 Well, he's been a bit of a back-and-forth on issues related to China, so I don't think he's taken it to much of a new level as much as a sort of more confused level. You know, as candidate Trump, as president-elect Trump, he had some very, very strong and quite controversial things to say about China, including, for example, slapping a 45 percent tariff on Chinese imports, declaring China a currency manipulator, which would trigger a number of economic punishments, and maybe most controversially, speaking with the president of Taiwan by telephone in December. All of this threw into real question what sort of U.S.-China relationship there might be, even so far as to question the validity of the long-standing one China policy. But upon entering office, all of this has been walked back quite remarkably, even to the extent of the president inviting, very early on in his time in office, the Chinese president to spend 24 hours with with the president Trump at the Mar-a-Lago estate, and coming out of that summit, you know, relatively positive feelings, it seems, about the future for U.S.-China relations. So we're still too early to know which direction this president may ultimately take the relationship, even though it's currently in a relatively positive place. So President Xi Jinping traveled to the Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida, the private sort of club of President Trump, the so-called Southern White House. Spent about 24 hours there, and this meeting was long on ceremony and short on substance. It was really a sort of get-to- know-you type of affair. The two presidents apparently did spend considerable amount of time speaking with one another, something like five or six hours worth of conversation. We don't know a lot with much precision about what was discussed, but the early reporting coming out of it suggests that the trade deficit that the United States has with China, as well as the challenge of North Korea, were probably the two biggest things discussed, and subsequent tweets by the president and some public statements since the summit suggest that he's looking to link those two issues in the U.S.-China relationship, that apparently he may be prepared to be less punitive with China on the trade question if he believes that China is doing what he thinks it should to bring greater pressure to bear on North Korea. So at the moment, those seem to be the two biggest issues that might have some near-term results coming out of the summit. Well, I think there's a mixed feeling, I would say, amongst allies in the region with regard to President Trump's approach towards China. A part of that is simply the unpredictability, the volatility, the flip-flopping that's taken place over just the last three to four months with regard to China. I think allied capitals have good reason to be concerned that they just don't know. We cannot be sure which direction President Trump is going to be taking the relationship over the next three to four months, and especially if a real crisis were to erupt, for example, on the Korean Peninsula. Now a little bit less strategically, though, I think some of the allied capitals are worried that the president might strike some sort of a deal over their heads, and I think that's a particular concern to countries like Japan or South Korea that President Trump will come to some sort of understanding with China, or more dramatically, might launch some sort of attack towards North Korea on the understanding that the Chinese would not overreact. But of course that would be extremely dangerous for Seoul and probably for Tokyo. With regard to Australia, I think obviously the early days of the Trump administration have not been all that pleasant, especially because of the now notorious telephone call between the Prime Minister and the president. With regard to China policy, I think there must be some worries in Canberra that if and as the president does take a more combative approach toward China, if he does choose to live up to some of the threats he made on the economic front, or even with regard to South China Sea, that Australia might be drawn into that sort of maelstrom, which wouldn't be good at all for Canberra who wants to have a more balanced relationship between these two great powers. Well, we don't know yet, but I think probably we can be relatively assured that the two sides are going to continue along the pathway of their current understandings and not let that issue set devolve into something more confrontational. Why is that? Well, first of all, China has pretty much created facts on the ground in terms of rebuilding the islands there and militarizing them that are going to be very, very difficult for anyone, including the United States, to change or dislodge. And to do so, if the United States chose to do, would probably mean war. And I don't think that that's something Washington is really prepared to do. Washington's interest is to be able to continue to assure freedom of navigation both commercial and, obviously, importantly, military-related shipping in accordance with international law. Now, that's an issue that China, I think, is unlikely to try and push back hard on. They will complain. They will, you know, deploy military assets if they think they need to to try and deter or try and keep American intelligence operations from getting too close or following developments too sharply. But I don't think they would do so in a way that would lead to a conflict between the two. There's always the potential of an inadvertent clash of some kind. But the two governments actually have protocols in place to try and avoid precisely that problem. So I think in the near to medium term, South China Sea, at least as it affects US-China relations, is unlikely to devolve into anything looking like a conflict.