 And today's topic is about extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. Extremism and terrorism has reared its ugly head once again on Pakistan's door. Many analysts would actually trace it to the 2021 Kabul takeover by the Taliban, which has resulted in alpha elements such as the Tariqat Alehman Pakistan killing innocent lives, ensuring that there's damage to critical infrastructure, and threatening peace, stability, and economic prosperity within the country. The spike is quite profound, and it is extremely important to understand the underlying factors which are resulting in this menace of terrorism revisiting Pakistan. That is precisely what we're going to be examining in this show. I have with me security and political analyst Mr. Amir Rana, who's also the director of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies. Mr. Amir Rana, thank you so much for joining me on the show. Yeah, thank you, Hamza, for having me in your show. All right, so Mr. Amir Rana, let's speak about the Bajor incident that recently took place. I mean, the Jammet-Ulma Islam puzzle was planning on holding a rally. And then you had this horrendous blast which took place. It, you know, there were massive casualties. It's all over the news, whether it's been on the BBC, on Al Jazeera, or in domestic media outlets as well. But this is not the first time this has happened. What in your view explains this spike of terrorism within Pakistan? Yeah, let's first discuss this latest terrorist attack which happened in Bajor yesterday. So it has a very particular background because there is one group called the Islamic State Horasan is active since many years and targeting the religious community. And mainly the GUI. And few times they also attempted to target the Jammet-Islamic. And the reason is that they believe that these parties are part of the democratic system. And ISK disagree with this notion. Though the TTP also have the similar ideology, but there's a deep-rooted debate in this area, which goes across the border in host and in Kunar as well. And it has a one sectarian dimension, which is the Salafi and Diwbandis. So this debate is going on in this territory since early 1980s. So this is a very particular background this area has. And this was the manifestation of the group. So in that context, a lot of suspicion is going on about the ISK. But we cannot rule out the other groups that can be involved, including the few hardliner TTP factions. They share the similar ideology and they are part of the sectarian divide. And they remain a very active actor in the past. We can't rule out the TTP and al-Qaeda, Indian subcontinent, is also evolving the new operational collaborations. So in that context, this incident is quite significant and it will determine the future course of these terrorist organizations. If it is the ISK, then we can presume that they will continue to take the political activities and be organized by the religious party, JUI and the JIA in this area and may expand their terrorist activities in other parts of the province. If this is to the TTP hardliner groups or al-Qaeda, it may be the warning for these religious parties that do not go and participate in the election. Then it would mean that it may be because the local factors are more involved in these attacks. We may see this in a very different context. So I think this will be the investigations going on and what will be revealed in coming days. It will be very important to assess in which way the things will go. So many analysts would claim that since the 2021 Kabul takeover by the Taliban and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan after decades of military presence over there attributes a spike in terrorist attacks to developments within Afghanistan. And there are certain statistics and you being an expert in this field, you would know for a fact that this is pretty much ever present that terrorist attacks have actually spiked since 2021. Do you think that's the sole factor which is contributing to the rise of terrorism or there are other variables involved? Yeah, I think we have to put all these things in context. Usually the time after the APS attacks describe that it was a peacetime. But even during these three, four years, we have seen the TTP and its breakaway factions launched massive attacks inside Pakistan. So there was no peacetime. It's an ongoing terror campaign in Pakistan. Though in terms of the military operation, we can claim few successes. The operations that were successful to route it out of the terrorist network from North Pakistan. But they had continued the activities across the border. And this was the reason that in 2019 security institutions thought maybe this is a time to negotiate with the TTP because they are weak. And we can talk with them. We can negotiate with them from the position of strength. You may recall that this was quite a popular argument in 2013 to 2014-15. Most of the analysts had argued that we must have to with terrorists from the position of strength when the government was initiating the talks with them. So this was a mindset that was at play in 2019. And the certain strategies were chopped out at what time they will go to have the negotiations. Initially, they had offered the Ministry for those who would surrender. Only few had surrendered and they come back and in these areas then TTP complained that those haven't been treated well. So this is a context. So when after Talban takeover, it was a major