 Preface to Book 1 of Two Treatises of Civil Government. The present edition of this book has not only been collated with the first three editions, which were published during the author's life, but also has the advantage of his last corrections and improvements, from a copy delivered to him by Mr. Peter Kost, communicated to the editor, and now lodged in Christ College, Cambridge. Two Treatises of Government. In the former, the false principles and foundation of Sir Robert Filmer and his followers are detected and overthrown. The latter is an essay concerning the true original extent and end of civil government. Preface. Reader. There haste here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning Government. What fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not worthwhile to tell thee. These which remain, I hope, are sufficient to establish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William, to make good his title in the consent of the people, which being the only one of all the awful governments, he has more fully and clearly than any prince in Christendom, and to justify to the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin. If these papers have that evidence I flatter myself is to be found in them, there will be no great miss of those which are lost, and my reader may be satisfied without them. For I imagine I shall have neither the time nor inclination to repeat my pains and fill up the wanting part of my answer, by tracing Sir Robert again through all the windings and obscurities which are to be met with in the several branches of his wonderful system. The King and body of the nation have since so thoroughly confuted his hypothesis that I suppose nobody hereafter will have either the confidence to appear against our common safety, and be again an advocate for slavery, or the weakness to be deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular style and well-turned periods. For if any one will be at the pains himself in those parts which are here to untouched, to strip Sir Robert's discourses of the flourish of doubtful expressions, and to endeavor to reduce his words to direct, positive, intelligible propositions, and then compare them one with another, he will quickly be satisfied. There was never so much glib nonsense put together in well-sounding English. If he think it not worthwhile to examine his works all through, let him make an experiment in that part where he treats a views of patience, and let him try whether he can with all his skill make Sir Robert intelligible, and consistent with himself, or common sense. I should not speak so plainly of a gentleman long since past answering had not the pulpit of late years publicly owned his doctrine, and made it the current divinity of the It is necessary those men who taking on them to be teachers have so dangerously misled others should be openly showed of what authority this their patriarch is, whom they have so blindly followed, that so they may either retract what upon so ill grounds they have vented and cannot be maintained, or else justify those principles which they preached up for gospel, that they had no better an author than an English courtier. For I should not have writ against Sir Robert, or taken the pains to show his mistakes, inconsistencies, and want of, what he so much boasts of and pretends wholly to build on, scripture-proofs, whether not men amongst us who, by crying up his books and espousing his doctrine, save me from the reproach of writing against a dead adversary. They have been so zealous in this point that if I have done him any wrong I cannot hope they should spare me. I wish, where they have done the truth and the public wrong, they would be as ready to redress it, and allow its just-wait to this reflection, vis that there cannot be done a greater mischief to prince and people than the propagating wrong notions concerning government, that so at last all times might not have reason to complain of the drama-chlesiastic. If anyone concerned really for truth undertakes a computation of my hypothesis, I promise him either to recant my mistake upon fair conviction, or to answer his difficulties. But he must remember two things. First, that caviling here and there at some expression or little incident of my discourse is not an answer to my book. Secondly, that I shall not take railing for arguments, nor think either of these worth my notice, though I shall always look on myself as bound to give satisfaction to any one who shall appear to be conscientiously scrupulous in the point, and shall show any just grounds for his scruples. I have nothing more but to advertise the reader that observations stands for observations on Hobbes' Milton, et cetera, and that a bare quotation of Pages always means pages of his patriarch, edition 1680. End of Preface. Book 1, Chapter 1 of Two Treatises of Civil Government. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Philippa. Two Treatises of Civil Government by John Locke. Book 1, Chapter 1. Slavery is so vile and miserable in a state of man, and so directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation, that it is hardly to be conceived that an Englishman, much less a gentleman, should plead for it. And truly I should have taken Sir Robert Filmer's patriarcha as any other treatise, which would persuade all men that they are slaves, and ought to be so, for such another exercise of wit, as was his who writ the encomium of Nero, rather than for a serious discourse meant in earnest, had not the gravity of the title and epistle, the picture in the front of the book, and the applause that followed it, required me to believe that the author and publisher were both in earnest. I therefore took it into my hands as all the expectation, and read it through with all the attention due to a treatise that made such a noise that it's coming abroad, and cannot but confess myself mightily surprised, that in a book which was to provide chains for all mankind, I should find nothing but a rope of sand, useful perhaps to such whose skill and business it is to raise a dust and would blind the people, the better to mislead them, but in truth not of any force to draw those into bondage who have their eyes open, and so much sense about them as to consider that chains are but an ill-wearing, how much care so ever have been taken to file and polish them. If any one think I take too much liberty in speaking so freely of a man who is the great champion of absolute power, and the idol of those who worship it, I beseech him to make this small allowance for once, to one who, even after the reading of Sir Robert's book, cannot but think himself as the laws allow him, a free man, and I know no fault it is to do so, unless any one better skilled in the fate of it than I should have it reveals to him that this treatise which has lain dormant so long was when it appeared in the world to carry by strength of its arguments all liberty out of it, and that from thenceforth our author's short model was to be the pattern in the mount, and the perfect standard of politics for the future. His system lies in a little compass, it is no more but this, that all government is absolute monarchy, and the ground he builds on is this, that no man is born free. In this last age a generation of men has sprung up amongst us that would flatter princes with an opinion that they have a divine right to absolute power, let the laws by which they are constituted and are to govern, and the conditions under which they enter upon their authority be what they will, and their engagements to observe them never so well ratified by solemn oaves and promises. To make way for this doctrine they have denied mankind a right to natural freedom, whereby they have not only as much as in them lies exposed all subjects to the utmost misery of tyranny and oppression, but have also unsettled the titles and shaken the thrones of princes, for they too by these men's system, except only one, are all born slaves, and by divine right are subjects to Adam's right heir, as if they had designed to make war upon all government and subvert the very foundations of human society to serve their present turn. However, we must believe them upon their own bare words when they tell us we are all born slaves, and we must continue so, there is no remedy for it, life and thralldom we entered into together, and can never be quit of the one till we part with the other. Scripture or reason, I am sure, do not anywhere say so, not with standing the noise of divine right, as if divine authority had subjected us to the unlimited will of another. An admirable state of mankind, and that which they have not had wit enough to find out till this latter age. For, however, Sir Robert Filmer seems to condemn the novelty of the contrary opinion, Patriarcha, page three, yet I believe it will be hard for him to find any other age or country of the world but this, which has asserted monarchy to be dure divino. And he confesses, Patriarcha, page four, that Hayward, Blackwood, Barkley, and others that have bravely vindicated the right of kings in most points, never thought of this, but with one consent admitted the natural liberty and equality of mankind. By whom this doctrine came at first to be broached, and brought in fashion amongst us, and what sad effects it gave rise to, I leave to historians to relate, or to the memory of those who were contemporaries with sieve-thorpe and manoring to recollect. My business at present is only to consider what Sir Robert Filmer, who is allowed to have carried this argument farthest, and is supposed to have brought it to perfection, has said in it. For from him, every one who would be as fashionable as French was at court, has learned, and runs away with this short system of politics, viz, men are not born free, and therefore could never have the liberty to choose either governors or forms of government. Princes have their power absolute and by divine right, for slaves could never have a right to compact or consent. Adam was an absolute monarch, and so are all princes ever since. CHAPTER II Sir Robert Filmer's great position is that men are not naturally free. This is the foundation on which his absolute monarchy stands, and from which it erects itself to an height that its power is above every power, kaput internubila, so high above all earthly and human things that thought can scarce reach it, that promises and oaths, which tie the infinite deity, cannot confine it. But if this foundation fails, all his fabric falls with it, and governments must be left again to the old way of being made by contrivance, and the consent of men and tropin ectisis, making use of their reason to unite together into society. To prove this grand position of his he tells us, page 12, men are born in subjection to their parents, and therefore cannot be free, and this authority of parents he calls royal authority, page 12, 14, fatherly authority right of fatherhood, page 12, 20. One would have thought he would in the beginning of such a work as this, on which was to depend the authority of princes and the obedience of subjects, have told us expressly what that fatherly authority is, have defined it, though not limited it, because in some other treatises of his he tells us it is unlimited and unlimitedable. Footnote, in grants and gifts that have their original from God or nature as the power of the father hath, no inferior power of man can limit nor make any law of prescription against them. Observations 158. The scripture teaches that supreme power was originally the father without any limitation. Observations 245. End of footnote. He should at least have given us such an account of it that we might have had an entire notion of this fatherhood or fatherly authority whenever it came in our way in his writings. This I expected to have found in the first chapter of his patriarcha. But instead thereof, having one en passant made his obeisance to the Arcana Imperie, page 5, two made his compliment to the rights and liberties of this or any other nation, page 6, which he is going presently to null and destroy, and three made his leg to those learned men who did not see so far into the matter as himself, page 7. He comes to fall on Bellamine, page 8, and by a victory over him establishes his fatherly authority beyond any question. Bellamine being routed by his own confession, page 11, the day is cleargot and there is no more need of any forces. For having done that, I observe not that he states the question or rallies up any arguments to make good his opinion, but rather tells us the story, as he thinks fit, of this strange kind of domineering phantom called the fatherhood, which whoever could catch presently got empire and unlimited absolute power. He assures us how this fatherhood began in Adam, continued its course, and kept the world in order all the time as a patriarchs till the flood, got out of the Arc with Noah and his sons, made and supported all the kings of the earth till the captivity of the Israelites in Egypt, and then the poor fatherhood was under hatches, till God, by giving the Israelites kings, re-established ancient and prime right of the lineal succession in paternal government. This is his business from page 12 to 19. And then, obviating an objection and clearing a difficulty or two with one half reason, page 23, to confirm the natural right of regal power, he ends the first chapter. I hope it is no injuritical and half quotation and half reason. For God says, honour thy father and mother. But our author contents himself with half, leaves out thy mother, quite, as little serviceable to his purpose. But more of that in another place. I do not think our author so little skilled in the way of writing discourses of this nature, nor so careless of the point in hand, that he by oversight commits the fault that he himself, in his anarchy of a mixed monarchy, page 239, objects to Mr. Hunton in these words. Where first I charge the author that he has not given us any definition or description of monarchy in general, for by the rules of method he should have first defined. And by the like rule of method Sir Robert should have told us what his fatherhood or fatherly authority is, before he had told us in whom it was to be found, and talked so much of it. But perhaps Sir Robert found that this fatherly authority, this power of fathers and of kings, for he makes them both the same, page 24, would make a very odd and frightful figure, and very disagreeing with what either children imagine of their parents or subjects of their kings, if he should have given us the whole draft together in that gigantic form, he had painted it in his own fancy. And therefore, like a wary physician, when he would have his patient swallow some harsh or corrosive liquor, he mingles it with a large quantity of that which may dilute it, that the scattered parts may go down with less feeling, and cause less aversion. Let us then endeavour to find what account he gives us of this fatherly authority, as it lies scattered in the several parts of his writings. And first, as it was vested in Adam, he says, not only Adam, but the succeeding patriarchs had, by right of fatherhood, royal authority over their children, page 12. This lordship, which Adam by command had over the whole world, and by right descending from him the patriarchs did enjoy, was as large and ample as the absolute dominion of any monarch which hath been since the creation, page 13. Dominion of life and death, making war and concluding peace, page 13. Adam and the patriarchs had absolute power of life and death, page 35. Kings in the right of parents succeed to the exercise of supreme jurisdiction, page 19. As kingly power is by the law of God, so it has no inferior law to limit it, Adam was lord of all, page 40. The father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will, page 78. The superiority of princes is above laws, page 79. The unlimited jurisdiction of kings is so amply described by Samuel, page 80. Princes are above the laws, page 93. And to this purpose see a great deal more which our author delivers in Bodan's words. It is certain that all laws, privileges and grants of princes have no force but during their life, if they be not ratified by the express consent or by the sufferance of the prince following, especially privileges, observations, page 279. The reason why laws have been also made by kings was this, when kings were either busied with wars or distracted with public cares, so that every private man could not have access to their persons to learn their wills and pleasure, then were laws of necessity invented, so that every particular subject might find his prince's pleasure deciphered unto him in the tables of his laws, page 92. In a monarchy the king must by necessity be above the laws, page 100. A perfect kingdom is that wherein the king rules all things, according to his own will, page 100. The common nor statute laws are or can be any diminution of that general power which kings have over their people by right of fatherhood, page 115. Adam was the father, king and lord over his family. A son, a subject, and a servant or slave were one and the same thing at first. The father had power to dispose or sell his children or servants, whence we find that the first reckoning up of goods in scripture, the man's servant and the maid's servant, are numbered among the possessions and substance of the owner as other goods were. Observations, preface. God also hath given to the father a right or liberty to alien his power over his children to any other, whence we find the sale and gift of children to have much been in use in the beginning of the world, when men had their servants for a possession and an inheritance, as well as other goods, where upon we find the power of castrating and making eunuchs much in use in old times. Observations, page 155. Law is nothing else but the will of him that hath the power of the supreme father. Observations, page 223. It was God's ordinance that supremacy should be unlimited in Adam, and as large as all the acts of his will, and as in him so in all others that have supreme power. Observations, page 245. I have been feigned to trouble my reader with these several quotations in our author's own words, that in them might be seen his own description of his fatherly authority as it lies scattered up and down in his writings, which he supposes was first vested in Adam, and by right belongs to all princes ever since. This fatherly authority, then, or right of fatherhood in our author's sense, is a divine, unalterable right of sovereignty, whereby a father or a prince have an absolute, arbitrary, unlimited and unlimited power over the lives, liberties and estates of his children and subjects, so that he may take or alienate their estates, sell, castrate, or use their persons as he pleases, they being all his slaves, and he, Lord or proprietor of everything, and his unbounded will, their law. Our author having placed such a mighty power in Adam, and upon that supposition founded all government and all power of princes, it is reasonable to expect that he should have proved this with arguments clear and evident, suitable to the weightiness of the cause, that since men had nothing else left them they might in slavery have such undeniable proofs of its necessity that their consciences might be convinced, and oblige them to submit peaceably to that absolute dominion which their governors had a right to exercise over them. Without this what good could our author do, or pretend to do, by erecting such an unlimited power, but flatter the natural vanity and ambition of men to active itself to grow and increase with the possession of any power, and by persuading those who, by the consent of their fellow men, are advanced to great but limited degrees of it, that by that part which is given them they have a right to all that was not so, and therefore may do what they please because they have authority to do more than others, and so tempt them to do what is neither for their own nor the good of those under their care, whereby great mischiefs cannot but follow. The sovereignty of Adam, being that on which as a sure basis our author builds his mighty absolute monarchy, I expected that in his patriarcha that his main supposition would have been proved, and established with all that evidence of arguments that such a fundamental tenet required, and that this on which the great stress of the business depends, would have been made out, with reasons sufficient to justify the confidence with which it was assumed. But in all that treatise I could find very little tending that way. The thing is there so taken for granted without proof that I could scarce believe myself when upon attentive reading that treatise I found there so mighty a structure raised upon the bare supposition of this foundation. For it is scarce credible that in a discourse where he pretends to confute the erroneous principle of man's natural freedom, he should do it by a bare supposition of Adam's authority, without offering any proof for that authority. Indeed he confidently says that Adam had royal authority, page twelve and thirteen. Absolute lordship and dominion of life and death, page thirteen. A universal monarchy, page thirty-three. Absolute power of life and death, page thirty-five. He is very frequent in such assertions. But what is strange in all his whole patriarcha, I find not one pretence of a reason to establish this, his great foundation of government, not anything that looks like an argument, but these words. To confirm this natural right of regal power, we find in the decalogue that the law which enjoins obedience to kings is delivered in the terms honor thy father, as if all power were originally in the father. And why may I not add as well that in the decalogue the law that enjoins obedience to queens is delivered in the terms of honor thy mother, as if all power were originally in the mother. The argument as Sir Robert puts it will hold as well for one as the other. But of this more in its due place. All that I take notice of here is that this is all our author says in this first or any of the following chapters to prove the absolute power of Adam, which is his great principle, and yet, as if he had there settled it upon sure demonstration, he begins his second chapter with these words. By conferring these proofs and reasons drawn from the authority of the scripture. Where those proofs and reasons for Adam's sovereignty are, baiting that of honor thy father above mentioned, I confess I cannot find. Unless what he says, page eleven, in these words we have an evident confession, vis of Bellemine, that creation made man prince of his posterity, must be taken for proofs and reasons drawn from scripture, or for any sort of proof at all, though from thence by a new way of inference. In the words immediately following he concludes, the royal authority of Adam sufficiently settled in him. If he has in that chapter or anywhere in the whole treaties, given any other proofs of Adam's royal authority, other than by often repeating it, which among some men goes for argument, I desire anybody for him to show me the place and page that I may be convinced of my mistake and acknowledge my oversight. If no such arguments are to be found, I beseech those men who have so much cried up this book to consider whether they do not give the world cause to suspect, that it is not the force of reason and argument that makes them for absolute monarchy, but some other by interest, and therefore are resolved to applaud any author that writes in favour of this doctrine, whether he support it with reason or no. But I hope they do not expect that rational and indifferent men should be brought over to their opinion, because this their great doctor of it, in a discourse made on purpose to set up the absolute monarchical power of Adam, in opposition to the natural freedom of mankind, has said so little to prove it, from whence it is rather naturally to be concluded that there is little to be said. But that I might omit no care to inform myself in our author's full sense, I consulted his observations on Aristotle Hobbes, etc. to see whether, in disputing with others, he made use of any arguments for this his darling tenet of Adam's sovereignty, since in his treatise of the natural power of kings he has been so sparing of them. In his observations on Mr. Hobbes' Leviathan, I think he has put in short all those arguments for it together, which in his writings I find him anywhere to make use of. His words are these, If God created only Adam, and of a piece of him made the woman, and if by generation from them too, as parts of them all, all mankind be propagated. If also God gave to Adam not only the dominion of the woman and the children that should issue from them, but also of all the earth, to subdue it, and of all the creatures on it, so that as long as Adam lived no man could claim or enjoy anything but by donation, asignation, or permission from him, I wonder, etc. observations 165. Here we have the sum of all his arguments, for Adam's sovereignty and against natural freedom, which I find up and down in his other treatises, and they are these following. God's creation of Adam, the dominion he gave him over Eve, and the dominion he had as father over his children, all which I shall particularly consider. End of Chapter 2 Book 1, Chapter 3 of Two Treatises of Civil Government This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Philippa Two Treatises of Civil Government by John Locke Book 1, Chapter 3 of Adam's title to sovereignty by creation Sir Robert, in his preface to his observations on Aristotle's politics, tells us, a natural freedom of mankind cannot be supposed without the denial of the creation of Adam. But how Adam's being created, which was nothing but his receiving a being immediately from omnipotence and the hand of God, gave Adam a sovereignty over anything I cannot see, nor consequently understand how a supposition of natural freedom is a denial of Adam's creation, and would be glad anybody else, since I also did not vouchsape as the favour, would make it out for him, for I find no difficulty to suppose the freedom of mankind, though I have always believed the creation of Adam. He was created, or began to exist, by God's immediate power, without the intervention of parents or the pre-existence of any of the same species to beget him, when it pleased God he should. And so did the lion, the king of beasts, before him, by the same creating power of God. And if bare existence by that power, and in that way will give dominion without any more ado, our author by this argument will make the lion have as good a title to it as he, and certainly the ancienter. No, for Adam had his title by the appointment of God, says our author in another place. Then bare creation gave him not dominion, and one might have supposed mankind free without the denying the creation of Adam, since it was God's appointment made him monarch. But let us see how he puts his creation and this appointment together. By the appointment of God, says the Robert, as soon as Adam was created he was monarch of the world, though he had no subjects, for though there could not be actual government till there were subjects, yet by the right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his posterity, though not in act, yet at least in habit, Adam was a king from his creation. I wish he had told us here what he meant by God's appointment, for whatsoever providence orders, or the law of nature directs, or positive revelation declares may be said to be by God's appointment. But I suppose it cannot be meant here in the first sense, i.e. by providence, because that would be to say no more but that as soon as Adam was created he was de facto monarch, because by right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his posterity. But he could not de facto be by providence constituted the governor of the world at a time when there was actually no government, no subjects to be governed, which our author here confesses. Monarch of the world is also differently used by our author, for sometimes he means by it a proprietor of all the world exclusive of the rest of mankind, and thus he does in the same page of his preface before cited. Adam says he, being commanded to multiply and people the earth and to subdue it, and having dominion given him over all creatures was thereby the monarch of the whole world, none of his posterity had any right to possess anything but by his grant or permission or by succession from him, too. Let us understand then by Monarch, proprietor of the world, and by appointment God's actual donation and revealed positive grant made to Adam, one Genesis 28, as we see Sir Robert himself does in this parallel place, and then his argument will stand thus. By the positive grant of God, as soon as Adam was created he was proprietor of the world, because by the right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his posterity. In which way of arguing there are two manifest falsehoods. First, it is false that God made that grant to Adam as soon as he was created, since, though it stands in the text immediately after his creation, yet it is plain it could not be spoken to Adam till after Eve was made and brought to him, and how then could he be monarch by appointment as soon as created, especially since he calls, if I mistake not, that which God says to Eve, 3 Genesis 16, the original grant of government, which not being till after the Fall, when Adam was somewhat, at least in time, and very much distant in condition from his creation, I cannot see how our author can say in this sense that by God's appointment as soon as Adam was created he was monarch of the world. Secondly, were it true that God's actual donation appointed Adam monarch of the world as soon as he was created, yet the reason here given for it would not prove it, but it would always be a false inference that God by a positive donation appointed Adam monarch of the world because by right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his posterity, for having given him the right of government by nature there was no need of a positive donation, at least it will never be proof of such a donation. On the other side the matter will not be much mended if we understand by God's appointment the law of nature, though it be a pretty harsh expression for it in this place, and by monarch of the world, sovereign ruler of mankind, for then the sentence under consideration must run thus, by the law of nature as soon as Adam was created he was governor of mankind, for by right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his posterity, which amounts to this, he was governor by right of nature, because he was governor by right of nature. But supposing we should grant that man is by nature governor of his children, Adam could not hear by be monarch as soon as created, for this right of nature being founded in his being their father, how Adam could have a natural right to be governor before he was a father, when by being a father only he had that right, is, me thinks, hard to conceive, unless he will have him to be a father before he was a father, and to have a title before he had it. To this foreseen objection our author answers very logically he was governor in habit and not in act, a very pretty way of being a governor without government, a father without children, and a king without subjects. And thus Sir Robert was an author before he writ his book, not in act, it is true, but in habit, for when he had once published it it was due to him by the right of nature to be an author, as much as it was to Adam to be governor of his children when he had begot them, and if to be such a monarch of the world, an absolute monarch, in habit, but not in act, will serve the turn, I should not much enviate to any of Sir Robert's friends that he thought fit graciously to bestow it upon, though even this of act and habit, if it signified anything but our author's skill in distinctions, be not to his purpose in this place. For the question is not here about Adam's actual exercise of government, but actually having a title to be governor. Government, says our author, was due to Adam by the right of nature. What is this right of nature? A right fathers have over their children by begetting them, Generatione just acuiritu parentibus in liberos, says our author, out of Grotius, Observations 223. The right then follows the begetting as a rising from it, so that, according to this way of reasoning or distinguishing of our author, Adam, as soon as he was created, had a title only in habit and not in act, which in plain English is, he had actually no title at all. To speak less learnedly and more intelligibly, one may say of Adam he was impossibility of being governor, since it was possible he might beget children, and thereby acquire that right of nature, be what it will, to govern them that accrues from thence. But what connection has this with Adam's creation, to make him say that as soon as he was created he was monarch of the world? For it may be as well said of Noah that as soon as he was born he was monarch of the world, since he was impossibility, which in our author's sense is enough to make a monarch, a monarch in habit, to outlive all mankind but his own posterity. What such necessary connection there is betwixt Adam's creation and his right to government, so that a natural freedom of mankind cannot be supposed without the denial of the creation of Adam, I confess for my part I do not see. Nor how those words, by the appointment, etc., Observations 254, however explained, can be put together to make any tolerable sense, at least to establish this position with which they end, vis Adam was a king from his creation. A king, says our author, not in act, but in habit, i.e. actually no king at all. I fear I have tired my reader's patience by dwelling longer on this passage than the weightiness of any argument in it seems to require, but I have unavoidably been engaged in it by our author's way of writing, who, huddling several suppositions together, and that in doubtful and general terms, makes such a medley and confusion that it is impossible to show his mistakes without examining the several senses wherein his words may be taken, and without seeing how in any of these various meanings they will consist together and have any truth in them. For in this present passage before us, how can anyone argue against this position of his, that Adam was a king from his creation, unless one examine whether the words, from his creation, to be taken as they may, for the time of the commencement of his government, as the foregoing words import, as soon as he was created he was monarch, or for the cause of it, as he says, page 11, creation made man prince of his posterity. How father can one judge of the truth of his beings till one has examined whether king be to be taken, as the words in the beginning of this passage would persuade, on supposition of his private dominion, which was by God's positive grant, monarch of the world by appointment, or king on supposition of his fatherly power over his offspring, which was by nature, due by the right of nature. Whether I say king be to be taken in both or one only of these two senses, or in neither of them, but only this, that creation made him prince, in a way, different from both the other. For though this assertion that Adam was king from his creation, be true in no sense, yet it stands here as an evident conclusion drawn from the preceding words, though in truth it be but a bare assertion joined to other assertions of the same kind, which confidently put together in words of undetermined and dubious meaning, look like a sort of arguing. When there is indeed neither proof nor connection, a way very familiar with our author, of which having given the reader a taste here, I shall, as much as the argument will permit me, avoid touching on hereafter. And should not have done it here, were it not to let the world see how incoherences in matter, and suppositions without proofs put handsomely together in good words and applausable style, are apt to pass for strong reason and good sense, till they come to be looked into with attention. Please visit LibriVox.org. Having at last got through the foregoing passage, where we have been so long detained not by the force of arguments and opposition, but by the intricacy of the words and the doubtfulness of the meaning, let us go on to his next argument for Adam's sovereignty. Our author tells us in the words of Mr. Seldon, that Adam by donation from God, Genesis 1.28, was made the general Lord of all things, not without such a private dominion to himself, as without his grant did exclude his children. This determination of Mr. Seldon, says our author, is consonant to the history of the Bible and natural reason, Observations 2.10. And in his preface to his observations on Aristotle, he says thus, The first government in the world was monarchical, in the father of all flesh, Adam being commanded to multiply and people the earth, and to subdue it, and having dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch of the whole world. None of his posterity had any right to possess anything but by his grant or permission, or by succession from him. The earth, says the psalmist, hath he given to the children of men, which show the title comes from fatherhood. Before I examine this argument, and the text on which it is founded, it is necessary to desire the reader to observe that our author, according to his usual method, begins in one sense and concludes in another. He begins here with Adam's propriety or private dominion by donation, and his conclusion is, which show the title comes from fatherhood. But let us see the argument. The words of the text are these, and God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveeth upon the earth, one Genesis 28. From whence our author concludes, that Adam, having hear dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch of the whole world? Whereby must be meant that either this grant of God gave Adam property, or as our author calls it, private dominion, over the earth and all inferior or irrational creatures, and so consequently that he was thereby monarch? Or secondly, that it gave him rule and dominion over all earthly creatures whatsoever, and thereby over his children, and so he was monarch? For as Mr. Seldon has properly worded it, Adam was made general lord of all things, one may very clearly understand him, that he means nothing to be granted to Adam here but property, and therefore he says not one word of Adam's monarchy. But our author says, Adam was here by monarch of the world, which properly speaking signifies sovereign ruler of all the men in the world, and so Adam, by this grant, must be constituted such a ruler. If our author means otherwise, he might with much cleanness have said, that Adam was here by proprietor of the whole world, but he begs your pardon in this point, clear, distinct speaking, not serving everywhere to his purpose, you must not expect it in him, as in Mr. Seldon or other such writers. In opposition therefore to our author's doctrine, that Adam was monarch of the whole world, founded on this place, I shall show, one, that by this grant, one Genesis 28, God gave no immediate power to Adam over men, over his children, over those of his own species, and so he was not made ruler or monarch, by this charter. Two, that by this grant, God gave him not private dominion over the inferior creatures, but right in common with all mankind, so neither was he monarch upon the account of the prophecy here given him. One, that this donation, one Genesis 28, gave Adam no power over men, will appear if we consider the words of it, for since all positive grants convey no more than the express words they are made in will carry, let us see which of them here will comprehend mankind or Adam's posterity, and those, I imagine, if any, must be these, every living thing that moveeth. The words in Hebrew are, hachaya haromeset, ayi bestiam reptantem, of which words the scripture itself is the best interpreter, God having created the fishes and sows the fifth day, the beginning of the sixth, he creates the irrational inhabitants of the dry land, which, verse 24, are described in these words, let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle and creeping things, and beasts of the earth after his kind, and, verse 2, and God made the beasts of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their kind, and everything that creepeth on the earth after his kind. Here, in the creation of all the brute inhabitants of the earth, he first speaks of them all under one general name, of living creatures, and then afterwards divides them into three ranks. One, cattle, or such creatures as were or might be tame, and so be the private possession of particular men. Two, hachaya, which, verse 24 and 25 in our Bible, is translated beasts, and by the Septuagint, Theria, wild beasts, and is the same word that here in our text, verse 28, where we have this great charter to Adam, is translated living thing, and is also the same word used, Genesis 9-2, where this ground is renewed to Noah, and their likewise translated beast. Three, the third rank were the creeping animals, which, verses 24 and 25, are comprised under the word haromeset. The same that is used here, verse 28, and is translated moving, but in the form of verses creeping, and by the Septuagint in all these places, herpeia, or reptiles. From whence it appears that the words which we translate here, in God's donation, verse 28, living creatures moving, are the same which, in the history of creation, verses 24 and 25, signify two ranks of terrestrial creatures, viz, wild beasts, and reptiles, and are so understood by the Septuagint. When God had made the irrational animals of the world, divided into three kinds from the places of their habitation, viz, fishes of the sea, fowls of the air, and living creatures of the earth, and these again into cattle, wild beasts, and reptiles, he considers of making man, and the dominion he should have over the terrestrial world, verse 26, and then he reckons up the inhabitants of these three kingdoms. But in the terrestrial leaves out the second rank, haia, or wild beasts. But here, verse 28, where he actually exercises this design, and gives him this dominion, the text mentions the fishes of the sea, and fowls of the air, and the terrestrial creatures, in the words that signify the wild beasts and reptiles, though translated living thing that moveeth, living out cattle. In both which places, though the word that signifies wild beasts be omitted in one, and that which signifies cattle in the other, yet since God certainly executed in one place what he declares he designed in the other, we cannot but understand the same in both places, and have here only an account how the terrestrial irrational animals, which were already created and reckoned up at their creation in three distinct ranks of cattle, wild beasts, and reptiles, were here, verse 28, actually put under the dominion of man, as they were designed, verse 26, nor do these words contain in them the least appearance of anything that can be rested to signify gods giving to one man dominion over another, to Adam over his posterity. And this further appears from Genesis 9, 2, where God renewing his charter to Noah and his sons, he gives them dominion over the fowls of the air, and the fishes of the sea, and the terrestrial creatures, expressed by Haya and Romaset, wild beasts and reptiles. The same words that in the text before us, one Genesis 28, are translated every moving thing that moveeth on the earth, which by no means can comprehend man, the grant being made to Noah and his sons, all the men then living, and not a one part of men over another, which is yet more evident from the very next words, verse 3, where God gives every remiss, every moving thing, the very words used chapter 128 to them for food, by all which it is plain that God's donation to Adam, chapter 128, and his designation, verse 26, and his grant to Noah and his sons, refer to and contain in them neither more nor less than the works of the creation of the fifth the day, and the beginning of the sixth, as they are set down from the twentieth to twenty-six verses inclusively of the first chapter, and so comprehend all the species of irrational animals of the Tarakwios globe, though all the words whereby they are expressed in the history of their creation are nowhere used in any of the following grants, but some of them omitted in one and some in another. From whence I think it is past all doubt that man cannot be comprehended in this grant, nor any dominion over those of his own species be conveyed to Adam? All the terrestrial irrational creatures are enumerated at their creation, verse 25, under the names beasts of the earth, cattle, and creeping things, but man, being not then created, was not contained under any of those names, and therefore, whether we understand the Hebrew words right or no, they cannot be supposed to comprehend man in the very same history and the very next verses following, especially since that Hebrew word remis, which, if any, in this donation to Adam, chapter 126, must comprehend man, is so plainly used in contra-distinction to him, as Genesis 620, 714, 21, 23, Genesis 8, 17, 19. And if God made all mankind slaves to Adam and his heirs by giving Adam dominion over every living thing that moveth on the earth, chapter 128, as our author would have it, me think Sir Robert should have carried his monarchical power one step higher, and satisfied the world that princes might eat their subjects too, since God gave as full power to Noah and his heirs, chapter 9, 2, to eat every living thing that moveth, as he did to Adam to have dominion over them, the Hebrew words in both places being the same. David, who might be supposed to understand the donation of God in this text, and the right of kings too, as well as our author in his comment on this place, as the learned and judicious Ainsworth calls it, in the Eighth Psalm finds here no such charter of monarchical power, his words are, Thou hast made him, i.e. man, the son of man, a little lower than the angels. Thou madeest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands. Thou hast put all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen, and the beasts of the fields, and the fowls of the air, and the fish of the sea, and whatsoever passes through the paths of the sea. In which words, if any one can find out that there is meant any monarchical power of one man over another, but only the dominion of the whole species of mankind over the inferior species of creatures, he may, for what I know, deserve to be one of Sir Robert's monarchs in habit for the rareness of the discovery. And by this time I hope it is evident that he that gave dominion over every living thing that moves us on the earth, gave Adam no monarchical power over those of his own species, which will yet appear more fully in the next thing I am to show. Two. Whatever God gave by the words of this grant, one Genesis 28, it was not to Adam in particular, exclusive of all other men, whatever dominion he had thereby, it was not a private dominion, but a dominion in common with the rest of mankind. That this donation was not made in particular to Adam appears evidently from the words of the text, it being made to more than one, for it was spoken in the plural number. God blessed them and said unto them, have dominion. God says unto Adam and Eve, have dominion, thereby says our author, Adam was monarch of the world. But the grant being to them, i.e. spoke to Eve also, as many interpreters think with reason that these words were not spoken till Adam had his wife, must not she thereby be lady as well as he Lord of the world? If it be said that Eve was subjected to Adam, it seems she was not so subjected to him as to hinder her dominion over the creatures or property in them, for shall we say that God ever made a joint grant to two, and one only was to have the benefit of it. But perhaps it will be said Eve was not made till afterward. Granted so, what advantage will I all forget by it? The text will be only the more directly against him, and shows that God in his donation gave the world to mankind in common and not to Adam in particular. The word them in the text must include the species of man, for it is certain them can by no means signify Adam alone. In the 26th verse, where God declares his intention to give this dominion, it is plain he meant that he would make a species of creatures that should have dominion over the other species of this terrestrial globe. The words are, and God said, let us make man in our image after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish, etc. They then must have dominion. Who? Even those who were to have the image of God, the individuals of that species of man that he was going to make. For that them should signify Adam singly exclusive of the rest that should be in the world with him, is against both scripture and all reason, and it cannot possibly be made sense if man in the former part of the verse do not signify the same with them in the latter. Only man there, as is usual, is taken for the species, and them the individuals of that species, and we have a reason in the very text. God makes him in his own image after his own likeness, makes him an intellectual creature and so capable of dominion, for where and so ever else the image of God consisted, the intellectual nature was certainly a part of it, and belonged to the whole species, and enabled them to have dominion over the inferior creatures. And therefore David says in the 8th Psalm above sighted, Thou hast made him little lower than the angels, Thou hast made him to have dominion. It is not of Adam King David speaks here, for verse 4 it is plain it is of man and the son of man, of the species of mankind. And that this grant spoken to Adam was made to him and the whole species of man is clear from our author's own proof out of the psalmist. The earth, said the psalmist, hath he given to the children of men, which shows the title comes from fatherhood. These are Sir Robert's words in the preface before sighted, and a strange inference it is he makes. God has given the earth to the children of men, ergo the title comes from fatherhood. It is pity's a propriety of the Hebrew tongue hath not used fathers of men instead of children of men to express mankind, then indeed our author might have had the countenance of the sound of the words to have placed the title in the fatherhood. But to conclude that the fatherhood had the right to the earth, because God gave it to the children of men, is a way of arguing peculiar to our author. And a man must have a great mind to go contrary to the sound as well as the sense of the words before he could light on it. But the sense is yet harder and more remote from our author's purpose, for as it stands in his preface, it is to prove Adam's being monarch, and his reasoning is thus, God gave the earth to the children of men, ergo Adam was monarch of the world. I defy any man to make a more pleasant conclusion than this, which cannot be excused from the most obvious absurdity, till it can be shown that by children of men, he who had no father, Adam alone, is signified. But whatever our author does, the scripture speaks not nonsense. To maintain this property and private dominion of Adam, our author labours in the following page to destroy the community granted to Noah and his sons in that parallel place, nine Genesis one, two, three, and he endeavours to do it in two ways. One. Sir Robert would persuade us, against the express words of the scripture, that what was here granted to Noah was not granted to his sons in common with him. His words are, as for the general community between Noah and his sons, which Mr. Seldon will have to be granted to them, nine Genesis two, the text does not warrant it. What warrant our author would have when the plain express words of scripture not capable of another meaning will not satisfy him, who pretends to build wholly on scripture, it is not easy to imagine. The text says, God blessed Noah and his sons and said unto them, i.e. as our author would have it, unto him, for, says he, although the sons are there mentioned with Noah in the blessing, yet it may best be understood with the subordination or benediction in succession, observations two eleven. That indeed is best for our author to be understood, which best serves to his purpose, but that truly may best be understood by anybody else, which best agrees with the plain construction of the words and arises from the obvious meaning of the place, and then with subordination and in succession will not be best understood in a grant of God, where he himself put them not, nor mentions any such limitation. But yet our author has reasons why it may best be understood so. The blessing, says he in the following words, might truly be fulfilled if the sons, either under or after their father, enjoyed a private dominion, observations two hundred and eleven, which is to say that a grant whose express words give a joint title in present, or the text says, into your hands they are delivered, may best be understood with the subordination or in succession, because it is possible that in subordination or in succession it may be enjoyed, which is all one as to say that a grant of anything in present possession may best be understood of reversion, because it is possible one may live to enjoy it in reversion. If the grant be indeed to a father and to his sons after him, who is so kind as to let his children enjoy it presently in common with him, one may truly say as to the event one will be as good as the other. But it can never be true that what the express words grant in possession and in common may best be understood to be in reversion. The sum of all his reasoning amounts to this. God did not give the sons of no other world in common with their father, because it was possible they might enjoy it under or after him. A very good sort of argument against an express text of scripture, but God must not be believed though he speaks it himself, when he says he does anything which will not consist with Sir Robert's hypothesis. For it is plain, however, he would exclude them, that part of this benediction, as he would have it in succession, must needs be meant to the sons and not to knower himself at all. Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth, says God in his blessing. This part of the benediction, as appears by the sequel, concerned not knower himself at all, for we read not of any children he had after the flood, and in the following chapter where his posterity is reckoned up there is no mention of any. And so this benediction in succession was not to take place till three hundred and fifty years after, and to save our author's imaginary monarchy the peopling of the world must be deferred three hundred and fifty years, for this part of the benediction cannot be understood with subordination unless our author will say that they must ask leave of their father knower to lie with their wives. But in this one point our author is constant to himself in all his discourses. He takes great care there should be monarchs in the world, but very little that there should be people, and indeed his way of government is not the way to people the world. For how much absolute monarchy helps to fulfill this great and primary blessing of God Almighty, be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth, which contains in it the improvement to of arts and sciences and the conveniences of life, may be seen in those large and rich countries which are happy under the Turkish government, where are not now to be found one-third, nay in many if not most parts of them one-thirtieth, perhaps I might say not one-hundredths of the people that were formerly, as will easily appear to anyone who will compare the accounts we have of it at this time with ancient history. But this by the by. The other parts of this benediction or grant are so expressed that they must needs be understood to belong equally to them all, as much to know as sons as to know himself, and not to his sons with the subordination or in succession. The fear of you and the dread of you, says God, shall be upon every beast, etc. Will anybody but our author say that the creatures feared and stood in awe of Noah only, and not of his sons without his leave or till after his death? And the following words, into your hands they are delivered. Are they to be understood as our author says, if your father please, or they shall be delivered into your hands hereafter? If this be to argue from scripture I know not what may not be proved by it, and I can scarce see how much this differs from that fiction and fancy, or how much a sureer foundation it will prove than the opinions of philosophers and poets, which our author so much condemns in his breathers. But our author goes on to prove that it may best be understood with a subordination or a benediction in succession, for, says he, it is not probable that the private dominion which God gave to Adam, and by his donation, asignation, or cessation to his children, was abrogated and a community of all things instituted between Noah and his sons. Noah was left the sole heir of the world. Why should it be thought that God would disinherit him of his birthright, and make him, of all men in the world, the only tenent in common with his children? Observations 211. The prejudices of our own ill-grounded opinions, however by us called probable, cannot authorize us to understand Scripture contrary to the direct and plain meaning of the words. I grant it is not probable that Adam's private dominion was here abrogated, because it is more than improbable, for it will never be proved, that ever Adam had any such private dominion. And since parallel places of Scripture are most probable to make us know how they may be best understood, their needs but the comparing this blessing here to Noah and his sons after the flood, with that to Adam after the creation, 1 Genesis 28, to assure any one that God gave Adam no such private dominion. It is probable, I confess, that Noah should have the same title, the same property and dominion after the flood that Adam had before it. But since private dominion cannot consist with the blessing and grant God gave to him and his sons in common, it is a sufficient reason to conclude that Adam had none, especially since in the donation made to him there are no words that express it, or do in the least favour it. And then let my reader judge whether it may best be understood, when in the one place there is not one word for it, not to say what has been above proved, that the text itself proves the contrary, and in the other the words and sense are directly against it. But our author says Noah was the sole heir of the world, why should it be thought that God would disinherit him of his birthright? Heir, indeed, in England, signifies the eldest son, who is by the law of England, to have all his father's land. But where God ever appointed any such heir of the world, our author would have done well to have showed us, and how God disinherited him of his birthright, or what harm was done to him if God gave his sons a right to make use of a part of the earth for the support of themselves and families, when the whole was not only more than Noah himself, but infinitely more than they all could make use of, and the possessions of one could not at all prejudice or, as to any use, straighten that of the other. Our author probably foreseeing that he might not be very successful in persuading people out of their senses, and say what he could men would be apt to believe the plain words of scripture, and think as they saw that the grant was spoken to Noah and his sons jointly. He endeavours to insinuate, as if this grant to Noah conveyed no property, no dominion, because subduing the earth and dominion over the creatures are therein omitted, nor the earth once named. And therefore says he, there is a considerable difference between these two texts. The first blessing gave Adam a dominion over the earth and all creatures. The latter allows Noah liberty to use the living creatures for food. Here is no alteration or diminishing of his titles to a property of all things, but an enlargement only of his commons—Observations 211. So that in our author's sense, all that were said here to Noah and his sons gave them no dominion, no property, but only enlarged the commons. Their commons, I should say, since God says to you are they given, though our author says his, for as for Noah's sons, they, it seems, by Sir Robert's appointment, during their father's lifetime, were to keep fasting days. Anyone but our author would be mightily suspected to be blinded with prejudice, that in all this blessing to Noah and his sons could see nothing but only an enlargement of commons, for as to dominion, which our author thinks omitted, the fear of you and the dread of you, says God, shall be upon every beast. Which, I suppose, expresses the dominion or superiority was designed man over the living creatures as fully as may be. For in that fear and dread seems chiefly to consist what was given to Adam over the inferior animals, who, as absolute a monarch as he was, could not make bold with a lark or rabbit to satisfy his hunger, and had the herbs but in common with the beasts, as is plain from 1 Genesis 2, 9, and 30. In the next place it is manifest that in this blessing to Noah and his sons, property is not only given in clear words, but in a larger extent than it was to Adam. Into your hands they are given, says God to Noah and his sons. Which words, if they give not property, nay, property in possession, it will be hard to find words that can. Since there is not a way to express a man's being possessed of anything more natural and more certain than to say it is delivered into his hands. And, at verse 3, to show that they had then given them the utmost property man is capable of, which is to have a right to destroy anything by using it. Every moving thing that liveth, saith God, shall be meat for you, which was not allowed Adam in his charter. This, our author calls, a liberty of using them for food, and only an enlargement of commons but no alteration of property. Observations 211. What other property man can have in the creatures but the liberty of using them is hard to be understood, so that if the first blessing, as our author says, gave Adam dominion over the creatures, and the blessing to Noah and his sons gave them such a liberty to use them as Adam had not, it must neither give them something that Adam with all his sovereignty wanted, something that one would be apt to take for a greater property, for certainly he has no absolute dominion over even the brutal part of the creatures, and the property he has in them is very narrow and scanty, who cannot make that use of them which is permitted to another. Should anyone who is absolute lord of a country have bidden our author subdue the earth, and given him dominion over the creatures in it, but not have permitted him to have taken a kid or a lamb out of the flock to satisfy his hunger, I guess he would scarce have thought himself lord or proprietor of that land or the cattle on it, but would have found the difference between having dominion which a shepherd may have, and having full property as an owner, so that, had it been his own case, so Robert I believe would have thought here was an alteration, nay an enlarging of property, and that Noah and his children had by this grant not only property given them, but such a property given them in the creatures as Adam had not. For, however, in respect of one another, men may be allowed to have property in their distinct portions of the creatures, yet in respect of God the maker of heaven and earth, who is sole lord and proprietor of the whole world, man's propriety in the creatures is nothing but that liberty to use them which God has permitted, and so man's property may be altered and enlarged, as we see it was here after the flood when other uses of them are allowed, which before were not. From all which I suppose it is clear that neither Adam nor Noah had any private dominion, any property in the creatures, exclusive of his posterity, as they should successively grow up into need of them, and come to be able to make use of them. Thus we have examined our author's argument for Adam's monarchy founded on the blessing pronounced on Genesis 28, wherein I think it is impossible for any sober reader to find any other but the setting of mankind above the other kinds of creatures in this habitable earth of ours. It is nothing but the giving to man, the whole species of man, as the chief inhabitant who is the image of his maker, the dominion over the other creatures. This lies so obvious in the plain words that any one but our author would have thought it necessary to have shown how these words that seemed to say the quite contrary gave Adam monarchical absolute power over other men or the sole property in all the creatures. And he thinks in a business of this moment, and that whereon he builds all that follows, he should have done something more than barely cite words which apparently make against him. For I confess, I cannot see anything in them tending to Adam's monarchy or private dominion, but quite the contrary. And either less deplore the dullness of my apprehension herein, since I find the apostle seems to have as little notion of any such private dominion of Adam as I, when he says, God gives us all things richly to enjoy, which he could not do if it were all given away already to monarch Adam and the monarchs his heirs and successors. To conclude, this text is so far from proving Adam's sole proprietor that on the contrary it is a confirmation of the original community of all things amongst the sons of men, which appearing from this donation of God as well as other places of scripture, the sovereignty of Adam built upon his private dominion, must fall, not having any foundation to support it. But yet, if, after all, any one will need have it so, that by this donation of God Adam was made sole proprietor of the whole earth, what will this be to his sovereignty? And how will it appear that propriety in land gives a man power over the life of another? Or how will the possession even of the whole earth give any one a sovereign arbitrary authority over the persons of men? The most specious thing to be said is that he that is proprietor of the whole world may deny all the rest of mankind food, and so at his pleasure starve them, if they will not acknowledge his sovereignty and obey his will. If this were true, it would be a good argument to prove that there never was any such property, that God never gave any such private dominion, that it is more reasonable to think that God, who bid mankind increase and multiply, should rather himself give them all a right to make use of the food and raiment and other conveniences of life, the materials whereof he had so plentifully provided for them, than to make them depend upon the will of a man for their subsistence, who should have power to destroy them all when he pleased, and who, being no better than other men, was in succession likelier by want and dependence of a scanty fortune, to tie them to hard service than by liberal allowance of the conveniences of life to promote the great design of God, increase and multiply. He that doubts this, let him look into the absolute monarchies of the world and see what becomes of the conveniences of life and the multitudes of people. But we know God hath not left one man so to the mercy of another that he may starve him if he please. God's the Lord and Father of all has given no one of his children such a property in his peculiar portion of the things of this world, but that he has given his needy brother a right to the surplusage of his goods, so that it cannot justly be denied him when his pressing wants call for it. And therefore no man could ever have a just power over the life of another by right of property in land or possessions, since it would always be a sin in any man of estate to let his brother perish for want of affording him relief out of his plenty. As justice gives every man a title to the product of his honest industry, and the fair acquisitions of his ancestors defended to him, so charity gives every man a title to so much out of another's plenty as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise. And a man can no more justly make use of another's necessity to force him to become his vassal by withholding that relief God requires him to afford to the wants of his brother. Then he that has more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to his obedience, and with a dagger at his throat offer him death or slavery. Should any one make so perverse in use of God's blessings poured on him with a liberal hand, should any one be cruel and uncharitable to that extremity? Yet all this would not prove that propriety in land, even in this case, gave any authority over the persons of men, but only that compact might, since the authority of the rich proprietor and the subjection of the needy beggar began not from the possession of the Lord, but the consent of the poor man, who preferred being his subject to starving. And the man he thus submits to can pretend to no more power over him than he has consented to upon compact. Upon this ground a man's having his stores filled in a time of scarcity, having money in his pocket, being in a vessel at sea, being able to swim, etc., may as well be the foundation of rule and dominion as being possessor of all the land in the world. Any of these being sufficient to enable me to save a man's life who would perish if such assistance would unite him. And anything by this rule that may be an occasion of working upon another's necessity to save his life or anything dear to him at the rate of his freedom may be made a foundation of sovereignty as well as property. From all which it is clear that though God should have given Adam private dominion, yet that private dominion could give him no sovereignty. But we have already sufficiently proved that God gave him no private dominion. CHAPTER V The next place of scripture we find our author builds his monarchy of Adam on, is Three Genesis 26, and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee. Here we have, says he, the original grant of government, from whence he concludes in the following part of the page, Observations 244, that the supreme power is settled in the fatherhood and limited to one kind of government, that is, to monarchy. For let his premises be what they will, this is always the conclusion. Let rule in any text be but once named, and presently absolute monarchy is by divine right established. If any one will but carefully read our author's own reasoning from these words, Observations 244, and consider among other things the line and posterity of Adam, as he there brings them in, he will find some difficulty to make sense of what he says, but we will allow this at present to his peculiar way of writing, and consider the force of the text in hand. The words are the curse of God upon the woman, for having been the first and forwardest in the disobedience, and if we will consider the occasion of what God says here to our first parents, that he was denouncing judgment and declaring his wrath against them both for their disobedience, we cannot suppose that this was the time wherein God was granting Adam prerogatives and privileges, investing him with dignity and authority, elevating him to dominion and monarchy. For though as a helper in the temptation Eve was laid below him, and so he had accidentally a superiority over her for her greater punishment, yet he too had his share in the fall as well as the sin, and was laid lower, as may be seen in the following verses, and it would be hard to imagine that God in the same breath should make him universal monarch of all mankind, and a day labourer for his life, turn him out of paradise to till the ground, verse 23, and at the same time advance him to a throne, and all the privileges and ease of absolute power. This was not a time when Adam could expect any favours, any grant of privileges, from his offended maker. If this be the original grant of government as our author tells us, and Adam was now made monarch, whatever Sir Robert would have him, it is plain God made him but a very poor monarch, such in one as our author himself would have counted it no great privilege to be. God sets him to work for his living, and seems rather to give him a spade in his hand to subdue the earth than a scepter to rule over its inhabitants. In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat thy bread, says God to him, verse 19. This was unavoidable, may it perhaps be answered, because he was yet without subjects, and had nobody to work for him. But afterwards, living as he did above nine hundred years, he might have people enough whom he might command to work for him. No, says God, not only whilst thou art without other help save thy wife, but as long as thou livest, shalt thou live by thy labour. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat thy bread till thou return unto the ground, for out of it was thou taken, for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return. Verse 19. It will perhaps be answered again in favour of our author, that these words are not spoken personally to Adam, but in him as their representative to all mankind. This being a curse upon mankind because of the fool. God, I believe, speaks differently from men, because he speaks with more truth, more certainty. But when he vouchsafes to speak to men, I do not think he speaks differently from them in crossing the rules of language in use amongst them. This would not be to condescend to their capacities when he humbles himself to speak to them, but to lose his design in speaking what thus spoken they could not understand. And yet thus we must think of God, if the interpretations of Scripture necessary to maintain our author's doctrine must be received for good. For by the ordinary rules of language it will be very hard to understand what God says if what he speaks here, in the singular number to Adam, must be understood to be spoken to all mankind, and what he says in the plural number, 1 Genesis 26 and 28, must be understood of Adam alone, exclusive of all others, and what he says to Noah and his sons jointly, must be understood to be meant to Noah alone. Genesis 9. Father, it is to be noted that these words here of 3 Genesis 16, which our author calls the original grant of government, were not spoken to Adam. Neither indeed was there any grant in them made to Adam, but a punishment laid upon Eve. And if we will take them as they were directed in particular to her, or in her as their representative, to all other women, they will at most concern the female sex only, and import no more but that subjection they should ordinarily be into their husbands. But there is here no more law to oblige a woman to such subjection, if the circumstances either of her condition or contract with her husband should exempt her from it, then there is that she should bring forth her children in sorrow and pain, if they can be found a remedy for it, which is also part of the same curse upon her, for the whole verse runs thus, unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception, in sorrow thou shall bring forth children, and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee. It would, I think, have been a hard matter for anybody but our author to have found out a grant of monarchical government to Adam in these words, which were neither spoke to nor of him. Neither will any one, I suppose, by these words think the weaker sex, as by a law, so subjected to the curse contained in them, that it is their duty not to endeavour to avoid it. And will any one say that Eve or any other woman sinned if she were brought to bed without those multiplied pains God threatens her herewith? Or that either of our Queen's Mary or Elizabeth, had they married any of their subjects, had been by this text put into a political subjection to him? Or that he thereby should have had monarchical rule over her? God in this text gives not that I see any authority to Adam over Eve or to men over their wives, but only foretells what should be the woman's lot, how by his providence he would order it so that she should be subject to her husband, as we see that generally the laws of mankind and customs of nations have ordered it so, and there is, I grant, a foundation in nature for it. Thus when God says of Jacob and Esau that the elder should serve the younger, 25 Genesis 23, nobody supposes that God hereby made Jacob Esau's sovereign, but foretold what should de facto come to pass. But if these words here spoke to Eve must need to be understood as a law to bind her and all other women to subjection, it can be no other subjection than what every wife owes her husband, and then if this be the original grant of government and the foundation of monarchical power, there will be as many monarchs as there are husbands. If therefore these words give any power to Adam, it can be only a conjugal power, not political, the power that every husband have to order the things of private concernment in his family, as proprietor of the goods and land there, and have his will take place before that of his wife in all things of their common concernment, but not a political power of life and death over her, much less over anybody else. This, I am sure, if our author will have this text be a grant, the original grant of government, political government, he ought to have proved it by some better arguments, than by barely saying that thy desire shall be unto thy husband was a law whereby Eve and all that should come of her were subjected to the absolute monarchical power of Adam and his heirs. Thy desire shall be to thy husband is too doubtful an expression, of whose signification interpreters are not agreed, to build so confidently on, and in a matter of such moment and so great and general concernment. But our author, according to his way of writing, having once named the text, concludes, presently without any more ado, that the meaning is as he would have it. Let the words rule and subject be but found in the text or margin, and it immediately signifies the duty of a subject to his prince. The relation is changed, and though God says husband, Sir Robert will have it king. Adam has presently absolute monarchical power over Eve, and not only over Eve, but all that should come of her, though the scriptures is not a word of it, nor our author a word to prove it. But Adam must for all that be an absolute monarch, and so down to the end of the chapter. And here I leave my reader to consider, whether my bare saying, without offering any reasons to evince it, that this text gave not, Adam, that absolute monarchical power, our author supposes, be not as sufficient to destroy that power, as his bare assertion is to establish it. Since the text mentions neither prince nor people, speaks nothing of absolute or monarchical power, but the subjection of Eve to Adam, a wife to her husband. And he that would trace our author so all through, would make a short and sufficient answer to the greatest part of the grounds he proceeds on, and abundantly confute them by barely denying it. It being a sufficient answer to assertions without proof, to deny them without giving a reason. And therefore, should I have said nothing but barely denied that by this text the supreme power was settled and founded by God himself in the fatherhood limited to monarchy and that to Adam's person and heirs, all which our author notably concludes from these words, as may be seen in the same page, Observations 244, it had been a sufficient answer. Should I have desired any sober man only to have read the text and considered to whom and on what occasion it was spoken, he would no doubt have wondered how our author found out monarchical absolute power in it, had he not had an exceeding good faculty to find it himself where he could not show it others. And thus we have examined the two places of scripture, all that I remember our author brings to prove Adam's sovereignty, that supremacy which as he says, it was God's ordinance should be unlimited in Adam, and as large as all the acts of his will, Observations 254, vis one Genesis 28 and three Genesis 16, one whereof signifies only the subjection of the inferior ranks of creatures to mankind and the other, the subjection that is due from a wife to her husband, both far enough from that which subjects all the governors of political societies. End of Book 1 Chapter 5 Book 1 Chapter 6 of Two Treatises of Civil Government This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Philippa. Two Treatises of Civil Government by John Locke. Book 1 Chapter 6 of Adam's Title to Sovereignty by Fatherhood There is one thing more, and then I think I've given you all that our author brings for proof of Adam's sovereignty, and that is a supposition of a natural right of dominion over his children by being their father. At this title of Fatherhood he is so pleased with that he will find it brought in almost every page, particularly he says, not only Adam, but the succeeding patriarchs had by right of Fatherhood royal authority over their children, page 12, and in the same page, this subjection of children being the fountain of all regal authority, etc. This being, as one would think by his so frequent mentioning it, the main basis of all his frame, we may well expect clear and evident reason for it, since he lays it down as a position necessary to his purpose, that every man that is born is so far from being free that by his very birth he becomes a subject of him that begets him, Observations 156, so that Adam, being the only man created, and all ever since being begotten, nobody has been born free. If we ask how Adam comes by this power over his children, he tells us here it is by begetting them, and so again, Observations 223, this natural dominion of Adam, says he, may be proved out of Grotius himself, who teaches that and indeed the act of begetting being that which makes a man a father, his right of a father over his children, can naturally arise from nothing else. Grotius tells us not here how far this this power of parents over their children extends, but our author, always very clear in the point that shows us, it is supreme power, and like that of absolute monarchs over their slaves, absolute power of life and death. He is at your demand of him how, or for what reason it is, that begetting a child's gives the father such an absolute power over him, will find him answer nothing. We are to take his word for this, as well as several other things, and by that the laws of nature and the constitutions of government must stand or fall. Had he been an absolute monarch, this way of talking might have suited well enough. Proratione Voluntas might have been of force in his mouth, but in the way of proof or argument is very unbecoming and with little advantage his plea for absolute monarchy. Sir Robert has too much lessened a subject's authority to leave himself the hopes of establishing anything by his bare saying it. One slave's opinion without proof is not of weight enough to dispose of the liberty and fortunes of all mankind. If all men are not, as I think they are, naturally equal, I am sure all slaves are. And then I may without presumption oppose my single opinion to his, and be confident at my saying that begetting of children makes them not slaves to their fathers, as certainly sets all mankind free, as his affirming the contrary makes them all slaves. But that this position, which is the foundation of all their doctrine who would have monarchy to be may have all fair play, let us hear what reasons others give for it, since our author offers none. The argument I have heard others make you soft to prove that fathers, by begetting them, come by an absolute power over their children is this—that fathers have a power over the lives of their children because they give them life and being, which is the only proof it is capable of, since there can be no reason why naturally one man should have any claim or pretense of right over that in another, which was never his, which he bestowed not, but was received from the bounty of another. One, I answer that every one who gives another anything has not always thereby a right to take it away again. But two, they who say the father gives life to his children are so dazzled with the thoughts of monarchy that they do not as they ought remember God, who is the author and giver of life, it is in him alone we live, move and have our being. How can he be thought to give life to another, that knows not where in his own life consists? Philosophers are at a loss about it after their most diligent inquiries, and anatomists after their whole lives and studies spent in dissections and diligent examining the bodies of men confess their ignorance in the structure and use of many parts of man's body and in that operation wherein life consists in the whole. And doth the rude plowman, or the more ignorant of a luxury, frame or fashion such an admirable engine as this is, and then put life and sense into it? Can any man say he formed the parts that are necessary to the life of his child? Or can he suppose himself to give the life, and yet not know what subject is fit to receive it, nor what actions or organs are necessary for its reception or preservation? To give life to that which has yet no being is to frame and make a living creature, fashion the parts, and mould and suit them to their uses, and having proportioned and seated them together to put into them a living soul. He that could do this might indeed have some pretence to destroy his own workmanship. But is there anyone so bold that dares thus far arrogate to himself the incomprehensible works of the Almighty? Who alone did at first and continue still to make a living soul, he alone can breathe in the breath of life? If any one thinks himself an artist at this, let him number up the parts of his child's body which he have made, tell me their uses and operations, and when the living and rational soul began to inhabit this curious structure, when sense began, and how this engine which he has framed thinks and reasons. If he made it, let him when it is out of order mend it, at least tell wherein the defects lie. Shall he that made the eye not see, says the psalmist, Psalm 94, 9? See these men's vanities. The structure of that one part is sufficient to convince us of an all-wise contriver, and he has so visible a claim to us as his workmanship that one of the ordinary appellations of God in Scripture is God our Maker and the Lord our Maker. And therefore, though our author for the magnifying his fatherhood be pleased to say, Observations 159, that even the power which God himself exercise of ever mankind is by right of fatherhood. Yet this fatherhood is such and one as utterly excludes all pretense of title in earthly parents, for he is king because he is indeed maker of us all, which no parents can pretend to be of their children. But had men skill and power to make their children, it is not so slight a piece of workmanship that it can be imagined they could make them without designing it. What father of a thousand when he begets a child thinks farther than the satisfying his present appetite. God in his infinite wisdom has put strong desires of copulation into the constitution of men, thereby to continue the race of mankind, which he does most commonly without the intention, and often against the consent and will of the begetter. And indeed those who desire and design children are but the occasions of their being, and when they design and wish to beget them, do little more towards their making than Deucalion and his wife in the fable did towards the making of mankind by throwing pebbles over their heads. But grant that the parents made their children, gave them life and being, and that hence there followed an absolute power. This would give the father but a joint dominion with the mother over them, for nobody can deny but that the woman hath an equal share if not the greater, as nourishing the child a long time in her own body out of her own substance. There it is fashioned, and from her it receives the materials and principles of its constitution. And it is so hard to imagine the rational soul should presently inhabit the yet unformed embryo as soon as the father has done his part in the act of generation, that if it must be supposed to derive anything from the parents, it must certainly owe most to the mother. But be that as it will, the mother cannot be denied an equal share in begetting of the child, and so the absolute authority of the father will not arise from hence. Our author indeed is of another mind, for he says, We know that God at the creation gave the sovereignty to the man over the woman, as being the nobler and principal agent in generation—observations 172. I remember not this in my Bible, and when the place is brought where God at the creation gave the sovereignty to man over the woman, and that for this reason, because he is the nobler and principal agent in generation, it will be time enough to consider and answer it. But it is no new thing for our author to tell us his own fancies for certain and divine truths, though there be often a great deal of difference between his and divine revelations. The God in the scripture says, his father and his mother that begot him. They who allege the practice of mankind for exposing or selling their children as a proof of their power over them are with Sir Robert Happy Argueurs, and cannot but recommend their opinion by founding it on the most shameful action and most unnatural murder human nature is capable of. The dens of lions and nurseries of wolves know no such cruelty as this. These savage inhabitants of the desert obey God and nature in being tender and careful of their offspring. They will hunt, watch, fight, and almost starve for the preservation of their young, never part with them, never forsake them till they are able to shift themselves. And is it the privilege of man alone to act more contrary to nature than the wild and most untamed part of the creation? Does God forbid us, under the severest penalty that of death, to take away the life of any man as stranger and upon provocation, and does He permit us to destroy those He has given us the charge and care of, and by the dictates of nature and reason, as well as His revealed command, requires us to preserve? He has in all the parts of the creation taken a peculiar care to propagate and continue the several species of creatures, and makes the individuals act so strongly to this end that they sometimes neglect their own private good for it, and seem to forget that general rule which nature teaches all things of self-preservation, and the preservation of their young as the strongest principle in them, overrules the constitution of their particular natures. Thus we see, when their young stand in need of it, the timorous become valiant, the fierce and savage kind, and the ravenous, tender and liberal. But if the example of what hath been done be the rule of what ought to be, history would have furnished our author with instances of this absolute fatherly power in its height and perfection, and he might have showed us, in Peru, people that begot children on purpose to fatten and eat them. The story is so remarkable that I cannot put set it down in the author's words. In some provinces, says he, there was so licorice after man's flesh, that there would not have the patience to stay till the breath was out of the body, but would suck the blood as it ran from the wounds of the dying man. There had public shambles of man's flesh, and their madness herein was to that degree that they spared not their own children which they had begot on strangers taken in war, for they made their captives their mistresses, and choicelessly nourished the children they had by them till about thirteen years old, they butchered and ate them, and they served the mothers after the same fashion when they grew past child-bearing, and ceased to bring them any more roasters. Thus far can the busy mind of man carry him to a brutality below the level of beasts, when he quits his reason which bases him almost equal to angels. Nor can it be otherwise in a creature whose thoughts are more than the sand and wider than the ocean, where fancy and passion must needs run him into strange courses, if reason which is his only star and compass, be not that he steers by. The imagination is always restless, and suggests variety of thoughts, and the will, reason being laid aside, is ready for every extravagant project, and in this state he that goes farthest out of the way is thought fittest to lead, and is sure of most followers, and when fashion has once established what folly or craft began, custom makes it sacred, and it will be thought impudence or madness to contradict or question it. He that will impartially survey the nations of the world will find so much of their religions, governments and manners brought in and continued amongst them by these means, that he will have but little reverence for the practices which are in use and credit amongst men, and will have reason to think that the woods and forests, where the irrational, untoward inhabitants keep right by following nature, are fitter to give us rules than cities and palaces, where those that call themselves civil and rational go out of their way by authority of example. If presidents are sufficient to establish a rule in this case, our author might have found in holy writ children sacrificed by their parents, and these amongst the people of God themselves, the psalmist tells us, Psalm 106, 38, they shed innocent blood, even the blood of their sons and of their daughters, whom they sacrificed unto the idols of Canaan. But God judged not of this by our author's rule, nor allowed of the authority of practice against his righteous law. But as it follows there, the land was polluted with blood, therefore was the wrath of the Lord kindled against his people, in so much that he abhorred his own inheritance. The killing of their children, though it were fashionable, was charged on them as innocent blood, and so had in the account of God the guilt of murder, as the offering them to idols had the guilt of idolatry. Be it then, as Sir Robert says, that anciently it was usual for men to sell and castrate their children, observations 155, let it be that they exposed them. Add to it, if you please, for this is still greater power, that they begat them for their tables to fat and eat them. If this proves a right to do so, we may by the same argument justify adultery, incest, and sodomy, for there are examples of these too, both ancient and modern. Sins, which I suppose have their principal aggravation from this, that they cross the main intention of nature, which will if the increase of mankind, and the continuation of the species in the highest perfection, and the distinction of families with the security of the marriage-bed, as necessary thereunto. In confirmation of this natural authority of the Father, our author brings a lame proof from the positive command of God in Scripture. His words are, To confirm the natural right of regal power, we find in the Decalogue that the law which enjoins obedience to kings is delivered in the terms honor thy Father, page 23. Whereas many confess that government only in the abstract is the ordinance of God, they are not able to prove any such ordinance in the Scripture, but only in the fatherly power, and therefore we find the commandment that enjoins obedience to superiors given in the terms honor thy Father, so that not only the power and right of government, but the form of the power of governing, and the person having the power, are all the ordinances of God. The first father had not only simply power, but power monarchical, as he was father immediately from God. Observations 254. To the same purpose the same law is cited by our author in several other places, and just after the same fashion that is, and mother, as apocryphal words are always left out, a great argument of our author's ingenuity in the goodness of his cause, which required in its defender zeal to a degree of warmth able to warp the sacred rule of the word of God to make it comply with his present occasion. A way of proceeding not unusual to those who embrace not truth, because reason and revelation offer them, but espouse tenets and parties for end different from truth, and then resolve at any rate to defend them, and so do with the words and sense of authors they would fit to their purpose, just as Procrustes did with his guests, lop or stretch them, as may best fit them to the size of their notions, and they always prove like those so served, deformed, lame, and useless. For had our author set down this command without garbling, as God gave it, and joined mother to father, every reader would have seen that it had made directly against him, and that it was so far from establishing the monarchical power of the father, that it set up the mother equal with him, and enjoined nothing but what was due in common to both father and mother. For that is the constant tenor of the scripture, honor thy father and thy mother, Exodus 20. He that smited his father or mother shall surely be put to death, 2115. He that cursedeth his father or mother shall surely be put to death, verse 17, repeated Leviticus 29, and by our Saviour, Matthew 15, 4. Ye shall fear every man, his mother and his father, Leviticus 19, 3. If a man have a rebellious son, which will not obey the voice of his father or the voice of his mother, then shall his father and his mother lay hold on him, and say, This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he will not obey our voice. Deuteronomy 21, 18, 19, 20, 21. Cursed be he that set it light by his father or his mother, 28, 16. My son, hear the instructions of thy father, and forsake not the law of thy mother, other words of Solomon, a king who was not ignorant of what belonged to him as a father or a king, and yet he joins father and mother together in all the instructions he gives children, quite through his book of proverbs. Woe unto him that saith unto his father, what begetest thou, all to the woman, what hast thou brought forth, Isaiah 11, verse 10. In thee have they set light by father or mother, Ezekiel 28, 2. And it shall come to pass, that when any shall yet prophesy, then his father and his mother that begat him shall say unto him, Thou shalt not live, and his father and his mother that begat him shall thrust him through when he prophesies, Zechariah 13, 3. Here not the father only, but the father and mother jointly had power in this case of life and death. Thus ran the law of the Old Testament, and in the new they are likewise joined in the obedience of their children, Ephesians 6, 1, the rule is children obey your parents, and I do not remember that I anywhere read children obey your father, and no more. The scripture joins mother, too, in that homage which is due from children, and had there been any text where the honor or obedience of children had been directed to the father alone, it is not likely that our author, who pretends to build all upon scripture, would have omitted it. Nay, the scripture makes the authority of father and mother, in respect of those they have begot, so equal that in some places it neglects even the priority of order which is thought due to the father, and the mother is but first, as Leviticus 19.3, from which so constantly joining father and mother together as is found quite through the scripture, we may conclude that the honor they have a title to from their children is one common right, belonging so equally to them both, that neither can claim it wholly, neither can be excluded. One would wonder, then, how our author infers from the fifth commandment that all power was originally in the father, how he finds monarchical power of government settled and fixed by the commandment honor thy father and thy mother. If all the honor due by the commandment, be it what it will, be the only right of the father, because he, as our author says, has the sovereignty over the woman as being the nobler and principal agent in generation, why did God afterwards all along join the mother with him to share in his honor? Can the father, by this sovereignty of his, discharge the child from paying this honor to his mother? The scripture gave no such license to the Jews, and yet they were often breaches wide enough to its husband and wife, even to divorce and separation, and I think nobody will say a child may withhold honor from his mother, or, as the scripture terms it, set light by her, though his father should command him to do so. No more than the mother could dispense with him for neglecting to honor his father, whereby it is plain that this command of God gives the father no sovereignty, no supremacy. I agree with our author that the title to this honor is vested in the parents by nature and is a right which accrues to them by their having begotten their children, and God by many positive declarations has confirmed it to them. I also allow our author's rule that in grants and gifts that have their original from God and nature as the power of the father, let me add, and mother, for whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder, no inferior power of men can limit, nor make any law of prescription against them. Observations 158. So that the mother having by this law of God a right to honor from her children, which is not subject to the will of her husband, we see this absolute monarchical power of the father can neither be founded on it, nor consist with it. And he has a power very far from monarchical, very far from that absoluteness our author contends for, when another has over his subject the same power he hath, and by the same title. And therefore he cannot forbear saying himself, that he cannot see how any man's children can be free from subjection to their parents, page 12, which, in common speech, I think signifies mother as well as father, or if parents here signifies only father, it is the first time I ever yet knew it to do so, and by such in use of words one may say anything. By our author's doctrine the father having absolute jurisdiction over his children has also the same over their issue, and the consequences good were it true that the father had such a power, and yet I ask our author whether the grandfather by his sovereignty could discharge the grandchild from paying to his father the honor due to him by the fifth commandment. If the grandfather hath by right of fatherhood sole sovereign power in him, and that obedience which is due to the supreme magistrate be commanded in these words, honor thy father, it is certain the grandfather might dispense with the grandson's honoring his father, which, since it is evident in common sense he cannot, it follows from hence, that honor thy father and mother cannot mean an absolute subjection to a sovereign power, but something else. The right therefore which parents have by nature and which is confirmed to them by the fifth commandment cannot be that political dominion which our author would derive from it, for that being in every civil society supreme somewhere can discharge any subject from any political obedience to any one of his fellow subjects. But what law of the magistrate can give a child liberty not to honor his father and mother? It is an eternal law annexed purely to the relation of parents and children, and so contains nothing of the magistrate's power in it, nor is subjected to it. Our author says, God hath given to a father a right or liberty to alien his power over his children to any other. Observations 155. I doubt whether he can alien wholly the right of honor that is due from them, but be that as it will, this I am sure he cannot alien and retain the same power. If therefore the magistrate's sovereignty be, as our author would have it, nothing but the authority of a supreme father, page 23, it is unavoidable that if the magistrate hath all this paternal right, as he must have if fatherhood be the fountain of all authority, then the subjects, though fathers, can have no power over their children, no right to honor from them, for it cannot be all in another's hands and a part remain with the parents. So that according to our author's own doctrine, honor thy father and mother cannot possibly be understood of political subjection and obedience, since the laws both in the Old and New Testament that commanded children to honor and obey their parents were given to such whose fathers were under civil government and fellow subjects with them in political societies, and have bid them honor and obey their parents, in our author's sense, had been to bid them be subjects to those who had no title to it, the rights to obedience from subjects being all vested in another, and instead of teaching obedience, this had been to cement sedition by setting up powers that were not. If therefore this command, honor thy father and mother, concern political dominion, it directly overthrows our author's monarchy, since it being to be paid by every child to his father, even in society every father must necessarily have political dominion, and there will be as many sovereigns as there are fathers, besides that the mother too had her title, which destroys the sovereignty of one supreme monarch. But if honor thy father and mother means something distinct from political power, as necessarily it must, it is besides our author's business and serves nothing to his purpose. The law that enjoins obedience to kings is delivered, says our author, in the terms honor thy father, as if all power were originally in the father, Observations 254, and that law is also delivered, say I, in the terms honor thy mother, as if all power were originally in the mother. I appeal whether the argument be not as good on one side as the other, father and mother being joined all along in the Old and New Testament, wherever honor or obedience is enjoined children. Again our author tells us, Observations 254, that this command, honor thy father, gives the right to govern, and makes the form of government monarchical. To which I answer that if by honor thy father be meant obedience to the political power of the magistrate, it concerns not any duty we owe to our natural fathers, who are subjects, because they, by our author's doctrine, are divested of all that power, it being placed wholly in the prince, and so being equally subject and slaves with their children can have no right, by that title, to any such honor or obedience, as contains in it political subjection. If honor thy father and mother signifies the duty we owe our natural parents, as by our saviour's interpretation, Matthew 15.4, and all the other mentioned places, it is plain it does, then it cannot concern political obedience, but a duty that is owing to persons who have no title to sovereignty nor any political authority as magistrates over subjects. For the person of a private father, and a title to obedience due to the supreme magistrate, are things inconsistent, and therefore this command, which must necessarily comprehend the persons of our natural fathers, must mean a duty we owe them distinct from our obedience to the magistrate, and from which the most absolute power of princes cannot absolve us. What this duty is, we shall in its due place examine. And thus we have at last got through all that in our altar looks like an argument for that absolute unlimited sovereignty described section 8, which he supposes in Adam, so that mankind ever since have been all born slaves without any title to freedom. But if creation, which gave nothing but a being, made not Adam prince of his posterity, if Adam, Genesis 128, was not constituted lord of mankind, nor had a private dominion given him exclusive of his children, but only a right and power over the earth, and inferior creatures in common with the children of men. If also, Genesis 3 16, God gave not any political power to Adam over his wife and children, but only subjected Eve to Adam as a punishment, or foretold the subjection of the weaker sex, in the ordering the common concernments of their families, but gave not thereby to Adam as to the husband power of life and death, which necessarily belongs to the magistrate. If fathers, by begetting their children, acquire no such power over them, and if the command, honor thy father and mother, give it not, but only enjoins a duty owing to parents equally whether subject or not, and to the mother as well as the father. If all this be so, as I think, by what has been said, is very evident, then man has a natural freedom, notwithstanding all are also confidently says to the contrary. Since all that share in the same common nature, faculties and powers, are in nature equal, and ought to partake in the same common rights and privileges, till the manifest appointment of God, who is lord over all blessed forever, can be produced to show any particular person's supremacy, or a man's own consent subjects him to a superior. This is so plain, that our author confesses that Sir John Hayward, Blackwood and Barkley, the great vindicators of the right of kings, could not deny it, but admit with one consent the natural liberty and equality of mankind, for a truth unquestionable. And our author have been so far from producing anything that may make good his great position, that Adam was absolute monarch and so men are not naturally free, that even his own proofs make against him, so that to use his own way of arguing, the first erroneous principle failing, the whole fabric of this vast engine of absolute power and tyranny, drops down of itself, and there needs no more to be said in answer to all that he builds upon so false and frail a foundation. But to save others the pains, whether any need, he is not sparing himself to show by his own contradictions the weakness of his own doctrine. Adam's absolute and sole dominion is that which he is everywhere full of, and all along builds on, and yet he tells us, page 12, that as Adam was Lord of his children, so his children under him had a command and power of their own children. The unlimited and undivided sovereignty of Adam's fatherhood by our author's computation stood but a little while, only during the first generation, but as soon as he had grandchildren, Sir Robert could give but a very ill account of it. Adam, as father of his children, says he, have an absolute unlimited royal power over them, and by virtue thereof over those that they begot, and so to all generations. And yet his children, Viz Cain and Seth, have a paternal power over their children at the same time, so that they are at the same time absolute lords and yet vassals and slaves. Adam has all the authority as grandfather of the people, and they have a part of it as fathers of a part of them. He is absolute over them and their posterity by having begotten them, and yet they are absolute over their children by the same title. No, says our author. Adam's children under him had power over their own children, but still with subordination to the first parent. A good distinction that sounds well, and it is pity it signifies nothing, nor can be reconciled with our author's words. I readily grant that supposing Adam's absolute power over his posterity any of his children might have from him a delegated and so a subordinate power over a part or all the rest. But that cannot be the power our author speaks of here. It is not a power by grant and commission, but the natural paternal power he supposes a father to have over his children. For, one, he says, as Adam was Lord of his children, so his children under him had a power over their children. They were then Lords over their own children after the same manner and by the same title that Adam was, i.e. by right of generation, by right of fatherhood. Two, it is plain he means the natural power of fathers, because he limits it to be only over their own children. A delegated power has no such limitation as only over their own children. It might be over others as well as their own children. Three, if it were a delegated power, it must appear in scripture. But there is no ground in scripture to affirm that Adam's children had any other power over theirs than what they naturally had as fathers. But that he means here paternal power and no other is passed out, from the inference he makes in these words immediately following. I see not then how the children of Adam or of any man else can be free from subjection to their parents. Whereby it appears that the power on one side and the subjection on the other, our author here speaks of, is that natural power and subjection between parents and children, for that which every man's children owed could be no other, and that our author always affirms to be absolute and unlimited. This natural power of parents over their children Adam had over his posterity, says our author, and this power of parents over their children, his children had over theirs in his lifetime, says our author also. So that Adam, by a natural right of father, had an absolute, unlimited power of all his posterity, and at the same time his children had by the same right, absolute, unlimited power over theirs. Here, then, are two absolute, unlimited powers existing together, which I would have anybody reconcile one to another, or to common sense. For the salvo he has put in of subordination makes it more absurd. To have one absolute, unlimited, nay, unlimited power in subordination to another is so manifest a contradiction that nothing can be more. Adam is absolute prince with the unlimited authority of fatherhood over all his posterity. All his posterity are then absolutely his subjects, and our author says his slaves, children, and grandchildren are equally in this state of subjection and slavery, and yet, says our author, the children of Adam have paternal, i.e., absolute, unlimited power over their own children, which in plain English is they are slaves and absolute princes at the same time, and in the same government, and one part of the subjects had an absolute, unlimited power over the other by the natural right of parentage. If anyone will suppose, in favour of our author, that he here meant that parents who are in subjection themselves to the absolute authority of their father have yet some power over their children, I confess he is something nearer the truth, but he will not at all hereby help our author. For he, nowhere speaking of the paternal power, but as an absolute, unlimited authority, cannot be supposed to understand anything else here, unless he himself had limited it and showed how far it reached. And that he means here paternal authority in that large extent is plain from the immediate following words. This subjection of children being, says he, the foundation of all regal authority, page 12. The subjection then that in the former line he says, every man is into his parents, and consequently what Adams' grandchildren were into their parents, was that which was the fountain of all regal authority, i.e. according to our author, absolute, unlimited authority. And thus Adams' children had regal authority over their children, whilst they themselves were subjects to their father and fellow subjects with their children. But let him mean as he pleases. It is plain he allows Adams' children to have paternal power, page 12, as also all other fathers to have paternal power over their children, observations 156. From whence, one of these two things will necessarily follow, that either Adams' children, even in his lifetime, had, and so all other fathers have, as he phrases it, page 12, by right of fatherhood, royal authority over their children, or else, that Adams, by right of fatherhood, had not royal authority. For it cannot be but that paternal power does or does not give royal authority to them that have it. If it does not, then Adams could not be sovereign by this title nor anybody else, and then there is an end of all our author's politics at once. If it does give royal authority, then everyone that has paternal power has royal authority, and then, by our author's patriarchal government, there will be as many kings as there are fathers. And thus what a monarchy he hath set up, let him and his disciples consider. Princes certainly will have great reason to thank him for these new politics, which set up as many absolute kings in every country as there are fathers of children. And yet who can blame our author for it, it lying unavoidably in the way of one discoursing upon our author's principles. For having placed an absolute power in fathers by right of begetting, he could not easily resolve how much of this power belonged to a son over the children he had begotten, and so it fell out to be a very hard matter to give all the power as he does to Adam, and yet allow a part in his lifetime to his children, when they were parents, and which he knew not well how to deny them. This makes him so doubtful in his expressions, and so uncertain where to place this absolute natural power which he calls fatherhood. Sometimes Adam alone has it all, as page 13, Observations 244, 245, and Preface. Sometimes parents have it, which word scarce signifies the father alone, page 12, 19. Sometimes children during their father's lifetime as page 12. Sometimes fathers of families as page 78 and 79. Sometimes fathers indefinitely, Observations 155. Sometimes the heir to Adam, Observations 253. Sometimes the posterity of Adam, 244, 246. Sometimes prime fathers, all sons or grandchildren of Noah, Observations 244. Sometimes the eldest parents, page 12. Sometimes all kings, page 19. Sometimes all that have supreme power, Observations 245. Sometimes heirs to those first progenitors who were at first the natural parents of the whole people, page 19. Sometimes an elective king, page 23. Sometimes those with a few or a multitude that govern the commonwealth, page 23. Sometimes he that can catch it, and usurper, page 23, Observations 155. Thus this new nothing that is to carry with it all power, authority, and government, this fatherhood, which is to design the person and establish the throne of Monarchs, whom the people are to obey, may, according to Sir Robert, come into any hands, any how, and so by his politics give to democracy, royal authority, and make an usurper a lawful prince. And if it will do all these fine feats, much good do our author and all his followers with their omnipotent fatherhood, which can serve for nothing but to unsettle and destroy all the lawful governments in the world, and to establish in their room disorder, tyranny, and usurpation. In the full-going chapters, we have seen what Adam's monarchy was, in our author's opinion, and upon what titles he founded it. The foundations which he lays the chief stress on, as those from which he thinks he may best derive monarchical power to future princes, are two, viz, fatherhood, and property, and therefore the way he proposes to remove the absurdities and inconveniences of the doctrine of natural freedom is to maintain the natural and private dominion of Adam, Observations 222. Conformable hereunto, he tells us, the grounds and principles of government necessarily depend upon the original of property, Observations 108. The subjection of children to their parents is the fountain of all regal authority, Page 12, and all power on earth is either derived or usurped from the fatherly power, there being no other original to be found of any power whatsoever. Observations 158. I will not stand here to examine how it can be said without a contradiction that the first grounds and principles of government necessarily depend upon the original of property and yet that there is no other original of any power whatsoever but that of the father. It being hard to understand how there can be no other original but fatherhood and yet that the grounds and principles of government depend upon the original of property, property and fatherhood being as far different as Lord of a manor and father of children. Nor do I see how they will either of them agree with what our author says, Observations 244, of God's sentence against Eve, Genesis 316, that it is the original grant of government, so that if that were the original, government had not its original by our author's own confession either from property or fatherhood and this text which he brings as a proof of Adam's power over Eve necessarily contradicts what he says of the fatherhood, that it is the sole fountain of all power. For if Adam had any such regal power over Eve as our author contends for, it must be by some other title than that of begetting. But I leave him to reconcile these contradictions as well as many others which may be plentifully found in him by anyone who will but read him with little attention and shall now come to consider how these two originals of government, Adam's natural and private dominion, will consist and serve to make out and establish the titles of succeeding monarchs who, as our author obliges them, must all derive their power from these fountains. Let us then suppose Adam made by God's donation, lord and sole proprietor of the whole earth, in as large and ample a manner a Sir Robert could wish. Let us suppose him also by right of fatherhood, absolute ruler over his children with an unlimited supremacy. I ask then, upon Adam's death, what becomes of both his natural and private dominion? And I doubt not, it will be answered that they descend to his next heir, as our author tells us in several places. But this way it is plain, cannot possibly convey both his natural and private dominion to the same person, for should we allow that all the property, all the estate of the father, ought to descend to the eldest son, which will need some proof to establish it, and so he has by that title all the private dominion of the father? Yet the father's natural dominion, the paternal power, cannot descend to him by inheritance, for it being a right that accrues to a man only by begetting, no man can have this natural dominion over anyone he does not beget. Unless it can be supposed that a man can have a right to anything without doing that upon which the right is solely founded. For if a father, by begetting, and no other title, has natural dominion over his children, he that does not beget them cannot have this natural dominion over them, and therefore be it true or false that our author says, Observations 156, that every man that is born by his very birth becomes a subject to him that begets him, this necessarily follows. This, that a man by his birth cannot become a subject to his brother, who did not beget him, unless it can be supposed that a man by the very same title can come to be under the natural and absolute dominion of two different men at once, or it be sensed to say that a man by birth is under the natural dominion of his father, only because he beget him, and a man by birth also is under the natural dominion of his eldest brother, although he did not beget him. If then the private dominion of Adam, i.e. his property in the creatures, descended at his death all entirely to his eldest son, his heir, for if it did not, there is presently an end of all Sir Robert's monarchy. And his natural dominion, the dominion a father has over his children by begetting them, belonged immediately upon Adam's decease equally to all his sons who had children, by the same title their father had it, the sovereignty founded upon property, and the sovereignty founded upon fatherhood come to be divided, since Cain as heir had that of property alone, Seth and the other sons that of fatherhood equally with him. This is the best that can be made of our author's doctrine, and of the two titles of sovereignty he sets up in Adam, one of them will either signify nothing, or if they both must stand, they can serve only to confound the rights of princes, and disorder government in his posterity, for by building upon two titles to dominion which cannot descend together, and which he allows may be separated, for he yields that Adam's children had their distinct territories by right of private dominion, observations 2.10, page 40, he makes it perpetually a doubt upon his principles where the sovereignty is, or to whom we owe our obedience, since fatherhood and property are distinct titles, and began presently upon Adam's death to be in distinct persons, and which then was to give way to the other. Let us take the account of it as he himself gives it us. He tells us, out of grotesque, that Adam's children, by donation, asignation, or some kind of session before he was dead, had their distinct territories by right of private dominion, Abel had his flocks and pastures for them, Cain had his fields for corn, and the land of Nod where he built him a city, observations 2.10. Here it is obvious to demand which of these two after Adam's death was sovereign. Cain says our author, page 19. By what title? As heir, for heirs to progenitors who were natural parents of their people are not only lords of their own children, but also of their brethren, says our author, page 19. What was Cain heir to? Not the entire possessions, not all that which Adam had private dominion in, for our author allows that Abel, by a title derived from his father, had his distinct territory for pasture by right of private dominion. What then Abel had by private dominion was exempt from Cain's dominion, for he could not have private dominion over that which was under the private dominion of another, and therefore his sovereignty over his brother is gone with this private dominion. And so there are presently two sovereigns, and his imaginary title of fatherhood is out of doors, and Cain is no prince over his brother, or else if Cain retain his sovereignty over Abel, notwithstanding his private dominion, it will follow that the first grounds and principles of government have nothing to do with property, whatever our author says to the contrary. It is true, Abel did not outlive his father, Adam, but that makes nothing to the argument which will hold good against Sir Robert in Abel's issue, or in Seth, or in any of the posterity of Adam not descended from Cain. The same inconvenience he runs into about the three sons of Noah, who, as he says, page 13, had the whole world divided amongst them by their father. I ask, then, in which of the three shall we find the establishment of regal power after Noah's death? Even all three, as our author there seems to say, then it will follow that regal power is founded in property of land, and follows private dominion, and not in paternal power or natural dominion. And so there is an end of paternal power as the fountain of regal authority, and the so much magnified fatherhood quite vanishes. If the regal power descended to Shem as eldest and heir to his father, then Noah's division of the world by lot to his sons, or his ten years sailing about the Mediterranean to appoint each son his part, which our author tells of page 15, was labour lost. His division of the world to them was to ill or to no purpose, for his grant to Chum and Jaffet was little worth if Shem notwithstanding this grant, as soon as Noah was dead, was to be lord over them. Or if this grant of private dominion to them over their assigned territories were good, here was set up two distinct sorts of power, not subordinate one to the other, with all those inconveniences which he musters up against the power of the people, observations 158, which I shall set down in his own words, only changing property for people. All power on earth is either derived or usurped from the fatherly power, there being no other original to be found of any power whatsoever, for if there should be granted two sorts of power without any subordination of one to the other, there would be in perpetual strife which should be supreme, for two Supremes cannot agree. If the fatherly power be supreme, then the power grounded on private dominion must be subordinate and depend on it, and if the power grounded on property be supreme, then the fatherly power must submit to it and cannot be exercised without the license of the proprietors, which must quite destroy the frame and course of nature. This is his own arguing against two distinct independent powers, which I set down in his own words, only putting power rising from property for power of the people. And when he has answered what he himself has urged here against two distinct powers, we shall be better able to see how, with any tolerable sense, he can derive all real authority from the natural and private dominion of Adam from fatherhood and property together, which are distinct titles that do not always meet in the same person, and it is plain by his own confession presently separated as soon both as Adams and Noah's death made way for succession, though our author frequently in his writings jumbles them together and omits not to make use of either where he thinks it will sound best to his purpose. But the absurdities of this will more sully appear in the next chapter, where we shall examine the ways of conveyance of the sovereignty of Adam to princes that were to reign after him. End of Chapter 7 The Robert, having not been very happy in any proof he brings for the sovereignty of Adam, is not much more fortunate in conveying it to future princes, who, if his politics be true, must all derive their titles from that first monarch. The ways he has assigned, as they lie, scattered up and down in his writings, I will set down in his own words. In his preface, he tells us that Adam, being monarch of the whole world, none of his posterity had any right to possess anything, but by his grant or permission, or by succession from him. Here he makes two ways of conveyance of anything Adam stood possessed of, and those are grants or succession. Again, he says, all kings either are, or are to be reputed, the next heirs to those first progenitors, who were at first the natural parents of the whole people. Page 19 There cannot be any multitude of men whatsoever, but that in it, considered by itself, there is one man amongst them that in nature have the right to be the king of all the rest, as being the next heir to Adam. Observations 253 Here in these places, inheritance is the only way he allows of conveying monarchical power to princes. In other places, he tells us, Observations 155 All power on earth is either derived or usurped from the fatherly power. Observations 158 All kings that now are or ever were, are or were either fathers of their people, or heirs of such fathers, or usurpers of the right of such fathers. Observations 253 And here he makes inheritance or usurpation the only ways whereby kings come by this original power. But yet he tells us, this fatherly empire, as it was of itself hereditary, so it was alienable by patent, and caesable by usurper. Observations 190 So then here inheritance, grant, or usurpation will convey it. And last of all, which is most admirable, he tells us page 100. It skills not which way kings come by their power, whether by election, donation, succession, or by any other means, for it is still the manner of the government by supreme power that makes them properly kings, and not the means of obtaining their crowns. Which I think is a full answer to all his whole hypothesis and discourse about Adam's royal authority, as the fountain from which all princes were to derive theirs, and he might have spared the trouble of speaking so much as he does up and down of heirs and inheritance, if to make any one, properly a king, needs no more but governing by supreme power, and it matters not by what means he came by it. By this notable way, our author may make Oliver as properly king as any one else he could think of, and had he had the happiness to live under Masonello's government, he could not by this his own rule have forborn to have done homage to him, with O King live forever, since the manner of his government by supreme power made him properly king, who was but the day before properly a fisherman. And if Don Quixote had taught his squire to govern with supreme authority, our author no doubt could have made a most loyal subject in Sancho Panza's island, and he must needs have deserved some preferment in such governments, since I think he is the first politician who, pretending to settle government upon its true basis, and to establish the thrones of lawful princes, ever told the world that he was properly a king whose manner of government was by supreme power by what means so ever he obtained it, which in plain English is to say that regal and supreme power is properly and truly his who can by any means seize upon it, and if this be to be properly a king, I wonder how he came to think of or where he will find, and usurper. This is so strange a doctrine that the surprise of it have made me pass by without their due reflection the contradictions he runs into by making sometimes inheritance alone, sometimes only grant or inheritance, sometimes only inheritance or usurpation, sometimes all these three, and at last election or any other means added to them, the ways whereby Adam's royal authority, that is his right to supreme rule, could be conveyed down to future kings and governors, so as to give them a title to the obedience and subjection of the people. But these contradictions lie so open that the very reading of our author's own words will discover them to any ordinary understanding, and though what I have quoted out of him, with abundance more of the same strain and coherence which might be found in him, might well excuse me from any further trouble in this argument, yet having proposed to myself to examine the main parts of his doctrine, I shall a little more particularly consider how inheritance, grant, usurpation, or election can anyway make out government in the world upon his principles, or derive to any one a right of empire from this regal authority of Adam, had it been never so well proved that he had been an absolute monarch and lord of the whole world. of monarchy by inheritance from Adam how to know the person to whom it belonged to have this power and to exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey, for where I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be majesty and rule in the world, yet I am nevertheless at liberty still till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience, since if there be no marks to know him by and distinguish him that hath right to rule from other men, it may be myself as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be everyone's duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject to convince him that there is regal power in the world, but there must be ways of designing and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs, and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes. He that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and sceptres would become the inheritance only of violence and rapping. Men, too, might as often and as innocently change their governors as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me and whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle, therefore, men's consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not only that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them. How successful our author has been in his attempts to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge by what has been already said. But were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is on the contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things. First, that this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed in tire to some other person, and so on to posterity. Secondly, that the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam by a right way of conveyance derived to them. If the first of these fail, the power of Adam where it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present government and societies in the world, but we must seek out some other original of power for the government as polities than this of Adam, or else there will be none at all in the world. If the latter fail, it will destroy