 Today, we are going to discuss the concept of intentionality. As I mentioned in the last class, that intentionality is an intrinsic property of consciousness. According to Searle, intentionality and consciousness are identical. They are necessarily related. Consciousness being produced by brain processes shows that intentionality is an intrinsic property of consciousness. They are necessarily related. Consciousness being produced by brain processes shows that intentionality says a kind of a causal relationship with brain processes. I am trying to cite this causal notion of intentionality precisely because there is already a theory of intentionality advocated by Edmund Hussle. According to Hussle, intentionality is also the necessary property of consciousness. But Hussle does not hold the causal theory of intentionality as it has been understood by Searle. Searle's biological naturalism remains sympathetic to the naturalistic tradition that is there is a scientific understanding of consciousness possible, meaning thereby everything is based on the ontological status of the matter. Intentionality has a material grounding, whether it is biological or physical. Intentionality has this material grounding because as you know Searle's biological naturalism is based on two presuppositions that is the atomic theory of matter and the evolutionary biology. So, intentionality does not disown these presuppositions. In other words, Searle's theory of intentionality is a causal theory of intentionality because it does not disown its causal root. Now, Hussle on the other hand tries to talk about a transcendental theory of consciousness where Hussle tries to figure out intentionality is a logical feature of consciousness. Consciousness is intentionally related with the world. So, Hussle's theorization of intentionality is different from the Searle's theorization of intentionality. For Hussle intentionality is a non physical phenomenon, it is a non physical feature of consciousness whereas for Searle it is a physical feature of consciousness. We would discuss about Hussle's intentionality a bit when we give a transcendental notion of consciousness, how consciousness is a transcendental phenomenon may be in some other class. Today we would try to analyze what is Searle's notion of intentionality. Now, intentionality as you know that it has this feature of directedness aboutness. So, whenever we talk about mental states or intentional states they are necessarily about the world or about the object or a state of affairs. Now, for Searle desire belief and intentions are the mental states as you see believe desire and intentions are the mental states which are directed about the world. Whenever I say that I have the desire then I try to say that I desire something. Now, I give an example and try to illustrate this notion of intentionality. Think of a case for intentionality is a part of the very experience of desire, belief and intention. Now, I cite this case of Rohan which could be anybody else but if Rohan is a person human being, Rohan desires to have a high profile job. Rohan believes that high profile jobs are available in the market. There are jobs available in the world and he intends to work hard to get the job. Rohan's desire will be fulfilled if and only if he works hard and secures good grade in the final exam. So, think of the case x, x being the person, x has desire, belief, intention. Now, x desire has something. So, this very expression of desire is to talk about how a particular mental state like desire is directed to the world. Because jobs are available in the world. So, this directedness or what shall call the aboutness is an intentional feature of the mind. Now, shall makes a distinction between intention and intentionality. Intentionality is always a feature. Whereas intention is a mental state. All mental states will have this feature of intentionality. What is important to understand here is this that how this mental states explain our actions because the mental states are about the mind as I mentioned in the last class that these mental states constitute the network and the network represents the mind. Something internal about the mental states, but when shall talks about the internality of mental states shall also tries to show that these mental states are expressed in the form of language, in the form of language. The expression of mental states in the form of language shows that they are directed about the world. They also show that they represent the world. Say for example, how the mental states are expressed in the form of language, in the form of language so the expression of mental states in the form of language s  brack Tul humour andries experiences things and how does he or si presents them. So, that will beang the court jaką kal doo mind in jo trist. And it will also show that this idea of fulfillment or is a satisfaction will talk about how thingstona surname or external relations. wat also something internaley to the mind and that is what is now we are trying to exchange and solve very wellexplainess, this that there is turned of a direction of feet between the individual, the subject, which is used concept being, and the well-served mentioned number in a language of tieing, Foster or wrestling, or field of view, 我是  Bahn  Actor anywhere I have it I know  triggering this and the world. So that kind of relationship will talk about now what is directedness look at let us extend this example little further if the teacher says that Roun is doing well in the class and Roun here is this statement of teachers Roun is happy about his performance 中国                                . and concepts intermён of abhones certain action. Ind tego se inviru an murk, ra hun intended to work, re hun is working for the examinationー. I an intentional action, an self calls it, intention in action , when he experiences this fact that he is being quien pier bodies pier pieces al joh a a c c n n  установ el     ض Hae inde t sh indoor                   . Kaaj SE of sa Shan   ,     live        , gaps aland osen  re home OULD నినిికిని ఎంపెదినిఉావగాటకినిని ఆయ౪వతిలూదినిచాచికాంజరికి మప్దినిపనిలినిందినికా.  