 And it is my pleasure to welcome you here today. We're going to put a lot of ideas up for what we think needs to be done in 2016 at the Nuclear Security Summit. I have one or two administrative announcements before I turn this over to Leslie McNeish, who's the Coordinating Director of the FISL Materials Working Group. One, please turn the ringer off on your cell phone. Two, we are live streaming this, and I'm not sure if we're taking questions via email. But is that true, Chris? We are not. But, you know, as you know, anyone who's probably watching this online knows me so you can email your question to me. Third, we do have emergency management rules and procedures here at CSIS, so if there is a problem with anything, Chris Coughlin, raise your hand in the back. He's the person you're going to see. And before I do anything else, I'm going to thank him and also Leslie McNeish for making this all happen today. So I turn the podium over to Leslie. Thank you all for coming. There's been a lot of work put into this project, and it's really exciting to have the rollout been today. So first I'm going to talk a little bit about the FISL Materials Working Group and some background for people who are less familiar with some of these topics. I know some of you, some of you this is going to be a little boring because you just know more than any human being should know about the Nuclear Security Summits. So the FISL Materials Working Group is a coalition of 80 organizations from around the world, plus additional individuals, and everyone in the coalition is really committed to the goal of preventing nuclear terrorism. Experts in FMWG emphasize that nuclear terrorism must be prevented, not responded to, and that's really what results in these recommendations and in the focus on this Nuclear Security Summit process is the idea that this is a huge opportunity and it's one of the most important that we have to prevent nuclear terrorism. So going on a little bit to the Nuclear Security Summit process, as I said, this is going to be repeating from any of you, but a series of international summits that are dedicated, that are specifically dedicated to nuclear security. There was one in Washington in 2010, another in Seoul, South Korea in 2012, and in the Hague, Netherlands, 2014. And then there's a fourth summit planned in 2016 for the United States. These summits have included dozens of presidents and prime ministers along with many other high-level officials and they've really succeeded in bringing high-level attention to this issue which, you know, it's not controversial that nuclear terrorism is bad, but sometimes it's difficult to get the attention for the reforms that we need and for the recommendations that we're going to hear about today and so these summits have been a really great way of bringing that attention. So then going on a little bit to some of the FMWG projects that we have developed in order to try to move this cross-forward and to our support for getting recommendations and the changes that are needed in place, the working groups that you're, or the policy development groups that you're going to hear from today are really one of two major projects that are very much related. The first one is actually the five priorities for the 2016 summit project, which is a one-page document that lays out really the top consensus objectives of the nuclear security expert community. So it's make the global nuclear security regime comprehensive, share information to build global confidence, implement measurable best practices and standards, create a sustainable mechanism for continuous progress and offer plans for eliminating civil, highly-initiated uranium and reducing plutonium. And these working groups really came out of some of those five priorities that one-page document doesn't get into too much detail. And so FMWG experts agreed we should really try to set up some working groups who can delve a little deeper into some of these issues that needed more study. And that's how we ended up with these three groups with the objective of developing innovative and practical recommendations on eliminating highly-inriched uranium in civilian applications, which Andrew Brinowski is going to talk about, enhancing the security of military nuclear materials, which James Doyle is going to talk about. And information sharing standards and best practices and security culture, which Sharon Squassoni is going to talk about. So I'm just going to say a couple of words about each of them. Andrew Brinowski is vice president for material security and minimization at the Nuclear Threat Initiative. He spent 24 years serving in senior-level positions with the U.S. Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. James Doyle is an independent nuclear security analyst and the chair of his group, Andrew and Sharon are going to be representing their groups. But Andrew's group is chaired by Elena Sokova and Sharon's group is chaired by Anita Nielsen. Dr. Doyle was a specialist in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Division at Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1997 to 2014. And he holds a PhD in international security studies. Sharon Squassoni is the director of the proliferation prevention program here and our wonderful host. So thank you very much. And she was previously a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior specialist in weapons of mass destruction at the Congressional Research Service and held positions in the executive branch of government. I also want to mention that we have the report that has the recommendations of all three working groups out in the table out there, as well as two reports from the Highland Australian Elimination Group, a roadmap to the elimination of H.U. and a H.U. Free Zone Report and another article from the Information Sharon Group about security culture. And with that, Andrew. Well, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure to be here. So I'm gonna spend about 15 or 20 minutes talking about the first working group. And very importantly, the words are, it's a working group on not minimizing the use of H.U. but really focus on eliminating the use of H.U. So what I'll do is I'll start with kind of a couple of status slides to show you what we've done and where we've been and then highlight the point that we need to go much further and actually work to eliminate by date certain the use of H.U. First in terms of, let's just go back one slide because I do wanna thank the chair of this working group, Alana Sakeva, did a phenomenal job. And Miles Pomper provided a huge amount of input. We're very pleased that Anya Lukyanova is here with us as well. And I personally wanted to thank our NTI team that is here, Elise Rowan and Samantha Pitz-Kiefer who also helped on this. So with that background, let's just go into a little bit of status about where we've been and then where we need to go. So what this shows you is that as was highlighted earlier there was a lot of momentum and a lot of work done at the three previous nuclear security summits on H.U. Minimization 2010 summit, 2012 and 2014, really focused on this. When I was in government, I ran the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and we were able to clean out 12 additional countries doing 61 shipments over a four-year period in order to clean out those 12 countries. They included Ukraine, they included Mexico and certainly they were noteworthy. But again, when you see the map, you'll see that there's a lot more that needs to be done. A lot of countries are in the process of converting their research reactors, 15 metric tons of H.U. has been downloaded to L.U. But 25 countries around the world still have H.U. or use H.U. and have stocks over one kilogram of highly enriched uranium. So given that this will be most likely the last nuclear security summit in 2016, what we really need to do is seize the opportunity, lock in the gains that we have made on the wide acceptance on H.U. Minimization but then at the summit come up with a comprehensive plan to actually end the use of H.U. in a variety of applications. So next slide, if we can look at the map here and hopefully you can either see it on the side screens or in the screen here. So what jumps out at you are the countries in orange slash red. And so this includes all those countries that have H.U. including some countries that have less than one kilogram of H.U. I specifically included them because if you