 Section 1 of 3 Dialogues between Hylis and Philanus. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. 3 Dialogues between Hylis and Philanus in opposition to skeptics and atheists by George Barkley. Section 1. 1 Dialogues between Hylis and Philanus in opposition to skeptics and atheists by George Barkley. Good morrow, Hylis. I did not expect to find you abroad so early. Hylis. It is indeed something unusual, but my thoughts were so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last night that finding I could not sleep I resolved to rise and take a turn in the garden. Phil. It happened well to let you see what innocent and agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a pleasanter time of the day or a more delightful season of the year? That purple sky, those wild but sweet notes of birds, the fragrant bloom upon the trees and flowers, the gentle influence of the rising sun, these and a thousand nameless beauties of nature inspire the soul with secret transports. Its faculties too, being at this time fresh and lively, are fit for those meditations, which the solitude of a garden and tranquility of the morning naturally disposes to. But I am afraid I interrupt your thoughts, for you seemed very intent on something. Hylis. It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you, if you will permit me to go on in the same vein. Not that I would by any means deprive myself of your company, for my thoughts always flow more easily in conversation with a friend than when I am alone. But my request is that you would suffer me to impart my reflections to you. Phil, with all my heart it is what I should have requested myself if you had not prevented me. Hylis. I was considering the odd fate of those men who have in all ages through an affectation of being distinguished from the vulgar, or some unaccountable turn of thought, pretended either to believe nothing at all or to believe the most extravagant things in the world. This, however, might be borne if their paradoxes and skepticism did not draw after them some consequences of general disadvantage to mankind. But the mischief lieth here, that when men of less leisure see them who are supposed to have spent their whole time in the pursuits of knowledge professing an entire ignorance of all things, or advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly received principles, they will be tempted to entertain suspicions concerning the most important truths, which they had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable. Phil, I entirely agree with you as to the ill tendency of the affected doubts of some philosophers and fantastical conceits of others. I am even so far gone of late in this way of thinking that I have quitted several of the sublime notions I had got in their schools for vulgar opinions, and I give it to you on my word, since this revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and common sense, I find my understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can now easily comprehend a great many things which before were all mystery and riddle. Heil, I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I heard of you. Phil, pray, what were those? Heil, you were presented, in last night's conversation, as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind of man, to wit that there is no such thing as material substance in the world. Phil, that there is no such thing as what philosophers call material substance, I am seriously persuaded. But if I were made to see anything absurd or skeptical in this, I should then have the same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion. Heil, what can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to common sense, or a more manifest piece of skepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as matter? Phil, softly, good Highless, what if it should prove that you who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater skeptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to common sense, than I who believe no such thing? Heil, you may as soon persuade me the part is greater than the whole, as that in order to avoid absurdity and skepticism I should ever be obliged to give up my opinion in this point. Phil, well then, are you content to admit that opinion for true, which upon examination shall appear more agreeable to common sense, and remote from skepticism? Heil, with all my heart, since you are for raising disputes about the plainest things in nature, I am content for once to hear what you have to say. Phil, pray, Highless, what do you mean by a skeptic? Heil, I mean what all men mean, one that doubts of everything. Phil, he then who entertains no doubts concerning some particular point, with regard to that point cannot be thought a skeptic? Heil, I agree with you. Phil, whether doth doubting consist in embracing the affirmative or negative side of a suspicion? Heil, in neither, for whoever understands English cannot but know that doubting signifies a suspense between both. Phil, he then that denies any point can no more be said to doubt of it than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of assurance? Heil, true. Phil, and consequently for such his denial is no more to be esteemed a skeptic than the other? Heil, I acknowledge it. Phil, how cometh it to pass, then, Highless, that you pronounce me a skeptic, because I deny what you affirm, to wit the existence of matter, since, for ought you can tell, I am preemptory in my denial, as you in your affirmation. Heil, hold, Philonus, I have been a little out in my definition, but every false step a man makes in discourse is not to be insisted on. I said, indeed, that a skeptic was one who doted of everything, but I should have added, or who denies the reality and truth of things. Phil, what things? Do you mean the principles and theorems of sciences? But these, you know, are universal intellectual notions, and consequently independent of matter. The denial, therefore, of this doth not imply the denying them. Heil, I grant it. But are there no other things? What think you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of sensible things, or pretending to know nothing of them? Is not this sufficient to denominate a man a skeptic? Phil, shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance of them, since, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed the greatest skeptic? Heil, that is what I desire. Phil, what mean you by sensible things? Heil, those things which are perceived by the senses. Can you imagine that I mean anything else? Phil, pardon me, Highless, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. Suffer me then to ask you this further question. Are those things only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately, or may those things properly be said to be sensible which are perceived immediately, or not without the intervention of others? Heil, I do not sufficiently understand you. Phil, in reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the letters, but immediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, etc. Now, that