 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Jude Cater. The Concept of Nature by Alfred North Whitehead Section 3. Time The two previous lectures of this course have been mainly critical. In the present lecture, I propose to enter upon a survey of the kinds of entities which are posited for knowledge and sense awareness. My purpose is to investigate the sorts of relations which these entities of various kinds can bear to each other. A classification of natural entities is the beginning of natural philosophy. Today we commence with the consideration of time. In the first place there is posited for us a general fact, namely, something is going on. There is an occurrence for definition. This general fact at once yields for our apprehension two factors, which I will name the discerned and the discernible. The discerned is comprised of those elements of the general fact which are discriminated with their own individual peculiarities. It is the field directly perceived. But the entities of this field have relations to other entities which are not particularly discriminated in this individual way. These other entities are known merely as the relata in relation to the entities of the discerned field. Such an entity is merely a something which has such and such definite relations to some definite entity or entities in the discerned field. As being thus related they are owing to the particular character of these relations known as elements of the general fact which is going on. But we are not aware of them except as entities fulfilling the functions of relata in these relations. Thus the complete general fact, posited as occurring, comprises both sets of entities. Namely the entities perceived in their own individuality and other entities merely apprehended as relata without further definition. This complete general fact is the discernible and it comprises the discerned. The discernible is all nature as disclosed in that sense awareness and extends beyond and comprises all of nature as actually discriminated or discerned in that sense awareness. The discerning or discrimination of nature is a peculiar awareness of special factors in nature in respect to their peculiar characters. But the factors in nature of which we have this peculiar sense awareness are known as not comprising all the factors which together form the whole complex of related entities within the general fact there for discernment. This peculiarity of knowledge is what I call its unexhaustive character. This character may be metaphorically described by the statement that nature as perceived always has a ragged edge. For example, there is a world beyond the room to which our sight is confined known to us as completing the space relations of the entities discerned within the room. The junction of the interior world of the room with the exterior world beyond is never sharp. Sounds and subtler factors disclosed in sense awareness float in from the outside. Every type of sense has its own set of discriminated entities which are known to be relata in relation with entities not discriminated by that sense. For example, we see something which we do not touch and we touch something which we do not see and we have a general sense of the space relations between the entity disclosed in sight and the entity disclosed in touch. Thus in the first place each of these two entities is known as a relatum in the general system of space relations and in the second place the particular mutual relation of these two entities as related to each other in this general system is determined. But the general system of space relations relating the entity discriminated by sight with that discriminated by touch is not dependent on the peculiar character of the other entity as reported by the alternative sense. For example, the space relations of the thing seen would have necessitated an entity as a relatum in the place of the thing touched even although certain elements of its character had not been disclosed by touch. Thus apart from touch an entity with a certain specific relation to the thing seen would have been disclosed by sense awareness but not otherwise discriminated in respect to its individual character. An entity merely known as spatially related to some discerned entity is what we mean by the bare idea of place. The concept of place marks the disclosure and sense awareness of entities in nature known merely by their spatial relations to discerned entities. It is the disclosure of the discernible by means of its relations to the discerned. This disclosure of an entity as a relatum without further specific discrimination of quality is the basis of our concept of significance. In the above example the thing seen was significant in that it disclosed its spatial relations to other entities not necessarily otherwise entering into consciousness. Thus significance is relatedness but it is relatedness with the emphasis on one end only of the relation. For the sake of simplicity I have confined the argument to spatial relations but the same considerations apply to temporal relations. The concept of period of time marks the disclosure and sense awareness of entities in nature known merely by their temporal relations to discerned entities. Still further, this separation of the ideas of space and time has merely been adopted for the sake of gaining simplicity of exposition by conformity to current language. What we discern is the specific character of a place through a period of time. This is what I mean by an event. We discern some specific character of an event but in discerning an event we are also aware of its significance as a relatum in the structure of events. This structure of events is the complex of events is related by the two relations of extension and co-gradience. The most simple expression of the properties of this structure are to be found in our spatial and temporal relations. A discerned event is known as related in this structure to other events whose specific characters are otherwise not disclosed in that immediate awareness except so far as that they are relata within the structure. The disclosure and sense awareness of the structure of events classifies events into those which are discerned in respect to some further individual character and those which are not otherwise disclosed except as elements of the structure. These signified events must include events in the remote past as well as events in the future. We are aware of these as the far-off periods of unbounded time, but there is another classification of events which is also inherent in sense awareness. These are the events which share the immediacy of the immediately present discerned events. These are the events whose characters together with those of the discerned events comprise all nature present for discernment. They form the complete general fact which is all nature now present as disclosed in that sense awareness. It is in this second classification of events that the differentiation of space from time takes its origin. The germ of space is to be found in the mutual relations of events within the immediate general fact which is all nature now discernible, namely within the one event which is the totality of present nature. The relations of other events to this totality of nature form the texture of time. The unity of this general present fact is expressed by the concept of simultaneity. The general fact is the whole simultaneous occurrence of nature which is now for sense awareness. This general fact is what I have called the discernible, but in future I will call it a duration, meaning thereby a certain whole of nature which is limited only by the property of being a simultaneity. Further in obedience to the principle of comprising within nature the whole terminus of sense awareness, simultaneity must not be conceived as an irrelevant mental concept opposed upon nature. Our sense awareness posits for immediate discernment a certain whole, here called a duration. Thus a duration is a definite natural entity. A duration is discriminated as a complex of partial events, and the natural entities which are now components of this complex are thereby said to be simultaneous with this duration. Also in a derivative sense they are simultaneous with each other in respect to this duration. Thus simultaneity is a definite natural relation. The word duration is perhaps unfortunate insofar as it suggests a mere abstract stretch of time. This is not what I mean. A duration is a concrete slab of nature limited by simultaneity which is an essential factor disclosed in sense awareness. Nature is a process. As in the case of everything directly exhibited in sense awareness there can be no explanation of this characteristic of nature. All that can be done is to use language which may speculatively demonstrate it and also to express the relation of this factor in nature to other factors. It is an exhibition of the process of nature that each duration happens and passes. The process of nature can also be termed the passage of nature. I definitely refrain at this stage from using the word time since the measurable time of science and of civilized life generally merely exhibits some aspects of the more fundamental fact of the passage of nature. I believe that in this doctrine I am in full accord with Bergson though he uses time for the fundamental fact which I call the passage of nature. Also the passage of nature is exhibited equally in spatial transition as well as in temporal transition. It is in virtue of its passage that nature is always moving on. It is involved in the meaning of this property of moving on that not only is any act of sense awareness just that act and no other but the terminus of each act is also unique and is the terminus of no other act. Sense awareness sees as its only chance and presents for knowledge something which is for it alone. There are two senses in which the terminus of sense awareness is unique. It is unique for the sense awareness of an individual mind and it is unique for the sense awareness of all minds which are operating under natural conditions. There is an important distinction between the two cases. One. For one mind not only is the discerned component of the general fact exhibited in any act of sense awareness distinct from the discerned component of the general fact exhibited in any other act of sense awareness of that mind but the two corresponding durations which are respectively related by simultaneity to the two discerned components are necessarily distinct. This is an exhibition of the temporal passage of nature namely one duration has passed into the other. Thus not only is the passage of nature an essential character of nature in its role of the terminus of sense awareness but it is also essential for sense awareness in itself. It is this truth which makes time appear to extend beyond nature but what extends beyond nature to mind is not the serial and measurable time which exhibits merely the character of passage in nature but the quality of passage itself which is in no way measurable except so far as it obtains in nature. That is to say passage is not measurable except as it occurs in nature in connection with extension. In passage we reach a connection of nature with the ultimate metaphysical reality. The quality of passage in durations is a particular exhibition in nature of a quality which extends beyond nature. For example passage is a quality not only of nature which is the thing known but also of sense awareness which is the procedure of knowing. Durations have all the reality that nature has but what that may be we need not now determine. The measurableness of time is derivative from the properties of durations so also is the serial character of time. We shall find that there are in nature competing serial time systems derived from different families of durations. These are a peculiarity of the character of passage as it is found in nature. This character has the reality of nature but we must not necessarily transfer natural time to extra-natural entities. 