look at Africa in the middle of Africa, you have Ghana and Nigeria and they have these miniature neutron source reactors which is something that we're trying to address. But you look at the map and you see a lot of orange. You see a lot of green and the green are the 27 countries that have been cleaned out of H.U. And then you can see in gray emphasizing the movement towards H.U. Minimization is those countries that had a research reactor that never had H.U. but had a research reactor that had L.U. The point being though is look at the red and the orange and there is still a huge amount of work to be done around the world. And that's why if people ask why do we need a roadmap? We need to lock in these efforts and do more efforts to clean out additional countries and remove H.U. where possible. On the next slide, this is basically the breakdown of the countries and how much material that they have. This highlights the 25 countries that have more than one kilogram of H.U. And one of the reasons why I wanted to put this up here is first so you could kind of get a sense of the magnitude of the material that is still out there. Certainly if you look at the U.S. and Russia, we still have more than 95% of the world stockpile of material. But if you look down towards the right, you can see that some of these other countries have smaller quantities of H.U. And what that does is it provides us an opportunity for some creative thinking. So what our working group came up with is actually two reports. One of the reports is a roadmap to minimize the use of H.U. And then another report that's out on the back table is let's be creative and let's try and think through and implement H.U. free zones. And when you look at some of these countries that have a small amount of H.U. left Argentina, slightly over one KG, Australia, slightly over one KG, if efforts are made in those countries, you could make significant progress towards some of these H.U. free zones and I'll show you some of those maps a little bit later. So again, what we're trying to do as we think about the last summit and sustainability, come up with a roadmap and come up with as many ways as possible to lock in these gains that have been made. So beginning then with some of the recommendations, if we go back to the last slide on establishing a roadmap, let's just go back one slide. Yep, so what we then came up with through our working group is a roadmap to focus on civilian H.U. And a roadmap that had clear time schedules and timetables for elimination of H.U. and civilian applications. So this isn't just a goal out there, we wanted to have some specific dates. The first date we have there is that the international community should work to convert all remaining civil H.U. field reactors to L.E.U. by 2035. So where do we come up with that date? That is not an FMWG date, that is not an NTI date. That is a date that is straight out of the president's FY16 budget request that is up on the hill. So this is a date that the NNSA and the U.S. government thought through and put out as a reasonable timeframe to work to convert all these research reactors from H.U. to L.E.U. Secondly and very importantly, we talked about the 12 countries that had been cleaned out over the past four years. We have to continue those efforts to repatriate H.E.U. fuel back to the country of origin, down-blend L.E.U. and develop replacement non-H.E.U. fuels. One of the things that I think is very important to highlight is despite everything going on with Russia and Ukraine, these H.E.U. fuel removal programs are continuing despite the current political crisis. So there are gonna be removals taking place this year. There will be some removals taking place next year, but I wanted to emphasize to this group that that is one of the protected areas where the United States and Russia are still cooperating in third countries to remove and repatriate, for example, Russian origin fuel. And then lastly on this bullet is continue efforts to engage countries that so far to date have been reluctant to eliminate their H.E.U. stocks. We realize there are still several countries out there where we need to work on in more detail, Belarus, South Africa. There are efforts that have been underway with those countries, but certainly given the amount of material that they have, we have to continue those efforts. So next slide, Chris, if we go to that, and I know that it keeps jumping around here, what we wanted to highlight for you here and it's in our roadmap is, in addition to what we just said about the 2035 date, is really try and focus on what we call the harder cases. And there's two in particular that we focused on. First is really we need to expand the focus on pulse reactors and critical and subcritical assemblies. If you look at the report that we've just published, Russia has 63 of these facilities inside Russia. And only one of the Russian research reactors has been converted. So a lot more work has to be done, not only on the research reactors, but on these pulse reactors and critical and subcritical assemblies. We need to decommission those facilities quite frankly, that are no longer needed. We need to work and continue our efforts on high density L.E.U. fuels. The NNSA is spending about 40 or 50 million a year on these very important high density L.E.U. fuels. And then we need to try and consolidate the workloads of some of these remaining research reactors to the extent possible. So that's one area. The second area which we put a lot of thought into is focusing on naval propulsion. And we are recommending that we launch a national or multinational research and development effort to replace H.E.U. in naval propulsion. Right now that's about 290 tons of H.E.U. in naval stocks. The French currently use low and rich uranium in their submarine fleet. But what we try to do is we know this is a difficult issue and a controversial issue. So what we came up with is we've got to focus first on the R&D. We have to focus on the research and development that will enable naval reactors to be converted from the use of H.E.U. to L.E.U. So we need to assess the feasibility. We need to accelerate efforts on research testing and so forth. And the U.S. and NNSA really needs to take the lead in allocating additional research and development funds particularly in the FY17 budget so that we can go ahead and work on that R&D in enough time to make decisions about possible conversion. I would note that there is quite a bit of support for this on the Hill. As many of you follow the marks by Senate energy and water and out of the president's FY16 budget request that I just mentioned, they specifically allocated five million out of the NNSA budget to focus on R&D for naval reactors. So you can see that there's a trend in this direction where more and more effort and more and more attention is beginning to this issue. Next slide on some of the specific recommendations. What we really are hoping through the Sherpa process. In fact, the folks that are meeting this week and I was in Norway last week for discussions is to take a lot of the recommendations out of this roadmap that we've worked so hard and actually put it into a gift basket and then have one of the countries such as Norway perhaps sponsor that gift basket so that it could be agreed to at the 2016 nuclear security summit. So what we want to put into that gift basket is not only focus on minimization but focus on ending again the use of HEU in civilian and other non weapons applications to make this process irreversible. So you can see on the slide here what are some of these bullets or commitments that countries could agree to. Keeping in mind back to the map, 27 countries are already completely HEU free and a lot of other countries are already moving further down that direction. So first of all, all future research facilities, civilian propulsion reactors, fast reactors should be designed and should be agreed so that they will not require HEU. Second, all existing civil HEU in use should be eliminated via conversion removal and down blending. A lot of that is already being done. A lot of those 27 countries have already done that. There should be no new HEU produced for civil use. There should be no HEU exported to countries that have not committed to eliminate civilian HEU and we should take HEU minimization and elimination efforts and expand them into these areas to include all non weapons applications and uses. So what are some of the