the letters are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt, but I would know whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too. Heil, no, certainly, it were absurd to think God or virtue sensible things, though they may be signified and suggested to the mind by sensible marks, with which they have an arbitrary connection. Phil, it seems then that by sensible things you mean those only which can be perceived immediately by sense. Heil, right. Phil, does it not follow from this, that though I see one part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colors, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing. Heil, it doth. Phil, in like manner, though I hear a variety of sounds, yet I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds. Heil, you cannot. Phil, and when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the cause of its heat or weight. Heil, to prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you once for all, that by sensible things I mean those only which are perceived by sense, and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately, for they make no inferences. The deducing therefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances which alone are perceived by sense entirely relates to reason. Phil, this point then is agreed between us, that sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense. You will farther inform me whether we immediately perceive by sight anything beside light and colors and figures or by hearing anything but sounds. By the palette anything besides taste, by the smell besides odors or by the touch more than tangible qualities. Heil, we do not. Phil, it seems therefore that if you take away all sensible qualities there remains nothing sensible. Heil, I grant it. Phil, sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible qualities or combinations of sensible qualities? Heil, nothing else. Phil, heat then is a sensible thing? Heil, certainly. Phil, does the reality of sensible things consist in being perceived or is it something distinct from their being perceived and that bears no relation to the mind? Heil, to exist as one thing and to be perceived is another. Phil, I speak with regard to sensible things only and of these I ask whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the mind and distinct from their being perceived? Heil, I mean a real absolute being, distinct from and without any relation to their being perceived. Phil, heat therefore, if it be allowed a real thing, must exist without the mind? Heil, it must. Phil, tell me, Hylis, is this real existence equally compatible to all degrees of heat, which we perceive or is there any reason why we should attribute it to some and deny it to others? And if there be, pray let me know that reason. Heil, whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense we may be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it. Phil, what, the greatest as well as the least? Heil, I tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect of both. They are both perceived by sense. Nay, the greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived and consequently if there is any difference we are more certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a lesser degree. Phil, but is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat a very great pain? Heil, no one can deny it. Phil, and is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure? Heil, no, certainly. Phil, is your material substance a senseless being or a being endowed with sense and perception? Heil, it is senseless without doubt. Phil, it cannot therefore be the subject of pain? Heil, by no means. Phil, nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense since you acknowledge this to be no small pain? Heil, I grant it. Phil, what shall we say then of your external object? Is it a material substance or no? Heil, it is a material substance with the sensible qualities in hearing in it. Phil, how then can a great heat exist in it since you own it cannot in a material substance? I desire you would clear this point. Heil, hold Philanus. I fear I was out in yielding intense heat to be a pain. It should seem rather that pain is something distinct from heat and the consequence or effect of it. Phil, upon putting your hand near the fire do you perceive one simple uniform sensation or two distinct sensations? Heil, but one simple sensation. Phil, is not the heat immediately perceived? Heil, it is. Phil, and the pain? Heil, true. Phil, seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived at the same time and the fire affects you only with one simple or uncompounded idea. It follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately perceived and the pain. And consequently that the intense heat immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain? Heil, it seems so. Phil, again, try in your thoughts, Heilus, if you can conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure. Heil, I cannot. Phil, or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure in general abstracted from every particular idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells, etc.? Heil, I do not find that I can. Phil, does it not therefore follow that sensible pain is nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas in an intense degree? Heil, it is undeniable, and to speak the truth I begin to suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving it. Phil, what? Are you then in that skeptical state of suspense between affirming and denying? Heil, I think I may be positive in the point. A very violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind. Phil, it has not therefore according to you any real being? Heil, I own it. Phil, is it therefore certain that there is no body in nature really hot? Heil, I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. I only say there is no such thing as an intense real heat. Phil, but did you not say before that all degrees of heat were equally real or if there was any difference that the greater were more undoubtedly real than the lesser? Heil, true. But it was because I did not then consider the grounds there is for distinguishing between them, which I now plainly see. And it is this. Because intense heat is nothing else but a particular kind of painful sensation, and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving being it follows that no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance. But this is no reason why we should deny heat in an inferior degree to exist in such a substance. Phil. But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat which exist only in the mind from those which exist without it? Heil, that is no difficult matter. You know the least pain cannot exist unperceived, whatever. Therefore, degree of heat as a pain exists only in the mind. But, as for all other degrees of heat, nothing obliges us to think the same of them. Phil. I think you granted before that no unperceiving being was capable of pleasure any more than of pain. Heil. I did. Phil. It is not warmth or a more gentle degree of heat than what causes uneasiness a pleasure. Heil. What then? Phil. Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an unperceiving substance or body. Heil. So it seems. Phil. Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that are not painful as those that are can exist only in a thinking substance, may we not conclude that external bodies are absolutely incapable of any degree of heat whatsoever? Heil. On second thoughts, I do not think it's so evident that warmth is a pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain. Phil. I do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure as heat is a pain. But, if you grant it to be even a small pleasure, it serves to make good my conclusion. Heil. I could rather call it an indolence. It seems to be nothing more than a privation of its pain and pleasure, and that such a quality or state as this may agree to an unthinking substance I hope you will not deny. Phil. If you are resolved to maintain that warmth or a gentle degree of heat is no pleasure, I know not how to convince you otherwise than by appealing to your own sense. But what think you of cold? Heil. The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of cold is a pain, and to feel a very great cold is to perceive a great uneasiness. It cannot therefore exist without the mind. But a lesser degree of cold may, as well as a lesser degree of heat. Phil. Those bodies therefore, upon whose application to our own, we perceive a moderate degree of heat must be concluded to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth in them, and those upon whose application we feel a light degree of cold must be thought to have cold in them. Heil. They must. Phil. Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man into an absurdity? Heil. Without doubt it cannot. Phil. Is it not an absurdity to think that the same things should be at the same time both cold and warm? Heil. It is. Phil. Suppose now one of your hands hot and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water in an intermediate state. Will not the water seem cold to one hand and warm to the other? Heil. It will. Phil. ought we not therefore, by your principles, to conclude it is really both cold and warm at the same time? That is, according to your own concessions to believe in absurdity? Heil. I confess it seems so. Phil. Consequently, the principles themselves are false, since you have granted that no true principle leads to an absurdity. Heil. But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to say there is no heat in the fire? Phil. To make the point still clear, tell me whether in two cases exactly alike we ought not to make the same judgment. Heil. We ought. Phil. When a pin pricks your finger, does it not rend and divide the fibers of your flesh? Heil. It doth. Phil. And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more? Heil. It doth not. Phil. Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation itself occasioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in the pin, you should not conformably to what you have now granted judge the sensation occasioned by the fire or anything like it to be in the fire. Heil. Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this point and acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations existing in our minds. But there still remains qualities enough to secure the reality of external things. Phil. But what will you say, Heilus, if it shall appear that the case is the same with regard to all other sensible qualities, and that they can no more be supposed to exist without the mind than heat and cold? Heil. Then indeed you will have done something to the purpose, but that is what I despair of seeing proved. Phil. Let us examine them in order. What think you of tastes? Do they exist without the mind, or no? Heil. Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is sweet or wormwood bitter? Phil. Inform me, Heilus, is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure or pleasant sensation, or is it not? Heil. It is. Phil. Bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain. Heil. I grant it. Phil. If, therefore, sugar and wormwood are unthinking corporeal substances existing without the mind, how can sweetness and bitterness, that is, pleasure and pain, agree to them? Heil. Hold, Philanus, I now see what has diluted me all this time. You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness are particular sorts of pleasure and pain, to which I answered simply that they were. Whereas I should have thus distinguished those qualities, as perceived by us, are pleasures or pains existing in the external objects. We must not, therefore, conclude, absolutely that there is no heat in the fire or sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar. What say you to this? Phil. I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you define to be the things we immediately perceive by our senses. Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of as distinct from these, I know nothing of them. Neither do they at all belong to the point in dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive, and assert those sensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what use can be made of this to your present purpose? I am at a loss to conceive. Tell me, then, once more, do you acknowledge that heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness, meaning those qualities which are perceived by the senses, do not exist without the mind? Phil. I see it is to no purpose to hold out. So I give up the cause as to those mentioned qualities, though I profess it sounds oddly to say that sugar is not sweet. Phil. But for your further satisfaction, take this along with you. That which at all other times seems sweet shall, to a distempered pallet, appear bitter, and nothing can be planer than that divers persons perceive different tastes in the same food, since that which one man delights in, another abhors. Did this be if the taste was something really inherent in the food? Hile. I acknowledge I know not how. Phil. In the next place, odours are to be considered, and, with regard to these, I would fain know whether what has been said of tastes does not exactly agree to them. Are they not so many pleasing or displeasing sensations? Hile. They are. Phil. Can you conceive it possible that they should exist in an unperceiving thing? Hile. I cannot. Phil. Or can you imagine that filth and odour affect those brute animals that feed on them out of choice with the same smells which we perceive in them? Hile. By no means. Phil. May we not therefore conclude of smells as of the other four mentioned qualities that they cannot exist in any but a perceiving substance, or mind? Hile. I think so. Phil. Then, as to sounds, what must we think of them? Are they accidents really inherent in external bodies or not? Hile. That they in here not in the sonorous bodies is plain from hints, because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an air pump sends forth no sound. The air, therefore, must be thought to the subject of sound. Phil. What reason is there for that? Hile. Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we perceive a sound greater or lesser, according to the air's motion. But, without some motion in the air, we never hear any sound at all. Phil. In granting that we never hear a sound, but when some motion is produced in the air, yet I do not see how you can infer from sense that the sound itself is in the air. Hile. It is this very motion in the external air that produces in the mind the sensation of sound. For striking on the drum of the ear, it causes the vibration, which, by the auditory nerves being communicated to the brain, the soul is thereupon affected with a sensation called sound. Phil. What? Is sound then a sensation? Hile. I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular sensation in the mind. Phil. And can any sensation exist without the mind? Hile. No. Certainly. Phil. How then can sound being a sensation exist in the air, if, by the air you mean, a senseless substance existing without the mind? Hile. You must distinguish, Philanus, between sound as it is perceived by us and as it is in itself, or bracket, what is the same thing, close bracket, between the sound we immediately perceive and that which exists without us? The former indeed is a particular kind of sensation, but the latter is merely a vibrative or undulatory motion of the air. Phil. I thought I had already obviated that distinction. By answer I gave when you were applying it in a like case before. But, to say no more of that, are you sure that sound is really nothing but motion? Hile. I am. Phil. Whatever, therefore, agrees to real sound may with truth be attributed to motion? Hile. It may. Phil. It is then good sense to speak of motion as of a thing that is loud. Sweet. Acute. Or grave? Hile. I see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it not evident those accidents or modes belong only to sensible sound or sound in the common acceptation of the word, but not to sound in the real and philosophic sense, which, as I just now told you, is nothing but a certain motion of the air? Phil. It seems then there are two sorts of sound. The one vulgar or that which is heard, the other philosophical and real? Hile. Even so. Phil. And the latter consists in motion? Hile. I told you so before. Phil. Tell me, Highless, to which of the senses think you the idea of motion belongs? To the hearing? Hile. No, certainly, but to the sight and touch. Phil. It should follow then that, according to you, real sounds may possibly be seen or felt, but never heard. End of Section 1. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Section 2. Of Three Dialogues Between Highless and Philanus. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Three Dialogues Between Highless and Philanus in Opposition to Skeptics and Atheists by George Barkley. Section 2. Hile. Look you, Philanus. You may, if you please, make a jest of my opinion, but that will not alter the truth of things. I own, indeed, the inferences you draw me into sound something oddly, but common language, you know, is framed by and for the use of the vulgar. We must not therefore wonder if expressions adapted to exact philosophic notions seem uncouth and out of the way. Phil. Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself to have gained no small point, since you make so light of departing from common phrases and opinions. It's being a main part of our inquiry to examine whose notions are widest of the common road, and most repugnant to the general sense of the world. But can you think it no more than a philosophical paradox to say that real sounds are never heard and that the idea of them contained by some other sense? And is there nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things? Heil. To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And after the concessions already made, I had as well grant that sounds to have no real being without the mind. Phil. And I hope you will make no difficulty to acknowledge the same of colors. Heil. Pardon me. The case of colors is very different. Can anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects? Phil. The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal substances existing without the mind? Heil. They are. Phil. And have true and real colors inhering in them? Heil. Each visible object has that color which we see in it. Phil. How? Is there anything visible but what we perceive by sight? Heil. There is not. Phil. And do we perceive anything by sense which we do not perceive immediately? Heil. How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing? I tell you we do not. Phil. Have patience, good-highless, and tell me once more whether there is anything immediately perceived by the senses, except sensible qualities. I know you asserted there was not, but I would now be informed whether you still persist in the same opinion. Heil. I do. Phil. Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible quality or made up of sensible qualities? Heil. What a question that is. Whoever thought it was? Phil. My reason for asking was because in saying each visible object has that color which we see in it, you make visible objects to be corporeal substances, which implies either that corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or else that there is something besides sensible qualities perceived by sight. But as this point was formally agreed between us and is still maintained by you, it is a clear consequence that your corporeal substance is nothing distinct from sensible qualities. Heil. You may draw as many absurd consequences as you please, and endeavor to perplex the plainest things, but you shall never persuade me out of my senses. I clearly understand my own meaning. Phil. I wish you would make me understand it too, but since you are unwilling to have your notion of corporeal substance examined, I shall urge that point no further. Only be pleased to let me know whether the same colors which we see exist in external bodies or some other. Heil. The very same. Phil. What? Are then the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder clouds really in them, or do you imagine they have in themselves any other form than that of a dark mist or vapor? Heil. I must own Philonous. Those colors are not really in the clouds, as they seem to be at this distance. They are only apparent colors. Phil. Apparent call you them? How shall we distinguish these apparent colors from real? Heil. Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent which, appearing only at a distance, vanish upon a nearer approach. Phil. And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which are discovered by the most near and exact survey? Heil. Right. Phil. Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help of a microscope or by the naked eye? Heil. By a microscope. Doubtless. Phil. But a microscope often discovers colors in an object different from those perceived by the unassisted site. And in case we had microscopes magnifying to any assigned degree, it is certain that no object whatsoever viewed through them would appear in the same color which it exhibits to the naked eye. Heil. And what will you conclude from all this? You cannot argue that there are really and naturally no colors on objects because by artificial management they may be altered or made to vanish. Heil. I think it may evidently be concluded from your own concessions that all the colors we see with our naked eyes are only apparent as those on the clouds since they vanish upon a more close and accurate inspection which is afforded us by a microscope. Then, as to what you say by way of prevention I ask you whether the real and natural state of an object is better discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight. Or by one which is less sharp. Heil. By the former without doubt. Phil. Is it not plain from dioptrics that microscopes make the sight more penetrating and represent objects as they would appear to the eye in case it were naturally endowed with the most exquisite sharpness? Heil. It is. Phil. Consequently the microscopical representation is to be thought that which best sets forth the real nature of the thing or what it is in itself. The colors, therefore, by it perceived are more genuine and real than those perceived otherwise. Heil. I confess there is something in what you say. Phil. Besides, it is not only possible but manifest that there actually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed to perceive those things which by reason of their minuteness escape our sight. What think you of those inconceivably small animals perceived by glasses? Must we suppose they are all stark blind? Or, in case they see, can it be imagined their sight has not the same use in preserving their bodies from injuries which appears in that of all other animals? And, if it has, is it not evident they must see particles less than their own bodies which will present them with a far different view in each object from that which strikes our own senses? Even our own eyes do not always represent objects to us after the same manner. In the jaundice everyone knows that all things seem yellow. Is it not, therefore, highly probable those animals in whose eyes we discern a very different texture from that of ours and whose bodies abound with different humors do not see the same colors in every object that we do? From all which, should it not seem to follow that all colors are equally apparent and that none of those which we perceive are really inherent in any outward object? Hile. It should. Phil, the point will be passed all doubt if you consider that in case colors were real properties or affections inherent in external bodies they could admit of no alteration without some change wrought in the very bodies themselves but is it not evident from what has been said that upon the use of microscopes upon a change happening in the burnouts of the eyes or a variation of distance without any manner of real alteration in the thing itself the colors of any object are either changed or totally disappear? Nay. All other circumstances remaining the same change but the situation of some objects and they shall present different colors to the eye. The same thing happens upon viewing an object in various degrees of light and what is more known than that the same bodies appear differently colored by candle light from what they do in the open day. Add to these the experiment of a prism which, separating the heterogeneous rays of light alters the color of any object and will cause the whitest to appear of a deep blue or red to the naked eye. And now tell me whether you are still of opinion that every body hath its true real color in herring in it and if you think it hath I would feign no further from you what certain distance and position of the object what peculiar texture and formation of the eye what degree or kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that true color and distinguishing it from apparent ones. I own myself entirely satisfied that they are all equally apparent and that there is no such thing as color really in herring in external bodies but that it is altogether in the light and what confirms me in this opinion is that in proportion to the light colors are still more or less vivid and if there be no light then are there no colors perceived. Besides allowing there are colors on external objects yet how is it possible for us to perceive them? For no external body affects the mind unless it acts first on our organs of sense but the only action of bodies is motion and motion cannot be communicated otherwise than by impulse. A distant object therefore cannot act on the eye nor consequently make itself or its properties perceivable to the soul. Once it plainly follows that it is immediately some contiguous substance which operating on the eye occasions a perception of colors and such is light. Phil How is light then a substance? Heil I tell you Philonous external light is nothing but a thin fluid substance whose minute particles being agitated with a brisk motion and in various manners reflected from the different surfaces of outward objects to the eyes communicate different motions to the optic nerves which being propagated to the brain cause there in various impressions and these are attended with the sensations of red blue, yellow, etc. Phil It seems then the light does no more than shake the optic nerves. Heil Nothing else Phil and consequent to each particular motion of the nerves the mind is affected with a sensation which is some particular color. Heil Right Phil and these sensations have no existence without the mind. Heil They have not. Phil How then do you affirm that colors are in the light since by light you understand a corporeal substance external to the mind? Heil Light and colors as immediately perceived by us I grant cannot exist without the mind but in themselves there are only the motions and configurations of certain insensible particles of matter. Phil Colors then in the vulgar sense or taken for the immediate objects of sight cannot agree to any but a perceiving substance. Heil That is what I say. Phil Well then since you give up the point as to those sensible qualities which are alone thought colors by all mankind beside you may hold what you please with regard to those invisible ones of the philosophers. It is not my business to dispute about them only I would advise you to rethink yourself whether considering the inquiry we are upon it be prudent for you to affirm the red and blue which we see are not real colors but certain unknown motions and figures which no man ever did or can see are truly so are not these shocking notions and are not they subject to as many ridiculous inferences as those you are obliged to announce before in the case of sounds. Heil I frankly own Philonus that it is in vain to linger. Colors, sounds, tastes, in a word all those termed secondary qualities have certainly no existence without the mind but by this acknowledgement I must not be supposed to derogate the reality of matter or external objects seeing it is no more than several philosophers maintain who nevertheless are