the authority of the present governors and absolve the people from subjection to them, since they, having no better acclaim than others to that power, which is alone the fountain of all authority, can have no title to rule over them. Our author, having fancied an absolute sovereignty in Adam, mentions several ways of its conveyance to princes that were to be his successors, but that which he chiefly insists on is that of inheritance, which occurs so often in his several discourses, and I having in the foregoing chapter quoted several of these passages, I shall not need here again to repeat them. This sovereignty he erects, as has been said upon a double foundation, is that of property and that of fatherhood. One was the right he was supposed to have in all creatures, a right to possess the earth with the beasts and other inferior ranks of things in it, for his private use, exclusive of all other men. The other was the right he was supposed to have to rule and govern men, all the rest of mankind. In both these rights, there being supposed an exclusion of all other men, it must be upon some reason peculiar to Adam that they must both be founded. That of his property are all the supposes to arise from God's immediate donation, Genesis 128, and that of fatherhood from the act of begetting. Now, in all inheritance, if the heir succeed not to the reason upon which his father's right was founded, he cannot succeed to the right which followeth from it. For example, Adam had a right of property in the creatures upon the donation and grant of God Almighty, who was Lord and proprietor of them all. Let this be so as our author tells us. Yet upon his death his heir can have no title to them, no such right of property in them, unless the same reason, vis God's donation, vested a right in the heir too. For if Adam could have had no property in or use of the creatures without this positive donation from God, and this donation were only personally to Adam, his heir could have no right by it. But upon his death it must revert to God, the Lord and owner again. For positive grants give no title farther than the express words convey it, and by which only it is held. And thus, if, as our author himself contends, that donation, Genesis 1.28, were made only to Adam personally, his heir could not succeed to his property in the creatures, and if it were a donation to any but Adam, let it be shown that it was to his heir in our author's sense, i.e. to one of his children exclusive of all the rest. But not to follow our author too far out of the way, the plain of the case is this. God, having made man, and planted in him as in all other animals a strong desire of self-preservation, and furnished the world with things fit for food and raiment and other necessaries of life, subservient to his design that man should live and abide for some time upon the face of the earth, and not that so curious and wonderful a piece of workmanship, by his own negligence or want of necessaries, should perish again presently after a few moments' continuance, God, I say, having made man and the world thus, spoke to him, i.e., directed him by his senses and reason, as he did the inferior animals by their sense and instinct, which were serviceable for his subsistence, and given him as the means of his preservation. And therefore I doubt not, but before these words were pronounced, 1 Genesis 28-29, if they must be understood literally to have been spoken, and without any such verbal donation, man had a right to induce of the creatures by the will and grant of God, for the desire, strong desire of preserving his life and being, having been planted in him as a principle of action by God himself, reason, which was the voice of God in him, could not but teach him and assure him that pursuing that natural inclination he had to preserve his being, he followed the will of his maker, and therefore had a right to make use of those creatures, which by his reason or senses he could discover would be serviceable there unto. And thus man's property in the creatures was founded upon the right he had to make use of those things that were necessary or useful to his being. This being the reason and foundation of Adam's property, gave the same title on the same ground to all his children, not only after his death but in his lifetime, so that here was no privilege of his heir above his other children, which could exclude them from an equal right to the use of the inferior creatures for the comfortable preservation of their beings, which is all the property man had in them. And so Adam's sovereignty built on property, or as our also calls it, private dominion, comes to nothing. Every man had a right to the creatures by the same title Adam had, vis by the right every one had to take care of and provide for their subsistence, and thus men had a right in common, Adam's children in common with him. But if any one had begun and made himself a property in any particular thing, which how he or any one else could do shall be shown in another place, that thing, that possession, if he disposed not otherwise of it by his positive grant, descended naturally to his children, and they had a right to succeed in it and possess it. It might reasonably be asked here how come children by this right of possessing before any other the properties of their parents upon their decease? For it being personally the parents, when they die without actually transferring their right to another, why does it not return again to the common stock of mankind? It will perhaps be answered that common consent has disposed of it to their children, common practice we see indeed does so dispose of it. But we cannot say that it is the common consent of mankind, for that have never been asked, nor actually given. And if common tacit consent had established it, it would make but a positive, and not a natural, right of children to inherit the goods of their parents. But where the practice is universal, it is reasonable to think the cause is natural. The ground, then, I think, to be this. The first and strongest desire God planted in men, and wrought into the very principles of their nature, being that of self-preservation, that is, the foundation of a right to the creatures for the particular support and use of each individual person himself. But next to this God planted in men a strong desire also of propagating their kind and continuing themselves in their posterity, and this gives children a title to share in the property of their parents, and a right to inherit their possessions. Men are not proprietors of what they have, merely for themselves. Their children have a title to part of it, and have their kind of right joined with their parents, in the possession which comes to be wholly theirs, when death, having put an end to their parents' use of it, have taken them from their possessions. And this we call inheritance. Men, being by a like obligation bound to preserve what they have begotten, as to preserve themselves, their issue come to have a right in the goods they are possessed of. That children have such a right is plain from the laws of God, and that men are convinced that children have such a right is evident from the law of the land, both which laws require parents to provide for their children. For children, being by the course of nature born weak and unable to provide for themselves, they have, by the appointment of God himself, who have thus ordered the course of nature, a right to be nourished and maintained by their parents. Nay, a right not only to bear subsistence, but to the conveniences and comforts of life, as far as the conditions of their parents can afford it. Hence it comes that when their parents leave the world, and so the care due to their children ceases, the effects of it are to extend as far as possibly they can, and the provisions they have made in their lifetime are understood to be intended, as nature requires they should, for their children, whom after themselves they are bound to provide for. Though the dying parents by express words declare nothing about them, nature appoints the descent of their property to their children, who thus come to have a title and natural right of inheritance to their father's goods, which the rest of mankind cannot pretend to. Were it not for this right of being nourished and maintained by their parents, which God and nature has given to children, and obliged parents to as a duty, it would be reasonable that the father should inherit the estate of his son, and be preferred in the inheritance before his grandchild. For to the grandfather there is due a long score of care and expenses laid out upon the breeding and education of his son, which one would think in justice ought to be paid. But that having been done in obedience to the same law whereby he received nourishment and education from his own parents, this score of education received from a man's father is paid by taking care and providing for his own children. Is paid, I say, as much as is required of payment by alteration of property, unless present necessity of the parents require a return of goods for their necessary support and subsistence, for we are not now speaking of that reverence, acknowledgement, respect, and honour that is always due from children to their parents, but of possessions and commodities of life valuable by money. But though it being incumbent on parents to bring up and provide for their children, yet this debt to their children does not quite cancel the score due to their parents, but only is made by nature preferable to it. For the debt a man owes to his father takes place and gives the father a right to inherit the son's goods, where for want of issue the right of children does not exclude that title. And therefore a man having a right to be maintained by his children where he needs it, and to enjoy also the comforts of life from them when the necessary provision due to them and their children will afford it, if his son die without issue the father has a right in nature to possess his goods and inherit his estate, whatever the municipal rules of some countries may absurdly direct otherwise. And so again his children and their issue from him, or for want of such his father and his issue. But where no such are to be found, i.e. no kindred, there we see the possessions of a private man revert to the community, and so in politics societies come into the hands of the public magistrate, but in the state of nature become again perfectly common nobody having a right to inherit them, nor can anyone have a property in them otherwise than in other things common by nature, of which I shall speak in its due place. I have been the larger in showing upon what ground children have a right to succeed to the possession of their father's properties, not only because by it it will appear that if Adam had a property, a titular insignificant useless property for it could be no better, for he was bound to nourish and maintain his children and posterity out of it, in the whole earth and its product, yet all his children coming to have, by the law of nature and right of inheritance, a joint title and right of property in it after his death, it could convey no right of sovereignty to any one of his posterity over the rest, since everyone having a right of inheritance to his portion, they might enjoy their inheritance or any part of it in common, or share it or some parts of it by division, as it best likes them. But no one could pretend to the whole inheritance, or any sovereignty supposed to accompany it, since a right of inheritance give every one of the rest as well as any one a title to share in the goods of his father. Not only upon this account I say have I been so particular in examining the reason of children's inheriting the property of their father's, but also because it will give us farther light in the inheritance of rule and power, which in countries where their particular municipal laws give the whole possession of land entirely to the firstborn, and descent of power has gone so to men by this custom, some have been apt to be deceived into an opinion that there was a natural or divine right of primogeniture to both estate and power, and that the inheritance of both rule over men and property in things sprang from the same original and were to descend by the same rules. Property whose original is from the right a man has to use any of the inferior creatures for the subsistence and comfort of his life is for the benefit and sole advantage of the proprietor, so that he may even destroy the thing that he has a property in by his use of it when need requires. But government being for the preservation of every man's right and property by preserving him from the violence or injury of others is for the good of the governed, for the magistrate's sword being for a terror to evildoers, and by that terror to enforce men to observe the positive laws of the society made conformable to the laws of nature for the public good, i.e. the good of every particular member of that society as far as by common rules it can be provided for. The sword is not given the magistrate for his own good alone. Children, therefore, as has been showed, by the dependence they have on their parents for subsistence, have a right of inheritance to their father's property, as that which belongs to them for their proper good and behoof, and therefore are fitly termed goods, wherein the first born has not a soul or peculiar right by any law of God and nature. The younger children having an equal title with him founded on that right they all have to maintenance support and comfort from their parents, and on nothing else. But government being for the benefit of the governed, and not the sole advantage of the governors, but only for theirs with the rest as they make a part of that politic body each of whose parts and members are taken care of and directed in its peculiar functions for the good of the whole, by the laws of society, cannot be inherited by the same title that children have to the goods of their father. The right a son has to be maintained and provided with the necessaries and conveniences of life out of his father's stock gives him a right to succeed to his father's property for his own good. But this can give him no right to succeed also to the rule which his father had over other men. All that a child has right to claim from his father is nourishment and education, and the things nature furnishes for the support of life. But he has no right to demand rule or dominion from him. He can subsist and receive from him the portion of good things and advantages of education naturally due to him without empire and dominion. That, if his father hath any, was vested in him for the good and behoove of others, and therefore the son cannot claim or inherit it by a title which is founded wholly upon his own private good and advantage. We must know how the first ruler from whom any one claims came by his authority, upon what ground any one has empire, what his title is to it, before we can know who has a right to succeed him in it and inherit it from him. If the agreement and consent of men first gave a scepter into any one's hand or put a crown on his head, that also must erect its dissent and conveyance. For the same authority that made the first a lawful ruler must make the second, too, and so give right of succession. In this case inheritance or primogenity can in itself have no right, no pretense to it, any farther than that consent which established the form of the government had so settled the succession. And thus we see the succession of crowns in several countries places it on different heads, and he comes by right of succession to be a prince in one place, who would be a subject in another. If God by his positive grant and revealed declaration first gave rule and dominion to any man, he that will claim by that title must have the same positive grant of God for his succession. For if that has not directed the course of its dissent and conveyance down to others, nobody can succeed to this title of the first ruler. Children have no right of inheritance to this, and primogenity can lay no claim to it, unless God the author of this constitution have so ordained it. Thus we see the pretensions of Saul's family, who received his crown from the immediate appointment of God, ended with his reign, and David by the same title that Saul reigned, vis God's appointment, succeeded in his throne to the exclusion of Jonathan and all pretensions of paternal inheritance. And if Solomon had a right to succeed his father, it must be by some other title than that of primogenity. A cadet or sister's son must have the preference in succession if he has the same title the first lawful prince had, and in dominion that has its foundation only in the positive appointment of God himself, Benjamin the youngest must have the inheritance of the crown if God so direct, as well as one of that tribe had the first possession. If paternal right, the act of begetting, give a man rule and dominion, inheritance or primogenity can give no title, for he that cannot succeed to his father's title, which was begetting, cannot succeed to that power over his brethren which his father had by paternal right over them. But of this I shall have occasion to say more in another place. This is plain in the meantime that in any government, whether supposed to be at first founded in paternal right, consent of the people, or the positive appointment of God himself, which can supersede either of the other and so begin a new government upon a new foundation, I say any government began upon either of these can, by right of succession, come to those only who have the title of him they succeed to. Power founded on contract can descend only to him who has right by that contract. Power founded on begetting he only can have that begets, and power founded on the positive grant or donation of God he only can have by right of succession to whom that grant directs it. From what I have said I think this is clear, that a right to use of the creatures being founded originally in the right a man has to subsist and enjoy the conveniences of life and the natural right children have to inherit the goods of their parents being founded in the right they have to the same subsistence and commodities of life out of the stock of their parents who are therefore taught by natural love and tenderness to provide for them as a part of themselves, and all this being only for the good of the proprietor or heir, it can be no reason for children's inheriting of rule and dominion which has another original and a different end. Nor can primogeniture have any pretense to a right of solely inheriting either property or power as we shall in its due place see more fully. It is enough to have showed here that Adam's property or private dominion could not convey any sovereignty or rule to his heir, who not having a right to inherit all his father's possessions, could not thereby come to have any sovereignty over his brethren, and therefore if any sovereignty on account of his property had been vested in Adam, which in truth there was not, yet it would have died with him. As Adam's sovereignty, if by virtue of being proprietor of the world he had any authority over men, could not have been inherited by any of his children over the rest, because they had the same title to divide the inheritance and every one had a right to a portion of his father's possessions. So neither could Adam's sovereignty by right of fatherhood, if any such he had, descend to any one of his children. For it being in our author's account a right acquired by begetting to rule over those he had begotten, it was not a power possible to be inherited, because the right being consequent to and built on and act perfectly personal made that power so too, and impossible to be inherited. For paternal power being a natural right rising only from the relation of father to son is as impossible to be inherited as the relation itself, and a man may pretend as well to inherit the conjugal power the husband whose heir he is had over his wife, as he can to inherit the paternal power of a father over his children. For the power of the husband being founded on contract, and the power of the father on begetting, he may as well inherit the power obtained by the conjugal contract which was only personal, as he may the power obtained by begetting which could reach no father than the person of the begetter, unless begetting can be a title to power in him that does not beget. Which makes it a reasonable question to ask whether Adam, dying before Eve, his heir, suppose Cain or Seth, should have by right of inheriting Adam's fatherhood, sovereign power over Eve, his mother. For Adam's fatherhood being nothing but a right he had to govern his children because he begotten them, he that inherits Adam's fatherhood, inherits nothing even in our author's sense, but the right Adam had to govern his children because he begot them. So that the monarchy of the heir would not have taken in Eve, or if it did being nothing but the fatherhood of Adam descended by inheritance, the heir must have right to govern Eve because Adam begot her, for fatherhood is nothing else. Perhaps it will be said with our author that a man can alien his power over his child, and what may be transferred by a compact may be possessed by inheritance. I answer, a father cannot alien the power he has over his child, he may perhaps to some degrees forfeit it, but cannot transfer it, and if any other man acquire it it is not by the father's grant but by some act of his own. For example, a father unnaturally careless of his child sells or gives him to another man, and he again exposes him, a third man finding him, breeds up, cherishes, and provides for him as his own. I think in this case nobody will doubt but that the greatest part of filial duty and subjection was here owing and to be paid to this foster father, and if anything could be demanded from the child by either of the other it could be only due to his natural father who perhaps might have forfeit it his right to much of that duty comprehended in the command, honour your parents, but could transfer none of it to another. Eve at purchased and neglected the child, got by his purchase and grant of the father no title to duty or honour from the child, but only he acquired it who by his own authority, performing the office and care of a father to the forlorn and perishing infant, made himself by paternal care, a title to proportionable degrees of paternal power. This will be more easily admitted upon consideration of the nature of paternal power for which I refer my reader to the second book. To return to the argument in hand, this is evident that paternal power arising only from begetting, for in that our author places it alone, can neither be transferred nor inherited, and he that does not beget can no more have paternal power which arises from thence, then he can have a right to anything who performs not the condition to which only it is annexed. If one should ask by what law has a father power over his children, it will be answered no doubt by the law of nature which gives such a power over them to him that begets them. If one should ask likewise by what law does our author's heir come by a right to inherit, I think it would be answered by the law of nature too, for I find not that our author brings one word of scripture to prove the right of such an heir he speaks of. Why then the law of nature gives father's paternal power over their children because they did beget them, and the same law of nature gives the same paternal power to the heir over his brethren who did not beget them. Whence it follows that either the father has not his paternal power by begetting, or else that the heir has it not at all, for it is hard to understand how the law of nature, which is the law of reason, can give the paternal power to the father over his children for the only reason of begetting, and to the first born over his brethren without this only reason, i.e. for no reason at all, and if the eldest by the law of nature can inherit this paternal power without the only reason that gives the title to it, so may the youngest as well as he, and a stranger as well as either, for where there is no reason for any one, as there is not but for him that begets, all have an equal title. I am sure our author offers no reason, and when any body does, we shall see whether it holds or no. In the meantime it is as good sense to say that by law of nature a man has right to inherit the property of another because he is of kin to him and is known to be of his blood, and therefore by the same law of nature, an utter stranger to his blood has right to inherit his estate, as to say that by the law of nature he that begets them has paternal power over his children, and therefore by the law of nature the heir that begets them not has this paternal power over them. Or supposing the law of the land gave absolute power over their children to such only who nursed them and fed their children themselves, could any body pretend that this law gave any one who did no such thing absolute power over those who were not his children. When therefore it can be showed that conjugal power can belong to him that is not an husband, it will also, I believe, be proved that our author's paternal power acquired by begetting may be inherited by a son, and that a brother as heir to his father's power may have paternal power over his brethren, and by the same rule conjugal power too. But till then I think we may rest satisfied that the paternal power of Adam, this sovereign authority of fatherhood, were there any such, could not descend to nor be inherited by his next heir. Fatherly power I easily grant our author, if it will do him any good, can never be lost because it will be as long in the world as there are furthers, but none of them will have Adam's paternal power or derive theirs from him. But every one will have his own, by the same title Adam had his, viz, by begetting. But not by inheritance or succession, no more than husbands have their conjugal power by inheritance from Adam. And thus we see as Adam had no such property, no such paternal power as gave him sovereign jurisdiction over mankind, so likewise his sovereignty built upon either of these titles, if he had any such, could not have descended to his heir, but must have ended with him. Adam, therefore, as has been proved, being neither monarch, nor his imaginary monarchy hereditable, the power which is now in the world, is not that which was Adam's, since all that Adam could have upon our author's grounds, either of property or fatherhood, necessarily died with him, and could not be conveyed to posterity by inheritance. In the next place we will consider whether Adam had any such heir to inherit his power, as our author talks of. Our author tells us, Observations 253, that it is a truth undeniable, that there cannot be any multitude of men whatsoever, either great or small, though gathered together from the several corners and remotest regions of the world, but that in the same multitude considered by itself, there is one man amongst them, that in nature had the right to be king of all the rest, as being the next heir to Adam, and all the other subjects to him, every man by nature is a king or a subject. And again, page 20, if Adam himself was still living and now ready to die, it is certain that there is one man and but one in the world who is next heir. Let this multitude of men be, if our author pleases, all the princes upon the earth. There will then be, by our author's rule, one amongst them, that in nature had the right to be king of all the rest, as being the right heir to Adam. An excellent way to establish the thrones of princes and settle the obedience of their subjects, by setting up a hundred or perhaps a thousand titles if there be so many princes in the world against any king now reigning, each as good upon our author's grounds, as his who wears the crown. If this right of heir carry any weight with it, if it be the ordinance of God, as our author seems to tell us, observations two for four, must not all be subject to it, from the highest to the lowest? Can those who wear the names of princes, without having the right of being heirs to Adam, demand obedience from their subjects by this title, and not be bound to pay it by the same law? Either governments in the world are not to be claimed and held by this title of Adam's heir, and then the starting of it is to no purpose. The being or not being Adam's heir signifies nothing as to the title of dominion. Or if it really be, as our author says, the true title to governments and sovereignty, the first thing to be done is to find out this true heir of Adam, seat him in his throne, and then all the kings and princes of the world ought to come and resign up their crowns and sceptres to him, as things that belong no more to them than to any of their subjects. For either this right in nature of Adam's heir, to be king over all the race of men, for altogether they make one multitude, is a right not necessary to the making of a lawful king, and so there may be lawful kings without it, and then king's titles and power depend not on it, or else all the kings in the world but one are not lawful kings, and so have no right to obedience. Either this title of heir to Adam is that whereby kings hold their crowns and have a right to subjection from their subjects, and then one only can have it, and the rest being subjects can require no obedience from other men who are but their fellow subjects, or else it is not the title whereby kings rule and have a right to obedience from their subjects, and then kings are kings without it, and this dream of the natural sovereignty of Adam's heir is of no use to obedience and government, for if kings have a right to dominion and the obedience of their subjects, who are not nor can possibly be heirs to Adam, what use is there of such a title when we are obliged to obey without it? If kings who are not heirs to Adam have no right to sovereignty, we are all free till our author or anybody for him will show us Adam's right heir. If there be but one heir of Adam, there can be but one lawful king in the world, and nobody in conscience can be obliged to obedience till it be resolved who that is, for it may be anyone who is not known to be of a younger house, and all others have equal titles. If there be more than one heir of Adam, everyone is his heir, and so everyone has regal power, for if two sons can be heirs together then all the sons are equally heirs, and so all are heirs being all sons or sons sons of Adam. Betwixt these two the right of heir cannot stand, for by it either but one only man or all men are kings. Take which you please. It dissolves the bonds of government and obedience, since if all men are heirs they can owe obedience to nobody. If only one, nobody can be obliged to pay obedience to him till he be known and his title made out. Please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Philippa. Two Treatises of Civil Government by John Locke. Book 1, Chapter 11. Who Heir. Part 1. The great question which in all ages has disturbed mankind and brought on them the greatest part of those mischiefs which have ruined cities, depopulated countries, and disordered the peace of the world, has been not whether there be power in the world nor whence it came, but who should have it. The settling of this point being of no smaller moment than the security of princes and the peace and welfare of their estates and kingdoms, a reformer of politics one would think, should lay this sure and be very clear in it. For if this remained disputable, all the rest will be to very little purpose, and the skill used in dressing up power with all the splendour and temptation absoluteness can add to it, without showing who has a right to have it, will serve only to give a greater edge to man's natural ambition, which of itself is but too keen. What can this do but set men on them more eagerly to scramble, and so lay a sure and lasting foundation of endless contention and disorder, instead of that peace and tranquility which is the business of government and the end of human society? This designation of the person, our author is more than ordinary obliged to take care of, because he affirming that the assignment of civil power is by divine institution, have made the conveyance as well as the power itself sacred, so that no consideration, no act or art of man, can divert it from that person to whom, by this divine right, it is assigned. No necessity or contrivance can substitute another person in his room, for if the assignment of civil power be by divine institution, and Adam's heir be he to whom it is thus assigned, as in the foregoing chapter our author tells us, it would be as much sacrilege for anyone to be king who was not Adam's heir, as it would have been amongst the Jews for anyone to have been priest who had not been of Aaron's posterity, for not only the priesthood in general being by divine institution, but the assignment of it to the sole line and posterity of Aaron, made it impossible to be enjoyed or exercised by anyone but those persons who were the offspring of Aaron, whose succession therefore was carefully observed, and by that the persons who had a right to the priesthood, certainly known. Let us see, then, what care our author has taken to make us know who is this heir, who by divine institution has a right to be king of all men. The first account of him we meet with is page 12 in these words. This subjection of children, being the fountain of all regal authority, by the ordination of God himself, it follows that civil power, not only in general, is by divine institution, but even the assignment of it, specifically to the eldest parents. Matters of such consequences this is, should be in plain words, as little liable as might be, to doubt or equivocation. And I think if language be capable of expressing anything distinctly and clearly, that of kindred, and the several degrees of nearness of blood, is one. It were therefore to be wished that our author had used a little more intelligible expressions here, that we might have better known who it is, to whom the assignment of civil power is made by divine institution, or at least would have told us what he meant by eldest parents. For I believe if land had been assigned or granted to him and the eldest parents of his family, he would have thought it had needed an interpreter, and it would scarce have been known to whom next it belonged. In propriety of speech, and certainly propriety of speech is necessary in a discourse of this nature, eldest parents signifies either the eldest men and women that have had children, or those who have longest had issue, and then our authors assertion will be that those fathers and mothers who have been longest in the world, or longest fruitful, have, by divine institution, a right to civil power. If there be any absurdity in this, our author must answer for it, and if his meaning be different from my explanation, he is to be blamed that he would not speak it plainly. This, I am sure, parents cannot signify heir's male, nor eldest parents, an infant child, who yet may sometimes be the true heir, if there can be but one. And we are hereby still as much at a loss whose civil power belongs to, notwithstanding this assignment by divine institution, as if there had been no such assignment at all, or our author has said nothing of it. This of eldest parents leaving us more in the dark, who by divine institution has a right to civil power, than those who never heard anything at all of heir, or descent, of which our author is so full. And though the chief matter of his writing be to teach obedience to those who have a right to it, which he tells us is conveyed by descent, yet who those are to whom this right by descent belongs, he leaves like the philosopher's stone in politics, out of the reach of anyone to discover from his writings. This obscurity cannot be imputed a want of language in so great a master of style as Sir Robert is when he is resolved with himself what he would say, and therefore I feel finding how hard it would be to settle rules of descent by divine institution, and how little it would be to his purpose, or conduce to the clearing and establishing the titles of princes, if such rules of descent were settled, he chose rather to contend himself with doubtful and general terms which might make no ill sound in men's ears who were willing to be pleased with them, rather than offer any clear rules of descent of this fatherhood of Adam, by which men's consciences might be satisfied whom it descended, and know the persons who had a right to regal power, and with it to their obedience. How else is it possible that laying so much stress as he does upon descent and Adam's heir, next heir, true heir, he should never tell us what heir means, nor the way to know who the next or true heir is. This, I do not remember, he does anywhere expressly handle. But where it comes in his way, very wearily and doubtfully touches, though it be so necessary that without it all discourses of government and obedience upon his principles would be to no purpose, and fatherly power, never so well made out, will be of no use to anybody. Hence he tells us, observations two for four, that not only the constitution of power in general, but the limitation of it to one kind, i.e. monarchy, and the determination of it to the individual person and line of Adam are all three ordinances of God. Neither Eve nor her children could either limit Adam's power or join others with him, and what was given unto Adam was given in his person to his posterity. Here again our author informs us that the divine ordinance had limited the descent of Adam's monarchical power. To whom? To Adam's line and posterity, says our author, a notable limitation, a limitation to all mankind. For if our author can find any one amongst mankind that is not of the line and posterity of Adam, he may perhaps tell him who this next heir of Adam is. But for us, I despair how this limitation of Adam's empire to his line and posterity will help us to find out one heir. This limitation, indeed, of our author, will save those the labour who would look for him amongst the race of brutes, if any such there were, but will very little contribute to the discovery of one next heir amongst men, though which make a short and easy determination of the question about the descent of Adam's regal power by telling us that the line and posterity of Adam is to have it. That is, in plain English, anyone may have it, since there is no person living that hath not the title of being of the line and posterity of Adam. And while it keeps there, it keeps within our author's limitation by God's ordinance. Indeed, page nineteen, he tells us that such heirs are not only lords of their own children, but of their brethren. Whereby, and by the words following, which we shall consider and on, he seems to insinuate that the eldest son is heir. But he nowhere that I know says it in direct words, but by the instances of Cain and Jacob that there follow, we may allow this to be so far his opinion concerning heirs, that where there are diverse children, the eldest son has the right to be heir. That primogeniture cannot give any title to paternal power we have already showed. That a father may have a natural right to some kind of power over his children is easily granted, but that an elder brother has so over his brethren remains to be proved. God or nature has not anywhere that I know places such jurisdiction in the firstborn, nor can reason find any such natural superiority amongst brethren. The law of Moses gave a double portion of the goods and possessions to the eldest, but we find not anywhere that naturally all by God's institution, superiority or dominion belong to him, and the instances there brought by our author are but slender proofs of a right to civil power and dominion in the firstborn, and do rather show the contrary. His words are in the foresighted place, and therefore we find God told Cain of his brother Abel, his desire shall be subject under thee, and thou shalt rule over him. To which I answer, one, these words of God to Cain are by many interpreters with great reason understood in a quite different sense than what our author uses them in. Two, whatever was meant by them, it could not be that Cain as elder had a natural dominion over Abel for the words are conditional, if thou dost well, and so personal to Cain, and whatever was signified by them did depend on his courage and not follow his birthright, and therefore could by no means be an establishment of dominion in the firstborn in general. For before this, Abel had his distinct territories by right of private dominion, as our author himself confesses, Observations 210, which he could not have had to the prejudice of the heir's title, if by divine institution Cain as heir were to inherit all his father's dominion. Three, if this were intended by God as the charter of primigenity and the grant of dominion to elder brothers in general as such by right of inheritance, we might expect that it should have included all his brethren, for we may well suppose Adam from whom the world was to be peopled had by this time that these were grown up to be men, more sons than these two, whereas Abel himself is not so much as named, and the words in the original can scarce with any good construction be applied to him. Four, it is too much to build a doctrine of so mighty consequence upon so doubtful and obscure a place of scripture, which may be well, may better understood in a quite different sense, and so can be but an ill proof, being as doubtful as the thing to be proved by it, especially when there is nothing else in scripture or reason to be found that favors or supports it. It follows, page 19, accordingly when Jacob bought his brother's birthright, Isaac blessed him thus, be Lord over thy brethren, and let the sons of thy mother bow before thee. Another instance I take it brought by our author to evince dominion due to birthright, and an admirable one it is, for it must be no ordinary way of reasoning in a man that is pleading for the natural power of kings and against all compact, to bring for proof of it an example where his own account of it founds all the right upon compact, and settles empire in the younger brother, unless buying and selling be no compact, for he tells us when Jacob bought his brother's birthright. But, passing by that, let us consider the history itself, with what use our author makes of it, and we shall find these following mistakes about it. One, that our author reports this as if Isaac had given Jacob immediately upon his purchasing the birthright, for he says, when Jacob bought Isaac blessed him, which is plainly otherwise in the scripture, for it appears that there was a distance of time between, and if we will take the story in the order it lies it must be no small distance, all Isaac's sojourning in Gerard and transactions with Abimelech, Genesis 26, coming between, Rebecca being then beautiful and consequently young, but Isaac when he blessed Jacob was old and decrepit, and Esau also complains of Jacob, Genesis 27, 36, that two times he had supplanted him. He took away my birthright, says he, and behold, now he had taken away my blessing, words that I think signify distance of time and difference of action. Two, another mistake of our author's is that he supposes Isaac gave Jacob the blessing and bid him be lord over his brethren because he had the birthright, for our author brings this example to prove that he that has the birthright has thereby a right to be lord over his brethren. But it is also manifest by the text that Isaac had no consideration of Jacob's having bought the birthright, for when he blessed him he considered him not as Jacob, but took him for Esau. Nor did Esau understand any such connection between birthright and the blessing, for he says he has supplanted me these two times. He took away my birthright, and behold, now he has taken away my blessing, whereas had the blessing which was to be lord over his brethren, belonged to the birthright. Esau could not have complained of this second as a cheat. Jacob haven't got nothing but what Esau had sold him when he sold him his birthright. So that it is plain, dominion, if these words signify it, was not understood to belong to the birthright. And that in those days of the patriarch's dominion was not understood to be the right of the heir, but only a greater proportion of goods is plain from Genesis 21-10, for Sarah, taking Isaac to be heir, says, cast out this bondwoman and her son, for the son of this bondwoman shall not be heir with my son, whereby could be meant nothing but that he should not have a pretense to an equal share of his father's estate after his death, which should have his portion presently, and be gone. Accordingly we read, Genesis 25, 5 and 6, that Abraham gave all that he had under Isaac, but unto the sons of the concubines which Abraham had, Abraham gave gifts, and sent them away from Isaac his son while he yet lived. That is, Abraham having given portions to all his other sons and sent them away, that which he had reserved, being the greatest part of his substance, Isaac as heir possessed after his death. But by being heir he had no right to be lured over his brethren, for if he had, why should Sarah endeavour to rob him of one of his subjects, or lessen the number of his slaves, by desiring to have Ishmael sent away? Thus, as under the law, the privilege of birthright was nothing but a double portion, so we see that before Moses in the patriarch's time, from whence our author pretends to take his model, there was no knowledge nor thought that birthright gave rule or empire, paternal or kingly authority to anyone over his brethren. If this be not plain enough in the story of Isaac and Ishmael, he that will look into one chronicles, Chapter 5, Verse 12, may there read these words. Reuben was the firstborn, but for as much as he defiled his father's bed, his birthright was given unto the sons of Joseph, the son of Israel, and the genealogy is not to be reckoned after the birthright, for Judah prevailed above his brethren, and of him came the chief ruler, but the birthright was Joseph's. What this birthright was, Jacob blessing Joseph, Genesis, Chapter 48, Verse 22, telleth us in these words, Moreover, I have given the one portion above thy brethren, which I took out of the hand of the Amorite, with my sword and with my bow. Whereby it is not only plain that the birthright was nothing but a double portion, but the text in chronicles is express against our author's doctrine, and shows that Dominion was no part of the birthright, for it tells us that Joseph had the birthright, but Judah the Dominion. One would think our author were very fond of the very name of birthright, when he brings this instance of Jacob and Esal, to prove that Dominion belongs to the heir over his brethren. One, because it will be but an ill example to prove that Dominion by God's ordination belonged to the eldest son, because Jacob the youngest here had it, let him come by it how he would, for if it prove anything, it can only prove against our author, that the assignment of Dominion to the eldest is not by divine institution, which would then be unalterable, for if by the law of God or nature, absolute power and empire belongs to the eldest son and his heirs, so that they are supreme monarchs and all the rest of their brethren slaves, our author gives us reason to doubt whether the eldest son has a power to part with it, to the prejudice of his posterity, since he tells us Observations 158, that in grants and gifts that have their original from God or nature, no inferior power of man can limit or make any law of prescription against them. Two, because this place, Genesis chapter 27 verse 29, brought by our author, concerns not at all the Dominion of one brother over the other, nor the subjection of Esau to Jacob, for it is plain in the history that Esau was never subject to Jacob, but lived apart in Mount Seir, where he found a distinct people and government, and was himself prince over them, as much as Jacob was in his own family. This text, if considered, can never be understood of Esau himself, or the personal Dominion of Jacob over him, for the words brethren and sons of thy mother, could not be used literally by Isaac, who knew Jacob had only one brother, and these words are so far from being true in a literal sense, or establishing any Dominion in Jacob over Esau, that in the story we find quite the contrary. Four, Genesis 32, Jacob several times calls Esau Lord and himself his servant, and Genesis 33, he bowed himself seven times to the ground to Esau. Whether Esau then were a subject and vassal, nay, as our author tells us, all subjects are slaves to Jacob, and Jacob his sovereign prince by birthright, I leave the reader to judge, and to believe if he can that these words of Isaac be Lord over thy brethren and let thy mother's sons bow down to thee, confirmed Jacob in a sovereignty over Esau upon the account of the birthright he had got from him. He's at read the story of Jacob and Esau will find there was never any jurisdiction or authority that either of them had over the other after their father's death. They lived with the friendship and equality of brethren, neither Lord, neither slave to his brother, but independent each of other, were both heads of their distinct families, where they received no laws from one another, but lived separately, and were the routes out of which sprang two distinct people and a two distinct governments. This blessing then of Isaac, whereon our author would build the dominion of the elder brother, signifies no more but what Rebecca had been told from God, Genesis 25 verse 23, Two nations are in thy womb, and two manner of people shall be separated from thy bowels, and the one people shall be strong as any other people, and the elder shall serve the younger. And so Jacob blessed Judah, Genesis 49, and gave him the scepter and dominion, from whence our author might have argued as well that jurisdiction and dominion belongs to the third son over his brethren, as well as from this blessing of Isaac that it belonged to Jacob. Both these places contain only predictions of what should long after happen to their posterities, and not any declaration of the right of inheritance to dominion in either. And thus we have our author's two great and only arguments to prove that heirs are lords over their brethren. One, because God tells Cain, Genesis 4, that however sin might set upon him he ought or might be master of it, for the most learned interpreters understood the words of sin and not of able, and give so strong reasons for it that nothing can convincingly be inferred from so doubtful a text to our author's purpose. Two, because in this of Genesis 27, Isaac foretells that the Israelites, the posterity of Jacob, should have dominion over the Edomites, the posterity of Esau. Therefore, says our author, heirs are lords of their brethren. I leave any one to judge of the conclusion. And now we see how our author has provided for the descending and conveyance down of Adam's monarchical power, or personal dominion, to posterity, by the inheritance of his heir succeeding to all his father's authority and becoming upon his death as much lord as his father was, not only over his own children, but over his brethren, and all descended from his father, and so in infinitum. But yet who this heir is, he does not once tell us, and all the light that we have from him in this so fundamental a point is only that in his instance of Jacob, by using the word birthright, as that which passed from Esau to Jacob, he leads us to guess that by heir he means the eldest son, though I do not remember he anywhere mentions expressly the title of the first born, but all along keeps himself under the shelter of the indefinite term heir. But taking it to be his meaning that the eldest son is heir, for if the eldest be not, there will be no pretence why the son should not all be heirs alike. And so by right of primogeniture has dominion over his brethren, this is but one step towards the settlement of succession, and the difficulties remain still as much as ever, till he can show us who is meant by right heir, in all those cases which may happen with a present possessor hath no son. This he silently passes over, and perhaps wisely too, for what can be wiser after one has affirmed that the person having that power as well as the power and form of government is the ordinance of God and by divine institution, vid observations 254 or page 12, than to be careful not to start any question concerning the person, the resolution whereof will certainly lead him into a confession that God and nature hath determined nothing about him. And if our author cannot show who by right of nature or a clear positive law of God has the next right to inherit the dominion of this natural monarch he hath been at such pains about, when he died without a son, he might have spared his pains in all the rest, it being more necessary for the settling men's consciences and determining their subjection and allegiance, to show them who by original right, superior and antecedent to the will or any act of men, hath a title to this paternal jurisdiction, than it is to show that by nature there was such a jurisdiction, it being to no purpose for me to know there is such a paternal power, which I ought and disposed to obey, unless, where there are many pretenders, I also know the person that is rightfully invested and endowed with it. For the main matter in question being concerning the duty of my obedience and the obligation of conscience I am under to pay it to him that is of right to my Lord and Master, I must know the person that this right of paternal power resides in, and so empowers him to claim obedience from me. For let it be true what he says, page 12, that civil power not only in general is by divine institution, but even the assignment of it especially to the eldest parents, and observations 254, that not only the power or right of government, but the form of the power of governing, and the person having that power are all the ordinance of God. Yet unless he show us in all cases who is this person, ordained by God, who is this eldest parent, all his abstract notions of monarchical power will signify just nothing when they are to be reduced to practice and men are conscientiously to pay their obedience. For paternal jurisdiction being not the thing to be obeyed because it cannot command, but is only that which gives one man a right which another hath not, and if it come by inheritance another man cannot have to command and be obeyed, it is ridiculous to say I pay obedience to the paternal power when I obey him to whom paternal power gives no right to my obedience, for he can have no divine right to my obedience who cannot show his divine right to the power of ruling over me, as well as that by divine right there is such a power in the world. And hence not being able to make out any prince's title to government as heir to Adam, which therefore is of no use, and had been better let alone, he is feigned to resolve all into present possession, and makes civil obedience as due to an usurper as to a lawful king, and thereby the usurper's title as good. His words are, Observations 253, and they deserve to be remembered. If an usurper dispossess the true heir, the subject's obedience to the fatherly power must go along and wait upon God's providence. But I shall leave his title of usurpers to be examined in his due place, and desire my sober reader to consider what thanks princes owe such politics as this, which can suppose paternal power, i.e. a right to government, in the hands of a cade or a Cromwell, and so all obedience being due to paternal power, the obedience of subjects will be due to them by the same right and upon as good grounds as it is to lawful princes. And yet this, as dangerous a doctrine as it is, must necessarily follow from making all political power to be nothing else but Adam's paternal power by right and divine institution descending from him without being able to show to whom it descended or who is heir to it. To settle government in the world and to lay obligations to obedience on any man's conscience, it is as necessary, as opposing with our author that all power be nothing but the being possessed of Adam's fatherhood, to satisfy him who has a right to this power, this fatherhood, when the possessor dies without sons to succeed immediately to it, as it was to tell him that upon the death of the father the eldest son had a right to it. For it is still to be remembered that the great question is, and that which our author would be thought to condemn for if he did not sometimes forget it, what persons have a right to be obeyed, and not whether there be a power in the world which is to be called paternal without knowing in whom it resides. For so it be a power, i.e. right to govern, it matters not whether it be termed paternal or regal, natural or acquired, whether you call it supreme fatherhood or supreme brotherhood, will be all one, provided we know who has it. I go on then to ask whether in the inheriting of this paternal power, this supreme fatherhood, the grandson by a daughter had a right before a nephew by a brother. Whether the grandson by the eldest son being an infant, before the younger son a man and able, whether the daughter before the uncle, or any other man descended by a male line, whether a grandson by a younger daughter before a granddaughter by an elder daughter, whether the elder son by a concubine before a younger son by a wife. From whence also will arise many questions of legitimation, and what in nature is the difference between a wife and a concubine? For as to the municipal or positive laws of men, they can signify nothing here. It may father be asked whether the eldest son being a fool shall inherit this paternal power before the younger, a wise man. And what degree of folly it must be that shall exclude him, and who shall be the judge of it? Whether the son of a fool excluded for his folly, before the son of his wise brother who reigned. Who has the paternal power, whilst the widow queen is with child by the deceased king, and nobody knows whether it will be a son or a daughter? Which shall be heir of the two male twins who by the dissection of the mother were laid open to the world? Whether a sister by the half blood before a brother's daughter by the whole blood? These and many more such doubts might be proposed about the titles of succession and the right of inheritance, and that not as idle speculations, but such as in history we shall find have concerned the inheritance of crowns and kingdoms. And if ours want them, we need not go farther for famous examples of it than the other kingdom in this very island, which having been fully related by the ingenious and learned author of Patriarcha non-monarcha, I need say no more of. Till our author hath resolved all the doubts that may arise about the next heir and showed that they are plainly determined by the law of nature or the revealed law of God, all his suppositions of a monarchical absolute supreme paternal power in Adam, and the descent of that power to his heirs would not be of the least use to establish the authority or make out the title of any one prince now on earth, but would rather unsettle and bring all into question? For let our author tell us as long as he pleases, and let all men believe it too, that Adam had a paternal and thereby a monarchical power, that this, the only power in the world, descended to his heirs, and that there is no other power in the world but this. Let all this be as clear demonstration as it is manifest error, yet if it be not past doubt to whom this paternal power descends, and whose now it is, nobody can be under any obligation of obedience, unless any one will say that I am bound to pay obedience to paternal power in a man who has no more paternal power than I myself, which is all one is to say I obey a man because he has a right to govern, and if I be asked how I know he has a right to govern, I should answer it cannot be known that he has any at all. For that cannot be the reason of my obedience which I know not to be so, much less can that be a reason of my obedience which nobody at all can know to be so. And therefore all this ado about Adam's fatherhood, the greatness of his power and the necessity of its supposal helps nothing to establish the power of those that govern or to determine the obedience of subjects who are to obey if they cannot tell whom they are to obey or if it cannot be known who are to govern and who to obey. In the state the world is now it is irrecoverably ignorant who is Adam's heir. This fatherhood, this monarchical power of Adam descending to his heirs would be of no more use to the government of mankind than it would be to the quieting of men's consciences or securing their healths if our author had assured them that Adam had a power to forgive sins or cure diseases which by divine institution descended to his heir whilst this heir is impossible to be known. And should not he do as rationally who upon this assurance of our author went and confessed his sins and expected a good absolution or took physics with expectation of health from anyone who had taken on himself the name of priest or physician or thrust himself into those employments saying, I acquiesce in the absolving power descending from Adam or I shall be cured by the medicinal power descending from Adam as he who says, I submit to and obey the paternal power descending from Adam when it has confessed all these powers descend only to his single heir and that heir is unknown. It is true the civil lawyers have pretended to determine some of these cases concerning the succession of princes but by our author's principles they have meddled in a matter that belongs not to them for if all political power be derived only from Adam and be to descend only to his successive heirs by the ordinance of God and divine institution this is a right antecedent and paramount to all government and therefore the positive laws of men cannot determine that which is itself the foundation of all law and government and is to receive its rule only from the law of God and nature and that being silent in the case I am apt to think there is no such right to be conveyed in this way I am sure it would be to no purpose if there were and men would be more at a loss concerning government and obedience to governors than if there were no such right since by positive laws and compact which divine institution if there be any shuts out all these endless inextricable doubts can be safely provided against but it can never be understood how a divine natural right and that of such moment as is all order and peace in the world should be conveyed down to posterity without any plain natural or divine rule concerning it and there would be an end of all civil government if the assignment of civil power were by divine institution to the heir and yet by that divine institution the person of the heir could not be known this paternal regal power being by divine right only his it leaves no room for human prudence or consent to place it anywhere else for if only one man have a divine right to the obedience of mankind nobody can claim that obedience but he that can show that right nor can men's consciences by any other pretence be obliged to it and thus this doctrine cuts up all government by the roots thus we see how our author laying it for a sure foundation that the very person that is to rule is the ordinance of God and by divine institution tells us at large only that this person is the heir but who this heir is he leaves us to guess and so this divine institution which assigns it to a person whom we have no rule to know is just as good as an assignment to nobody at all but whatever our author does divine institution makes no such ridiculous assignments nor can God be supposed to make it a sacred law that one certain person should have a right to something and yet not give rules to mark out and know that person by or give an heir a divine right to power and yet not point out who that heir is it is rather to be thought that an heir had no such right by divine institution than that God should give such a right to the heir but yet leave it doubtful and undeterminable who such heir is if God had given the land of Canaan to Abraham and in general terms to somebody after him without naming his seed whereby it might be known who that somebody was it would have been as good and useful an assignment to determine the right to the land of Canaan as it would be the determining the right of crowns to give empire to Adam and his successive heirs after him without telling who his heir is for the word heir without a rule to know who it is signifies no more than somebody I know not whom God making it a divine institution that mentioned not to marry those who are near of kin thinks it not enough to say none of usual approach to any that is near of kin to him to uncover their nakedness but moreover gives rules to know who are those near of kin forbidden by divine institution or else that law would have been of no use it being to no purpose delay restraint or give privileges to men in such general terms as the particular person concerned cannot be known by but God's not having anywhere said the next heir shall inherit all his father's estate or dominion we are not to wonder that he had nowhere appointed who that heir should be for never having intended any such thing never designed any heir in that sense we cannot expect he should anywhere nominate or appoint any person to it as we might had it been otherwise and therefore in scripture though the word heir occur yet there is no such thing as heir in our also sense one that was by right of nature to inherit all that his father had exclusive of his brethren hence Sarah supposes that if Ishmael stayed in the house to share in Abraham's estate after his death this son of a bond woman might be heir with Isaac and therefore says she cast out this bond woman and her son for the son of this bond woman shall not be heir with my son but this cannot excuse our author who telling us there is in every number of men one who is right and next heir to Adam ought to have told us what the laws of descent are but he having been so swearing to instruct us by rules how to know who is heir let us see in the next place what his history out of scripture on which he pretends wholly to build his government gives us in this necessary and fundamental point end of chapter 11 part 2 book one chapter 11 part 3 of two treatises of civil government this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Philippa two treatises of civil government by John Locke book one chapter 11 who heir part 3 our author to make good the title of his book page 13 begins his history of the descent of Adam's regal power page 13 in these words this lordship which Adam by command had over the whole world and by right descending from him the patriarchs did enjoy was a large etc how does he prove that the patriarchs by descent did enjoy it for dominion of life and death says he we find Judah the father pronounced sentence of death against Tamar his daughter-in-law for playing the harlot page 13 how does this prove that Judah had absolute and sovereign authority he pronounced sentence of death the pronouncing of sentence of death is not a certain mark of sovereignty but usually the office of inferior magistrates the power of making laws of life and death is indeed a mark of sovereignty but pronouncing the sentence according to those laws may be done by others and therefore this will but ill prove that he had sovereign authority as if one should say judge jeffries pronounced sentence of death in the late times therefore judge jeffries had sovereign authority but it will be said Judah did it not by commission from another and therefore did it in his own right who knows whether he had any right at all heat of passion might carry him to do that which he had no