 Hi everyone, thanks for coming to today's panel on the US Space Force. We're still waiting on one more panelist, but in the meantime, we're just gonna go ahead and get started. Right, so like I mentioned, today's panel is on the US Space Force and I'll give a short description of what we're gonna be talking about on this panel. So despite bearing the brunt of jokes from late night comedians and a Netflix series of the same name, the Space Force is tasked with a serious mission of protecting US assets in Earth's orbit and conducting space operations for other military branches. Today's panel will cover the purpose of the Space Force along with the pros and cons of moving space operations in the Air Force to an independent branch of the military. Our first speaker joining us today is Dr. Andrea Harrington, who serves as department chair of the department space power and director of the Schrieber Space Scholars concentration at Air Command Staff College. Dr. Harrington has significant experience to the emerging field of international space law and has conducted research for organizations like the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Society for the Advancement of Space Safety. We're also joined hopefully by Dr. Peter Hayes, who advises the office of the assistant secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, while also serving as an adjunct professor at George Washington University's Space Policy Institute. Dr. Hayes has had direct experience in developing and implementing major space policy initiatives in addition to his 25 years in the Air Force. And just to go over a little bit of how our panel today is going to work. So I'm going to get each panelist starting with Dr. Harrington, around 10 minutes or so to give a quick introduction about themselves, expand upon what I mentioned in their bios. And then later on we'll open up to audience questions. So there should be a little Q and A box at the bottom of your screen. And then if you want, you can start asking questions while the panelists are speaking. And I will call on audience questions after both panelists have done speaking. Dr. Harrington, would you like to kick us off? Sure, thank you very much for your kind introduction. And thank you for inviting me to take part in this conference to appreciate the opportunity, particularly given the strange times that we're living in, virtual conferences actually give an opportunity to access audiences that we otherwise might not be able to. And so I'm honored by the opportunity. So as Sabrina mentioned, I'm the director of the Schrieber Space Scholars concentration at Air Command and Staff College. So if you're not overly familiar with what that means, I'll start by kind of walking you through that. So Air Command and Staff College is part of Air University, which is a professional military education operation that we undertake. It's degree granting. So at the intermediate and at the senior level, IDE and SDE, we grant master's degrees as well as fulfilling the accreditation requirements from the joint staff. And so Air Command and Staff College is the IDE piece, Air War College is the SDE piece, the senior piece. And so at our level at ACSC, we've got primarily O4s, which are Air Force and Space Force majors and equivalents from sister services. Given that this conference is all about civil relations, I do wanna point out that we do get civilian students in our classes as well at Air Command and Staff College and at Air War College. And that those students provide an important diversity of perspective in the classroom and bring that back with them to the government departments that they work in when they go back after they complete the process. So the Schriever Space Scholars at ACSC started in 2018 or started taking students in 2018. It was kicked off in 2017. General Raymond, who is now the Chief of Space Operations for the US Space Force was the driving force between getting the concentration started in order to develop folks with a real space expertise coming out of Air Command and Staff College. And so instead of teaching Air Power One and Air Power Two as part of the core curriculum, which the rest of the ACSC students all take, our students take Space Power One and Space Power Two. They do get Air Power in a short course before the academic year starts, a two-week intensive on Air Power just so that they get the context that their fellow students are receiving. But the core courses that they get during the year focus on that Space Power Peace rather than the Air Power Peace. And so our students now are US Space Force officers, US Air Force officers, as well as other sister services. So we have US Army, US Navy and US Coast Guard. As I mentioned, we've also got civilians. So we've got two out of 26 of our students this year are civilians, one from the NRO and one from the NGA. And we've also got international officers. So this year we have five international officers in our concentration out of that 26 that I mentioned, representing France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Japan. So we've got a pretty good mix of folks who are learning from each other and with each other in order to understand the importance of space. And we do focus quite heavily, not only on the military operation side, but on the interaction between military, civil and commercial space in the way that those are all tied together. So my area of expertise, as Sabrina also mentioned, is really on the international law side. So I want to give you some context for the US Space Force and international law to start out here. So as she mentioned, there has been a lot of sort of outcry in the media and mentioned in the media and comedy poked at Space Force in late night shows and so forth. And one of the things that happened very early on was this outcry that US Space Force is illegal under international law. This is ridiculous, how can this happen? And the reality is it is not illegal under international law. And this is a good moment for me to go ahead and say something I should have said upfront at the beginning of my comments, but we'll still be here in the recording, all of my