 We now have time for direct questions from the audience, so gentlemen there. I have a couple of questions in clarification mostly, but I thought it very interesting. You're probably familiar with the recent research on Syria linking drought urbanization and the crisis that evolved there, and I would ask you to maybe comment on your findings in relation to that argument, which would suggest in your last point, you pointed out that people are reducing their exposure to drought, but it could be also that they are escaping drought, which is the argument that has been put forward for explaining conflict in Syria. And as a result of escaping drought, they end up in urban centers and end up in open conflict with people that they normally wouldn't be exposed to. So I would hazard a guess to use maybe a badly phrased word. The idea here being that there is both a cause and consequence in conflict as a mediating factor. You've never really given us a model here to suggest that perhaps the movement of peoples is partly explained by ultimately your hazard risks which are drought and flood in conflict is the result of that. Whereas you've portrayed it more or less as an independent cause, and I would suggest that it is impacted by those other more structural factors that are sometimes beyond the control of leaders or individuals, sometimes not, for example, drought can be politically designed, whereas flooding may not be. The other basic question I had is in regard to your flooding, why you chose to operationalize it in such a kind of an interesting way, 100-year floods, why not look at trend lines over a short period of time or do you just not get enough variance on that? Because it strikes me that you're just not going to get the same kind of trend line if you're looking at that 100-year average for risk exposure for flooding instead of looking at the incidences of floods on an annual basis. Maybe as you pointed out, there just wasn't enough trend for you to draw some conclusions from, but nevertheless, I mean, everything else you've told us in terms of operationalizing your risk factors are based on trend lines and all of a sudden you throw at us a one-year or 100-year average for floods or maybe I've misunderstood that. You're coming about conflict being the consequence of drought or floods and people moving out of the countryside into cities. I definitely agree. I've seen a lot of studies on the effect of drought on the incidence of conflict and also on urbanization and conflict. There's a big correlation there. This paper should be seen just from the perspective of an individual if you're born somewhere and everything is out of your control. What are the risk factors that you're exposed to on a day-to-day basis? That was more of a comment to that. In terms of the flood data that I'm talking about, I don't know. This is a hazard map that has been developed by the UN and it takes into account different things. It takes into account discharge models for rivers and to see which areas would be affected if there's too much water in the rivers, but it also takes into account this database on floods that has actually taken place observed floods in this period from the Dartmouth flood observatory. I guess what you should see each of those colors on the pixels as is the risk that there will be a flood next year, basically. I hope this answers the question. Yeah, that's a constant. For some of the risk factors, we have this constant hazard map that we are then looking at population movements in relation to and for others we look at how they change over time. A lot of this seems to be driven by population growth. Just more people being exposed to hazards. Unless you can say something about the trend line regarding the increasing incidences of hazards, I would say just more people are being exposed because there's more people in Africa. How would you rebut that? No, I don't want to do that. I think you're absolutely right that the reason why we see such a large increase in the number of people being exposed to these hazards is because of population growth, obviously. If you look at the shares, how the shares change over time, we see that the share of population exposed to drought is not increasing so much, whereas the share of people exposed to flood is increasing a lot. This I conclude is because people are moving into cities closer to rivers where they are exposed to flood risk, away from the rural areas where there's a large risk of drought. Have you compared your results to actual data on mortality of people who have suffered from these hazards during these same years? Well, for the drought data, which was something that we developed more or less ourselves or at least calculated the index ourselves, what I've done is I've checked this up against other data sources. The problem is that we need data sources that cover the whole continent and that are measured in a consistent way across countries, right? So it's very hard to find something that you can actually validate the data on. But what we did is we correlated this index that we constructed ourselves with self-reported droughts at the district level, so at the subnational level. Every time somebody has reported drought to an international database, we found that at least using our data, we could get a lot higher R-square or explanatory power than if we used some different alternative measures that were based on weather stations and sort of compiled from different sources. What mortality and malaria mortality have been going up or down? I have no idea actually. Sorry. Yes, is there a source I could go to to sort of look up disasters who defines the disasters and find the data on disasters? There seems to be a rather abstract quantity. The other thing is about using river floods. The floods I've been experiencing myself are floods in urban areas because there's a sudden heavy rainfall and sewers back up and the water becomes contaminated and things like that, not directly related to rivers. So are you, you've got a way of looking at this type of flooding? Firstly, for the question about the sources for this type of data, if you're interested in disasters as such, which