 Theory of abstract ideas or general ideas occurs in the last section of book one part one and mae'r unrhyw bwysig yn gweithio'r prinsibl yn cael ei wneud, ac mae'n gweithio'r ddweud o'r ddweud. Felly, ydych chi'n gweithio'r ddweud yn gweithio'r ddweud yn fawr o'r bwysig o'r part 1, ac mae'r unrhyw yn gweithio'r ddweud. Mae'n gweithio'r ddweud. Felly, ydych chi'n gweithio'r ddweud yn y cyfrifysgol, fel Llock o Barkley o Hwm, yn y rhan fyddi'r cyfrifysgol, sydd yn ddweud i'r ideae'r cyfrifysgol. Felly, ydych chi'n ffun cofent o cyfrifysgol o'r ff luônaol iddyn ni, yn y regulation gwaith bythwyr, yn y fawr y bydd cael Llock o'r ddweud, fel Llock o Barkley o Hwm, rydych chi'n gweithio'r ddweud i'r cyfrifysgol. Felly, rydych chi'n gweithio'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ffaitho'r ddweud ond mae'r rhan fyddi'r ddweud oherwydd. The rock saying, all things that exist are only particulars. And he's echoed by Barclay, and he's echoed by Hume in the section that we're talking about 1176. Now if the only things we encounter in experience are particulars, this raises the question of how we are able to think in general terms. How do we get general ideas, or, if you like, how do we use general terms? So, dwi'n gweithio y teoriol Lox, oherwydd y teoriol Lox yn ysgolion ar gyfer Barclennol i'r Hwm. Fel hynny, mae'n ddysgu Lox. Felly, mae'n ddysgu Lox, mae'n ddysgu'r ddysgu'r ddysgu'r ddysgu Lox. OK, felly ydy'r Lox yn ymddiadau cyfrifol. Cyfrifol yn ysgolion, dar di oedd, lakhau mélidagol granithol shadeisudd a gweld delve yn o gyfrifol i'r ddysgu'r du顰 a'iaid gallu a dydd y dy Är eirft iddiling hefyd yw'r拙ad gyda oedd hynny. Felly, am ddysgu'r ddysgu, mae'n mewn gwneud � bwyd f enriched o bwerdangol schwier than whane ddig idded. Bydd ychydig dar bullion yma un rhetoric yn ddech pl minerals o termin y oedau hy contemporaryion yw fy modrion. Y dy cwell yn ymdweith yma, mewn gweld espyrig, ddysgu'r opaeth ei i'w gweithio i chi'n cael ei amser i'r unig. Fy gyddi'r ddysgrif hon i'w ysgolwyddon, roedd o'r baby, a'r tynnu'r ysgolwyddo i'r mwyaf, ymddor, ymddor, ymddor. I ddod o'r hyn o'r cyflawn i ddweud cyhoedd, yn ddweud i ddweud i ddweud i ddweud, oeddu yn ddweud i ddweud i ddweud i ddweud i ddweud i ddweud i ddweud, mae'n meddwl ei wneud i'w wneud i'r hynny i ddeithasol a wneud i'r llyfrigion gennynol. Mae'r llyfrigion, mae'n mynd i ddod yn fwy o'r holl fyddion o'r llyfrigion rhaid i'r Mhwyter, i'r Petyd, i'r James, i'r Mary, i'r Jane, i'r holl yn cyllidol i chi, i'r holl yn ymddwyr i'r cymdeithasol. Felly, y ddiddordeb yn ddiddordeb yn ei gweithio i'r ddiddordeb sy'n ddiddordeb am y cydwyr a'i'r ddiddordeb yn ei ddiddordeb yn ei ddiddordeb yn y ddiddordeb. yw'r idea ysgrifennu. Rwy'n meddwl, Lach gafodd unrhyw unrhyw sy'n meddwl gyda Ffanoff. Mae'n rhaid i ddweud oherwydd sy'n meddwl i'r ysgrifennu yw'r ysgrifennu sy'n meddwl sy'n meddwl i'r idea ysgrifennu. Mae'n meddwl i'r ysgrifennu sy'n meddwl i'r ysgrifennu. Mae'n meddwl i'r ysgrifennu sy'n meddwl i ddweud oherwydd mae'n meddwl i ddweudio oherwydd trangol, oherwydd equilatorol eich ceirol, urhaid isosili, neu skelinon, oherwydd wnaeth eich cwrs ond ry canw specifica sy'n meddwl i'r ysgrifennu. Nid yw'r amser y sy'n meddwl i ddiwedd y f等au Roeddem yn 快fynu y ddechrau maen nhw'n meddwl yn meddwl i fy modd o'r tryngylch, felly mae'n meddwl iawn yn ymdiddoriad. Rwy'n meddwl i'n meddwl. Rwy'n meddwl i'n meddwl i'r troch i'r troch yn ei ddau fath o'r amlwg. Rwy'n meddwl i'n meddwl i'r troch yn ymdill, yn ei ddweud, a yn rhaid i ddweud, ydw yw y cwm ddwy'n meddwl i'r troch yn ei ddweud? Roedd y gallwn gallu'n meddwl i'r troch yn ei ddweud? Yn gwrthod y gallau cyfnodd yn fywr o gyfnodd gyda LOX essay. Rwy'n rhoi bod y dyma'r idea. LOX's gorfod ythod i'r amlwgol a'r cyfrannu yw y cyfrannu. Ond, mae hwn yn cael ei wneud ychydig i'r cyfrannu cyfnodd yw'r ysgrifennig ddwy'r ysgrifennig wedi cael ei ddwylo'n gyfrannu'r idea. Yn gwrthod y cartwch, rydyn ni'n ddweud sy'n gwybodaeth yn ddych yn y rhagleniaid. along with some of the other ideas. It's clearly, any empiricist has to give an account of this. He might not say we have these weird general ideas, but he's got