 Institute of Peace and our public event today talking about Sudan after sanctions. For those of you who are joining us for the first time, the United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institute that was founded by Congress over 30 years ago. Our mission is to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflict around the world, and we do this by working with individuals, organizations and governments to share approaches, understanding and best practices on peace building and resolving conflict without violence. Today you're joining us for a Facebook live public event. For those of you who are online, we hope that this will be a conversation and a discussion about a report that USIP released recently and you can find on our website. It's called Sudan after sanctions. In order to participate in the conversation, please add your comments on USIP's Facebook page and we will feed those into the conversation after an initial presentation by the author. This report is part of USIP's broader engagement in Sudan, where we are seeking to promote inclusive governance and peace processes. And we do this by working from the bottom up and from the top down, so engaging with individuals and organizations that are working towards a more peaceful society, as well as by engaging with formal leaders and sharing our analysis with the government and with the United States government in their interaction with Sudan. So without saying much more, I'm pleased to introduce Ali Virgi, who's a visiting expert at USIP and the author of the report that we're going to discuss today. Ali, welcome. Thank you. Ali comes with a long history of experience in Sudan and in the region. He lived in the country for several years through the elections and the referendum and was more recently involved in regional initiatives on South Sudan. So we're really pleased to have him here with us today. And so I'd like to start the conversation and ask you why undertake this research? What drove your interest to ask these questions? Well, thank you, Susan, and thank you to all of us joining online, Ramadan Mubarak and Salam alaikum to those in Sudan. Well, I think it's really important to explain some of that process because we don't always stop and ask that question. But it seemed to me really important to say, look, Sudan is at a historic moment. We've seen that lifting of sanctions in October last year was a really important for the first time in more than 20 years opening between the United States and Sudan. And that is really important. But despite this importance, most of the focus, most of the conversation seemed to be about whether lifting of sanctions was good or not good, whether it was rewarding the government of Sudan, whether it was benefiting the Sudanese people, but very much from a government to government point of view, very much from an elite politician to elite politician point of view. And I was quite interested to ask and to see what do people who are not in that government's political elite, who are not in political parties, what do they think about it? If we're talking about opening a normalization or possible normalization of relations between Sudan and the United States, it seemed to me that Sudanese were missing from the conversation. And we really needed to try and understand those views. And so without necessarily myself having an opinion as to whether the US decision was a good one or not a good one or whether there were faults to it or not, what did Sudanese think about that? Could we go beyond the elite political perspective and find out what those sorts of people thought and that was what motivated the research? It's really interesting because I think in the United States there are very strong mechanisms where people can voice their views and there was a lot of advocacy groups who were engaged in trying to shape the US policy on this decision. And I think for many of us sitting in Washington we didn't have the same perspective of what was happening in Sudan. And the same for the Sudanese side. I mean there were Sudanese NGOs and civil society groups who were vocal and their views are important of course but they're not the only views either. Of course. So with any research there is what it hopes to achieve and then what people think they will achieve and what a report says. So can you tell us a little bit about what the research is and what it isn't? Yes. Well, as I've just alluded to, there have been a number of other research reports and analyses done of the decision of what the United States should do, what the Sudanese government should do. And you know, those are all valuable contributions but I wanted to try and offer something a little bit different by bringing in those other voices. But this report doesn't pretend or doesn't aim to suggest that it's representative of all Sudanese views. It's not a survey, it's not an opinion poll. It wasn't designed to be, it wasn't set out to be a quantitative exercise. What I was interested in, what sort of developed over time was really understanding that there are lots of different perceptions out there. Some of those I might agree with, some of them I might not, some of them might be factually grounded, some of them aren't. But they exist and we haven't heard a lot about them. And so let's try and see what those views are. I'm not claiming that these views are necessarily held by all Sudanese. But they are there, they do exist, they are held by some Sudanese and they need to be considered both from a US interest point of view and from a Sudanese point of view as well. So this report was really an attempt to redress the balance. An attempt to say there is more than just what, so and so in the government or so and so who's a leader of political party thinks. At the same time, I'm not intending to say that all Sudanese think this way. There may be other views as well. Those are not necessarily incompatible with the perspective and the range that's here. What we're really trying to do is to have a wide enough cross section of people. Not to suggest that that was necessarily statistically representative, but to demonstrate that even from somebody who is holding a very menial job to somebody who's a professional, from a young person to someone who's much older, from one person from one part of the country to somebody from another part, that these views are both in common and different. And these are the perspectives that do exist and ought to be considered because right now is, as you know, a moment where the decision about what the future relationship between the US and Sudan might look like is still under consideration. We don't know what that is. It seems to me that there's still an opportunity and need in fact for the Sudanese perspective, the Sudanese citizen perspective to also be included. So one of the challenges of writing something that's about perceptions is that some people will read it like it is fact. Or some people might engage in it and just try to deny or set the record straight. And so what's your advice? Why undertake it in this manner? And how would you hope that people read the report? Right, or indeed say you missed out this perception or people also have this view. You're right, I mean it is difficult. And of course there is a question as an author, what do you put emphasis on? You have to make some of those choices. I think it's important that people look at this report as an additional contribution to the knowledge that we already have. That as you said earlier, if we were looking at this from a US policy point of view, if Congress is going to do something, members of Congress have great access to their constituents, they regularly consult them. You can call your congressman, you can phone, you can send an email, you can do all these things. There's plenty of opinion polling in this country. There's lots of other ways in which public opinion, whether through the media, whether through civic groups, is reflected. And so in Sudan, we have two difficulties. One is that as people looking at things from Washington, US policy makers don't have the same sort of access