the farthest imaginable from denying matter. For the clearer understanding of this you must know sensible qualities are by philosophers divided into primary and secondary. The former are extension, figure, solidity, gravity, motion and rest and these they hold exist really in bodies. The latter are those above enumerated or briefly all sensible qualities beside the primary which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the mind. But all this I doubt not you are apprised of. For my part I have been a long time sensible there was such an opinion current among philosophers but was never thoroughly convinced of its truth until now. Phil, you are still then of opinion that extension and figures are inherent in external unthinking substances? Heil, I am. Phil, but what of the same arguments which are brought against secondary qualities will hold good against these also? Heil, why then I shall be obliged to think they too exist only in the mind. Phil, is it your opinion the very figure and extension which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object or material substance? Heil, it is. Phil, have all other animals as good grounds to think the same of the figure and extension which they see and feel. Heil, without doubt, if they have any thought at all. Phil, answer me, Heilis, think you the senses were bestowed upon all animals for their preservation and well-being in life or were they given to men alone for this end? Heil, I make no question, but they have the same use in all other animals. Phil, if so, is it not necessary they should be enabled by them to perceive their own limbs and those bodies which are capable of harming them? Heil, certainly. Phil, a might therefore must be supposed to see his own foot and things equal or even less than it, as bodies of some considerable dimension, though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible or at best as so many visible points. Heil, I cannot deny it. Phil, and to creatures less than the might they will seem yet larger. Heil, they will. Phil, in so much that what you can hardly discern will to another extremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain. Heil, all this I grant. Phil, can one in the same thing be at the same time in itself of different dimensions? Heil, that were absurd to imagine. Phil, but from what you have laid down it follows that both the extension by you perceived and that perceived by the might itself as likewise all those perceived by lesser animals are each of them the true extension of the might's foot, that is to say by your own principles you are led into an absurdity. Heil, there seems to be some difficulty in the point. Phil, again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent property of any object can be changed without some change in the thing itself? Heil, I have. Phil, but as we approach to or recede from an object the visible extension varies being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater than another. Does it not therefore follow from hence likewise that it is not really inherent in the object? Heil, I own, I am at a loss what to think. Phil, your judgment will soon be determined if you will venture to think as freely concerning this quality as you have done concerning the rest. Was it not admitted as a good argument that neither heat nor cold was in the water because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to the other? Heil, it was. Phil, is it not the very same reasoning to conclude there is no extension or figure in an object because to one eye it shall seem little, smooth and round when at the same time it appears to the other great uneven and regular? Heil, the very same but does this latter fact ever happen? Phil, you may at any time make the experiment by looking with one eye bare and with the other through a microscope. Heil, I know not how to maintain it and yet I am loath to give up extension. I see so many odd consequences following upon such a concession. Phil, odd say you after the concessions already made I hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness, but on the other hand should it not seem very odd if the general reasoning which includes all other sensible qualities did not also include extension? If it be allowed that no idea, nor anything like an idea, can exist in an unperceiving substance then surely it follows that no figure or mode of extension which we can either perceive or imagine or have any idea of can be really inherent in matter. Not to mention the peculiar difficulty there must be in conceiving a material substance prior to and distinct from extension to be the substratum of extension. Be the sensible quality what it will. Figure or sound or color it seems alike impossible it should subsist in that which does not perceive it. Heil, I give up the point for the present preserving still a right to retract my opinion in case I shall hereafter discover any false step in my progress to it. Phil, what is a right you cannot be denied? Figures and extension being dispatched we proceed next to motion. Can a real motion in any external body be at the same time very swift and very slow? Heil it cannot. Phil is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal proportion to the time it takes up in describing any given space thus a body that describes a mile in an hour moves three times faster than it would in case it described only a mile in three hours? Heil, I agree with you. Phil, it is not time measured by the succession of ideas in our minds? Heil, it is. Phil, and is it not possible ideas should succeed one another twice as fast in your mind as they do in mine or in that of some spirit of another kind? Heil I own it. Phil, consequently the same body may to another seem to perform its motion over any space in the half the time that it does to you and the same reasoning will hold as to any other proportion that is to say according to your principles bracket since the motions perceived are both really in the object close bracket it is possible one in the same body shall be really moved the same way at once both very swiftly and very slow how is this consistent either with common sense or with what you just now granted Heil, I have nothing to say to it Phil then as for solidity either you do not mean any sensible quality by that word and so it is beside our inquiry or if you do it must be either hardness or resistance but both the one and the other are plainly relative to our senses it being evident that what seems hard to one animal may appear soft to another with greater force and firmness of limbs nor is it less plain that the resistance I feel is not in the body Heil, I own the very sensation of resistance which is all you immediately perceive is not in the body but the cause of that sensation is Phil, but the causes of our sensations are not things immediately perceived and therefore are not sensible this point which I thought had been already determined Heil, I own it was but you will pardon me if I seem a little embarrassed I know not how to quit my old notions Phil, to help you out do but consider