is events that combine the hazard with the exposure and the vulnerability, then there is this EM, that EM, that which is hosted by University in Belgium, that contains information about most large disaster events in the world. But this is something, as I showed in the first slide, that I'm a little bit critical towards because there tends to be more complete reporting over time in this database. So what I'd suggest is try to find the data on the hazards and then, I mean, depends on what kind of analysis you want to make basically. But in economic analysis, I think it's better to use hazard data in itself and there are a lot of sources on, for instance, if you look at drought, then the sources of rainfall data. If you look at floods, then I think I can recommend this river flood database, although it's not fantastic. And this leads me back to your next question. So I guess what we suffer from here is we try to say something general about the whole continent and we need some very large databases to do this and we need them to be measured in a consistent way across countries. So this leaves out a lot of detail. And probably the figure that I'm most worried about here is the flood figure because as you also say, it doesn't take into account these kind of floods that are caused by rainfall. So I would say probably a lot more people are exposed to flood than what you see here. But the interesting thing is perhaps more the trend that more people are being exposed to this particular type of flood over time. Okay, for another question here. Okay, thank you very much for a very interesting presentation. I just have a quick one. Your table four, you looked at the correlation between living in an urban environment and exposure to hazards and you reported some correlation coefficients. I'm just wondering whether you had any test of statistical test of significance because you seem to draw conclusions based on the signs that you obtained but some of the figures may not actually be statistically significant. So I'm just wondering whether you tested that or not. Thank you. Okay, so this table only shows the correlation coefficients. This is a simple correlation matrix. But as you might imagine, since we have 29 million observations in this database all of them are highly significant. But I'm not sure. That's why I don't think it's so meaningful to report this. Simply because of the number of observations, even a tiny signal will shine through and we should probably think more about how each of the elements are measured instead of looking at the significance level, I think. Okay, one more question. Thank you, Peter, for the presentation. I think probably, as I'm called Madina from Uganda, given that I work for a policy think tank, I would like to see more policy messages coming out of this information other than being a bit on our academic side. But I think for more informativeness for this work would be if you pick out some bit of like job apps for case studies within the sub-Saharan component, given that the risk management aspects within these economies actually driving some of the results you're getting. You find that the risk management aspects within South Africa is different from Uganda, which I just basically may be on paper. And you find or camouflage some of the information you're getting in terms of not being affected by malaria in urban areas. But you find that because South Africa has better risk management for these hazards, probably that's why in urban areas you're getting better results. And the integrated urban planning maps, which actually help in managing risk, can kind of derail or foster some of the results you're getting. So if you pick out within your analysis a couple of country job maps which can actually show you that differences within heterogeneity within these economies is critical to risk management. Yes. Okay, thank you for your comment. In terms of risk management and of course policy conclusions, there's a little bit of difference between which of these hazards we look at and what conclusions you can draw. You're absolutely right in terms of the risk of malaria of being exposed to malaria. There's a huge difference between countries and areas depending on what kind of interventions have been made. In fact, those who wrote this paper on the malaria data, they guessed that a large share of this reduction in malaria has been taken place because of interventions such as insecticide-treated nets that have been dealt out in some places but of course not in all places. So in this case, the risk of exposure to malaria is somehow confounded with what I warned against in the first slide that you also look at vulnerability when you're actually saying you're looking at a hazard. So I'm also susceptible to this error myself. Whereas the risk of floods and drought in this study should be unaffected by policy decisions or risk management in this study, whereas in reality, if you go to the ground, there will be a big difference between the risk of floods in a well-developed place that have strategies for where to build buildings and in a place where there are no strategies for how to and where to build. So this is something that is not taken into account in that case, whereas it is taken into account in the malaria case, which might in turn confound the results a little bit. So yeah, thanks for that. Okay, thank you. Let's move forward. I'll give the floor to Henry Konsen. Questions? Chris Kyle, local participant from Finland, have the results of your analysis actually been used by the Vietnamese government to any extent? No, it has not. No, and that's partly because they probably don't know it because it's an academic paper that we've been writing and academic papers have to be accepted and it's still unpublished. It was... My co-author and I have both been working for a government organization in Vietnam so they know of these results and it may be used in ways we don't know but they do know about it. A very interesting study, but I would be curious to know how this stacks up against states that are more vulnerable. Vietnam arguably is a fairly resilient country so you're kind of preaching to the