formats and the ways that we can do this? First of all, for the communique, there could be some consensus language in the 2016 communique that could pull from some of the ideas in the roadmap. A second option, perhaps more concrete, as I mentioned would be to actually have a gift basket that takes a lot of the recommendations in the roadmap and turns that into a gift basket, a joint statement and try and get as many out of the 53 summit countries as possible to agree to do that. They could also focus on adopting HEU guidelines and they could also issue some statements on HEU free zones and I'll get to that on the next couple of slides. Then in addition to the options of communique, gift basket, there's also the individual or national country commitments and don't forget that every country attending the summit issues a national statement based on their national interests and the steps that they can take and there's a lot of things that they can do and they've actually done this in the past. For example, at the last summit, Vietnam did a very good job of highlighting some of the efforts that they had done on a national basis in their country national statement on conversion and removal of material. So now just a couple of cool charts that hopefully you can see. Okay, so HEU free zones guys. Okay, so this is one of our favorite ideas and the report is out there. It's got great colors. I know you guys are gonna love it but it does actually make a difference to do these maps by region and then you get a sense of what we're talking about. So let's look at Latin America and see what we can do there on HEU free zones and you look at the map here, you can see Mexico. Great, HEU free, Brazil, HEU free, Chile. I was there for that operation when we removed all the HEU, HEU free, Argentina, a small amount of HEU left. Efforts are underway and with your help we can continue to apply a focus on this issue such that that last remaining amount of material in Argentina can be downblended or removed and then you get a Latin America HEU free zone. So the idea here is at the last summit there was just one joint statement that covered all 12 countries that had removed their HEU. What we're saying is well, try and come up with more than just one statement. Come up with a Latin American HEU free zone. If we go to the next slide, let's try and push the envelope and do another HEU free zone. So the next slide shows a possible Asian, Southeast Asian and Australian HEU free zone if we can get it to work there. So again, you look at the map, it's kind of pretty clear here. Okay, you can see that orange red is Australia, orange red is Indonesia. Both of those countries have a very small remaining amount of material left. Vietnam cleaned out at the last summit, Taiwan cleaned out, Thailand HEU free, Philippines HEU free. So why not try and group together in this very important region and try and have an HEU free zone by these countries again to try and lock in some of the gains that have been made and encourage as they are doing Indonesia and Australia to try and take some steps by the summit in 2016. Last HEU free zone that I wanted to highlight, which is one of my favorites, which people might not naturally think about is let's push for an HEU free zone in Eastern and Central Europe. So why would we wanna do that? Well, if you look at this region, this region has more countries cleaned out of HEU than in any other region that has been worked on with HEU removal. So there are nine countries, you can see them here, a huge amount of effort in Eastern and Central Europe to do these removal efforts. Czech Republic HEU free, Hungary last summit HEU free, Ukraine as you well know, cleaned out in 2012, Romania HEU free, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, Serbia, all HEU free, two remaining hard cases, Poland and Belarus. Efforts are underway with Poland to try and complete the final shipment from Poland, but this also could be a way to try and focus on this area and try and really have this region be as free of HEU as possible. Belarus is not a member currently attending the summit. So if you actually get Poland and you get them cleaned out by 2016, then you could get a pretty impressive HEU free zone right in the middle of Eastern and Central Europe, which is a key strategic area. So just to close with how then to ensure sustainability and comprehensiveness. So to summarize, again, the focus of what we have done through the FISA material working group is to try and focus not on just promoting minimization, but actually focus on HEU phase out and elimination. And we believe that can be done with a lot of international effort by some of the specific dates that we highlighted. And there's several ways we can use to reinforce this goal. NPT review process, the IAEA ministerial is gonna be coming up in December. That is very timely because you're gonna have the summit in the spring of 2016 and then about six or seven months after that, you will have the December IAEA ministerial where you could further discuss the roadmap and HEU free zones and what has been done so far. One of the ideas of the working group came up with is a dedicated international conference on ending civilian use of HEU. And you would do that sometime after 2016. Why in the absence of summits, you wanna keep the momentum going, you wanna keep the focus on this issue. I was just in Norway last week, Norway has showed incredible leadership as many of you know in this area. Maybe they could sponsor as a house gift some kind of conference on ending the civilian use of HEU. Maybe they do that in 2017 or 2018 just to keep things going. Another idea we came up with is establish a high level intergovernmental group to promote and secure global political consensus on this issue. Maybe after the summit's end, maybe you still keep the Sherpas and the Sue Sherpas involved. After all, they are very knowledgeable. They've been empowered by their countries and governments. Maybe it could include some of them and others to have a high level group focused on this. We certainly wanna continue our RERTR, our Reduced Enrichment and Research and Test Reactor Program, and our Russian Fuel Removal Program Annual Meetings. And then we certainly wanna use some of these other established mechanisms, the global partnership, as well as the global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism. So I know that was a lot to go through in a short period of time. Again, we are just very pleased that we have the summary document that Leslie and Sharon highlighted, and then the two reports that are out there on the back table that really make up the essence of the recommendations here. So thank you very much. And with that, I'll turn it over to Jim Doyle. Thank you. Hello, everyone. Thank you for your attendance. And I wanna thank Leslie and the FISL Material Working Group for the opportunity to chair one of these working groups and also to thank Sharon and CSIS for hosting the event. Can everybody hear me in the back? Okay, I would like to make a couple comments about the working group here. We had representation, either not citizenship or experts who had spent many years of their professional careers in the countries of the United States, France, Israel, Pakistan, and China. So we had a very international working group for a very controversial topic. The security of military nuclear materials has rightfully been called out by many of the participants in the Nuclear Security Summit process as something that should attract more attention than the civilian materials because 85% of weapons usable nuclear materials in the world is in weapons programs. We know that countries make their utmost effort to secure this material. It's probably one of the highest priorities they have in terms of national security. The same level of effort is probably put into protecting their national leadership, their diplomatic codes or the codes that they use for nuclear weapons release. But at the same time, we know that there is never perfect security for these materials and there have been quite a long history of publicized and confirmed incidents that reveal the security can never be perfect. And these aren't limited to developed countries. Of course, you're probably familiar with incidents here in the United States in terms of inadvertent movement of nuclear weapons and problems of compliance and morale at nuclear weapons installations. So as you look around the world, the