2. For two minds the discerned components of the general facts exhibited in their respective acts of sense awareness must be different. For each mind in its awareness of nature is aware of a certain complex of related natural entities and their relations to the living body as a focus. But the associated durations may be identical. Here we are touching on that character of the passage nature which issues in the spatial relations of simultaneous bodies. This possible identity of the durations in the case of the sense awareness of distinct minds is what binds into one nature the private experiences of sentient beings. We are here considering the spatial side of the passage of nature. Passage in this aspect of it also seems to extend beyond nature to mind. It is important to distinguish simultaneity from instantaneousness. I lay no stress on the mere current usage of the two terms. There are two concepts which I want to distinguish and one I call simultaneity and the other instantaneousness. I hope that the words are judiciously chosen. But it really does not matter so long as I succeed in explaining my meaning. Simultaneity is the property of a group of natural elements which in some sense are components of a duration. A duration can be all nature present as the immediate fact posited by sense awareness. A duration retains within itself the passage of nature. There are within it antecedents and consequence which are also durations which may be the complete specious presence of quicker consciousness. In other words, a duration retains temporal thickness. Any concept of all nature is immediately known as always a concept of some duration though it may be enlarged in its temporal thickness beyond the possible specious present of any being known to us as existing within nature. Thus, simultaneity is an ultimate factor in nature immediate for sense awareness. Instantaneousness is a complex logical concept of a procedure in thought by which constructed logical entities are produced for the sake of the simple expression in thought of properties of nature. Instantaneousness is the concept of all nature at an instant where an instant is conceived as deprived of all temporal extension. For example, we conceive of the distribution of matter and space at an instant. This is a very useful concept in science especially in applied mathematics but it is a very complex idea so far as concerns its connections with the immediate facts of sense awareness. There is no such thing as nature at an instant posited by sense awareness. What sense awareness delivers over for knowledge is nature through a period. Accordingly, nature at an instant since it is not itself a natural entity must be defined in terms of genuine natural entities. Unless we do so, our science which employs the concept of instantaneous nature must abandon all claim to be founded upon observation. I will use the term moment to mean all nature at an instant. A moment in the sense in which the term is used here has no temporal extension and is in this respect to be contrasted with a duration which has such extension. What is directly yielded to our knowledge by sense awareness is a duration. Accordingly, we have now to explain how moments are derived from durations and also to explain the purpose served by their introduction. A moment is a limit to which we approach as we can find attention to durations of minimum extension. Natural relations among the ingredients of a duration gain in complexity as we consider durations of increasing temporal extension. Accordingly, there is an approach to ideal simplicity as we approach an ideal diminution of extension. The word limit has a precise signification in the logic of number and even in the logic of non-numerical one-dimensional series. As used here, it is so far a mere metaphor and it is necessary to explain directly the concept which it is meant to indicate. Durations can have the two termed relational property of extending one over the other. Thus, the duration which is all nature during a certain minute extends over the duration which is all nature during the 30th second of that minute. This relation of extending over, extension as I shall call it, is a fundamental natural relation whose field comprises more than durations. It is a relation which two limited events can have to each other. Furthermore, as holding between durations the relation appears to refer to the purely temporal extension. I shall, however, maintain that the same relation of extension lies at the base both of temporal and spatial extension. This discussion can be postponed and for the present we are simply concerned with the relation of extension as it occurs in its temporal aspect for the limited field of durations. The concept of extension exhibits in thought one side of the ultimate passage of nature. This relation holds because of the special character which passage assumes in nature. It is the relation which in the case of durations expresses the properties of passing over. Thus, the duration which was one definite minute passed over the duration which was its 30th second. The duration of the 30th second was part of the duration of the minute. I shall use the terms whole and part exclusively in this sense that the part is an event which is extended over by the other event which is the whole. Thus in my nomenclature whole and part refer exclusively to this fundamental relation of extension. And accordingly in this technical usage only events can be either holes or parts. The continuity of nature arises from extension. Every event extends over other events and every event is extended over by other events. Thus in the special case of durations which are now the only events directly under consideration. Every duration is part of other durations and every duration has other durations which are parts of it. Accordingly there are no maximum durations and no minimum durations. Thus there is no atomic structure of durations and the perfect definition of a duration so as to mark out its individuality and distinguish it from highly analogous durations over which it is passing or which are passing over it is an arbitrary postulate of thought. Sense awareness posits durations as factors in nature but does not clearly enable thought to use it as distinguishing the separate individualities of the entities of an allied group of slightly differing durations. This is one instance of the indeterminateness of sense awareness. Exactness is an ideal of thought and is only realized and experienced by the selection of a route of approximation. The absence of maximum and minimum durations does not exhaust the properties of nature which make up its continuity. The passage of nature involves the existence of a family of durations. When two durations belong to the same family either one contains the other or they overlap each other in a subordinate duration without either containing the other or they are completely separate. The excluded case is that of durations overlapping in finite events but not containing a third duration as a common part. It is evident that the relation of extension is transitive namely as applied to durations if a duration A is part of duration B and duration B is part of duration C then A is part of C. Thus the first two cases may be combined into one and we can say that two durations which belong to the same family either are such that there are durations which are parts of both or are completely separate. Furthermore the converse of this proposition holds namely if two durations have other durations which are parts of both or if the two durations are completely separate then they belong to the same family. The further characteristics of the continuity of nature so far as durations are concerned which has not yet been formulated arises in connection with a family of durations. It can be stated in this way there are durations which contain as parts any two durations of the same family. For example a week contains as parts any two of its days. It is evident that a containing duration satisfies the conditions for belonging to the same family as the two contained durations. We are now prepared to proceed to the definition of a moment of time. Consider a set of durations all taken from the same family. Let it have the following properties one of any two members of the set one contains the other as a part and two there is no duration which is a common part of every member of the set. Now the relation of the whole in part is asymmetrical and by this I mean that if A is part of B then B is not part of A. Also we have already noted that the relation is transitive. Accordingly we can easily see that the durations of any set with the properties just enumerated must be arranged in a one-dimensional serial order in which as we descend the series we progressively reach durations of smaller and smaller temporal extension. The series may start with any arbitrarily