comments here today are in my personal capacity. So they do not represent the views of the US Space Force, the US Air Force or any other branch of the US government or department in the US government. So just keep that in mind. So in a legal interpretation here, I'll walk through the Outer Space Treaty, which is most commonly what folks cite as the problem for US Space Force and I'll walk through why there is not a problem there with the OST. So there are a lot of misconceptions about the Outer Space Treaty in general, which is a treaty on principles that are governing activities in outer space. And so one of the most common misconceptions about the Outer Space Treaty is around military operations in general. What is and is not permitted are peaceful uses, the exclusively allowed uses of space or not. And so these are the questions that I hear sort of misrepresented quite frequently in the media. So first of all, underlying principle, there is freedom of use and exploration of outer space for all states. And so that's kind of our underlying basic principle to set us out. And the Outer Space Treaty and Space Law in general are part of international law as a whole international law does have force in space. And so the Outer Space Treaty not only mentions that in Article 3, but specifically pulls in the UN Charter and calls out the UN Charter for space as well. And I'm gonna talk a little bit more about that in a minute. But in terms of that controversial question about peaceful uses of space, I turn to Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty, which is really the article that directly addresses different potential military uses of space. And the first paragraph of Article 4 addresses all of space, so space and celestial bodies. And the limitation from Article 1 of paragraph 4 has to do with nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. So you can't put nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit around Earth or station them in space in any other manner. And so that's that big prohibition there. And so that's what we've got in space. For celestial bodies specifically, we look to paragraph 2 of Article 4. And paragraph 2 of Article 4 does tell us that celestial bodies are for exclusively peaceful purposes. You can only use celestial bodies for peaceful purposes. The language in that paragraph is quite similar to that of the Antarctic Treaty with regard to celestial bodies. And so there are some enumerated things that are definitely not considered peaceful uses that you cannot do on celestial bodies, like testing weapons, building military fortifications or conducting military maneuvers. But it also specifies that you can use military personnel for any peaceful purposes and military equipment for peaceful purposes. And if you look at the Antarctic example, which as I said is quite similar, you see military personnel and equipment being used particularly for transportation of personnel and equipment in Antarctica. Similar uses and possibly some different uses given the difference in the environment of a celestial body in Antarctica would certainly be permissible under the outer space treaty as well. But there are those additional restrictions exclusively peaceful purposes. So I'm gonna go back to the UN Charter for a minute and just point out that the UN Charter in article two gives us a prohibition on using force or threatening to use force against the political independence or territorial integrity of a state. And in article 51 gives us the right of self-defense, the right to use force in self-defense, which is a codification of existing customary international law. And article 33 of the UN Charter tells us that we need to resolve disputes by peaceful means and gives a non-exhaustive list of options for peaceful dispute resolution. So those provisions of the UN Charter all apply just as much in outer space as they do in any other terrestrial environment. But there is an additional level of restriction for celestial bodies limiting only to quote unquote exclusively peaceful purposes on celestial bodies. And so nothing that I have seen proposed thus far with regard to US Space Force would in any way violate these prohibitions, these very specific prohibitions on activities in space and would simply carry forward many of the activities, the legal activities that have been conducted in outer space by the US Air Force and by other branches and international partners. I also just wanna point out because it's relevant particularly for that commercial piece. And as I mentioned earlier, military, civil and commercial are all quite intertwined when we're talking about space activities that article six is a really important provision of the outer space treaty that makes the state responsible even for private activities in space. So if it's a national activity, if it's a company for example that has its primary operations in that country, then that state has the responsibility to authorize and supervise that entity's activities. And if that entity does anything in space that would be considered a violation of international law, then the state is going to be treated as if the state directly or an agent of the state undertook those activities. And so that I think is important to point out here for the purposes of the outer space treaty and military operations in space. Okay, so the next point I wanna make is that now that we understand that space force is not problematic under international law, I would actually argue that space force is beneficial from a transparency and confidence building measure perspective because as we saw from the outcry when space force was announced, I think folks have a real misunderstanding as to what military operations are already being carried out in space by the Air Force and by international partners and other entities. And so this idea that we're being upfront, we've got space force here, it's very easy to see that we're committed to a high level of military operations in space, enables opportunities for public relations, public affairs to get involved and get out ahead of that discussion and really demonstrate the way that space force