to give some account of how we managed to do general thinking. Here is Barclays rival account. A word becomes general by being made the sign not of an abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind. a o! byddwn am y newid a rhoi ei ddim wneud yn mynd o'r bydd y bydd gwyrdd o'r bydd yn ymgyrch yn mynd i bydd pan allanol i'r byddwn a'r bydd yn ymgyrch mae hynny'n siargrwych o'r hyn i'r ddefnydd yw efallai am yma. Ydyn nhw y fydd y loketh sefydliad yлей yn gromopeth geolog ac yn gwneud yma'r gweld ben yw'r diagrannol o'r gwneud ydyn ni'n gwybod gyda y cyeffordau y llai gyda'r llai gwaith yn cymryd. Felly mae rywbeth ar hynnu'r llai. Mae'r llai gyda llai gyda llai, myfydloliw. Ond rwyf fel nid yw, mae'n cyffordd eich llai gyda. Dw i'r line ar ôl ohnogi, sy'n wentlynyddiad eich llai. Ac mae'n gweld cheifio ffyrdd â hynny byddai'r ffordd hanfodol yn eithaf, ac mae'r ffordd hwnnef angen – a'r ffordd hefyd yn eithaf angen, sy'n mynd i ddweud y mae'r ffordd hwnnef sgarwau. Mae'r ffordd hwnnef angen neu'r ffordd hanfodol yn y rhaeddaeth gwaith i'r lŷn iawn ymlaes brand. Mae'r ffordd hwnnef eich hollod o enyf yn y de realisech gweithnod a'r gyfan gweithwyr gyngor. O chi'n ei ddweud yr ardal i'n cael ei wneud hyn, Is that although when we perform the proof we're using a specific triangle as it happens a right-angled isosceles triangle, nevertheless the proof is equally applicable to any triangle at all. Though the idea I have in view whilst I make the demonstration be for instance that of an isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles of what sort or bigness so ever. And that because neither the right angle nor the equality nor determinate length of the sides are at all concerned in the demonstration. So a very familiar practice of using a particular example as a way of reasoning more generally. Once we've proved that the angles of that triangle add up to 180 degrees or two right angles we're very happy to extend that conclusion to all other triangles because we see that no part of our reasoning has depended on the specific characteristics of the triangle we've picked. Okay so that's Barclay's account of abstraction. We use individual specific ideas with all their particularity but we use them as representatives. Now just in passing Barclay is probably a bit unfair to Locke. It's not clear that Locke's theory of abstraction depends on producing indeterminate images that will equally match all triangles and none of them. Michael Ayers has argued this length but I just give one quotation here which suggests at any rate that Locke isn't quite in the position that Barclay thinks he is. But at any rate as I've said both Barclay and Hume treat Locke as a foil. They do take him to have this rather naive idea with abstract images. Hume accordingly credits Barclay with one of the most valuable discoveries that has been made recently in the Republic of Letters. Barclay's criticism of Locke, his development of an alternative theory of general ideas is a great success. And you get the impression from this that Hume's theory is going to be essentially the same as Barclay's. But actually it's not quite the same because Hume gives a major role to custom. Now we'll see later when we come to deal with Hume on induction that custom plays a major role there. Custom is habit, we see things happen, we expect the same in the future. And here Hume is appealing to a custom which he will later say is very similar in explaining our operation of general thought. So when we found a resemblance among several objects we apply the same name to all of them. And this name plays a crucial role. After we've acquired a custom of this kind the hearing of that name revives the idea of one of these objects and makes the imagination conceive it with all its particular circumstances and proportions. So notice when we conceive if I say triangle or dog the idea of a particular triangle or a particular dog comes into your mind with all its particular features. But as the same word is supposed to have been frequently applied to other individuals the word not being able to revive the idea of all these individuals only revives that custom which