assumed duration of any temporal extension but in descending the series the temporal extension progressively contracts and the successive durations are packed one within the other like the nest of boxes of a Chinese toy. But the set differs from the toy in this particular. The toy has a smallest box which forms the end box of its series but the set of durations can have no smallest duration nor can it converge towards a duration as its limit. For the parts either of the end duration or of the limit would be parts of all the durations of the set and thus the second condition for the set would be violated. I will call such a set of durations an abstractive set of durations. It is evident that an abstractive set as we pass along it converges to the ideal of all nature with no temporal extension namely to the ideal of all nature at an instant. But this ideal is in fact the ideal of a non-entity. What the abstractive set is in fact doing is to guide thought to the consideration of the progressive simplicity of natural relations as we progressively diminish the temporal extension of the duration considered. Now the whole point of the procedure is that the quantitative expressions of these natural properties do converge to limits though the abstractive set does not converge to any limiting duration. The laws relating these quantitative limits are the laws of nature at an instant although in truth there is no nature at an instant and there is only the abstractive set. Thus an abstractive set is effectively the entity meant when we consider an instant of time without temporal extension. It subserves all the necessary purposes of giving a definite meaning to the concept of the properties of nature at an instant. I fully agree that this concept is fundamental in the expression of physical science. The difficulty is to express our meaning in terms of the immediate deliverances of sense awareness and I offer the above explanation as a complete solution of the problem. In this explanation a moment is the set of natural properties reached by a route of approximation. An abstractive series is a route of approximation. There are different routes of approximation to the same limiting set of the properties of nature. In other words there are different abstractive sets which are to be regarded as routes of approximation to the same moment. Accordingly there is a certain amount of technical detail necessary in explaining the relations of such abstractive sets with the same convergence and in guarding against possible exceptional cases. Such details are not suitable for exposition in these lectures and I have dealt with them fully elsewhere. It is more convenient for technical purposes to look on a moment as being the class of all abstractive sets of durations with the same convergence. With this definition provided that we can successfully explain what we mean by the same convergence apart from a detailed knowledge of the set of natural properties arrived at by approximation a moment is merely a class of sets of durations whose relations of extension in respect to each other have certain definite peculiarities. The intrinsic properties of the moment are the properties of nature arrived at as a limit as we proceed along any one of its abstractive sets. These are the properties of nature at that moment or at that instant. The durations which enter into the composition of a moment all belong to one family thus there is one family of moments corresponding to one family of durations. Also, if we take two moments of the same family among the durations which enter into the composition of one moment, the smaller durations are completely separated from the smaller durations which enter into the composition of the other moment. Thus the two moments in their intrinsic properties must exhibit the limits of completely different states of nature. In this sense the two moments are completely separated. I will call two moments of the same family parallel. Corresponding to each duration there are two moments of the associated family of moments which are the boundary moments of that duration. A boundary moment of a duration can be defined in this way. There are durations of the same family as the given duration which overlap it but are not contained in it. Consider an abstractive set of such durations. Such a set defines a moment which is just as much without the duration as within it. Such a moment is a boundary moment of the duration. Also, we call upon our sense awareness of the passage of nature to inform us that there are two such boundary moments, namely the earlier one and the later one. We will call them the initial and the final boundaries. There are also moments of the same family such that the shorter durations in their composition are entirely separated from the given duration. Such moments will be said to lie outside the given duration. Again, other moments of the family are such that the shorter durations in their composition are parts of the given duration. Such moments are said to lie within the given duration or to in here in it. The whole family of parallel moments is accounted for in this way by reference to any given duration of the associated family of durations. Namely, there are the moments of the family which lie without the given duration. There are the two moments which are the boundary moments of the given duration and the moments which lie within the given duration. Furthermore, any two moments of the same family are the boundary moments of some one duration of the associated family of durations. It is now possible to define the serial relation of temporal order among the moments of a family. For let A and C be any two moments of the family, these moments are the boundary moments of one duration D of the associated family, and any moment B which lies within the duration D will be said to lie between the moments A and C. Thus, the three termed relation of lying between as relating three moments A, B, and C is completely defined. Also, our knowledge of the passage of nature assures us that this relation distributes the moments of the family into a serial order. I abstain from enumerating the definite properties which secure this result. I have enumerated them in my recently published book to which I have already referred. Furthermore, the passage of nature enables us to know that one direction along the series corresponds to passage into the future, and the other direction corresponds to retroaggression towards the past. Such an ordered series of moments is what we mean by time defined as a series. Each element of the series exhibits an instantaneous state of nature. Evidently, this serial time is the result of an intellectual process of abstraction. What I have done is to give precise definitions of the procedure by which the abstraction is affected. This procedure is merely a particular case of the general method which in my book I name the method of extensive abstraction. This serial time is evidently not the very passage of nature itself. It exhibits some of the natural properties which flow from it. The state of nature at a moment has evidently lost this ultimate quality of passage. Also, the temporal series of moments only retains it as an extrinsic relation of entities and not as the outcome of the essential being of the terms of the series. Nothing has yet been said as to the measurement of time. Such measurement does not follow from the mere serial property of time. It requires a theory of congruence which will be considered in a later lecture. In estimating the adequacy of this definition of the temporal series as a formulation of experience, it is necessary to discriminate between the crude deliverance of sense awareness and our intellectual theories. The lapse of time is a measurable serial quality. The whole of scientific theory depends on this assumption and any theory of time which fails to provide such a measurable series stands self-condemned as unable to account for the most salient fact and experience. Our difficulties only begin when we ask what it is that is measured. It is evidently something so fundamental an experience that we can hardly stand back from it and hold it apart so as to view it in its own proportions. We have first to make up our minds whether time is to be found in nature or nature is to be found in time. The difficulty of the latter alternative, namely of making time prior to nature, is that time then becomes a metaphysical enigma. What sort of entities are its instance or its periods? The disassociation of time from events discloses to our immediate inspection that the attempt to set up time as an independent terminus for knowledge is like the effort to find substance in a shadow. There is time because there are happenings and apart from happenings there is nothing. It is necessary, however, to make a distinction. In some sense, time extends beyond nature. It is not true that a timeless sense-awareness and a timeless thought combine to contemplate a timeful nature. Sense-awareness and thought are themselves processes as well as their termini in nature. In other words, there is a passage of sense-awareness and a passage of thought. Thus, the reign of the quality of passage extends beyond nature. But now the distinction arises between passage which is fundamental and the temporal series which is a logical abstraction representing some of the properties of nature. A temporal series, as we have defined it, represents merely certain properties of a family of durations. Properties indeed which durations only possess because of their partaking of the character of passage. But on the other hand, properties which only durations to possess. Accordingly, time in the sense of a measurable temporal series is a character of nature only and does not extend to the processes of thought and of sense-awareness except by a correlation of these processes with the temporal series implicated in their procedures. So far the passage of nature has been considered in connection with the passage of durations. And in this connection it is peculiarly associated with temporal series. We must remember, however, that the character of passage is peculiarly associated with the extension of events and that from this extension spatial transition arises just as much as temporal transition. The discussion of this point is reserved for a later lecture. But it is necessary to remember it now that we are proceeding to discuss the application of the concept of passage beyond