is participating in this cooperative and important security and safety building set of measures in space. So if you look at space policy directive four, which is the space policy directive that came out regarding the creation of the space force, it sets out that there are certain missions, I apologize, my dogs are barking. It sets out that there are important missions that space force is going to be organized, trained and equipped to support. And the very first one, the very first item on that list talks about preserving the freedom of use of outer space for all responsible actors in space, civil, military and commercial and doing so within the bounds of international law and upholding international law. So that importance of international law with regard to the space force is called out there as well in SPD four and in many of the other documents that we have seen that have contributed to the development of space force so far, the space power capstone document which is the strategic level doctrine for US space force that has come out of the CSO's office sets up for us that doctrine for space force and it also mentions international law and upholding international law and the importance of that as well and preserving safety and security in the space domain for all responsible actors and so promoting that level of international cooperation and that cooperation with international partners and preserving for use by them as well. So let's see, yeah, one of the core competencies from that space power capstone document which I wanted to mention is that space security piece. So creating stable conditions with safe and secure access for space activities and in conducting cooperation and coordination those are defining attributes of what needs to be done to preserve space security. So I'll end there. I think that's just a little bit over my 10 minutes. I apologize if I've run a tab bit long and I'm happy to take questions. Thank you for that. Really great overview of your work and what you do as well as international space law, of course. Are there any questions from the audience before we begin? I also have a few questions prepared in case people are still gathering their thoughts. So Dr. Harrington, I actually have a question for you while we're waiting for people to write in their questions but could you clarify a little bit about what operations the space force is specifically limited to in regards to international space law? Sure, so the way you phrase that let me make another clarification to kind of start out here. So US Space Command is the command that will actually carry out missions related to outer space. So US Space Force has been designated to organize, train, and equip largely in support of US Space Command's missions but in support of any other space missions that may be required by other commands as well. So it's really US Space Command that is going to be carrying out any of these missions not directly the US Space Force. The US Space Force provides the personnel and equipment to support that. And so if you were going to ask any questions about legality of particular activities in space, you're more likely to be asking questions about the legality of US Space Command actions in space rather than directly US Space Force actions because the US Space Force, as I mentioned, really is set up to organize, train, and equip there on the front end. And could you clarify if you had a particular question if there were like a certain set of missions or a certain type of missions that were under international law that might be problematic or that would be okay? I wasn't really clear on what you wanted clarified there. I'm sorry. Yeah, sure. I think I was just sort of a general question about like what can the space force do under international space law? But I think you also addressed that a little bit while you were talking before as well. Yeah, so the answer is anything any other military branch could do except they cannot put weapons of mass destruction or particularly nuclear weapons in orbit around Earth or station them in outer space. And if they are involved in any activities on a celestial body in the future, certainly we're not there yet now, but at some point we expect in humanity's development we will be there that they'll be limited to exclusively peaceful uses on celestial bodies much like military forces in general are limited to exclusively peaceful uses in Antarctica. So that's a good barometer for what space force personnel might be able to do on the moon or on another celestial body. Similar types of activities to those activities carried out by military forces in Antarctica today. Thank you. I believe there are also some questions from the audience. So I will go ahead and ask them to you now. So Heather asks, do you think the free use provision of international law regarding space will change once private companies start launching space operations or regularly slash once resource extraction from space becomes more common? So actually I think that the freedom of use provision is really beneficial for continuing private activities in space because that freedom of use provision gives all states the equal right to participate in those space activities. And as long as the state that you're in is willing to authorize your space activity as a private company, which is common space activities are well supported by domestic governments that really want to get the benefits of the economic growth and the prestige from those activities occurring in outer space under their purview, it encourages the further development of those space activities and creates a sort of regulatory certainty that those activities are going to be free to be continued as long as you have the appropriate authorizations from your particular domestic government to do that. And so I would argue that that's actually a beneficial provision and not a detractor. Now you might be talking when you say about space resource use and extraction, you might be talking about potential limitations that you might see under article two, which we didn't talk about in my opening comments, which is the not appropriation provision. You're