we have acquired by surveying them. They're not really present to the mind but only in power. We keep ourselves in a readiness to survey any of them. So you think of a specific dog but because the word dog has been associated by you with lots of other specific animals those other specific animals or your idea of them are as it were waiting in the wings waiting to jump in as needed in your thinking. So all of your thinking involves very specific ideas but other ideas are potentially there. So in particular Hume says suppose some proposition is put to us which may match with the particular idea we're thinking of at the moment but doesn't match in general. So suppose I think of the idea of a triangle and it happens that an equilateral triangle as it were appears in my mind. So when I think of a triangle I'm thinking of a specific equilateral triangle and then maybe the proposition occurs to me or somebody says to me all triangles are equilateral. Now you might think that I will be seduced into believing that because I have this idea in my mind which I'm using as a representative of all triangles and it happens to be equilateral but actually Hume says we've got this magical faculty in the soul that when this happens when some general rule is proposed to us which doesn't match with all of our ideas that are associated with the word triangle lo and behold by magic as it were another idea occurs to me and jumps in. The custom brings to my mind an idea of a triangle that is not equilateral and so I see that the proposed general rule that all triangles are equilateral is false. Okay so to sum up some ideas are particular in their nature but general in their representation. So everything that exists is particular but some ideas manage to become general in their representation by being annexed to a general term which from a customary conjunction has a relation to many other particular ideas and readily recalls them in the imagination. Don Garrett has coined a useful term for the set of ideas that are associated with a term and readily recalled in this way. He calls them the revival set, very appropriate name. Okay so Hume has his alternative theory but before presenting this he attacks Locke's theory using some similar considerations to Barkley but actually he puts forward three arguments one of them involving the separability principle, one involving the copy principle that we've already come across and one involving the conceivability principle that we've already mentioned but not discussed in much detail. So I've put references there, I would suggest go and look at those passages, see how he argues it. What I'm going to focus on now is the first of these, the separability principle because we'll see that that plays quite a significant role later on in Hume's philosophy. Now it's a little bit strange when he introduces the separability principle. He says we have observed that whatever objects are different to distinguishable and that whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination. We have observed that, when did we observe that? Well it's not quite clear, he's never said that before. The nearest seems to be Treatise 1134 where he talks about the liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its ideas and he refers to that as his second principle the first principle being the copy principle. So it seems most plausible that when Hume suddenly starts talking about what is universally known as his separability principle, though he doesn't call it that that he's actually referring back to that principle of the liberty of the imagination. Okay, now what exactly does that amount to? Whatever objects are different to distinguishable and that whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination. When we think of different things we're able to separate the ideas of them and he goes on to say these propositions are equally true in the inverse and that whatever objects are separable are also distinguishable and that whatever objects are distinguishable are also different. So he seems to be saying that distinguishability, difference, separability all come to the same thing. Well his argument for