consistency of this fact that feeling is playing represents something. It is also true in the case of desire . Finuç association that the represent of things when ever I say I desire a glass of water or I like to have a glass have water the desire represents something that I am thrusted something that I am thirsty or I am experiencing thrust something like that now the question is whether feeling also expresses or represents something according to sir there are mental states which are unintentional they do not represent things say for example my sudden feeling of happiness and fear fear and illicit are some kind of mental experiences but they do not really represent things certain cases of say Rohan did not get a job think of a situation where Rohan did not get a job then there is a possibility that Rohan may get depressed because he was anxious of getting job so anxiety depression are non representational mental states they do not represent anything meaning thereby they are not directed towards any object I am anxious of certain things it is difficult to say that what I am anxious so in the depression the person is not really know what is the cause of depression so therefore for sir the feeling of depression and anxious anxiety are not directed they are the evidence of undirected mental states so there are mental states which are directed about the world and there are mental states which are not directed about the world say for example I am feeling very nervous or I am feeling kind of a fear being in this room but I do not know what is the cause of my fear so in that situation things are non intentional in character there are feelings but feelings are non intentional they do not represent things then we need to understand what is the nature of representation in souls and what is the nature of representation in souls and what is the nature of representation in souls theory of intentionality intending and intentional are just one form of intentionality now we need to look at what is souls notion of representation as I said that mental states are intentional states and all intentional states are representational because they represent an object or state of a face in the world intentional states are representational states when I say that I must also point out little bit on this that how thoughts or mental states are representational this is network of mental states that soul is talking about refers to thoughts thoughts are mental now if thoughts are mental phenomena then how thoughts cause action according to soul thought and actions are intentionally related there is some kind of a causal intentionality operating in this soul says that intending to act or the intention are just one form of intentionality as I mentioned that there is a kind of a intention in action now this intention in action tries to show that there is some kind of a causal chain intention which is causing action now if intention causes action and this entire experience is linked by intentionality and soul causes intention in actions now they are just one form of intentionality they are not two different kinds of intentionality intentionality of thought and intentionality of action or the performance of my action are not two different kinds of intentionality there one kind of intentionality now therefore intending is an intentional act it is an intentional act so all voluntary action according to soul are intentional actions desiring is a mental act intending is a mental act thinking is a mental act because whenever I think I think of something that would show what is mental and what is non mental so intentionality is the marker of the mental there one can see the similarity between soul and brentano brentano also says that intentionality is the specific feature of the non physical or the mental so mental and physical distinction is created by intentionality and soul also uses this as a marker of the mental phenomena when I say that an individual performs and a conscious being performs a person performs an action then this action is an intentional expression of certain things so look at this expressions intentional expressions in the case of a sorry this is wrongly typed it should be baby daughter if I say our baby daughter often cries for food and let oh my friend spate keeps waiting till my friend arrives no they are two different conscious beings one is the human and another is non human for soul the non human expressions are also intentional because the non human is also a living being so being a biological source that they express intentionality so animals plants etc. as I mentioned in the previous class that they are all have this capacity to express intentional actions but when it comes to human beings they express in a different way because human being use language in a typical way probably it is through humans beings language or a linguistic form of life we are able to understand the other forms of life but for sir we are able to understand the other forms of life but for sir human linguistic activities are formed are structured and can be explained with the help of intentionality so meaning according to sir can be explained through intentionality so meaning is very much part of the social linguistic activities of human beings when I say that meaning can be explained through intentionality one has to look at this point of sir that intentionality is a primary condition for language use language is secondary because meaning is derived from intentionality meaning is not derived from language use or the form of life in the way Wittgenstein puts it so sir has a different concern here we need to need to look at this in a more explicit manner. So, this idea of meaning derived from intentionality has to be seen explicitly and we will do that in one of the classes when I would be speaking about language world relationship but for today let us look at briefly how does the meaning derived from intentionality but today let us look at briefly how does sir explain the intentionality that is involved in language use as you all know sir has this hypothesis in 70s when he wrote speech ads of course speech ads was published in 1969 by Cambridge university page now in speech ads sir comes out with this hypothesis that philosophy of action is a branch of philosophy of language when he says this he makes it a point that is whenever I express something I perform a linguistic action so expressions linguistic expressions are nothing but actions one kind of actions but in later period when he wrote intentionality in 83 he comes out with another hypothesis that is philosophy of language is a part of or a branch of philosophy of mind so all the linguistic activities that human beings perform flows from human intentionality so intentionality is therefore primary and intentionality has the defining powers defining power in the sense that it explains human actions human linguistic behaviors particularly meaning so in this sense sal tries to give primacy to the intentional rather than the linguistic for sir intentionality is not linguistic why intentionality is not linguistic I will come back to this