I would say generally palatable and relatively inattrusive to people in all and up to everyday business and so on. I didn't say by definition I suppose if Sunak signs an agreement he thinks he can sell it. That's what I meant. I'm not saying what he thinks he can and cannot do. I'm simply saying if there is a deal between the EU and the UK that the person who signs that deal and then the Prime Minister slides off on that deal the Prime Minister feels he can bring with him his party. My point is I think he has a much more difficult challenge with selling it to the DUP who have taken an even more radical view of what has to be done with the protocol for it to be acceptable to them. But whether the Prime Minister feels he is in a position under ECJ to accept the form of words which emphasises the fact that at the end of the day the ECJ will play a role only in defining issues of interpretation of the law which is a bit kind of the formula we found in Switzerland. In my view that's only a slight variant of what's in the protocol probably acceptable to the EU side but I think something could be done there. Is that enough for the British Prime Minister? I don't know. But if he signs a deal I assume he thinks he can. Thank you. Eugenio, I think you have a question. Eugenio Diazini, University of Cambridge I have been following the interest of each of the panellists and me. I said we seem to be much of a way of everything is based on the assumption that all the parties involved want to find a solution. But it seems to me that we should consider also the Doomsday scenario. The UK has played over again and we asked the EU to be called then a card which was played on the sanction. That the only people entitled to exercise sovereignty were they. It's for the year 1912 and for the year 1920 and timing again since. What happens if you do it again? That's a serious risk but the contrary example is 1998 when the British leadership entered into an agreement and what they secured was agreement on the union. This was something that was very, very strong and very powerful from the EU's point of view. Part of the objective going forward was to replace the Andrew Arsh agreement. The risk now is that by the tactical position there and now that takes you back and the choice maker of them is to have the union on their terms and they would probably say what does the matter of us think about the union? It's our birthright. I was raised in that mindset and my grandfather signed the covenant in 1912 as opposed to the different scenario where the union is based on an agreement that they conceded with the enormous point that was actually at the heart of the Andrew Arsh agreement which was a doubling role in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland on a new basis on an agreed basis and so that the choice for unionism is between going forward on the basis of that approach is consensual and potentially enduring as opposed to then retreating into it's our way only so that's why leadership does matter it's actually another choice to be made I'm old enough to remember Chancellor Neal's Ulster of the Crossroads speech in the 1960s so that's a choice for unions and that's why just to answer this question a wee bit and also Peter's in relation to the DUP I was trying to get the latest point and I can't so this is off memory but the issue of the protocol of the ECG has become increasingly important for people in Northern Ireland I think it's something like 36% or so they are concerned around it even though when you look at the intensity of that concern it's fairly low but essentially it's gone alongside this process of increasingly solid opposition to the protocol that covers more and more bases and in terms of whether then any deal that keeps the ECG role could be solved the deep I think this goes to a point which is around basically if we're having a UK EU agreement of any sort the question will be how will the UK government prepare strong unionism for what will be seen as a betrayal, another betrayal and I think that's partly because because the government has presented has used unionist opposition in quite cynical ways and quite dangerous ways over the past two years in relation to trying to see movement from the EU and I'm just saying as I've seen it and I think essentially the dangerous part of that is that it hasn't been listening to moderate unionists sort of lost that missed that chance and it's been listening to those who have expressed serious concerns and doubts about the Good Friday, Belfast agreement and so this process now if they want to get an agreement and sell it which I think they do they need to begin to genuinely listen to unionist concerns but be careful as to whom they give to whom they're giving soccer and that's the point too about the ERG so where is the solid ground on which the UK government is going to be making such an agreement and at some point at some point somebody will have to say why is it that we are taking these decisions because they are having consequences and that point of principle and absolutist principles and ideology is not a good basis for decision making and we are seeing the consequences the UK as a whole not just Northern Ireland the UK as a whole is seeing the consequences and I think if we're wanting in relation to all these huge issues that the UK is facing that Europe is facing at some point the UK government will have to be courageous enough perhaps to do some evidence based decision making when it comes to that UK-EA relationship even at the risk of staring down the ERG and indeed the hard line is in the DUP thank you Katie and it should be mentioned in case you don't know Katie is running this very large ESRC funded project and you're getting your data from opinion polls through I think you want