security of nuclear materials, there are conditions in which you have to secure these materials and the resources that different countries have to devote to that task is different. Oh, I'm going the other way. Excuse me. Okay, so here's a little pie chart that shows you that this material is in a lot of different forms. It's even military nuclear materials are not all in what we would call full-up weapons that are deployed on a military base or on a nuclear ballistic missile submarine. This material exists in various types of forms, weapons components, material that's been declared excess, and material that's in bulk storage and so on. So there are various levels of protection even within the category of military nuclear materials. We want to try to establish and strengthen an international norm which has really two parts here. One is that we want to have confidence that countries are using the highest levels and the highest standards of security for their military nuclear materials, and we also want the international community to have that confidence. So there should be some way for countries possessing nuclear weapons and military materials to provide reassurances to the international community. We came up with a series of recommendations and the first one is to define really what we mean by the highest levels. So under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 to which all these countries that possess military nuclear weapons materials are party, it says that there's an obligation to protect that material to appropriate and effective standards. But this is not specifically defined anywhere. One of the things that could be sort of used as a model for a definition is information circular 225. Guidelines for the protection of civilian nuclear materials of various categories. And then this would allow, for example, countries to confirm that they were prepared to protect their materials against a full spectrum of plausible adversary threats, sort of design basis threat, have sufficiently effective accounting and control systems capable of detecting any theft regular in depth inspection, peer review and realistic testing to ensure that security and accounting systems are effective and programs to improve, constantly improve and measure security culture. Second recommendation is to provide assurances to call upon states with military nuclear materials to provide assurances to the international community. There was at least a 20 year period of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union where mechanisms were in place to provide assurances despite the fact that you have a fundamental tension between information that would be able to provide assurance to the international community that you're doing X, Y and Z. You're following certain procedures. You have a certain level of physical protection in terms of a intrusion detection fence and so on. Those things, on the one hand, are necessary to provide credible assurances, but on the other hand, you don't want any specific information that would be useful to an adversary to escape. But we have a history of doing that kind of cooperation between the United States and Russia, between the United States and Great Britain and even some cooperation with France as well. Other ways that this could be done would be bilateral or laboratory to laboratory or military to military conferences where you exchanged best practice information and provided credible assurances, and this could be done either openly or a confidential information exchanges. It's really critical to break out of the mindset where countries with nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons materials can say, look, this is our highest priority. Just trust us, things are safe. That is an unsatisfactory for many reasons, but one of them is perhaps, if you think about the consequences of an event and none of that dialogue of reassurance had taken place, there's gonna be a great deal more suspicion. There's going to be finger pointing about you didn't meet your obligations in terms of the International Convention on Preventing Acts of Terrorism or United Nations Resolution 1540. Also prior exchanges of information in the case of an event could help mitigate the consequences of that event by either knowing the exact materials that had been stolen or by exchanging information about threats that could know who was responsible to help either find the materials before they could be used in an event or to minimize the consequences of that event if you know exactly what was taken. Another reason to provide such assurances is to make sure that another country that might be concerned about your level of security free nuclear materials doesn't plan to seize them to protect their national security interests in the event of a crisis. Our third recommendation was to reaffirm the previous commitments through the Nuclear Security Summit process and other venues. In the 2014 statement included it was the fundamental responsibility of states participating to have high security for all nuclear material including military nuclear materials. We wanna repeat that type of a statement in the 2016 summit. We wanna define the Security Council 1540 appropriate and effective security and reaffirm that commitment and also the International Convention for Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. So we have also the various forum that could be used to discuss in recommendation number four, I'm sorry, I'm not keeping up with my slides here. The first and the most important one is the P5 process because these are the states that are ostensibly authorized to are recognized as formal nuclear weapons states and so establishing a working group within the P5 countries to begin to raise these issues and discuss the types of information that could be exchanged that wouldn't supply any information, sensitive information to adversaries but would provide assurances to the international community. This is a proper place to begin discussing this. You could establish a working group there. You could have host expert meetings and develop a reporting forum potentially that could be then encouraged to be used by other countries in terms of the 1540 national reports. The NPT is another possible venue to extend this discussion. Obligations for the level of security assurances and providing those assurances could be written into if we go forward in the next NPT review conference and revise the action plan, revive the action plan process that could be put in as a action to be monitored in terms of progress toward that goal in the five year increments of the NPT treaty review process. Another potential forum that needs to be considered is the IAEA, whether they can play a role in this. The plutonium agreement, plutonium management disposition agreement that deals with the plutonium declared excess to military needs by the United States and Russia was the subject of a research program at the IAEA that included verification of the amount declared excess and a certain amount of assurances that the material was in a secure state as well. So the IAEA has touched upon this issue. It's not currently equipped in terms of resources and manpower and expertise to handle this, but it's something that the member states of the IAEA could consider becoming more involved in. In terms of takeaways, military materials present the greatest threat in terms of the nuclear security agenda. They are not subject to the highest level of enforceable standards for security and accounting in terms of any international cooperation. There are domestic laws in all of these countries that possess them, of course, that establish standards, but even that landscape is variable in terms of the degree to which things are specifically defined and they are adhered to and periodically improved standards. So this challenge must remain at the top of the national security, the nuclear security agenda and all possible venues have to be used to continue the discussion. Not only the Nuclear Security Summit process, but as I've said, the P5, the Committee on Disarmament, bilateral and multilateral discussions as well. The objective of these should be to share best practices in a manner that helps each country with military nuclear materials make their security more effective and we have to try to establish more firmly in terms of international law and conventions the norm that not only should you have the highest standards but