converted, if you will, a country that has shown its ability to recover from war, for example, rather quickly and chart its own course. What are the implications for countries that are not coping as well? The more fragile states, a small island developing states in particular, they're highly vulnerable to a variety of effects induced by climate change including hurricanes and so on. To give you an example, Haiti was brought up earlier as a country that didn't cope well in the face of an earthquake but in addition also a number of hurricanes have hit that country and they go about constructing buildings in a way that are resilient to earthquakes but not necessarily hurricanes and vice versa. You didn't tell us about the construction methods that were pursued after the hurricane in Vietnam in particular whether they altered their course or trajectory. Maybe you did, but did they pursue a different kind of building construction that would provide lessons for countries or more particularly inform the insurance sector as to what is the sort of investments they need to make and who they would work with in the construction industry to ensure that another hurricane which will inevitably come will not generate the same kind of impact. You also didn't tell us about fatalities. Were there any deaths from this and how much? Thank you very much. Yes, there were several questions. Yes, there were fatalities, not that many. I think it's eight or ten fatalities. And yes, Vietnam is prepared and they react. And as I said, the reason why Danbury was something special is because it changed course fairly late. So while we were following the trajectory from the Japanese submissive law to the Institute hitting actually as you see we were all expecting it to slow down considerably because this island is taking a lot of it. And then it followed. We were thinking that it would go slightly more south and be less severe. So that was the surprise part and the reason why because there was evacuation going on when it happened but just the wrong place at the time. The Vietnamese army move out quickly when they have this trajectory to evacuate people if it's serious. And that of course is what you're saying. The reason why we can do it here is because hurricanes or big storms are not that rare in Vietnam. So they know what to do. And also we know that we have data and they're coping with it. The earthquake in Haiti is in my view not a very good case for statistical analysis. What we're doing here is that we try to establish statistical measures and that means that we have to have something where we can use lots of large numbers in some sense. And when you have the very, very rare event or the truly outlying event, this method is not useful. So it can be used, I would say also in small island states where it's also not rare to have these hurricanes and we know that they're coping with it. And we also have household surveys or other kinds of data that are comparable over time. Then it's useful. But for the big event, I don't believe in statistics at all even though I do it. For the truly big events, we have to go there and we have to be on the ground and we have to look at it as an independent case or event and take it from there. Here because there is some form of repetition which is not completely random but we can randomize in some sense. We can assess the impact and it may be useful for the future and it may be useful for Vietnam to look at the costs. And I think that's where we can use it. We cannot use it in all cases for flooding events also in sub-Saharan Africa. And for states without data, weak states without household surveys of course is not useful at all. So yes, I'm preaching to the... Yeah. Okay. There are some more questions back there. Okay, thanks so much. Henrik, two quick questions. Did you have any data on savings and what happened to savings post-hurricane or typhoon? And then secondly, I was a little surprised that there wasn't an increase in food purchases following the event. And you said it could have been due to a substitution effect but I just wanted to kind of push you there because we know that food markets work pretty well in Vietnam so presumably it wasn't a supply effect. So was it just a question of lack of ability to purchase? You're pushing me into speculation. But that's fine. First of all, yes, since it's based on the household surveys we could actually look into savings. We do not because we haven't constructed. As you see, we have a very specific measure of income and we could of course look at the savings component also from the household surveys. But we didn't do that. But that is probably a good idea to do in addition to the loans of course. Second, no, I'm also convinced it's not a supply effect being so close to the Red River Delta. So my guess is it's actually that some of them were poor. But that's pure speculation. I don't know why they did not increase buying food. Thanks. Actually, mine was quite related to his previous comment because I was trying to compare the results you just reported and one of the results is you show a decline in yield although not statistically significant. And on the other result you say that there was an increase on self-produced food consumption. On the other hand, you say there is zero effect on the income, both sideline income and total income and you say that there was also a decline in purchased food consumption. And I was a little bit keen about the mechanism behind this kind of contradicting effect and I was thinking maybe saving could be playing a role something related to that. So I was actually about to follow up on that question that you look into other potential driving mechanism to this contradictory kind of effect. We haven't looked into these different mechanisms if you want. You can certainly have a decrease in patty production and an increase in self-consumption because you need not... I mean they consume other things than rice as such so what we think of is here that they actually consume their dead livestock. If the chicken were died because of the storm or mudslide or the rain that comes after this is what we see as increased consumption as such. It's