 I guess before I start sharing my slides and my talk, I want to underscore one thing that Governor Lane said about how research at the European Central Bank has really blossomed in recent years and recent decades. I did have the pleasure and privilege of speaking at this conference. It was just 2 years ago, it seems like 20, but in 2019 and indeed. I learned an enormous amount from the other conference participants, but especially researchers at the C. B. Some very interesting work, for example, on the effects of negative interest rates, but many other topics. And I find myself as a researcher, certainly when I'm teaching new topics constantly finding research from the C. B, which speaks to it and I'll come back to this issue of the technocratic importance of central banks later. But anyway, with that, I will share my slides. Which I gather, take a minute to come on, but I will proceed as if you're seeing it already. So, I was originally given a title for this where we agreed on a title for this of the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy. But I actually think that's a little narrow in terms of the debate around central banks today. So, I'm trying to broaden it along with all the discussions of how central banks might broaden their topics. So, I want to emphasize that when I speak about central banks, I'm thinking of all central banks and not just the C. B. and the federal reserve. And each face is its unique challenges. It's unique environment in which it operates. But I'm going to try to stress some of those differences here before I proceed. I just want to mention that the figures I'm presenting here draw a series of papers I've done with mixes of co-authors, including a Hancoes, Francisca Snorke, Carmen Reinhardt, and Ethan Ilzitsky, they're mentioned, mentioned beneath the slides. Sorry. So, first, let me start by giving a brief overview of what I hope to cover today and starting with the fact that the challenges facing emerging markets are way different than what are facing advanced economies at least for the moment. They are not facing ultra low interest rates. They are very limited in their fiscal space compared to advanced economies. A number, a small number, are ready and default. Many, many developing economies are in default. And so it's something very different, but I'm going to try to talk about that also. And then in the second part of the talk, I'm going to turn to advanced economies, but particularly talking about the debate over expanding the role of the central bank in, you know, at the zero bound. So, let me just try to summarize a few points just in case it gets lost in my various figures and slides. First, there's no question that the role of central banking has morphed. It's far different than when I wrote my 1985 paper theoretical paper, making the case for having an independent central bank. I wasn't beginning to think about any of the roles that it plays today. And there are one of the factors that has, is coloring this debate is the central banks have been very successful in their achieving their mandates, certainly in bringing down inflation, and it's created an appetite for having central banks do more since they seem to do things so well. A second thing, which has affected central banks for sure is the zero bound on interest rates. I'm going to talk about that later, which I think to some extent takes away the most powerful traditional instrument central banks have with no, I'll be more specific about that later. I'm going to come at the end to the expansion of targets areas where I think it's very clear areas where I want to suggest maybe a different focus. Lars is giving a terrific talk tomorrow. I can make an advertisement for, I mean, I haven't heard the talk, but I've looked at the papers. And he makes some of these points far more deeply and with more focus than perhaps I'll succeed in doing today. But let me just cover a few things. First, I think one of the achievements of central banks that's really been quite remarkable is by being such technocratic institutions. I started my discussion with praising the research that's come out of the European Central Bank, but that is really the foundation on which central bank influence rests that yes, they're not always right. The newspapers and op ed writers are constantly saying central banks can't predict anything they can't do anything right. Well, maybe, but they do things a lot better than they were done before. And I think that's part of why other agencies, other people are trying to think of ways to emulate them. So the technocratic expansion has certainly been good. And of course, I think I'd be less than honest, not to emphasize a lot of this has been about economists. And if you don't like economics, I do. But if you don't like economics, you're probably a little bit less enthusiastic about this center of research and research, almost empowerment that we see in central banks. But of course, as central banks expand into more political domains, that's inevitable. And I'm not saying, you know, it's something that can be completely avoided. But I think it obviously creates pressures. You know that something maybe you don't think about as often, but because I teach at a great university, which covers many, many fields. And I think we get more as central banks have accumulated more power and expanded their remit sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, business economists are writing papers about this and say, wait a second. If you are getting more into political economy, if you are getting more into political decision making, we think our discipline has something to say about this. And there's a growing rich variety of papers and research about this, not so much about the issues we looked at in the 80s and 90s, but really about these modern day issues. And I would say at an, you know, to us, maybe an extreme but not so much in the field. There are certainly very credible sociologists, political economists, arguing that central banks have been an enabler of financial globalization and a financial markets which has led to