authority to do Judah had dominion of life and death how does that appear he exercised it he pronounced sentence of death against Tamar our author thinks it a very good proof that because he did it therefore he had a right to do it he lay with her also by the same way of proof he had a right to do that too if the consequence be good from doing to a right of doing Absalom too may be reckoned amongst our authors sovereigns for he pronounced such a sentence of death against his brother Amnon and mount upon a like occasion and had it executed too if that be sufficient to prove a dominion of life and death but allowing this all to be clear demonstration of sovereign power who was it that had this lordship by right descending to him from Adam as large and ample as the absolutist dominion of any monarch Judah says our author Judah a younger son of Jacob his father and elder brethren living so that if our authors own proof be to be taken a younger brother may in the life of his father and elder brothers by right of descent enjoy Adam's monarchical power and if one so qualified may be monarch by descent why may not every man if Judah his father and elder brother living were one of Adam's heirs I know not who can be excluded from this inheritance all men by inheritance may be monarchs as well as Judah touching war we see that Abraham commanded an army of 318 soldiers of his own family and Esau met his brother Jacob with 400 men at arms for matter of peace Abraham made a league with Abimelech etc. page 13 is it not possible for a man to have 318 men in his family without being heir to Adam a planter in the West Indies has more and might if he pleased who doubts muster them up and lead them out against the Indians to seek reparation upon any injury received from them and this without the absolute dominion of a monarch descending to him from Adam would it not be an admirable argument to prove that all power by God's institution descended from Adam by inheritance and that the very person and power of this planter with the ordinance of God because he had power in his family over servants born in his house and bought with his money for this was just Abraham's case those who were rich in the patriarch's days as in the West Indies now bought men and made servants and by their increase as well as purchasing of new came to have large and numerous families which though they made use of in war or peace can it be thoughts the power they had over them was an inheritance descended from Adam when it was the purchase of their money a man's riding in an expedition against an enemy his horse bought in a fair would be as good a proof that the owner enjoyed the lordship which Adam by command had over the whole world by right descending to him as Abraham's leading out the servants of his family is that the patriarchs enjoyed this lordship by descent from Adam since the title to the power the master had in both cases whether over slaves or horses was only from his purchase and the getting a dominion over anything by bargain and money is a new way of proving one had it by descent and inheritance but making war and peace are marks of sovereignty let it be so in politics societies may not therefore a man in the West Indies who had with him sons of his own friends or companions soldiers under pay or slaves bought with money or perhaps a band made up of all these make war and peace if there should be occasion and ratify the articles too within oath without being a sovereign an absolute king over those who went with him he that says he cannot must then allow many masters of ships many private planters to be absolute monics for as much as this they have done war and peace cannot be made for politics societies but by the supreme power of such societies because war and peace giving a different motion to the force of such a politic body none can make war or peace but that which has the direction of the force of the whole body and that in politics societies is only the supreme power in voluntary societies for the time he that has such a power by consent may make war and peace and so may a single man for himself the state of war not consisting in the number of partisans but the enmity of the parties where they have no superior to appeal to the actual making of war or peace is no proof of any other power but only of disposing those to exercise or cease acts of enmity for whom he makes it and this power in many cases anyone may have without any politics supremacy and therefore the making of war or peace will not prove that everyone that does so is a politic ruler much less a king for then common wealths must be kings too for they do us certainly make war and peace as monarchical government but granting this a mark of sovereignty in Abraham is it a proof of the descent to him of Adam's sovereignty over the whole world if it be it will surely be as good a proof of the descent of Adam's lordship to others too and then common wealths as well as Abraham will be heirs of Adam for they make war and peace as well as he if you say that the lordship of Adam does not by right descent to common wealths though they make war and peace the same say I of Abraham and then there is an end of your argument if you stand to your argument and say those that do make war and peace as common wealths do without doubt do inherit Adam's lordship there is an end of your monarchy unless you will say that common wealths by descent enjoying Adam's lordship are monarchies and that indeed would be a new way of making all the governments in the world monarchical to give our author the honor of this new invention for I confess it is not I have first found it out by tracing his principles and so charged it on him it is fit my readers know that as absurd as it may seem he teaches it himself page 23 where he ingeniously says in all kingdoms and common wealths in the world whether the prince be the supreme father of the people or but the true heir to such a father or come to the crown by usurpation or election or whether some few or a multitude govern the common wealth yet still the authority that is in any one or in many or in all these is the only right and natural authority of a supreme father which right of fatherhood he often tells us is regal and royal authority as particularly page 12 the page immediately preceding this instance of Abraham this regal authority he says those that govern common wealths have and if we true that regal and royal authority be in those that govern common wealths it is as true that common wealths are governed by kings for if regal authority be in him that governs he that governs must needs be a king and so all common wealths are nothing but downright monarchies and then what need any more a deal about the matter the governments of the world are as they should be there is nothing but monarchy in it this without doubt was the surest way our author could have found to turn all other governments but monarchical out of the world but all this scarce proves Abraham to have been a king as heir to Adam if by inheritance he had been king lot who was of the same family must needs have been his subject by that title before the servants in his family but we see they lived as friends and equals and when their herdsmen could not agree there was no pretense of jurisdiction or superiority between them but they parted by consent Genesis 13 hence he is called both by Abraham and by the text Abraham's brother the name of friendship and equality and not of jurisdiction and authority though he were really but his nephew and if our author knows that Abraham was Adam's heir and a king it was more it seems than Abraham himself knew or his servant whom he sent a wooing for his son for when he sets out the advantages of the match 24 Genesis 35 thereby to prevail with the young woman and her friends he says I am Abraham's servant and the Lord has blessed my master greatly and he has become great and he has given him flocks and herds in silver and gold and men servants and maid servants and camels and asses and Sarah my master's wife bear a son to my master when she was old and under him have he given all he has can one think that a discreet servant that was thus particular to set out his master's greatness would have omitted the crown Isaac was to have if he had known of any such can it be imagined he should have neglected to have told them on such an occasion as this that Abraham was a king a name well known at that time for he had nine of them his neighbors if he or his master had thought any such thing the likeliest matter of all the rest to make his errand successful but this discovery it seems was reserved for our author to make two or three thousand years after and let him enjoy the credit of it only he should have taken care that some of Adam's land should have descended to this his heir as well as all Adam's lordship for though this lordship which Abraham if we may believe our author as well as the other patriarchs by right descending to him did enjoy was as large and ample as the absolutist dominion of any monarch which has been since the creation yet his estate his territories his dominions were very narrow and scanty for he had not the possession of a foot of land till he bought a field and a cave of the Sons of Heth to bury Sarah in the instance of Esau joined with this of Abraham to prove that the lordship which Adam had over the whole world by right descending from him the patriarchs did enjoy is yet more pleasant than the former Esau met his brother Jacob with four hundred men at arms he therefore was a king by right of air to Adam four hundred armed men then however got together are enough to prove him that leads them to be a king and Adam's heir there have been Tories in Ireland whatever there are in other countries who would have thanked our author for so honorable an opinion of them especially if there have been nobody near with a better title of five hundred armed men to question their royal authority of four hundred it is a shame for men to trifle so to say no worse of it in so serious an argument here Esau is brought as a proof that Adam's lordship Adam's absolute dominion as large as that of any monarch descended by right to the patriarchs and in this very chapter page 19 Jacob is brought as an instance of one that by birthright was lord over his brethren so we have here two brothers absolute monarchs by the same title and at the same time heirs to Adam the eldest heir to Adam because he met his brother with four hundred men and the youngest heir to Adam by birthright Esau enjoyed the lordship which Adam had over the whole world by right descending to him in as large and ample manner as the absolutist dominion of any monarch and at the same time Jacob lord over him by the right heirs have to be lords over their brethren resum teniatis I never I confess met with any man of parts so dexterous as Sir Robert at this way of arguing but it was his misfortune to light upon a hypothesis that could not be accommodated to the nature of things and human affairs his principles could not be made to agree with that constitution and order which God had settled in the world and therefore must needs often clash with common sense and experience in the next section he tells us this patriarchal power continued not only till the flood but after it as the name patriarch does in part prove the word patriarch does more than in part prove that patriarchal power continued in the world as long as they were patriarchs for it is necessary that patriarchal power should be whilst there are patriarchs as it is necessary that there should be paternal or conjugal power whilst there are fathers or husbands but this is but playing with names that which he would fallaciously insinuate is the thing in question to be proved this that the lordship which Adam had over the world the supposed absolute universal dominion of Adam by right descending from him the patriarchs did enjoy if he affirms such an absolute monarchy continued to the flood in the world I would be glad to know what record he has it from for I confess I cannot find a word of it in my Bible if by patriarchal power he means anything else it is nothing to the matter in hand and how the name patriarch in some part proves that those who are called by that name had absolute monarchical power I confess I do not see and therefore I think needs no answer till the argument from it be made out a little clearer the three sons of Noah had the world says our author divided amongst them by their father for of them was the whole world overspread page 14 the world might be overspread by the offspring of Noah's sons though he never divided the world amongst them for the earth might be replenished without being divided so that all our authors argument here proves no such division however I allow it to him and then ask the world being divided amongst them which of the three was Adam's heir if Adam's lordship Adams monarchy by right descended only to the eldest then the other two could be but his subjects his slaves if by right it descended to all three brothers by the same right it will descend to all mankind and then it will be impossible what he says page 19 that heirs are lords of their brethren should be true but all brothers and consequently all men will be equal and independent all heirs to Adams monarchy and consequently all Monarchs too one as much as another but it will be said Noah their father divided the world amongst them so that our author will allow more to Noah than he will to God Almighty for observations to one one he thought it hard that God himself should give the world to Noah and his sons to the prejudice of Noah's birthright his words are Noah was left sole heir to the world why should it be thought that God would disinherit him out of his birthright and make him of all men in the world the only tenant in common with his children and yet here he thinks it fit that Noah should disinherit shame of his birthright and divide the world between him and his brethren so that this birthright when our author pleases must and when he pleases must not be sacred and inviolable if Noah did divide the world between his sons and his assignment of dominions to them were good there is an end of divine institution all our author's discourse of Adam's heir with whatsoever he builds on it is quite out of doors the natural power of kings falls to the ground and then the form of the power governing and the person having that power will not be as he says they are observations to five four the ordinance of God but there will be ordinances of man for if the right of the air be the ordinance of God a divine right no man father or not father can alter it if it be not a divine right it is only human depending on the will of man and so where human institution gives it not the firstborn has no right at all above his brethren and men may put government into what hands and under what form they please he goes on most of the civilist nations of the earth labor to fetch their original from some of the sons or nephews of Noah page 14 how many do most of the civilist nations amount to and who are they I fear the chineses are very great and civil people as well as several other people of the east west north and south trouble not themselves much about this matter all that believe the bible which I believe are our authors most of the civilist nations must necessarily derive themselves from Noah but for the rest of the world they think little of his sons or nephews but if the heralds and antiquaries of all nations for it is these men generally that labor to find out the originals of nations or all the nations themselves should labor to fetch their original from some of the sons or nephews of Noah what would this be to prove that the lordship which Adam had over the whole world by right to send it to the patriarchs whoever nations or races of men labor to fetch their original from maybe concluded to be thought by them men of renown famous to posterity for the greatness of the virtues and actions but beyond these they look not nor consider who they were heirs to but look on them as such as raised themselves by their own virtue to a degree that would give a luster to those who in future ages could pretend to derive themselves from them but if it were oligies hercules brahma tambolin pheromon they if Jupiter and Saturn were the names from whence diverse races of men both ancient and modern have laboured to derive their original will that prove that those men enjoyed the lordship of Adam by right descending to them if not this is but a flourish of our authors to mislead his reader that in itself signifies nothing to as much purpose is what he tells us page 15 concerning this division of the world that some say it was by lot and others that Noah sailed round the Mediterranean in ten years and divided the world into Asia, Africa and Europe portions of his three sons America then it seems was left to be his that could catch it why our author takes such pains to prove the division of the world by Noah to his sons and will not leave out an imagination though no better than a dream that he can find anywhere to favour it is hard to guess since such a division if it prove anything must necessarily take away the title of Adam's heir unless three brothers can all together be heirs of Adam and therefore the following words how so ever the manner of this division be uncertain yet it is most certain the division itself was by families from Noah and his children of which the parents were heads and princes page 15 if allowed him to be true and of any force to prove that all the power in the world is nothing but the lordship of Adams descending by right they will only prove that the fathers of the children are all heirs to this lordship of Adam for if in those days Ham and Jaffet and other parents besides the eldest son were heads and princes over their families and had a right to divide the earth by families what hinders younger brothers being fathers of families from having the same right if Ham and Jaffet were princes by right descending to them notwithstanding any title of heir in their eldest brother younger brothers by the same right descending to them our princes now and so all our alters natural power of kings will reach no farther than their own children and no kingdom by this natural right can be bigger than a family for either this lordship of Adam over the whole world by right descends only to the eldest son and then there can be but one heir as our alter says page 19 or else it by right descends to all the sons equally and then every father of a family will have it as well as the three sons of Noah take which you will it destroys the present governments and kingdoms that are now in the world since whoever has this natural power of a king by right descending to him must have it either as our alter tells us Cain had it and be lord over his brethren and so be alone king of the whole world or else as he tells us here share my ham and jaffet had it three brothers and so be only prince of his own family and all families independent one of another all the world must be only one empire by the right of the next air or else every family be a distinct government of itself by the lordship of Adams descending to parents of families and to this only tend all the proofs he here gives us of the descent of Adams lordship for continuing his story of this descent he says in the dispersion of Babel we must certainly find the establishment of royal power throughout the kingdoms of the world page 14 if you must find it pray do and you will help us to a new piece of history but you must show it us before we shall be bound to believe that regal power was established in the world upon your principles for that regal power was established in the kingdoms of the world I think nobody will dispute but that there should be kingdoms in the world who several kings enjoyed their crowns by right descending to them from Adam that we think not only apocryphal but also utterly impossible if our author has no better foundation for his monarchy than a supposition of what was known at the dispersion of Babel the monarchy he erects thereon whose top is to reach to heaven to unite mankind will serve only to divide and scatter them as that tower did and instead of establishing civil government and order in the world will produce nothing but confusion for he tells us the nations that they were divided into were distinct families which had fathers for rulers over them whereby it appears that even in the confusion God was careful to preserve the fatherly authority by distributing the diversity of languages according to the diversity of families page 14 it would have been a hard matter for anyone but our author to have found out so plainly in the text he here brings that all the nations in that dispersion were governed by fathers and that God was careful to preserve the fatherly authority the words of the text these are the sons of shem after their families after their tongues in their lands after their nations and the same thing is said of ham and shafed after an enumeration of their posterities in all which there is not one word said of their governors or forms of government of fathers or fatherly authority but our author who is very quick cited to spy out fatherhood where nobody else could see any of the least glimpses of it tells us positively their rulers were fathers and God was careful to preserve the fatherly authority and why because those of the same family spoke the same language and so of necessity in the division kept together just as if one should argue thus Hannibal in his army consisting of diverse nations kept those of the same language together therefore fathers were captains of each band and Hannibal was careful of the fatherly authority or in peopleing of carolina the english french scotch and welsh that are there plant themselves together and by them the country is divided in their lands after their tongues after their families after their nations therefore care was taken of the fatherly authority or because in many parts of america every little tribe was a distinct people with a different language one should infer that therefore God was careful to preserve the fatherly authority or that therefore their rulers enjoyed Adam's lordship by right descending to them though we know not who were their governors nor what their form of government but only that they were divided into little independent societies speaking different languages the scripture says not a word of their rulers or forms of government but only gives an account how mankind came to be divided into distinct languages and nations and therefore it is not to argue from the authority of scripture to tell us positively fathers were their rulers when the scripture says no such thing but to set up fancies of one's own brain when we confidently have a matter of fact where records are utterly silent upon a like ground i.e. none at all he says that they were not confused multitudes without heads and governors and at liberty to choose what governors or governments they pleased for i demand when mankind were all yet of one language all congregated in the plane of shinar were they then all under one monarch who enjoyed the lordship of adam by right descending to him if they were not there were then no thoughts it is plain of adam's air no right to government known then upon that title no care taken by god or man of adam's fatherly authority if when mankind were but one people dwelt all together and were of one language and were upon building a city together and when it was plain that they could not but know the right air for shem lived till isaac's time and long while after the division at babel if then i say they were not under the monarchical government of adam's fatherhood by right descending to the air it is plain there was no regard had to the fatherhood no monarchy acknowledged due to adam's air no empire of shems in asia and consequently no such division of the world by know as our authors talked of as far as we can conclude anything from scripture in this matter it seems from this place that if they had any government it was rather a commonwealth than an absolute monarchy for the scripture tells us genesis 11 they said it was not a prince commanded the building of this city and tower it was not by the command of one monarch but by the consultation of many a free people let us build us a city they built it for themselves as free men not as slaves for their lord and master that we be not scattered abroad having a city once built and fixed habitations to settle our abodes and families this was the consultation and design of a people that were at liberty to pass asunder but desired to keep in one body and could not have been either necessary or likely in men tied together under the government of one monarch who if they had been as our author tells us all slaves under the absolute dominion of a monarch needed not have taken such care to hinder themselves from wandering out of the reach of his dominion a demand whether this be not plainer in scripture than anything of adam's air or salvely authority but if being as god says genesis 11 6 one people they had one ruler one king by natural right absolute and supreme over them what care had god to preserve the paternal authority of the supreme fatherhood if on a sudden he suffer 72 for so many are also talks of distinct nations to be erected out of it under distinct governors and at once to withdraw themselves from the obedience of their sovereign this is to entitle god's care how and to what we please can it be sense to say that god was careful to preserve the fatherly authority in those who had it not for if these were subjects under a supreme prince what authority had they was it an instance of god's care to preserve the fatherly authority when he took away the true supreme fatherhood of the natural monarch can it be reason to say that god for the preservation of fatherly authority let several new governments with their governors start up who could not all have fatherly authority and is it not as much reason to say that god is careful to destroy fatherly authority when he suffers one who is in possession of it to have his government torn in pieces and shared by several of his subjects would it not be an argument just like this for monarchical government to say when any monarchy was shattered to pieces and divided amongst revolted subjects that god was careful to preserve monarchical power by rending a settled empire into a multitude of little governments if anyone will say that what happens in providence to be preserved god is careful to preserve as a thing therefore to be esteemed by men as necessary or useful it is a peculiar propriety of speech which everyone will not think fit to imitate but this I'm sure is impossible to be either proper or true speaking that shem for example for he was then alive should have fatherly authority or sovereignty by right of fatherhood over that one people at babel and that the next moment shem yet living seventy two others should have fatherly authority or sovereignty by right of fatherhood over the same people divided into so many distinct governments either these seventy two fathers actually were rulers just before the confusion and then they were not one people but that got himself as they were or else they were a common wealth and then where was monarchy or else these seventy two fathers had fatherly authority but knew it not strange that fatherly authority should be the only original of government amongst men and yet all mankind not know it and stranger yet that the confusion of tongues should reveal it to them all of a sudden and in an instant these seventy two should know that they had fatherly power and all others know that they were to obey it in them and everyone know that particular fatherly authority to which he was a subject he that can think this arguing from scripture may from thence make out what model of a utopia will best suit with his fancy or interest and this fatherhood thus disposed of will justify both the prince who claims an universal monarchy and his subjects who being fathers of families shall quit all subjection to him and count on his empire into less governments for themselves for it will always remain a doubt in which of these the fatherly authority resided till our author resolves us whether Shem who was then alive or these seventy two new princes beginning so many new empires in his dominions and over his subjects had right to govern since our author tells us that both one and the other had fatherly which is supreme authority and are brought in by him as instances of those who did enjoy the lordship of Adam by right descending to them which was as large and ample as the absolutist dominion of any monarchy this at least is unavoidable that if God was careful to preserve the fatherly authority in the seventy two new erected nations it necessarily follows that he was as careful to destroy all pretenses of Adam's air since he took care and therefore did preserve the fatherly authority in so many at least seventy one that could not possibly be Adam's airs when the right air if God had ever ordained any such inheritance could not but be known Shem then living and they being all one people end of chapter 11 part 3 book 1 chapter 11 part 4 of two treatises of civil government this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Philippa two treatises of civil government by John Locke book 1 chapter 11 who air part 4 Nimrod is his next instance of enjoying this patriarchal power page 16 but I know not for what reason our author seems a little unkind to him and says that he against right enlarged his empire by seizing violently on the rights of other lords of families these lords of families here were called fathers of families in his account of the dispersion at Babel but it matters not how they were called so we know who they are for this fatherly authority must be in them either as airs to Adam and so they could not be 72 nor above one at once or else as natural parents over their children and so every father will have paternal authority of his children by the same right and in as large extent as those 72 had and so be independent princes over their own offspring taking his lords of families in this later sense as it is hard to give those words any other sense in this place he gives us a very pretty account of the original of monarchy and in these following words page 16 and in this sense he may be said to be the author and founder of monarchy of his as against right seizing violently on the rights of fathers over their children which paternal authority if it be in them by right of nature for how else could those 72 come by it nobody can take from them without their own consents and then I desire our author and his friends to consider how far this will concern other princes and whether it will not according to his conclusion of that paragraph resolve all regal power of those whose dominions extend beyond their families either inter tyranny and usurpation or election and consent of fathers of families which will differ very little from consent of the people all his instances in the next section page 17 of the 12 dukes of Edom the nine kings in a little corner of Asia in Abraham's days the 31 kings in Canaan destroyed by Joshua and the care he takes to prove that these were all sovereign princes and that every town in those days had a king are so many direct proofs against him that it was not the lordship of Adam by right descending to them that made kings for if they had held their royalties by that title either there must have been but one sovereign over them all or else every father of a family had been as good a prince and had as good a claim to royalty as these for if all the sons of Esau had each of them the younger as well as the eldest the right of fatherhood and so were sovereign princes after their father's death the same right had their sons after them and so on to all posterity which will limit all the natural power of fatherhood only to be over the issue of their own bodies and their descendants which power of fatherhood dies with the head of each family and makes way for the like power of fatherhood to take place in each of his sons over their respective posterities whereby the power of fatherhood will be preserved indeed and is intelligible but will not be at all to our author's purpose none of the instances he brings are proof of any power they had as heirs of Adam's paternal authority by the title of his fatherhood descending to them no nor of any power they had by virtue of their own for Adam's fatherhood being of all mankind it could descend but to one at once and from him to his right heir only and so they could by that title be but one king in the world at his time and by right of fatherhood not descending from Adam it must be only as they themselves were fathers and so could be over none but their own posterity so that if those twelve dukes of Edom if Abraham and the nine kings his neighbours if Jacob and Esau and the thirty-one kings in Canaan the seventy-two kings mutilated by Adonibesec the thirty-two kings that came to Ben Haddad the seventy kings of Greece making war at Troy were as our author contends all of them sovereign princes it is evident that kings derived their power from some other original than fatherhood since some of these had power over more than their own posterity and it is demonstration that they could not be all heirs to Adam for I challenge any man to make pretence to power by right of fatherhood either intelligible or possible in anyone otherwise than either as Adam's heir or as progenitor over his own descendants naturally sprung from him and if I also could show that any one of these princes of which he gives us his whole larger catalogue had his authority by either of these titles I think I might yield him the cause though it is manifest they are all impertinent and directly contrary to what he brings them to prove vis that the lordship which Adam had over the world by right descended to the patriarchs having told us page 16 that the patriarchal government continued in Abraham Isaac and Jacob until the Egyptian bondage page 17 he tells us by manifest footsteps we may trace this paternal government unto the Israelites coming into Egypt where the exercise of supreme patriarchal government was intermitted because they were in subjection to a stronger prince what these footsteps are of paternal government in our also sense i.e. of absolute monarchical power descending from Adam and exercised by right of fatherhood we have seen that is for 2290 years no footsteps at all since in all that time he cannot produce any one example of any person who claimed or exercised regal authority by right of fatherhood or show anyone who being a king was Adam's heir all that his proof amount to is only this that there were fathers patriarchs and kings in that age of the world but that the fathers and patriarchs had any absolute arbitrary power or by what titles those kings had theirs and of what extent it was the scripture is wholly silent it is manifest by right of fatherhood they neither did nor could claim any title to dominion and empire to say that the exercise of supreme patriarchal government was intermitted because they were in subjection to a stronger prince proves nothing but what i before suspected this that patriarchal jurisdiction or government is a fallacious expression and does not in our author signify what he would yet insinuate by it paternal and regal power such an absolute sovereignty as he supposes was in Adam for how can he say that patriarchal jurisdiction was intermitted in Egypt where there was a king under whose regal government the Israelites were if patriarchal were absolute monarchical jurisdiction and if it were not but something else why does he make such a do about a power not in question and nothing to the purpose the exercise of patriarchal jurisdiction if patriarchal be regal was not intermitted whilst the Israelites were in Egypt it is true the exercise of regal power was not then in the hands of any of the promised seed of Abraham nor before neither that i know but what is that the intermission of regal authority as descending from Adam unless our author will have it that this chosen line of Abraham had the right of inheritance to Adam's lordship and then to what purpose are his instances of the 72 rulers in whom the fatherly authority was preserved in the confusion at Babel why does he bring the twelve princes sons of Ishmael and the dukes of Edom and join them with Abraham Isaac and Jacob as examples of the exercise of true patriarchal government if the exercise of patriarchal jurisdiction were intermitted in the world whenever the heirs of Jacob had not supreme power i fear supreme patriarchal jurisdiction was not only intermitted but from the time of the Egyptian bondage quite lost in the world since it will be hard to find from that time downwards anyone who exercised it as an inheritance descending to him from the patriarchs Abraham Isaac and Jacob i imagined monarchical government would have served his turn in the hands of Pharaoh or anybody but one cannot easily discover in all places what his discourse tends to as particularly in this place it is not obvious to guess what he drives that when he says the exercise of supreme patriarchal jurisdiction in Egypt or how this serves to make out the descent of Adam's lordship to the patriarchs or anybody else for i thought he had been giving us out of scripture proofs and examples of monarchical government founded on paternal authority descending from Adam and not a history of the Jews amongst whom yet we find no kings till many years after they were a people and when kings were their rulers there is not the least mention or room for a pretence that they were heirs to Adam or kings by paternal authority i expected talking so much as he does of scripture that he would have produced then to series of monarchs whose titles were clear to Adam's fatherhood and who as heirs to him owned and exercised paternal jurisdiction over their subjects and that this was the true patriarchal government whereas he neither proves that the patriarchs were kings nor that either kings or patriarchs were heirs to Adam or so much as pretended to it and one may as well prove that the patriarchs were all absolute monarchs but the power both of patriarchs and kings was only paternal and that this power descended to them from Adam i say all these propositions may be as well proved by a confused account of a multitude of little kings in the west indies out of Ferdinand of Soto or any of our late histories of the northern america all by our authors 70 kings of Greece out of Homer as by anything he brings out of scripture in that multitude of kings he has reckoned up and me thinks he should have let Homer and his wars of Troy alone since his great zeal to truth or monarchy carried him to such a pitch of transport against philosophers and poets that he tells us in his preface that there are too many in these days who please themselves in running after the opinions of philosophers and poets to find out such an original of government as might promise them some title to liberty to the great scandal of christianity and bringing in of atheism and yet these heathens philosopher Aristotle and poet Homer are not rejected by our zealous christian politician whenever they offer anything that seems to serve his turn whether to the great scandal of christianity and bringing in of atheism let him look this i cannot but observe in authors who it is visible write not for truth how ready zeal for interest and party is to entitle christianity to their designs and to charge atheism on those who will not without examining submit to their doctrines and blindly swallow their nonsense but to return to his scripture history our author father tells us page 18 that after the return of the israelites out of bondage god out of a special care of them chose moses and joshua successively to govern as princes in the place instead of the supreme fathers if it be true that they returned out of bondage it must be into a state of freedom and must imply that both before and after this bondage they were free unless our author will say that changing of masters is returning out of bondage or that a slave returns out of bondage when he is removed from one galley to another if then they returned out of bondage it is plain that in those days whatever our author in his preface says to the contrary there were difference between a son a subject and a slave and that neither the patriarchs before nor their rulers after this egyptian bondage numbered their sons or subjects amongst their possessions and disposed of them with as absolute a dominion as they did their other goods this is evident in jacob to whom ruben offered his two sons as pledges and judo was at last sure as he for benjamin's safe return out of egypt which had all been vain superfluous and but a sort of mockery if jacob had had the same power over every one of his family as he had over his ox or his ass as an owner over his substance and the offers that ruben or judo made had been such a security for returning of benjamin as if a man should take two lambs out of his lord's flock and offer one a security that he will safely restore the other when they were out of this bondage what then god out of a special care of them the israelites it is well that once in his book he will allow god to have any care of the people for in other places he speaks as mankind as if god had no care of any part of them but only of their monarchs and at the rest of the people the societies of men were made as so many herds of cattle only for the service use and pleasure of their princes chose moses and joshua successively to govern as princes a shrewd argument our author has found out to prove god's care of the fatherly authority and adam's heirs that here as an expression of his care of his own people he chooses those for princes over them that had not the least pretense to either the person's chosen were moses of the tribe of levi and joshua of the tribe of effray neither of which had any title to fatherhood but says our author they were in the place and stead of the supreme fathers if god had anywhere as plainly declared his choice of such fathers to be rulers as he did of moses and joshua we might believe moses and joshua were in their place and stead but that being the question in debate till that be better proved moses being chosen by god to be ruler of his people will no more prove that government belonged to adam's heir or to the fatherhood than god's choosing errand of the tribe of levi to be priest will prove that the priesthood belongs to adam's heir or the prime fathers says god would choose errand to be priest and moses ruler in israel though neither of those offices were settled on adam's heir or the fatherhood our author goes on and after them likewise for a time he raised up judges to defend his people in time of peril page 18 this proves fatherly authority to be the original of government and that he descended from adam to his heirs just as well as what went before only here our author seems to confess that these judges who were all the governors they then had were only men of valour whom they made their generals to defend them in time of peril and cannot god raise up such men unless fatherhood have a title to government but says our author when god gave the Israelites kings he reestablished the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government page 18 how did god reestablish it by law a positive command we find no such thing our author means then that when god gave them in giving them a king he reestablished the right etc to reestablish de facto the right of lineal succession to paternal government is to put a man in possession of that government which his fathers did enjoy and he by lineal succession had a right to for first if it were another government and what his ancestors had it was not succeeding to an ancient right but beginning a new one for if a prince should give a man besides his ancient patrimony which for some ages his family had been deceased of an additional estate never before in the possession of his ancestors he could not be said to reestablish the right of lineal succession to any more than what had been formally enjoyed by his ancestors if therefore the power the kings of Israel had were anything more than Isaac or Jacob had it was not the reestablishing in them the right of succession to a power but giving them a new power however you please to call it paternal or not and whether Isaac and Jacob had the same power that the kings of Israel had I desire anyone by what has been above said to consider and I do not think they will find that either Abraham Isaac or Jacob had any regal power at all next there can be no reestablishment of the prime and ancient right of lineal succession to anything unless he that is put in possession of it has the right to succeed and be the true and next heir to him he succeeds to can that be a reestablishment which begins in a new family or that the reestablishment of an ancient right of lineal succession when a crown is given to one who has no right of succession to it and who if the lineal succession had gone on had been out of all possibility of pretense to it Saul the first king God gave the Israelites was of the tribe of Benjamin was the ancient and prime right of lineal succession reestablished in him the next was David the youngest son of Jesse of the posterity of Judah Jacob's third son was the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government reestablished in him or in Solomon his younger son and successor in the throne or in Jeroboam over the ten tribes or in Asthalia a woman who reigned six years and utter stranger to the royal blood if the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government were reestablished in any of these or their posterity the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government belongs to younger brothers as well as elder and may be reestablished in any man living for whatever younger brothers by ancient and prime right of lineal succession may have as well as the elder that every man living may have a right to by lineal succession and Sir Robert as well as any other and so what a brave right of lineal succession to his paternal or regal government our author has reestablished for the securing the rights and inheritance of crowns where everyone may have it let the world consider but says our author however page 19 when so ever god made choice of any special person to be king he intended that the issue also should have benefit thereof as being comprehended sufficiently in the person of the father although the father was only named in the grant this yet will not help out succession for if as our author says the benefit of the grant be intended to the issue of the grantee this will not direct the succession since if god give anything to a man and his issue in general the claim cannot be to any one of that issue in particular everyone that is of his race will have an equal right if it be said our author meant air I believe our author was as willing as anybody to have used that word if it would have served his turn but Solomon who succeeded David in the throne being no more his heir than Jeroboam who succeeded him in the government of the ten tribes was his issue our author had reason to avoid saying that god intended it to the heirs when that would not hold in a succession which our author could not accept against and so he has left his succession as undetermined as if he had said nothing about it for if the regal power could be given by god to a man and his issue as the land of Canaan was to Abraham and his seed must they not all have a title to it all share in it and one may as well say that by god's grant to Abraham and his seed the land of Canaan was to belong only to one of his seed exclusive of all the others as by god's grant of dominion to a man and his issue this dominion was to belong in peculiar to one of his issue exclusive of all others but how well our author prove that when so ever god made choice of any special person to be king he intended that the I suppose he means his issue also should have benefit thereof as he so soon forgot Moses and Joshua whom in this very section he says god out of a special care chose to govern as princes and the judges that god raised up had not these princes having the authority of the supreme fatherhood the same power that the kings had and being specially chosen by god himself should not their issue have the benefit of that choice as well as davids or solomons if these had the paternal authority put into their hands immediately by god why had not their issue the benefit of this grant in a succession to this power or if they had it as Adams heirs why did not their heirs enjoy it after them by right descending to them for they could not be heirs to one another was the power the same and from the same original in Moses Joshua and the judges as it was in david and the kings and was it inheritable in one and not in the other if it was not paternal authority then god's own people were governed by those that had not paternal authority and those governors did well enough without it if it were paternal authority and god chose the persons that were to exercise it our author's rule fails that when so ever god makes choice of any person to be supreme ruler for I suppose the name king has no spell in it it is not the title but the power makes the difference he intends that the issue also should have the benefit of it since from there coming out of Egypt to davids time four hundred years the issue was never so sufficiently comprehended in the person of the father as that any son after the death of his father succeeded to the government amongst all those judges that judged Israel if to avoid this it be said god always chose the person of the successor and so transferring the fatherly authority to him excluded his issue from succeeding to it that is manifestly not so in the story of jethra where he articleed with the people and they made him judge over them as his plane judges eleven it is in vain then to say that when so ever god chooses any special person to have the exercise of paternal authority for if that be not to be king I desire to know the difference between a king and one having the exercise of paternal authority he intends the issue also shall have the benefit of it since we find the authority the judges had ended with them and descended not to their issue and if the judges had not paternal authority I fear it will trouble our author or any of the friends to his principles to tell who had then the paternal authority that is the government and supreme power amongst the Israelites and I suspect they must confess that the chosen people of God continued a people several hundreds of years without any knowledge or thought of this paternal authority or any appearance of monarchical government at all to be satisfied of this he need but read the story of the Levite and the war there upon with the benjamites in the last three chapters of judges and when he finds that the Levite appeals to the people for justice that it was the tribes and the congregation that debated resolved and directed all that was done on that occasion he must conclude either that God was not careful to preserve the fatherly authority amongst his own chosen people or else that the fatherly authority may be preserved where there is no monarchical government if the latter then it will follow that though fatherly authority be never so well proved yet it will not infer a necessity of monarchical government if the former it will seem very strange and improbable that God should ordain fatherly authority to be so sacred amongst the sons of men that there could be no power or government without it and yet that amongst his own people even whilst he is providing a government for them and therein prescribes rules to the several states and relations of men this great and fundamental one this most material and necessary of all the rest should be concealed and lie neglected for four hundred years after before I leave this I must ask how our author knows that when so ever God makes choice of any special person to be king he intends that the issue should have the benefit thereof does God by the law of nature or revelation say so by the same law also he must say which of his issue must enjoy the crown in succession and so point out the air or else leave his issue to divide or scramble for the government both alike absurd and such as will destroy the benefit of such grant to the issue when any such declaration of God's intention is produced it will be our duty to believe God intends it so but till that be done our author must show us some better warrant before we shall be obliged to receive him as the authentic revealer of God's intentions the issue says our author is comprehended sufficiently in the person of the father though the father only was named in the grant and yet God when he gave the land of Cain under Abraham Genesis 13 15 thought of it to put his seed into the grant too so the priesthood was given to Aaron and his seed and the crown God gave not only to David but his seed also and however our author assures us that God intends that the issue should have the benefit of it when he chooses any person to be king yet we see that the kingdom which he gives to Saul without mentioning his seed after him never came to any of his issue and why when God chose a person to be king he should intend that his issue should have the benefit of it more than when he chose on to be judge in Israel I would say no reason or why does a grant of fatherly authority to a king more comprehend the issue than when a like grant is made to a judge is paternal authority by right to descend to the issue of one and not of the other there will need some reason to be shown of this difference more than the name when the thing given is the same fatherly authority and the manner of giving it God's choice of the person the same too for I suppose our author when he says God raised up judges will by no means allow they were chosen by the people but since our author has so confidently assured us of the care of God to preserve the fatherhood and pretend to build all he said upon the authority of the scripture we may well expect that people whose law constitution and history is chiefly contained in the scripture should furnish him with the clearest instances of God's care of preserving the fatherly authority in that people who it is agreed he had a most peculiar care of let us see then what state this paternal authority or government was in amongst the Jews from their beginning to be a people it was omitted by our altars confession from their coming into Egypt till their return out of that bondage above 200 years from thence till God gave the Israelites a king about 400 years more our author gives but a very slender account of it nor indeed all that time are there the least footsteps of paternal or regal government amongst them but then says our author God reestablished the ancient and prime right of linear succession to paternal government what a linear succession to paternal government was then established we have already seen I only now consider how long this lasted and that was to their captivity about 500 years from thence to their destruction by the Romans above 650 years later the ancient and prime right of linear succession to paternal government was again lost and they continued a people in the promised land without it so that of 1750 years that they were God's peculiar people they had hereditary kingly government amongst them not one third of the time and of that time there is not the least footstep of one moment of paternal government nor the re-establishment of the ancient and prime right of linear succession to it whether we supposed it to be derived as from its fountain from David, Saul, Abraham or which upon our author's principles is the only true from Adam end of chapter 11 end of book one book two chapter one of two treatises of civil government this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org two treatises of civil government by John Locke book two chapter one it having been shown in the foregoing discourse first that Adam had not either by natural right of fatherhood or by positive donation from God any such authority over his children or dominion over the world as is pretended second that if he had his heirs yet had no right to it third that if his heirs had there being no law of nature nor positive law of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise the right of succession and consequently of bearing rule could not have been certainly determined and fourth that if even that had been determined yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line of Adam's posterity being so long since utterly lost that in the races of mankind and families of the world there remains not to one above another the least pretends to be the eldest house and to have the right of inheritance all these premises having as I think been clearly made out it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit or derive any the least shadow of authority from that which is held to be the fountain of all power Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts or the strongest carries it and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief tumult sedition and rebellion things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against must of necessity find out another rise of government another original of political power and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us to this purpose I think it may not be amiss to set down what I take to be political power that the power of a magistrate over a subject may be distinguished from that of a father over his children a master over his servant a husband over his wife and a lord over his slave all which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the same man if he be considered under these different relations it may help us to distinguish these powers one from another and show the difference betwixt a ruler of a commonwealth a father of a family and a captain of a galley political power then I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death and consequently all less penalties for the regulating and preserving of property and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws and in the defense of the commonwealth from foreign injury and all this only for the public good end of chapter one book two chapter two of two treatises of civil government this is a liverbox recording all liverbox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liverbox.org two treatises of civil government by john lock book two chapter two on the state of nature to understand political power right and derive it from its original we must consider what state all men are naturally in and that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit within the bounds of the law of nature without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man a state also of equality wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal no one having more than another there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection unless the lord and master of them all should by any manifest declaration of his will set one above another and confer on him by an evident and clear appointment an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty this equality of men by nature the judicious hooker looks upon as so evident in itself and beyond all question that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men on which he builds the duties they owe one another and from once he derives the great maxims of justice and charity his words are quote the like natural inducement have brought men to know that it is no less their duty to love others than themselves for seeing those things which are equal must needs all have one measure if i cannot but wish to receive good even as much at every man's hands as any man can wish unto his own soul how should i look to have any part of my desire here and satisfied unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men being of one in the same nature to have anything offered them repugnant to this desire must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me so that if i do harm i must look to suffer there being no reason that others should show greater measure of love to me than they have by me showed unto them my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be impose it upon me a natural duty of bearing to them word fully the like affection from which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves what several rules and canons natural reason have drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant unquote of the laws of ecclesiastical polity book one but though this be a state of liberty yet it is not a state of license though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions yet he has not liberty to destroy himself or so much as any creature in his possession but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it which obliges everyone and reason which is that law teaches all mankind who will but consult it that being all equal and independent no one ought to harm another in his life health liberty or possessions for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise maker all the servants of one sovereign master sent into the world by his order and about his business they are his property whose workmanship they are made to last during his not one another's pleasure and being furnished with like faculties sharing all in one community of nature there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy one another as if we were made for one another's uses as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours everyone as he is bound to preserve himself and not quit his station willfully so by the like reason when his own preservation comes not in competition ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind and may not unless it be to do justice on an offender take away or impair the life or what tends to the preservation of the life the liberty health limb or goods of another and that all men may be restrained from invading others rights and from doing hurt to one another and the law of nature be observed which will if the peace and preservation of all mankind the execution of the law of nature is in that state put into every man's hands whereby everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation for the law of nature would as all other laws that concern men in this world be in vain if there were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders and if anyone in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done everyone may do so for in that state of perfect equality where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another what any may do in prosecution of that law everyone must needs have a right to do and thus in the state of nature one man comes by a power over another but yet no absolute or arbitrary power to use a criminal when he has got him in his hands according to the passionate heats or boundless extravagancy of his own will but only to retribute to him so far as calm reason and conscience dictate what is proportionate to his transgression which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint for these two are the only reasons why one man may lawfully do harm to another which is what we call punishment in transgressing the law of nature the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity which is that measure God has set to the actions of men for their mutual security and so he becomes dangerous to mankind the tie which is to secure him from injury and violence being slighted and broken by him which being a trespass against the whole species and the peace and safety of it provided for by the law of nature every man upon this score by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general may restrain or where it is necessary destroy things not just to them and so may bring such evil on anyone who hath transgressed that law as may make him repent the doing of it and thereby deter him and by his example others from doing the like mischief and in this case and upon this ground every man hath a right to punish the offender and be executioner of the law of nature i doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men but before they condemn it i desire them to resolve me by what right any prince or state can put to death or punish an alien for any crime he commits in their country it is certain their laws by virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative reach not a stranger they speak not to him nor if they did is he bound to harken to them the legislative authority by which they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth hath no power over him those who have the supreme power of making laws in england france or holland are to an indian but like the rest of the world men without authority and therefore if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to punish offenses against it as he soberly judges the case to require i see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country since in reference to him they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have over another besides the crime which consists in violating the law and varying from the right rule of reason whereby a man so far becomes degenerate and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature and to be a noxious creature there is commonly injury done to some person or other and some other man receives damage by his transgression in which case he who hath received any damage has besides the right of punishment common to him with every other man a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it and any other person who finds it just may also join with him that is injured and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the harm he has suffered from these two distinct rights the one of punishing the crime for restraint and preventing the like offense which right of punishing is in everybody the other of taking reparation which belongs only to the injured party comes it to pass that the magistrate who by being magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his hands can often where the public good demands not the execution of the law remit the punishment of criminal offenses by his own authority but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has received that he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name and he alone can remit the demnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender by right of self-preservation as every man has a power to punish the crime to prevent it's being committed again by the right he has of preserving all mankind and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end and thus it is that every man in the state of nature has a power to kill a murderer both to deter others from doing the like injury which no reparation can compensate by the example of the punishment that attends it from everybody and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal who having renounced reason the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind hath by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one declared war against all mankind and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or tiger one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society nor security and upon this is grounded that great law of nature who so shed of men's blood by man shall his blood be shed and Cain was so fully convinced that everyone had a right to destroy such criminal that after the murder of his brother he cries out everyone that find of me shall slay me so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind by the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser breaches of that law it will perhaps be demanded with death i answer each transgression may be punished to that degree and with so much severity as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender give him cause to repent and terrify others from doing the like every offense that can be committed in the state of nature may in the state of nature be also punished equally and far forth as it may in a commonwealth for though it would be besides my present purpose to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature or its measures of punishment yet it is certain there is such a law and that too as intelligible and plain to a rational creature and a studier of that law as the positive laws of commonwealth's may possibly plainer as much as reason is easier to be understood than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men following contrary and hidden interests put into words for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of country which are only so far right as they are founded on the law of nature by which they are to be regulated and interpreted to this strange doctrine namely that in the state of nature everyone has the executive power of the law of nature I doubt not but it will be objected that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends and on the other side that ill nature passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow and that therefore god hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men I certainly grant that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature which must certainly be great where men may be judges in their own case since it is easy to be imagined that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it but I shall desire those who make this objection to remember that absolute monarchs are but men and if government is to be the remedy of those evils which necessarily follow for men's being judges in their own cases and the state of nature is therefore not to be endured I desire to know what kind of government that is and how much better it is than the state of nature where one man commanding a multitude has the liberty to be judged in his own case and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases without the least liberty to anyone to question or control those who execute his pleasure and in whatsoever he doth whether led by reason mistake or passion must be submitted to much better it is in the state of nature wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another and if he that judges judges a miss in his own or any other case he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind it is often asked as a mighty objection where are or ever were there any men in such a state of nature to which it may suffice as an answer at present that since all princes and rulers of independent governments all through the world are in a state of nature it is plain the world never was nor ever will be without numbers of men in that state I have named all governors of independent communities whether they are or are not in league with others for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of nature between men but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community and make one body politic other promises and compacts men may make one with another and yet still be in the state of nature the promises and bargains for truck etc between the two men in the desert island mentioned by garcilaso de la vega in his history of paru or between a swiss and an indian in the woods of america are binding to them though they are perfectly in a state of nature in reference to one another for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men as men and not as members of society to those that say there never were any men in the state of nature I will not only oppose the authority of the judicious hooker of the laws of ecclesiastical polity book one section 10 where he says quote the laws which have been hitherto mentioned that is the laws of nature do bind men absolutely even as they are men although they have never any settled fellowship never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do or not to do but for as much as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competence store of things needful for such a life as our nature doth desire a life fit for the dignity of man therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us as living single and solely by ourselves we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others this was the cause of men's uniting themselves at first in politic societies unquote but I moreover affirm that all men are naturally in that state and remain so till by their own consents they make themselves members of some politic society and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse to make it very clear end of chapter two book two chapter three of two treatises of civil government this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libra vox dot org two treatises of civil government by john lock book two chapter three of the state of war the state of war is a state of enmity and destruction and therefore declaring by word or action not a passionate and hasty but a sedate settled design upon another man's life puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has declared such an intention and so has exposed his life to the other's power to be taken away by him or anyone that joins with him in his defense and espouses his quarrel it being reasonable and just I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction for by the fundamental law of nature man being to be preserved as much as possible when all cannot be preserved the safety of an innocent is to be preferred and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him or has discovered an enmity to his being for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion because such men are not under the ties of the common law of reason have no other rule but that of force and violence and so may be treated as beasts of prey those dangerous and noxious creatures that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power and hence it is that he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power does thereby put himself into a state of war with him it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life for I have reason to conclude that he who would get me into his power without my consent would use me as he pleased when he had got me there and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it for nobody can desire to have me in his absolute power unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my freedom that is make me a slave to be free from such force is the only security of my preservation and reason bids me look on him as an enemy to my preservation who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me thereby puts himself into a state of war with me he that in the state of nature would take away the freedom that belongs to anyone in that state must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away everything else that freedom being the foundation of all the rest as he that in the state of society would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or commonwealth must be supposed to design to take away from them everything else and so be looked on as in a state of war this makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief who has not in the least hurt him nor declared any design upon his life any farther than by the use of force so to get him in his power as to take away his money or what he pleases from him because using force where he has no right to get me into his power let his pretense be what it will i have no reason to suppose that he who would take away my liberty would not when he had me in his power take away everything else and therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put himself into a state of war with me that is kill him if i can for to that hazard does he justly expose himself whoever introduces a state of war and is aggressor in it and here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war which however some men have confounded are as far distant as a state of peace good will mutual assistance and preservation and a state of enmity malice violence and mutual destruction are one from another men living together according to reason without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them is properly the state of nature but force or a declared design of force upon the person of another where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for belief is the state of war and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor though he be in society and a fellow subject thus a thief whom i cannot harm but by appeal to the law for having stolen all that i am worth i may kill when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat because the law which was made for my preservation where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force which if lost is capable of no reparation permits me my own defense and the right of war a liberty to kill the aggressor because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge nor the decision of the law for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable want of a common judge with authority puts all men in a state of nature force without right upon a man's person makes a state of war both where there is and is not a common judge but when the actual force is over the state of war ceases between those that are in society and are equally on both sides subjected to the fair determination of the law because then there lies open the remedy of appeal for the past injury and to prevent future harm but where no such appeal is as in the state of nature for want of positive laws and judges with authority to appeal to the state of war once begun continues with a right to the innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can until the aggressor offers peace and desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he has already done and secure the innocent for the future nay where an appeal to the law and constituted judges lies open but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice and a bare-faced resting of the laws to protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men or party of men there it is hard to imagine anything but a state of war for wherever violence is used and injury done though by hands appointed to administer justice it is still violence and injury however colored with the name pretenses or forms of law the end whereof being to protect and redress the innocent by an unbiased application of it to all who are under it wherever that is not bona fide done war is made upon the sufferers who having no appeal on earth to write them they are left to the only remedy in such cases an appeal to heaven to avoid this state of war wherein there is no appeal but to heaven and wherein every the least difference is apt to end where there is no authority to decide between the contenders is one great reason of men's putting themselves into society and quitting the state of nature for where there is an authority a power on earth from which relief can be had by appeal there the continuance of the state of war is excluded and the controversy is decided by that power had there been any such court any superior jurisdiction on earth to determine the right between jebtha and the ammonites they had never come to a state of war but we see he was forced to appeal to heaven the lord the judge says he be judged this day between the children of israel and the children of aman judges 11 27 and then prosecuting and relying on his appeal he leads out his army to battle and therefore in such controversies where the question is put who shall be judge it cannot be meant who shall decide the controversy everyone knows what jebtha here tells us that the lord the judge shall judge where there is no judge on earth the appeal lies to god in heaven that question then cannot mean who shall judge whether another hath put himself in a state of war with me and whether i may as jebtha did appeal to heaven in it of that myself can only be the judge in my own conscience as i will answer it at the great day to the supreme judge of all men end of chapter three book two chapter four of two treatises of civil government this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libra vox dot org two treatises of civil government by john lock book two chapter four of slavery the natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man but to have only the law of nature for his rule the liberty of man in society is to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth nor under the dominion of any will or restraint of any law but what that legislative shall enact according to the trust put in it freedom then is not what sir robert filmer tells us observations a 55 a liberty for everyone to do what he lists to live as he pleases and not to be tied by any laws but freedom of men under government is to have a standing rule to live by common to every one of that society and made by the legislative power erected in it a liberty to follow my own will in all things where the rule prescribes not and not to be subject to the inconstant uncertain unknown arbitrary will of another man as freedom of nature is to be under no other restraint but the law of nature this freedom from absolute arbitrary power is so necessary to and closely joined with a man's preservation that he cannot part with it but by what forfeits his preservation and life together for a man not having the power of his own life cannot by compact or his own consent enslave himself to anyone nor put himself under the absolute arbitrary power of another to take away his life when he pleases nobody can give more power than he has himself and he that cannot take away his own life cannot give another power over it indeed having by his fault forfeited his own life by some act that deserves death he to whom he has forfeited it may when he has him in his power delay to take it and make use of him to his own service and he does him no injury by it for whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery at way the value of his life it is in his power by resisting the will of his master to draw on himself the death he desires this is the perfect condition of slavery which is nothing else but the state of war continued between a lawful conqueror and a captive for if once compact enter between them and make an agreement for a limited power on the one side and obedience on the other the state of war and slavery ceases as long as the compact endures for as has been said no man can by agreement pass over to another that which he hath not in himself a power over his own life i confess we find among the jews as well as other nations that men did sell themselves but it is plain this was only to drudgery not to slavery for it is evident the person sold was not under an absolute arbitrary despotical power for the master could not have power to kill him at any time whom at a certain time he was obliged to let go free out of his service and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life that he could not at pleasure so much as maim him but the loss of an eye or tooth set him free exodus 21 end of chapter four book two chapter five of two treatises of civil government this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libra vox dot org two treatises of civil government by john lock book two chapter five of property whether we consider natural reason which tells us that men being once born have a right to their preservation and consequently to meet and drink and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence or revelation which gives us an account of those grants god made of the world to adam and to know and his sons it is very clear that god as king david says psalms 115 16 has given the earth to the children of men given it to mankind in common but this being supposed it seems to some a very great difficulty how anyone should ever come to have a property in anything i will not content myself to answer that if it be difficult to make a property upon a supposition that god gave the world to adam and his posterity in common it is impossible that any man but one universal monarch should have any property upon a supposition that god gave the world to adam and his heirs in succession exclusive of all the rest of his posterity but i shall endeavor to show how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which god gave to mankind in common and that without any express compact of all the commoners god who have given the world to men in common have also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience the earth and all that is therein is given to men for the support and comfort of their being and though all the fruits it naturally produces and beasts it feeds belong to mankind in common as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature and nobody has originally a private dominion exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them as they are thus in a natural state yet being given for the use of men there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any use or at all beneficial to any particular man the fruit or venison which nourishes the wild indian who knows no enclosure and is still a tenant in common must be his and so his that is a part of him that another can no longer have any right to it before it can do him any good for the support of his life though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men yet every man has a property in his own person this nobody has any right to but himself the labor of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in he hath mixed his labor with and joined to it something that is his own and thereby makes it his property it being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in it hath by this labor something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men for this labor being the unquestionable property of the labor no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to at least where there is enough and as good left in common for others he that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood has certainly appropriated them to himself nobody can deny but the nourishment is his i ask them when did they begin to be his when he digested or when he it or when he boiled or when he brought them home or when he picked them up and it is plain if the first gathering made them not his nothing else could that labor put a distinction between them and common that added something to them more than nature the common mother of all had done and so they became his private right and will anyone say he had no right to those acorns or apples he thus appropriated because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common if such a consent as that was necessary man had starved notwithstanding the plenty god had given him we see in commons which remain so by compact that it is the taking any part of what is common and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in which begins the property without which the common is of no use and the taking of this or that part does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners thus the grass my horse has bit the turfs my servant has cut and the ore i have digged in any place where i have a right to them in common with others become my property without the assignation or consent of anybody the labor that was mine removing them out of that common state they were in have fixed my property in them by making an explicit consent of every commoner necessary to anyone's appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common children or servants could not cut the meat which their father or master had provided for them in common without assigning to everyone his peculiar part though the water running in the fountain be everyone's yet who can doubt but that in the picture is his only who drew it out his labor hath taken it out of the hands of nature where it was common and belonged equally to all her children and hath thereby appropriated it to himself thus this law of reason makes the deer that indians who have killed it it is allowed to be his goods who have bestowed his labor upon it though before it was the common right of everyone and amongst those who are counted the civilized part of mankind who have made and multiplied positive laws to determine property this original law of nature for the beginning of property in what was before common still takes place and by virtue thereof what fish anyone catches in the ocean that great and still remaining common of mankind or what amber grease anyone takes up here is by the labor that removes it out of that common state nature left it in made his property who takes that pains about it and even amongst us the hair that anyone is hunting is thought his who pursues her during the chase for being a beast that is still looked upon as common and no man's private possession whoever has employed so much labor about any of that kind as to find and pursue her has thereby removed her from the state of nature wherein she was common and hath begun a property it will perhaps be objected to this that if gathering the acorns or other fruits of the earth etc makes a right to them then anyone may engross as much as he will to which i answer not so the same law of nature that does by this means give us property does also bound that property too god has given us all things richly first timothy 612 is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration but how far has he given it us to enjoy as much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils so much he may by his labor fix a property in whatever is beyond this is more than his share and belongs to others nothing was made by god for man to spoil or destroy and thus considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the world and the few spenders and to have small part of that provision the industry of one man could extend itself and engross it to the prejudice of others especially keeping within the bounds set by reason of what might serve for his use there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so established but the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth and the beasts that subsist on it but the earth itself as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest i think it is plain that property in that too is acquired as the former as much land as a man till's plants improves cultivates and can use the product of so much is his property he by his labor does as it were enclose it from the common nor will it invalidate his right to say everybody else has an equal title to it and therefore he cannot appropriate he cannot enclose without the consent of all his fellow commoners all mankind god when he gave the world in common to all mankind commanded man also to labor and the penury of his condition required it of him god and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth that is improve it for the benefit of life and therein lay out something upon it that was his own his labor he that in obedience to this command of god subdued tilled and sewed any part of it thereby annexed to it something that was his property which another had no title to nor could without injury take from him nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land by improving it any prejudice to any other man since there was still enough and is good left and more than the yet unprovided could use so that in effect there was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself and he that leaves as much as another can make use of does as good as take nothing at all nobody could think himself injured by the drinking of another man though he took a good draft who had a whole river of the same water left to quench his thirst and the case of land and water where there is enough of both is perfectly the same god gave the world to men in common but since he gave it them for their benefit and the greatest means of life they were capable to draw from it it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated he gave it to the use of the industrious and rational and labor was to be his title to it not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious he that had as good left for his improvement as was already taken up needed not complain ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labor if he did it is plain he desired the benefit of another's pains which he had no right to and not the ground which god had given him in common with others to labor on and whereof there was as good left as that already possessed and more than he knew what to do with or his industry could reach to it is true in land that is common in england or any other country where there is plenty of people under government who have money on commerce no one can enclose or appropriate any part without the consent of all his fellow commoners because this is left common by compact that is by the law of the land which is not to be violated and that would be common in respect of some men it is not so to all mankind but is the joint property of this country or this parish besides the remainder after such enclosure would not be as good to the rest of the commoners as the whole was when they could all make use of the whole whereas in the beginning and first peopeling of the great common of the world it was quite otherwise the law man was under was rather for appropriating god commanded and his wants forced him to labor that was his property which could not be taken from him wherever he had fixed it and hence subduing or cultivating the earth and having dominion we see are joined together the one gave title to the other so that god by commanding to subdue gave authority so far to appropriate and the condition of human life which requires labor and materials to work on necessarily introduces private possessions the measure of property nature has well set by the extent of men's labor and the conveniences of life no man's labor could subdue or appropriate all nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part so that it was impossible for any man this way to entrench upon the right of another or acquire to himself a property to the prejudice of his neighbor who would still have room for as good and as large a possession after the other had taken out his as before it was appropriated this measure did confine every man's possession to a very moderate proportion and such as he might appropriate to himself without injury to anybody in the first ages of the world when men were more endangered to be lost by wandering from their company in the vast wilderness of the earth than to be straightened for want of room to plant in and the same measure may be allowed still without prejudice to anybody as full as the world seems for supposing a man or family in the state they were at first peepling of the world by the children of Adam or Noah let him plant in some inland vacant spaces of America we shall find that the possessions he could make himself upon the measures we have given would not be very large nor even to this day prejudice the rest of mankind or give them reason to complain or think themselves injured by this man's encroachment though the race of men have now spread themselves to all the corners of the world and do infinitely exceed the small number was at the beginning nay the extent of ground is of so little value without labor that I've heard it affirmed that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to plow so and reap without being disturbed upon land he has no other title to but only his making use of it but on the contrary the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him who by his industry on neglected and consequently wasteland has increased the stock of corn which they wanted but be this as it will which I lay no stress on this I dare boldly affirm that the same rule of propriety namely that every man should have as much as he could make use of would hold still in the world without straightening anybody since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants had not the invention of money and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it introduced by consent larger possessions and a right to them which how it has done I shall buy and buy show more at large this is certain that in the beginning before the desire of having more than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man or had agreed that a little piece of yellow metal which would keep without wasting or decay should be worth a great piece of flesh or a whole heap of corn though men had a right to appropriate by their labor each one to himself as much of the things of nature as he could use yet this could not be much nor to the prejudice of others where the same plenty was still left to those who would use the same industry to which let me add that he who appropriates land to himself by his labor does not lessen but increase the common stock of mankind for the provisions serving to the support of human life produced by one acre of enclosed and cultivated land are to speak within much compass 10 times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness lying waste in common and therefore he that encloses land and has a greater plenty of the conveniences of life from 10 acres than he could have from 100 left in nature may truly be said to give 90 acres to mankind for his labor now supplies him with provisions out of 10 acres which were but the product of 100 lying in common i've here rated the improved land very low in making its product but as 10 to 1 when it is much nearer 100 to 1 for i ask whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of america left to nature without any improvement tillage or husbandry a thousand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniences of life as 10 acres of equally fertile land do in debenture where they are so well cultivated before the appropriation of land he who gathered as much of the wild fruit killed caught or tamed as many of the beasts as he could he that so employed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of nature as any way to alter them from the state which nature put them in by placing any of his labor on them did thereby acquire a property in them but if they perished in his possession without their due use if the fruits rotted or the venison putrified before he could spend it he offended against the common law of nature and was liable to be punished he invaded his neighbor's share for he had no right farther than his use called for any of them and they might serve to afford him conveniences of life the same measures governed the possession of land too whatsoever he tilled and reaped laid up and made use of before it spoiled that was his peculiar right whatsoever he enclosed and could feed and make use of the cattle and product was also his but if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering and laying up this part of the earth notwithstanding its enclosure was still to be looked on as waste and might be the possession of any other thus at the beginning cane might take as much ground as he could till and make it his own land and yet leave enough to able sheep to feed on a few acres would serve for both their possessions but as families increased and industry enlarged their stocks their possessions enlarged with the need of them and yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of till they incorporated settled themselves together and built cities and then by consent they came in time to set out the bounds of their distinct territories and agree on limits between them and their neighbors and by laws within themselves settled the properties of those of the same society for we see that in that part of the world which was first inhabited and therefore like to be best peopled even as low down as Abraham's time they wandered with their flocks and their herds which was their substance freely up and down and this Abraham did in a country where he was a stranger once it was plain that at least a great part of the land lay in common that the inhabitants valued it not nor claimed property in any more than they made use of but when there was not room enough in the same place for their herds to feed together they by consent as Abraham and Lot did Genesis 13 5 separated and enlarge their pasture where it best liked them and for the same reason Esau went from his father and his brother and planted in Mount Seer Genesis 36 6 and thus without supposing any private dominion and property in Adam over all the world exclusive of all other men which can no way be proved nor anyone's property be made out from it but supposing the world given as it was to the children of men in common we see how labor could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it for their private uses wherein there could be no doubt of right no room for quarrel nor is it so strange as perhaps before consideration it may appear that the property of labor should be able to overbalance the community of land for it is labor indeed that puts the difference of value on everything and let anyone consider what the difference is between an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar sown with wheat or barley and an acre of the same land lying in common without any husbandry upon it and he will find that the improvement of labor makes the far greater part of the value I think it will be but a very modest computation to say that of the products of the earth useful to the life of man nine tenths are the effects of labor nay if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use and cast up the several expenses about them what in them is purely owing to nature and what to labor we shall find that in most of them 99 hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labor there cannot be a clearer demonstration of anything than several nations of the americans are of this who are rich in land and poor in all the comforts of life whom nature having furnished as liberally as any other people with the materials of plenty that is a fruitful soil apt to produce an abundance what might serve for food raiment and delight yet for want of improving it by labor have not one hundredth part of the conveniences we enjoy and a king of a large and fruitful territory there feeds lodges and is clad worse than a day laborer in england to make this a little clearer let us but trace some of the ordinary provisions of life through their several progresses before they come to our use and see how much they receive of their value from human industry bread wine and cloth are things of daily use and great plenty yet notwithstanding acorns water and leaves or skins must be our bread drink and clothing did not labor furnish us with these more useful commodities for whatever bread is more worth than acorns wine than water and cloth or silk than leaves skins or moss that is wholly owing to labor and industry the one of these being the food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with the other provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us which how much they exceed the other in value when anyone hath computed he will then see how much labor makes the far greater part of the value of things we enjoy in this world and the ground which produces the materials is scarce to be reckoned in as any or at most but a very small part of it so little that even amongst us land that is left wholly to nature that hath no improvement of pastureage tillage or planting is called as indeed it is waste and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing this shows how much the numbers of men are to be preferred to largeness of dominions and that the increase of lands and the right employing of them is the great art of government and that prince who shall be so wise and godlike as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and encouragement to the honest industry of mankind against the oppression of power and narrowness of party will quickly be too hard for his neighbors but this by the by to return to the argument in hand an acre of land that bears here 20 bushels of wheat and another in America which with the same husbandry would do the like are without doubt of the same natural intrinsic value but yet the benefit mankind receives from the one in a year is worth five pound and from the other possibly not worth a penny if all the profit in indian received from it were to be valued and sold here at least i may truly say not one thousandth it is labor then which puts the greatest part of value upon land without which it would scarcely be worth anything it is to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful products for all the straw bran bread and that acre of wheat is worth more than the product of an acre of as good land which lies waste is all the effect of labor for it is not barely the plowman's pains the reapers and thresher's toil and the baker's sweat is to be counted into the bread we eat the labor of those who broke the oxen who digged and wrought the iron and stones who failed and framed the timber employed about the plow mill oven or any other utensils which are a vast number requisite to this corn from its being seed to be sown to its being made bread must all be charged on the account of labor and received as an effect of that nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless materials as in themselves it would be a strange catalog of things that industry provided and made use of about every loaf of bread before it came to our use if we could trace them iron wood leather bark timber stone bricks coals lime cloth dying drugs pitch tar masts ropes and all the materials made use of in the ship that brought any of the commodities made use of by any of the workmen to any part of the work all which it would be almost impossible at least too long to reckon up from all which it is evident that though the things of nature are given in common yet man by being master of himself and proprietor of his own person and the actions or labor of it had still in himself the great foundation of property and that which made up the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being when invention and arts had improved the conveniences of life was perfectly his own and did not belong in common to others thus labor in the beginning gave a right of property wherever anyone was pleased to employ it upon what was common which remained a long while the far greater part and is yet more than mankind makes use of men at first for the most part contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities and though afterwards in some parts of the world where the increase of people and stock with the use of money had made land scarce and so of some value the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories and by laws within themselves regulated the properties of the private men of their society and so by compact and agreement settled the property which labor and industry began and the leagues that have been made between several states and kingdoms whether expressly or tacitly disowning all claim and rights to the land in the others possession have by common consent given up their pretenses to their natural common right which originally they had to those countries and so have by positive agreement settled a property amongst themselves in distinct parts and parcels of the earth yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found which the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind in the consent of the use of their common money lie waste and are more than the people who dwell on it do or can make use of and so still lie in common though this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money the greatest part of things really useful to the life of man and such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world look after as it doth the americans now are generally things of short duration such as if they are not consumed by use will decay and perish of themselves gold silver and diamonds are things that fancy or agreement hath put the value on more than real use and the necessary support of life now of those good things which nature hath provided in common everyone had a right as has been said to as much as he could use and property in all that he could affect with his labor all that his industry could extend to to alter from the state nature had put it in was his he that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or apples had thereby a property in them they were his goods as soon as gathered he was only to look that he used them before they spoiled else he took more than his share and robbed others and indeed it was a foolish thing as well as dishonest to hoard up more than he could make use of if he gave away a part to anybody else so that it perished not uselessly in his possession these he also made use of and if he also bartered away plums that would have rotted in a week for nuts that would last good for his eating a whole year he did no injury he wasted not the common stock destroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged to others so long as nothing perished uselessly in his hands again if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal pleased with its color or exchange his sheep for shells or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond and keep those by him all his life he invaded not the right of others he might keep up as much of these durable things as he pleased the exceeding of the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his possessions but the perishing of anything uselessly in it and thus came in the use of money some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling and that by mutual consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful but perishable supports of life and as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions in different proportions so this invention of money gave them opportunity to continue and enlarge them for supposing an island separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world wherein there were but a hundred families but there were sheep horses and cows with other useful animals wholesome fruits and land enough for corn for a hundred thousand times as many but nothing in the island either because of its commonness or perishableness fit to supply the place of money what reason could anyone have there to enlarge his possessions beyond the use of his family and a plentiful supply to its consumption either in what their own industry produced or they could barter for the like perishable useful commodities with others where there is not some thing both lasting and scarce and so valuable to be hoarded up there men will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land where it never so rich never so free for them to take for I ask what would a man value ten thousand or a hundred thousand acres of excellent land ready cultivated and well stocked too with cattle in the middle of the inland parts of America where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world to draw money to him by the sale of the product it would not be worthy in closing and we should see him give up again to the wild common of nature whatever was more than would supply the conveniences of life to be had there for him and his family thus in the beginning all the world was America and more so than that is now for no such thing as money was anywhere known find out something that hath the use and value of money amongst his neighbors you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions but since gold and silver being little useful to the life of man in proportion to food raiment and carriage has its value only from the consent of men whereof labor yet makes in great part the measure it is plain that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth they having by a tacit and voluntary consent found out a way how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of by receiving an exchange for the over plus gold and silver which may be hoarded up without injury to anyone these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor this partage of things in an inequality of private possessions men have made practical out of the bounds of society and without compact only by putting a value on gold and silver and tacitly agreeing in the use of money foreign governments the laws regulate the right of property and the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions and thus I think it is very easy to conceive without any difficulty how labor could at first begin a title of property and the common things of nature and how the spending it upon our uses bounded it so that there could be no reason of quarreling about title nor any doubt about the largeness of possession it gave right and convenience he went together for as a man had a right to all he could employ his labor upon so he had no temptation to labor for more than he could make use of this left no room for controversy about the title nor for any encroachment on the right of others what portion a man carved to himself was easily seen and it was useless as well as dishonest to carve himself too much or take more than he needed end of chapter five book to chapter six of two treatises of civil government this is a lipovox recording all lipovox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit lipovox.org recording by Anna Simon two treatises of civil government by john lock book to chapter six of paternal power it may perhaps be centered as an impertinent criticism in a discourse of this nature to find fault with words and names that have attained in the world and yet possibly it may not be a miss to offer new ones when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes as this of paternal power probably has done which seems so to place the power of parents over their children wholly in the father as if the mother had no share in it whereas if we consult reason or revelation we shall find we have an equal title this may give one reason to ask whether this might not be more properly called parental power for whatever obligation nature and the right of generation lays on children it must certainly bind them equal to both the concurrent causes of it and accordingly we see the positive law of god everywhere joins them together without distinction when it commands the obedience of children honor thy father and thy mother exodus 2012 who's whoever cursive his father or his mother leviticus 29 you shall fill every man his mother and his father leviticus 19 3 children obey your parents etc aphesians 6 1 is the style of the old and new testament had but this one thing being well considered without looking any deeper into the matter it might perhaps have kept men from running into those gross mistakes they've made about this power of parents which however it might without any great harshness bear the name of absolute dominion and regal authority when under the title of paternal power it seemed appropriated to the father would yet have sounded but oddly and in the very name shown the absurdity if this supposed absolute power over children had been called parental and thereby have discovered that it belonged to the mother too for it will but very ill serve the turn of those men who contend so much for the absolute power and authority of the fatherhood as they call it that the mother should have any share in it and it would have but ill supported the monarchy they contend for when by the very name it appeared that that fundamental authority from whence they would derive their government of a single person only was not placed in one but two persons jointly but to let this of names pass though i've said above chapter two that all men by nature are equal i cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality age or virtue may give men a just presidency excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level birth may subject some and alliance or benefits others to pay an observance to those to whom nature gratitude or other respect may have made it too and yet all this consists with the equality which all men are in in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another which was the equality i there spoke of as proper to the business in hand being that equal right that every man had those natural freedom without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man children i confess are not born in this full state of equality they are born to it their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them when they come into the world and for some time after but it is but a temporary one the bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling clothes they are wrapped up in and supported by in the weakness of their infancy age and reason as they grow up loosen them till the length they drop quite off and leave a man at his own free disposal adam was created a perfect man his body and mind in full possession of their strength and reason and so was capable from the first instant of his being to provide for his own support and preservation and govern his actions according to the dictates of the law of reason which god had implanted in him from him the world is peopled with his descendants who are all born infants weak and helpless without knowledge or understanding but the supply that the effects of this imperfect state till the improvement of growth and age has removed them adam and eve and after them all parents were by the law of nature under an obligation to preserve nourish and educate the children they had begotten not as their own workmanship but the workmanship of their own maker the almighty to whom they were to be accountable for them the law that was to govern adam was the same that was to govern all his posterity the law of reason but his offspring having another way of entrance into the world different from him by a natural birth that produced them ignorant and without the use of reason they were not presently under that law for nobody can be under a law which is not promulgated to him and this law being promulgated or made known by reason only he that has not come to the use of his reason cannot be said to be under this law and adam's children being not presently as soon as born under this law of reason were not presently free for law in its true notion is not so much the limitation as a direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest and prescribes no father than is for the general good of those under that law could they be happier without it the law as a useless thing would of itself vanish and that ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges is in only from bugs and precipices so that however it may be mistaken the end of law is not to abolish or restrain but to preserve and enlarge freedom for in all the states of created beings capable of laws where there is no law there is no freedom for liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others which cannot be where there is no law but freedom is not as we are told a liberty for every man to do what he lists for who could be free when every other man's humor might domineer over him but a liberty to dispose and order as he lists his person actions possessions and his whole property within the allowance of those laws under which he is and there in not to be subject to the arbitrary will of another but freely follow his own the power then that parents have over their children arises from that duty which is incumbent on them to take care of their offspring during the imperfect state of childhood to inform the mind and govern the actions of their yet ignorant non-age till reason shall take its place and ease them of that trouble is what the children want and the parents are bound to for God having given man an understanding to direct his actions has allowed him a freedom of will and liberty of acting as properly belonging there on to within the bounds of that law is under but whilst he is in an estate wherein he has not understanding of his own to direct his will he is not to have any will of his own to follow he that understands for him must will for him too he must prescribe to his will and regulate his actions but when he comes to the estate that made his father a freeman the son is a freeman too this holds in all the laws a man is under whether natural or civil is a man under the law of nature what made him free of that law what gave him a free disposing of his property according to his own will within the compass of that law i answer a state of maturity wherein he might be supposed capable to know that law that so he might keep his actions within the bounds of it when he has acquired that state he is presumed to know how far that law is to be his guide and how far he may make use of his freedom and so comes to have it till then somebody else must guide him who's presumed to know how far the law allows liberty if such a state of reason such an age of discretion made him free the same shall make his son free too is a man under the law of england what made him free of that law that is to have the liberty to dispose of his actions and possessions according to his own will within the permission of that law a capacity of knowing that law which is supposed by that law at the age of one and twenty years and in some cases sooner if this made the father free it shall make the son free too till then we see the law allows the son to have no will but he is to be guided by the will of his father or guardian who is to understand for him and if the father die and fail to substitute a deputy in his trust if he had not provided a tutor to govern his son during his minority during his want of understanding the law takes care to do it some other must govern him and be a will to him till he has attained to a state of freedom and as an understanding we fit to take the government of his will but after that the father and son are equally free as much as a tutor and pupil after knowledge equally subject to the same law together without any dominion left in the father over the life liberty or a state of his son whether they be only in the state and in the law of nature or under the positive laws of an established government but if through defects that may happen out of the ordinary cause of nature anyone comes not to such a degree of reason where any might be supposed capable of knowing the law and so living within the rules of it he is never capable of being a free man he's never let loose through the disposure of his own will because he knows no bounds to it has not understanding its proper guide but it's continued under the tuition and government of others all the time his own understanding is incapable of that charge and so lunatics and idiots are never set free from the government of their parents children who are not as yet come into those years where they may have and innocence which are excluded by a natural defect from ever having thirdly madman which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right reason to guide themselves have for their guide the reason that guided other men which are tutors over them to seek and procure their good for them says hooker of the laws of ecclesiastical polity book 1 section 7 all which seems no more than that duty which god and nature has laid on man as well as other creatures to preserve their offspring till they can be able to shift for themselves and will scarce amount to an instance of proof of parents regal authority thus we are born free as we are born rational not that we have actually the exercise of either age that brings one brings with it the other two and thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist together and are both founded on the same principle a child is free by his father's title by his father's understanding which is to govern him till he had it of its own the freedom of man at years of discretion and subjection of a child to his parents whilst yet short of that age are so consistent and so distinguishable that the most blinded contendous harmonicae by right of fatherhood cannot miss this difference the most obstinate cannot but allow their consistency for were their doctrine all true where the right air of Adam now known and by that title settled a monarch in his throne invested with all the absolute unlimited power sir robert filmer talks of if he should die as soon as his air were born must not the child notwithstanding he were never so free never so much sovereign be in subjection to his mother and nurse the tutors and governors till age and education brought him reason and ability to govern himself and others the necessities of his life the health of his body and the information of his mind would require him to be directed by the will of others and not his own and yet will anyone think that this restraint and subjection were inconsistent with or spoiled him of that liberty or sovereignty he had a right to or gave away his empire to those who had the government of his knowledge this government over him only prepared him to battle and sooner for it if anybody should ask me when my son is of age to be free i shall answer just when his monarch is of age to govern but at what time such a judicious hooker of the laws of ecclesiastical polity book one section six a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use of reason as suffice it to make him capable of those laws whereby he is then bound to guide his actions this is a great deal more easy for sense to discern than for anyone by skill and learning to determine commonwealths themselves take notice of and allow that there is a time when men are to begin to act like freemen and therefore till that time require not oaths of fealty or allegiance or other public owning of or submission to the government of their countries the freedom then of man and liberty of acting according to his own will is grounded on his having reason which is able to instruct him in that law he's to govern himself by and make him know how far he's left to the freedom of his own will to turn him loose and unrestrained liberty before he has reason to guide him is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free but to thrust him out amongst brutes and abandon him to a state as ratchet and as much beneath that of a man as theirs this is that which puts the authority into the parents hands to govern the minority of their children god have made it their business to employ this care on their offspring and had placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness and concern to temper this power to apply it as his wisdom designed it to the children's good as long as he should need to be under it but what reason can hence advance this care of the parents due to their offspring into an absolute arbitrary dominion of the father whose power reaches no father than by such a discipline as he finds most effectual to give such strength and health to their bodies such vigor and rectitude to their minds as may best fit his children to be most useful to themselves and others and if it be necessary to his condition to make them work when they are able for their own subsistence but in this power the mother too has her share with the father nay this power so little belongs to the father by any peculiar right of nature but only as he is guardian of his children that when he quits his care of them he loses his power over them which goes along with their nourishment and education to which it is inseparably annexed and it belongs as much to the foster father of an exposed child as to the natural father of another so little power does the bear act of begetting give a man over his issue if all his care ends there and this be all that tightly had to the name and authority of a father and what will become of this paternal power in that part of the world where one woman has more than one husband at a time or in those parts of america where when the husband and wife part which happens frequently the children are all left to the mother follow her and are wholly under her care and provision if the father die whilst the children are young do they not naturally everywhere owe the same obedience to their mother during their minority as to their father were he alive and will anyone say that the mother had the legislative power over her children that she can make standing rules which shall be of perpetual obligation by which they ought to regulate all the concerns their property and bound their liberty all the course of their lives or can she enforce the observation of them with capital punishments for this is the proper power of the magistrate of which the father had not so much as the shadow his command of his children is but temporary and reaches not their life or property it is but a help to the weakness and imperfection of their knowledge that is fully necessary to their education and though a father may dispose of his own possessions as he pleases when his children are out of danger of perishing for want yet his power extends not to the lives or goods which either their own industry or another's bounty has made theirs nor to their liberty neither when they are once arrived to the infringement of the years of discretion the father's empire then ceases and he can from then forwards no more dispose of the liberty of his son than that of any other man and it must be far from an absolute or perpetual jurisdiction from which a man may withdraw himself having a license from divine authority to leave father and mother and cleave to his wife but there will be a time when a child comes to be as free from subjection to the will and command of his father as the father himself is free from subjection to the will of anybody else and they are each under no other restraint but that which is common to them both whether it be the law of nature or municipal law of their country yet this freedom exempts not a son from that honor which he ought by the law of god and nature to pay his parents god having made the parents instruments in his great design of continuing the race of mankind and the occasions of life to their children as yet laid on them an obligation to nourish preserve and bring up their offspring so he is laid on the children a perpetual obligation of honoring their parents which containing in it an inward esteem and reverence to be shown by all outward expressions ties up the child from anything that may ever injure or affront disturb or endanger the happiness or life of those from whom he received his and engages him in all actions of defense relief assistance and comfort of those by whose means he entered into being and has been made capable of any enjoyment of life from this obligation no state no freedom can absolve children but this is very far from giving parents a power of command over their children or an authority to make laws and dispose as they please of their lives or liberties it is one thing to owe honor respect gratitude and assistance another to require an absolute obedience and submission the honor due to parents a monarch in his throne owes his mother and yet this lessons not his authority nor subjects him to her government the subjection of a minor places in the father a temporary government which terminates with a minority of the child and the honor due from a child places in the parents a perpetual right respect reverence support and compliance to more or less as the father's care cost and kindness in his education has been more or less this ends not with minority but holds in all parts and conditions of a man's life the want of distinguishing these two powers that is that which the father had in the right of tuition during minority and the right of honor all his life may perhaps have caused a great part of the mistakes about this matter for to speak properly of them the first of these is rather the privilege of children and duty of parents than any prerogative of paternal power the nourishment and education of their children is a charge so incumbent on parents for their children's good that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it and though the power of commanding and chastising them go along with it yet God has woven into the principles of human nature such a tenderness for their offspring that there is little fear that parents should use their power with too much rigor the excess is seldom on the severe side the strong bias of nature drawn the other way and therefore God Almighty when he would express his gentle dealings with the Israelites he tells them that though he chasten them he chasten them as a man chastens his son the tyranny 85 that is with tenderness and affection and kept them under no severe discipline than what was absolutely best for them and have been less kindness to have slackened this is that power to which children are commanded obedience that the pains and care of their parents may not be increased or ill rewarded on the other side honor and support all that which gratitude requires to return for the benefits received by and from them is the indispensable duty of the child and the proper privilege of the parents this is intended for the parents advantage as the other is for the child no education the parents duty seems to have most power because the ignorance and infirmities of childhood stand in need of restraint and correction which is a visible exercise of rule and a kind of dominion and that duty which is comprehended in the word honor requires less obedience though the obligation be stronger on grown than younger children for who can think the command children obey your parents requires in a man that has children of his own the same submission to his father as it does in his yet young children to him and that by this precept he were bound to obey all his father's commands if out of a conceder authority he should have the indiscretion to treat him still as a boy the first part then of paternal power or rather duty which is education belongs so to the father that it terminates at a certain season when the business of education is over it ceases of itself and is also alienable before for a man they put the tuition of his son in other hands and he that has made his son an apprentice to another has discharged him during that time of a great part of his obedience both to himself and to his mother but all the duty of honor the other part remains nevertheless entire to them nothing can cancel that it is so inseparable from them both at the father's authority cannot dispossess the mother of this right nor can any man discharge his son from honoring her that bore him but both these are very far from a power to make laws and enforcing them with penalties that may reach a state liberty limbs and life the power of commanding ends with knowledge and though after that honor and respect support and defense and whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to for the highest benefits he is naturally capable of be always due from a son to his parents yet all this puts no scepter into the father's hand no sovereign power of commanding he has no dominion over his son's property or actions nor any right that his will should prescribe to his sons in all things however it may become his son in many things not very inconvenient to him and his family to pay a difference to it a man may owe honor and respect to an ancient or wise man defense to his child or friend relief and support of the distressed and gratitude to a benefactor to such a degree that all he has all he can do cannot sufficiently pay it but all these give no authority no right to anyone of making laws over him from whom they are owing and it is plain all this is due not only to the bare title of father not only because as has been said it is owing to the mother too but because these obligations to parents and the degrees of what is required of children may be varied by the different care and kindness trouble and expense which is often employed upon one child more than another this shows the reason how it comes to pass that parents in societies where they themselves are subjects retain a power over their children and have as much right to their subjection as those who are in the state of nature which could not possibly be if all political power were only paternal and that in truth they were one and the same thing for then all paternal power being in the prince the subject could naturally have none of it but these two powers political and paternal are so