on those things. Secondly, not all the things I mentioned readily exist. It's a lot more difficult to find out public opinion in Sudan. And so I would say that this report really is useful because it demonstrates what some people believe and where those perceptions are faulty. And you can look at some of this and you say, well, that's ridiculous. There's no way that that's what the US is actually after. Or the governor of Sudan might also say that that's really an unfair characterization. But the fact that one person believes it means that other people believe it and it means that if you're serious about addressing this very acrimonious relationship that the United States and Sudan have, you have to look beyond what does the government think? What do a very unrepresentative view in the government think? They might be the people that make the decisions. They might be the policy makers, but they're the only ones who matter. Absolutely. I'm pleased to welcome Azashami, who's also joining us. Welcome. I'm just starting our conversation. Allie's talking a little bit about the report. Nice to have you here with us. Thanks for coming. So maybe we can turn a little bit to the key findings. And what were some of the main things that stood out for you as a result of these interviews that you conducted? Right. Well, I won't go through everything. And I really would encourage people to read the report. I hope you do. You already plugged it, so thanks, Susan. I think I'm going to pick three things just to focus on that might be something we can discuss further. The first, and I've suggested this a little bit already, is that many of the respondents attributed interests of the United States that really diverge very dramatically from both the public position of the US government now and previous administrations, and also the private interests of the privately expressed goals of the US government. And that's really interesting. So whether we think that that's sensible or not, we have to see that this relationship of the US is couched through what might have been done 20 years ago under the Clinton administration. It might be relevant to consider what's happened around the secession of South Sudan. And that isn't always part of the lens of US policymakers because we're in the here and now. But for many Sudanese, the current expectation and understanding of what the US is trying to do is seen through this historical relationship. It seems through some things that might be outdated. If you were to ask anyone in Washington, say, well, yes, that might have been our position then, but we have a different view now. So that's that's one thing that those misperceptions and misunderstandings and perceptions of continuity still exist. This matters because of the future of the engagement process and whether if the US is genuinely interested in reform in Sudan, it needs to bring the Sudanese people with it, right? If the Sudanese believe that actually the US is up to no good, it has the various interests in Sudan, then they won't believe in the project or any attempts that the US might genuinely have in encouraging reform. The second coming to sanctions. This report is entitled Sudan After Sanctions, but I don't really want to talk a lot about sanctions themselves. What I want to really argue is that many people and many of the respondents felt that there was a lot of continuity after the sanctions have been lifted. There's perceptions that, yes, the US government might have done, taken action to remove or lift certain sanctions, but what has really changed? What has really changed for your average person? What has changed for your average business person that it's still really difficult to trade, it's still really difficult to obtain foreign currency, it's still really difficult to access US goods and services. And so there's a lot of concern and a lot of views that actually the US hasn't really lifted sanctions. That a lot of people perceive no real change and whether that's as a result of other measures that are there, whether it's a result of the state sponsors of terrorism designation or other things or a lag in sanctions relief, this has contributed to views that actually the US government hasn't really been serious about lifting sanctions. And of course, that isn't what the US administration would say. They'd say, you know, we've taken very comprehensive measures to remove sanctions and certain transactions and certain business arrangements are possible, but that isn't necessarily something that is shared or understood by Sudanese. The last thing, just to mention briefly, is about religious freedom. We know that as part of consideration of the next phase of engagement between the US and Sudan, religious freedom is likely to be one of the priority issues. It's important to the administration now and they really want to promote it. And one of the concerns that people have is that religious freedom will be very narrowly construed. That religious freedom is more than freedom for minorities, that that's important, but that if you genuinely want to address intolerance, if you genuinely want to address a lack of respect for other beliefs, you also need to consider what would encourage and broaden freedom for all believers, no matter what they believe, whether they're in the majority or the minority, you need to consider other freedoms, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, so these are also fundamental to underpinning freedom of belief. And you need to address the general lack of inclusion in the government or in the political system and structure, because belief and religion is only one facet of identity in one respect and if you have a system which encourages a very narrow conception of what it means or who ought to be entitled to be part of the government structure, who gets to whose views count and whose views don't, then religion is only another possible way of excluding people. So if you really want to address religious freedom, you've got to look more broadly. And let me just say that there was a concern that some people felt that this US administration wouldn't have that broader, holistic understanding of religious freedom, and so while they were genuinely supportive of the idea that yes, there should be religious freedom, I think a lot of Sudanese would consider themselves very tolerant people, that in order to achieve that, it would need more fundamental reform and so the US should push for that. So something that struck me reading the report was the sense that people didn't get a lot of information about what they should expect at the end of sanctions. And we can imagine where that may have come from or may not have come from and I'm just I'm curious did people talk about whether they they received information and about what was going to happen in the sanctions relief process? What were the topics that sort of rose to the surface naturally over the course of conversations that might help us understand where where people's hearts and minds are at the moment? Well, this research was done in January and February, so it was a few months after sanctions had been lifted in October. And I think a lot of people expressed their own views or conceded that maybe their expectations had been unrealistic. Maybe they had expected things to change very dramatically, very quickly, and that hadn't happened. And in fact, the economy had got worse at that time. So a lot of people attributed the sanctions lifting with this economic decline, which may not be fair. And economists might say, well, there's no basis for linking those two. But for your average person, they happen. They coincided. And I think that is an example of where there is a lack of information and understanding. And so the US process with Sudan and between the two governments was necessarily secretive and confidential and required that discretion that diplomatic arrangements often do. And I think people understand that and certainly appreciate that a degree of confidentiality and discretion is required. But at a certain point, this understanding of what is going on and what does it