not allowed to claim territorial sovereignty over any area of outer space or a celestial body. And so there are some open questions as to what the limitations really are under the not appropriation principle. And there are some folks in the minority at this point, but there is a strong minority that would argue that appropriation of space resources would run afoul of the not appropriation principle. I on the other hand, and I believe at the majority at this point of scholars and the majority of states in UN copious, certainly not all, there are some detractors, but the majority would say that it is not a prohibited use under article two under the not appropriation principle for a few reasons. So one, you're severing the resources from the celestial body. So you're not saying this area of the celestial body is mine and I get to keep it and I get title to it. You're taking something from it and moving on and saying, hey, I've severed this resource. I've done the labor to get access to this resource. And so now I'm claiming this resource, but not actually the celestial body or not actually space itself. There are analogies that can be made to this on earth like removing fish from the ocean or removing other sorts of non-moving like fish or not necessarily renewable resources from a particular area in terms of mining rights. And so there are parallels to be made there. The argument that I also find very compelling is that under the moon agreement, which is the more restrictive of the two agreements and the United States is not party to the moon agreement, neither are the majority of the major space faring states. So Russia, China, UK, not part of the moon agreement either, but the moon agreement does allow for the extraction and use of space resources. It requires that there be an international regime setup among those member states to the moon agreement and that that activity would be governed by that international regime in order to deal with equitable benefit sharing from those activities. And the moon agreement does otherwise include the same and stronger non-appropriation language than is in the outer space treaty. And so it's hard to interpret that the outer space treaty would be the more restrictive of the two documents given the resistance to the moon agreement because of the requirements built in if you were going to participate in space resource extraction under the moon agreement. In international law, we have something called the Lotus principle, which comes out of a PCIJ case over a ship called the Lotus and it was a case between France and Turkey, but the principle in international law that gets cited is this idea that if something is not expressly prohibited then it is permitted. And so when you look at the language of the outer space treaty, when you compare it to the moon agreement, the outer space treaty does not expressly prohibit the extraction of space resources and the claiming of space resources, but rather prohibits the appropriation of the area itself. And so therefore we interpret that there is not a prohibition on space resource extraction. I also think it's really important to note that the outer space treaty has a goal of promoting use and exploration of space and gaining that access for as many states as possible and promoting peace and cooperation in space as well. And so if you were to say, states cannot extract and get monetary benefit from then selling space resources, you would be significantly limiting the ability of states to continue to develop more complex and longer term space operations in the sense that water ice is one of the key things that's looking to be mined from space or extracted from space to be used for robotic and human missions, for fuel and or for oxygen and water. And so if we can't rely on those resources in space to be able to drive those activities forward, then we're gonna have a real problem in increasing our activities. And it actually makes it a lot more affordable for states to get into space, if they can get into space and then purchase those resources and all the background work has been done to figure out how to get up there and extract and make usable those resources, all that background work has been done, becomes much cheaper and easier and more efficient for states to start engaging in those activities. So there is a benefit there. Luxembourg has done some interesting studies about how to go ahead and analyze the potential benefit to the worldwide economy and the potential benefit to a number of states who might wish to be engaging in these kinds of space activities from having a robust industry of space resource utilization and extraction. And thank you for that very extensive answer. I think we have a couple more questions from people. So I wanna ask why is the Space Corps created as a separate entity instead of having it remain as a command under the jurisdiction of the United States Air Force? Okay, so a quick point of clarification. The commands are separate from the services. So the Air Force organized trains and equips, the Space Force organized trains and equips. So it's not, the separate command is one thing in the command structure. The separate service is something different in the service structure. And the argument for creating a separate space force that is not part of the Air Force has to do primarily with that organized train and equip piece, which is to say there's been a lot of criticism over the years as to how the Air Force has handled space acquisitions in particular in terms of getting the space systems developed and put in place that we need to have from a national security perspective and that maybe the Air Force model for acquisitions itself might be problematic for space, but additionally that the Air Force by nature of being the Air Force is going to prioritize Air Force type assets over space type assets. And so space needs to be able to advocate for itself from an acquisitions perspective. And it's also a very different set of training as well that you're looking at when it comes to space activities versus traditional Air Force activities. And the service cultures can be quite relevant