 I was in Hungary, Budapest, Hungary, at a conference, and it was a conference about the Soviet Union. And there were people from the Soviet Union there, including a friend of mine, who later under Yeltsin became Deputy Defense Minister by the name of Andrei Kokoshin. He came to the conference a day or two early and left because there was a coup against Gorbachev. That was August of 1991. I got there by the time he was leaving and end of the conference, which lasted three or four days, I got a phone call from him because Yeltsin was basically defying the takeover against Gorbachev and Kokoshin had been called back and Gorbachev had by that time been released. So a lot happened in those two or three days. But he asked me to come to Russia and he used the term Russia several times, not the Soviet Union, and it still was the Soviet Union. And I said, Oh, I have no passport. I have no visa. I have nothing. I had a passport, not a visa. And he said, I'll have the Russian ambassador in your hotel in Budapest in about 45 minutes. And I laughed. And I said, You're bureaucracy is much slower than I was. You can't do anything in 45 minutes. He said, be in the lobby in 45 minutes. You'll have your credentials to get there. So I basically went downstairs into my great shock. The ambassador did show up and he did have my credentials. Long story short, I caught a train to Frankfurt and flew to Moscow. And in the Frankfurt Airport, the American ambassador from Moscow called me and said, Don't come this bedlam over here. We have no, we have no way to take care of you. We have nowhere to arrange meetings. We have no way to provide security. I said, Well, I'll take my chances because I'm going to have Russian friends on the ground to take me around. And so again, long story short, I went to Moscow. I stayed three days. I saw what was going on. I talked to a number of the military people, both those that were lined up with Yeltsin and those that were remnants of the Soviet Union. I sat in a fascinating meeting where the heads of the republics, including Gorbachev, who by that time had been released from the coup, and he was presiding over a meeting of the heads of the republics and they were debating the breakup of the Soviet Union. So I sat there all one day and listened to the breakup and putting all that together was an unbelievable amount of information. But the bottom lines were pretty clear. The Soviet Union was breaking up and they were breaking up with the largest store of nuclear weapons, a biological program, at least. They denied the weapon part of it and huge, huge stockpiles of chemical weapons. The danger was clear. Their own military leaders knew they had to have assistance and help. And so to me, it was urgent. It was apparent and we had a vital stake, not just the United States, but the world had a vital stake in helping out in that situation to the extent that they would permit help in that situation. And so some of those questions obviously were unknown, but that's where the idea of what became known as a cooperative threat reduction program or the non-lubric program came from. Dick Combs and I came up with it on the airplane coming back from Moscow. And of course, it was a rough outline. We had to put it in legislative form. We had to convince the people in the Senate to begin with. And the answer is the first draft was none in Combs. And of course, Senator Luger joined in at a later stage and was absolutely crucial to getting the legislation passed. But at that stage, Rob, we were in conference. We had passed the Senate Armed Services Bill. I was chair of the committee. Les Aspen was chair of the House Committee. So we were in conference on the bill. It was not a bill waiting to be approved. And so we had to add provisions in the conference report. So we put what later became known as the cooperative threat reduction program in the conference report. Les Aspen wanted to make sure we had emergency food and medical aid for the Soviet Union. He was focused on that aspect. I was focused on the weapons and the materials and the personnel who knew how to make weapons but didn't know how to feed their families. So that was my focus. His focus was on the humanitarian side. And of course, we put those two pieces together and we brought out the conference report, which went to the floor of the Senate, which went to the floor of the House. Put it mildly, all hell broke loose when we brought that provision in back because here we were offering aid to our adversary of the last 40 years in a country that could destroy us. So it took a lot of explaining and the explanation was not good enough to begin with. So the whole bill was jeopardized. Technically, although the legislation was essential, technically it was out of scope. The opponent's critics were correct on that. So we basically took that provision out and went on and passed the bill. And so I went to my friend Dick Luger. He and I worked together on a number of things. And I said, Dick, I want to talk to you about this concept. We need your help. And so he was very, very smart. He understood what was going on. He kept up with it and he and I formed a partnership then. And we started to work on individual senators, two, three, four at a time and members of the House, that this was absolutely urgent legislation and that it was in America's vital interest. It was our security at stake. We did not want Russian scientists in North Korea and Iran and