greater inequality partly by helping firms move their businesses around. I don't want to get into a critique or discussion of that, but just to make you aware that particularly as the remit of central banks expands as they take on new tasks or as they aim to. There's certainly very powerful intellectual forces that are wanting to weigh in on all of this. I'll mention there are other areas of course, but I'm certainly going to talk about the environment and green economics. That's the focus I believe of Lars's talk tomorrow. But I just the point I think I've been making that he makes, I think, much more deeply is that, you know, the central banks job should probably be more in steering the than deciding where the ship's going to go. Central banks don't have the democratic accountability. They don't have necessarily the breadth of technical capacity, even if they're rated economics. But maybe to make some decisions and some very fraught political decisions that need to be made. I just mentioned one thing again as a, you know, someone who teaches at university. I think the younger generations extremely well educated in climate science and issues around climate. They're much less well educated on energy and exactly what the trade offs are going to be in order to go from one place to another. I think central banks have a big role to play in ensuring stability along this path. If, and I very much hope we do have a more aggressive transition to green and I realize a lot of the people I'm speaking today to today or in Europe, which has really taken many admirable steps in this dimension. But as you well know, other parts of the world have different challenges, different problems and, you know, not, you know, facing facing different trade offs. And it's not going to be so easy to think of how to make this transition. And what I'm getting to about central banks is there will be volatility. We've seen volatility around the pandemic as first when there's the shutdown and now as the supply chains have clogs in various places. You've seen it with wind lacking in Europe this summer and creating energy and price volatility. And I think as we go on, we're not going to get it exactly right in making the energy transition and by we, I mean governments and political entities. And central banks will absolutely be needed to step in in parallel or maybe new ways to that they've done over the last 15 years in trying to have more stability on that path. And I would just say that, you know, rather than say, well, the world could fall apart in 50 years, that will create a lot of instability, instability is in our remit. So central bank, it's in our, it should be one of our targets. And say, therefore, central banks should step in today to try to deal with this. I think that's actually not the best argument and not the right focus for central banks. Again, Lars says something in his JME paper that, you know, we can't pretend we know more about climate science than we do. Central banks can provide their classic stabilizing role. And I think that's something that's very important. I'll briefly mention inequality. I actually think crypto currencies and digital currencies in area where central banks really need to take the lead. They're doing that to some extent. Again, there's great work going on at the ECB many, many central banks. But I also think in terms of power within the government, who should be the central regulator. This is one area I would put more of the more with the central bank. And I say that, not simply because I believe in economics and the competency of central banks, but I say that also because I think we need a lot of international coordination in the sphere. And it's very difficult to do that when you're trying to coordinate disparate entities. And I think central banks among their many accomplishments of recent years have really demonstrated quite a capacity for coordination. All right, I have to pause just to show one graph which sets the stage for some of the remarks I'm making later. I showed a version of this graph in 2019 in my talk. It is very, very familiar to you. Phillip Lane emphasized this point at the very outset of talking about what the new challenges are to monetary policy. This is the measure of the 10 year real interest rate with treasury bills. There's a lot of talk about the secular decline. I actually think I actually think that describing it as a secular decline is not really an accurate description of what is going on. Paul Schmelzing who was at Yale and I had the privilege of having as a thesis student when he was in the history department also working on finance. As papers and I'm sure many of you have seen this showing the trend decline of a real and nominal interest rates over 8 centuries. And one of Paul's findings is that there is a trend decline in real interest rates, but it's a very slow. It's on the order of say 1% every 50 years and not 3 or 3.5% over 12 years. And I believe, you know, a significant part of what we've experienced is a reaction to the pandemic and not these long run trends about which there are many papers about inequality. There's a lot of facts, et cetera, but there's something else going on. And I think the main point I would make about this is we just don't know what's around the corner. This has been quite surprising. So you're very familiar I think all of you with the debate that's going on and advanced economies but let me just say what's happened since the pandemic, what's going on in emerging markets is and developing economies is remarkable. And the IMF and the World Bank, which have their annual meeting shortly will release reports highlighting this problem. It's not that I've seen them. I know that they will because it's important to them, but I've seen what they've written in the past. And, you know, we're going through an extremely difficult period for them, whatever's going on within countries in terms of inequality growing, it's probably worse across countries. We're looking at we had been looking at an era of globalization and growing global quality. If you count all citizens of the