there as well. So if you think of the Air Force culture, Sabrina mentioned the Netflix series early on as part of the comedy that has arisen about space force. But if you watch that Netflix series, one of the things that they exaggerate but they point out is that difference between Air Force culture and space force culture where Air Force solutions tend to involve bombing or fighter planes and fighter pilots, right? There's a cultural distinction there between what we would expect a space force to really be training people to do and to be thinking about and preparing for and planning for. And so when you're talking about the training piece, that separate space force training allows development of a culture that is going to point towards the outcomes that the space force is trying to achieve, a different set of values, a different sort of expectations for what a space force needs to do from that set of expectations, which is quite different and reasonably so for an Air Force. Thank you. So I think we have some other questions from the audience. So someone asks, do you think space international law will change to reflect countries increased military presence in space? I think they also clarify that and that their question was in reference to the recent Russian nesting dollar satellite test. Is there any push towards rebounding space law to address defense from aggressors in space? Okay, so in 2017, there were some hearings that were hosted in Congress, led by Senator Ted Cruz to ask the question as to whether or not it would be a good idea to either withdraw from the outer space treaty or open the outer space treaty up and try to renegotiate some provisions. And there were a couple of days of those hearings where experts came and spoke about the outer space treaty and about space operations. And at the conclusion of those hearings, it was decided we're good, we're gonna stay in the outer space treaty, we're not gonna try to open it up or make any changes to the outer space treaty itself. That being said, and I agree with that assessment wholeheartedly, I think the outer space treaty does a whole lot more good than any restriction on freedom of operation, et cetera. I think there is room for additional development in addition to the outer space treaty without altering the underlying outer space treaty to create some norms for responsible behavior in space and that you might see a push back towards something like a code of conduct that was proposed by the Europeans just in terms of conducting safe operations. One of the concerns about the nesting doll stories that you mentioned was that if it made a close approach, is it safe to approach, get into that kind of proximity with other satellites? That's a safety concern, right, for the operation of satellites. So if you had a code of conduct, that were kind of rules of behavior or rules of the road for space, then you would have an idea of what's considered a safe distance to approach. And you could consider such norms to fall within the due regard provision and article nine of the outer space treaty where states are intended to act with due regard for the space activities of other states, right? So your freedom of use and exploration is limited by the requirement that you act with due regard for other states so that everybody can fully exercise their own freedom of use and exploration. I call it the prime directive because I am admittedly a big Star Trek fan, but I've heard other international space law experts refer to that as the golden rule of space. So that is one way to deal with that particular problem. Russia and China proposed the PPWT, a treaty on the prevention of placing of weapons in space a couple of times through the conference on disarmament at the UN, but the treaty is not enforced, right? It was a draft treaty that was submitted and it has not received wide enthusiasm or wide acceptance and there are a couple of reasons for that. One is that there was not an included definition of what would be considered a space weapon in terms of that placement in outer space. And as you probably know, anything that can maneuver in space can potentially be a weapon, can be used as a weapon. And so with the emphasis on dual use capabilities in space, it would be really difficult to define what exactly is a weapon for the purposes of such an agreement. And then the second problem is that it did not take into account direct ascent anti-satellite weapons that could go from the ground to space to take out the capabilities of a satellite because you wouldn't be placing that weapon in space. So that treaty on placement of weapons in space would not affect that. And we've seen tests from multiple states in 2019. India tested a direct ascent ASAT weapon. China in 2007 had a test that actually created quite a lot of debris. And so we've seen those kinds of capabilities as well and it wouldn't be addressed by that document. I don't think we are going to see a treaty that specifically limits particular military uses of space or particular weaponization in space. I do think we might see probably not a treaty, probably not binding law, but a set of norms, a set of guidelines, what we call soft law, addressing general safe operations in space or responsible behavior in space. However, you wanna phrase that term that would include military operations but wouldn't specifically be addressing these kinds of military operations. Thank you. So I think we have some more questions. Someone asks, do you think that space command and space force will maintain the same approach slash goals under Biden as opposed to Trump? So that's an interesting question. And I think in general, and I don't think a lot of people really look too closely at this, but I think in general, we have seen a lot of continuity in US space policy even coming from the Obama administration into the Trump administration. There has been continuity and there has been an emphasis on that international law piece. And even in terms of, say, the space resource extraction piece, President Obama signed into law, the domestic law in the US that allows private companies to get licenses to extract and sell