 Good afternoon, and thanks for the kind introduction. Ladies and gentlemen, Madam Chair and dear David. Germans are not known for being punters, but then I came to London and met David Marsh. And if that wasn't enough, the Lehman collapse five years ago brought to a sudden halt a business model that in the words of Prime Minister Cameron had become lopsided, too dependent on debt, consumption, and financial services. Against this backdrop, I met David in January 2009. In his charmingly provocative way, he enticed me into a wager involving the pound and the euro. The bet was whether or not the exchange rate would be a parity before the end of 2009. Now recall that in January 2009, the pound had plunged to a record low of about 94% pens to the euro. Dazzled by what appeared to be a free fall of the pound and carried away by my euro enthusiasm, I said, yes, the pound will fall to parity in 2009, whereas David predicted that it would not. Now, needless to say, we got it right. But let me assure you, it still hurts. But you say it up. I did, and that's why it hurts even more. So for the past four years, I have been looking for a rematch. Now maybe the time has come. David and I have been asked to speak about Germany and Europe before and after the Germany election. Now as I see it, only Europe would lend itself to another wager. For I suspect that David and I could readily agree on the German question, at least the kind of German question that is on people's minds in the run-up to our election. And this question is not who wins on Sunday. Now that is for the German people to decide. But there is a question I will not duck. It relates to Germany and Europe, or more specifically to Germany and the euro. The question is this. Could Sunday's election lead to a major change in Germany's European policy? Now the answer is a plain no. And I will explain why in a minute. But before I do, I have to come back to my lost wager. My hunch is that David would not be prepared to challenge me on my prediction that regardless of the outcome, Germany's policy on Europe and the euro will not alter fundamentally. Now David, if I'm wrong, we have a first deal. In any case, I would like to offer another bet. I would be prepared to bet that the euro zone stays together as it is. Now it would be a bit unfair if I had to claim the zone will keep intact forever. In that case, I would never get my reward, whereas David would get his as soon as the first member had left. So a fair bet would be to predict the survival or demise of the zone as it is until the end of 2014. Now why do I think David would be more prepared to accept this bet? Through his many writings, he has gained a reputation as a euro skeptic. By no means a skeptic on Europe. By English standards, David is a staunch pro-European. But as I see it, he is worried that the euro might be disintegrating rather than an integrating force. Now this has made him a euro doomster. And if he were proven right, he would go down in history as Europe's neural rubini. Just as Mr. Rubini became famous for predicting the subprime crash, David would be remembered as Europe's told you so. Would be, but not will be, because the euro will not crash. Now this is not a Morgenstern prediction. Christian Morgenstern was a witty German writer and poet who died shortly before World War I. One of his most famous lines goes like this. Weil, so schließt, ein Messerschaf, nicht sein kann, was nicht sein darf. For, he reasons pointedly, that which must not cannot be. Morgenstern was making fun of German idealism, which would rather ignore facts than give in to them. I would readily admit that those who view the euro as an idealistic project have a point. They are right to point out that the euro is a bit of an orphan. We introduced the common currency, but left it without an economic and political union. The crisis has laid bare this structural deficiency. Not that this shortcoming was unknown to the founders of the euro. Giving up the D-mark was highly controversial in Germany. It was seen by many as putting the cart before the horse by starting with a monetary union ahead of a political union. So the risks were well known, but there were good reasons to incur them nevertheless. An essential motivation were the economic advantages to be gained from complimenting a common market with a common currency. These economic considerations continued to be as valid as they were when we launched the euro. Indeed, without the euro making eminent economic sense, it might not have introduced in the first place or would have survived until today. For when you think of it, what is more surprising? That so far the euro has survived the deepest crisis in European integration or that it has hit troubled waters? I hope you know my answer. An answer based on the notion that the euro is worth fighting for because it has always been more than just an economic project. It has been and continues to be not only an economic end in itself, but a means to a political end. And this end is the reinforcement of the European space of prosperity, peace, and democracy, a triad that we either enjoy together or lose together. The euro's political nature as well as its economic benefits provide the dual key to what I call the German question at stake in Sunday's election or rather not at stake. For do not expect that the outcome of the election could lead to a reversal in our European policy. Is this good