mean and who is responsible for it and what does it mean for me and what ought to I to do about it is something that was very much missing. And I think there's fault on both sides. The government of Sudan isn't necessarily communicating very well with its own citizens on many things. And this is no different and part of what limits its effectiveness perhaps is its inability to also have people believe in its policy objectives. The US didn't make, I would say, a very dramatic public outreach effort. And people pointed to things like there are protests going on over the economic conditions. And there has been repression of those protests. And what's the US position? We don't know. What's the US statement on this? Where is it? Why hasn't the embassy's website been updated recently? So I think communications and understanding and information is a really key part of this. This occurred again and again that people said, oh, well, President Trump said this. And that means for Sudan this. And obviously, that may not be the case. It might be the case. It might not be the case. But without really communicating and explaining how US policy in Sudan links to other US policy objectives and US policy pronouncements, it's very difficult for people to situate what's going on. And we have to be aware of the limitations of that. I mean, another example of this is the deputy secretary of state visited Khartoum. And that was a big deal. That was a big deal. He was the highest ranking US government official to visit Sudan in, I don't know how many years, quite some time. And of course, the State Department and the US government was quite proud of this sort of achievement because to get the deputy secretary of state's time is something which is difficult. And yet, so many people said, yeah, we heard somebody was here. And he gave a big speech at one of the main mosques in Khartoum. And yet, people don't know what he said. And there hasn't been the effort to explain and express and share those sentiments other than looking at the website of the embassy, which how many people have access to, how many people look at. So these are sort of examples of where people are aware of this US interest, but then don't see the follow-up. And communications, as we know, is something which isn't a one-off thing. It's got to be continual. It's got to be engaging. It's got to do something that goes beyond just having a one-off PR stunt. And it has to show progress at the end of the day. So before I can turn to Azaz, I want to push you on this point because I think it's relatively easy to identify gaps and problems and what's not done well. It's always harder to articulate what is it that some Sudanese who you talk to would like to see, or in your analysis looking at what you heard, what should the US government do in this next phase? Yeah. Well, the report offers three recommendations. And there are only three because sometimes it's useful to just concentrate and focus rather than ask for too much. I think one thing first is to say that with this second phase of engagement, whatever it looks like, this normalization process, that part of the issue, part of what people really hope and expect is that whatever the issues prioritized are, whether it's religious freedom or economic reform, whatever it might be, that there needs to be really clear steps, clear indicators on those issues so that you can measure progress. The more amorphous and ambiguous an issue is, the more difficult it is to say progress has been made. And that's important because if people feel that the process isn't genuine, that actually it's just a pretext to get to a predetermined outcome, then they don't trust it. And if the US is really interested in promoting reform within Sudan, those sorts of steps are necessary. Part of that is also saying, what's the time frame for these things? Now, there are things that can be done in a few months. There are things that can be done in six months. But there are some things that might take quite some time to reform. And so if you need to have a process that has those sorts of shorter, medium, and longer term objectives, the second thing which the report suggests is that it would be useful to consider establishing a non-government panel. So it doesn't mean an NGO or civil society, necessarily, but something outside of the US and Sudanese governments to monitor compliance with these indicators. That part of, again, what weakened the existing process was very much the US government and the Sudanese government saying, yeah, we've made progress on these things and we've decided that's good enough. And if you want to have a more sustained, longer term reform process, it would be really valuable to include perspectives that are outside the government. Not only where an NGO or an individual can write and say, this is my view, but something more systematic, something more formalized, something that really brings in subject matter experts on some of these really difficult issues. Religious freedom, for example, is a difficult issue. We should ask people who are in that community. We should ask faith leaders what they think. It's not necessarily useful for government officials to be the only ones who make those kind of decisions. And the third and final one, and we've touched on this already, is communications. That more extensive public diplomacy by the US officially in Sudan, in Arabic, in English, in other languages that are relevant in other parts of Sudan, it's not only an Arabic-speaking country, would also help. It would help convey what the US is actually trying to achieve, what the US expects in Sudan, what the US hopes of Sudan, how the US is on the side of the Sudanese people in terms of promoting their freedoms, whether those are religious freedoms, fundamental freedoms of other kinds, economic freedoms. It's also things that relate to trade. So there are lots of US companies today that still say, oh, can't go to Sudan, too many restrictions. And we've heard from various people in the government here that actually a lot of things are allowed. And yet if you have a look at what the US government says about these sorts of things, in Sudan, it's very, very limited. And that's part of what affects this idea of continuity and the continuation of sanctions. Great. Well, I'm just going to turn back and, again, welcome anybody who's joined us on Facebook Live. We are going to turn to some questions here in the room first. And then we hope that you are sending us your comments on USIP's Facebook page. You can also follow us on Twitter. The hashtag is Sudan After Sanctions. And we're looking forward to bringing all of you into the conversation. But first, as I want to turn to you. And I'm wondering what your reaction was to some of what you read in the report. You are Sudanese-American. You travel regularly to Sudan. You're deeply engaged in following these issues. And I'm curious to hear your thoughts and any questions that you have to push, Ali. Thanks so much for having me. And thank you, Ali, and for the USIP for commissioning this report. I have not been in Sudan for a while, though. But I've been really close with people there. The report was very interesting. I heard a lot of views that I've heard around me. And it was really interesting to see how people articulated that and their expectations. Because there is a dichotomy. It's like no sanction, yes sanction. But we never got into the point of, what if now the sanction has lifted? Let's move beyond that, which is a good step. And I really liked a lot of how you encamp us and put them all together. And you touched on the human rights aspect, which was not really present in the five tracks process. Even though I know Ambassador Booth said it was underpinning of the whole process. But I'm glad that a lot of people picked on that, even though we might seem that the layman might not read all the process and tracks and stuff like that. But people actually can feel it. But one thing I want to say is, even though the report is trying to move away from what sanctions are good or bad or whatever, but we cannot consider that