space resources. He signed that into law in late 2015 and the Trump administration has continued to support these activities including through an executive order in April of this year and has been very supportive of those commercial space activities. Both administrations in particular have been increasingly supportive of commercial space activities and have been supportive of the kind of military partnerships that the US military has engaged with in space with our partners in space as well. And so I don't see a dramatic change or a dramatic shift from the priorities of a Trump administration to a Biden administration in the sense that protection of commerce in space, continuity of commerce and that feeling of security for businesses that wanna operate in space but they're going to be able to continue to do so in the face of outside threats is going to continue to be important for a Biden administration much as it also was for a Trump administration and that ability to defend and deter in space is going to be, I think, another piece of continuity between those two administrations. I think you might actually see more divergence in terms of NASA priorities from the Trump administration to the Biden administration then on the space force side. But of course, this is my opinion and where I'm seeing this from the top. Interestingly, so looking at how the Trump administration has handled space policy directives the SPDs all modified the Obama space policy. So the Trump administration did not actually create an entirely new space policy that would replace wholesale the Obama space policy. It made changes in the areas where it had priorities and where it saw that it needed to do so. And so I think that further helps to indicate the extent to which really there has not been a wholesale sea change in space policy priorities from Obama to Trump. And therefore I think we'll see a similar progression from a Trump to Biden administration as well. Thank you. So I think shifting gears a little bit. So someone asked, do you think the establishment of the space force was more of a message to the rest of the world that we are ready, we mean the US, I assume, that we are ready to defend our space absence or does it give operational significance on how the US acts in space? So space force or as it was previously referred to space core is a concept that has been discussed and debated and proposed in the US government since at least 2001. And it had come back quite strongly in 2016 in a bipartisan discussion from the House, from the House of Representatives that was headed up by one Democratic representative and one Republican representative really pushing for that space core idea. So first of all, it's not a new idea, right? I think that really the shift to space force separating from the Air Force signals not necessarily so much a change in operations but really emphasizes the extent to which the US understands that it needs to make space a priority is dedicating the resources and the personnel and the attention in order to make space a priority, right? So it's not that I think that the goals or the operations will significantly change or the functions will significantly change but I think it's a signal to say, look, we're taking this seriously, we understand as more countries and more private entities get more involved in space activities and there are more space assets out there all in orbit at the same time and out in space at the same time that this is gonna continue to be a major question of security and stability not only for military space uses but also for civil and commercial space uses and securing that domain is really important. And so now is the time that we can say, we really need to emphasize that focus on space and those related missions. Thank you. So we had a question from the audience that says, scholars talk about space being militarized but not yet weaponized, is this so true? Does development of US space force make weaponization space more likely? If so, does this make the domain more or less secure? Can changes in international law affect this dynamic one way or the other? So I did not think that the creation of US space force changes the dynamic as to whether or not space will be weaponized. I think from a sort of messaging perspective, I think that it's important that we get out ahead of space force messaging and what's the purpose of the space force and how are the assets of the space force in terms of those personnel that are trained and organized and the equipment that's provided to them, how is that gonna be used in outer space? And so I think messaging is gonna be really important because certainly competitors in space like Russia or China could use their own messaging in order to emphasize the militaristic nature of having a space force, right? Of having a military service dedicated to space and use that domestically, internally in their own countries to ramp up and potentially spur further weaponization. So from that perspective, that's where I really see, it's not necessarily the space force itself that would be likely to encourage or discourage weaponization of space, but rather the messaging and the negotiation and the cooperation and how we handle those elements that will demonstrate whether or not ultimately we're gonna see space become weaponized and whether or not space force spurs that forward or not, really depending on that messaging piece and getting good at that messaging piece in terms of those kinds of issues. And so I think Sabrina's opening comments about the kinds of attention that space force has gotten in the media don't necessarily lend themselves to that positive message that would be really beneficial for space force. And so I mentioned the opportunities for space force to actually enhance transparency and work on confidence building with other countries, whether they're international partners or whether they're competitors. And so I think the onus is really gonna be on the US government as a whole government approach to messaging about the purpose of the space force and engaging in those cooperative kinds of activities dealing with space domain awareness, for