world the same. Yeah, I understand there are many nuances to this the elephant diagram of global inequality. But by and large, Thomas Piketty emphasizes the point that capitalism's led inequality. Not if you count everyone in the world the same that's lifted billions of people out of abjack poverty. And the this period we're going through has been a reversal. It looks like it's going to be very difficult for many years to come. I'll say a little more. So, of course, emerging markets have vastly less fiscal policy space. They're actually a few and default. I think Suriname, Zambia, Argentina, Lebanon and Ecuador. But there are a lot there of emerging markets in a more precipitous place. I don't want to overstate this point. I would say some countries such as Brazil and Mexico to date have weathered the problems better than you might have thought. But nevertheless, if you look at the prognosis for their growth for their health problems for their various issues they're facing. It's very different. And in particular, I'll show you one graph in a second. Just as you see the interest burden of debt falling in advanced countries, it is rising across much of the rest of the world. Debt in advanced countries is rising, but the interest burden has been falling. I'll come to it in a second. But in emerging markets and even more so in developing economies, which are many cut off from credit, that is not the case. And a much higher share is owed to foreigners, which is also a big source of fragility. One further point I would make is that in addition to just looking narrowly at fiscal. You need to think about more broadly how private debt has expanded. And there's been papers on this. My, my work with a Han Francisco and Carmen released recently talks about this. It's of all the different kinds of debt that have been rising and in emerging markets, especially there's not always a clear demarcation between what's private and what's public state on companies. Small countries that are entirely reliant on a couple of businesses. But in addition to that, they have banking issues. Now, in advanced economies, we had the global financial crisis, which of course wasn't really global. I think it's more accurately described the 2008 2009 crisis as the advanced economy financial crisis. And emerging markets came roaring out of the financial crisis. They had a dip, but thanks to the rising prices of commodities, the remarkable growth that China sustained. They did not suffer the same way. But consequently, they didn't institute the same banking reforms. And so I think also there's some questions going forward. Not simply about, you know, what we narrowly see in death, but what's going on with their banks and of course, very much as Ireland, Iceland, Spain experience. I think there are many concerns going forward around emerging markets. Well, this graph, you know, but I'll put it up anyway, which is giving interest payments and interest rates and advanced economies. They've both been trending down and I think a point, you know, you think about this all the time, but many light people don't think about was the falling interest rates have benefited advanced countries, not simply because today's short rates are lower. Advanced countries are constantly rolling over maturing debt. If you borrowed something 20 years ago, you were paying a much higher 20 year interest rate than you're going to be paying today. And that's also been driving interest rates down and will continue to for a little while. On the other hand, in emerging markets, despite also having that wind at their backs, their interest payments have been rising. And maybe this isn't the most dramatic graph. Because as it's laid out here, the interest payments as a share of GDP is still not that high, although it's rising. But this is weighted by GDP. So it gives China an enormous weight. If you did it not weighted by GDP, it would be much more dramatic. And, you know, of course, if we go to 10 year bond yields, they're very low in the richer countries, but in emerging markets, they're high and I'm not even giving some of the weakest emerging markets here. And of course, we've seen a number of emerging markets recently raising interest rates already, I think. Poland, Russia, Hungary, Mexico, Brazil, Columbia are all central banks that have been raising their interest rates of late. So they're facing a very different problem. So, I mean, I'm not the only one who thinks there's concern. At least the World Bank speaking out about this forcefully we'll see what the IMF says, and the certainly the rating agencies have been downgrading emerging markets. And then lastly, on emerging markets. This is a graph from a paper by Kramer Willis and Yang it was given at the NBR macro annual in April. And it shows the different portiles of wealth across the world. The blue is the poorest quartile. And you can see there was this period up to 2000, where there really had been convergence, the poorest quartile was doing better. And then after 2000, there was an extended period where the second and third quartile were doing better than the first quartile that actually had already slowed down before the pandemic. And this paper doesn't run through 2020 but with the numbers, such as the IMF and the World Bank are releasing, it's gotten much worse. The World Central Banks are facing very different problems. Let me, let me turn now to advanced economies. And I'll have to refer back to my 2019 talk to the various books and papers I've written about this. I'm going to give some very strong views, but I think I nuance them, explain them and defend them in these various writings, but just for the sake of clarity, you know, make make these points. And first, as it says in the top line, you know, the advanced emerging distinction is more of a continuum. And, you know, Greece is not the same as Germany in terms of, you know, it's graduation from problems, although it's been very obviously a lot has changed in the last 10 years. I do think the impact of the zero bound is profound. I remind you my talk from 2019 was about how to think about in