nature. Otherwise we shall have too narrow an idea of the essence of passage. It is necessary to dwell on the subject of sense-awareness in this connection as an example of the way in which time concerns mind. Although measurable time is a mere abstract from nature and nature is closed to mind. Consider sense-awareness, not its terminus which is nature, but sense-awareness in itself as a procedure of mind. Sense-awareness is a relation of mind to nature. Accordingly we are now considering mind as a rollatum in sense-awareness. For mind there is the immediate sense-awareness and there is memory. The distinction between memory and the present immediacy has a double bearing. On the one hand it discloses that mind is not impartially aware of all those natural durations to which it is related by awareness. Its awareness shares in the passage of nature. We can imagine a being whose awareness conceived as his private possession suffers no transition although the terminus of his awareness is our own transient nature. There is no essential reason why memory should not be raised to the vividness of the present fact. And then, from the side of mind, what is the difference between the present and the past? Yet with this hypothesis we can also suppose that the vivid remembrance and the present fact are posited in awareness as in their temporal serial order. Accordingly we must admit that though we can imagine that mind in the operation of sense-awareness might be free from any character of passage, yet in point of fact our experience of sense-awareness exhibits our minds as partaking in this character. On the other hand the mere fact of memory is an escape from transience. In memory the past is present. It is not present as over leaping the temporal succession of nature, but it is present as an immediate fact for the mind. Accordingly memory is a disengagement of the mind from the mere passage of nature for what has passed for nature has not passed for mind. Furthermore, the distinction between memory and the immediate present is not so clear as it is conventional to suppose. There is an intellectual theory of time as a moving knife edge, exhibiting a present fact without temporal extension. This theory arises from the concept of an ideal exactitude of observation. Astronomical observations are successively refined to be exact to tenths, to hundredths, and to thousandths of seconds. But the final refinements are arrived at by a system of averaging and even then present us with a stretch of time as a margin of error. Here error is merely a conventional term to express the fact that the character of experience does not accord with the ideal of thought. I have already explained how the concept of a moment conciliates the observed fact with this ideal. Namely, there is a limiting simplicity in the quantitative expression of the properties of durations which has arrived at by considering any one of the abstractive sets included in the moment. In other words, the extrinsic character of the moment as an aggregate of durations has associated with it the intrinsic character of the moment which is the limiting expression of natural properties. Thus, the character of a moment and the ideal of exactness which it enshrines do not in any way weaken the position that the ultimate terminus of awareness is a duration with temporal thickness. This immediate duration is not clearly marked out for our apprehension. Its earlier boundary is blurred by a fading into memory and its later boundary is blurred by an emergence from anticipation. There is no sharp distinction either between memory and the present immediacy or between the present immediacy and anticipation. The present is a wavering breadth of boundary between the two extremes. Thus, our own sense awareness with its extended present has some of the character of the sense awareness of the imaginary being whose mind was free from passage and who contemplated all nature as an immediate fact. Our own present has its antecedents and its consequence, and for the imaginary being all nature has its antecedent and its consequent durations. Thus, the only difference in this respect between us and the imaginary being is that for him all nature shares in the immediacy of our present duration. The conclusion of this discussion is that so far a sense awareness is concerned, there is a passage of mind which is distinguishable from the passage of nature though closely allied with it. We may speculate if we like that this alliance of the passage of mind with the passage of nature arises from their both sharing in some ultimate character of passage which dominates all being. But this is a speculation in which we have no concern. The immediate deduction which is sufficient for us is that, so far as sense awareness is concerned, mind is not in time or in space in the same sense in which the events of nature are in time, but that it is derivatively in time and in space by reason of the peculiar alliance of its passage with the passage of nature. Thus, mind is in time and in space in a sense peculiar to itself. This has been a long discussion to arrive at a very simple and obvious conclusion. We all feel that in some sense our minds are here in this room and at this time. But it is not quite in the same sense as that in which the events of nature which are the existences of our brain have their spatial and temporal positions. The fundamental distinction to remember is that immediacy for sense awareness is not the same as instantaneousness for nature. This last conclusion bears on the next discussion with which I will terminate this lecture. This question can be formulated thus. Can alternative temporal series be found in nature? A few years ago such a suggestion would have been put aside as being fantastically impossible. It would have had no bearing on the science then current and was akin to no ideas which had ever entered into the dreams of philosophy. The 18th and 19th centuries accepted as their natural philosophy a certain circle of concepts which were as rigid and definite as those of the philosophy of the Middle Ages and were accepted with as little critical research. I will call this natural philosophy materialism. Not only were men of science materialists but also adherents of all schools of philosophy. The idealists only differed from the philosophic materialists on question of the alignment of nature and reference to mind. But no one had any doubt that the philosophy of nature considered in itself was of the type which I have called materialism. It is the philosophy which I have already examined in my two lectures of this course preceding the present one. It can be summarized as the belief that nature is an aggregate of material and that this material exists in some sense at each successive member of a one-dimensional series of extensionless instance of time. Furthermore, the mutual relations of the material entities at each instant form these entities into a spatial configuration in an unbounded space. It would seem that space on this theory would be as instantaneous as the instance and that some explanation is required of the relations between the successive instantaneous spaces. The materialistic theory is, however, silent on this point and the succession of instantaneous spaces is tacitly combined into one persistent space. This theory is a purely intellectual rendering of experience which has had the luck to get itself formulated at the dawn of scientific thought. It has dominated the language and the imagination of science since science flourished in Alexandria with the result that it is now hardly possible to speak without appearing to assume its immediate obviousness. But when it is distinctly formulated in the abstract terms in which I have just stated it, the theory is very far from obvious. The passing complex of factors which compose the fact which is the terminus of sense awareness places before us nothing corresponding to the trinity of this natural materialism. This trinity is composed, one, of the temporal series of extensionless instance, two, of the aggregate of material entities, and three, of space, which is the outcome of relations of matter. There is a wide gap between these presuppositions of the intellectual theory of materialism and the immediate deliverances of sense awareness. I do not question that this materialistic trinity embodies important characters of nature, but it is necessary to express these characters in terms of the facts of experience. This is exactly what in this lecture I have been endeavoring to do so far as time is concerned, and we have now come up against the question, is there only one temporal series? The uniqueness of the temporal series is presupposed in the materialist philosophy of nature, but that philosophy is merely a theory, like the Aristotelian scientific theory so firmly believed in the Middle Ages. If in this lecture I have in any way succeeded in getting behind the theory to the immediate facts, the answer is not nearly so certain. The question can be transformed into this alternative form. Is there only one family of durations? In this question, the meaning of a family of durations has been defined earlier in this lecture. The answer is now, not at all obvious. On the materialistic theory, the instantaneous present is the only field for the creative activity of nature. The past is gone and the future is not yet. Thus, on this theory, the immediacy of perception is of an instantaneous present, and this unique present is the outcome of the past and the promise of the future. But we deny this immediately given instantaneous present. There is no such thing to be found in nature. As an ultimate fact, it is a non-entity. What is immediate for sense-awareness is a duration. Now a duration has within itself a past and a future, and the temporal breaths of the immediate durations of sense-awareness are very indeterminate and dependent on the individual recipient. Accordingly, there is no unique factor in nature which for every recipient is preeminently and necessarily the present. The passage of nature leaves nothing between the past and the future. What we perceive as the present is the vivid fringe of memory tinged with anticipation. This vividness lights up the discriminated field within a duration. But no assurance can thereby be given that the happenings of nature cannot be assorted into other durations of alternative families. We cannot even know that the series of immediate durations posited