 Thank you very much to the organizer for for doing this, even though we are in a very, very weird times. Okay, so very quickly because I just realized that I have a lot of things to, I would like to say a lot of things. Probably everybody of us has read something about the involvement of third states like the US and UK in the conflict of Yemen and through the arms transfers of, through arms transfer directed to Saudi Arabia. So basically Saudi Arabia is using British and American and American weaponry and also other other weapons coming from other third states. So looking at the scholarship that we have, we started to see around this phenomenon which is not new at all. I mean it's a typical Cold War and probably also states started to transfer arms and things probably even before the modern age. We have, we still have, we have this problem of saying what are we doing as third states, are we involved in the conflict, are we involved in what are the weapons, the weapons we transfer are going to be used. So, today in my, today in my, in the paper I present, I'm, I would like to, I would like to draw on some findings, findings from by a professor and I are, and I are professor, Professor Anna Stavrianakis, who was quite involved in the, in the research of this of the involvement of Britain, British involvement in with regards to Saudi Arabia, intervention in Yemen. So, first of all, a very general, a very general premise. Since at least the 1930s, states, but almost all states, or at least the major, let's say the major arms, arms producing states have system domestic systems whereby they need to authorize the export. So, every, the export of armaments. So, every arms exiting the country is authorized by, by the, by the government in various ways, but we always have an authorization. Then we have, then after the end of the Cold War, we started to have, we started to have a reform of these systems. And in this system, we started to see pre export assessments being provided by relevant legislation. And this pre export assessment include the prevent, the, yeah, the assessment of possible, of possible violations of human rights and humanitarian law, among other things. I'm just focusing on these two because they are the, the, the most legal, the most legal criteria. Now, for example, now we have also some international and super, a super national, super national legislation that actually impose this kind of, this kind of pre export assessment. So we have the, the European Union Council common position nine for four of 2008 and the arms trade treaty, speaking about speaking about this kind of pre export assessment based on human rights and humanitarian law. So, reading the professor Savrionakis findings, I realized that I realized that she has a point in saying that these, these pre export assessments can be actually used by state and that actually used by exporting states to actually escape responsibility to try to avoid, they try to avoid the involvement from anything that happens with the armaments beyond borders. So today with you I'm going, I'm going to go through very quickly through three scenarios that identified. I'm going to skip some things that I would have liked to present with you so if I miss something please just ask me some question and then I will have the chance to expand on some aspects. So this scenario is when we have another estimation of positive aspects by the arms exporting states and then under estimation of, let's say undesirable or inconvenient considerations. If you read, for example, President Trump statement of the 24th of July to 2019 you will have an idea of what, what I mean, Trump try to emphasize for example, the security and the defense, the national security and the fence, both of the US and of the Saudi Arabia, vetoing actually the Congress resolution to stop, to stop arms being sent to Saudi Arabia. I argue that this basically this basically is not is not an interpretation that we can accept as lawyers, because we can look at article seven of the arms treaty, even though I know that I even thank you even know I know that I mean the US is not part of the country, but it's clear in special in special regulations in special lex specialist regulations that security and defense consideration cannot overcome the risk of human rights and IHL violations. And I argue that this is common also in other in other legal regimes that consider this consider our military operations or risk of human rights or violation of human dignity. I just mentioned, for example, the principle of non-nurse in torture, for example, security and defense is no is no trump card for possible risk. But also if we look at article 14 of the liver code, which is considered to be one probably one of the first sources of IHL as Nils Meltzer points out military necessity is not is not does not derogate IHL principle so soldiers need to abide by IHL even when they are actually they are actually claiming that they are doing something for military needs. So this is the first scenario. And so it's a it's a way for saying that we need to to frame risk assessment properly according to the principles of that we have already in international law. The second scenario is when we have the argument or actually the even actually the possibility by the treaty itself for example the arms treaty. It's saying we are putting in place mitigating risk mitigating measures to decrease the read the level of risk in order to send arms abroad anyway. My idea. I'm basing the originality of my future doctoral dissertation is is the idea that these mitigating measures, even though they don't speak about prevention. These are these are actually evidence of an obligation to prevent. Exactly like the tree of the tree of the Alabama Corfu and genocide case are explaining us. Of course, we don't have a provision like the genocide case, which exactly spells out prevent the duty to prevent. But if we look at the purpose of the arms treaty. And we look also at the relevant relevant case the commission case law, we can and we can see that the exporting state is put in a position of preventing some undesirable and lawful effects of the arms trade and mitigating mitigating risk mitigating measures needs to be interpreted in that way. Finally, unfortunately, probably it's the most contested point of my paper and I left it. I left it at the end. I would like to argue as well that there is a link between the due diligence obligations due diligence obligation the case of arms transfer regulation and complicity. I would like to argue as as other people have already have already done in other fields. That you did the respect abiding by due diligence obligations actually put the arms exporting state in a position for having an higher degree of knowledge with regards to the final destination and the final use of the of the arms. So, these are my arguments, I just wrap up. I'm really fascinated by, by what some authors say, say that thinking about risk means thinking or imagining future. I would say that as international lawyers week when we made in the future, we should think about the future that has no torture human rights violations or IHL violations in the future. So, we need actually to read the risk assessment rules in that way, in a way that risk assessments are not be are not used as a jail free card for arms exporting state and even arms exporting state have their own responsibility for the final use of the arms. Thank you very much.