questions one can critique sal's position but what is important here look it how does sal articulate the notion of intentionality is a part of linguistic expressions now when sal says that speech is an expression sal says that we talk about p p is a proposition and p has a kind of a force embedded in it and sal calls it in low questionary force in speech act Austin defines that there are three stages one is the low questionary stage in low questionary stage and the low questionary stage so for linguistic expressions are concerned so the low questionary force is involved in the propositions or in the expression of the statement so whenever I say something say p then p also carries some kind of a force for example if I say close the door is an expression of a command close the door but if I say please close the door may be used in the sense of a request so command request are carrying something say p then p also carries some command request are carrying some kind of a force and Austin calls them performative waterances sal calls them speech acts there is no difference between sal and Austin here because when Austin says by saying there please close the door I am performing an action I am trying to say this with a particular force and sal calls it in a low questionary force this is low questionary force will act in such a way that it will force the hearer to act in a particular way meaning thereby the hearer would follow what I said and then he would perform what is desired so speech act is like performative act now all performative acts have a content because when I say please close the door this statement has a content it expresses a certain meaning and the speech act is more this statement has a content it expresses a certain meaning and the hearer understands that meaning and reacts to the statement made by the speaker so there is a representational content involved in the representational state expressed by the speaker sal says this representational state will have a direction of feet what is this direction of feet as I mentioned to you earlier that if acts expresses p p is a statement to the hearer then the hearer listens to that statement and says present and again reacts if I say please close the door then the hearer listen to the statement made by me and closes the door so when I say please close the door I have this hope or there is some kind of a expectation that the hearer will follow now when hearer does something meaning thereby when hearer closes the door then this intentionality is from intentionality towards the speaker so there are two kinds of intentionality operating here one the speaker when says something intentionality is from mind to the world when the hearer is saying something then it is coming from world to the mind and that is what is called direction of feet so in the case of speech act when the speaker performs certain action and his desire is fulfilled then the direction of feet is achieved and some points out that every statement is expressed with a psychological mode it is not that just representative content but there is a psychological mode involved in it so p m stands for the psychological mode r c for the representational content so when the representational content and psychological mode are involved in expressing a speech act what is achieved is some kind of a condition of satisfaction because I am satisfied in the sense that what I was expecting is also fulfilled so why say something and I expect certain things I say that please close the door but I also desire that the hearer would follow what I said but if the hearer does not follow it does not obey then I will express dissatisfaction speaker's expression of dissatisfaction is something which is essential for understanding meaning because I will say in the case of speech act the sincerity condition is violated because whenever request is made it is made with an authority and the hearer would follow what the speaker says if the hearer does not listen to what is said and expected by the speaker then there is a breach of what kind of a linguistic activities there is no direction of it what is there is a kind of a dissatisfaction because it violates the principle of condition of satisfaction according to sir now as I mentioned earlier that the condition of satisfaction will talk about some kind of internality that every ill-e-christian action and the sincerity condition will talk about some kind of an internality that they it is me who is satisfied it is my mind which is getting satisfied or a particular desire which is getting satisfied so desire is not available there desire is very much part of my mental states it is associated with other mental states it is part of my mind so in in that sense sir would try to show how mind and meaning are related they are not to separate things they are in fact related to each other and this relationship can be explicated through intentionality so intentionality not only explains the meaning embedded in our linguistic activities but also explains our experiences the structure of experiences because it tries to explicate the structure of representational states or intentional states how intentional states has a content and how this content brings satisfaction so all that so whenever sir will talk about intentionality sir will talk about experience of the content of mental states and sir will also suggest that this intentionality the human intentionality is self-referential self-reflexive and that is what is shown when he talks about direction of fit when I am seeing a particular object it says in the case of perception this self-referentiality is explicit when I say I am seeing the rose the fact that I am seeing the rose I am experiencing the beauty that the rose has now this experience is not only showing a kind of intentionality connecting the subject to the object but also experiencing the object in me but thereby sir does not say that the content is an object the content can be symbolized can have a syntactic representation in my thought so sir differs very strongly from the other representationalist who are you that intentionality is causally produced by certain mechanical function of the brain according to them particularly the cognitive science and artificial intelligence theory of mind would try to show that there is a syntactic representation where content can be computed look I would try to look at this quotation and please pay the attention to this that I am mostly empathically not saying that a believe is a kind of a picture not I am endorsing tractatus account of meaning nor I am saying that believe represents something is something