true to the... They sell most of the rice. The self-consumption of rice in this area is not that big as such. So that would affect their income more than they will and then consumption via the income effects. That's true. Also unfortunately we don't have the prices but again based on the markets in Vietnam there are not that big price effects in this area on patty because it comes from elsewhere. But it's true. We were also surprised there's no significant loss. We were looking into whether or not they would increase labor supply and sideline income given this loss in their income from patty but that's not what we saw. Another question here. Thank you. I'm among the converted anyway. Because one of the issues I read about Vietnam is the way they use their army to mitigate these issues. The government really responds by use of the army into agriculture-related issues, into disaster management and probably that's why we find the aspect on disaster aid not really going to the Vietnamese themselves but the budget which is going to control the disaster management largely goes to the army to make sure they're coming to actually manage disasters. So probably on the aspect of the cost-benefit analysis we do that, if you give us that nice story of how government comes in to kind of mitigate these impacts that way the households actually do not really feel the aspect of employing more people to control some of these disaster management aspects. So that story really is good at that level for how maybe other governments can use their armies to come in to control the aspects on disaster and quantifying the natural risks. Thank you. The use of the army and military in disaster situations is something that we discuss with sociologists and topologists. They do not agree with us that it's a good idea. Turning a disaster into a military situation is not always good. But yes, it's true in Vietnam they're using the army for a lot of this. The aid component that we're looking for is that they have a special fund for transfer of money. So it's a social transfer that could be used which is always also for starvation and pre-harvest or pre-harvest starvation. So this is a very particular question in the survey questionnaire that we looked for. We have not, if you notice, when we say cost-benefit analysis it's truly only at the household level. We have no cost for the government as such. We try to compare what happens to households, private households. So this larger picture is not ready yet. We had to add a lot to that in terms of expenditures. All right, let's take one more. My name is Pekka Reinkan. I'm from the Finnish Red Cross. We're an organization dealing with the aftermath of different kinds of disasters. Lehmann's interpretation of what you said is probably that it pays off to prepare. I mean, one of the most interesting things to get out of the studies like yours, yours is actually whether preparedness, when you invest in preparing communities for events like this, actually pays off to the extent that investment into preparedness would be the wisest thing to do on earth when it comes to, especially, areas where you have frequent events like these. As a Lehmann, I agree with you. Interpreting, I think it would be pushing the results of this paper because we do not compare with and without preparation. So we will be pushing the results of our paper quite a lot. Maybe you can say something like Vietnam. Since Vietnam has experienced these storms a lot, farmers are used to it. They have this spread out of plots and they know what to do. They also know to move away in time, if possible. So that saves lives and possibly livelihood, I don't know. But it does not come out of our study. But yes, I agree in general terms that preparation is best, right? But I think Morten will talk much more about that. No, Morten may mention that in a second. Okay, anyway, good time to give the floor to Morten. So, comments, please. Thank you very much for the presentation. I mean, I have... I worked for the Africa Progess panel, which is a think tank based in Geneva, and it's chaired by Kofiana. And last year, we did a report basically trying to figure out what would be the position of Africa as they head out to COP 21 in Paris. And the whole narrative has changed. And now it's more about how do they mitigate? How do countries mitigate and adapt to increasing climate impact? I mean, it's clear that the risk have been accepted by all, but how do they now reduce or mitigate this risk? And now it boils down to finance. And then I had the opportunity to talk to some climate negotiators ahead of COP 21 and I mean, it was one of... I mean, the top most, I mean, of their priority was that there should be finance. And the finance, I mean, interestingly, governments have committed to supporting themselves through the INDCs, which was accepted in COP 21. But it's the issue of equity and fairness when it comes to climate finance. If you pollute more, you should pay more. And this is what the narrative should be about. I mean, we run the risk of having, I would say, a fatigue when it comes to the whole climate discussion. If countries suffering or bearing the brunt of increasing emissions from other countries, if they are not able to get the finance to help look our farmers mad at to changing weather patterns, then definitely the discussion will not go further. So for me, it's about having, I mean, this world-focus narrative about climate finance because there's one thing to promise and there's another thing to make sure that these promises are met. And the only promises that count are promises that are met. If they are not met, then those promises are definitely shouldn't even be made. So if you change, I mean, the whole narrative, and I also add one to, I mean, the whole challenges climate change brings. I mean, apart from migration, public health and food production, there is another rising, I mean, impact when it comes to energy. And now, I mean, most African countries, I mean, having energy challenges because you have water levels in dams reducing. And now, I mean, without energy, I mean, no economy can run, I mean, efficiently. So if you add energy