Iraq and Libya. And that was where the situation was headed in my view. Well, when the Soviet Union fell, there were by some estimates 35,000 nuclear warheads spread across the former Soviet Union. Let's say 22,000 of those or so were tactical warheads and the rest were strategic warheads. And those ended up being on the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan and in Ukraine. And so none of those countries, you know, after thinking about it for a while wanted to have those weapons. So they had to be returned. They had to be secured. Where were they gonna go? And so anything goes, everything might be for sale. And so you wanted to be able to get control of that material, those warheads, that material, those launch systems and make sure that they didn't fall into the wrong hands. That time, the mission was to remove the warheads from Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine, chip them back to Russia. And we had agreed with the Russians that that would be the best way to dispose of the excess warheads. So the very first mission was to take armored blankets. These are Kevlar type blankets protect against small arms fire and fires while warheads are in transportation. And the Russians didn't have that kind of protection. So we got them out of army reserves, excess material. I came to work for DNA 1996. I was assigned to the nuclear weapons storage facility program. And along with that, there was material protection control and accounting, all kind of around what we were gonna do or what the Russians were gonna do with the material that came out of weapons that were being returned to them from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan for dismantlement. We were really facilitators and supporters, but it was the first time we actually got to engage with the Russians face to face as the first physical mission where we delivered something, which I think was really important to get the program started. My first project in CTR was in spent submarine fuel. So as a submarine officer, I think it was logical to put me there. And so I spent a year and a half working with the Russian Federation on spent nuclear fuel transportation. And this is something that's been part of the CTR program for a long time. Russian submarines run on highly enriched fuel, which could be for other things other than submarine fuel. So our team worked with Russian scientists to transport that fuel to the reprocessing center in Mayak in Russia. The former Soviet Union had a very, very large bio weapons program. They employed, you know, somewhere in the range of 70,000 scientists and technicians and it wasn't just in Russia itself. It was in the stands also and, you know, Georgia and everywhere else. At the time we got there, they hadn't been funded well in years. There was a great worry. There was always worry about where would these former bio weapons scientists and techs go? There was a defense science board study back in, I'm gonna say 94, 95. It's in the history books. I just don't remember the exact date. And it's loosely entitled how to keep former Soviet bio weapons scientists off the street. And the simple answer was engage them, pull them into projects where they can get money into their institutes, keep their people fed, keep them there so they don't get lured away by Syria or Iran, North Korea, something like that. So the projects focused on that. We worked to shore up the safety and security at the bio facilities that they would let us into so things could not be stolen or accidentally released. We tried to upgrade the way they were doing science a little bit so that they could do peer reviewed articles and get published. The institutes, I mean, most of them were in a shambles, quite honestly, when we got there in the late 90s and early 2000s. And so that was the goal. It was to engage these scientists, keep them where they were, keep them happy, leverage their knowledge, because the Soviet Union did some very, very cool science work that we just never did in the West, that might have prophylactic and medical value to the troops and to the nation, writ large. So that was the purpose initially of biosafety, biosecurity and cooperative research projects. We also had projects to eliminate stuff. Step Nagorsk was an elimination project. I mean, we green fielded that place, pretty much eliminated all production capability that they had destroyed the fermenters, destroyed the lofilizers and the freeze dryers, just everything. And in doing so, we kept all the scientists there engaged in destruction work and turned them into construction kinda guys and safety guys and asbestos removal guys and stuff like that. So they all had a paycheck. They all stayed up in Step Nagorsk. So that was worthwhile. Relationship was very professional. I would say formal, but in a sort of informal way. And that is, it was based on our positions and our knowledge and capabilities, not based on our personalities. So while we got to know each other, it was always based on, look, we're responsible for the safety and security of nuclear warheads. This is not, we're not here to be friends. We're here because we're concerned about that. And both of us are concerned about that. All of us on the team, different teams, I think formed really strong professional bonds and in some cases very, you know, very personable bonds with the principal investigators and the staff and their colleagues that work with them and work