normal times, which unfortunately we're nowhere near at the moment, but in normal times if we continue to have the kind of downward trend in real interest rates that Schmelzing documents and certainly the very well known papers by Williams, Laubach and Holston that they document if we continue to have this. We need to think about how to do effective zero negative interest rate policy. And of course there are challenges, but there are with everything. And I'll come back to it. Instead, central banks are forced to rely on other instruments. Now the ECB is different, because there is no corresponding Treasury, and the role that the ECB plays is really correspondingly much larger. So in this remark I'm making, I'm really referring to a single country central banks. I don't know what your terminology is for it. But like the United States, like New Zealand, like the United Kingdom now. And I argue in my book that really quantitative easing is not an instrument. It's really just maturity transformation. It's not an instrument, which is at all special to the monetary authorities. There's nothing they do that couldn't be done by fiscal authorities. Okay, and a crisis that's completely different because that's the classic role of central banks to be able to move very quickly and forcefully in a crisis backed up by the fiscal authorities later when needed. There's no questions about what was done in the pandemic. What was done during the financial crisis. Where I have to say central banks were not only forceful, but quite creative in their responses. But in normal times, which will happen again someday. For example, in the United States, one week Treasury bills actually last I checked pay a lower interest rate than reserves. They're a very perfect substitute. It's really just maturity transformation. And yes, there's some liquidity effects. My colleague, Javier Bax and his co-author Ralph Cochin have papers emphasizing how the short term liquidity effects in the banking sector big, but they're not the same as interest rate effects. It's not nearly as powerful an instrument. And again, you know that at least, you know, in the United States, the Treasury is constantly refinancing trillions of dollars every year. And its choice of maturity structure to choose overwhelms anything the Federal Reserve could do in normal times. So, and I would say the same about what I would call fiscal QE, where the private sector where the central bank, so I'm referring to pure QE there where the central banks buying Treasury bills or Treasury bonds. But when it comes to fiscal QE, which is my term for when central banks buy private sector debt. That's also certainly something the fiscal authorities can do. In fact, through various guarantees and various different facilities that government set up the fiscal authorities are deeply entwined. But during a crisis, it's very different, but this isn't a unique role to central banks. And I think this here, here, there's a very important overlap, but I think in both QE and pure QE and fiscal QE, this outside of prices, the central banks are junior partners in the relationship, not the ECB that's different. And then finally, as I as I mentioned, you know, there's there's this push to have central banks expand what their list of targets are, and being asked to weigh in areas that are thinly related to their mandate and expertise. It's part of the price of success, but it's also part of being stuck at the zero bound where these other activities aren't happening as much. You may get lucky. I'd say that somewhat sarcastically if that's allowed in this day and age. You may get lucky and inflation may rise quite a bit. And central banks will be very clearly focused on that for a while, but I don't think these other issues are necessarily going to go away. So, I think I've certainly covered this, this problem that the impact of the zero bounds really something profound. And, you know, I don't want to go off on it too much and I particularly say that it's a moment in time. There's so much crazy going on and crazy is made maybe not the right word, but such extreme changes going on in policy. It's been necessary to have, you know, record fiscal deficits outside of wartime. It's been necessary to do all sorts of things to try to protect people deal with this tragic pandemic. So, I'm not referring to this, but it will change. And I think how to think of bringing back the use of central banking to make interest rates negative at the short term without the constraints that we face at the moments. Very important. And there are, there's certainly ways to deal with us. I'll come back to. I want to take a tangent if you can forgive me on another piece of my research, but it's really remarkable evidence to me that how dormant normal monetary policy has become. And this comes from a paper I gave at the end of last year at the Brookings panel with Ethan Olszewski and Carmen Reinhardt, which observed that if you look at the center of the global financial system exchange rate volatility has collapsed and even during the pandemic. It's actually been trending down for certainly since 2014, arguably before that and by the center, I mean the Euro, the yen, the dollar, you could include the RMB, although of course the central bank of China somewhat fixes by design. So this is a volatility graph from our paper. There are many different ways to look at it. This is the US dollar. This is from 75 through 2020, obviously, taking a synthetic Euro before the formation of the Euro. And you can see this decline, even this remarkable decline during the pandemic. I could show you the same thing for the yen. Even more remarkable. And yes, there's a lot of talk about exchange rate changes, but let's not forget during the financial crisis. Depending on whether you look at intraday or end of day, the Euro, you know, went between, I don't know where, you know, up to like 160, 159, 160, and had, you know, gone down below one, you know, at one point. I mean, that's just nothing. What we're seeing now is just nothing compared to that. And I think another interesting observation