that if extension be once acknowledged to have no existence without the mind the same must necessarily be granted of motion, solidity and gravity since they all evidently suppose extension it is therefore superfluous to inquire particularly concerning each of them in denying extension you have denied them all to have any real existence Heil, I wonder Philanus if what you say be true why those philosophers who deny the secondary qualities any real existence should yet attribute it to the primary if there is no difference between them how can this be accounted for Phil, it is not my business to account for every opinion of the philosophers but among other reasons which may be assigned for this it seems probable that pleasure and pain being rather annexed to the former than the latter may be one heat and cold, tastes and smells have something more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the ideas of extension figure and motion affect us with and it being too visibly absurd to hold that pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving substance men are more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the secondary than the primary qualities you will be satisfied there is something in this if you recollect the difference you made between an intense and more moderate degree of heat allowing the one a real existence while you denied it to the other but after all there is no rational ground for that distinction for surely an indifference sensation is as truly a sensation as one more pleasing or painful and consequently should not any more than they be supposed to exist in an unthinking subject Hile, it has just come into my head villainous that I have somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible extension now though it be acknowledged that great and small consisting merely in the relation which other extended beings have to the parts of our own bodies do not really in here in the substances themselves yet nothing obliges us to hold the same with regard to absolute extension which is something abstracted from great and small from this or that particular magnitude or figure so likewise as to motion swift and slow are all together relative to the succession of ideas in our own minds but it does not follow because those modifications of motion exist not without the mind and therefore absolute motion abstracted from them does not Phil, pray what is it that distinguishes one motion or one part of extension from another is it not something sensible as some degree of swiftness or slowness some certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each? Hile, I think so Phil, these qualities therefore stripped of all sensible properties are without all specific numerical differences as the schools call them Hile, they are Phil, that is to say their extension in general and motion in general, Hile let it be so, Phil but it is a universally received maxim that everything which exists is particular how then can motion in general or extension in general exist in any corporeal substance Hile, I will take time to solve your difficulty Phil, but I think the point may be speedily decided without doubt, you can tell whether you are able to frame this or that idea now I am content to put our dispute on this issue if you can frame in your thoughts a distinct abstract idea of motion or extension divested of all those sensible modes as swift and slow, great and small round and square and the like which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind I will then yield the point you contend for but if you cannot it will be unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion of Hile, to confess ingenuously, I cannot Phil can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction term secondary? Hile what? Is it not an easy matter to consider extension and motion by themselves extracted from all other sensible qualities? Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them? Phil, I acknowledge Hile's it is not difficult to form general propositions and reasonings about those qualities without mentioning any other and in this sense to consider or treat of them abstractedly but how does it follow that because I can pronounce the word motion by itself I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body or because theorems may be made of extension and figures without any mention of great or small or any other sensible mode or quality that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension without any particular size or figure or sensible quality should be distinctly formed and apprehended by the mind Mathematicians treat of quantity without regarding what other sensible qualities it is attended with as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations but when laying aside the words they contemplate the bare ideas I believe you will find they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension Hile, but what say you to pure intellect may not abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty? Phil, since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all it is plain I cannot frame them with the help of pure intellect whatsoever faculty you understand by those words besides not to inquire into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual objects as virtue reason, god or the like thus much seems manifest that sensible things are only to be perceived by senses or represented by the imagination figures therefore and extension being originally perceived by sense do not belong to pure intellect but for your farther satisfaction try if you can frame the idea of any figure abstracted from all particularities of size or even from other sensible qualities Hile, let me think a little I do not find that I can Phil, and can you think it possible that should really exist in nature which implies every pugnancy in its conception? Hile, by no means Phil, since therefore it is possible even for the mind to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities does it not follow that where the one exists there necessarily the other exists likewise? Hile, it should seem so Phil, consequently the very same arguments which you admitted as conclusive against the secondary qualities are without any farther application of force against the primary too besides if you will trust your senses is it not plain all sensible qualities coexist or to them appear as being in the same place do they ever represent a motion or figure as being divested of all other visible and tangible qualities? Hile you need say no more on this head I am free to own if there be no secret error or oversight in our proceedings hitherto that all sensible qualities are alike to be denied existence without the mind but my fear is that I have been too liberal in my former concessions or overlook some fallacy or other in short I did not take time to think Phil, for that matter Hile you may take what time you please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry you are at liberty to recover any slips you might have made or offer whatever you have admitted which makes for