 Okay, so now we are going to have Q&A's session and I will ask you two or three questions to start and then we will take questions and comments from the audience. My first question is about could we go a little deeper in the internal domestic economic situation because there is a debate. Can you say yourself that the 6% growth rate is what would be necessary to keep the good social conditions without unrest and turmoil? But yesterday I think it was, now Kitanaka told us that the real growth rate might be closer to 2% and you told me half an hour ago that the reality is probably 3%, but 3% is half of the 6% which are needed. So is this a serious issue that could threaten the legitimacy of the party? Well, thank you, Deary. I mentioned that 3% figure to you on a Chatham House basis, but now the room knows that's good. But the bottom line is this, that if you speak to enough Chinese corporates who measure things like their export sales, imports, as well as electricity demand, these become different measures of where growth actually stands in an economy and therefore if you aggregate those unofficial, as it were, calculations of where substantive growth actually stands, it is some ways, a long ways less than 6 as the current Chinese government indicates. The second point I think is what's causing that. I mentioned part of it before, Xi Jinping because he is at heart a Leninist does not inherently trust markets and therefore if there's a defining characteristic of the last several years of Xi Jinping's economic reign, it has been the deleveraging campaign which has been designed for good macroeconomic reasons to reduce the overall level of corporate debt in the economy, but in the implementation of it, the deleveraging campaign has preference to state and enterprises and being, as it were, discriminatory against private firms. Secondly, you also see some language from the Chinese Communist Party leadership not wanting private companies in China to get too big so that they actually dominate the party. And there's something of that story I think alive in the Alibaba tale. And then finally, you have smaller things, but still significant, the enhanced role of the Communist Party secretaries within the individual firm hierarchy of a private firm. Put those together and you see really through 17 and 18, a radical decline in private business confidence in China and that's what's translated its way through to the overall Chinese growth numbers. Remember, the private sector now represents 60% of China's GDP, 6-0. So therefore, it's been the engine room for the growth of jobs, of technology, of exports, of the rest. And so when that sector is unhappy, it translates through into real numbers. The final point is what's the system done about it? From November last year, you begin to see Xi Jinping realizing he has a problem. And there have been a rapid series of measures involving levels of fiscal stimulus, level of monetary policy relaxation, a change in the administrative use of credit to put more of it in the direction of small and medium private enterprises. But so far the data is fairly thin about these private sector players bouncing back as quickly as China wanted. And the final piece in this jigsaw is the US-China trade war. It hasn't been the cause of China's slowing growth, but it is added to it, both objectively because the traders sector of the Chinese economy is about 36% of GDP. And if you look at the sheer volume of the US-China trade, it flows through to the real economy. But also it dovetails with the problem with declining business confidence caused by other factors which have been more domestic. Does it represent a legitimacy threat to the party? Xi Jinping would not have acted unless it represented a problem to him. And so it is the one issue domestically on which I think Xi Jinping remains politically vulnerable. Thank you very much. The second question is about Hong Kong. You said elegantly that it was the unfinished business for the revolution. So how can this business be finished? What is the worst case hypothesis? My reference before was to Taiwan being unfinished business for the Chinese revolution. I think it's important for us to understand how Beijing looks at developments in Hong Kong now. And when they look at Hong Kong, they see something which is troublesome, difficult, but of a vastly smaller order of magnitude compared with the US-China trade war. That is up here for China to resolve as a top priority. Managing Hong Kong is in the middle of the field. It doesn't mean it's unimportant, but I just wanted to give folks here a sense of proportional reality to it. I think we're on the question which we see often debated about whether our Chinese friends will resort to military force in Hong Kong. I do not believe that is probable at all. And the reason I say that is, one, logistically it is a massive task. Think about the military or paramilitary occupation of Hong Kong. Seven million people over a vast number of islands. This would make Tiananmen in 1989 look like a cakewalk. This is a very difficult logistical exercise. Number two, it would inevitably involve a lot of bloodshed. And because of that, because of the bloodshed, you're going to have therefore a huge international reaction, not just to the physicality of the occupation, but what will be very violent. You've seen the number of hardcore protesters now in Hong Kong who are now quite well trained on how to deal with things. And then finally, with Carrie Lam still in control, if you're Xi Jinping, as soon as you militarily intervene, Hong Kong becomes 100% Xi Jinping's problem. Right now, it's 90% Carrie Lam's problem. So for those basic political realities I regard as improbable. There's a separate question about how this thing can be managed appropriately over the next several months. We can go to that later if you'd like. But on the headline question of would they do that, I think on balance, no. Unless the protest movement became mega violent, which I mean blowing up public infrastructure, killing lots of people, all those sorts of things, that would cross some threshold. But under present circumstances and known behaviors, I do not see that happening. Just to end on this, a Hong Kong question, you don't know, we are 22 years after the retrocession and 28 years before the final integration with mainland China. How do you see the possibility of Hong Kong becoming a Chinese province like the others, even in 28 years, because it is one generation? Do you think the mentalities in Hong Kong will change so much in 28 years that it is possible to get to that point without major upheavals? I've lived in China quite a lot over the years, but I've also lived in Hong Kong. My kids were born in Hong Kong, have any friends there, and I know the place reasonably well. Although I don't speak a word of Cantonese, I only speak Mandarin, but it has about it quite a different political and social consciousness to anything you find on the mainland, even in the rest of Guangdong in the south of the country. There's quite a different psychology. So if the Brits were there for 150 years, they actually left or had an impact on the place of psychology in quite a profound way. So I am not sure how this will evolve, but in my own engagements with my friends in China, I've left a few radical ideas, which is if you wanted to calm things down with Hong Kong and whoever the future chief executive of Hong Kong might be once Carrie Lam does go, and I think she will sooner or later, because the Chinese and the Hong Kong administration will need a circuit breaker in this current cycle. But if a new chief executive, whoever she or he might be, was to throw out some conciliatory lines to the protest movement, conduct one or two of the public inquiries which the protest movement want, for example, into the proper deployment of the police, undertake a radical investment in social housing and the underlying difficulties in Hong Kong for poorer, lower middle class people to live comfortably in Hong Kong. Then there's an argument you can begin to present to our Chinese friends along these lines, which is unlike Taiwan, the PRC has already won in Hong Kong. You got sovereignty in 1997. That's what that agreement was all about. And guess what? On the economic measures of things, if you go to the future, if we look at Xinjiang's economy just across the border now, as of two years ago, Xinjiang as a municipal area had a bigger GDP than Hong Kong. Play that out to 2049. That is a very, very big gap which is going to open up. And that's before you look at this mega-development in the Greater Bay Area, which is linking Xinjiang with the rest of the Pearl River Delta in a massive project of development. As I say to our Chinese friends, by the time we get to mid-century, Hong Kong will be as important to China domestically in its size as Macau is today. So why worry about it in the scheme of things? And this is a radical thought for our Chinese friends. Once we get to the 25-year point of the 50 years of one country, two systems, why not roll it over again for another 50? When I've written this to my Chinese friends, there was as much silence in that room as there has been here. In other words, zero response.