nations should provide assurances to the international community that they are doing so. Thank you. Thanks, Jim, and I have the admittedly unsexy topic. It's not each of you, it's not military material, it's information sharing, standards, and security culture, but it is no less important. And as I sat here, as I usually do, thinking about how long have I known you guys, we all used to work together a really long time ago and when I think back, it was at a time when Anita Nielsen was just starting at the IEA and I mentioned Anita because she was chair of this working group. And before she was the Director of the Office of Nuclear Security, there was no Office of Nuclear Security and this was way before 9-11, she headed an office, I think it was called Information Analysis, something like that. It was really at the very beginning when the IEA decided it was going to use unclassified information and this came out of, not quite sure what it was, Iraq, North Korea, something where we thought, well, there are a lot of sources of unclassified information that the agency could use. And so you could have no better expert to talk about both the interplay of nuclear security and information analysis except Anita's not here, so you're stuck with me, for which I apologize. But we had a, one, a very international group as you can tell from the names, ranging across academia, like Wyn Bowen and Igor Kropunov, industry, and then hangers on. And actually Yusuke Naoyi is with the Japan, Japan's Center of Excellence. So it was really a terrific group. Unfortunately, we had three things we had to look at, information sharing, standards, and security culture. So even though you've already been overloaded with information, I'm gonna add on to this. But to help you out, I think if you look at this, the small recommendations pamphlet, our recommendations start on page 23. I'm gonna apologize in advance a little bit because I think some of the slides were done earlier than this report. So they kind of go together, but they might not be as pithy as what's in the report. So let me just start out with our going in position, which is that one of the five priorities from the FMWG, which is that we need to share information to build global confidence. When it comes to nuclear security, this is not a given. As a matter of fact, this contradicts the conventional wisdom. There's a rationale, a well-worn rationale against transparency in nuclear security, which is that you need to keep information confidential to make sure that theft and sabotage and unauthorized access are even more important, more difficult. But we took a slightly, we took a different approach, which is that what we need in the nuclear security regime is accountability. And accountability depends on the quantity and quality of the information available to build confidence that all your nuclear and other radioactive materials are adequately protected. And so our findings were that there was a need for a better understanding of and more information about nuclear security, security events, standards of performance and implementation to reassure a broad range of stakeholders, which includes the public. And one thing we didn't get printed up in time, but will be coming out and I'm not sure in what venue it's gonna be, but it's a matrix. And I'll talk you a little bit through this of what kinds of information, which stakeholders, because obviously you're not gonna share all information with everybody that just wouldn't serve your purpose, which is the second point. You need a differentiated approach to information sharing, and you have to really identify the necessary channels. And fundamentally, you need to balance making information available with protecting the sensitive items from disclosure and inappropriate access. We found also media has a critical and one could say underused role for public engagement and that all of this stuff is really, really important for nuclear security culture, which is the last topic that I'm gonna talk about. So our recommendations were that the countries that are participating in the Nuclear Security Summit need to commit to sharing more information. And so the first thing they need to do is implement, and this we've heard, so it's our mantra, implement everything that you said you were gonna do already, right? So that means reporting under UN Security Council Resolution 1540, it means reporting under IXENT and the CPPNM, all of that stuff. But more importantly, you need to establish a plan to provide what, and these, so these slides I have to tell you, these are not my slides, every single word on this slide was agonized over late into the night at our last working group. So I'm not gonna diverge from the text. Sufficient, consistent, persistent, credible, and timely information, okay? So those are a lot of adjectives, but that's what we thought it took to, you know, that's what we thought all countries really need to think about. What's sufficient and you need to be consistent? Enough said. To do that, you need to identify appropriate information and channels to share information. You need to encourage more substantive information in relation to security events. So I've been reading, I don't know how many of you have read Command and Control, the Eric Schlosser book? So, you know, any time you have, and that's sort of a nuclear-related event, but any time you have a nuclear-related event, whether it's TMI or Fukushima, or you know, a nuclear material smuggling thing, what you get is, yeah, something's happened and we can't tell you about it. That doesn't really build confidence in the public. Okay, that's a gross over generalization, but the important point there is need to think carefully about how can we provide more information in a positive way. Thirdly, we believe very strongly that you need to invest in interaction with industry, media, and NGOs as important tools to reach all of your stakeholders. And finally, that you need to establish regional networks among stakeholders for information, if that is possible. Let me talk before I go on to standards a little bit about this matrix that we have put together. So the kinds of stakeholders that we identified were, at the bottom level, license holders and operators of facilities, regulators, first responders, which would include not just fire departments, but ambulances, emergency workers, law enforcement, security services, intelligence agencies, health and environment, media, educators and trainers, and finally, the public. And so just to give you one example, we went through the stakeholder, the kind of information, the reasons for sharing, why you need a good reason for sharing information, potential constraints on sharing, timeliness or urgency, and who they would actually share the information with. And so a license holder or an operator might share information with a regulator in a secured channel, but he might share other information with law enforcement, security services, et cetera. And then finally, there has to be a value to the provider of the information sharing. And so we lay all of this out in a matrix which should be available shortly, but not today in a couple of weeks. Okay, the second part of this briefing or our task was to look at standards. And our findings here were that, and this is well known to this audience, the legal basis for nuclear security has significant gaps. There's no required standards, the IEA issues guidelines, but it's up to each state to define those and implement them. There's no required peer review, and there's no process to assess and improve the system as a whole. And so we found that that really constituted insufficient accountability across the board. So the I-PASS missions, these Nuclear Security, sorry, Physical Protection, Peer Reviews, they've increased, but we kind of found that their potential to raise standards across the board and build confidence really hasn't been realized. And so we had a couple of ideas for how to do that. And then finally, that safety, security, and safeguards are, this will come as a shock, shock to all of you. Safety, security, and safeguards are insufficiently integrated. This is certainly not new to anybody who's been in this business for a while, but when we get to our recommendations, you'll see that we suggest we should take a more holistic approach. And so we're hoping that the Nuclear Security Summit in 2016 will establish a legacy by A, starting a process aimed at closing