when we look at what happened. There are 20 years of locate and where Sudan was completely incommunicando. People moved from analog to digital, within this 20 years. These are like a very pivotal time where so many had happened and Sudan was completely caught off. Sudan is a normal person, not necessarily the government or the sort of influential. So that's why when the sanctions are lifted, you're not going to feel it because there's so much has been lost. There might not be reversible. You know what I mean? There's time, there's a movement of technology. There's a whole generation who had not been exposed to certain technology or had not been exposed to even access to things that we take for granted. Like library, like online library, like you know what I mean? Like a lot of people have been caught off from that. So it's very hard that we think there's something in the state and it's like something that can happen overnight. That's one thing. And there's something that's irreversible. Maybe we need to accept that, you know? That, okay, so how we can make up for the lost time or the lag? I feel like a lot of things that people had, maybe had felt it, it's not necessarily to be economic, but the impetus of why the sanctions were in place to begin with. It was the war. The war is not over yet. You know what I mean? And in sense, maybe some of the offenses and the aggression has stopped, but not all of it. We can all say it's over. And also the mitigation of what had happened to the war, how many of the IDP people had returned. I know this might not affect a lot of people in Khartoum or for the people that I've met, but it could also give the sense if you see a large number of perpetuation of people going back, or you see people like already had started to have this, if you see it even in Khartoum, so there's not a lot of IDP around you, for instance. Also, human rights issues, which are basically like the freedom of expression, how many newspaper have been confiscated, how many people had been detained. So it's kind of confusing to a lot of people that, okay, the sanctions were in place because of certain things, aggression and human rights violation and whatnot, and now it's lifted, but it is the status quo. So it might not be economic. Maybe the currency that I'm looking for is not necessarily to be the dollar or the hard currency prevalence or availability, but maybe they want to know to what extent the human rights issue has improved for them. And I know it will take time, and going back to your comment that you want things that are be doable, like policy makers and people, they're tired of hearing what the problems are. And I cannot, I can just echo what Ali said about their commendation. You need to have a timeframe so you can measure. You know what I mean? How could you evaluate? Going forward, now we know what people think. Now we have left it. Maybe now we can see what is missing, but we need to have timeframe for us to recheck the process and also check if Sudan has made any progress because for Sudan as a government at the top, for them to left the sanction is good for them, their image, it might not trickle down to people. It could be for debt relief, you know what I mean? Or just like for their prestige or whatever. Could be for many reasons. Election are coming up, you know? So it might not be necessary directly benefiting the person. Even if the economic stage becomes open, it's still, you have a system for 20 years that has been very a patronage system that only benefits certain people. I cannot expect that to be a level stage yet. You know what I mean? So again, that goes back to the second recommendation about having an independent committee that can oversee that and make sure that the game is fair and that now that we had opened the gate, is everybody have access to it? Or it's just like being, again, reproducing the same elective and not very inclusive as everybody would want it to be. Can I ask specifically this idea of developing clear benchmarks and timelines and essentially defining what are the next tracks of engagement. And in your experience, are symphonies who you talk with, are they wanting and ready to be part of that conversation? Do they have a sense of what they would like to see happen? And are they willing to feed into the discussion? There are, they're very, the civil society in Sudan might be divided. Some of them are completely into like not engaging with the government, not wanting to be part of anything, which understandably because all of the they feel like they always cheat it. They always like they feel to come to the table and they're just there as a talk and representation of civil society, but not necessarily being engaged fully and honestly. But I know there's other civil society members who are trying to curb this space for themselves to be active. They try to do that with the dialogue, but they need to see something to prove to the others that is worthwhile. You know what I mean? Yes, you would expect the civil society should jump on it and come with, but again, you're talking about a society that's traumatized and it has been through many, many disappointments. So you need to show the good faith. You need to show that yes, their presence would be worth it. But I know there are civil society members and organization, especially those who are directly impacted or working with the war zones, for instance. They will, they would want to be there. And actually they should be there because that's the only way for you to know how, how really the progress is happening. And little by little you will build, don't imagine everybody to come in, but you need to set a good example for everybody to join, yeah. So as we're getting some questions from our Facebook online viewers, I wanted to dig into this recommendation about the independent committee a little bit because I think one of the challenges for any committee that has external members is how do you get beyond the typical civil society organizations whose voice is absolutely important? But how do you start to get down to people who are not normally included in the conversation but are very much impacted and potentially impacted on the consequences of the next phase of engagement? And both of you have deep experience working in Sudan. So what are your thoughts about what some of the modalities would need to look like in order for this kind of committee to be successful? Well, I don't want to be too prescriptive because part of the idea here is simply, it's not to say there's only one way to do it. Of course, of course. I think what underlines this recommendation to begin with is the idea that you need to go beyond this very narrow government elite. And it is difficult, but there are ways to do it. And I think part of what would be necessary is to really consider if this is the issue, who would it be useful to speak to beyond the key informants, the key actors on that issue? So normally, if you were to do something on economic reform, for example, you talk to the, excuse me, Minister of Finance and the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank and the customs people and these sorts of things. And it seems to me that some of the methods that were used in the report in terms of qualitative discussions with lots of people in-depth basis, a part of it. Quantitative research is also part of it. You know, actually talking to people and trying to have a much more statistical approach. Spending enough time in the country is probably the key thing to this, right? That one thing that official governmental representatives are limited by is their inability to leave the capital or the infrequency of which they leave the capital, but also the fact they've got other responsibilities. So having somebody who, or having a group of people who actually can have enough time to go around without the pressure of other responsibilities is part of it as well. And I think that's really kind of key, that we have a lot of independent experts already on human rights, UN rapporteurs and this sort of thing, but they come for just a couple of days and then