by the sense-awareness of one individual mind all necessarily belong to the same family of durations. There is not the slightest reason to believe that this is so. Indeed, if my theory of nature be correct, it will not be the case. The materialistic theory has all the completeness of the thought of the Middle Ages, which had a complete answer to everything, be it in heaven or in hell or in nature. There is a trimeness about it with its instantaneous present, its vanished past, its non-existent future, and its inert matter. This trimeness is very medieval and ill-accords with brute fact. The theory which I am urging admits a greater ultimate mystery and a deeper ignorance. The past and the future meet and mingle in the ill-defined present. The passage of nature which is only another name for the creative force of existence has no narrow ledge of definite instantaneous present within which to operate. Its operative presence which is now urging nature forward must be sought for throughout the whole in the remotest past as well as in the narrowest breath of any present duration, perhaps also in the unrealized future, perhaps also in the future which might be as well as the actual future which will be. It is impossible to meditate on time and the mystery of the creative passage of nature without an overwhelming emotion at the limitations of human intelligence. End of Section 3 Chapter 4 The Method of Extensive Abstraction Today's lecture must commence with the consideration of limited events. We shall then be in a position to enter upon an investigation of the factors in nature which are represented by our conception of space. The duration which is the immediate disclosure of our sense awareness is discriminated into parts. There is the part which is the life of all nature within a room, and there is the part which is the life of all nature within a table in the room. These parts are limited events. They have the endurance of the present duration, and they are parts of it. But whereas a duration is an unlimited whole, and in a certain limited sense is all that there is, a limited event possesses a completely defined limitation of extent which is expressed for us in spatiotemporal terms. We are accustomed to associate an event with a certain melodramatic quality. If a man is run over, that is an event comprised within certain spatiotemporal limits. We are not accustomed to consider the endurance of the Great Pyramid throughout any definite day as an event, but the natural fact which is the Great Pyramid throughout a day, meaning thereby all nature within it, is an event of the same character as the man's accident, meaning thereby all nature with spatiotemporal limitations so as to include the man and the motor during the period when they were in contact. We are accustomed to analyze these events into three factors, time, space, and material. In fact, we at once applied to them the concepts of the materialistic theory of nature. I do not deny the utility of this analysis for the purpose of expressing important laws of nature. What I am denying is that any one of these factors is posited for us in sense awareness in concrete independence. We perceive one unit factor in nature, and this factor is that something is going on then, there. We perceive the going on of the Great Pyramid in its relations to the goings on of the surrounding Egyptian events. We are so trained both by language and by formal teaching and by the resulting convenience to express our thoughts in terms of this materialistic analysis that intellectually we tend to ignore the true unity of the factor really exhibited in sense awareness. It is this unit factor retaining in itself the passage of nature which is the primary concrete element discriminated in nature. These primary factors are what I mean by events. Events are the field of a two termed relation, namely the relation of extension which was considered in the last lecture. Events are the things related by the relation of extension. If an event A extends over an event B, then B is part of A, and A is a whole of which B is a part. Whole and part are invariably used in these lectures in this definite sense. It follows that in reference to this relation, any two events A and B may have any one of four relations to each other, namely one, A may extend over B, or two, B may extend over A, or three, A and B may both extend over some third event C, but neither over the other, or four, A and B may be entirely separate. These alternatives can obviously be illustrated by Euler's diagrams as they appear in logical textbooks. The continuity of nature is the continuity of events. This continuity is merely the name for the aggregate of a variety of properties of events in connection with the relation of extension. In the first place, the relation is transitive. Secondly, every event contains other events as parts of itself. Thirdly, every event is a part of other events. Fourthly, given any two finite events, there are events, each of which contains both of them as parts. And fifthly, there is a special relation between events which I term junction. Two events have junction when there is a third event of which both events are parts, and which is such that no part of it is separated from both of the two given events. Thus, two events with junction make up exactly one event, which is in a sense their sum. Only certain pairs of events have this property. In general, any event containing two events also contains parts which are separated from both events. There is an alternative definition of the junction of two events which I have adopted in my recent book, CF and Query. Two events have junction when there is a third event such that, one, it overlaps both events, and two, it has no part which is separated from both the given events. If either of these alternative definitions is adopted as the definition of junction, the other definition appears as an axiom respecting the character of junction as we know it in nature. But we are not thinking of logical definitions so much as the formulation of the results of direct observation. There is a certain continuity inherent in the observed unity of an event, and these two definitions of junction are really axioms based on observation respecting the character of this continuity. The relations of whole and part and of overlapping are particular cases of the junction of events, but it is possible for events to have junction when they are separate from each other. For example, the upper and the lower part of the Great Pyramid are divided by some imaginary horizontal plane. The continuity which nature derives from events has been obscured by the illustrations which I have been obliged to give. For example, I have taken the existence of the Great Pyramid as a fairly well known fact to which I could safely appeal as an illustration. This is a type of event which exhibits itself to us as the situation of a recognizable object, and in the example chosen, the object is so widely recognized that it has received a name. An object is an entity of a different type from an event. For example, the event which is the life of nature within the Great Pyramid yesterday and today is divisible into two parts, namely the Great Pyramid yesterday and the Great Pyramid today. But the recognizable object which is also called the Great Pyramid is the same object today as it was yesterday. I shall have to consider the theory of objects in another lecture. The whole subject is invested with an unmerited air of subtlety by the fact that when the event is the situation of a well-marked object, we have no language to distinguish the event from the object. In the case of the Great Pyramid, the object is the perceived unit entity which as perceived remains self-identical throughout the ages. While the whole dance of molecules and the shifting play of the electromagnetic field are ingredients of the event. An object is in a sense out of time. It is only derivatively in time by reason of its having the relation to events which I term situation. This relation of situation will require discussion in a subsequent lecture. The point which I want to make now is that being the situation of a well-marked object is not an inherent necessity for an event. Wherever and whenever something is going on there is an event. Furthermore, wherever and whenever in themselves presuppose an event for space and time in themselves are abstractions from events. It is therefore a consequence of this doctrine that something is always going on everywhere. Even in so-called empty space. This conclusion is in accord with modern physical science which presupposes the play of an electromagnetic field throughout space and time. This doctrine of science has been thrown into the materialistic form of an all-pervading ether. But the ether is evidently a mere idle concept. In the phraseology which Bacon applied to the doctrine of final causes it is a barren virgin. Nothing is deduced from it and the ether merely subserves the purpose of satisfying the demands of the materialistic theory. The important concept is that of the shifting facts of the fields of force. This is the concept of an ether of events which should be substituted for that of a material ether. It requires no illustration to assure you that an event is a complex fact and the relations between two events form an almost impenetrable maze. The clue discovered by the common sense of mankind and systematically utilized in science is what I have elsewhere CF organization of thought called the law of convergence to simplicity by diminution of extent. If A and B are two events and A1 is part of A and B1 is part of B then in many respects the relations between the parts A1 and B1 will be simpler than the relations between A and B. This is the principle which presides over all attempts at exact observation. The first outcome of the systematic use of this law has been the formulation of the abstract concepts of time and space. In the previous lecture I sketched how the principle was applied to obtain the time series. I now proceed to consider how the spatial entities are obtained by the same method. The systematic procedure is identical in principle in both cases and I have called the general type of procedure the method of extensive abstraction. You will remember that in my last lecture I defined the concept of an abstractive set of durations. This definition can be extended so as to apply to any events, limited events as well as durations. The