 Thank you, Alex, and thank you, Michael, good to see you again. And we agree on most of the issues that he discussed here because we were working together on the issues in the past. However, on certain issues, we look at them from different perspectives. If we look at the process of or efforts to negotiation with insurgents, I'm not going to use the word Taliban because it's not only Taliban, it's the insurgents. Afghanistan actually faces an insurgency, an insurgency environment, not only one faction of the Taliban. And as Michael said, you call all these insurgents Taliban whether or not. So the hallmark of the failed efforts of the past seven years actually include two points. One is the missed opportunities. And second, failure to integrate the negotiation or reconciliation in the context of an overall counterinsurgency strategy because there was no counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan in the past eight years. So all what we see, we have seen in the past seven or eight years were either fragmented, rhetoric, and at the same time, not transparent and not effective. So therefore, I think if we look at three stages as Michael also referred to it, born and after born and then the way that some efforts, fragmented efforts at the place I will come back to this. But if you look at the Afghan psyche, Michael in his book referred to it, that there's a potential for reconciliation in Pashtun society. And however, I think there's one thing that I want to stress that the kind of potential is more for peace rather than for reconciliation because and Pashtun is actually living in a very difficult environment faced so many difficult times. They want to prefer to delay the final decision. That's why when he refers to Tiga or Moritoria, one thing, that's because they, okay, we will stop here, we will wait for final decision. That is the second. And this affects the whole process of reconciliation in Afghanistan with the Pashtun society. In the 70s, I went to Bakhtia of the government to resolve the dispute between two tribes, Jadiz and Mangal, over the rights of logging and a mountain. And I realized that there are 70 issues not resolved. They're all Tiga's or all these Moritoria's truths. In some cases the government wanted that to not to resolve issues, but now today the same way. Those who are in Helmand or in Kandahar or in Farah, they are not going to make a commitment unless they say, okay, that's the only way. They will talk to you and therefore I think Afghanistan missed two opportunities for a grand deal. One was at Bonn. As Michael said that it failed to address the causes of war and also to include all parties. That's one, because at that time all Taliban's were terrorists, all Taliban's were linked to Al-Qaeda or that was a perception. So neither the international community nor the Northern Alliance were willing to include although at that time 85% of Taliban were ready to join the political process, renounce violence and including the leadership that I know. The second opportunity was missed in 2002-2003. That was the time that Taliban finally decide what to do. They tried their strategies in Karachi in 2002 I think. And then finally decided okay, we are not ready to wage a conflict on conflict and there are so many problems in Afghanistan to negotiate with the government. So they actually created two teams. One was to look after the possibility of fighting the other one to talk to the government. That was the time that they were coming to us. They came to me, contacted me, contacted Minister of Defense Faheem, contacted President Karzai. And all they wanted was a guarantee for their protection. And in my conversation with them I said okay, I will protect you as a minister of interior. I said no, you are not the only person in Afghanistan. There are several centers of power in Afghanistan. You are here in the Ministry of Interior, yes. And then Minister of Defense as its own agenda, Faheem Khan. The intelligence chief out of Khan was his own network. U.S.'s own network, coalition forces, ISAF, intelligence agencies of these countries. If you can find a way, a mechanism that can guarantee the protection where all these actors will be involved then we will be assured that we but we were unable to create that kind of a mechanism. Because on the black list issue there was never a regional agreement who should be on the black list and the rest are fine. Whatever reconciliation was made was on an individual basis. Yes, 12 people of 42 of the UN list were reconciled but they were just individuals they came back. It did not affect the situation on the field. And at the same time there is always one question whether the insurgency the instability is caused by insurgency or insurgency is caused by an unstable environment. Failure of the government. Failure of the international community. Mis-treatment of people. In many cases the three wars that was going counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and state-building. This sometimes worked across purposes. What was done in the interest of counter-terrorism it actually alienated people and caused resentment that is bad for winning hearts and minds which is the key to women insurgency. What was being done for counter-insurgency actually was not good for state-building because some very un-you know people with questionable past were co-opted in state-building so they were not interested in a stable state. Michael referred to the 2002 and I haven't experienced in 2003 when two militia corps were fighting with tanks and artillery in the north and I was there two months to stop that war and then to disengage them and to collect the heavy weapons because the civilians were losing their lives and there were tanks who were waiting when to loot Mazar Sharif in October 2003 and then the international community was looking it was green on green as they said and so all these created that environment. Now in any negotiation I think unless you create the strategic context it will be fragmented it will be ineffective. Yes I agree with Michael that the small reconciliation even small they actually will help. I don't agree that it will help all the time because if you sustain them it will help otherwise if you cannot sustain them this will discourage others from doing the same kind of a deal. Look at Mousaq Allah what happened Mousaq Allah Yes at the beginning that was a very attractive deal Mullah Salam a commander with the Taliban he came to the side of the government he took over in Mousaq Allah with his men and there were so many VIP visits there to praise them and to brag about it but what happened today the last time Mullah Salam talked to me about a month ago before he went to India he said nobody even can protect my family in Kajaki I had to go myself there to Kajaki to protect my family and what is the difference Mullah Salam today who is manning only a post in Mousaq Allah the building of the district administration in another government district administrator who is in Nadi Ali or in Greshk that he is only confined to that building actually this discouraged many others from making the same deal now suppose that the Taliban commander and Helman today said okay I will go to the side of the government what are you going to do with his men and can you find him a job can you integrate him into the armed forces I think there was one bad experience that Michael knows would be with the Greshk that there was an idea that I would get the men of Mullah Salam and the Khmer band and the security built of Greshk and if I remember correctly Michael and then this was a conspiracy the government, suspicions which has very present consequences therefore there is no plan unless you have a major plan and you integrate it the overall counter-insurgency strategy it is not going to work because all the rebellions in Afghanistan had one common strategy to outlast the other side as long as that tendency is there as long as there are cries around the world that we are going to lose in Afghanistan why they would come there are many reports about these negotiations in Saudi Arabia I have spoken with many of those people who were involved they said there was nothing substantive in it unless you change the environment it will be very difficult to reach a kind of agreement that will not create more problems in the future so therefore there are three points that we have to take into consideration first for reconciliation I mean sustainable reconciliation not tactical deals there should be incentive for negotiation both sides should realize that they can get something through negotiation that they cannot get through fighting the second is the who can deliver in this negotiation as I said Mujahideen has reconciled 6,000 people but it made no difference on the people and so you have to find who can deliver when you negotiate with them and finally what costs are acceptable there are some costs you pay but the opportunity costs are higher which after you make a deal maybe that will spawn more problems if the negotiation reaches that aims at turning the clock back to 2001 or 2000 I think it is going to be the source of more problems in Afghanistan Afghans are not going to go back to 2000 not going to go back to 2001 so therefore I think you have to what costs are acceptable to both sides so therefore I will stop here but just one last point is that the time for a grand deal is gone it is very difficult because there is no one group there is no possibility unless Afghanistan, Pakistan all can work together so it has to be local deals but local deals that eventually will make the top leadership irrelevant and that is possible only if the country stabilizes the country when the people then it will make the deal eventually I think to defeat the insurgents in Afghanistan is to make it irrelevant not to kill the fighters thank you very much