the gaps in the framework covering nuclear security, starting a process of, we call this strengthening, as you can tell this is written by committee, right? Strengthening the voluntary IEA guidance to become mandatory. The FMWG and the Nuclear Security Governance Experts group have been involved in other efforts that look specifically at the international framework, but we were also moving along this path. We propose a, what we call, a sustainable long-term and differentiated system to build confidence with periodic international peer review, which could include I-PASS, but also should extend to national performance control, industry self-review, and communication of the results. This gets back to the information sharing part of it. We thought that when I-PASS missions go out that there should be some kind of way to call from all those I-PASS missions best practices and observations without revealing sensitive information, but say, hey, we've noticed this trend in this particular task that, you don't name the countries, but so that could be passed on to countries. We also think you need to come up with a mechanism to demonstrate and reward good performance and practices. All right, so we're on to the last part, security culture. Fundamentally, you can provide a lot of guns and guards and gates, but if there's no attention to what those things mean, and no importance within an organization, not just at the site, but also by the regulator within the whole system, then you can have the best guns, guards, and gates, and you still won't have a good nuclear security system, and we all know the examples of things in the past where doors were propped open, guards left their posts. I mean, that's why we've embarked on this, and so this working group really focused on the value of security culture as underpinning the entire nuclear security regime. These points are fairly obvious. You need security culture to be comprehensive across the board or from the bottom up, not just at the site of a nuclear facility, but up to the state level. Even so, we do not have any requirement to certify competence, I guess I could say. You could say. There's no certified education and training. The Centers of Excellence, I think the working group believes that they have an opportunity here. There have been, I don't know how many, at least a dozen or more, Centers of Excellence that have cropped up since the summit started. They have an opportunity to actually really support the development of nuclear security culture. And our final point was that there's scant integration of security culture development and promotion across the CBRN spectrum, so not just in the nuclear side. And our recommendations were that we should reinforce the bridges and synergies between nuclear security, nuclear safety, and international safeguards and export control, no surprise there. We should take into account some of the experiences gained across the CBRN spectrum. So learn from the other areas, and you know the EU, European Union, they have Centers of Excellence that do span chem, bio, and radiological. We would like to see enhanced interaction between not just the IEA, but also nuclear security practitioners and the academic community. Some of that is going on in the IEA, Nuclear Security Support, so many acronyms, NSSC, Nuclear Security Support Center Network, although more can be done, especially on the industry side. And then finally, we need to promote nuclear security culture in international training, including the kinds of training that the IEA does. I think that's my last slide, and so I'm gonna sit down but act as the moderator for our Q&A session. Warren Stern in the background, so please, you're already identified, I don't know where your affiliation now is, but go ahead. Same as it's been for a while. And Warren Stern, Brookhaven National Lab, this is for all of you, but in particular Andrew, for the last three decades plus, we've worked as a government towards the elimination or the minimization of the use of HEU in civilian applications, and we're a lot safer for it. But our approach to plutonium is very different and it's more about management and dealing with the problem and people aren't talking about elimination of the use of civil use of plutonium much. So I guess the question is, at what point do you see the threat of the use of civil use of plutonium crossing over with the threat of civil use of HEU when we begin to focus more on the civil use of plutonium? I'll start with that. So NTI just had our global dialogue meeting recently where we got together with a lot of the Sherpas. And if you go back and you're exactly right, if you go back and look at the 2014 Communique, there's only a three or four word reference on focusing on plutonium and plutonium management. So one of the things that in addition to all this work, Warren, that you've highlighted here, many of us believe that given that this is the last summit, we similarly need to have much greater attention and much greater focus on the issue of separated plutonium and the concerns that we have about those materials. And we even went so far as to have a breakout session on it. And one of the recommendations coming out is we should draft up a gift basket. And we should base it on INSIRC 549, which as you well know from your background, includes support from several countries and kind of expand and build on that and increase the enforcement and the reporting and the frequency of meeting of that group, which can certainly be empowered to do more things. So I would just say that that is an area that if we think about comprehensiveness, we also have to focus our attention on and that is something that we are looking at. You're exactly right, that needs to be addressed in more detail as well. Just so I would just to put this in a broader policy context, I think the reason why H-E-U or the conventional wisdom is that H-E-U poses a bigger threat in terms of terrorism because it's much easier to make a nuclear explosive device out of H-E-U than it is plutonium. So underneath Warren's question is, at what point are we either that the terrorists are getting better at their capabilities or that maybe it's the point at which we've eliminated, once we eliminate H-E-U, then we can focus on this next part. I would say this, when you talk to White House officials, they say, oh, the nuclear security summits have always focused on plutonium, not entirely true. And it's a much more difficult problem, I think, because of this perennial focus on managing. We can simply manage the plutonium problem. So I saw a hand here, I think it's Doug Birch. Yeah, hi, this is a question for all of you, but I'd like Andrew to answer it if that's possible. Is a treaty, a comprehensive and enforceable treaty to require higher security for these fissile materials? Is that something that's possible? And if it is, are these steps that you're recommending today steps toward that goal or are they in lieu of that goal? Well, that's a great question, Doug. There are many views on this. So is it possible, yes. Is it likely, not so very likely? Certainly not by the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. Although I would say at the 2014 summit, there was growing recognition of the need to improve governance. Now, you could ask me, why do I say that? And that's purely, I mean, I guess I could go back to my office and type up a list for you, but more on the anecdotal side of it, where in the beginning of the summit process, I think there was a focus on, gee, we have this problem with very vulnerable material. Let's focus on securing that, removing it, and then we'll call victory and go home. I think over time, there was, as levels of awareness improved, there was sort of like, oh, well, we've been getting by on this patchwork framework of agreements and gosh, implementation isn't so great. Do we need to strengthen the governance? I didn't get the sense that Sherpa's or political leaders, nobody's ready to write a treaty. On this any more than they're ready to write a treaty on a convention that bans nuclear weapons. But we wouldn't be in, I think civil society has an obligation to point out or point the way towards a broader vision for the future. We can continue to improve incrementally, but at some point, I think we will have to look at the whole system and say, look, we need better standards because it's really impossible without significant monitoring to ensure that nuclear