only change that is required is the substitution of the word event for the word duration. Accordingly an abstractive set of events is any set of events which possesses the two properties one of any two members of the set one contains the other as a part and two there is no event which is a common part of every member of the set. Such a set you will remember has the properties of the Chinese toy which is a nest of boxes one within the other with the difference that the toy has a smallest box while the abstractive class has neither a smallest event nor does it converge to a limiting event which is not a member of the set. Thus so far as the abstractive sets of events are concerned an abstractive set converges to nothing. There is the set with its members growing indefinitely smaller and smaller as we proceed in thought towards the smaller end of the series but there is no absolute minimum of any sort which is finally reached. In fact the set is just itself and indicates nothing else in the way of events except itself but each event has an intrinsic character in the way of being a situation of objects and of having parts which are situations of objects and to state the matter more generally in the way of being a field of the life of nature. This character can be defined by quantitative expressions expressing relations between various quantities intrinsic to the event or between such quantities and other quantities intrinsic to other events. In the case of events of considerable spatiotemporal extension this set of quantitative expressions is of bewildering complexity. If E be an event let us denote by Q times E the set of quantitative expressions defining its character including its connections with the rest of nature. Let E1, E2, E3, etc. be an abstractive set. The numbers being so arranged that each member such as EN extends over all these exceeding numbers such as EN plus 1, EN plus 2, and so on. Then corresponding to the series E1, E2, E3, EN, EN plus 1. There is the series Q times E1, Q times E2, Q times E3, Q times EN, Q times EN plus 1. Call the series of events S and the series of quantitative expressions Q times S. The series S has no last term and no events which are contained in every member of the series. Accordingly the series of events converges to nothing. It is just itself. Also the series Q times S has no last term. But the set of homologous quantities running through the various terms of the series do converge to definite limits. For example if Q1 be a quantitative measurement found in Q times E1 and Q2 the homologue of Q1 to be found in Q times E2 and Q3 the homologue to Q1 and Q2 to be found in Q times E3 and so on. Then the series Q1, Q2, Q3, QN, QN plus 1. Though it has no last term does in general converge to a definite limit. Accordingly there is a class of limits L times S which is the class of the limits of those members of Q times EN which have homologs throughout the series QS as N indefinitely increases. We can represent this statement diagrammatically by using an arrow to mean converges to then E1, E2, E3, EN, EN plus 1 converges to nothing and Q times E1, Q times E2, Q times E3, Q times EN, Q times EN plus 1 converges to L times S. The mutual relations between the limits in the set L times S and also between these limits and the limits in other sets L times S1, L times S2 which arise from other abstractive sets S1, S2, etc. have a peculiar simplicity. Thus the set S does indicate an ideal simplicity of natural relations though this simplicity is not the character of any actual event in S. We can make an approximation to such a simplicity which as estimated numerically is as close as we like by considering an event which is far enough down the series towards the small end. It will be noted that it is the infinite series as it stretches away in unending succession towards the small end which is of importance. The arbitrarily large event with which the series starts has no importance at all. We can arbitrarily exclude any set of events at the big end of an abstractive set without the loss of any important property to the set as thus modified. I call the limiting character of natural relations which is indicated by an abstractive set the intrinsic character of the set. Also the properties connected with the relation of whole and part as concerning its members by which an abstractive set is defined together form what I call its extrinsic character. The fact that the extrinsic character of an abstractive set determines a definite intrinsic character is the reason of the importance of the precise concepts of space and time. This emergence of a definite intrinsic character from an abstractive set is the precise meaning of the law of convergence. For example, we see a train approaching during a minute. The event which is the life of nature within that train during the minute is of great complexity and the expression of its relations and of the ingredients of its character baffles us. If we take one second of that minute the more limited event which is thus obtained is simpler in respect to its ingredients and shorter and shorter times such as a tenth of that second or a hundredth or a thousandth so long as we have a definite rule giving a definite succession of diminishing events give events whose ingredient characters converge to the ideal simplicity of the character of the train at a definite instant. Furthermore, there are different types of such convergence to simplicity. For example, we can converge as above to the limiting character expressing nature at an instant within the whole volume of the train at that instant or to nature at an instant within some portion of that volume for example within the boiler of the engine or to nature at an instant on some area of surface or to nature at an instant on some line within the train or to nature at an instant at some point of the train. In the last case the simple limiting characters arrived at will be expressed as densities, specific gravities and types of material. Furthermore, we need not necessarily converge to an abstraction which involves nature at an instant. We may converge to the physical ingredients of a certain point tracked throughout the whole minute. Accordingly there are different types of extrinsic character of convergence which lead to the approximation to different types of intrinsic characters as limits. We now pass to the investigation of possible connections between abstractive sets. One set may cover another. I define covering as follows. An abstractive set P covers an abstractive set Q when every member of P contains as its parts some members of Q. It is evident that if any event E contains as a part any member of the set Q then owing to the transitive property of extension every succeeding member of the small end of Q is part of E. In such a case I will say that the abstractive set Q inheres in the event E. Thus when an abstractive set P covers an abstractive set Q the abstractive set Q inheres in every member of P. Two abstractive sets may each cover the other. When this is the case I shall call the two sets equal in abstractive force. When there is no danger of misunderstanding I shall shorten this phrase by simply saying that the two abstractive sets are equal. The possibility of this equality of abstractive sets arises from the fact that both sets P and Q are infinite series towards their small ends. Thus the equality means that given any event X belonging to P we can always by proceeding far enough towards the small end of Q find an event Y which is part of X and that by proceeding far enough towards the small end of P we can find an event Z which is part of Y and so on indefinitely. The importance of the equality of abstractive sets arises from the assumption that the intrinsic characters of the two sets are identical. If this were not the case exact observation would be at an end. It is evident that any two abstractive sets which are equal to a third abstractive set are equal to each other. An abstractive element is the whole group of abstractive sets which are equal to any one of themselves. Thus all abstractive sets belonging to the same element are equal and converge to the same intrinsic character. Thus an abstractive element is the group of roots of approximation to a definite intrinsic character of ideal simplicity to be found as a limit among natural facts. If an abstractive set P covers an abstractive set Q then any abstractive set belonging to the abstractive element of which P is a member will cover any abstractive set belonging to the element of which Q is a member. Accordingly it is useful to stretch the meaning of the term covering and to speak of one abstract element covering another abstractive element. If we attempt in like manner to stretch the term equal in the sense of equal in abstractive force it is obvious that an abstractive element can only be equal to itself. Thus an abstractive element has a unique abstractive force and is the construct from events which represents one definite intrinsic character which is arrived at as a limit by the use of the principle of convergence to simplicity by diminution of extent. When an abstractive element A covers an abstractive element B the intrinsic character of A in a sense includes the intrinsic character of B. It results that statements about the intrinsic character of B are in a sense statements about the intrinsic character of A but the intrinsic character of A is more complex than that of B. The abstractive elements form the fundamental elements of space and time and we now turn to the consideration of the properties involved in the formation of special classes of such elements. In my last lecture I have already investigated one class of abstractive elements namely moments. Each moment is a group of abstractive sets and the events which are members of these sets are all members of one family of durations. The moments of one family form a temporal series and allowing the existence of different families and environments there will be alternative temporal series in nature. Thus the method of extensive abstraction explains the origin of temporal series in terms of the immediate facts of experience and at the same time allows for the existence of the alternative temporal series which are demanded by the modern theory of electromagnetic relativity. We now turn to space. This thing to do is to get hold of the class of abstractive elements which are in some sense the points of space. Such an abstractive