news or bad news? To me, it's good news. But I'm not a Morgenstern idealist, so I suspect that some will see it as a message of mixed, see the message as a mixed blessing at best. But be that as it may, it is a realistic message. Europe will not be a decisive electoral issue. Sure, eurozone problems are high on voters' minds. Germans know that we cannot retreat on an island of the blessed. We need stable and prosperous neighbors for the sake of our own stability and prosperity. At the same time, many Germans are concerned that we are being asked to take on too many liabilities that could turn into real losses. The essence of our response to the crisis has been to strike a balance between these sentiments and interests. And whoever will form the next government, maintaining this balance will continue to be a key objective of our policy on the euro. This explains that while Europe figures prominently on people's minds, it will not be an electoral game changer. Even if the opposition wins, they too would have to reconcile two objectives, helping partners to recover in a way that contains the risks for the German taxpayer. Now, some might call this a populistic argument. I disagree. For a start, let me remind you that populism has not always had pejorative connotations. My Oxford Dictionary defines a populist as, and I now quote, a member of a political party seeking to represent the interests of ordinary people, end of quote. Now, there's nothing wrong about representing the interests of ordinary people. In fact, democracy could not survive otherwise. But of course, this is not the end of the story. In a representative democracy, leaders do not operate on an imperative mandate. Instead, they might have to take decisions that do not meet with universal approval. Theodore Roosevelt opined, I have no idea what the American people think. I'm only interested in what they should think, end of quote. Now, all very well, Mr. President. Yes, leaders have a responsibility to lead, but they can only exercise this responsibility if they receive or retain a mandate to leave. The next German chancellor will have no mandate for a U-term. This does not exclude adjustments, for as Keynes has said, when the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir? So adjustments there might be, but there will be continuity in our basic approach. And that will be so not only because of popular will. It is also the sensible thing to do. Germans are acutely aware that their well-being is tied up with that of our European neighbors. We will not forget that European integration has been essential for our post-war comeback. Economically through the common market, politically through joining a democratic club, and morally through the hand extended to us by the victims of Nazi aggression. We will not forget that the success of German reunification and of united Germany are bound up with European integration. But Germany alone cannot deliver a strong and prosperous Europe. Even our resources are limited. We know it, and the markets know it. Today, Germany is the anchor of the eurozone. We are the anchor because we have a highly productive and globally competitive economy. Figures never tell the whole story, but they can be instructive. Now here are some that make Germany stand out among Europe's big economies. Manufacturing as a percentage of GDP significantly higher. Exports to BRICS countries as percentage of total exports much higher. Spending on research and development, as well as patents granted, again well above the average. Economic importance of the property sector, significantly lower. These are not the ingredients of universal success. Each country has to find its own way of securing its comparative economic advantages. But what the figures do show is this. You have to have an innovative and productive economy to prosper in a highly competitive global economy, at least in the longer term. Financial engineering and property speculation, excessive public and private spending, all fueled by cheap money, can generate bubble booms. But when the sand begins to shift, as it inevitably will, the houses of cards collapse. Today, Germany is economically strong. Only 10 years ago, we were weak. Maintaining economic prosperity and social stability will need further reforms in the years to come. So it is with us, and so it is with our European neighbors. We all have homework to do. Some more than others, but there can only be a strong Europe if its constituent parts are strong. Germany needs a strong Europe, and the euro is a vital underpinning of a Europe that can hold its ground in the global arena. So for economic as well as political reasons, our commitment to the euro is rock solid. All parties who could conceivably form the next government backed the euro and European integration. And they all know that this doesn't come free of charge. The same is true for the German people. Germans know that their place in the world is in Europe. They have been, and they will remain ready to show solidarity with friends in need. But there is a limit to what Germany can do and what Germans will be willing to do. It takes two to tangle. I do not know if there is a dance that takes exactly 17 to perform. But for the euro zone, the message from Germany is this. We are all in this together, and we must all do our own bit for it together. Expect to hear this dual message regardless of who wins next Sunday. Thank you.