security is at a sufficient level. That's my take, Andy. Yeah, and I mean, just Doug, to follow up. I would add that for this next summit, for the last summit, perhaps, you want to use as many tools as you have out there. Having been involved in these summits and been familiar with the communique and the gift baskets, I do think that the gift baskets are an extremely powerful tool. And that's why one of the recommendations and one of the options for advancing the work that we've talked about on HE elimination is a gift basket where if you think of the 53 summit countries, you would think that you could get quite a lot of them, 30, 35, 40, to sign up to some kind of detailed program plan or roadmap, and that's why we're calling it a roadmap. It's a vision for elimination. And I think if you get that many countries and that much momentum behind it and then you have a process through the IEA ministerial or other mechanisms to go back and review and monitor the progress, I think it can be extremely effective. And that's why we're actually, as I indicated, going to be working to take a lot of the good work out of this working group and actually draft a gift basket and see if we can get a country that we have in mind to possibly sponsor that in the upcoming October Sherpa meeting. I would just like to second what Sharon said and particularly in the realm of military nuclear materials, it's even more the case. I mean, there are at least three countries or two countries that aren't even gonna attend the Nuclear Security Summit that possessed nuclear weapons. Russia, of course, with the most nuclear material, military nuclear material in the world. And a treaty is still beyond the horizon. I think it would be opposed at this moment by practically all the states that possess nuclear weapons and including the United States. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't continue to discuss what the standards would become if we reached the point where there was a willingness to discuss everybody trying to reach the same level of effective security or adequate security. That's a more appropriate term. Thank you. Thank you. My name's Adam Provo, I'm a graduate student with the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. And my question is primarily directed to Sharon. I know that Russia will not be attending the summit, but one of your points was to demonstrate a reward for best practices. I was wondering kind of theoretically if Russia can be re-engaged in the conversation. How could we demonstrate a reward to Russia when it doesn't appear that they, how could we demonstrate a reward in a way that they don't feel like they're receiving assistance or aid or something like that, something that they would actually want and they would feel kind of a sense of parody. So for best practices, thank you. Are you saying we should bribe Russia to come to the Nuclear Security Summit? I don't think that's a good idea. Yeah, I may not have more to say on that than that. There are, you know, in our, at least in our US-Russian relationship, so many other things that we need to work on that even though I would heartily welcome Russian participation in the Nuclear Security Summit, you know, there's, I think, very little, if no chance of giving them a reward on that. There are, you know, within the Nuclear Security realm, we need to work with them on many things, including especially on the HEU minimization or sorry, elimination and repatriation. I know that's not a satisfying answer to you, but the real, you know, I'm trying to remember on the risks, on the rewards part, was that with relation to standards or really on nuclear security culture? We could, let's talk about this after the session. Sorry, other questions? Thank you, Paul Walker with the Green Cross International. Thank you all three for very nice presentations and for all the good work, obviously, you've been doing. And I say that with a bias because I'm a member of the physical materials working group, but I wanted to ask you about the IAEA and your personal opinions on the IAEA. I mean, one of the things that's troubled a lot of us probably in this room is that much of this depends not on, not only on national governments, it depends on obviously the IAEA, the multilateral group for safeguards, inspections and I-PASS missions and all the other related good work that they do, but my personal sense is that the IAEA is much too weak and grossly underfunded, as we find with a lot of the multilateral organizations we work with, particularly in the arms control and disarmament community. And the good missions they do, for example, under I-PASS are all voluntary and those I-PASS missions are overbooked and scheduled a good year or two in advance and we could probably quadruple the number or more of I-PASS missions if we wanted and we could make some of those assessments, I think as you pointed out Sharon, perhaps mandatory, depending on what level of bad practice they showed. So I wanted to ask you all, what do you think needs to be done with the IAEA? Can we depend on the IAEA for all these good initiatives that we're recommending under the physical material working group? Or should there be some initiatives taken to strengthen the IAEA in a whole range of ways? And that could include, for example, stakeholder involvement. I mean, one of the things, a number of us are very supportive of, as you know, is expanded stakeholder involvement, civil society, industry, non-governmental academics, all of us in these various groups. And I can tell you from personal experience, the IAEA is not strong on this and never has been at all. In fact, most multilateral organizations are not, but the IAEA is particularly egregious in not in fact involving an adequate amount of the public and civil society in their meetings in Vienna. So just to get your general impressions as to what should be done to strengthen the IAEA and in turn strengthen safety and security and everything else we've talked about. It's a very tough question. And I think the IAEA could take initial steps with if other countries joined the United States and Russia and I think Great Britain in terms of declaring excess materials from their military programs. Once those materials were converted to non-classified forms, then the IAEA could do a safeguards function on those materials. It's this fundamental tension that you're most worried about in terms of the subject which my working group looked at with military materials and that is this information going from countries to potential adversaries through the multinational organization which is the IAEA. And the IAEA has to be very concerned about that. That's why they have IAEA confidential information but they have member states, non-nuclear weapon states that some of whom may be hedging and some of whom may decide in their national security interest to pursue nuclear weapons in the future and they could potentially obtain information related to that through this activity. So that's the fundamental concern. But I would think that this would be a matter that should be discussed among member states in terms of taking on a larger role and if there was such a sentiment then every member state would have to contribute more in terms of financial resources and to give them even the capability to take this step. But in the future if we do have additional declarations of material access to military needs, I think that would be an appropriate role for the agency. So Paul, I mean an excellent question. I guess the way I would look at it is there is a huge amount of effort being put into these, drafting these action plans. And in fact the Sherpa teams this week that are meeting in Lithuania are reviewing. They're gonna be spending a day, a day and a half going over the action plans and one way to look at it is that if there is a lot of specific detailed robust activity, particularly in the IEA action plan, I mean they're gonna be also talking about G-CENT and G8 and so forth, then there's actually a working group that's been focusing on that action plan that's been led by some extremely smart and capable people that you know, then if that is adopted by the Sherpas and then approved by the heads of state at the summit, I would argue then that that then kind of empowers those actions to be done and then if they adopt the program of work and those action plans then they have to come up with the funding and the resources to do that. So I think that