of this decline in volatility is that if you look at dollar Euro volatility, and I could have picked other or currency measures relative to other assets. Exchange rate volatility didn't just go down in absolute terms. It went down during the pandemic relative to oil relative to commodity prices relative to the S and P 500. And we don't know all the reasons for this. Of course, there are other candidates. And I, but the one I think that we think is the leading candidate is that not only is interest policy of the advanced countries at the zero bound, but you know it's going to be at the zero bound for a time to come. Yes, there's forward guidance central banks give, but I think it's been pretty clear to everyone that the shadow negative interest for the shadow interest rate. The interest rate that you might have gotten during the pandemic and I don't necessarily speak at this minute. I'm not trying to comment on current policy, but the shadow interest rate during the pandemic was negative. It wasn't just a little bit negative. It was very negative. So I think markets recognize that and it might have contributed to reduced exchange volatility. I have to say there's another explanation, which is the US expanded the use of swap lines. Although that did not have nearly the same effect during the financial crisis. And, you know, finally, just to complete this thought. If you look at G for currency volatility, so I'm bringing in China. And you look here as a graph figure, which contains both the Bretton, the sort of Halcyon era of the Bretton Woods system. 50 through 70 and looks at the Bretton Woods period, which. We term the recent period, the extended Bret, Bretton Woods to. Dually, duly, Fokerts, Landau and Garber coined the term. Bretton Woods to talking about how Asia had been stabilizing exchange rates against the dollar. Many of the their ideas are really. Used in Ben Bernanke's famous global savings lot speech. We now speak of extended Bretton Woods to where even at the core, there's been this exchange rate volatility. And by the way, the title of our paper. Hence, will this exchange the fall collapse and exchange rate volatility survive after COVID. Okay, just, you know, not to be difficult, but just a brief mention of negative interest rates, which the ECB talks very candidly about. But I do think if we continue in this trend of downward. Our star downward neutral. Real interest rates and we want to take low inflation. I think by far the most elegant approach would be to do what needs to be done to have short term negative interest, right? I've written. Certainly chapters of my book about this and papers about this. You know, certainly theoretically the most elegant approach is simply to create an exchange rate between paper currency and bank reserves. But there are a lot of trends, which really make all this a lot easier in the short term phasing out large nomination notes and having CBDCs. Can that make this transition easier as well? Okay, I won't say anymore. And of course, I just want to emphasize, I've said it 3 or 4 times already. The ECB is different. There's no pure QE. There's in the, in the. In the ECB because there's no Europe wide fiscal authority able to coordinate to just counter whatever the ECB is doing. And it gives it a more significant governance role. I said my talk was about all central banks. I think I, one other. Let's say digression I want to make is to underscore that the, the euro and even more of the dollar are really quite unique. And so some economists will write a paper about the United States and draw conclusions for the United Kingdom, much less Australia and New Zealand. And they're, they're, they're not all the same. And of course, if you look at foreign currency reserves, the dollar and the euro account for a very large share central bank foreign currency reserves. This is from my QJ paper with. Which where we try to ask what is the currency around which other countries have their currency orbit. The dollar is absolutely dominant and the euro after that. And certainly in terms of world debt markets. This is a big topic in Europe. This is, it's hard to keep up. This is from the end of 2020. And this figures already wildly outdated. This is from our slightly updated from our Brookings paper. But the US had almost as much debt outstanding and private markets as all the other advanced economies put together. Okay, let me lastly come to the issue of should central banks expand their targets. I've mentioned green economics. There are people who think central banks have caused inequality and I would I would listen to them by the way. But I disagree with the point. So there's a very narrow point, which is central banks have been bringing down interest rates, low interest rates, raise asset prices, high asset prices, make rich people even richer. And so you're doing a bad job because you're creating inequality. And of course, that fails to ask questions like what if central banks didn't bring down interest rates. What would have happened to jobs. What would have happened to consumption inequality. What would have happened to recessions welfare. And I think in terms of the global trends and interest rates, which I highlighted earlier, the central banks are really followers. Yes, you have a big effect on the market the day you do things. Yes, the risk that you put into the markets and take out of the markets has an effect. But the larger trends have to do with, with, with other things. That isn't to say that as the targets that central banks tape expand. You need to listen, not just to other political actors. But again, you know, speaking from within a broad university. There are many other disciplines that think they have something to say. You start if you want to be talking about inequality, but my fundamental point is that something central banks should care about, but it's very hard to make it their target. I do think what the Federal Reserve did with. Nuisance in what it meant by unemployment and maybe. Basically putting a higher weight on unemployment relative to inflation to take account of unemployment's