contributing factor which the establishment thought that now we have the pro Pakistan regime, they will facilitate this peace process with the TTP. But we ignore that this TTP and Al-Qaeda are ideologically and politically the same. And they also share the tribal bond. So this was in my view, if I may say it was a strategic error at the part of the Pakistan security institutions that they undermined the ideological credentials of this movement. They thought maybe the Talban would be friendly, mainly the Hakanis we were depending that they will facilitate. But the Hakanis were proved very clever player in all these negotiations game. They tried to keep their neutral position. They forced Pakistan's state to get indulged in the negotiations. So it was a major mistake and Pakistan allowed on the behalf of the Taliban the TTP to come back in Pakistan. And Pakistan was hoping the situation has been changed, TTP is weak. So this wasn't the case and many analysts were indicating even at that time this is going to be very counterproductive. But this also I think the security institution and even the government at that time had some other broader political, geoeconomic vision in their mind that the Taliban government will facilitate their many initiative, transnational development initiative in this region. And of course the Indian factor to whom the Pakistan had tried to counter since last four or five decades in Afghanistan. It was considered the major success. But at what cost? And the cost Pakistan is still paying. And we haven't seen any development on mega transnational projects. Even we can see that this small developments happen or our relationship is Central Asia, but not significant will happen. And this is going to be Taliban going to be complete there in two years. And this is quite, I think, the time that they would have determined their direction. Rather they had made things for Pakistan more complicated. Even when we have seen that they had not only created the security situation, they created dispute over the fence on the borders. And the first year we have seen the many insiders around this fence related disputes for economy and how they have evolved their monetary policy and they control the currency market. It had the direct impact on Pakistan economic crisis, the smuggling. So all the areas from women's marketing to the North Cortex to listen to weapons. In every areas we have seen that Taliban wasn't the one cooperative and rather been assertive compared with the previous regime. So there was a need for Pakistan to revise and review its approach towards Taliban. They had reviewed, but the problem is that they reviewed the approach. And those who are right now are the architect or running this behind the door negotiation with the Taliban. They don't want to bring this process on surface, surface answer. And maybe they're thinking they can convince Taliban because Pakistan had invested the four or five decades in this war. And Pakistan will not go to sacrifice or surrender so easily. It will try to attempt to maximum to convince Taliban and to bring them on their terms. But I don't think the prospects of the success of any backdoor channel unless things will bring on surface. And this can ensure the transparency. It can hold the Taliban, accountable, the commitment they will make. They are very good negotiation behind the doors. But they are very bad making their commitments on public. You may recall that after the August 15, after takeover in 2021, they had made a lot of promises, inclusive government, ensuring the women's rights to the government. Yeah, and we have seen how they had fulfilled their promises. So I think this is the way to bring everything on surface. The people can see the people from Iran, Iran, people from Pakistan, all these terrorist networks, militant networks, they will also, of course, show their reaction. And we will see that which side the Taliban are going. And if the TDP is not happy with the Taliban, then what will be their strategy? So there will be a plenty of advantages if we will bring all this process on surface. Okay, so when we talk about the TTA for the Taliban of Pakistan, who does that? It's almost as if based on your analysis, like they're providing sanctuaries to the TDP, to the ETIM, to the ISKP in provinces such as Helmand. So in a way, the TTA or the Taliban government in Kabul is exercising plausible deniability with regard to providing sanctuaries and claiming internationally that they're not harboring terrorists. Is that a fair argument? Yes, of course, they are doing this, playing the same game as they had attempted in their first regime in the 90s. And they had denied that they have no presence of the terrorist networks. And later we found the multiple kind of terrorist networks who are not sharing in Afghanistan. So the approach is the same. And I think they have their own justification, ideological linkages and access, religious bond, tribal, ethnic. So they have many justification. But most important for them is the moral obligation. They feel that these groups had provided them the support of the war. If they went against them, maybe it will prove counterproductive and create resentment within their ranks and files. So this is the backlash they are scared of. So it's a complicated choice for the Taliban. But one thing they can can ensure, as they had promised China, that they relocate the DIM in the far away from the area. So Chinese are not going to buy this