with us and the commercial partners really closely on those particular programs. The scientists at Ross Adam, I thought were good partners. We collectively geeked out over the details on the design and the requirements. And that provided a common bond. You know, one of my trips to Murmansk, they invited us up to the Lennon, which the Lennon is the first nuclear surface ship was a nuclear ice breaker that was commissioned by the Russians. And of course, they still have a fleet of nuclear ice breakers that they have an active service. But the officer that toured us on the Lennon was actually the engineer for over 20 years. So he had some amazing stories about being out at sea, on the ice and operating in those incredibly austere conditions, and we kind of bonded on the nuclear operation side too. So on a personal level, I think we had, we found connections as people often do when you have a common background and a common purpose. Most of our original engagement in Russia was cooperative research projects. And most of those drove us to do biosecurity and biosafety upgrades at the various institutes. But like I said, every place was different. So Vector, you know, which is what they're biggie, they're a big part of their bio weapons program, one of the two smallpox repositories in the world, CDC being the other one, you know, but it was a heavy duty bio weapons facility, testing production and stuff. So they were much more standoffish. You know, I met their director, Lev Sandachev, back in the day, and you can look him up, he's in all the old bio weapons books and stuff. I mean, and he was cordial enough and a nice enough guide, but he had his agenda and he had his direction from up above on what they would share and what they would not share. You know, so we helped them with safety and security, which was needed. We helped them do some conversion. We shifted one of their old production lines into a yogurt production line, like the little Activa liquid stuff that, you know, for probiotic purposes, it was called Bifido, this is stuff. And so, you know, we tried to do some defense conversion with them, we did research projects that were beneficial, but they were also a little bit standoffish. A different place, RCMDT, the research center for molecular diagnostics and therapy, which is in Moscow, these guys were entrepreneurs. I mean, they were open, they were getting patents, they were developing diagnostic tools based on, you know, research projects that we funded, they were your snazzy salesmen, you know? So they were always open. I kind of only asked for what they needed, you know, and they managed their projects very well and they turned them into other revenue streams, which I also thought was very cool. And they were nice, super friendly. Glycino was an agricultural pathogen facility, true bio weapons site. Some of the nicest guys in the world, for years I still got Christmas cards from them at home. And they also reached out, they sent me birthday emails and stuff like that. Super positive guys, their facility had just been left in a total shambles, all their greenhouses fell apart, you know, and they really didn't have a lot of work. So we helped them get a few projects going, improve their, you know, pathogen security and their repository. And, you know, they were thrilled by the little bit of love and attention that we showed them and they were very, very gracious people. But in my heart, I believe all of them were pretty open to the cooperation that we were trying to make happen. And to, you know, they wanted to be good scientists and they wanted to contribute to the bigger picture and they wanted to be known. On the Ministry of Defense side, similarly, I think there were individuals with which I was, you know, able to make a connection and they were genuinely interested in improving the condition of their country. And there were some that were more standoffish and weren't really interested in making a relationship. So, and I'm sure the same was true on both sides. But, you know, as we came closer to the end of, you know, the work that we had planned and it was apparent that we weren't going to start any new projects with the Russians, it just, those relationships just started to fall away. People were not answering full calls and it just kind of faded away slowly. When I first started working with the Russian M&E in 1996, all those big stars on the buttons, all those buttons disappeared off the uniforms and it had the Russian double-headed eagle on. By the time I was finishing up the work on nuclear weapons storage security, those buttons with the big stars were coming back on the senior officers. They wanted to let the younger officers know that they were part of the Soviet army that was the superpower army, right? And Mr. Putin's power was increasing, you know, obviously at the time, and so, you know, he had a decided opinion of what the relationship with the West should be and so that, particularly through MOD, colored that relationship. CTR program relationship with him isn't something that's well known in the Russian public at all. People really didn't know, you know, outside of academia and the ministries where we worked, a lot of that assistance was happening. But the Russians know what it is and the Russians know how to turn a phrase on what we're doing. I worked all the way up through and after the expiration of the Russian agreement. Although the CTR agreement expired, we