to say a bit about that yes that's a project that my colleague David Finnell posted by the government and the surveys being done that's a lucid poll okay great because we have so many questions I'm going to double up we have Chris Figerton followed by Tony Watts again please try and keep your questions as brief as possible we are running out of time I encourage the panellists to answer as briefly as they can as well so Chris and then Tony thank you thank you very much I had a question from the work by David by the third speaker a retrospective look at this post 2016 negotiations and at one point you mentioned Theresa May's checkers on the my question to you had she been able to sell that to the party would it have also been something that would be a basis for negotiations with the European Union would it have been realistic to negotiate with the EU I didn't mention the checkers which was a contractual deal which was negotiated with the EU which was the backstop which was that the if it were not possible to eliminate the need for a border somewhere in Ireland through the future trade negotiations that the fallback would be the UK would remain within the custom union and that deal was by the way accepted by the EU with great reluctance by a large number of member states who thought the UK was treated too generously with it but they swallowed it and it was agreed it was part of the package but it was then rejected by the House of Commons and Boris Johnson came along with the protocol okay so we'll try that double up thing again we'll start with Tony and then Tony if you ask the question then please Captain Barnard would you ask the second question please thank you Tony Andrew mentioned the trade reminder where the deal came from initial ideas to ejection what was surprising was not that it was ejection it was difficult to avoid a deal under which the government got Brexit done and the deal was you know since Boris Johnson made sure it not helps you doesn't have an agreement and if not what's explaining initial ideas Tony thank you for your observations a simple resolution about the Court of Justice I just wonder from a legal perspective whether you're optimistic because after 12.04 of the Bill Barnard protocol makes clear it's not just about interpretation but it's a whole intermediary by the Commission for the Court of Justice and what the organising it seems to me would require an amendment to act with both of them sorry please I don't know can I comment on this question maybe it was but I've also some reason to believe that they thought they could live with it and make it work and there were pencil upsides these are mentioned in well known speeches by DUP commentators at the time so I can't say into that all the way I think it's very important to recognise the risk and therefore it's part of why the current situation is so bedibbled by distrust and re-establishing trust is absolutely fundamental point the further thing was relevant here thanks to the discussion on the jurisdiction of the Court the Government has set a very high bar protocol bill or both the same outcomes as Katie said that's not achievable and things that might have been acceptable practical solutions that might have been acceptable a year ago to the DUP are now way far below their expectations so actually I'll come back then to the airpoint maybe it's the Government that doesn't want to deal Do you want to comment on that Katie? Just very briefly I shouldn't forget the DUP was proposed to the protocol and the withdrawal agreement in 2019 so we had that unusual situation where all the parties from NI were opposing the protocol the withdrawal agreement voted in the House of Commons and so that was a sort of unusual collaboration at the time between all the parties and businesses it was kind of a unique moment because they didn't receive legislative consent either from the newly formed assembly what made the difference though when they began to move and to say in some famous points yes there could be benefits here for Northern Ireland partly I think they were listening to some business businesses but also I think they were being told things behind the scenes possibly about well this isn't as bad as it looks maybe we're basically not going to fully implement it as the EU expects and that's of course this is why it seems so difficult to follow because we're not sure what people are being told behind the scenes that makes such a difference then in the way that they respond publicly and the kind of leadership that they show and we know that this leadership is so important for people's views on our protocol because in relation to polling we know that people see political parties that they support as the most reliable sources of information on the protocol so it's been absolutely critical and so that behind the scenes stuff beyond scrutiny possibly not in line with some of the realities and the facts has actually been really problematic when it comes to implementing protocol and people's responses to it Dave do you want to tell us from the point of view? Yeah I mean the first here I speak and we have no one I'm speculating when you say mandate I mean this is very misleading there is no issue of a mandate what is on the table at the moment is the protocol has agreed the question is whether you can make an amendment to that or not as of now certainly the EU does not want to have an open-ended renegotiation of the protocol my sense is that if you can find solutions to many of the practical issues which don't involve implementing protocol as such which are about implementation there may be willingness and if that is agreed and there we go to Andrew's point about trust as being so this is a deal that you're going to stick to right because that's the question and I think