argument to Pakistan, even they haven't offered this. Though this was disclosed in media, the Taliban, for potential sport, we will really get them away from the border. But this is this is not a guarantee that they will stop terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. Rather, it will give more advantage to the TTP, that their families are in the secure places, safe and secure places, and they can continue their campaign. They haven't even a single time, at least in a form, either our NSO was the state minister for foreign affairs with the or the defense minister. Yes, they haven't formally, publicly acknowledged that TTP is not just. So this is a very complicated situation Pakistan has got. Okay, all right. So I mean, what are the policy responses that the government can exercise or maybe the military established to get exercise when there's evidence to suggest that the TTP sanctuaries are across the border? Does Pakistan have the option of pursuing hot pursuit, trying to eradicate these terrorist groups within Afghanistan? What should Pakistan do? I mean, obviously, you've mentioned that diplomacy negotiation for the TPA might be ongoing back channel, but it's not really resulted in a decline in the spike in terrorist activities in the country. What do you think are the policy responses that Pakistan government should exercise? Yeah, Pakistan had tried multiple, both the diplomatic, as I said, it was mostly a backdoor. And even on the operational front, they had given the proper response to these networks who are trying to launch attacks inside Pakistan. They eliminated multiple terrorist cells, but of course, they have their bases in Afghanistan. And Pakistan still got a few operational options, but a few of them are very tricky to use. And if the tariff didn't increase in Pakistan specifically during the election times, so it will build pressure on the security institution to effectively respond to the threat, then the fear is that Pakistan may launch the strikes inside Afghanistan as Pakistan did these strikes in last year, and which had proved somehow counterproductive and make things more worse. Though TTP claimed that the Pakistan intelligence agencies are conducting operations inside Afghanistan, killing their leaders. But these kind of operations continue, but operational response, I think this could be a very counterproductive. This why that we are saying that we have to be bring before we reach at the level of the zero tolerance, we have to at least use all the political and diplomatic options and see that how these will go. If we are not utilizing them, and we are talking only the backdoor, so I think it will put more pressure on the Pakistan security forces to go over for the ultimate choices for counter offensive. And this is going to be a war-like situation, and this war is the groups the state had patronized once, and they still have enjoyed the centuries, they have their network, the properties, businesses in Pakistan. So it will complicate the security challenge for Pakistan, not only for Pakistan, for Afghanistan, of course, but for the regional security. So I don't think the Central Asian state and mainly China even can imagine that the Pakistan will reach at that point, because they think Pakistan would be facilitating pursuing the Taliban for their geopolitical relationship, for forcing them to change their mind. So this challenge will get complex. You see that Pakistan is right now walking on a very tight road. So let's see how intelligently our security solution will deal with this situation. Amir, what about hybrid warfare? We talk about propaganda warfare or the use of social media. I mean, you write extensively, as the columnist for Don, occasionally he also spoken about extremist literature as well. Do you think that extremism and the literature, which is actually disseminated through social media platforms, which often appeal to the youth, which are either disenchanted, they're not employed, they're not disenfranchised, but they're pretty much isolated from society? Do you think that there's a need to nab literature, which is actually promoted to social media platforms and also to nab propaganda warfare, which is being perpetrated by these terrorist outfits? Yeah, I think it has a different context, in a broader context. If you're talking about that, if maybe the external forces are involved creating this hybrid warfare in Pakistan and they are fueling, I think, first we have to look at from where they are getting all the materials. So this is all the timelines we got in our society, in our policies. So when we have somebody is exploiting, so first we have to look at our weaknesses and to be removed from all this because nobody can explain. So this exercise, not extensive level, though very few efforts have been done, but I think we still need to be look at it. We've got the basic attitude towards extremist group, either they are from each sect or another. So this is, I think, make things very complicated and is deep-rooted in the state view of the religion. So they think this is going to create the harmony within the society and they had outsourced this project to religious organization. And time these religious parties, the groups to the establishment relied on, had failed Pakistan. And we still are blaming and these organizations, mainly on social media, consumed this similar argument of externalizing threat, utilizing the same narrative that the state has not shared in the partnership