example, which is a high priority for the space force and really emphasizing those sorts of missions. Thank you. So I think we have a couple more questions. So someone asks, it seems like the space force is going to follow a NASA style model in terms of acquiring new technologies, specifically via direct private public partnerships. Is this a good idea and what kind of effect does it have on the US military industrial complex? This is where I really wish that Dr. Hayes had joined here for the panel because he is an acquisitions expert and I am very much admittedly not an acquisitions expert. And so I want to avoid misinforming the audience about those acquisitions questions. In general, speaking from a broad perspective, I think the public private partnerships will be beneficial in terms of developing our space industry and our space capabilities in the United States because those partners who are going to work with the Department of Defense on creating those assets are going to have their own gains from doing so. They're going to gain expertise and there will be lots of spin-off technologies that become available more broadly in the economy and that help to continue to develop not only the space industry but other industries. So I think it's very beneficial from that perspective but in terms of the particulars of the acquisitions process, I'm sorry to disappoint but that's not really my area and I don't want to kind of go off of the narrative there. Yeah, of course, there is. So Heather asks kind of in relation to your previous question on space treaties, how can we actually enforce space treaties? Are there any legal mechanisms to do so, et cetera? So the enforcement question is a question that gets asked pretty much every time I talk to a new audience about space law. And enforcement is a problem in international law more broadly. This is not something that's in any way unique to the space law or to the space domain. Some treaties in other domains do have enforcement provisions specifically built into the treaties but the Outer Space Treaty and its progeny do not have such specific enforcement mechanisms. The one exception to that is the liability convention which is not so much enforcement as it is. If there is a damage caused, the provisions as to how payment is to be handled and how any dispute about fault or payment will be handled under the liability convention, there are those very specific provisions. But in terms of violations of the Outer Space Treaty or any other treaties, there are not those enforcement mechanisms built in in space. And so you get back to that article 33 of the UN Charter Peaceful Dispute Resolution question. So you follow peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms. So diplomatic negotiation certainly is one preferred way to go about that. You can send it to Marsh. If there's a really severe violation, sanctions will sometimes be implemented. I'm not talking about space specifically but in international law more generally. So there's something that's enough of a problem that it would rise to the level of using sanctions than that's something that happens because that is permissible within international law to conduct those kinds of sanctions. Sometimes there are more sort of specific provisions where states can be excluded from cooperation in particular projects because of their behavior in one or more domains. But the enforcement piece is a very valid question. It's very difficult to enforce international law particularly because states are all equal sovereigns under the United Nations Charter and under international law. So if a state does not consent, for example, to go into a case of the ICJ, the International Court of Justice or does not consent to an arbitration in order to determine the results of a particular dispute, if the state is not willing to consent, the fact that that state has sovereignty means that it does not have to consent and the Outer Space Treaty does not have a provision that requires consent to go to the ICJ or that requires arbitration. Although other treaties, as I've mentioned, do have different enforcement mechanisms and sometimes those are the enforcement mechanisms that are put in place, those arbitration clauses or a requirement for ICJ jurisdiction. I will mention that space assets are sometimes used as verification measures for enforcement of treaties. So national technical means of verification started in the SALT treaties. And what we're really talking about there are those remote sensing assets that can sense the earth from space. And so those assets can be used to conduct treaty verification measures for other treaties to ensure whether it's land use or radioactive material, et cetera, and monitor what other states are doing under their international agreements. Thank you. So we have two more questions. So Connor asked, are there any implications of space force on civilian space agencies like NASA, either through co-opting space funding or interfering with scientific research? So I don't see there being a danger of co-opting NASA funding. I think that NASA's funding levels will be what NASA's funding levels are going to be regardless of space force, space force is being seen as part of the defense budget and NASA is certainly separate and NASA has separate functions. And so I don't see there being a problem from a NASA budget perspective outside of there being, you know, budget constraints across the whole of government. In terms of scientific exploration, I think space force actually bolsters the possibilities for NASA to continue to carry out its activities in promoting that safety and security in space for that environment for NASA to continue to carry out those activities, which certainly are activities within the purview of international law and that are encouraged. And in fact, having additional US presence in space means you might be able to have cooperation between space force and NASA on some of these activities in an ongoing way that would be beneficial to both groups. And so I don't see there being a problem for NASA or anything substantially changing about NASA's mission as a result of the