to the whole discussion, that will also be quite important. And let me bring in one issue that cut across the whole presentation was the issue of if you're talking about risk and we are trying to reduce the risk when it comes to, I mean, weather extremes, then it has to start. The whole discussion has to start from the fact that how do they, I mean, how do countries become more proactive than reactive? I mean, I'm talking about we have, if you go to some, I mean, South African countries, maybe Ghana, for example, and when there's a flood or when the, I mean, pending flood, we have the major agencies having, not having the ability to predict even rainforest. So when it comes to this, I mean, it has to do, they are able, they should be able to predict these weather extremes. And then the next discussion will be, okay, this is, I mean, what is before us and then we can find the, I mean, a critical solution. So for me, it's about the weather data and how we can predict extreme weather situations and then how they own. I mean, now the issue is data ownership. Can data be owned by governments or by the private sector or must it be a PPP? If that comes to fall, I mean, definitely, you should have countries like Mali or Burkina Faso able to predict extreme weather events and then proactively, I mean, acting to solve these challenges. Thank you. Thank you very much. Very good observations. Thanks a lot. I don't really think I have anything to add apart from one thing. And that is, I think you're really touching on what is the main problem here. You remember when Clinton was out and running for presidency and we heard this, it's the economy stupid. Here is the financing that is going to be really, really difficult. Who is going to pay the bill in the end? And we have tried to look into that in the Paris Agreement, but there's a long way still to go and this is going to be extremely expensive. We all know that. And as you really also point out, some countries, basically the globe north, they have already benefitted from the emissions. So there's an equitieship should they who have benefitted then pay the ball for the party that they have had or is it the new common countries that also want to have as you point out energy emissions, that's emissions due to energy production. How do we handle that? And I, yeah, that's going to be probably where things are going to honestly stumble. Right. Other comments, questions? So I'm finding myself speaking a lot because my research is on failed and fragile states. All three topics focus specifically on my research that addresses questions of vulnerability. And in response to your overarching question, I would say that a primary task is to stop drawing this distinction between a set of problems that the global south face and a set of problems that the rest of the world face. It's a shared problem, the problem from hell, the wicked problem that requires immense coordination, political capital, resources and so on. But one way to draw out the lack of distinction is in the area of migration. You suggested that it's too early perhaps to develop a regime recognizing the rights of the individuals moving or displaced as a result of climate change, but perhaps that's precisely where we should be going. I can't think of a better example than what's going on in Europe right now with respect to the refugee crisis. Maybe it's obvious, but what kind of attitudinal shifts are taking place within this part of the world that are both negative and positive? We've seen some negative shifts, in particular with the decision by Britain to leave the European Union, which is partly a function perceived as insecurity derived from the refugee crisis. In turn that refugee crisis, if we take the evidence at face value is partly driven by climate change, and it's only going to increase over time. So part of the challenge here is to encourage an attitudinal shift or at least a shift in perception that what affects those countries in the global south is ultimately going to affect us. There are others who have drawn out a more stark comparison here. You can't escape climate change because it's going to come to you. You can live in the Antarctic, but the rest of us have to live in regions where eventually people are going to be visiting you, whether they're displaced or through some kind of well-structured immigration regime. They're going to come and they're going to come as a result of climate change. They're going to be displaced as a result of conflict. It might in itself be driven by climate change. We're going to talk about the causal mechanisms there, but it's happening. It's happening now, whether it's urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa. People are leaving and they're coming to your doorstep. So how do you make that point without being sort of rude about it? It's very difficult. People need to accept the fact that where they live is not going to be what they thought was their country, their region as it existed 10, 15, 20 years ago. So opening borders perhaps is one solution as uncomfortable as that might be for some countries. I come from a country, Canada, which is struggling with this issue. We've taken in 25,000 people from Iraq. It's not a lot. We think it's a big deal, but we could probably take in 200,000 before we even think about being burdened by that kind of shift in demography and so on. Thanks. I know we need to be on time. Just one comment, so I know there are two at least here who want to make comments. So just briefly I think that the migration issue might be the one getting things to the headlines and getting people at least in Europe, northern Europe to react. We saw it last year. People walking literally on the roads towards the north. We had one million migrants coming over the Mediterranean last year. That has not happened this year, but you know how many people actually according to the UN have arrived on the shores of the Mediterranean in Europe around half a million by August, early August. So we are not very different. It's not very different the number of people arriving. The difference is that they are not walking towards the north. They are so to say