perfectly distinct and separate are built upon so different foundations and given to so different ends that every subject that is a father has as much a paternal power over his children as the prince has over his and every prince that has parents owes them as much filial duty and obedience as the meanest of his subjects due to theirs and can therefore contain not any part or degree of that kind of dominion which a prince or magistrate has over his subject though the obligation on the parents to bring up their children and the obligation on children to honor their parents contain all the power on the one hand and submission on the other which are proper to this relation yet there is another power ordinarily in the father whereby he has a tie on the obedience of his children which though it be common to him with other men yet the occasions of showing it almost constantly happening to fathers in their private families and the instances of it elsewhere being rare unless taken notice of it passes in the world for a part of paternal jurisdiction and this is the power men generally have to bestow their estates on those who please them best the possession of the father being the expectation and inheritance of the children ordinarily in certain proportions according to the law and custom of each country yet it is commonly in the father's power to bestow it with a more sparing or liberal hand according as the behavior of this or that child have comported with his will and humor this is no small tie on the obedience of children and there being always a next to the enjoyment of land a submission to the government of the country of which that land is a part it has been commonly supposed that the father could oblige his posterity to that government of which he himself was a subject and that his compact helped them whereas it being only a necessary condition and next to the land and the inheritance of an estate which is under that government reaches only those who will take it on that condition and so is no natural tie or engagement but a voluntary submission for every man's children being by nature as free as himself or any of his ancestors ever were may whilst they are in that freedom choose what society they will join themselves to what common wealth they will put themselves under but if they will enjoy the inheritance of their ancestors they must take it on the same terms their ancestors had it and submit to all the conditions and next to such a possession by this power indeed fathers oblige their children to obedience themselves even when they are past minority and most commonly to subject them to this or that political power but neither of these by any peculiar right of fatherhood but by the reward they have in their hands to enforce and recompense such a compliance and is no more power than what a French man has over an Englishman who by the hopes of an estate he will leave him will certainly have a strong tie on his obedience and if when it is left him he will enjoy it he must certainly take it upon the conditions and next to the possession of land in that country where it lies whether it be France or England to conclude then though the father's power of commanding extends no farther than the minority of his children and to a degree only fit for the discipline and government of that age and though that honor and respect and all that which the latins called piety which the indispensably owe to their parents all their lifetime and in all estates with all that support and defense is due to them gives the father no power of governing that is making laws and enacting penalties on his children though by all this he has no dominion over the property or actions of his son yet it is obvious to conceive how easy it was in the first ages of the world and in places still where the thinness of people gives families leave to separate into unprocessed quarters and they have room to remove or plant themselves in yet vacant habitations for the father of the family to become the prince of it he had been a ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children and since without some government it would be hard for them to live together it was like least it should by the express or tacit consent of the children when they were grown up be in the father where it seemed without change barely to continue when indeed nothing more was required to it than the permitting the father to exercise alone in his family that executive power of the law of nature which every free man naturally have and by that permission resigning up to him a monarchical power whilst they remained in it but that this was not by any paternal right but only by the consent of his children is evident from hence that nobody doubts but if a stranger whom chance or business has brought to his family had their killed any of his children or committed any other fact he might condemn and put him to death or otherwise have punished him as well as any of his children which it was impossible he should do by virtue of any paternal authority over one who is not his child but by virtue of that executive power of the law of nature which as a man he had a right to and he alone could punish him in his family where the respect of his children had laid by the exercise of such a power to give way to the dignity and authority they were willing should remain in him above the rest of his family thus it was easy and almost natural for children by a tacit and scarce avoidable consent to make way for the father's authority and government they had been accustomed in their childhood to follow his direction and to refer their little differences to him and when they were man who fitted to rule them their little properties and less covetousness seldom afforded greater controversies and when any should arise where could they have a fitter umpire than he by whose care they had everyone been sustained and brought up and who had a tenderness for them all it is no wonder that they made no distinction betwixt minority and full age nor looked after one and twenty or any other age that might make them the free disposes of themselves and fortunes when they could have no desire to be out of their privilege the government they had been under during it continued still to be more their protection than restraint and they could nowhere find a greater security to their peace liberty and fortunes than in the rule of a father thus the natural fathers of families by an insensible change became the politic monarchs of them too and as they chance to live long and leave able and worthy heirs for several successions or otherwise so they laid the foundations of hereditary or elective kingdoms and the several constitutions and manners according as chance contrivance or occasions happened to mold them but if princes have their titles in their father's right and to be a sufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political authority because they commonly were those in whose hands we find the facto the exercise of government i say if this argument be good it will as strongly prove that all princes may princes only ought to be priests since it is as certain that in the beginning the father of the family was priest as that he was ruler in his own household end of book to chapter six book to chapter seven of two tree disease on civil government this is a libravox recording all libravox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libravox dot orc recording by nicky selivan chapter seven of political or civil society god having made man such a creature that in his own judgment it was not good for him to be alone putting him under strong obligations of necessity convenience and inclination to drive him into society as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it the first society was between man and wife which gave beginning to that between parents and children to which in time that between master and servant came to be added and though all these might and commonly did meet together and make up but one family wherein the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family each of these or altogether came short of political society as we shall see if we consider the different ends ties and bounds of each of these conjugal society is made by voluntary compact between man and woman and though it consists chiefly in such a communion and right in one another's bodies as is necessary to its chief end procreation yet it draws with it mutual support and assistance and a communion of interests too as necessary not only to unite their care and affection but also necessary to their common offspring who have a right to be nourished and maintained by them till they're able to provide for themselves for the end of conjunction between male and female being not barely procreation but the continuation of the species this conjunction between male and female ought to last even after procreation so long as it is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones who are to be sustained by those that got them till they are able to shift and provide for themselves this rule which the infinite wise maker have set to the works of his hands we find the inferior creatures steadily obey in those viviferous animals which feed on grass the conjunction between male and female lasts no longer than the very active copulation because the teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish the young till it be able to feed on grass the male only begets but concerns not himself for the female or young to whose sustenance he can contribute nothing but in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer because the dam not being able well to subsist herself and nourish her numerous offspring by her own prey alone a more laborious as well as more dangerous way of living than by feeding on grass the assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common family which cannot subsist till they're able to pray for themselves but by the joint care of the male and the female the same is to be observed in all birds except some domestic ones where plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding and taking care of the younger brood whose young needing food in the nest the cock and hen continue mates till the young are able to use their wing and provide for themselves and herein I think lies the chief if not the only reason why the male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other creatures this because the female is capable of conceiving and de facto is commonly with child again and brings forth to a new birth long before the former is out of a dependency for support on his parents help and able to shift for himself and has all the assistance is due to him from his parents whereby his father who is bound to take care for those he heth begot is under an obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same woman longer than other creatures whose young being able to subsist of themselves before the time of procreation returns again the conjugal bond dissolves of itself and they are at liberty till hymen at his usual anniversary season summons them again to choose new mates wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great creator who having given to man foresight and an ability to lay up for the future as well as to supply the present necessity have made it necessary that society of man and wife should be more lasting than of male and female amongst other creatures that so their industry might be encouraged in their interest better united to make provision and lay up goods for their common issue which uncertain mixture or easy and frequent solutions of conjugal society would mightly disturb but though these are ties upon mankind which make the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in man than the other species of animals yet it would give one reason to inquire why this compact where procreation and education are secured and inheritance taking care for may not be made determinable either by consent or at a certain time or upon certain conditions as well as any other voluntary compacts there being no necessity in the nature of the thing nor in the ends of it that it should always be for life i mean to such as are under no restraint of any positive law which ordains all such contracts to be perpetual but the husband and wife though they have but one common concern yet have different understandings will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too it therefore being necessary that the last determination i.e. the rule should be placed somewhere it naturally falls to the man's share as the abler and the stronger but this reaching but to the things of their common interest and property leaves the wife in full and free possession of what by contract is her peculiar right and gives the husband no more power over her life than she has over his the power of the husband being so far from that of an absolute monarch that the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate from him where natural right or their contract allows it whether that contract be made by themselves in the state of nature or by the customs or laws of the country they live in and the children upon such separation fall to the father or mother's lot as such contract does determine for all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under a political government as well as in the state of nature the civil magistrate does not abridge the right or power of either naturally necessary to those ends this procreation and mutual support and assistance whilst they're together but only decides any controversy that may arise between man and wife about them if it were otherwise and that absolute sovereignty and power of life and death naturally belong to the husband and were necessary to the society between man and wife there could be no matrimony in any of those countries where the husband is allowed no such absolute authority but the ends of matrimony requiring no such power in the husband the condition of conjugal society put it not in him it being not at all necessary to that state conjugal society could subsist and attain its ends without it nay community of goods and the power over them mutual assistance and maintenance and other things belonging to the conjugal society might be varied and regulated by that contract which unites man and wife in that society as far as may consist with procreation and the bringing up of children till they could shift for themselves nothing being necessary to any society that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made the society betwixt parents and children and their distinct rights and powers belonging respectively to them I have treated of so largely in the foregoing chapter that I shall not hear need to say anything of it and I think it is plain that it is far different from a politic society master and servant are names as old as history but given to those of far different condition for a free man makes himself a servant to another by selling him for a certain time the service he undertakes to do in exchange for wages he is to receive and though this commonly puts him into the family of his master and under the ordinary discipline thereof yet it gives the master but a temporary power over him and no greater than what is contained in the contract between them but there is another sort of servants which by a peculiar name we call slaves who being captives taken in a just war are by the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters these men having as I say forfeited their lives and with it their liberties and lost their estates and being in the state of slavery not capable of any property cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society the chief and whereof is the preservation of property let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these subordinate relations of wife children servants and slaves united under the domestic rule of a family which what resemblance so ever it may have in its order offices in number two with a little commonwealth yet is very far from it both in its constitution power and end or if it must be thought a monarchy and the powder familious the absolute monarch in it absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered in short power when it is plain by what has been said before that the master of the family has a very distinct and differently limited power both as to time and extent over those several persons that are in it for expecting the slave and the family is as much a family and his power as powder familious as great whether there be any slaves in his family or no he has no legislative power of life and death over any of them and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he and he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family who has but a very limited one over every individual in it but how a family or any other society of men differ from that which is properly political society we shall best see by considering wherein political society itself consists man being born as has been proved with a title to perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature equally with any other man or number of men in the world hath by nature a power not only to preserve his property that is his life liberty and estate against the injuries and attempts of other men but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others as he is persuaded the offense deserves even with death itself in crimes where the heinousness of the fact in his opinion requires it but because no political society can be nor subsist without having in itself the power to preserve the property and in order there unto punish the offenses of all those of that society there and there only is political society where every one of the members hath quitted his natural power resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it and thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded the community comes to be umpire by settled standing rules indifferent and the same to all parties and by men having authority from the community for the execution of those rules decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right and punishes those offenses which any member hath committed against the society with such penalties as the law has established whereby it is easy to discern who are and who are not in political society together those who are united into one body and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to with authority to decide controversies between them and punish offenders are in civil society one with another but those who have no such common people i mean on earth are still in a state of nature each being where there is no other judge for himself and executioner which is as i have before showed it the perfect state of nature and thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it committed amongst the members of that society which is the power of making laws as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members by anyone that is not of it which is the power of war and peace and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society as far as it is possible but though every man who has entered into civil society and has become a member of any commonwealth has thereby quoted his power to punish offenses against the law of nature in prosecution of his own private judgment yet with the judgment of offenses which he has given up to the legislative in all cases where he can appeal to the magistrate he has given a right to the commonwealth to employ his force for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth whenever he should be called to it which indeed are his own judgments they being made by himself or his representative and herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society which is to judge by standing laws how far offenses are to be punished when committed within the commonwealth and also to determine by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact how far injuries from without are to be vindicated and in both these to employ all the force of all the members when there shall be need wherever therefore any number of men are so united into one society as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature and to resign it to the public there and their only is a political or civil society and this is done wherever any number of men in the state of nature enter into society to make one people one body politic under one supreme government or else when anyone joins himself to and incorporates with any government already made for hereby he authorizes the society or which is all one the legislative thereof to make laws for him as the public good of the society shall require to the execution whereof his own assistance as to his own decrees is due and this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a commonwealth by setting up a judge on earth with authority to determine all the controversies and redresses of the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth which judge is the legislative or magistrates appointed by it and wherever there are a number of men however associated that have no such decisive power to appeal to there they are still in the state of nature hence it is evident that absolute monarchy which by some men is counted the only government in the world is indeed inconsistent with civil society and so can be no form of civil government at all for the end of civil society being to avoid and remedy those inconveniences of the state of nature which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own case by setting up a known authority to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received or controversy that may arise and which every one of the society ought to obey wherever any persons are who have not such an authority to appeal to for the decision of any difference between them there those persons are still in the state of nature and so is every absolute prince in respect to those who are under his dominion for he being supposed to have all both legislative and executive power in himself alone there is no judge to be found no appeal lies open to anyone who may fairly and indifferently and with authority decide and from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any injury or inconvenience that may be suffered from the prince or by his order so that such a man however entitled czar or grand senior or how you please is as much in the state of nature with all under his dominion as he is with the rest of mankind for wherever any two men are who have no standing rule and common judge to appeal to on earth for the determination of controversies of right betwixt them there they are still in the state of nature and under all the inconveniences of it with only this woeful difference to the subject or rather slave of an absolute prince that whereas in the ordinary state of nature he has a liberty to judge of his right and according to the best of his power to maintain it now whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch he has not only no appeal as those in society ought to have but as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures is denied a liberty to judge of or to defend his right and so is exposed to all the misery and inconveniences that a man can fear from one who being in the unrestrained state of nature is yet corrupted with flattery and armed with power for he that thinks absolute power purifies men's blood and corrects the baseness of human nature need read but the history of this or any other age to be convinced of the contrary he that would have been insolent and injurious in the woods of America would not probably be much better in a throne where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out to justify all that he shall do to his subjects and the sword presently silenced all those that dare question it for what the protection of absolute monarch is what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes be and to what degree of happiness insecurity it carries a civil society where this sort of government is grown to perfection he that will look into the late relation of silent may easily see in absolute monarchies indeed as well as other governments of the world the subjects have an appeal to the law and judges to decide any controversies and restrain any violence that may happen between the subjects themselves one amongst another this everyone thinks necessary and believes he deserves to be thought as declared an enemy to society and mankind who should go about to take it away but whether this be from true love of mankind in society and such a charity as we owe all one another there is reason to doubt for this is no more than what every man who loves his own power profit or greatness may and naturally must do keep those animals from hurting or destroying one another who labor and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage and so are taken care of not out of any love the master has for them but love for himself and the profit they bring him for if it be asked what security what fence is there in such a state against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler the very question can scarce be born they are ready to tell you that it deserves death only to ask after safety betwixt subject and subject they will grant there must be measures laws and judges for their mutual peace and security but as for the ruler he ought to be absolute and is above all such circumstances because he has power to do more hurt and wrong it is right when he does it to ask how you may be guarded from harm or injury on that side where the strongest hand is to do it is presently the voice of faction and rebellion and if when men quitting the state of nature entered into society they agreed that all of them but one should be under their restraint of laws but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of nature increased with power and made licentious by impunity this is to think that men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by polkats or foxes but our content may think it safety to be devoured by lions but whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people's understandings it hinders not men from feeling and when they perceive that any man in what station so ever is out of the bounds of the civil society which they are of and that they have no appeal on earth against him they may receive from him they are apt to think themselves in the state of nature in respect of him whom they find to be so and to take care as soon as they can to have that safety and security in civil society for which it was first instituted and for which only they entered into it and therefore though perhaps at first as shall be showed more at large hereafter in the following part of this discourse some one good and excellent man having got a pre-eminency among the rest had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue as to a kind of natural authority that the chief rule which arbitration of their differences by atacic consent developed into his hands without any other caution but the assurance they had of his uprightness and wisdom yet when time giving authority and as some men would persuade us sacredness of customs which the negligent and unforeseen innocence of the first ages began had brought in successors of another stamp the people finding their properties not secure under the government as then it was whereas government has no other end but the preservation of property could never be safe nor at rest nor think themselves in civil society till the legislature was placed in collective bodies of men calling them senate parliament or what you please by which means every single person became subject equally with other the meanest men to those laws which he himself as part of the legislative had established nor could anyone by his own authority avoid the force of the law when once made nor by any pretense of superiority plead exemption thereby to a license his own or the miscarriages of any of his dependence no man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it for if any man may do what he thinks fit and there be no appeal on earth for redress or security against any harm he shall do i ask whether he be not perfectly still in the state of nature and so can be no part or member of that civil society unless anyone will say the state of nature in civil society are one and the same thing which i have never yet found anyone so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm end of chapter seven recording by nickie solovan chicago book two chapter eight of two treatises of civil government this is a lipovox recording all lipovox recordings are in the public domain for more information at the volunteer please visit lipovox.org recording by anasimone two treatises of civil government by john lock book two chapter eight of the beginning of political societies man being as has been said by nature all free equal and independent no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent the only way whereby anyone divests himself of his natural liberty and puts on the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable safe and peaceable living one amongst another in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater security against any that are not of it this any number of men may do because it injures not the freedom of the rest they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature when any number of men have so consented to make one community or government they are thereby presently incorporated and make one body politic where in the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest for when any number of men have by the consent of every individual made a community they have thereby made that community one body with the power to act as one body which is only by the will and determination of the majority for that which acts any community being only the consent of the individuals of it and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way it is necessary the body should move that way with the greater force carries it which is the consent of the majority or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body one community which the consent of every individual that united into it agreed that should and so everyone is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority and therefore we see that in assemblies empowered to act by positive laws where no number is set by that positive law which empowers them the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole and of course determines as having by the law of nature and reason the power of the whole and thus every man by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the determination of the majority and to be concluded by it or else this original compact whereby he with others incorporates into one society would signify nothing and be no compact if he be left free and under no other ties and he was in before in the state of nature for what appearance would there be of any compact what new engagement if he were no farther tight by any decrees of the society then he himself thought fit and did actually consent to this would be still as great a liberty as he himself had before his compact or anyone else in the state of nature hath who may submit himself and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit for if the consent of the majority shall not in reason be received as the act of the whole and conclude every individual nothing but the consent of every individual can make anything to be the act of the whole but such a consent is next to impossible ever to be had if we consider the infirmities of health and applications of business which in a number though much less than that of a commonwealth will necessarily keep many away from the public assembly to which if we add the variety of opinions and contrariety of interests which unavoidably happen in all collections of men the coming into society upon such terms would be only like katoes coming into the theater only to go out again such a constitution as this would make the mighty leviathan of a shorter duration and the feeblest creatures and not let it outlast the day it was born in which cannot be supposed till we can think that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved for where the majority cannot conclude the rest there they cannot act as one body and consequently will be immediately dissolved again whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends of for which they unite into society to the majority of the community unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority and this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society which is all the compact that is or needs be between the individuals that enter into or make up a commonwealth and thus that which begins and actually constitutes any political society is nothing but a consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society and this is that and that only which did or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world to this i find two objections made first that there are no instances to be found in story of a company of men independent and equal one amongst another that met together and in this way began and set up a government secondly it is impossible of right that man should do so because all men being born under government they are to submit to that and are not at liberty to begin a new one to the first there is this to answer that it is not at all to be wondered that history gives us but a very little account of men that live together in the state of nature the inconveniences of that condition and the love and want of society no sooner brought any number of them together but they presently united and incorporated if they're designed to continue together and if we may not suppose men ever to have been in the state of nature because we hear not much of them in such a state we may as well suppose the armies of salman asa or xerxes were never children because we hear little of them till they were men and embodied in armies government is everywhere antecedent to records and letters seldom come in amongst the people till a long continuation of civil society has by other more necessary arts provided for their safety ease and plenty and then they begin to look after the history of their founders and search into their original when they have outlived the memory of it for it is with commonwealths as with particular persons they are commonly ignorant of their own births and infancies and if they know anything of their original they are beholden for it to the accidental records that others have kept of it and those that we have of the beginning of any polities in the world accepting that of the dews where god himself immediately interposed and which favors not at all paternal dominion are all either plain instances of such a beginning as i've mentioned or at least have manifest footsteps of it he must show a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact when it agrees not with his hypothesis who will not allow that the beginning of Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of several men free and independent one of another amongst whom there was no natural superiority or subjection and if josephus accostus word may be taken he tells us that in many parts of america there was no government at all there are great and apparent conjectures says he that these men speaking of those of peru for a long time had neither kings nor commonwealths but lived in troops as they do this day in florida the taiwanas those of brazil and many other nations which have no certain kings but as occasion is offered in peace or war they choose their captains as they please if it be said that every man there was born subject to his father or the head of his family that the subjection due from a child to a father took not away his freedom of uniting into what political society he thought fit has been already proved but be that as it will these men in his evident were actually free and whatever superiority some politicians now would place in any of them they themselves claimed it not but by consent were all equal till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves so that their political societies all began from a voluntary union and a mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of their governors and forms of government and i hope those who went away from sparta with pilantes mentioned by justin will be allowed to have been free men independent one of another and to have set up a government over themselves by their own consent thus i've given several examples out of history of people free and in the state of nature that being met together incorporated and began a commonwealth and if the want of such instances be an argument to prove that government were not nor could not be so begun i suppose the contenders for paternal empire were better let it alone than urge it against natural liberty for if they can give so many instances out of history of governance begun upon paternal right i think though at best an argument from what has been to what should of right be has no great force one might without any great danger yield them the cause but if i might advise them in the case they would dwell not to search too much into the original of governments as they have begun de facto as they should find at the foundation of most of them something very little favorable to the design they promote and such a power as they contend for but to conclude reason being plain on our side that men are naturally free and the examples of history showing that the governments of the world that were begun in peace had their beginning laid on that foundation and were made by the consent of the people there can be a little room for doubt either where the right is or what has been the opinion or practice of mankind about the first erecting of governments i will not deny that if we look back as far as history will direct us towards the original of commonwealths we shall generally find them under the government and administration of one man and i am also apt to believe that where a family was numerous enough to subsist by itself and continued and tied together without mixing with others as it often happens where there is much land and few people the government commonly began in the father for the father having by the law of nature the same power with every man else to punish as he thought fit any offenses against that law might thereby punish his transgressing children even when they were men and out of their pupillage and they were very likely to submit to his punishment and all joined with him against the offender in their turns giving him thereby power to execute a sentence against any transgression and so in effect make him a lawmaker and governor over all that remained in conjunction with his family he was fittest to be trusted paternal affection secured their property and interest under his care and the custom of obeying him in their childhood made it easier to submit to him rather than to any other if therefore they must have one to rule them as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live together who so likely to be the man as he that was their common father unless negligence cruelty or any other defect of mind or body made him unfit for it but when either the father died and left his next air for want of age wisdom courage or any other qualities less fit for rule or where several families met and consented to continue together there it is not to be doubted but they used their natural freedom to set up him whom they judged the ableist and most likely to rule well over them conformable here on to we find the people of america who living out of reach of the conquering souls and spreading domination of the two great empires of peru and mexico enjoyed their own natural freedom though kaitres parbus they commonly prefer the error of their deceased king yet if they find him anyway weak or incapable they pass him by and set up the stoutest and bravest man for their ruler thus through looking back as far as records give us any account of peopling the world and the history of nations we commonly find the government to be in one hand yet it destroys not that which i affirm that is at the beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals to join into and make one society who when they are thus incorporated might set up what form of government they thought fit but this having given occasion to men to mistake and think that by nature government was monarchical and belonged to the father it may not be a miss here to consider why people in the beginning generally pitched upon this form which though perhaps the father's preeminency might in the first institution of some commonwealths give a rise to and place in the beginning the power in one hand yet it is plain that the reason that continued the form of government in a single person was not any regard or respect to paternal authority since all petty monarchies that is almost all monarchies near the original have been commonly at least upon occasion elective first then in the beginning of things the father's government of the childhood of those sprung from him having accustomed them to the rule of one man and taught them that where it was exercised with care and skill with affection and love to those under it it was sufficient to procure and preserve to men all the political happiness they sought for in society it was no wonder that they should pitch upon and naturally run into that form of government which from their infancy had been all accustomed to and which by experience they'd found both easy and safe to which if we add that monarchy being simple and most obvious to men whom neither experience had instructed in forms of government nor the ambition or insolence of empire had taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative or the inconveniences of absolute power which monarchy and succession was apt to lay claim to and bring upon them it was not at all strange that they should not much trouble themselves to think of methods of restraining any exorbitances of those to whom they had given the authority over them and of balancing the power of government by placing several parts of it in different hands they had neither felt the oppression of tyrannical dominion nor did the fashion of the age nor their possessions or way of living which afforded little matter for covetousness or ambition gave them any reason to apprehend or provide against it and therefore it is no wonder they put themselves into such a frame of government as was not only as I said most obvious and simple but also best suited to their present state and condition which stood more in need of defense against foreign invasions and injuries than of multiplicity of laws the equality of a simple poor way of living confining their desires within the narrow bounds of each man's small property made few controversies and so no need of many laws to decide them or variety of officers to superintend the process or look after the execution of justice where there were but few trespassers and few offenders since then those who liked one another so well as to join into society cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship together and some trust in one another they could not but have greater apprehensions of others than of one another and therefore their first care and thought cannot but be supposed to be how to secure themselves against foreign force it was natural for them to put themselves under a frame of government which might best serve to that end and choose the wisest and bravest man to conduct them in their wars and lead them out against their enemies and in this chiefly be their ruler thus we see that the kings of the indians in america which is still a pattern of the first ages in asia and europe whilst the inhabitants were too few for their country and want of people and money gave men no attemptation to enlarge their possessions of land or contest for wider extent of ground are little more than generals of their armies and though they command absolutely a war yet at home and in time of peace they exercise very little dominion and have but a very moderate sovereignty the resolutions of peace and war being ordinarily either in the people or in a council though the war itself which admits not of plurality of governors naturally devolves the command into the king's sole authority and thus in israel itself the chief business of their judges and first kings seems to have been to be captains in war and leaders of their armies which besides what is signified by going out and in before the people which was to march forth to war and home again in the heads of their forces appears plainly in the story of jefta the emanites making war upon israel the gileadites in fear sent to jefta a bastard of their family whom they had cast off and article with him if he will assist them against the emanites to make them their ruler which they do in these words and the people made him head and captain over them judges 11 11 which was as it seems all one has to be judge and he judged israel judges 12 7 that is was their captain general six years so when jotham upgrades the shechemites with the obligation they had to get in who'd been their judge and ruler he tells them he fought for you and adventured his life far and delivered you out of the hands of midian judges 9 17 nothing mentioned of him but what he did as a general and indeed that is always found in his history or in any of the rest of the judges and abimelech particularly is called king though at most he was but their general and when being wary of the ill conduct of samuel's sons the children of israel desire the king like all the nations to judge them and to go out before them and to fight their battles one samuel 8 20 god granting their desire says to samuel i will send the eman and i shall anoint him to be captain over my people israel that he may save my people out of the hands of the philistines 9 16 as if the only business of a king had been to lead out their armies and fight in their defense and accordingly and his inauguration pouring a vial of oil upon him declares the soul that the lord had anointed him to be captain over his inheritance 10 1 and therefore those who after souls being solemnly chosen and saluted king by the tribes at misba were unwilling to have him their king made no other objection but this how shall this man save us 5 27 as if they should have said this man is unfit to be our king not having skill and conduct enough in war to be able to defend us and when god resolved to transfer the government to david it is in these words but now thy kingdom shall not continue the lord has thought him a man after his own heart and the lord have commanded him to be captain over his people 13 14 as if the whole kingly authority were nothing else but to be their general and therefore the tribes who had stuck to souls family and opposed david's reign when they came to hebron with terms of submission to him they tell him amongst other arguments they had to submit to him as to their king that he was in effect their king in souls time and therefore they had no reason but to receive him as their king now also say they in time past when soul was king over us now was he that led us out and brought us in israel and the lord said unto the now shall feed my people israel and now shall be a captain over israel thus whether a family by degrees grew up into a commonwealth and the fatherly authority being continued on to the elder son everyone in his turn growing up under it thus at least admitted to it and the easiness and equality of it not offending anyone everyone acquiesced till time seemed to have confirmed it and settled a right of succession by prescription or whether several families or the descendants of several families whom chance neighborhood or business brought together uniting into society the need of a general whose conduct might defend them against their enemies in war and the great confidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age such as are almost all those which begin governments that ever come to last in the world gave men one of another made the first beginners of commonwealths generally put the rule into one man's hand without any other expressed limitation or restraint but what the nature of the thing and the end of government required whichever of those it was that at first put the rule into the hands of a single person certain it is nobody was entrusted with it but for the public good and safety and to those ends in the infancies of commonwealths those who had it commonly used it and unless they had done so young societies could not have subsisted without such nursing fathers tender and careful of the public wheel all governments would have sunk under the weakness and infirmities of their infancy and the prince and the people had soon perished together but through the golden age before vain ambition and amors galerades habendi evil concupiscence had corrupted men's minds into a mistake of true power and honor had more virtue and consequently better governors as well as less vicious subjects and there was then no stretching prerogative on the one side to oppress the people nor consequently on the other any dispute about privilege to lessen or restrain the power of the magistrate and so no contest between rulers and people about governors or government yet one ambition and luxury in future ages would retain and increase the power without doing the business for which it was given and aided by slattery taught princes to have distinct and separate interests from their people men found it necessary to examine more carefully the original and rights of government and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitances and prevent the abuses of their power which they having entrusted in another's hands only for their own good they found was made use of to hurt them thus we may see how probable it is that people that were naturally free and by their own consent either submitted to the government of their father or united together out of different families to make a government should generally put the rule into one man's hands and choose to be under the conduct of a single person without so much as by express conditions limiting or regulating his power which they thought safe enough in his honesty and prudence though they never dreamt of monarchy being iure divino which we never heard of among mankind that it was revealed to us by the divinity of this last age nor ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion or to be the foundation of all government and thus much may suffice to show that as far as we have any light from history we have reason to conclude that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people i say peaceful because i shall have occasion in another place to speak of conquest which some esteem away of beginning of governments the other objection i find urge against the beginning of polities in the way i've mentioned is this that is that all men being born under government some or other it is impossible any of them should ever be free and at liberty to unite together and begin a new one or ever be able to erect a lawful government if this argument be good i ask how came so many lawful monarchies into the world for if anybody upon this supposition can show me any one man in any age of the world free to begin a lawful monarchy i will be bound to show him 10 other freemen at liberty at the same time to unite and begin a new government under a regal or any other form it being demonstration that if anyone born under the dominion of another may be so free as to have a right to command others in a new and distinct empire everyone that is born under the dominion of another may be so free to and may become a ruler or subject of a distinct separate government and so by this their own principle either all men however born are free or else there is but one lawful prince one lawful government in the world and then they have nothing to do but barely to show us which that is which when they have done i doubt not but all mankind will easily agree to pay obedience to him no it be a sufficient answer to their objection to show that it involves them in the same difficulties that it does those they use it against yet i shall never to discover the weakness of this argument a little farther all men say they are born under government and therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new one everyone is born as subject to his father or as prince and is therefore under the perpetual tie of subjection and allegiance it is plain mankind never owned nor considered any such natural subjection that they were born in to one or to the other that type them without their own consents to a subjection to them and their heirs for there are no examples so frequent in history both sacred and profane as those of men was drawing themselves and their obedience from the jurisdiction they were born under and the family or community they were bred up in and setting up new government in other places from whence spring all that number of petty commonwealths in the beginning of ages and which always multiplied as long as there was room enough till the stronger or more fortunate swallowed the weaker and those great ones again breaking to pieces dissolved into lesser dominions all which are so many testimonies against paternal sovereignty and plainly prove that it was not the natural right of the father descending to his heirs that made governments in the beginning since it was impossible upon that ground there should have been so many little kingdoms all must have been but only one universal monarchy if men had not been at liberty to separate themselves from their families and the government be it what it will there was set up in it and go and make distinct commonwealths and other governments as they felt fit this has been the practice of the world from its first beginning to this day nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of mankind that they are born under constituted and ancient polities that have established laws and set forms of government then if they were born in the woods amongst the unconfined inhabitants that run loose in them for those who would persuade us that by being born under any government we are naturally subjects to it and have no more any title or pretence to the freedom of the state of nature have no other reason baiting that of paternal power which we've already answered to produce for it but only because our fathers or progenitors passed away their natural liberty and thereby bound up themselves and their posterity to a perpetual subjection to the government which they themselves submitted to it is true that whatever engagements or promises anyone has made for himself he is under the obligation of them but cannot by any compact whatsoever bind his children or posterity for his son when a man being altogether as free as the father any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the son than it can of anybody else he may indeed annex such conditions to the land he enjoyed as a subject of any commonwealth as may oblige his son to be of that community if he will enjoy those possessions which were his fathers because that estate being his father's property he may dispose or settle it as he pleases and this had generally given me occasion to mistake in this matter because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be dismembered nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father but under the same terms his father did by becoming a member of the society whereby he puts himself presently under the government he finds there established as much as any other subject of the commonwealth and thus the consent of freemen born under government which only makes them members of it being given separately in their turns as each comes to be of age and not in a multitude together people take no notice of it and thinking it not done at all or not necessary conclude their naturally subjects as their man but it is plain governments themselves understand it otherwise they claim no power over the son because of that they had over the father nor look on children as being their subjects by their fathers being so if a subject of england have a child by an english woman in france who subject is he not the king of england's for he must have lived to be admitted to the privileges of it nor the king of frances for how then has his father a liberty to bring him away and breed him as he pleases and whoever was judged as a traitor or deserter if he left a ward against the country for being barely born in it of parents that were aliens there it is plain then by the practice of governments themselves as well as by the law of right reason that a child is born a subject of no country or government he is under his father's tuition and authority till he comes to age of discretion and then he is a freeman at liberty what government he will put himself under what body politic he will unite himself to for if an englishman's son born in france be at liberty and may do so it is evident there is no tie upon him by his father's being a subject of this kingdom nor is he bound up by any compact of his ancestors and why then have not his son by the same reason the same liberty though he be born anywhere else since the power that a father had naturally over his children is the same wherever they be born and the ties of natural obligations are not bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths every man being as has been showed naturally free and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power but only his own consent it is to be considered what shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man's consent to make a subject to the laws of any government there is a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent which will concern our present case nobody doubts but an express consent of any man entering into any society makes him a perfect member of that society a subject of that government the difficulty is what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent and how far it binds that is how far anyone shall be looked on to have consented and thereby submitted to any government where he has made no expressions of it at all and to this i say that every man that have any possessions or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government doth thereby give his tacit consent and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government during such enjoyment as anyone under it whether this his possession be of land to him and his ass forever or a lodging only for a week or whether it be barely traveling freely on the highway and in effect it reaches as far as the very being of anyone within the territories of that government to understand this the better it is fit to consider that every man when he had first incorporates himself into any commonwealth he by his uniting himself there on to annex also and submit to the community those possessions which he has or shall acquire that do not already belong to any other government for it would be a direct contradiction for anyone to enter into society with others for the securing and regulating of property and yet to suppose his land whose property is to be regulated by the laws of the society should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government to which he himself the proprietor of the land is a subject by the same act therefore whereby anyone unites this person which was before free to any commonwealth by the same he unites his possessions which were before free to it also and they become both of them person and possession subject to the government and the minion of that commonwealth as long as it has a being whoever therefore from thence forth by inheritance purchase permission or other ways enjoys any part of the land so annexed to and another government of that commonwealth must take it to the condition it is under that is of submitting to the government of the commonwealth under whose jurisdiction it is as far forth as any subject of it but since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over the land and reaches the possessor of it before he has actually incorporated himself in the society only as he dwells upon and enjoys that the obligation anyone is under by virtue of such enjoyment to submit to the government begins and ends with the enjoyment so that whenever the owner who has given nothing but such a test consent to the government will by donation sale or otherwise quit the sad possession is it limited to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth or to agree with others to begin a new one in vacuous locus in any part of the world they can find free and unpossessed whereas he that has once by actual agreement and any expressed declaration given his consent to be of any commonwealth is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be and remain unalterably accepted to it and can never be again in the liberty of the state of nature unless by any calamity the government he was under becomes to be dissolved or else by some public act cuts him off from being any longer a member of it but submitting to the laws of any country living quietly and enjoying privileges and protection under them makes not a man a member of that society this is only a local protection and homage due to and from all those who not being in a state of war come within the territories belonging to any government to all parts were of the force of its laws extents but this no more makes a man a member of that society a perpetual subject of that commonwealth then it would make a man a subject to another in his family he found it convenient to abide for some time though whilst he continued in it he were obliged to comply with the laws and submit to the government he found there and thus we see that foreigners by living all their lives under another government and enjoying the privileges and protection of it though they are bound even in conscience to submit to its administration as far forth as any does in yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that commonwealth nothing can make any man so but is actually entering into it by positive engagement and express promise and compact this is that which i think concerning the beginning of political societies and that consent which makes anyone a member of any commonwealth end of book two chapter eight book two chapter nine of two treatises of civil government this is a libravox recording all libravox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libravox.org two treatises of civil government by john lock book two chapter nine of the ends of political society and government if a man in the state of nature be so free as has been said if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions equal to the greatest and subject to nobody why will he part with his freedom why will he give up this empire and subject himself to the dominion of control of any other power to which it is obvious to answer that though in the state of nature he hath such a right yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others for all being kings as much as he every man has equal and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice the employment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe very unsecure this makes him willing to quit a condition which however free is full of fears and continual dangers and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives liberties and estates which i call by the general name property the great and chief end therefore of men's uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting first there wants an established settled known law received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong and the common measure to decide all controversies between them for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures yet men being biased by their interest as well as ignorant for want of study of it are not apt to allow of it as a binding law to them in the application of it to their particular cases secondly in the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge with authority to determine all differences according to the established law for everyone in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature men being partial to themselves passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far and with too much heat in their own cases as well as negligence and unconcernedness to make them too remiss and other men's thirdly in the state of nature they're often wants power to back and support the sentence when right and to give it due execution they who by any injustice offend will seldom fail where they are able by force to make good their injustice such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous and frequently destructive to those who attempt it thus mankind not withstanding all the privileges of the state of nature being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are quickly driven into society hence it comes to pass that we seldom find any number of men live anytime together in this state the inconveniences that they are there in exposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government and therein seek the preservation of their property it is this makes them so willingly give up everyone his single power of punishing to be exercised by such alone as shall be appointed to it amongst them and by such rules as the community or those authorized by them to that purpose shall agree on and in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power as well as of the governments and societies themselves for in the state of nature to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights a man has two powers the first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the law of nature by which law come into them all he and all the rest of mankind are one community make up one society distinct from all other creatures and were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men there would be no need of any other no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community and by positive agreements combined into smaller and divided associations the other power a man has in the state of nature is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law both these he gives up when he joins in a private if I may so call it or particular politics society and incorporates into any commonwealth separate from the rest of mankind the first power vis of doing whatsoever be thought for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society so far forth as the preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require which laws of the society in many things can find the liberty he had by the law of nature secondly the power of punishing he wholly gives up and engages his natural force which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature by his own single authority as he saw fit to assist the executive power of that society as the law thereof shall require for being now in a new state wherein he is to enjoy many conveniences from the labor assistance and society of others in the same community as well as protection from its whole strength he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty in providing for himself as the good prosperity and safety of the society shall require which is not only necessary but just since the other members of the society do the like but though men when they enter into society give up the equality liberty and executive power they had in the state of nature into the hands of the society to be so far disposed of by the legislature as the good of the society shall require yet it being only with an intention in everyone the better to preserve himself his liberty and property for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse the power of the society or legislative constituted by them can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good but is obliged to preserve everyone's property by providing against these three defects above mentioned that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy and so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth is bound to govern by established standing laws promulgated and known to the people and not by extemporary decrees by indifferent and upright judges who are to decide controversies by those laws and to employ the force of the community at home only in the execution of such laws or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries and secure the community from inroads and invasion and all this to be directed to no other end but the peace safety and public good of the people end of book two chapter nine book two chapter ten of two treaties of civil government this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org two treaties of civil government by John Locke book two chapter ten of the forms of a commonwealth the majority having as has been showed upon men's first uniting into society the whole power of the community naturally in them may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men and their heirs or successors and then it is an oligarchy or else into the hands of one man and then it is a monarchy if to him and his heirs it is an hereditary monarchy if to him only for life but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor to return to them an elective monarchy and so accordingly of these the community may make compounded and mixed forms of government as they think good and if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives or any limited time and then the supreme power to revert to them again when it is so reverted the community may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please and so constitute a new form of government for the form of government depending upon the placing of the supreme power which is the legislative it being impossible to conceive that an inferior powers should prescribe to a superior or any but the supreme make laws according as the power of making laws is placed such is the form of the commonwealth by commonwealth i must be understood all along to mean not a democracy or any form of government but any independent community which the latines signified by the word civitus to which the word which best answers in our language is commonwealth and most properly expresses such a society of men which community or city in english does not for there may be subordinate communities in a government and city amongst us has a quite different notion from commonwealth and therefore to avoid ambiguity i crave leave to use the word commonwealth in that sense in which i find it used by king james the first and i take it to be its genuine signification which if anybody dislike i consent with him to change it for a better end of book two chapter ten book two chapter eleven up to three tesis of civil government this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recording signed a public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libra vox dot org recording by jc guan two treatises of civil government by john lock book two chapter eleven of the extent of the legislative power section 134 the great end of men's entering into society being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety and a great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power as the first and fundamental natural law which is to govern even the legislative itself is the preservation of the society and as far as will consist with the public good of every person in it the legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealths but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it nor can any addict of anybody else in what form so ever conceived or by what powers so ever backed have the force and obligation of a law which has not get sanctioned from the legislative which the public has chosen and appointed for without this the law could not have that which is absolutely necessary to its being a law footnote the lawful power of making laws to commend the whole politic societies and men belonging so properly onto the same entire societies that for any prince or pretended of what can't so ever upon earth to exercise the same of himself and not by express commission immediately and personally received from god or else by authority derives at the first from their consent upon whose persons the imposed laws it is no better than mere tyranny laws they are not therefore which public approbation has not made so hookers ecclesiastical policier book one section 10 of this point therefore we are to note that this man naturally have no fault and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men therefore utterly without our consent we could in such sort be at no man's commandment leaving and to be commanded we do consent when that society where if we be a part has at any time before consented without revoking the same after by the like universal agreement laws therefore human of what kind so ever are available by consent i bid and footnote which is absolutely necessary to its being a law the consent of society over whom nobody can have a power to make laws but by their own consent and by authority received from them and therefore all the obedience which by the most solemn ties anyone can be obliged to pay ultimately terminate in this supreme power and is directed by those laws which it enact nor can any oath to any foreign power whatsoever or any domestic subordinate power discharge any member of the society from disobedience to the legislative acting pursuant to their trust nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted or further than they do allow its being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society which is not the supreme section 135 though the legislative whether placed in one or more whether it be always in being or only by intervals though it be the supreme power in every common wealth yet first it is not nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people for its being but the joint power of every number of the society given up by that person or assembly which is legislator it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society and gave up to the community for nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself and nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself or over any other to destroy his own life or take away the life or property of another a man as has been proved cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life liberty or possession of another but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind this is all he doth or can give up to the common wealth and buy it to the legislative power so that the legislative can have no more than this their power in the utmost bounds of it is limited to the public good of the society it is a power that has no other end but preservation and therefore can never footnote two foundations there are which bear up public societies the one a natural inclination whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship the other and order expressly or secretly agreed upon touching the manner of their union in living together the latter is that which we call the law of a common well the very soul of a politic body the parts were of are by law animated held together and sets on work in such actions as the common good requires lost politic ordained for external order and regiment amongst men are never framed as they should be unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate rebellious and diverse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature in a word unless presuming man to be in regard of his depraved mind little better than a wild beast they do accordingly provide notwithstanding so to frame his outward actions that they be no hindrance unto the common good for which societies are instituted unless they do this they are not perfect hookers ecclesiastical policier volume one section 10 and footnote and therefore can never have a right to destroy and slave or designedly to impoverish the subjects the obligations of the law of nature sees not in society but only in many cases are drawn closer and have by human laws known penalty annexed to them to enforce their observation thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men legislators as well as others the rules that they make for other men's actions must as well as their own and other men's actions be conformable to the law of nature i.e to the will of god of which that is a declaration and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind no human sanction can be good or valid against it section 136 secondly footnote human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must erect albeit such measures they are as have also their higher rules to be measured by which rules are to the law of god and the law of nature so that laws human must be made according to the general laws of nature and without contradiction to any positive law of scripture otherwise they are ill-made hookers ecclesiastical policier book three section nine to constrain men of anything inconvenient don't seem unreasonable i bid book one section 10 and footnote secondly the legislative or supreme authority cannot assume to itself a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees but is bound to dispense justice and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws and known authorized judges for the law of nature being unwritten and so nowhere to be found but in the minds of men they who's through passion or interest from a site or mess apply it cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge and so it serves not as it ought to determine the rights and fence the properties of those that live under it especially where everyone is judge interpreter and executioner of it too and that's in his own case and he that has rights on his side having ordinary but his own single strength has not forced enough to defend himself from injuries or to punish delinquents to avoid these inconveniences which disorder men's properties in the state of nature men unite into societies that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties and may have standing roles to bound it by which everyone may know what it is to this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society which they enter into and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit with distrust that they shall be governed by declared laws or else their peace quiet and property will still be at the same uncertainty as it was in the state of nature section 137 absolute arbitrary power or governing without settled standing laws can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for and tie themselves up under were it not to preserve their lives liberties and fortunes and by stated rules of rights and property to secure their peace and quiet it cannot be supposed that they should intend had the power to do so to give to anyone or more an absolute arbitrary power over their persons in the states and put a force into the magistrates hunt to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them this were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of nature were in they had the liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others and were upon equal terms a force to maintain it whether invaded by a single man or many in combination whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator they have disarmed themselves and armed him to make a prey of them when he pleases he being in a much worse condition who is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man who has the command of a hundred thousand then he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of a hundred thousand single men no body being secure that his will who has such a command is better than that of other men though his force be a hundred thousand times stronger and therefore whatever form the commonwealth is under the rolling power ought to govern by declared and received laws and nor by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature if they shall have armed one or if you man was the joint power of a multitude to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts or unrestrained until that moment unknown wells without having any measures sent down which may guide and justify their actions for all the power the government has being only for the good of the society as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws that both the people may know their duty and be safe and secure within the limits of the law and the rulers too kept within their bounds and not be tempted by the power they have in their hands to employ it to such purposes and by such measures as they would not have known and own not willingly section 138 thirdly the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent for the preservation of property being the end of government and that for which men enter into society it necessarily supposes and requires that the people should have property without which they must be supposed to lose that by entering into society which was the end for which they entered into it to gross an absurdity for any man to own men therefore in society having property they have such a right to the goods which by the laws of the community are theirs and that nobody has a right to take their substance or any part of it from them without their own consent without this they have no property at all for I have truly no property in that which another can by right take from me when he places against my consent hence it is a mistake to think that the supreme or legislative power of any common wealth can do what it will and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily or take any part of them at pleasure this is not much to be feared in government where the legislative consists wholly or in part in assemblies which are variable whose members upon the dissolution of the assembly are subjects under the common laws of their country equally with the rest but in government where the legislative is in one lasting assembly always in being or in one man as an absolute monarchies there is danger still that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power by taking what they think fits from the people for a man's property is not at all secure though there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects if he who commends those subjects have power to take from any private man what part he pleases of his property and to use and dispose of it as he thinks good section 139 but government into whatever hands it is put being as I have before showed entrusted with this condition and for this end that men might have and secure their properties the prince or senate however it may have power to make laws for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another yet can ever have a power to take to themselves the whole or any part of the subject's property without their own consent for this will be in effect to leave them no property at all and let us see that even absolute power where it is necessary is not arbitrary by being absolute but is still limited by that reason and confined to those ends which required it in some cases to be absolute we need look no further than the common practice of martial discipline for the preservation of the army and in it of the whole common wealth requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer and it is just lead that to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them but yet we see that neither the sergeant that could command the soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon or stand in a breach where he is almost sure to perish can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money nor the general that can condemn him for death for deserting his post or for not obeying the most desperate orders can yet with all his absolute power of life and death dispose of one farthing of that soldier's estate or sees one drop of his goods whom yet he can command anything and hang for the last disobedience because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end for which the commander has his power vis the preservation of the rest but the disposing of his good has nothing to do with it section 140 it is true governments cannot be supported without great charge and it is fit everyone who enjoys his share of the protection should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it but still it must be his own consent i.e the consent of the majority giving it either by themselves or the representatives chosen by them for if anyone shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people by his own authority and without such consent of the people he thereby invades the fundamental law of property and subverts the end of government for what property have i in that which another may by right take when he pleases to himself section 141 forcefully the legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands for it is being but a delegated power from the people they who have it cannot pass it over to others the people alone can appoint the form of the common wealth which is by constituting the legislative and appointing in whose hands that shall be and when the people have said we submit to rules and be governed by laws made by such men and in such forms nobody else can say other men shall make laws for them nor can the people be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and authorized to make laws for them the power of the legislative being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution can be no other than what the positive grant conveyed which being only to make laws and not to make legislators the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and place it in other hands section 142 these are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the society and the law of god and nature have set to the legislative power of every common wealth in all forms of government first they are to govern by promulgated established laws not to be varied in particular cases but have one rule for rich and poor for the favorite at court and the country man at plow secondly these laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the people thirdly they must not raise taxes on the property of the people without the consent of the people given by themselves or their deputies and this properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies to be from time to time chosen by themselves fourthly the legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else or place it anywhere but where the people have end of book two chapter 11 of two treatises of civil government this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording my Ashwin Jain two treatises of civil government by John Locke book two chapter 12 of the legislative, executive and federative power of the commonwealth the legislative power is that which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and members of it but because those laws which are constantly to be executed and whose force is always to continue may be made in a little time therefore there is no need that the legislative should always in being not having all their business to do and because it may be too great a temptation to human frailty have to grasp that power for the same persons who have the power of making laws to have also in their hands the power to execute them whereby they make them themselves from obedience to the laws they make and suit the law both in its making and execution to their own private advantage and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community contrary to the end of society and government therefore in well-ordered commonwealths where the good of the whole is to be considered as it are the legislative power is put into the hands of diverse persons who newly assembled have by themselves or jointly with others a power to make laws which when they have been being separated again they are themselves subject to the laws they have made which is a new tie upon them to take care and they make them for the public good but because the laws that are at once and in a short time made have a constant and lasting force and need a perpetual execution or an attendance therein too therefore it is necessary they should be have power always in being we should see to the execution of the laws that are made and remain in force and thus the legislative and executive power come often to be separated there is another power in every commonwealth which one may call natural because it is that which answers to the power every man naturally at before he entered society for though in a commonwealth the members of eight are distinct persons still in reference to one another and as such are governed by the laws of the society yet in reference to the rest of mankind they make one body which is as every member of it before was still in the state of nature with the rest of the mankind hence it is that the controversies that happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it are managed by the public and an injury done to a member of a body engages the whole in the reparation of it so that under this consideration the whole community is one body in the state of nature in respect of all other states or persons out of its community it is therefore contains the power of war and peace leaks and alliances and all the transactions with all persons and communities without the commonwealth and may be called federative if anyone pleases so the thing we understood I am indifferent as to the name these two powers executive and federative though may be really distinct in themselves yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the society within itself upon all that are parts of it the other the management of the security and interest of the public without with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from yet they are always almost united and though this federative power in the well or ill management of it we have great moment to the commonwealth yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent standing positive laws than the executor and so must necessarily be left with the prudence and wisdom of those whose hands it is in to be managed for the public good for the laws that concern subjects one amongst another being to direct their actions may well enough receive them but what is to be done in reference to foreigners depending much upon their actions and the variation designs an interest must be left in great part to the prudence of those who have this power committed to them to be managed by the best of their skill for the advantage of the commonwealth though as I said the executive and federative power of every community we really distinct in themselves yet they are hardly to be separated and placed at the same time in the hands of distinct persons for both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise it is almost impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct and not subordinate hands or that the executive and federative power should be placed in persons that might act separately whereby the force of the public would be under different commands which would be apt sometime or other cause disorder or ruin end of chapter 12 recording by ashwin jen book 2 chapter 13 of two treatises of a civil government this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by ashwin jen two treatises of civil government by john lock book 2 chapter 13 of the subordination of the powers of the commonwealth though in a constituted commonwealth standing upon its own basis and acting according to its own nature that is acting for the preservation of the community they can be but one supreme power which is the legislative to which all the rest are and must be subordinate yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends they remain still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them for all power given with trust for the attaining an end being limited by that end whenever that end is manifestly neglected or opposed the trust must necessarily be forfeited and the power devolve into the hands of those that give it who may place it anew where they shall think best for the safety and security and thus the community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of anybody even of the legislators where they shall be so foolish or so wicked as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject for no man or society of men having a power to deliver up the preservation or consequently the means of it to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another whenever anyone shall go about to bring them into such a slavish condition they will always have a right to preserve what they have not a power to part with and to rid themselves of those who invade this fundamental sacred and unalterable law of self reservation for which they entered into society and thus the community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power but not as considered under any form of government because this power of the people can never take place till the government is dissolved in all cases which the government subsists the legislative is a supreme power for what can give laws to another must needs be superior to him and since the legislative is no otherwise legislative society but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts and for every member of the society prescribing rules for the actions and giving power of execution where they are transgressed the legislative must needs be the supreme and all other powers in any members of parts of the society derived from and subordinate to it in some common wells where the legislative is not always in being and the executive is vested in a single person who has also a share in the legislative there that single person in a very tolerable sense may also be called supreme not that he has in self all supreme power which is that of lawmaking but because he has in him the supreme execution from whom all in fear magistrates derive all the several subordinate powers or at least the greatest part of them having also no legislative superior to him there being no law to be made without his consent which cannot be expected should ever subject him to the other part of the legislative he is properly enough in the sense supreme but yet it is to be observed that though oaths of allegiance and faulty are taken to him it is not to him a supreme legislator but as supreme executor of the law made by a joint power of him with others allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law which when he violates he has no right to obedience nor can claim it otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the law and so is to be considered as the image phantom or representative of the common wealth acted by the will of society declared in its laws and thus he has no will no power but that of the law but when he quits this representation this public will and acts by his own private will degrades himself and is but a single private person without power and without will that has any right to obedience the members going no obedience but to the public will of society the executive power placed anywhere but in a person that has also a share in the legislative is visibly subordinate and accountable to it and maybe at pleasure changed and displaced so that it is not the supreme executive power that is exempt from subordination but the supreme executive power vested in one who having a share in the legislative has no distinct superior legislative to be subordinate and accountable to father than he himself shall join and consent so that he is no more subordinate than he himself shall think fit which one may certainly conclude will be but very little of other ministerial and subordinate powers in a common wealth we need not speak they being so multiplied with infinite variety in the different customs and constitutions of distinct common wealth that it is impossible to give a particular account of blame all only there's much which is necessary to our present purpose we may take notice of concerning them that they have no matter of authority any of them beyond what is by positive grant and commission dedicated to them and all of them accountable to some other power in the common wealth it is not necessary no not so much as convenient the legislative should be always in being but absolutely necessary that the executive powers should because there is not always need of new laws to be made but always need of execution of the laws that are made when the legislative has put the execution of the laws they make into other hands they have a power still to resume it out of those hands when they find cause and to punish for any maladministration against the laws the same holds also in regard of the federative power that and the executive being both ministerial and subordinate to the legislative which as has been showed in a constituted common wealth is supreme the legislative also in this case being supposed to consist of several persons for if it be a single person it cannot but be always in being and so will as supreme naturally have the supreme executive power together with the legislative may assemble and exercise the legislature at the times that either their original constitution or their own adjournment appoints or when they please if neither of these had appointed any time or there would be no other way prescribed to convoke them for the supreme power being placed in them by the people it is always in them and they may exercise it when the place unless by their original constitution they're limited to certain seasons or by an act of the supreme power they have adjourned to a certain time and when that time comes they have a right to assemble and act again if the legislative or any part of it be made up of representatives chosen for that time by the people which afterwards return into the ordinary state of subjects and have no share in the legislature but upon a new choice this power of choosing must also be exercised by the people either at certain appointed seasons or else when they are summoned to it and in this latter case the power of unworking the legislative is ordinarily placed in the executive and has one of these two limitations in respect of time that either the original constitution requires the assembling and acting at certain intervals and then the executive power there's nothing but ministerially issued directions for the electing and assembling according to due forms or else it is left to his prudence call them by new elections when the occasions or exigencies of the public require the amendment of old or making of new laws or the redress or prevention of any inconveniences that lie on or threaten the people it may be demanded here what if the executive power being possessed of the force of the common wealth shall make use of that force to hint to the meeting and acting of the legislative when the original constitution or public exigencies require it i say using force upon the people without authority and contrary to the trust put in him that does is a state of war with the people who have arrived to reinstate their legislative in the exercise of the power for having erected a legislative with an intent they should exercise the power of making laws either at certain times or when there is need of it when they are hindered by any force from what is so necessary to the society and wherein the safety and preservation of the people consists the people have a right to remove it by force in all states and conditions that true remedy of force without authority is to oppose force to it the use of force without authority always puts him in that uses it into a state of war as their gracer and renders him liable to be treated accordingly the power of assembling and dismissing the legislative place in the executive gives not the executive a superiority over it but is a fiduciary trust placed in him for the safety of the people in a case where the uncertainty and variable less of human affairs could not be a steady fixed truth what is not being possible that the first framers of the government should by any foresight be so much masters of future events has to be able to prefix so just periods of return duration to the assemblies of the legislative in all times to come that might exactly answer all the exigencies of the commonwealth the best remedy could be found for this defect was to trust to this prudence of one who was always to be present and whose business it was to watch over public good constant frequent meetings of the legislative and long continuations of their assemblies without necessary occasion could not but be burdensome to the people and most necessarily in time reduce more dangerous inconveniences and yet the quick turnoff affairs might be sometimes such as to need to present help and delay of the convening might endanger the public and sometimes to their business might be so great that the limited time of their sitting might be too short for their work and rob the public of that benefit which could be had only from their mature deliberation what then could be done in this case to prevent the community from being exposed some time or other to eminent hazard on one side or the other by fixed intervals and periods said to the meeting and acting of the legislative but to interest it to the prudence of some who being present and acquainted with the state of public affairs might make use of this prerogative for the public good and where else could this be so well placed as in his hands who was interested with the execution of the laws the same end thus supposing the regulation of times for the assembling and setting of the legislative not settled by the original constitution it naturally fell into the hands of the executive not as an arbitrary power depending on his good pleasure but with this trust obvious to have exercised only for the public field as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might require whether settled periods of their convening or a liberty left to the prince for convoking the legislative perhaps a mixture of both had the least inconvenience attending it it is not my business here to inquire but only to shoo that though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking and dissolving such conventions of the legislative yet it is not thereby superior to it things of this world are in so constant a flux that nothing remains long in the same state thus people riches great power change their stations flourishing mighty cities come to ruin and prove in times neglected the solid corners with other and frequented places grow into populist countries filled with wealth and inhabitants but things not always changing equally and private interest often keeping up customs and privileges when the reasons of them are seized it often comes to pass that in governments we're part of the legislative consists of representatives chosen by the people that interact of time this representation becomes very unequal and disproportionate to the reasons it was at first established upon to what gross absurdities the following of custom when reason has left it may lead we may be satisfied when we see the bare name of a town of which there remains not so much as the runes we escape so much housing as a sheep coat or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be found since as many representatives to the grant assembly of lawmakers as a whole county numerous in people and powerful in riches the strangers stand amused at and everyone must confess needs a remedy the most thing it hard to find one because the constitution of legislative being the original and supreme act of society and dissident to all positive laws in it and depending wholly on the people no inferior power can alter it and therefore the people when the legislative is once constituted having in such a government as we have been speaking of no power to act as long as the government stands its inconvenience is thought incapable of a remedy salut populi supreme alex is certainly so just and fundamental a rule that he who sincerely follows it cannot dangerously err if therefore the executive who has the power of unworking the legislative observing rather the true proportion than fashion of representation regulates not by all custom but through reason the number of members in all places that have a right to be distinctly represented which no part of the people however incorporated can pretend to but in proportion to the assistance which it affords to the public it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative but to have restored the old and true one and to have rectified the disorders with succession of time and insensibly as well as inevitably introduced for it being the interest as well as intention of the people to have a fair and equal representative whoever brings it nearest to the head is an undoubted friend to an establishment of the government it cannot miss the consent and approbation of the community prerogative being nothing but a power in the hands of the prince to provide for the public good in such cases which depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences certain and unalterable laws could not safely direct whatsoever shall be done manifestly for the good of the people and establishing the government upon its true foundations is and always will be just prerogative the power of electing new corporations and therewith new representatives carries with it a supposition that in time the measures of representation might vary and those places have a just right to be represented which before had done and by the same reason those cease to have a right and be too inconsiderable for such a privilege which before had it it is not a change from the present state which perhaps corruption or decay has introduced that makes an intrude upon the government by the tendency of it to injure or press the people and to set up one part or party with a distinction from and an unequal subjection of the rest whatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to society and people in general upon just and lasting measures will always when done justify itself and whenever the people shall choose the representatives upon just and undeniably equal measures to table to the original frame of the government it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society whoever permitted or caused them so to do end of chapter 13 recording by Ashwin jen book 2 chapter 14 of two treatises of civil government this is a library of recording all of your recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liverybox.org recording by Ashwin jen two treatises of civil government by john lock book 2 chapter 14 of prerogative where the legislative and executive powers are in distinct hands as they are in all moderated monarchies and well-framed governments there the good of the society requires that several things should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power for the legislators not being able to foresee and provide by laws for all that may be useful to the community the executor of the laws having the power in his hands as by the common law of nature i write to make use of it for the good of the society in many cases where the municipal law has given no direction till the legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it many things there are which the law can by no means provide for and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands to be ordered by him as a public good and advantage shall require nay it is fit that the laws themselves should be in some cases give way to the executive power or rather to this fundamental law of nature and government with that as much as may be all members of the society are to be preserved for since many accidents may happen wherein a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm as not to pull down innocent man's house to stop the fire when the next to it is burning and a man may come sometimes within the reach of the law which makes no distinction of persons by an action that may deserve reward and pardon it is fit the ruler should have a power in many cases to mitigate the severity of the law and pardon some offenders for the end of common being the preservation of all and as much as may be even the guilty are to be spared but can prove no prejudice to the innocent this power to act according to discretion for the public could without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it is that which is called prerogative for since in some governments the law making power is not always in being and is usually too numerous and so to slow with a dispatch requisite execution and because also it is impossible to foresee and so by laws to provide for all accidents and necessities that may concern the public or to make such laws as will do no harm if they are executed with an inflexible rigor on all occasions and upon all persons that may come in their way therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe this power which is employed for the benefit of the community and suitably to the trust and ends of the government is undoubted prerogative and never is questioned for the people are very seldom or never scrupulous or nice in the point they are far from examining prerogative whilst it is in any tolerable degree employed for the use it was meant that is for the good of the people and not manifestly against it but if there comes to be a question between the executive power and the people about a thin claim as a prerogative the tendency of the exercise of such prerogative to the good or hurt of the people will easily decide that question it is easy to conceive that in the infancy of governments when common wells differed little from families in number of people they differed from them too but little in number of laws and the governors being as fathers of them watching over them for their good the government was almost all prerogative a few established laws served the turn and the discretion and care of the ruler supplied the rest but when mistake of flattery prevailed with weak princes to make use of this power for private ends of their own and not for the public good the people were fined by express laws to get prerogative determined in those points wherein they found disadvantage from it and those declared limitations of prerogative were by the people found necessary in cases which they and their ancestors had left in the utmost latitude to the wisdom of those princes who made no other but a right use of it that is for the good of their people and therefore they have a very wrong notion of comment who say the people have encroached upon the prerogative when they have got any part of it to be defined by positive laws for in so doing they have not pulled from the prince anything that of right belong to him but only declared that that power which they indefinitely left in his or his ancestors hands to be exercised for their good was not a thing which they intended him when he used it otherwise for the end of government being the good of the community whatsoever alterations are made in it tending to that end cannot be an encroachment upon anybody since nobody in government can have a right tending to any other end and those only encroachments which prejudice or hinder the public good those who say otherwise speak as if the prince had a distinct and separate interest from the good of the community and was not made for it the root and source from which sprang almost all those evils and disorders which happened in kingly comments and indeed if that be so the people under his comment are not a society of rational creatures entered into a community for the mutual good they're not such as have such rulers over themselves to guard and promote that good but are to be looked on as an herd of inferior creatures under the dominion of a master who keeps them and works them for his own pleasure or profit if men were so void of reason and brutish as to enter into society upon such terms prerogative might indeed be what some men would have it an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to the people but since a rational creature cannot be supposed when free to put himself into subjection to another for his own harm though where he finds a good and wise ruler he may not perhaps think it either necessary or useful to set precise bounds to his power in all things prerogative can be nothing but the people's permitting their rulers to do several things of their own free choice where the law was silent and sometimes do against the direct letter of the law for the public good and they're acquiescing in it when so done for as a good prince whose mindful of the trust put into his hands and careful of the good of his people cannot have too much prerogative that is power to do good so a weak and ill prince who would claim that power which his predecessors exercised without the direction of the law as a prerogative belonging to him by right of his office which he may exercise at his pleasure to make a promote and interest distinct from that of the public gives the people an occasion to claim their right and limit that power which whilst it was exercised for their good their content should be tacitly allowed and therefore he that will look into the history of england will find that prerogative was always largest in the hands of our wisest and best princes because the people observing the whole tendency of their actions to be the public good contested not what was done without law to that end or if any human frailty or mistake for princes are but men made as others appeared in some small declination from that end yet was visible the main of their conduct tended to nothing but the care of the public the people therefore finding reason to be satisfied with these princes whenever they acted without or contrary to the letter of the law acquiesced in what they did and without the least complaint let them enlarge their prerogative as they pleased judging rightly that they did nothing herein to their prejudice of their laws since they acted confirmable to the foundation and held of all laws the public could such godlike princes indeed had some title to arbitrary power by that argument that would prove absolute monarchy the best government as that which called himself covers the universe by because such kings partake of his wisdom and goodness upon this is founded that saying that the reins of good princes have been always most dangerous to the liberties of the people for when their successes managing the government with different thoughts would draw the actions of those good rulers into precedent and make them the standard of the prerogative as in what had been done only for the good of the people was a right in them to do for the harm of the people if they're so pleased it has often occasioned contest and sometimes public disorders before the people could recover their original right and get that to be declared not to be prerogative which truly was never so since it is impossible that anybody in the society should ever have a right to do the people harm though it be very possible and reasonable that the people should not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative of those kings or rulers who themselves transgressed not the bounds of the public good a prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule the power of calling parliaments in england as to precise time place and duration is certainly a prerogative of the king but still with this trust that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation as the exigencies of the times in variety of occasions shall require for it being impossible to foresee which should always be the fittest place for them to assemble in and what the best season the choice of these was left with the executive power as might be most subservient to the public good and best suit the ends of parliaments the whole question will be asked in this matter of prerogative but who shall be the judge when this power is made a right use of I answer between an executive power in being with such a prerogative and a legislative depends upon his will for the convening they can be no judge on earth as they can be none between the legislative and the people should either the executive or the legislative when they have got the power in their hands design or go about to enslave or destroy them the people have no other remedy in this as in all cases where they have no judge on earth but you appeal to heaven for the rulers in such attempts exercising a power that people never put into their hands who can never be supposed to consent anybody should rule over them for their harm do that which they have not a right to do and where the body of the people or any single man is deprived of their right or is under the exercise of a power without right and have no appeal on earth then they have a liberty to appeal to heaven whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment and therefore though the people cannot be judge so as to have by the constitution of that society any superior power to determine and give effective sentence in the case yet they have by law antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men resolved that ultimate determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind where there lies no appeal on earth ways to judge whether they have just caused to make their appeal to heaven and this judgment they cannot fight with it being out of a man's power so to submit himself to another as to give him a liberty to destroy him god and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself as to neglect his own preservation and since he cannot take away his own life neither can he give another power to take it nor let anyone think this lays a perpetual foundation for this order for this operates not till the inconvenience is so great the majority feel it and are wary of it and find a necessity to have it amended but this the executive power or vice princes never need come in the danger of and it is the thing of all others they have most need to avoid as of all others the most penniless end of chapter 14 recording my ashen jen book two chapter 15 of two treatises of civil government this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libra vox.org two treatises of civil government by john lock book two chapter 15 of paternal political and despotical power considered together though i have had occasion to speak of these separately before yet the great mistakes of late about government having as i suppose a risen from confounding these distinct powers one with another it may not perhaps be amiss to consider them here together first then paternal or parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their children to govern them for the children's good till they come to the use of reason or a state of knowledge wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule whether it be the law of nature or the municipal law of their country they are to govern themselves by capable i say to know it as well as several others who live as freemen under that law the affection and tenderness which god had planted in the breast of parents towards their children makes it evident that this is not intended to be a severe arbitrary government but only for the help instruction and preservation of their offspring but happen as it will there is as i have proved no reason why it should be thought to extend to life and death at any time over their children more than over anybody else neither can there be any pretense why this parental power should keep the child when grown to a man in subjection to the will of his parents any farther than having received life and education from his parents obliges him to respect honor gratitude assistance and support all his life to both father and mother and thus to his true the paternal is a natural government but not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of that which is political the power of the father does not reach at all to the property of the child which is only in his own disposing secondly political power is that power which every man having in the state of nature has given up into the hands of the society and therein to the governors whom the society hath set over itself with this express or tacit trust that it shall be employed for their good and the preservation of their property now this power which every man has in the state of nature and which he parts with to the society in all cases where the society can secure him is to use such means for the preserving of his own property as he thinks good and nature allows him and to punish the breach of the law of nature and others so as according to the best of his reason may most conduce to the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind so that the end and measure of this power when in every man's hands in the state of nature being the preservation of all his society that is all mankind in general it can have no other end or measure when in the hands of the magistrate but to preserve the members of that society in their lives liberties and possessions and so cannot be absolute arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes which are as much as possible to be preserved but a power to make laws and annex such penalties to them as may tend to the preservation of the whole by cutting off those parts and those only which are so corrupt that they threaten the sound and healthy without which no severity is lawful and this power has its original only from compact in agreement and the mutual consent of those who make up the community third despotical power is an absolute arbitrary power one man has over another to take away his life whenever he pleases this is a power which neither nature gives for it has made no such distinction between one man and another nor compact can convey for man not having such an arbitrary power over his own life cannot give another man such a power over it but it is the effect only a forfeiture which the aggressor makes of his own life when he puts himself into the state of war with another for having quitted reason which god hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man and the common bond whereby humankind is united into one fellowship in society and having renounced the way of peace which that teaches and made use of the force of war to compass his unjust ends upon another where he has no right and so revolting from his own kind to that abyss by making force which is theirs to be his rule of right he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person and the rest of mankind that will join with him in the execution of justice as any other wild beast or noxious brute with whom mankind can have neither society nor security and thus captives taken in a just and lawful war and such only are subject to a despotical power which as it arises not from compact so neither is it capable of any but is the state of war continued for what compact can be made with a man who is not master of his own life what condition can he perform and if he be once allowed to be master of his own life the despotical arbitrary power of his master ceases he is that master of himself and his own life and has a right to to the means of preserving it so that as soon as as compact enters slavery ceases and he so far quits his absolute power and puts an end to the state of war who enters into conditions with his captive nature gives the first of these viz paternal power to parents for the benefit of their children during their minority to supply their want of ability and understanding how to manage their property by property i must be understood here as in other places to mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods voluntary agreement gives the second viz political power to governors for the benefit of their subjects to secure them in the possession and use of their properties and forfeiture gives the third despotical power to lords for their own benefit over those who are stripped of all property he that shall consider the distinct rise and extent and the different ends of these several powers will plainly see that paternal power comes as far short of that of the magistrate as despotical exceeds it and that absolute dominion however placed is so far from being one kind of civil society that it is inconsistent with it as slavery is with property paternal power is only where minority makes the child incapable to manage his property political where men have property in their own disposal and despotical over such as have no property at all end of book two chapter fifteen book two chapter sixteen of two treatises of civil government this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libra vox dot org two treatises of civil government by john lock book two chapter sixteen of conquest though governments can originally have no other rise than that before mentioned nor politics be founded on anything but the consent of the people yet such have been the disorders ambition has filled the world with that in the noise of war which makes so great a part of the history of mankind this consent is little taken notice of and therefore many have mistaken the force of arms for the consent of the people and reckon conquest is one of the originals of government but conquest is as far from setting up any government as demolishing announces from building a new one in the place indeed it often makes way for a new frame of a commonwealth by destroying the former but without the consent of the people can never erect a new one that the aggressor who puts himself into the state of war with another and unjustly invades another man's right can by such an unjust war never come to have a right over the conquered will be easily agreed by all men who will not think that robbers and pirates have a right of empire over whomever they have forced enough to master or that men are bound by promises which unlawful force extorts from them should a robber break into my house and with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to convey my estate to him would this give him any title just such a title by his sword has an unjust conqueror who forces me into submission the injury and the crime is equal whether committed by the wearer of a crown or some petty villain the title of the offender and the number of his followers make no difference in the offense unless it be to aggravate it the only difference is great robbers punish little ones to keep them in their obedience but the great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs because they are too big for the weak hands of justice in this world and have the power in their own possession which should punish offenders what is my remedy against a robber that so broke into my house appeal to the law for justice but perhaps justice is denied or i am crippled and cannot stir robbed and have not the means to do it if god has taken away all means of seeking remedy there is nothing left but patience but my son when able may seek relief of the law which i am denied he or his son may renew his appeal till he recover his right but the conquered or their children have no court no arbitrator on earth to appeal to then they may appeal as jeff did to heaven and repeat their appeal till they have recovered their native right of their ancestors which was to have such a legislative over them as the majority should approve and freely acquiesce in if it be objected this would cause endless trouble i answer no more than justice does where she lies open to all that appeal to her he that troubles his neighbor without a cause is punished for it by the justice of the court he appeals to and he that appeals to heaven must be sure he has right on his side and a right to that is worth the trouble and cost of the appeal as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived and will be sure to retribute to everyone according to the mischiefs he hath created to his fellow subjects that is any part of mankind from once it is plain that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of the conquered but supposing victory favors the right side let us consider a conqueror in a lawful war and see what power he gets and over whom first it is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that conquered with him that they fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest but must at least be as much freemen as they were before and most commonly they serve upon terms and on condition to share with their leader and enjoy a part of the spoil and other advantages that attend the conquering sword or at least have a part of the subdued country bestowed upon them and the conquering people are not i hope to be slaves by conquest and wear their laurels only to show they are sacrifices to their leaders triumph they that found absolute monarchy upon the title of the sword can make their heroes who are the founders of such monarchies errant draw concerns and forget they had any officers and soldiers that fought on their side in the battles they won or assisted them in the subduing or shared in possessing the countries they mastered we are told by some that the english monarchy is founded in the norman conquest and that our princes have thereby a title to absolute dominion which if it were true as by the history it appears otherwise and that william had a right to make war on this island yet his dominion by conquest could reach no farther than to the saxons and britains that were the inhabitants of this country the normans that came with him and helped to and all descended from them are freemen and no subjects by conquest let that give what dominion it will and if i or anybody else shall claim freedom as derived from them it will be very hard to prove the contrary and it is plain the law that has made no distinction between the one and the other intends not that there should be any difference in their freedoms or privileges but supposing which seldom happens that the conquerors and conquered never incorporated into one people under the same laws and freedom let us see next what power lawful conqueror has over the subdued and that i say is purely despotical he has an absolute power over the lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them but not over the lives or fortunes of those who engage not in the war nor over the possessions even of those who were actually engaged in it secondly i say the conqueror gets no power but only over those who have actually assisted concurred or consented to that unjust force that is used against him for the people having given nothing to their governors no power to do an unjust thing such as is to make an unjust war for they never had such a power in themselves they ought not to be charged as guilty of the violence and unjustice that is committed in an unjust war any farther than they actually abetted no more than they are to be thought guilty of any violence or oppression their governors should use upon the people themselves or any part of their fellow subjects they have empowered them no more to the one than to the other conquerors it is true seldom trouble themselves to make the distinction but they willingly permit the confusion of war to sweep all together but yet this altar is not the right for the conqueror's power over the lives of the conquered being only because they have used force to do or maintain an injustice he can have that power only over those who have concurred in that force all the rest are innocent and he has no more title over the people of that country who have done him no injury and so have made no forfeiture of their lives than he has over any other who without injuries or provocations have lived upon fair terms with him thirdly the power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes an unjust war is perfectly despotical he has an absolute power over the lives of those who by putting themselves in a state of war have forfeited them but he has not there by a right and title to their possessions this i doubt not but at first sight will seem a strange doctrine it being so quite contrary to the practice of the world there being nothing more familiar in speaking of the dominions of countries than to say such a one conquered it as if conquest without any more due conveyed a right of possession but when we consider that the practice of the strong and powerful how universal so ever it may be is seldom the right of rule whether it be one part of the subjection of the conquered not to argue against the conditions cut out to them by the conquering sword though in all war there be usually a complication of force and damage and the aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate when he uses force against the persons of those he makes war upon yet it is the use of force only that puts a man into the state of war for whether by force he begins the injury or else having quietly and by fraud done the injury he refuses to make reparation and by force maintains it which is the same thing as at first to have done it by force it is the unjust use of force that makes the war for he that breaks up in my house and violently turns me out of doors or having peaceably got in by force keeps me out does in effect the same thing supposing we are in such a state that we have no common judge on earth whom i may appeal to and to whom we are both obliged to submit for of such i'm now speaking it is the unjust use of force then that puts a man into the state of war with another and thereby he that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of his life for quitting reason which is the rule given between man and man and using force the way of beasts he becomes liable to be destroyed by him he uses force against as any savage ravenous beast that is dangerous to his being but because the miscarriages of the father are no faults of the children and they may be rational and peaceable notwithstanding the britishness and injustice of the father the father by his miscarriages and violence can forfeit but his own life but involves not his children in his guilt or destruction his goods which nature that will if the preservation of all mankind as much as is possible have made to belong to the children to keep them from perishing do still continue to belong to his children for supposing them not to have joined in the war either through infancy absence or choice they have done nothing to forfeit them nor has the conqueror any right to take them away by the bare title of having subdued him that by force attempted his destruction though perhaps he may have some right to them to repair the damages he has sustained by the war and the defense of his own right which how far it reaches to the possessions of the conquered we shall see by and by so that he that by conquest has a right over a man's person to destroy him if he pleases has not thereby a right over his estate to possess and enjoy it for it is the brutal force the aggressor has used that gives his adversary a right to take away his life and destroy him if he pleases as a noxious creature but it is damage sustained that alone gives him title to another man's goods for though i may kill a thief that sets on me in the highway yet i may not which seems less take away his money and let him go this would be robbery on my side his force and the state of war he put himself in made him forfeit his life but gave me no title to his goods the right then of conquest extends only to the lives of those who joined in the war not to their estates but only in order to make reparation for the damages received and the charges of the war and that too with the reservation of the right of the innocent wife and children let the conqueror have as much justice on his side as could be supposed he has no right to seize more than the vanquished could forfeit his life is at the victor's mercy and his service and goods he may appropriate to make himself reparation but he cannot take the goods of his wife and children they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed and their shares in the estate he possessed for example i in the state of nature and all commonwealths are in the state of nature one with another have injured another man and refusing to give satisfaction it comes to a state of war wherein my defending by force that what i have gotten unjustly makes me the aggressor i am conquered my life it is true forfeit is at mercy but not my wife's