understood that the Russians wanted to distance themselves from a program that looked like it was assistance and aid. So we understood that motivation on their part. What we tried to do is transfer this relationship on nuclear security to a mil-to-mil arrangement where we would exchange information and knowledge as peers and the progress was difficult. Russians were resistant to allow us to continue the relationship with the 12th main directorate which is the organization responsible for security and safety of nuclear warheads. And then the program was halted by the joint staff because of the Russian incursion into Crimea in 2014. And so that was the last engagement that we had. Mr. Putin's power was increasing, you know, obviously at the time. And so, you know, he had a decided opinion of what the relationship with the West should be. And so that, particularly through MOD, colored that relationship. The disinformation promoted after we worked so hard to try and work as partners is really disheartening. It helps them definitely on the world stage, you know, to achieve their means of knocking the United States down and raising their own voice. To say things like, you know, Ukraine is trying to develop nukes. Now, we worked with the Russians in Ukraine on making sure that those warheads are removed, right? We provided them assistance to do that job, right? And then to say that it's on us and that we're doing something behind their back. It really, it just makes no sense. It's an obvious part of the war promotion. If you tell a lie often enough, eventually people, some people are going to accept it or forget that it was a lie in the first place. And I think that's what Russia is hoping will happen, that eventually they will, you know, kind of wear down the resistance and the counter-messaging. Countering the big lie that Russia's trying to put out there is very, very important. We were building lots of laboratories. We were training lots of scientists. We are providing modern tools to those scientists. And although, you know, we beat the drum that this was disease surveillance and that we were trying to minimize pathogen repositories and unfortunately most bio stuff is dual use. So no matter what you say that everything is for peaceful purposes, it's easy for, you know, minds to jump the gun and say, well, no, it has to be nefarious. To me it's clearly a political ploy to deflect attention and blame away from what they're doing in the Ukraine, what they are doing in the Ukraine. They, as you said, they have worked with the CTR program. They know us. They know what we do. They watched us. They did it with us. They worked with us in Ukraine and elsewhere prior to 2014. So they know what the program is and there's no good reason for them to be able to justify what they're saying and they know it. They aren't saying it because they think it's true. They aren't saying it because they want people to believe it. They're saying it to distract us and everyone else from what's really happening. We have in the past been the quiet professional program that goes out and does what we need to do and meets with partners and have not done as much tuning our own horn to get that word out. So I think going forward, it's going to be much more important to get that message out ourselves to understand that we need to let everybody know what we do and why we're doing it and what it means and what it really consists of to pull back the curtain so that it's not a surprise when somebody hears DITRA and Cooperative Threat Reduction. They understand that this is really a good thing and that when some disinformation comes out there's that existing narrative that provides a backstop to say, well, why should I believe this when I've seen what they're doing here? And I think our partners that have worked with us, they already know that. They already know the benefit of the program. It's, we need to do more like this to share what we know and what they know with everybody else. So I think, you know, if we, the US, we DITRA, we OSD policy and put out good news stories and get our partner nations to jump on them, get some good words out there, I think we can turn the tide on this. Disinformation won't live forever. Since the nature of the focus, I should say, of CTR has changed over the 30 years, I do believe that there is a time that's now that we need to actually focus on advertising those relationships and advertising the good that comes out of those programs that we are working with our partners on. And there shouldn't be harm in that, right? It's just getting past ourselves. Hopefully we can get the story out and so people can understand that. We really did work with them well. We worked with them well. There was trust. We put a lot of effort into trying to continue it even beyond and they took actions that prevented it. The fact that none of Luger dedicated their Senate careers in many ways to this program is just extraordinary. What other program can you find senators from Republican and Democrat working together where they dedicate themselves so much to an actual program? I think not just the work in Russia but the work that we've done around the world, it really does make the world a safer place. It's important to be able to do what we're doing and to have our partners understand why we're there, why we want to help and to give them the support that they need to make sure that these materials don't fall into the wrong hands.