very important to look at the tractatarian account of meaning suggest a representational theory of a meaning what Einstein says that language represents the world propositions are the pictures of the world so propositions have pictorial element in it thoughts are expressed in propositions so thoughts would also have the pictoriality in them so sir is not accepting the tractatarian notion of representation sir is also not endorsing the notion of representation which is been argued by the cognitive scientist and people who are trying to study human mind from through artificial intelligence because look at their notion of representation believe is a representational state and believe when we syntactically computed we will have a symbolic representation but sell does not believe that according to sir the content that is experienced by the subject is not to be characterized as an object content is not an object of thought rather content is just experienced whenever I am perceiving certain things or seeing certain things or acting on certain things so or saying certain things in the case of meaning action perception intentionality is acting in the mode of intention and action so therefore the content is being experienced by the subject but content is not an object of our observation or experience so there is no syntactic representation of content possible according to sir so therefore he strongly differs from the other representationalist particularly the cognitive scientist and to some extent he differs from Woodenstein's notion of representation so in that sense so the kind of theory of meaning is advocating will be something very unique we will study them in some other class but let us look at what is sir's notion of representation sir's notion of representation is not syntactical the syntax in the computational process is observer relative I am sure professor nath will explain when you talk about sir's distinction between strong ai and weak ai sir puts as very empathically that computers cannot think now this sounds very typical of sir when sir says the computers cannot think what he means by this that computers do not have first order intentionality the kind of intentionality which is been produced by the machines or the computers the kind of intelligence which is shown by cognitive machines which has this cognitive power are second order intentionality biological intentionality is the first order intentionality all biological beings living beings will have first order intentionality because their intentionality is something intrinsic to their consciousness it is something intrinsic to their life whereas machine intentionality is a derived notion of intentionality because whatever is being there whatever is being programmed are the representational states ascribed to certain machines so therefore they are all derived intentionality they will all have second order intentionality and sir also points out that an artificial system will not have life the kind of consciousness we have computer will not have so to understand what is consciousness we need to understand what is the concept of consciousness and what kind of form of life human beings live a computer does not fall in love human beings fall in love so falling in love is a kind of an experience which sir will associate strongly with human life whereas in the case of computer that is absent so there could be several other examples other forms of life which human beings have computer doesn't smile like human beings smile human beings smile is a meaningful one they represent a meaning they send a message to us so in that sense there are enormous attributes of human consciousness now we will need to look at them and try to show how computers cannot have intentionality now sir mental representation m r are related to feelings experience and understanding so when I say something I understand this fact that what is being said or in other words when I say something I mean whatever is said so meaning presupposes understanding in that sense the content is revealed in different modes of intentionality as I mentioned earlier that the perception seeing experiencing believing hoping etcetera are different kinds of experiences or different kind of expression of human intentionality in which the content of representational state is experienced understanding imagination are higher order conscious features of the feature of human intentionality because in animals do not understand the way human beings understand animals lacks this power of imagination as I mentioned that intentionality has self referentiality intentionality with the help of its self referential feature tries to show that it is me who is acting the sense of identity is produced by the self referential feature of intentionality because the subject understands this fact that he is acting or she is acting she is doing this she is experiencing the object so the action is associated with the subject which is very necessary when one talks about the concept like moral responsibility animals do not have the sense of moral responsibility and what cell calls the deontic power of intentionality so human intentionality is deontic has a sense of right or wrong human beings have the aesthetic imagination they are engaged with creating new things art poetry are the manifestation of human imagination aesthetic imagination so in that sense human intentionality is a very profound notion of intentionality and is transformed from the machine intentionality the intentionality of an artificial system it is the human intentionality shows how we are interacting with the world how we are intentionally involved in the world so the performance of action perception meaning etcetera will project the significance of human intentionality this I would like to conclude the lecture setting that cells theory of intentionality would explain how intentionality is an intrinsic feature of consciousness cells theory of intentionality will also suggest that it is different from the Houselian theory of intentionality and Housel gives a transcendental notion of intentionality a phenomenological account of intentionality when cell says intentionality is intrinsic to human mind it is intrinsic because it is irreducible it is not causally explained by certain function of the brain processes or it cannot be causally produced by certain mechanical function of a machine so human intentionality is a different and to talk about human intentionality we need to look at the entire form of human life the profoundity of human life then only we will understand what is consciousness and how consciousness is intentional thank you