effect on inequality. That may that that I certainly wholeheartedly supported and agreed with. But there are limits. And then, as I mentioned, there are these broader ideas out there saying that central banks are partnered with the financial sector. And that all eventually conspires against working people. You will, you will, these ideas are in the winds of academics in many disciplines and you'll be hearing more of this. It's, it's a very hard for central banks to set objectives and areas outside their expertise. I will say one leading central banker, actually leading former central banker at this point, said to me not so long ago that this person believed that central banks have more competency in the economics of the environment than the rest of their government. That might be it's not a very healthy situation for sure. I, I, I think it's good that central banks encourage competency in this area. But I think it's really hard to be making decisions about what should be nuclear power. Should we use natural gas as a transition fuel and not just say we should never have natural gas. These are, these are political decisions that that need to be made. And of course, where central banks can play a big role is saying, look, we, we back. What you're doing, but we, we, you know, we're going to stabilize the economy. We are going to warn you. Not to discourage you. We're going to warn you that there may be more volatility to come and we are going to try to be creative and trying to deal with this. You may get inflation. You may get deflation. You may get larger business cycles, but we're not the ones setting the objectives. And again, you know, coming to this point that central banks should be steering the ship, but not deciding where it's going when it comes to some of these 3050 100 year 100 year goals. I do appreciate that it is important that as part of the pillars of the establishment, the commanding heights of the global economy. Central banks do need to speak out about the environment. It's some level, it's very important what China does. And if the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve speak out forcefully. That helps. I do, I don't want to discourage that I'd say the same thing about the World Bank the IMF other global leaders. But I would not confuse that with the technocratic side of things. I've talked about inequality. Let me just take one last subject cryptocurrency, which I, I also write about quite a bit in my 2016 book and also I write there about the future of central bank digital currencies. I think there's a very strong case here for central banks to play a leading role. And I think they have in some respects. If you certainly look at what happened to Facebook when it introduced Libra now DM, which is still forthcoming. They really ran into central bags. That was the first line of defense when the Swiss regulators really rained the Facebook cryptocurrency in was by saying fine. But you make the central banks happy and then we'll go ahead. And that played an important role in my own country. The central bank regulators is it's in, I'm sorry, the cryptocurrency regulation is just incredibly diffuse. That's extremely problematic. There's a tendency as a SWARP Prasad emphasizes in his recent book for people to like find the most permissive parent that they can find that will approve whatever they're doing. There needs to be more centralization nationally. But also internationally. And I think this is a role for central banks. I think clearly digital currencies and there are many papers coming out about this. I was involved in a G 30 paper, but it's one of many, many. And I mentioned wrote about this in my book that there's a lot to be said about this. But I do think that primarily starts with central banks. Back in the late. 1970s. The US post office sued companies producing fax machines. They claimed that that it can. That was a form of correspondence and therefore was included under their monopoly on correspondence. There was a. Case, I think it even went to the Supreme court. I'm not sure, but I think it did about this that the postal service lost. You know, it's sort of ironic fax machines have lost to by now. But, you know, 1 could argue, well, there are these new. Digital currencies central banks saying that they have a role is a little bit like the postal service saying that it should be able to regulate fax machines and it's monopoly extended fax machines. That's of course nonsense. But, but I think for many reasons we understand central banks play a central role. I mentioned here in an aside, there actually is kind of a digital currency already in the United States. It's called treasury direct. The treasury doesn't advertise it on buses, because I think they're worried it would become too popular. But I think that this should end up in the central bank. And then lastly, and perhaps most importantly about this issue and where central bank independence plays an essential role. Is it's very important to have political insulation from all the lobbying. I think a dynamic we saw with the financial crisis was the financial sector got very wealthy. There was a period when it was the biggest donor to both political parties in the United States. And it had a lot of it had a lot of influence and there was some good deregulation, but some bad deregulation. You're all very familiar with those problems. The point I want to make is we could see the same phenomenon here. Crypto is very exciting. It's producing a lot of money. There, of course, is some real innovation here, but there's a lot of regulatory arbitrage regulatory avoidance involved in crypto. And I think it's very, very valuable to have an institution which remains independent and insulated. So, let me just conclude by saying the case for into central banking today is just far richer and more nuanced than I dreamed. When I was a junior economist at the Federal Reserve in the 1980s. And I got the idea of having a theoretical model of central bank independence. It's way too narrow. But on the other hand, the topic has become way more important. Thank you.