with these religious institutions. And even now, they twist these narratives, the argument against the state and state institutions. And they, it has created a state of denial within the society. Let me give you the example. What do you think, what should be the reaction of the GUI after yesterday's attack? If you go to the social media, you can see that the local GUI leaders saying that neither TTP is our enemy, neither IS is our enemy, and we don't consider them our enemies. So this is the responsibility of the state to provide us the security. So from when this narrative comes, aren't they scared of these groups? Do they, at least it's clearly indicated that they don't trust on Pakistan the state institutions and they are demanding the security. So this is, I think, the kind of the mindset, the mindset of the denial which has created. This is only one example, but if you go to look at the mindset of all religious actors, even the political actors in the country, it's almost the same. Okay, so domestically, I mean, is there, there is this claim that maybe there are sleeper cells within Pakistan which are being tapped into by these nefarious elements. Because to conduct attacks with such brazen frequency, you obviously need the requisite infrastructure and you do need domestic level support. So do you think that countering extremism within Pakistan by tackling these sleeper cells is also a strategy that the government can follow over? Of course, we need to follow our very comprehensive counter-extremism policy. Though we have on papers, but practically, we haven't seen any substantive development. Of course, the sleeper cells, this is very important. This is the one operational aspect and they got the sleeper cells. And you might have noticed that during last few weeks, the TTP is issuing the statement on social media that this group in this area, this area had joined the TTP. Can you imagine that so many militant commanders and groups were operating in several districts Pakistan from South Punjab to Belochistan and North Punjab? No, we haven't heard any of these commanders, the people, the TTP is claiming that they are joining the organization. They are new recruits. They can prove to be their human resource, the facilitator. They can help them to establish the sleeper cells. This is very concerning. And most of these people are announcing their affiliations with the TTP. They come from a religious background or a religious motherhood. So this is, I think, the Pakistan state need to be very vigilant. We see from where the new recruits can come. And so this need a very comprehensive counter extremism policy. Unless we will have this an effective one. On paper, you will see the talk about the counter narrative. They talk about the sermons controls and the loudspeaker control, controlling the religious spaces. But practically, we see very little substantive developments. Even they talk about the militant groups. And we know that despite the ban on several militant groups, they are still in the streets. And ironically, they come up in the support of the state institutions. So this gave a very wrong message that it shows that maybe the state institutions are soft on certain banned militant groups. We have to be a very uniform, zero tolerance space, counter extremism policy. So very briefly, Amir, because I'm actually running out of time. Do you think that there's a need to distinguish between the good Taliban and the bad Taliban on thought of maybe the government of Pakistan or the establishment? Or do you think it's a fallacy to believe that there could actually be a good Taliban? All of them are extremists. All of them have taken up arms. And all of them would actually attack innocent civilians if given a chance. Yeah, this is a fallacy in a political context. In a strategic context, when you want to talk, then it may have little utility. As the US has exploited with the Taliban and apparently they disengaged the Taliban from Al-Qaeda and they agreed on that they will not allow the Al-Qaeda to exploit their side. But in Pakistan's perspective, this is more complicated issue because this is deep rooted in our view about the religious groups. We are still very soft on the extremist group and it goes to the TTP and Taliban as well. For us, this is a fallacy and we shouldn't discriminate between good and bad because they are counterproductive of our society for our strategic, political and economic priorities. After that, the states adopt different approaches while considering the threat at a serious level. At what stage they can be engaged in rehabilitation? How they can be disengaged with the violent activities? So these kind of the models are available all across the world which can be used rather than to go for having distinction between good and bad. Alright, Mr. Amirana, Political and Security Analyst and Director of the Pakistan Institute for Security Studies. Thank you so much for joining me on this. That's all that we have for now on Islamabad today for Think Tech Hawaii. To follow us on social media, you can log on to our updates all across the platforms so that we can actually keep you abreast of all the major happening within Pakistan and all across the world. That's it from me, Hamd Arifat. Until next time, take care. If you like what we do, please click the like and subscribe button on YouTube. You can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and LinkedIn. Check out our website, thinktechawaii.com. Mahalo.