they're gone. And what really is needed is the continuity to kind of do this. And the point here is that this is not an externally driven organization or entity or approach. It should also involve Sudanese from all walks of life. And that really requires outreach beyond just the narrow few. Do you have any thoughts on what could make this type of independent committee more successful in engaging with a range of people? Again, not being prescriptive, but kind of brainstorming. Yeah, I would imagine that we need to not bring the usual suspects when you think about civil society. There's a lot of forms of CSOs and interest group who are not necessarily registered or like NGOs or stuff like that. But they have, especially that the civil society environment in Sudan is very restrictive and it's very mandated. So I think going to, as you said, to other parts of the country, looking at groups of people, whether tribal or people of group interests who have been affected by certain of these tracks. And I would suggest that the tracks needs to be a little bit expanded to move towards what the people want, not to be government oriented. You know what I mean? Governments can always, they have their own lingo and their own jargon and they have their own game. It's completely different than what a person, what that means to a person. And we need to make it more humanized and more towards a sustainable change, not only checkbooks, you know what I mean? And we know as a fact that changing laws in certain governments or states does not mean this status will change. You can always have beautiful, really flower, like amazing flawless laws, but it's not necessarily translated into reality or affecting the real people. So I feel like we need to make it more realistic and also I cannot stress that enough. I know people in the embassy and diplomats don't have the time, there are only so many of them, but it would be good to have a little bit of expansion. I don't know how long is the term for them, the Sudan. If it's a one year, that's really short time for you to get acquainted with the country and all that. So if there's a way to make it a little bit longer, so you get to know the people. People get to know you, not only you, it's a two way too, you know? What people would tell you the first time they meet you is completely different than when they have seen you that you're here and you're committed and you're willing to be here for the long run, you know? That's very important. And not only for this process, but also to how the U.S. is perceived. That is just like helicoptering, just coming in and now and out, you know what I mean? And never showing up again, yeah. It strikes me that there's this threat of confidence across the report, that people don't have confidence in the U.S. government's intent and motivations. They don't have confidence in their own governments, a willingness to engage with them and follow through on those actions and those, you know, that's all perception. But going forward, there needs to be a way to start to address those things. I'm gonna turn to some comments and questions from those who are joining us online. And the first one, I think, is something that we hear relatively often. So I do want to raise it. And the comment was that since the sanctions have lifted, the situation has worsened in Sudan. So why didn't the report address this? And why do you think that the situation is worsening now? Or maybe I can say from the interviews that you had, did people make any guesses about why this economic situation in particular seems to be getting worse? And we'll ask you as well. Well, thank you for the question. I haven't been able to go through all of the findings of the report here, but I would encourage everyone to look at that because this question is, I think, addressed and really dealt with in some depth. I'm not an economist. I'm not going to be able to say whether sanctions have made things worse economically or not. Certainly some of the respondents felt that they had and they attributed the fact that both of these things seem to be simultaneous to suggest that one was causing the other. And you know, one person or a couple of people argued, for example, that sanctions had made currency controls less restrictive, so you could now transact with international banks, maybe not US banks, but international banks more broadly, and that had made it easier to move money and so there'd been capital flight. I have no idea whether that's true or not, whether there's any data to support that. This is certainly what somebody suggested. I think it's also important though to look at whether these are coincidental. I would argue though that, and again, coming back to a US point of view, if US interested to be pursued and achieved, then looking at the fact that these things coincided is really important and not so much from whether one is economically supported by the other, but from a public relations point of view and how do you address that if you really believe that actually it wasn't the case? And you know, this is a PR issue that you can see in all sorts of other crises and situations, both domestic and international. What is making things worse, the second part of the question, well just very briefly, I mean, we know that Sudan's economic management isn't great and this is irrespective of sanctions, irrespective of what the US has done. Those things have certainly contributed. I agree with what Azaz said earlier, certainly we shouldn't forget and ignore the history of what US engagement and US sanctions have done, but at the same time, there's a lot of responsibility that needs to be accepted by the Sudanese government and the Sudanese economic managers themselves. And certainly as long as you spend most of your money on defense, on security, and don't spend very much on other things, as long as you have an economy which is very difficult to work in because of restrictions, because of bureaucracy, because of corruption, then it's gonna be difficult for the private sector to thrive. One person argued that it was one good reason for lifting sanctions was that it removed the protection of regime-linked companies. They argued that when sanctions were there, companies that were linked to the government, linked to the political party ruling the country were basically protected. They could find their ways around them, but other companies weren't. And so these are some of the things that really are still there, that even if sanctions have made the competition more equal, that isn't something that, as I said, can be addressed overnight. Though some of those companies are gonna struggle, creating employment is gonna remain difficult and so on. So I think there's still a lot of factors that underpin why Sudan's economy is weak. I think it'll be really interesting to see over time some of the data that comes out from that. Do you have any thoughts on this question? Yeah, it's the same thing. And I think, as you said, I just wanna emphasize that that the government always portrayed that the economic crisis is due to the sanctions, which was not true. That's why a lot of people, like, this is priming, you know what I mean? If I keep telling you that the reason for such a situation is so-and-so, you will expect it to improve once it's lifted, but it's not necessarily that it's logical to, there's no correlation between them. Well, it may be partially true, right? But I think the point is the picture is more complex. Yes, it's much more complex, you know what I mean? To say that, and again, it's a result of a lot of things. There's a lot of countries that are not intersectional and still are struggling. You know what I mean? It could be fiscal policy or something like that. So it's not that only. Yeah, so, but a lot of people made that coincide, but there's a lot of atrocity measures that have been taking place, and that was a tipping point with or without the lifting of the sanctions. So that's my understanding. I'm not an economist, an economist as well, but this is, I feel like it was going towards that anyway, you know, so. Yeah, it was, I