there may be a willingness to introduce some nuances in the wording and make some amendments to one or two of the bits and pieces particularly relating to the ECJ and in my view it is beyond the width of man to imagine some weasel wording of that which will not give the British government everything it wants which may make it slightly more acceptable and I want to be very clear that this will be largely cosmetic because the only outcome which is possible is basically the implementation of the protocol pretty much as we know it perhaps with some changes to the language which are a gesture in the direction of some of the issues the British have raised there will not be a fundamental negotiation of the protocol absolutely not will that be enough for the British government I don't know it is all down to the question of whether they in the grand scheme of things believe a deal on this is important because of relations with Europe in general the war in Ukraine relations with the United States the economic situation here in the UK this comes together into a political judgment do you try and take this irritant out of the system and can you bring your party with you and can you eventually bring at least a majority of unionists if not all unionists with you that's a calculus only the British government can make great okay thank you David I'm going to invite Bari to ask some questions which have come in from our zoom audience Bari thanks me and I'm very very conscious of time and there are many brilliant questions from our audience thanks for being with us David is just draw on two of them and I'm going to put them to each of you and I think Niva is going to invite you to make your closing remarks you can choose to respond to them if you wish to come up and set a deference for our audience to join first I'm going to ask is from Karen Banks who's the formerly of the legal service of the EU Commission and just to summarise given the UK's consistent bad faith or pressure from the EU could the EU believe that adequate checks would be introduced in the case of any case of any kind secondly and this is a short question and I just want to ensure this we've all heard this before but it's coming more than once I'll put it to the panel how much of a risk is the current juncture to peace in Northern Ireland that's from a couple of people on the first one the protocol provides for supervision that itself was a controversial bit in the detailed negotiations on the application of the protocol so that's the guarantor or by the means of securing that is to have your own supervision so I think that's possible but it doesn't undermine the more fundamental point that we won't get to deal with some substantial restoration of trust Billy Davis can I ask No I mean there are ways in which the implementation and the oversight can be reduced it can't be eliminated it's a question of risk calculation and that depends on the guarantees which the British government puts on the table and the ability of the EU to monitor those and to verify so it's trust would verify and that's the balance which has to be found but the most important thing will be we're not going to come back in 12 months time and redo this we've been doing it for four years we got the protocol we now are told we have to amend the protocol so let's see if we can adjust things but people are going to wonder this has to be the end and that will be the key question I'm going to collect some questions from people in the room and then I'm going to ask the panel to each individually sum up for one minute you can either address those questions I'm going to give you a few reflections on the conversation and we'll bring it to a close so please briefly and Brian, please take the question in the formative level plan we've made three points yes of course the first of those is the protocol itself is a huge part of protecting the good value of the EU it's a lot of room and yet the good value of the EU has clearly been damaged since it's not working there are people now calling for a removal of community consent more dangerous suggestion but it's there no other panel I think has mentioned the point made brought up by the EU and I think I can explain more about the EU on the first call bit there's a conflict with the EU and when you have a comment do you think the older people the responsibility of the UK government is technically to fight the agreement more than the first call I've got these my second point is I don't really see if it's helpful to go over the history of having a body of a sad and convoluted history and the history of being what I explained I think but particularly now of course the exchange of what they were forced to explain the huge difficulties around the ban act in terms of the post-war constitution of the EU the British government now wants to redeem that reason more my final point if I may is it's unhelpful I think but very typical I think academic audience but always lay into the British government the EU to listen to the sort of four legs of the world is there what's the panel thing about the way we're able to mention it's like mutual enforcement whereby it would be made illegal through it or anything that we would do or what do they think about technical very quickly technical alternatives the sort of things outlined by the last policy was that to the European government's own expert that we would be made known because they didn't want to Great and that's great Guggen former special advisor to the former Northern Ireland First Minister Dina Trimble, North Trimble recently passed away and thank you Black James yourself sir please as quickly as possible is there any solution without a more realistic assessment about how limited protocol negotiations are going to be because the deal was you