and children's they made not the war nor assisted in it i could not forfeit their lives they were not mine to forfeit my wife had a share in my estate that neither could i forfeit and my children also being born of me had a right to be maintained out of my labor or substance here then is the case the conqueror has a title to reparation for damages received and the children have a title to their father's estate for their subsistence for as to the wife's share neither her own labor or compact gave her a title to it it is plain her husband could not forfeit what was hers what must be done in the case i answer the fundamental law of nature being that all as much as maybe should be preserved it follows that if there be not enough fully to satisfy both viz for the conqueror's losses and children's maintenance he that hath and to spare must remit something of his full satisfaction and give way to the pressing and preferable title of those who are in danger to perish without it but supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be made up to the conqueror to the utmost farthing and that the children of the vanquished spoiled of all their father's goods are to be left to starve and perish yet the satisfying of what shall on this score be due to the conqueror will scarce give him a title to any country shall be conquered for the damages of war can scarce amount to the value of any considerable tract of land in any part of the world where all land is possessed and none lies waste and if i have not taken away the conqueror's land which being vanquished it is impossible i should scarce any other spoil i have done him can amount to the value of mine supposing it equally cultivated and of an extent anyway coming near what i had overrun of his the destruction of a year's product or two for seldom reaches four or five is the utmost spoil that usually can be done for as to money and such riches and treasure taken away these are none of nature's goods they have but a fantastical imaginary value nature has put no such upon them they are of no more account by her standard than the wampum poke of the americans to a european prince or the silver money of europe would have been formally to an american and five years product is not worth the perpetual inheritance of land where all is possessed and none remains waste to be taken up by him that is deceased which will be easily granted if one do but take away the imaginary value of money the disproportion being more than between five and five hundred though at the same time half a year's product is more worth than the inheritance where they're being more land than the inhabitants possess and make use of anyone has liberty to make use of the waste but their conquerors take little care to possess themselves of the lands of the vanquished no damage therefore that men in the state of nature as all princes and governments are in reference to one another suffer from another can give a conqueror power to dispossess the posterity of the vanquished and turn them out of that inheritance which ought to be the possession of them and their descendants to all generations the conqueror indeed will be apt to think himself master and it is the very condition of the subdued not to be able to dispute their right but if that be all it gives no other title than what bare force gives to the stronger over the weaker and by this reason he that is strongest will have a right to whatever he pleases to seize on over those then that joined with him in the war and over those of the subdued country that opposed him not and the posterity even of those that did the conqueror even in a just war hath by his conquest no right of dominion they are free from any subjection to him and if their former government be dissolved they are at liberty to begin and erect another to themselves the conqueror it is true usually by the force he has over them compels them with a sword at their breasts to stoop to his conditions and submit to such a government as he pleases to afford them but the inquiry is what right hath he to do so if it be said they submit by their own consent then this allows their consent to be necessary to give the conqueror a title to rule over them it remains only to be considered whether promises extorted by force without right can be thought consent and how far they bind to which I shall say they bind not at all because whatsoever another gets from me by force I shall retain the right of and he is obliged presently to restore he that forces my horse from me ought presently to restore him and I have still a right to retake him by the same reason he that forced to promise from me ought presently to restore it i.e. quit me of the obligation of it or I may resume it myself i.e. choose whether I will perform it for the law of nature laying an obligation on me only by the rules they prescribes cannot oblige me by the violation of her rules such is the extorting anything from me by force nor does it at all alter the case to say I gave my promise no more than it excuses the force and passes the right when I put my hand in my pocket and deliver my purse myself to a thief who demands it with a pistol at my breast from all which it follows that the government of a conqueror imposed by force on the subdued against whom he had no right of war or who joined not in the war against him where he had right has no obligation upon them but let us suppose that all the men of that community being all members of the same body politic may be taken to have joined in that unjust war wherein they are subdued and so their lives are at the mercy of the conqueror I say this concerns not their children who are in their minority for since a father hath not in himself a power over the life or liberty of his child no act of his can possibly forfeit it so that the children whatever may have happened to the fathers are free men and the absolute power of the conqueror reaches no farther than the persons of the men that were subdued by him and dies with them and should he govern them as slaves subjected to his absolute arbitrary power he has no such right of dominion over their children he can have no power over them but by their own consent whatever he may drive them to say or do and he has no lawful authority whilst force and not choice compels them to submission every man is born with a double right first a right of freedom to his person which no other man has a power over but the free disposal of it lies in himself secondly a right before any other man to inherit with his brethren his father's goods by the first of these a man is naturally free from subjection to any government though he'd be born in a place under its jurisdiction but if he disclaim the lawful government of the country he was born in he must also quit the right that belonged to him by the laws of it and the possessions they're descending to him from his ancestors if it were a government made by their consent by the second the inhabitants of any country who are descended and derive a title to their estates from those who are subdued and had a government forced upon them against their free contents retain a right to the possession of their ancestors though they consent not freely to the government whose heart conditions were by force imposed on the possessors of that country for the first conqueror never having had title to the land of that country the people who are the descendants of or claim under those who were forced to submit to the yoke of a government by constraint have always a right to shake it off and free themselves from the usurpation or tyranny which the sword hath brought in upon them till their rulers put them under such a frame of government as they willingly and of choice consent to who doubts but that the greece and christians descendants of the ancient possessors of that country may justly cast off the turkish yoke which they have so long grown under whenever they have an opportunity to do it for no government can have a right to obedience from a people who have not freely consented to it which they can never be supposed to do till either they are put in a full state of liberty to choose their government and governors or at least till they have such standing laws to which they have by themselves or their representatives given their free consent and also till they are allowed their due property which is to be the proprietors of what they have that nobody can take away any part of it without their own consent without which men under any government are not in the state of free men but are direct slaves under the force of war by granting that the conqueror in a just war has a right to the estates as well as power over the persons of the conquered which it is plain he hath not nothing of absolute power will follow from hence in the continuance of the government because the descendants of these being all free men if he grants them estates and possessions to inhabit his country without which it would be worth nothing whatsoever he grants them they have so far as it is granted property in the nature whereof is that without a man's own consent it cannot be taken from him their persons are free by a native right and their properties be they more or less are their own and at their own dispose and not at his or else it is no property supposing the conqueror gives to one man a thousand acres to him and his heirs forever to another he lets a thousand acres for his life under the rent of fifty pounds or five hundred pounds per annum has not the right of one of these a right to his thousand acres forever and the other during his life paying the said rent and hath not the tenant for life a property in all that he gets over and above his rent by his labor and industry during the said term supposing it be double the rent can anyone say the king or conqueror after his grant made by his power of conqueror take all the way or part of the land from the heirs of one or from the other during his life he paying the rent or can he take away from either the goods or money they have got upon the said land at his pleasure if he can then all for involuntary contracts cease and are void in the world there needs nothing to dissolve them at any time but power enough and all the grants and promises of men in power are but mockery and collusion for can there be anything more ridiculous than to say I give you and yours this forever and that in the surest and most solemn way of conveyance can be devised and yet it is to be understood that I have right if I please to take it away from you again tomorrow I will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the laws of their country but this I am sure they owe subjection to the laws of God in nature nobody no power can exempt them from the obligations of that external law those are so great and so strong in the case of promises that omnipotency itself can be tied by them grants promises and oaths are bonds that hold the almighty whatever some flatterers say to princes of the world who all together with all their people joined to them are in comparison of the great God but as a drop of the bucket or a dust on the balance inconsiderable nothing the short of the case in conquest is this the conqueror if he have a just cause has a despotical right over the persons of all that actually aided and concurred in the war against him and a right to make up his damage and cost out of their labor and estates so that he injure not the right of any other over the rest of the people if there were any that consented not to the war and over the children of the captives themselves or the possessions of either he has no power and so can have by virtue of conquest no lawful title himself to dominion over them or derive it to his posterity but is an aggressor if he attempts upon their properties and thereby puts himself in a state of war against them and has no better a right of principality he nor any of his successors than Hingar or Haba the Danes had here in England or Spartacus had he conquered Italy would have had which is to have their yoke cast off as soon as God shall give those under their subjection courage and opportunity to do it thus notwithstanding whatever title the kings of Assyria had over Judah by the sword God assisted has a kayak to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire and the Lord was with Hezekiah and he prospered wherefore he went forth and he rebelled against the king of Assyria and served him not second Kings 187 once it is plain that shaking off a power which force and not right have said over anyone though it hath the name of rebellion yet is no offense before God but is that which he allows and countenances though even promises and covenants when obtained by force have intervened for it is very probable to anyone that reads the story of Ahaz and Hezekiah attentively that the Assyrians subdued Ahaz and deposed him and made Hezekiah king in his father's lifetime and that Hezekiah by agreement had done him homage and paid him tribute all this time end of book two chapter 16 book two chapter 17 of two treatises of civil government this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org two treatises of civil government by John Locke book two chapter 17 of user-patient as conquest may be called a foreign user-patient so user-patient is a kind of domestic conquest with this difference that a user-per can never have right on his side it being no user-patient but where one is got into the possession of what another has a right to this so far as it is user-patient is a change only of persons but not of the forms and rules of the government for if the user-per extend his power beyond what if right belong to the lawful princes or governors of the commonwealth it is tyranny added to user-patient in all lawful governments the designation of the persons who are to bear rule as is natural and necessary apart as the form of the government itself and is that which had its establishment originally from the people the anarchy being much alike to have no form of government at all or to agree that it shall be monarchical but to appoint no way to design the person that shall have the power and be the monarch hence all commonwealths with the form of government established have rules also of appointing those who are to have any share in the public authority and settled methods of conveying the right to them for the anarchy is much alike to have no form of government at all or to agree that it shall be monarchical but to appoint no way to know or design the person that shall have the power and be the monarch whoever gets into the exercise of any part of the power by other ways than what the laws of the community have prescribed hath no right to be obeyed though the form of the commonwealth be still preserved since he is not the person the laws have appointed and consequently not the person that people have consented to nor can such a new surfer or any deriving from him ever have a title till the people are both at liberty to consent and have actually consented to allow and confirm in him the power he hath till then you served end of volume 2 chapter 17 book 2 chapter 18 of two treatises of civil government this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org two treatises of civil government by John Locke book 2 chapter 18 of tyranny as usurpation is the exercise of power which another hath a right to so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right which nobody can have a right to and this is making use of the power anyone has in his hands not for the good of those who are under it but for his own private separate advantage when the governor however entitled makes not the law but his will the rule and his commands and actions are not directed to the preservation of the properties of his people but the satisfaction of his own ambition revenge covetousness or any other irregular passion if one can doubt this to be truth or reason because it comes from the obscure hand of a subject I hope the authority of a king will make it pass with him King James I in his speech to the parliament 1603 tells them thus I will ever prefer the wheel of the public and of the whole commonwealth in making of good laws and constitutions to any particular and private ends of mine thinking ever the wealth and the wheel of the commonwealth to be my greatest wheel and worldly felicity a point wherein a lawful king doth directly differ from a tyrant for I do acknowledge that the special and greatest point of difference that is between a rightful king and a usurping tyrant is this that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his kingdom and people are only ordained for the satisfaction of his desires and unreasonable appetites the righteous and just king doth by the contrary acknowledge himself to be ordained for the procuring of the wealth and property of his people and again in his speech to the parliament 1609 he had these words the king binds himself by a double oath to the observation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom tacitly as by being a king and so bound to protect as well the people as the laws of his kingdom and expressly by his oath at his coronation so as every just king in a subtle kingdom is bound to observe that faction made to his people by his laws in framing his government agreeable there and to according to that faction which God made with Noah after the deluge hereafter see time and harvest and cold and heat and summer and winter and night and day shall not cease while the earth remaineth and therefore a king governing in a settled kingdom leaves to be king and degenerates into a tyrant as soon as he leaves off to rule according to his laws and a little after therefore all kings that are not tyrants or perjured will be glad to bound themselves within the limit of their laws and they that persuade them the contrary are vipers and pests both against them and the commonwealth thus that learned king who well understood the notion of things makes the difference between a king and a tyrant to consist only in this that one makes the laws the bounds of his power and the good of the public the end of his government the other makes all give way to his own will and appetite it is a mistake to think this fault is proper only to monarchies other forms of government are liable to it as well as that for wherever the power that is put in any hands for the government of the people and the preservation of their properties is applied to other ends and made use of to impoverish harass or subdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands of those that have it there it presently becomes tyranny whether those that thus use it are one or many thus we read of the 30 tyrants at Athens as well as one at Syracuse and the intolerable dominion of the December at Rome was nothing better wherever law ends tyranny begins if the law be transgressed to another's harm and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law and makes use of the force that he has under his command to compass that upon the subject which the law allows not ceases in that to be a magistrate and acting without authority may be opposed as any other man who by force invades the right of another this is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates he that hath authority to seize my person in the street may be opposed as a thief and a robber if he endeavors to break into my house to execute a writ notwithstanding that I know he has such a warrant and such a legal authority as will empower him to arrest me abroad and why this should not hold in the highest as well as in the most inferior magistrate I would gladly be informed is it reasonable that the eldest brother because he has the greatest part of his father's estate should thereby have a right to take away any of his younger brother's portions or that a rich man who possessed a whole country should from thence have a right to seize when he pleased the cottage and garden of his poor neighbor the being rightfully possessed of great power and riches exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of Adam is so far for being an excuse much less a reason for rapine and oppression which the endamaging another without authority is that it is a great aggravation of it for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right in a great than in a petty officer no more justifiable in a king than a constable but is so much the worse in him that he has put more trust in him has already a much greater share than the rest of his brethren and is supposed from the advantages of his education employment and counselors to be more knowing in the measures of right and wrong may the commands then of a prince be opposed may he be resisted as often as anyone shall find himself agreed and but imagine he has not right done him this will unhinge and overturn all politics and instead of government in order leave nothing but anarchy and confusion to answer this that force is to be opposed to nothing but to unjust and unlawful force whoever makes any opposition any other case draws on himself a just condemnation both from God and man and so no danger or confusion will follow as is often suggested for first as in some countries the person of the prince by the law is sacred and so whatever he commands or does his person is still free from all question or violence not liable to force or any judicial censure or condemnation but yet opposition may be made to the illegal acts of any inferior officer or other commissioned by him unless he will by actually putting himself into a state of war with his people dissolve the government and leave them to that defense which belongs to everyone in the state of nature for of such things who can tell what the end will be and a neighbor kingdom has showed the world an odd example in all other cases the sacredness of the person exempts him from all inconveniences whereby he is secure whilst the government stands from all violence and harm whatsoever then which there cannot be a wiser constitution for the harm he can do in his own person not being likely to happen often nor to extend itself far nor being able by his single strength to subvert the laws nor press the body of the people should any prince have so much weakness and ill nature as to be willing to do it the inconveniency of some particular mischiefs that may happen sometimes when a heady prince comes to the throne are well recompensed by the peace of the public and security of the government in the person of the chief magistrate thus set out of the reach of danger it being safer for the body that some few private men should sometimes be in danger to suffer than that the head of the republic should be easily and upon slight occasions exposed secondly but this privilege belonging only to the king's person hinders not but they may be questioned opposed and resisted who use unjust force though they pretend a commission from him which the law authorizes not as is plain in the case of him that has the king's writ to arrest a man which is a full commission from the king and yet he that has it cannot break open a man's house to do it nor execute this command of the king upon certain days nor in certain places though this commission have no such exception in it but they are the limitations of the law which if anyone transgress the king's commission excuses him not for the king's authority being given him only by the law he cannot empower anyone to act against the law or justify him by his commission in so doing the commission or command of any magistrate where he has no authority as being void and insignificant being as void and insignificant as that of any private man the difference between the one and the other being that the magistrate has some authority so far and to such ends and the private man has none at all for it is not the commission but the authority that gives the right of acting and against the laws there can be no authority but notwithstanding such resistance the king's person and authority are still both secured and so no danger to governor or government thirdly supposing a government wherein the person of the chief magistrate is not thus sacred yet this doctrine of the lawfulness of resisting all unlawful exercises of his power will not upon every slight occasion endanger him or embroil the government for where the injured party may be relieved and his damages repaired by an appeal to the law there can be no pretense for force which is only to be used where a man is intercepted from appealing to the law for nothing is to be accounted hostile force but where it leaves not the remedy of such an appeal and if it is such force alone that puts him to use it in a state of war and makes it lawful to resist him a man with a sword in his hand demands my purse in the highway when perhaps I have not 12 pence in my pocket this man I may lawfully kill to another I deliver 100 pounds to hold only whilst I light which he refuses to restore to me when I'm got up again but draws his sword to defend the possession of it by force if I endeavor to retake it the mischief this man does me is 100 or possibly a thousand times more than the other perhaps intended me whom I killed before he really did me any and yet I might lawfully kill the one and cannot so much as hurt the other lawfully the reason where I was playing because the one using force which threatened my life I could not have time to appeal to the law to secure it and when it was gone it was too late to appeal the law could not restore life to my dead carcass the loss was irreparable which to prevent the law of nature gave me a right to destroy him who had put himself into a state of war with me and threatened my destruction but in the other case my life not being in danger I may have the benefit of appealing to the law and have a reparation for my 100 pounds that way fourthly but if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate be maintained by the power he has got and the remedy which is due by law be by the same power obstructed yet the right of resisting even in such manifest acts of tyranny will not suddenly or on slight occasions disturb the government for if it reached no farther than some private men's cases though they have a right to defend themselves and to recover by force what unlawful force has taken from them yet the right to do so will not easily engage them in a contest wherein they are sure to perish it being impossible for one or a few oppressed men to disturb the government where the body of the people do not think themselves concerned in it as for a raving madman or heady malcontent to overturn a well-settled state the people being as little apt to follow the one as the other but if either these illegal acts have extended to the majority of the people or if the mischief and oppression has lighted only on some few but in such cases as the precedent and consequences seem to threaten all and they are persuaded in their consciences that their laws and with them their estates liberties and lives are in danger and perhaps their religion too how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force and used against them I cannot tell this is an inconvenience I confess that attends all governments whatsoever when the governors have brought it to this past to be generally suspected of their people the most dangerous state which they can possibly put themselves in wherein they are the less to be pitied because it is so easily to be avoided it being as impossible for a governor if he really means the good of his people and the preservation of them and their laws together not to make them see and feel it as it is for the father of a family not to let his children see he loves and takes care of them but if all the world shall observe pretenses of one kind and actions of another arts used to elude the law and the trust of prerogative which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the prince's hand to do good not harm to the people employed contrary for the end for which it was given if the people shall find the ministers and subordinate magistrates chosen suitable to such ends and favored or laid by proportionally as they promote or oppose them if they see several experiments made of arbitrary power and that religion underhand favored though publicly proclaimed against which is readiness to introduce it and the operators in it supported as much as may be and when that cannot be done yet approved still and liked the better if a long train of actions so the council's all tending that way how can a man any more hinder himself from being persuaded in his own mind which way things are going or from casting about how to save himself that he could from believing the captain of the ship he was in was carrying him and the rest of the company to Algiers when he found him always steering that course though crosswinds leaks in his ships and wanted men in provisions did often force him to turn his course another way for some time which he steadily returned to again as soon as the wind weather and other circumstances would let him end of chapter eighteen book two chapter nineteen of two treatises of civil government this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org two treatises of civil government by John Locke book two chapter nineteen of the dissolution of government he that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution of government ought in the first place to distinguish between the dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government that which makes the community and brings men out of the loose state of nature into one politic society is the agreement which everyone has with the rest to incorporate and act as one body and so be one distinct commonwealth the usual and almost only way whereby this union is dissolved is the inroad of foreign force making a conquest upon them for in that case not being able to maintain and support themselves as one entire and independent body the union belonging to that body which consisted therein must necessarily cease and so everyone returned to the state he was in before with the liberty to shift for himself and provide for his own safety as he thinks fit in some other society whenever the society is dissolved it is certain the government of the society cannot remain thus conquerors swords often cut up governments by the roots and mangled societies to pieces separating the subdued or scattered multitude from the protection of and dependence on that society which ought to have preserved them from violence the world is too well instructed in and too forward to allow of this way of dissolving of governments to need any more to be said of it and there was not much argument to prove that where the society is dissolved the government cannot remain that being as impossible as for the frame of an house to subsist when the materials of it are scattered and dissipated by a whirlwind or jumbled into a confused heat by an earthquake besides this overturning from without governments are dissolved from within first when the legislative is altered civil society being a state of peace among those who are of it from whom the state of war is excluded by the umpire age which they have provided in their legislature for the ending all differences that may arise amongst any of them it is in their legislative that the members of a commonwealth are united and combined together into one coherent living body this is the soul that gives form life and unity to the commonwealth from hence the several members have their mutual influence sympathy and connection and therefore when the legislative is broken or dissolved dissolution and death follows for the essence and union of the society consisting in having one will the legislative when once established by the majority the constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of society whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union under the direction of persons and bonds of law made by persons authorized therein too by the consent and appointment of the people without which no one man or number of men amongst them can have authority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest when anyone or more shall take upon them to make laws whom the people have not appointed to do so they make laws without authority which the people are not therefore bound to obey by which means they come again to be out of subjection and may constitute to themselves a new legislative as they think best being in full liberty to resist the force of those who without authority would impose anything upon them everyone is at the disposure of his own will when those who had by the delegation of the society the declaring of the public will are excluded from it and others usurp the place who have no such authority or delegation this being usually brought about by such in the commonwealth who misuse the power they have it is hard to consider it a right and know at whose door to lay it without knowing the form of government in which it happens let us suppose then the legislative placed in the concurrence of three distinct persons first a single hereditary person having the constant supreme executive power and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the other two within certain periods of time two an assembly of hereditary nobility three an assembly of representatives chosen pro tempore by the people such a form of government supposed it is evident first that when such a single person or prince sets up his own arbitrary will in place of the laws which are the will of the society declared by the legislative then the legislative is changed for that being in effect the legislative whose rules and laws are put into execution and required to be obeyed when other laws are set up and other rules pretended and enforced then what the legislative constituted by the society have enacted it is plain that the legislative is changed whoever introduces new laws not being there until authorized by the fundamental appointment of the society or subverts the old disowns and overturns the power by which they were made and so sets up a new legislative secondly when the prince hinders the legislative from assembling in its new time or from acting freely pursuant to those ends for which it was constituted the legislative is altered for it is not a certain number of men no nor their meeting unless they have also freedom of debating and leisure of perfection what is for the good of the society wherein the legislative consists when these are taken away or altered so as to deprive the society of the due exercise of their power the legislative is truly altered for it is not names that constitute governments but the use and exercise of those powers that were intended to accompany them so that he who takes away the freedom or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due seasons in effect takes away the legislative and puts an end to the government thirdly when by the arbitrary power of the prince the electors or ways of election are altered without the consent and contrary to the common interest of the people there also the legislative is altered for if others than those whom the society have authorized therein to do choose or in another way than what the society have prescribed those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the people fourthly the delivery also of the people into the subjection of a foreign power either by the prince or by the legislative is certainly a change of the legislative and so a dissolution of the government for the end why people entered into society being to be persevered one entire free independent society to be governed by its own laws this is lost whenever they are given up onto the power of another why in such a constitution as this the dissolution of the government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince is evident because he having the force treasure and offices of the state to employ and often persuading himself or being flattered by others that as supreme magistrate he is incapable of control he alone is in a condition to make great advances towards such changes under pretense of lawful authority and has it in his hands to terrify or suppress opposers as factious seditious and enemies to the government whereas no other part of the legislative or people is capable by themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative without open and visible rebellion apt enough to be taken notice of which when it prevails produces effects very little different from foreign conquest besides the prince in such a form of government having the power of dissolving the other parts of the legislative and thereby rendering them private persons they can never in opposition to him or without his concurrence alter the legislative by a law his consent being necessary to give any of their decrees that sanction but yet so far as the other parts of the legislative in any way contribute to any attempt upon the government and do either promote or not what lies in them hinder such designs they are guilty and partake in this which is certainly the greatest crime men can be guilty of one towards another there is one way more whereby such a government may be dissolved and that is when he who has the supreme executive power neglects and abandons that charge so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution this is demonstratively to reduce alt anarchy and so effectively to dissolve the government for laws not being made for themselves but to be by their execution the bonds of the society to keep every part of the body politic in its due place and function when that totally ceases the government visibly ceases and the people become a confused multitude without order or connection where there is no longer the administration of justice for the securing of men's rights nor any remaining power within the community to direct the force or provide for the necessities of the public there certainly is no government left where the laws cannot be executed it is all one as if there were no laws and a government without laws is I suppose a mystery in politics inconceivable to human capacity and inconsistent with human society in these and the light cases when the government is dissolved the people are at liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a new legislative differing from the other by the change of persons or form or both as they shall find it most for their safety and good for the society can never by the fault of another lose the native and original right it has to preserve itself which can only be done by a subtle legislative and a fair and impartial execution of the laws made by it but the state of mankind is not so miserable that they are not capable of using this remedy till it be too late to look for any to tell people they may provide for themselves by erecting a new legislative when by oppression artifice or being delivered over to a foreign power their old one is gone is only to tell them they may expect relief when it is too late and the evil is past cure this is in effect no more than to bid them first be slaves and then to take care of their liberty and when their chains are on tell them they may act like freemen this if barely so is rather mockery than relief and men can never be secure from tyranny if there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly under it and therefore it is that they have not only a right to get out of it but to prevent it there is therefore secondly another way whereby governments are dissolved that is when the legislative or the prince either of them act contrary to their trust first the legislative acts against the trust reposed in them when they endeavor to invade the property of the subject and to make themselves or any part of the community masters or arbitrary disposers of the lives liberties or fortunes of the people the reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property and the end why they choose and authorize a legislative is that there may be laws made and rules set as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the society to limit the power and moderate the dominion of every part and member of the society for since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which everyone designs to secure by entering into society and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making whenever the legislators endeavor to take away and destroy the property of the people or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power they put themselves into a state of war with the people who are there upon absolved from any further obedience and are left to the common refuge which god hath provided for all men against force and violence when so ever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society and either by ambition fear folly or corruption endeavor to grasp themselves or put into the hands of any other an absolute power over the lives liberties and estates of the people by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends and it devolves to the people who have a right to resume their original liberty and by the establishment of a new legislative such as they shall think fit provide for their own safety and security which is the end for which they are in society what i've said here concerning the legislative in general holds true also concerning the supreme executor who having a double trust put in him both to have a part in the legislative and the supreme execution of the law acts against both when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law of the society he also acts contrary to his trust when he either employs the force treasure and offices of the society to corrupt the representatives and gain them to his purposes or openly pre-engages the electors and prescribes to their choice such whom he has by solicitations threats promises or otherwise one to his designs and employs them to bring in such who have promised beforehand what to vote and what to enact thus to regulate candidates and electors and new model the ways of election what is it but to cut up the government by the roots and poison the very fountain of public security for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their representatives as the fence to their properties could do it for no other end but that they might always be freely chosen and so chosen freely act and advise as the necessity of the common wealth and the public good should upon examination and mature debate be judged to require this those who give their votes before they hear the debate and have weighed the reasons on all sides are not capable of doing to prepare such an assembly as this and endeavor to set up the declarative betters of his own will for the true representatives of the people and the lawmakers of the society is certainly as great a breach of trust and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the government as is possible to be met with to which if one shall add rewards and punishments visibly employed to the same end and all the arts of perverted law made use of to take off and destroy all that stand in the liberties of their country it will be passed out what is doing what power they ought to have in the society who thus employ it contrary to the trust went along with it in its first institution it is easy to determine and one cannot but see that he who has once attempted any such thing as this cannot any longer be trusted to this perhaps it will be said that the people being ignorant and always discontented to lay the foundation of government in the unsteady opinion and uncertain humor of the people is to expose it to certain ruin and no government will be able long to subsist if the people may set up a new legislative whenever they take offense at the old one to this i answer quite the contrary people are not so easily got out of their old forms as some are apt to suggest they are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to or adventures ones introduced by time or corruption it is not an easy thing to get them changed even when all the world sees there is an opportunity for it this slowness and a version in the people to quite their old constitutions has in the many revolutions which have been seen in this kingdom in this and former ages still kept us to or after some intervals of fruitless attempts still brought us back again to our old legislative of king lords and commons and whatever provocations have made the crown be taken from some of our prince's heads they never carried the people so far as to place it in another line but it will be said this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion to which i answer first no more than any other hypothesis for when the people are made miserable and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power cry up their governors as much as you will for sons of jupiter let them be sacred and divine descended or authorized from heaven give them out for whom or what you please the same will happen the people generally ill treated and contrary to right will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them they will wish and seek for the opportunity which in the change weakness and accidents of human affairs seldom delays long to offer itself he must have lived but a little while in the world who has not seen examples of this in his time and he must have read very little who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of governments in the world secondly i answer such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs great mistakes in the ruling part many wrong and inconvenient laws and all the slips of human frailty will be borne by the people without mutiny or murmur but if a long train of abuses prevarications and artifices all tending the same way make the design visible to the people and they cannot but feel what they lie under and see whether they are going is it not to be wondered that they should then rouse themselves and endeavor to put the rule into such hands which may secure them the ends for which government was at first directed and without which ancient names and specious forms are so far from being better that they are much worse than the state of nature or pure anarchy the inconveniences being all is great and is near but the remedy farther off and more difficult thirdly i answer that this doctrine of a power in the people of providing for their safety anew by a new legislative whenever their legislators have acted contrary to their trust by invading their property is the best fence against rebellion and the probabilist means to hinder it for rebellion being an opposition not to persons but authority which is founded only in the constitutions and laws of the government those whoever they be who by force breakthrough and by force justify their violation of them are truly and properly rebels for when men by entering into society in civil government have excluded force and introduced laws for the preservation of property peace and unity among themselves those who set up force again in opposition to the laws do rebel that is bring back again into the state of war and are properly rebels which they who are in power by the pretense they have authority the temptation of force they have in their hands and the flattery of those about them being likely as to do the proper way to prevent the evil is to show them the danger and injustice of it who are under the greatest temptation to run into it in both the four mentioned cases when either the legislative is changed or the legislators act contrary to the end for which they were constituted those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion for if anyone by force takes away the established legislative of any society and the laws by them made pursuant to their trust he thereby takes away the umpire edge which everyone had consented to for a peaceable division of all their controversies and a bar to the state of war amongst them they who remove or change the legislative take away this decisive power which nobody can have but by the appointment and consent to the people and so destroying the authority which the people did and nobody else can set up and introducing a power which the people have not authorized they actually introduce a state of war which is that a force without authority and thus by removing the legislative established in the society in whose decisions the people acquiesced and united as to that of their own will they untie the knot and expose the people anew to the state of war and if those who by force take away the legislative are rebels the legislators themselves as has been shown can be no less esteemed so when they who were set up for the protection and preservation of the people their liberties and properties shall by force invade and endeavor to take them away and so they putting themselves into a state of war with those who made them the protectors and guardians of their peace are properly and with the greatest aggravation rebellence rebels but if they who say it lays a foundation for rebellion mean that it may occasion civil wars or in testine broils to tell the people they are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or properties and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who were their magistrates when they invade their properties contrary to the trust put in them and that therefore this doctrine is not to be allowed being so destructive to the peace of the world they may as well say upon the same ground that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed if any mischief come in such cases it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right but on him that invades his neighbors if the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has for peace sake to him who will lay violent hands upon it i desire it may be considered what a kind of peace there will be in the world which consists only in violence and repeat and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors who would not think it an admirable piece betwixt the mighty and the mean when the lamb without resistance yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf polyphemus's den gives us a perfect pattern of such a piece and such a government wearing ulysses and his companions had nothing to do but quietly to suffer themselves to be devoured and no doubt ulysses who was a prudent man preached up passive obedience and exhorted them to a quiet submission by representing to them of what concernment peace was to mankind and by showing the inconveniences that might happen if they should offer to resist polyphemus who had now the power over them the end of government is the good of mankind and which is best for mankind that the people should always be exposed to the boundless will of tyranny or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power and employ it for the destruction and not the preservation of the properties of their people nor let anyone say that mischief can arise from hence as often it shall please a busy head or turbulent spirit to desire the alteration of the government it is true such men may stir whenever they please but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition for till the mischief be grown general and the ill designs of the rulers become visible or their attempts sensible to the greater part the people who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves by resistance are not apt to stir the examples of particular injustice or oppression of here and there and unfortunate man moves them not but if they universally have a persuasion grounded upon manifest evidence that designs are carrying on against their liberties and the general course and tendency of things cannot but give them a strong suspicion of the evil intention of their governors who is to be blamed for it who can help it if they who might avoid it bring themselves into this suspicion are the people to be blamed if they have the sense of rational creatures and can think of things no otherwise than as they find and feel them and is it not rather their fault who put things into such a posture that they would not have them thought to be as they are I grant that the pride ambition and turbulence of private men have sometimes caused great disorders in commonwealths and factions have been fatal to states and kingdoms but whether the mischief have often are begun in the people's wantonness and a desire to cast off the lawful authority of their rulers or in the rulers insolence and endeavors to get an exercise in arbitrary power over the people whether oppression or disobedience gave the first rise to the disorder I leave it to impartial history to determine this I am sure whoever either ruler or subject by force goes about to invade the rights of either prince or people and lays the foundation for overturning the constitution and frame of any just government is highly guilty of the greatest crime I think a man is capable of being to answer for all of those mischiefs of blood, rapine and desolation which the breaking to pieces of government spring on a country and he who does it is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind and is to be treated accordingly that subjects or foreigners attempting by force on the properties of any people may be resisted with force is agreed on all hands but that magistrates doing the same thing may be resisted hath of late been denied as if those who had the greatest privileges and advantages by the law had thereby a power to break those laws by which alone they were set in a better place than their brethren whereas their offense is thereby the greater both as being ungrateful for the greater share they have by the law and breaking also that trust which is put into their hands by their brethren whosoever uses force without right as everyone does in society who does it without law puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he uses it and in that state all former ties are canceled all other rights cease and everyone has a right to defend himself and to resist the aggressor this is so evident that barkley himself that great assurter of the power and sacredness of kings is forced to confess that it is lawful for the people in some cases to resist their king and that too in a chapter wherein he pretends to show that the divine law shuts up the people from all manner of rebellion whereby it is evident even by his own doctrine that since they may in some cases resist all resisting a princess is not rebellion his words are these in english thus but if anyone should ask must the people then always lay themselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny must they see their cities pillaged and laid in ashes their wives and children exposed to the tyrants lust and fury and themselves and families reduced by their king to ruin and all the miseries of want and oppression and yet sit still must men alone be debarred the common privilege of opposing force with force which nature allows so freely to all other creatures for their preservation from injury I answer self-defense is a part of the law of nature nor can it be denied the community even against the king himself but to revenge themselves upon him must by no means be allowed them it being not agreeable to that law wherefore if the king shall show and hatred not only to some particular persons but sets himself against the body of the commonwealth whereof he is the head and shall with intolerable ill usage cruelly tyrannize over the whole or a considerable part of the people in this case the people have a right to resist and to defend themselves from injury but it must be with this caution that they only defend themselves but do not attack their prince they may repair the damages received but not for any provocation exceed the bounds of due reverence and respect they may repulse the present attempt but must not revenge past violences for it is natural for us to defend life and limb but that an inferior should punish the superior is against nature the mischief which has designed them the people may prevent before it be done but when it is done they must not revenge it on the king though the author of the villainy this therefore is the privilege of the people in general above what any private person have that particular men are allowed by our adversaries themselves Buchanan only accepted to have no other remedy but patience but the body of the people may with respect resist intolerable tyranny for when it is but moderate they ought to endure it thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of resistance it is true he has annexed two limitations to it to no purpose first he says it must be with reverence secondly it must be without retribution or punishment and the reason he gives is because an inferior cannot punish a superior first how to resist force without striking again or how to strike with reverence will need some skill to make intelligible he that shall oppose an assault only with a shield to receive the blows or in any more respectful posture without a sword in his hand to abate the confidence and force of the assailant will quickly be at an end of his resistance and will find such a defense serve only to draw on himself the worst usage this is a ridiculous way of resisting as juvenile thought it of fighting ubitiposis ego vapulum tatum and the success of the combat will be unavoidably the same he there describes it libertas papyrus hec est pulsada sprogat a pugnus concisis adorat at least said pauses come dentibus in de reverte this will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance where men may not strike again he therefore who may resist must be allowed to strike and then let our author or anybody else join a knock on the head or a cut on the face with as much reverence and respect as he thinks fit he that can reconcile blows and reverence may for odd i know desire for his pains a civil respectful cuddling wherever he can meet with it secondly as to his second and inferior cannot punish the superior that is true generally speaking whilst he is his superior but to resist force with force being the state of war that levels the parties cancels all former relation of reverence respect and superiority and the odds that remains is that he who opposes the unjust aggressor has this superiority over him that he has a right when he prevails to punish the offender both for the breach of the peace and all the evils that followed upon it Barkley therefore in another place more coherently to himself denies it to be lawful to resist a king in any case but he there assigns two cases whereby a king may unking himself his words are which in english run thus what then can there no case happen wherein the people may have right and by their own authority help themselves take arms and set upon their king imperiously domineering over them none at all whilst he remains a king honor the king and he that resists the power resists the ordinance of god are divine oracles that will never permit it the people therefore can never come by a power over him unless he does something that makes him cease to be a king for then he divests himself of his crown and dignity and returns to the state of a private man and the people become free and superior the power which they had in the interregnum before they crowned him king devolving to them again but there are but few miscarriages which bring the matter to this state after considering it well on all sides I can find but two two cases there are I say whereby a king ipso facto becomes no king and loses all power and regal authority over his people which are also taken notice of by wunzeras the first is if he endeavour to overturn the government that is if he have a purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth as it is recorded of nero that he resolved to cut off the senate and people of rome laid the city waste with fire and sword and then removed to some other place and of caligula that he openly declared that he would be no longer ahead to the people or senate and that he had it in his thoughts to cut off the worthiest men of both ranks and then retired to alexandria and he wished that the people had but one neck that he might dispatch them all at a blow such designs as these when any king harbors in his thoughts and seriously promotes he immediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth and consequently forfeits the power of governing his subjects as a master does the dominion over his slaves whom he hath abandoned the other case is when a king makes himself the dependent of another and subjects his kingdom which his ancestors left him and the people put free into his hands to the dominion of another for however perhaps it may not be his intention to prejudice the people yet because he has hereby lost the principal part of regal dignity vis to be next and immediately under god supreme in his kingdom and also because he betrayed or forced his people whose liberty he ought to have carefully preserved into the power and dominion of a foreign nation by this as it were alienation of his kingdom he himself loses the power he had in it before without transferring any the least right to those on whom he would have bestowed it and so by this act sets the people free and leaves them at their own disposal one example of this is to be found in the scotch annals in these cases Barkley the great champion of absolute monarchy is forced to allow that a king may be resisted and ceases to be king that is in short not to multiply cases in whatsoever he has no authority there he is no king and may be resisted for wheresoever the authority ceases the king ceases too and becomes like other men who have no authority and these two cases he instances in differ little from those above mentioned to be destructive to governments only that he has omitted the principle from which this doctrine flows that is the breach of trust not in preserving the form of government agreed on and in not intending the end of government itself which is the public good and preservation of property when a king has dethroned himself and put himself in a state of war with his people what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no king as they would any other man who has put himself into a state of war with them Barkley and those of his opinion would do well to tell us this farther I desire may be taken notice of out of Barkley that he says the mischief that is designed them the people may prevent before it be done whereby he allows resistance when tyranny is but in design such designs as these says he when any king harbors in his thoughts and seriously promotes he immediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth so that according to him the neglect of the public good is to be taken as an evidence of such design or at least for a sufficient cause of resistance and the reason of all he gives in these words because he betrayed or forced his people whose liberty he ought carefully to have preserved what he finds into the power and dominion of a foreign nation signifies nothing the fault and forfeiture lying in the loss of their liberty which he ought to have preserved and not in any distinction of the persons to whose dominion they were subjected the people's right is equally invaded and their liberty lost whether they are made slaves to any of their own or to a foreign nation and in this lies the injury and against this only have they the right of defense and there are instances to be found in all countries which show that it is not the change of nations in the persons of their governors but the change of government that gives the offense bilsen a bishop of our church and a great stickler for the power and prerogative of princes does if i mistake not in his treatise of christian subjection acknowledge that princes may forfeit their power and their title to the obedience of their subjects and if their needed authority in a case where reason is so plain i could send my reader to bracton fortescu and the author of the mirror and others writers that cannot be suspected to be ignorant of our government or enemies to it but i thought hooker alone might be enough to satisfy those men who were lying on him for their ecclesiastical polity are by a strong fate carried to deny those principles upon which he builds it whether they are herein made the tools of cunning or workmen to pull down their own fabric they were best look this i'm sure their civil policies so new so dangerous and so destructive to both rulers and people that as former ages never could bear the broaching of it so it may be hoped those to come redeemed from the impositions of these egyptian under taskmasters will abhor the memory of such servile flatterers who whilst it seemed to serve their turn resolved all government into absolute tyranny and would have all men born too what their mean souls fitted them for slavery here it is like the common question will be made who shall be judged whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their trust this perhaps ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst people when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative to this i reply the people shall be judged for who shall be judged whether his trusty or deputy acts well and according to the trust reposed in him but he who deputes him and must by having deputed him still have a power to discard him when he fails in his trust if this be reasonable in particular cases of private men why should it be otherwise in that of the greatest moment where the welfare of millions is concerned and also where evil if not prevented is greater and the redress very difficult dear and dangerous but farther this question who shall be judged cannot mean that there is no judge at all for where there is no judicature on earth to decide controversies amongst men God in heaven is judge he alone it is true is judge of the right but every man is judged for himself as in all other cases so in this whether another hath put himself into a state of war with him and whether he should appeal to the supreme judge as jet that did if a controversy arise between prince and some of the people in a manner where the law is silent or doubtful and the thing be of great consequence I should think the proper empire in such a case should be the body of the people for in cases where the prince hath a trust reposed in him and is dispensed from the common ordinary rules of law there if any men find themselves aggrieved and think the prince acts contrary to or beyond that trust who so proper to judge is the body of the people who at first lodge that trust in him how far they meant it should extend but if the prince or whoever they be in the administration decline that way of determination the appeal then lies nowhere but to heaven force between either persons who have no known superior on earth or which permits no appeal to a judge on earth being properly a state of war wherein the appeal lies only to heaven and in that state the injured party must judge for himself when he will think fit to make use of that appeal and put himself upon it to conclude the power that every individual gave the society when he entered into it can never revert to the individuals again as long as the society lasts but will always remain in the community because without this there can be no community no commonwealth which is contrary to the original agreement so also when the society hath placed the legislative in an assembly of men to continue in them and their successors with direction and authority for providing such successors the legislative can never revert to the people whilst that government lasts because having provided the legislative with power to continue forever they have given up their political power to the legislative and cannot resume it but if they have set limits to the duration of their legislative and made the supreme power in any person or assembly only temporary or else when by the miscarriages of those in authority it is forfeited upon this forfeiture or at the determination of the time set it reverts to the society and the people have a right to act as supreme and continue the legislative in themselves or erect a new form or under the old form place it in new hands as they think good Feeney End of Book 2 Chapter 19 End of Two Treatises of Civil Government by John Locke edited by Thomas Hollis