mean, I did a helicopter in and out at the time that Ali was doing his research, and I was struck because at that point, the pricing, it was being priced at the moment, so the inflation was so high, and then you heard from people again saying, you know, this is the worst, this is going to be, the economy is not going to hold. And it shifted, the narratives shifted very much from the sanctions are responsible for the suffering in the country to the designation of state sponsors of terrorism is responsible for suffering in the country. And I think it's very common that we develop a narrative in order to get a policy result, and sometimes we get caught up in our own narrative. So I think this is not unique in any way to Sudan, but drawing out the complexity, I think is important. And it's complicated because there is some truth to it as well. Exactly. Certainly it's not irrelevant as a factor. Right. So let me turn to a second question, and this is whether anyone who you spoke to drew similar conclusions to the normalization processes that are underway between Sudan and other countries, or the engagement processes, because some of them are less normalization, I would say. So for example, the European member states or the UK strategic dialogue. Well, the main focus was here on the US relations, so I didn't necessarily ask or encourage people to look in that direction. I think to some extent, it was relevant in terms of considering what are people's understandings and what do they see as the ulterior motive behind it. And so that certainly applied to the Europeans and to the UK to some extent. But because the relationship with the US has been so acrimonious, I would have to say that people did see some difference there. That the UK hasn't bombed Sudan, at least not since the Second World War. The EU hasn't designated Sudan as a sponsor of terrorism. And so the nature of the relationship and the acrimony wasn't quite the same. And I think everybody still recognizes that the US is still a really important player and has a lot of ability, particularly because of its role in say the international financial institutions and key to debt relief, that may not be as consequential with some of the other Western players. And I know there's been some very good research conducted looking at particularly the EU, the cartoon process. On migration, some work done on the UK strategic dialogue process by other organizations. Which is this also something that comes up in your conversations about? Yeah, I would say that we need to, okay, it's very hard to only look at what the US and the Sudan are doing without looking into the full picture. And that's why we still need some accountability of some sort. Sudan is now, it's always been lucky for some reason to be strategically in some time and era where people come to their rescue. You know what I mean? It's like, oh, is this interesting allies that comes out of the woods for no reason. And now again, for reasons that are not related to Sudan, which are, it's the immigration and legal immigration to the UK and to the EU in general, a lot of partners are throwing this money at Sudan to do it at a cost to human rights. And the whole international policy or international relations policy now is moving away from human rights, democracy and whatever into very self-centered interest, which is okay, most countries are and that's what politics is. But there used to be a balance between self-interest and government and national interests and the will links of the other people who are involved. This is, I feel like it's a little bit becoming less important to a lot of partners, international partners. With Sudan being part of the Khartoum process, that in itself is very problematic. And even if the US is not directly engaged in that, I think having some conditions that that process does not result into more violation of human rights is very key. Because it's not only that. We cannot just look at our own thing and be like they're all interconnected in one way or another. And that's it for me, thank you. I mean, it's a really interesting problem set that is much, much broader than just this engagement, how migration and fragility, what is driving migration? I was struck in the time in Sudan that the government of Sudan articulates very seriously its role in addressing migration. And so maybe one of the potentials is to open up an actual dialogue on how you can balance those various interests over time. I mean, I think that the difference as well is that because of this migration relationship, European countries have a closer relationship with the government of Sudan that goes back a bit longer than this US normalization overture opening. And migration just isn't the same or migration from East Africa isn't the same issue of relevance here. Even though there is a big debate about immigration and so on, it isn't necessarily that kind of immigration which drives things in the same way that it might drive European captains. So while we're talking about regional dynamics, I'm curious if you can reflect it all on how the lifting of the sanctions or lifting of some of those sanctions has impacted on the region. How has this played out in Sudan's relationships with its neighboring countries and this very complex and increasingly complex situation across the Red Sea and the Gulf and the Horn of Africa? It's probably an event all on its own, but. I mean, and I think you have to also look beyond the region because Sudan's foreign relations have been shaped by this legacy of sanctions which were for a long time a fact of life. It may have been the governor of Sudan's ambition to have those sanctions lifted, but they were there for a long time. And so foreign policy evolved as that being, this is one of the conditions of which we have to do things. And that explains a lot about Sudan's turn to the East, the involvement of China, of India, of Malaysia. I mean, and more recently with the lifting of sanctions, first of all, we have to actually attribute how responsible, how important some of the lobbying by Gulf countries in particular of Washington was in getting the sanctions permanently lifted. That wasn't done deal by any means. The fact that Sudan has been rehabilitated always in the process of rehabilitating is a real dramatic shift in sort of its relationship with the wider region, the wider world. And sanctions, I think you can see that as part of that narrative, that if normalization or better relations because of migration have driven an improved relationship with the Europeans, the lifting of sanctions has driven a better relationship with the Americans, that Sudan is definitely stronger in that sense. Internally though, and this is part of, I think what's really interesting about what's happened is that sanctions lifting and these other related processes might have strengthened Sudan as an international player or Sudan's foreign relations, but they haven't necessarily addressed the internal contradictions and weaknesses. And some of the reality is that because the U.S. was a very convenient enemy, scapegoat, whatever you wanna call it for whatever went wrong in Sudan, that as normalization occurs or continues to occur, that becomes less and less convincing as an explanation. And that also addresses then, well, what do we have to do internally? And that's a much more difficult conversation to manage. In some ways that parallels the situation in the region where there might be turmoil internally, whether in Ethiopia or Egypt, that those are some of the same challenges that they have. They don't necessarily have an external enemy or adversary to blame everything on. And so really what you see in those countries is a turning inwards and saying, well, how do we address these problems? And that's really difficult. And so I'm really interested to see if this normalization with the U.S. continues, which it appears it will, how those internal contradictions are addressed by the Sudanese and whether the U.S. can play or does play a useful role in encouraging some of those contradictions to be resolved. Resolved for the benefit of