this is very cursory and this is a little bit strange because we'll see he does actually make significant use of this principle. He simply says for how is it possible we can separate what is not distinguishable or distinguish what is not different and that's pretty much it. He seems to think that it's a pretty obvious principle. Now I suspect that what's going on here is that Hume is motivated by his general picture of the human mind and his empiricist picture of our ideas as copied from impressions, copied from sensation and as always Hume tends to model all this on a visual picture. So although we have five senses and we get ideas from the impressions of all of those five senses Hume seems most of the time to be thinking in terms of visual impressions and ideas. OK so when I look around me I get a visual image My ideas are copied from that and Hume seems to be working with a picture of something like a pixelated computer screen. So I've got that image we can divide it into lots of parts and my imagination gives me the freedom to take apart here, imagine it over there so I can move things around how I like and it seems to be that if you can separate out a part of that and you can distinguish it, it's different, you can move it around and this seems to make sense of how I've suggested he's referring back to what he called the liberty of the imagination to transpose our ideas. It's as simple as that. But we'll see that Hume immediately goes on to draw quite significant conclusions from this principle which makes it look as though maybe it's not so trivial. In particular it is evident at first sight that the precise length of a line is not different nor distinguishable from the line itself nor the precise degree of any quality from the quality. So straight away, you think of a line, think of the length of a line you cannot distinguish those ideas, they're not separable so you can't think of one of them alone. Now that looks like a much more significant conclusion than Hume's rather short justification of the principle would seem to justify and raises an obvious problem because we do seem to be able to draw these distinctions. I can talk about the length of a line distinct from the line itself. Maybe I can't form an idea of the line distinct from the idea of its length or vice versa but I seem to be able to talk about it okay and think about it. So for example we can distinguish between the figure and the body figured. We can distinguish between motion and the body moved. Recall Barkley saying that when we think of a body in motion we always think of the body with its specific motion and we may use that as a representative when thinking about moving bodies in general but in our thought we cannot distinguish an abstract idea of the object that's moving from the specific motion. So again we've got both Hume and Barkley saying that when we think of things we always think of particular things in all their particularity so we've got this remaining problem how we can have general thoughts. So Hume at the end of section 7 talks about what he calls the distinction of reason which is so much talked about and so much misunderstood and his account of the distinction of reason the way we can distinguish between the body and the body moved is by means of his theory of abstraction or theory of general ideas. It's because of these patterns of resemblance. So suppose we see a globe of white marble all we get is the impression of a white colour disposed in a certain form. So I look at a globe of white marble what comes to me is a white impression or loads and loads of little white impressions in fact disposed in a certain way. So I can think of the globe of white marble I can think of its whiteness I can think of its circularity I'm actually thinking of the same thing I cannot distinguish or separate those thoughts however what I can observe is different resemblances so when I look at a globe of black marble I see the similarity in shape if I look at a cube of white marble I see the similarity in colour and it's because of these different patterns of resemblance that I'm able to draw the distinction between the relevant general ideas.