is one strategy and I think that makes a lot of sense. The other thing that I think has been very positive with the IEA is at the last summit this strengthening security implementation gift basket by 35 countries has now been extended and proposed to be adopted as an INSIRC, an information circulars to a wider group than just those 35 countries attending the Nuclear Security Summit. So I think if those things happen and I think if there's a balanced approach and what comes out of the summit is not putting everything on the IEA but using the five mechanisms plus other mechanisms that we've identified, which could be very useful, then you might have a way to get the most beneficial things you can out of the IEA but also try and use some other mechanisms to also work on sustainability. So I would add to that, no, we can't just dump this problem back into the IEA's lap and move on because it's there and it's convenient. Nuclear security, when you go back, I mean it's not something that suddenly was created or rose up after 9-11, right? It was for a long time one of the missions of the IEA but the IEA will tell you that they are a creature of what their member states want and that is fundamentally the problem. I almost, as I'm sitting here, I'm almost, the question that arose in my mind was are multilateral organizations or institutions just atavistic? Are they useful anymore, right? We look at the conference on disarmament and say well it hasn't negotiated, well that's not entirely true. In nuclear disarmament it hasn't negotiated anything in a while but it's done some other things. Are they agile enough? Are they flexible enough? Are there other mechanisms that we need to engage? I totally agree with both the earlier comments about you need to give it the capacity, you need to give it some leadership. I will tell you one funny little story. When I raised the issue of gee, you guys really should bring in some industry folks to learn from what they do at their sites in terms of nuclear security training and safety and all this and they said that's a great idea, have them contact us because we can't reach out to them. And I thought, you know, when I look back on the application that I had to make to go to one of their international conferences and how much of my, I said industry guys, they're never gonna go through that. So they need to be a little more agile. I wanna go back to this gentleman's question on because I really flubbed it, on rewarding good performance and practices because I'm reminded about, you know, how do you create incentives for the players, the stakeholders to do things? And one of my favorite analogies is the lead standards, right, in environmental design. So, you know, when you look at this building, right, a lot of the design of this building was so that we could get our, I think it's platinum, platinum status as an environmentally friendly design. So can't we create something like that in for nuclear security? When you think about it, you have to connect it. I mean, there's a prestige factor there but you also have to connect it probably to some real money. And there, there are some ideas floating out there about how do you attach that good performance to, for example, insurance to operate facilities? Easier said than done. I think it's an interesting, I mean, I know of a few people who are working on it. We do that in this, not so much a lead standard but through info on nuclear safety where there are some very, this is a voluntary, the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, the voluntary system that was set up after Three Mile Island where there are peer reviews and they are taken very seriously and a nuclear power plant that is not meeting safety standards can actually have its insurance pulled, which means they can't operate and when you're looking at a million dollars a day in downtime, there's a really big incentive for doing it right. So I think we need to look across the board in other areas where incentive structures have been created and maybe to the extent that the IAEA could help advise in that regard but you would have to approach them first and then the other way around. So I think we just need to be a lot more creative and approach this through a lot of different mechanisms and if it means we don't get a treaty but we get a system that works, then I'm all for that. Do we have further one more question I think and then we're almost done. Hi, Brian Bradley, Exchange Monitor Publications. Since the working group started proposing its idea of some international security regime for military stocks, I guess, what groups have you engaged or if you can't say what groups you've engaged, what is kind of the level of feedback, how on board are the different groups? Do they seem to be with this idea and what do you think is a realistic timeline to kind of get it up and running? Well, I think we addressed some of those questions in the previous exchange but the appetite for a treaty or even a defined standards for security and covering the various categories such as physical protection, the training of personnel, the performance of various levels of equipment or accounting systems for military materials, that the appetite for such a treaty now is extremely low. I mean, the United States probably wouldn't even be in favor of it. France would certainly oppose it, Pakistan and India would oppose it and China and Russia would probably oppose it. That's today, that doesn't mean we shouldn't consider some of these things working towards improving this stuff in the future, of course we have to but I wanted to touch upon the previous question in terms of innovation for offering incentives possibly and this idea of indexing or clear listing and this work has been done at NTI and I also wanted to mention the study they've done on nuclear military materials but their index on civil military standards where you have some type of ranking by a credible multi-national organization that included experts in the field is a possible way to go on military nuclear materials as well. Now, what would the judgment of such an organization mean to the countries to get an A or A plus or a 90%? It might not mean anything but if you could link it to a willingness among industry in order and export control laws and so on, in other words, there's gonna be some advantage to countries that attain a high score and there's gonna be disadvantage to those that obtain a low score. If you can relate that to nuclear commerce, it might create an incentive or disincentive structure. The other thing is it could create incentives or it could create a better confidence and lower tensions if a country that scored low in their first year of some type of index on military security improved then the benefits, the political benefits in terms of tensions with their neighbors and so on could be very important because it's not unreasonable that if country A believed that its neighbor, country B had a terrible nuclear security if there was a government coup in that country and it looked like an extremist organization was gonna take over that they would move to seize that material. So this idea of having some type of credible a rating system in the future that's based on a multinational organization to me doesn't seem to be outside the possibility. If I could just jump in on that. One of the other parallel efforts that NTI has been doing and I think you and I had actually talked about it is we launched last year a very high level military material security study group. So it's headed by Senator Nunn, Senator Luger, Lord Brown from the UK and what we did with that study is bring in very senior retired military officials from Pakistan, from France, from the UK as well as others from China, from Russia to come up with specific recommendations. The logic being these are people who have been in positions of authority. They're two or three or four star generals that know what can and cannot be done and we are in the final stages of finalizing that report and rolling that out and that will come out with some very specific recommendations on one, how to strengthen the security of military materials, two, how to provide assurances to others on the security of military materials. So add that to the summer beach reading list and that'll be coming out in August. Great, I can hardly wait. If there are no further questions, please just join me in thanking our panelists and hope to see you soon. Hope you are.