the people rather than for the benefit of only a few. I wanna turn to a cluster of questions that talk about citizen engagement broadly because I think they're really good questions and we can address them maybe together. And one is a question about the role of the media and how can the media help to improve public understanding and public inclusion in the conversation. Another is about whether there could be and whether there need to be further studies on the more qualitative nature of citizens' perceptions of their role in Sudan. So what do they see as a vision? And I know there is some work out there, so maybe we can draw that out. And the last is perhaps the kind of framing question which is can U.S. Sudan engagement lead to some sort of comprehensive piece in the country? Is that a reasonable expectation? And should that be the goal and objective? It should be the drive actually. It should be the drive because the whole reason for the sanctions were of course because of the engagement of Sudan with some terrorist organization but it was reimposed again in 2007 because of what happened in Darfur. So I feel like we need to address that like the whole reason for the sanctions to be in the first place. I know it cannot happen overnight but that should be the guiding lights or the guiding star for us that. And I think addressing all these aspects of cessation of war, human rights violation and all that should ultimately lead us into something and dialogue. I feel like we need to be engaged and we need to talk and we keep the channel open and not cut it even if it does not reach something. We still need to talk. We need to keep engaging with others. I wanted to comment something on the media which again goes back to the human rights basics. What media are you talking about in Sudan? One of the things like most of the media are state controlled one way or another. Yesterday I saw something very interesting in one of them, a newspaper like an ad. They're thanking the NES under the National Security Services for their generous gifts that they give them every Ramadan to all the editor-in-chief. That's. Transparency. That's very bizarre. Yeah, it is transparency. I can give you that. But again, this is like really very bizarre to me. And again, most of the newspaper, they did try to run some stories that they're not necessarily approved by NES but they faced really major economic precautions because they confiscate runs and all that. And it's very hard, you know what I mean? At the end of the day, this is a developing country. These people have families to feed and all that. And the social media or online platforms for news are usually targeted by the government. Just this, I think it was Omar Abashir who said any of the online activists will not be allowed to go back to Sudan again. That's very, that has an impact on the news, on the production, on the way that people exchange news and also the overreaching of having bloggers and online activists who are arrested from another country to be brought back. So this affects how people engage and share information and make them eventually be self-censoring. And by the self-censoring, you end up omitting a lot of things and end up controlling yourself and capturing yourself before you're asking the question. So, and I personally think it's very hard for anyone, like some people might believe what are they here in state television or Sudanese television, but I personally not, I don't. I take it with a gram of salt. I have to go and make sure that I eat that. But there is a major gap of information of where people get their information from and whether that information is accurate or not. So it needs to be addressed on multiple level, government policy, freedom of expression, not interfering and meddling with what newspaper do. And also there is deterioration of capacity, of journalists. I have not read any investigative reporting that comes out of Sudan. You know what I mean? It's like I can't like cleaning the weed, which one is true, which one is hearsay and even access to information with this information access act that actually classifies everything. So there is gap. There's some laws that are not even published. So there is some work on the part of the government and also rehabilitating the whole information gathering and producing and disseminating machines as well, you know, formal and informal. And that creates a bit of a vicious cycle, right? Because there are those in the government who may be champions of some sort of opening of space, but if you don't have a well-developed media capacity, then people don't trust that the work will be done in a professional manner. And so it drives this cycle, whether that's true or not, but it drives this cycle of perceptions that there isn't space for trust. And so, I mean, it strikes me again that there's a need to figure out who are the champions and how can they be supported across all the different sectors. And there are some journalists who are trying to do that and those who run any investigative reporting on any topic, any given topic, you would be surprised that nine out of 10 are persecuted by us. They end up being persecuted or they end up being facing charges for covering this story or that. So it makes, again, even the journalists, even those who want to do that, they still fear the precautions of covering stories in depth, which, again, affect and really, in a negative way, the skills and ability of journalists as well. Allie, your thoughts on this cluster of questions, the role of the media, the potential to drive towards comprehensive peace? Well, as a former journalist in Sudan, definitely a sympathetic to the plight of the media, I think the question for U.S. policymakers is, how do you go beyond the principle of freedom of expression? Let's assume and let's say that, you know, that's a bedrock principle of this country and, you know, it should be telegraphed in U.S. foreign policy, including in Sudan, that if that is a basic premise, how do you go beyond it? One of the things we've seen over the years is that the legalistic protections and reforms don't necessarily work. The Constitution protects freedom of expression, protects freedom of the media, and yet you have these kinds of problems. So I think one thing that would be really useful would be for any future U.S. engagement process to more intelligently use the Sudanese media, not only to communicate with the Sudanese media consumers and as a way to also use those views, but also to demonstrate to the Sudanese government why it's important to have a freer media. And, I mean, realistically, this is not gonna change overnight. Media reform is a problem in lots of countries. Media freedom is a problem in lots of countries. And I think it's part of a wider conversation or should be part of a wider conversation about why a free media is important in general, in all places, and Sudan can't be an exception or can't be seen as an outlier in that. But what is different here is that because there's this normalization process, the U.S. can push a bit harder, perhaps on freedom of the media in a way that may be more difficult in some of the other places where it's also a problem. The question about a more comprehensive piece, and then there was a third one as well, which I have lost now. The idea of whether there is a need in space for further studies on the qualitative nature of citizens' perceptions of their role and, again, their hopes, their aspirations. Yeah, well, let me answer that one first. As a researcher, yes, research is always more necessary. I mean, this study that we've done now is certainly limited, it certainly has its limitations. It is a particular moment in time, and I think it's really important that the qualitative research, which goes beyond elite interviews, continues. And that should be something which, hopefully, anyone who's interested in supporting a true understanding of what people think should consider. That we often ignore or say, well, perceptions of your average person, that's for someone else to do. It's not necessarily what conflict and peace researchers