creation of US space force. I think there are potentially more challenges actually that come from the increased commercial activities in space for NASA. So for one example, there was a question earlier about space resource extraction. And so when we're looking at private companies that might be going to celestial bodies to extract resources from space, there are some questions about what sorts of rules those private companies will have to follow. Will they be similar to the rules that NASA has followed for planetary protection under the Cospar Planetary Protection Guidelines, for example, about claim room processes and protecting against the possibility of forward contamination of earth bacteria or other earth elements to celestial bodies that might interfere with scientific research or have the possibility to interfere with scientific research, particularly research into origins of the universe or origins of life. And so I think that raises more of a question for the potential scientific outcomes for NASA on the commercial side than anything that space force is likely to do. Thank you for the response. Our final question from any attendees is how difficult is it for a new actor to establish a presence in space? So there are some interesting resources out there for new actors in space, including the Secure World Foundation has a handbook that there's a physical handbook but there's also a free PDF that can be downloaded from the Secure World Foundation website for new actors in space to look through the steps of how to start up. Some of it is going to depend on what kind of a new actor it is. So if you're talking about a new actor in terms of a new country that has not engaged in space activities previously, not that the country itself is new but that space activities are new to the country, then that potentially is gonna be a longer road to figuring out how to get those activities kicked off both from a technical perspective and from a legal perspective because if that country has not put the legal mechanisms in place for their authorization responsibilities it might be a longer process to work with that government and ensure they have the appropriate approvals necessary. If you're talking about a new actor as in a new business in a country where space activities are well-established then I think that there's a pretty straightforward path for new actors. If you're looking at the US or Europe or Japan, India, a number of other countries where there has been a long history of space activities from private actors and that you can follow those baked-in procedures. The US has a set of baked-in procedures that handbook for new actors in space if you're talking about thinking about starting your own space startup company. I'd advocate that you have a look at that book and it'll walk you through the different regulatory steps that you might need to go through in order to start that authorization process through licensing, et cetera, and take those appropriate steps. But I think that it's easier now than ever for new actors to get involved in space and we see not only university institutes launching satellites and getting involved in space activities, but increasingly high schools and even middle schools that are building satellites to be launched into space because that barrier to access to space has really come down significantly within the last 10 to 20 years. Thank you. I think those are all of our audience questions. I have one more question for anyone else. The audience has an additional question for our panelists. Dr. Harrington, please feel free to ask and we may have time to address one or two of them before our panel ends. And so one of my questions for you is, do you believe current international space law is able to adequately handle the militarization of space? So in terms of the militarization of space, I find it difficult to separate that question from the question of is international space law equipped to handle the continuing growth and development of space activities overall, right? For me, those are not separate questions. The militarization of spaces is one piece of the broader continued growth and development of space activities and the increase in the number of space assets. And I think the Outer Space Treaty sets a very solid foundation for space activities as a base. But I think as space continues to become more congested and we've seen filings for thousands of new satellites in lower orbit, particularly geared toward those new internet providing constellations from a couple of the major players on that side, as space continues to become so much more congested, there are going to need to be additional sort of rules of the road, like I mentioned earlier, guidelines for responsible behavior. They don't necessarily need to be put in their own binding treaty that's gonna be ratified by all states. But they do need to be negotiated at the international level and have a general level of agreement from states such that they can be implemented in a way through domestic law with that authorization and supervision requirement that's already built into the Outer Space Treaty for states to maintain responsible behavior in space, to avoid collisions, to avoid major debris creating events to ensure smooth orbital insertion of satellites that are gonna be going up in the future to make sure that that freedom of use and exploration is preserved. And I think that one way we can use international space law to enhance the possibilities for carrying out those objectives is that do regard provision in Article 9 and really having that conversation at the international level about what does do regard mean, how do we act with do regard for other actors in space and ensure that we keep the space environment usable for all of those states who are legally guaranteed that freedom of access and use. Thank you. I think that just concludes our panel. Apologies to go to Dr. Harrington and attendees that are other panelists, Dr. Hayes, wasn't able to make it and be here with us today. But thank you, Dr. Harrington, for offering your expertise for this panel. We really appreciate it, your allies for sure.