element must in some sense exhibit a convergence to an absolute minimum of intrinsic character. Euclid has expressed for all time the general idea of a point as being without parts and without magnitude. It is this character of being an absolute minimum which we want to get at and to express in terms of the extrinsic characters of the abstractive sets which make up a point. Furthermore, points which are thus arrived at represent the ideal of events without any extension though there are in fact no such entities as these ideal events. These points will not be the points of an external timeless space but have instantaneous spaces. We ultimately want to arrive at the timeless space of physical science and also of common thought which is now tinged with the concepts of space. It will be convenient to reserve the term point for these spaces when we get to them. I will therefore use the name event particles for the ideal minimum limits to events. Thus an event particle is an abstractive element and as such is a group of abstractive sets and a point, namely a point of timeless space will be a class of event particles. The required character of the abstractive sets which form event particles would be secured if we could define them as having the property of being covered by any abstractive set which they cover. For then, any other abstractive set of an event particle covered would be equal to it and would therefore be a member of the same event particle. Accordingly, an event particle could cover no other abstractive element. This is the definition which I originally proposed at a congress in Paris in 1914. There is, however, a difficulty involved in this definition if adopted without some further addition and I am now not satisfied with the way in which I attempted to get over that difficulty in the paper referred to. The difficulty is this. When event particles have once been defined it is easy to define the aggregate of event particles forming the boundary of an event and then to define the point contact at their boundaries possible for a pair of events of which one is part of the other. We can then conceive all the intricacies of tangency. In particular, we can conceive an abstractive set of which all the members have point contact at the same event particle. It is then easy to prove that there will be no abstractive set with the property of being covered by every abstractive set which it covers. I state this difficulty at some length because its existence guides the development of our line of argument. We have got to annex some condition to the root property of being covered by any abstractive set which it covers. When we look into this question of suitable conditions we find that in addition to event particles all the other relevant spatial and spatiotemporal abstractive elements can be defined in the same way by suitably varying the conditions. Accordingly, we proceed in a general way suitable for employment beyond event particles. Let sigma be the name of any condition which some abstractive sets fulfill. I say that an abstractive set is sigma prime when it has two properties. One, that it satisfies the condition sigma and two, that it is covered by every abstractive set which both is covered by it and satisfies the condition sigma. In other words, you cannot get any abstractive set satisfying the condition sigma which exhibits intrinsic character more simple than that of a sigma prime. There are also the correlative abstractive sets which I call the sets of sigma antiprimes. An abstractive set is a sigma antiprime when it has the two properties. One, that it satisfies the condition sigma and two, that it covers every abstractive set which both covers it and satisfies the condition sigma. In other words, you cannot get any abstractive set satisfying the condition sigma which exhibits an intrinsic character more complex than that of a sigma antiprime. The intrinsic character of a sigma prime has a certain minimum of fullness among those abstractive sets which are subject to the condition of satisfying sigma whereas the intrinsic character of a sigma antiprime has a corresponding maximum of fullness and includes all it can in the circumstances. Let us first consider what help the notion of antiprimes could give us in the definition of moments which we gave in the last lecture. Let the condition sigma be the property of being a class whose members are all durations an abstractive set which satisfies this condition is thus an abstractive set composed wholly of durations. It is convenient then to define a moment as the group of abstractive sets which are equal to some sigma antiprime where the condition sigma has this special meaning. It will be found on consideration, one, that each abstractive set forming a moment is a sigma antiprime where sigma has this special meaning and two, that we have excluded from membership of moments abstractive sets of durations which all have one common boundary either the initial boundary or the final boundary. We thus exclude special cases which are apt to confuse general reasoning. The new definition of a moment which supersedes our previous definition is, by the aid of the notion of antiprimes the more precisely drawn of the two and the more useful. The particular condition which sigma stood for in the definition of moments included something additional to anything which can be derived from the bare notion of extension. A duration exhibits for thought a totality. The notion of totality is something beyond that of extension though the two are interwoven in the notion of a duration. In the same way the particular condition sigma required for the definition of an event particle must be looked for beyond the mere notion of extension. The same remark is also true of the particular conditions requisite for the other spatial elements. This additional notion is obtained by distinguishing between the notion of position and the notion of convergence to an ideal zero of extension as exhibited by an abstractive set of events. In order to understand this distinction consider a point of the instantaneous space which we conceive as apparent to us in an almost instantaneous glance. This point is an event particle. It has two aspects. In one aspect it is there where it is. This is its position in the space. In another aspect it is got hat by ignoring the circumambient space and by concentrating attention on the smaller and smaller sets of events which approximate to it. This is its extrinsic character. Thus a point has three characters namely its position in the whole instantaneous space its extrinsic character and its intrinsic character. The same is true of any other spatial element. For example an instantaneous volume in instantaneous space has three characters namely its position its extrinsic character as a group of abstractive sets and its intrinsic character which is the limit of natural properties which is indicated by any one of these abstractive sets. Before we can talk about position in instantaneous space we must evidently be quite clear as to what we mean by instantaneous space in itself. Instantaneous space must be looked for as the character of a moment. For a moment is all nature at an instant. It cannot be the intrinsic character of the moment. For the intrinsic character tells us the limiting character of nature in space at that instant. Instantaneous space must be an assemblage of abstractive elements considered in their mutual relations. Thus an instantaneous space is the assemblage of abstractive elements covered by some one moment and it is the instantaneous space of that moment. We have now to ask what character we have found in nature which is capable of according to the elements of an instantaneous space different qualities of position. This question at once brings us to the intersection of moments which is a topic not as yet considered in these lectures. The locus of intersection of two moments is the assemblage of abstractive elements covered by both of them. Now two moments of the same temporal series cannot intersect. Two moments respectively of different families necessarily intersect. Accordingly in the instantaneous space of a moment we should expect the fundamental properties to be marked by the intersections with moments of other families. If M be a given moment the intersection of M with another moment A is an instantaneous plane in the instantaneous space of M. And if B be a third moment intersecting both M and A the intersection of M and B is another plane in the space M. Also the common intersection of A, B and M is the intersection of the two planes in the space M. Namely it is a straight line in the space M. An exceptional case arises if B and M intersect in the same plane as A and M. Furthermore if C be a fourth moment then apart from special cases which we need not consider it intersects M in a plane which the straight line A, B, M meets. Thus there is in general a common intersection of four moments of different families. This common intersection is an assemblage of abstractive elements which are each covered or lie in all four moments. The three dimensional property of instantaneous space comes to this that apart from special relations between the four moments any fifth either contains the whole of their common intersection or not a bit. No further subdivision of the common intersection is possible by means of moments. The all or none principle holds. This is not an a priori truth but an empirical fact of nature. It will be convenient to reserve the ordinary spatial terms plane, straight line, point for the elements of the timeless space of a time system. Accordingly an instantaneous plane in the instantaneous space of a moment will be called a level. An instantaneous straight line will be called a rect and an instantaneous point will be called a punct. Thus a punct is the assemblage of abstractive elements which lie in each of four moments whose families have no special relations to each other. Also if p be any moment either every abstractive element belonging to a given punct lies in p or no abstractive element of that punct lies in p. Position is the quality which an abstractive element possesses in virtue of the moments in which it lies. The abstractive elements which lie in the instantaneous space of a given moment m are differentiated from each other by the various other moments which intersect m so as to contain various selections of these abstractive elements. It is this differentiation of the elements