always focus on. And so I would argue, and I think this is one reason I'm grateful that USIP has done this, because it's not necessarily about conflict as such, is to understand how wider societal views underpin political dynamics, and therefore are relevant to a more peaceful and inclusive society. So answer to that question is definitely, yes, more research is necessary. And more kinds of research in more places and by more people and by Sudanese-led initiatives as well. In terms of the overall big picture about peace in Sudan, I think my view on sanctions is that with the sanctions being lifted, it shouldn't go back. It's not a good to go back and become productive to return to that. So even if the original expectations and ambitions and objectives of sanctions haven't all been met, that's the reality they've been lifted. It would not be helpful to encourage the government of Sudan to take further steps of reform if we went back and said, okay, well, hang on, everything goes back to the way it was two years ago or three years ago. That said, it's obvious that the way in which conflict is approached in Sudan hasn't delivered results. The current mediation process for South Kordifam, Blue Nile, Darfur is basically very much stuck. One of the notable things that the sanctions lifting process has done was to sustain the secession of hostilities. It's perhaps questionable in some areas, but it seems that it's largely held, it's largely improved across conflict areas. I think the question now is how to go beyond that. That, you know, it shouldn't be as part of any future engagement to say there needs to be a new peace agreement or there needs to be a permanent ceasefire. That might be part of it, but that doesn't change the underlying reasons for conflict, the mentality that has led to conflict. And so I think, again, much like with other freedoms, the principle is there, we want a peaceful Sudan. That is a common interest of the United States and the Sudanese. The US may have other interests, but that is one where there really is a commonality between what both countries and both citizenaries want. The question now is how to do that intelligently and usefully. What more can we ask the government of Sudan to do in terms of conflict dynamics and conflict arrangements? And that's where I think there is some possibility. There are some things that can be done to further encourage and incentivize and develop those sorts of arrangements so that in future we aren't perhaps talking about these conflicts which were dragged on for so many years. It seems like there's a need to define clearly what are the measures of progress, but what are the processes to get there as well? And so if there are ways to engage media and to start to build in media robustly, if there are ways to engage Sudanese in the conversation, if there are ways to start to enhance levels of relationship between the United States and Sudan at various levels, not just in the government, but rebuilding that fundamental society to society relationship that this will all help to push towards a healthier, more peaceful Sudan that I think is in everybody's interest. Part of this is going beyond what I call negative measures. Things that don't do this or desist from that. Stop bombing people. Stop repressing the media. Stop demolishing churches. Those are measures that yes, need to be there and they're very clear. Don't behave in that sort of way. But you've also got to think about the positive conception of those things. How does one therefore encourage religious freedom or freedom of expression or freedom of the media or resolution of conflict? And if we can think about, and if the engagement process from both the Sudanese point of view and the US point of view can think about positive measures, I think that will also take us much further. It seems like continuing for the United States to continue to get a better understanding of what are the constraints that are faced by the Sudanese government and those within the Sudan government to make those reforms. And because as we've noted, there's been such a long rupture in terms of those relationships and engagements starting to build those relationships is also a really critical component. And it takes time and it can't be rushed. And I think fundamentally the last point about resolution of conflict or that being an underlying objective is that that isn't gonna happen in a six month period. It's not gonna happen in one year. It's gonna take time. And so any process also needs to be realistic about that sort of time. Any last quick thoughts? Yes, I have one thing about just committing on this. You said that in the report about changing the mentality, which is true, is not just one act is like to what extent you actually commit it to freedom of expression. And it takes more than just this, don't do that, don't do that, perfection, like I need to change the mentality. And I think that can be felt sometimes not from the active omission, but sometimes can be from other proactive measures of showing that you are really committed to those values. I wanna also say something that Sudan is not Khartoum, which is very easy for us always to fall into that. And I know for many reasons, any research will start on Khartoum because it's a kind of molten pot, but Sudan is not. And there are two parts of Sudan that needs to be looked at. One is the parts of the war zones, and especially in Blue Nile and Kurdistan, because most of the people from that part of the country always wanted the sanctions to remain because it was their only way not to be forgotten. And we need to see how the left hand of the sanction does actually affect those people who thought the sanctions were their only way of international recognition somehow. The other part is the other part of Sudan, the other peripheries, there's like a gold rush happening now in north of Sudan where a CNE is just being disposed into the Nile. You know what I mean? I'm not sure what my second cousin would think of sanctions if you tell them that up north. They don't know what that means. All they know is like strangers are coming to the village, taken over, disposing all these CNE and they're ending up with all these like health complication and have no roads, no hospitals, no money to go to the nearest hospital. So to them, it's irrelevant. It just doesn't make sense. You know what I mean? So we need to, even if they don't know what it means, we know what it means. And we bear the responsibility to either democratize this information to them, make it in context to them, or instead walk for them or walk with them to make sure that the lefting of the sanction is actually in their benefit. And because, I don't know, to call it cartomization of Sudan, I feel like Sudan is hijacked by Khartoum being, it's the only representation for Sudan, which is not. But I know international actors and partners, it's very hard. And I know there's a lot of restrictions from the government on your movement out. So it's not only you as a visitor or as a researcher, but also the government needs to open that up and look at these parts of Sudan as part of the country and reach out to them and engage them and also be part of the committee. So also the committee has to take into this part this regional aspect and approach to it. Well, Allie, thank you so much for the work on this report, for the conversation today. Azaz, thank you for joining us. Thank you. And everybody who joined us on Facebook Live for your questions and your comments. As Allie said, we never write reports to be definitive. We write reports to provoke a conversation. And we hope that this is the beginning of the conversation. People are welcome to continue to post their thoughts and questions on USIP's Facebook account. We welcome engagement on our Twitter account and certainly welcome engagement in person and in future conversations with those of you who are close to and around DC. So thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you. Have a good day, everybody. Just want to wish everyone even a bark. And even bark. Yes, thank you. Thank you.