got the TCN you got the TCN you got the whole protocol and the one thing that can happen is there can either be a hard border nor can Ireland be taken out of the single market and that's the consequence of a green lane and not just great thank you we're going to leave it there so I'm going to ask each of the panellists to sum up for less than one minute if they can and then we're going to bring it to a close so I'm going to go in reverse order sorry we're not going to answer yes okay one minute Graham two points the Good Friday agreement is an international agreement written down international law the protocol is an international agreement both of them signed and ratified by the United Kingdom if you tell me they're in contradiction the responsibility lies with the British Government nobody else and I do not know how you can ask the EU to solve that problem secondly on the question of alternative arrangements this was exhaustively exampled and there is no working model anywhere in the world where those alternative technological solutions mutual enforcement nobody does it anywhere in the world not between the U.S. and Canada anywhere you find they don't work they have been shown not to work and our member states and I'm going to do the bureaucracy in Brussels our member states will not sign up to anything of that kind because it will not work it does not provide the necessary guarantees for the integrity of the single market and that's an approving fact sorry Katie please briefly I speak a lot in Europe as well I speak bearing in mind the audience so when I'm speaking in the EU for example to EU member states I'm very critical of the EU as well and so just to sort of make that point and I sat alongside Lars Carlson in the European Parliament I wrote a report with David Finnemore that was commissioned by the same committee and I'm not called a European Parliament advisor on that basis my report had the same status as Lars's and I know Lars very well now we interact we work from Board of Management stuff but I think the fundamental point is if technological solutions were the answer and the UK Government really believed that they would have been fully implemented in relation to the Irish sea so the fundamental issue is you need a legal decision as to where the border lies and how it's going to operate and it's that ambiguity that remains obviously the issue at stake here is the question is the DEP really the problem I think ultimately if we're being honest it's not really seen as the problem for the UK Government and I think it's been it wasn't seen as a problem when Johnson signed the protocol originally it was sort of sidelined on that then it became a problem that the UK Government has pointed to a lot and I think we're conscious it might not be seen as a problem anymore but it remains it's concerns remain our concerns in Northern Ireland and therefore a concern for anybody who's concerned about the agreement and then just to conclude on a slightly different note I'm going to disagree with David isn't that great no not really fundamentally but I think we're wrong if we think we'd be unwise to think in terms of having a single package that tries to do everything so I'm not really disagreeing with you having a slight different take on it all in which I think basically possibly a better way of doing it would not be to wait for the nothing agreed or everything agreed approach but to have agreements as they arise so agreements in relation to the data sharing agreement in relation to tariff rate croters in that way you can have proper implementation periods for whatever is agreed on technical matters and you can also build up the trust necessary for them further movement hopefully in relation to ECGA because it's extremely difficult and that relates to this whole point about the fact that this withdrawal agreement is through the protocol is in relation to that ongoing relationship between the UK and the EU sorry yeah and so just fake deadlines actually just makes us good agreements ultimately perfect and Andrew so in good faith a lot of the ideas that we're going to talk about were tried and discussed in the course of negotiations between 2017-2018 and the result of that long process was to come first to the backstop and then to the protocol as it is and the question that remains is what is the realistic alternative I beg Shankar for forgiveness for quoting him in his evidence to Parliamentary committees saying that there was no solution to alternative arrangements to the SPS issue because my characterisation is that you can't stop a pathogen with a camera and that's why DG Sante or the Bennoir are so stringent someone's looking after my health and one thing would be rigorous and the idea that the Ben Act and all that meant that the new alternative is completely rather dovish the agreement in December 2020 is informed by the year of detailed negotiation and Michael Gove told Parliament it was okay the grace periods are fine and actually in six months time we can have the enforcement of the rules on sausages read the hands out of the December announcement that shows a year after they have a majority a year after the Ben Act was irrelevant they said the protocol okay by the point what's the alternative the good Friday agreement did not foresee these issues so it doesn't I wrote about this extensively you have to go back more to how we got there and hence process of agreement rather than saying it means this it means that that's become part of the problem okay great thank you very much this concludes our first face to face meeting for the future of the Island of Ireland series I hope you've enjoyed it please do follow us and share and spread the word about us but if you can all in our usual fashion thank the panellists for being here