contained in the south. And that means that if you go to my country in Denmark, people think that, well, it's stabilized. It was just a 2015 issue and they are not reacting anymore. So again, that's really a paradox that if you don't see it outside our windows, we don't think about it. And I think that migration might be the one, the tricking one, where people actually realize things are happening. Right. Please. Thank you for your talk. Just within the mud framework you gave us the mud framework migration adaptation. Right. Where are we putting this issue now that we're talking about everywhere? Green is green growth or something? Is it another mud issue within that? Sorry to say again. The mud framework is indicated. The mud. Mud. Migration, adaptation, damages. Yes. And now the talk around the policy table now is that they are changing either, is it greening, how to responding to some of these issues? So where are you putting to that framework you gave us the issue now that green growth, green growth, green growth. I want to hear about your perceptions in terms of where we fit into that for us in the Global South. Right. Green growth, to my mind, that is when you actually produce special energy in ways which do not cause greenhouse gas emissions. So that would be mitigation to my mind. And let's just face the damage, the loss and damage idea that is basically the situation where you cannot mitigate, you cannot adapt, you just have the problem and you cannot cope with the problem. Then the idea is that then we need to find another way of compensating those harmed by this. That's the idea behind it. It's first full put forward by the SIDS Small Island developing states which are particularly vulnerable to this. So that's a special measure you might say that has been put into article 8 of the Paris Agreement. And when you try to read it you wonder how lawyers could write like that. I find it difficult to read at least. And I find it very difficult to see what's really in it when it comes down to it. But green production I would put into mitigation first of all. Right. So I think we have three minutes and one question. Is that right? Yes. My name is Arthit Dolavan. When I was first studying international fair crises in Canada 30 years ago the big crisis was the population crisis. And now we have the climate crisis and the most recent is the refugee crisis in developed areas of the world. So it seems that the population crisis has somehow gone away from these discussions. Now I think we need to take another look at that because we've had a paper here on subsurface in Africa. And you yourself pointed out that the climate impacts of climate change are most serious in the developing countries areas like subsurface in Africa which has also got an incredibly rapid population increase. And this is also contributing to things like migration, not only the climate change but the growth in the population as the first presenter showed more and people are suffering just because there are more people there. So as a lawyer perhaps the area that you can look at is the area of sort of reproduction rights and rights of women in those areas. And the statistics on that area and over half of people there don't have access to family planning and don't have access to contraception and so on and don't have information about it. So perhaps that's an area where we could assert a certain type of right to make this education and this choice available to people and in a way mitigate to their local because I think it's a pipe dream to think that migration is going to solve what 40 million people in Syria and we get a million of them over there over here, we're not going to solve this through migration we have to look at. I don't think probably birth control and family planning is the solution in Syria but in places where there are serious problems we can see the coming crisis and climate change and we see the growth of population there. We need to address, I think we need to find ways to address the population issue there too. Right, very short answer. Yes, absolutely. I think a very important point to make is that climate change is a factor together with other factors and you rightly point to population growth as one of these contributing factors to the challenge we are faced with. But we have to acknowledge at the same time that population growth is very different in different areas of the world. You point to Sub-Saharan Africa and then we have I think that the population is estimated to be 970 million. According to the predictions by the UN, you'll see that by 2100 in something like 8-4 years from now it's expected to be around 4 billion. It's more than a quarter of the population size. At the same time we are faced with more extreme weather events due to climate change but it doesn't take too much fantasy to realise that this might actually work against one another and become difficult. We are going to have probably very large urbanisation and things are going to not work in the same direction. If you look out from a European Union perspective as we do when we are here you will also see that the Arab countries they have less than 1 million inhabitants at the moment come to the same predictions. They will have around 800 something million in 8-4 years from now and at the same time the climate change consequences I expect to be much more more severe in these countries to what extent that actually influences on the population growth I don't know but if you look at these two things together you might imagine that this is going to be difficult. There are going to be more conflicts of people moving more around they might also move of course to place where they can live which I would do if I were in that situation obviously and that might mean from Northern Europe. So we are going to see very many other situations compared to what we have seen so far which are going to be challenging and I think that population growth is a very important one to take into account absolutely. But that is just one of the factors we have to factor in right. Thank you. I think this concludes the session here. It's lunchtime but let's thank the speakers first.