which constitutes their differentiation of position. An abstractive element which belongs to a punct has the simplest type of position in m. An abstractive element which belongs to a rect but not to a punct has a more complex quality of position. An abstractive element which belongs to a level and not to a rect has a still more complex quality of position. And finally the most complex quality of position belongs to an abstractive element which belongs to a volume level. A volume, however, has not yet been defined. This definition will be given in the next lecture. Evidently, levels, rects, and punks, in their capacity as infinite aggregates, cannot be the terminy of sense-awareness, nor can they be limits which are approximated to in sense-awareness. Any one member of a level has a certain quality arising from its character as also belonging to a certain set of moments, but the level as a whole is a mere logical notion without any root of approximation along entities posited in sense-awareness. On the other hand, an event particle is defined so as to exhibit this character of being a root of approximation marked out by entities posited in self-awareness. A definite event particle is defined in reference to a definite punked in the following manner. Let the condition sigma mean the property of covering all the abstractive elements which are members of that punked. So that an abstractive set which satisfies the condition sigma is an abstractive set which covers every abstractive element belonging to the punked. Then the definition of the event particle associated with the punked is that it is the group of all the sigma primes where sigma has this particular meaning. It is evident that with this meaning of sigma every abstractive set equal to sigma prime is itself a sigma prime. Accordingly an event particle as thus defined is an abstractive element namely it is the group of these abstractive sets which are each equal to some given abstractive set. If we write out the definition of the event particle associated with some given punked which we will call pi it is as follows. The event particle associated with pi is the group of abstractive classes each of which has the two properties. One that it covers every abstractive set in pi and two that all the abstractive sets which also satisfy the former condition as to pi and which it covers also cover it. An event particle has position by reason of its association with a punked and conversely the punked gains its derived character as a root of approximation from its association with the event particle. These two characters of a point are always recurring in any treatment of the derivation of a point from the observed facts of nature but in general there is no clear recognition of their distinction. The peculiar simplicity of an instantaneous point has a two fold origin one connected with position that is to say with its character as a punked and the other connected with its character as an event particle. The simplicity of the punked arises from its indivisibility by a moment. The simplicity of an event particle arises from the indivisibility of its intrinsic character. The intrinsic character of an event particle is indivisible in the sense that every abstractive set covered by it exhibits the same intrinsic character. It follows that though there are diverse abstractive elements covered by event particles there is no advantage to be gained by considering them since we gain no additional simplicity in the expression of natural properties. These two characters of simplicity enjoyed respectively by event particles and punks define a meaning for Euclid's phrase without parts and without magnitude. It is obviously convenient to sweep away out of our thoughts all these stray abstractive sets which are covered by event particles without themselves being members of them. They give us nothing new in the way of intrinsic character. Accordingly we can think of rects and levels as merely loci of event particles. In doing so we are also cutting out those abstractive elements which cover sets of event particles without those elements ever being event particles themselves. There are classes of these abstractive elements which are of great importance. I will consider them later on in this and in other lectures. Meanwhile we will ignore them. Also I will always speak of event particles in preference to punks, the latter being an artificial word for which I have no great affection. Parallelism among rects and levels is now explicable. Consider the instantaneous space belonging to a moment A and let A belong to the temporal series of moments which I will call alpha. Consider any other temporal series of moments which I will call beta. The moments of beta do not intersect each other and they intersect the moment A in a family of levels. None of these levels can intersect and they form a family of parallel instantaneous planes in the instantaneous space of moment A. Thus the parallelism of moments in a temporal series begets the parallelism of levels in an instantaneous space and thence as it is easy to see the parallelism of rects. Accordingly the Euclidean property of space arises from the parabolic property of time. It may be that there is reason to adopt a hyperbolic theory of time and a corresponding hyperbolic theory of space. Such a theory has not been worked out so it is not possible to judge as to the character of the evidence which could be brought forward in its favor. The theory of order in an instantaneous space is immediately derived from time order. For consider the space of a moment M. Let alpha be the name of a time system to which M does not belong. Let A1, A2, A3, etc. be moments of alpha in the order of their occurrences. Then A1, A2, A3, etc. intersect M in parallel levels 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 3, etc. Then the relative order of the parallel levels in the space of M is the same as the relative order of the corresponding moments in the time system alpha. Any rect in M which intersects all these levels in its set of punks, thereby receives for its punks an order of position on it. So spatial order is derivative from temporal order. Furthermore there are alternative time systems but there is only one definite spatial order in each instantaneous space. Accordingly the various modes of deriving spatial order from diverse time systems must harmonize with one spatial order in each instantaneous space. In this way also diverse time orders are comparable. We have two great questions still on hand to be settled before our theory of space is fully adjusted. One of these is the question of the determination of the methods of measurement within the space. In other words the congruence theory of the space. The measurement of space will be found to be closely connected with the measurement of time, with respect to which no principles have as yet been determined. Thus our congruence theory will be a theory both for space and for time. Secondly there is the determination of the timeless space which corresponds to any particular time system with its infinite set of instantaneous spaces in its successive moments. This is the space or rather these are the spaces of physical science. It is very unusual to dismiss this space by saying that this is conceptual. I do not understand the virtue of these phrases. I suppose that it is meant that the space is the conception of something in nature. Accordingly if the space of physical science is to be called conceptual I ask what in nature is it the conception of? For example when we speak of a point in the timeless space of physical science I suppose that we are speaking of something in nature. If we are not so speaking our scientists are exercising their wits in the realms of pure fantasy and this is probably not the case. This demand for a definite habeas corpus act for the production of the relevant entities in nature applies whether space be relative or absolute. On the theory of relative space it may perhaps be argued that there is no timeless space for physical science and that there is only the momentary series of instantaneous spaces. An explanation must then be asked for the meaning of the very common statement that such and such a man walked four miles in some definite hour. How can you measure distance from one space into another space? I understand walking out of the sheet of an ordinance map. But the meaning of saying that Cambridge at ten o'clock this morning in the appropriate instantaneous space for that instant is fifty-two miles from London at eleven o'clock this morning in the appropriate instantaneous space for that instant beats me entirely. I think that by the time of meaning has been produced for this statement you will find that you have constructed what is in fact a timeless space. What I cannot understand is how to produce an explanation of meaning without in effect making some such construction. Also I may add that I do not know how the instantaneous spaces are thus correlated into one space by any method which is available on the current theories of space. You will have noticed that by the aid of the assumption of alternative time systems we are arriving at an explanation of the character of space. In natural science to explain means merely to discover interconnections. For example in one sense there is no explanation of the red which you see. It is red and there is nothing else to be said about it. Either it is posited before you in sense awareness or you are ignorant of the entity red. But science has explained red. Namely it has discovered interconnections between red as a factor in nature and other factors in nature. For example waves of light which are waves of electromagnetic disturbances. There are also various pathological states of the body which lead to the seeing of red without the occurrence of light waves. Thus connections have been discovered between red as posited in sense awareness and various other factors in nature. The discovery of these connections constitutes the scientific explanation of our vision of color. In like manner the dependence of the character of space on the character of time constitutes an explanation in the sense in which science seeks to explain. The systematizing intellect abhors bare facts. The character of space has hitherto been presented as a collection of bare facts ultimate and disconnected. The theory which I am expounding sweeps away this disconnection of the facts of space. End of chapter 4.