your first opinion Hile, one great oversight I take to be this that I did not sufficiently distinguish the object from the sensation now, though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not hence follow that the former cannot Phil, what object do you mean? the object of the senses Hile, the same Phil, it is then immediately perceived? Hile right Phil, make me to understand the difference between what is immediately perceived and a sensation Phil, the sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving besides which there is something perceived, and this I call the object for example, there is red and yellow on that tulip but then the act of perceiving those colors is in me only and not in the tulip Phil, what tulip do you speak of? is it that which you see? Hile, the same Phil, and what do you see beside color, figure and extension? Hile, nothing Phil, what you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent with the extension is it not? Hile, that is not all I would say they have a real existence without the mind in some unthinking substance Phil, that the colors are really in the tulip which I see is manifest neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your mind or mine but that any immediate object of the senses that is any idea or combination of ideas should exist in an unthinking substance or exterior to all minds is in itself an evident contradiction nor can I imagine how this follows from what you said just now to it that the red and yellow were on the tulip you saw since you do not pretend to see that unthinking substance Hile, you have an artful way of diverting our inquiry from the subject Phil, I see you have no mind to be pressed that way to return then to your distinction between sensation and object if I take you right you distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the mind, the other not Hile, true Phil, and this action cannot exist in or belong to any unthinking thing Hile, that is my meaning Phil, so that if there was a perception without any active mind it were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance Hile, I grant it but it is impossible there should be such a perception Phil, when is the mind said to be active? Hile, when it produces puts an end to or changes anything Phil, can the mind produce discontinue or change anything but by an act of the will? Hile, it cannot Phil, the mind therefore is to be accounted active in its perception so far forth as volition is included in them Hile, it is Phil, in plucking this flower I am active because I do it by the motion of my hand which was consequent upon my volition so likewise in applying it to my nose but is either of these smelling Hile, no Phil, I act to in drawing the air through my nose because breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition but neither can this be called smelling for if it were I should smell every time I breathed in that manner Hile, true Phil, smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this Hile, it is but I do not find my will concerned any farther whatever more there is as that I perceive such a particular smell or any smell at all this is independent of my will and therein I am altogether passive do you find it otherwise with you, Hileus? Hile, no the very same Phil, then as to seeing is it not in your power to open your eyes or keep them shut Hile, without doubt Phil but does it in like manner depend on your will that in looking on this flower you perceive white rather than any other color or directing your open eyes toward the under part of the heaven can you avoid seeing the sun or is light or darkness the effect of your volition? Hile, no certainly Phil, you are then in these respects altogether passive Hile, I am Phil tell me now whether seeing consists in perceiving light and colors or in opening and turning the eyes Hile, without doubt in the former Phil, since therefore you are in the very perception of light and colors altogether passive what has become of that action you are speaking of as an ingredient in every sensation and does it not follow from your own concessions that the perception of light and colors including no action in it may exist in an unperceiving substance and is not this a plain contradiction Hile, I know not what to think of it Phil, besides since you distinguish the active and passive in every perception you must do it in that of pain but how is it possible that pain be it as little active as you please should exist in an unperceiving substance in short do but consider the point and then confess ingenuously whether light and colors, tastes, sounds etc. are not all equally passions or sensations in the soul you may indeed call them external objects and give them in words what subsistence you please but examine your own thoughts and then tell me whether it be not as I say Hile, I acknowledge Philanus that upon a fair observation of what passes in my mind I can discover nothing else but that I am a thinking being affected with variety of sensations neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation should exist in an unperceiving substance but then on the other hand when I look on sensible things in a different view considering them as so many modes and qualities I find it necessary to suppose a material substratum without which they cannot be conceived to exist End of Section 2 Recording by Jeffrey Edwards Section 3 of 3 Dialogues Between Hileus and Philanus This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Jeffrey Edwards 3 Dialogues Between Hileus and Philanus In Opposition to Skeptics and Atheists by George Barkley Section 3 Phil Material substratum call you it Pray by which of your senses came you acquainted with that being Hile It is not itself sensible its modes and qualities only being perceived by the senses Phil was by reflection and reason you obtained the idea of it Hile I do not pretend to any proper positive idea of it however I conclude it exists because qualities cannot be conceived to exist without a support Phil It seems then you have only a relative notion of it or that you conceive it not otherwise then by conceiving the relation it bears to sensible qualities Hile Right Phil be pleased therefore to let me know where in that relation consists Hile Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term substratum or substance Phil If so the word substratum should import that it is spread under the sensible qualities or accidents Hile True Phil I own it Phil It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct from extension Hile I tell you extension is only a mode and matter is something that supports modes and is it not evident the thing supported is different from the thing supporting Phil So that's something distinct from and exclusive of extension is supposed to be the substratum of extension Hile Just so Phil Can a thing be spread without extension or is not the idea of extension necessarily included in spreading Hile It is Phil You suppose spread under anything must have in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under which it is spread Hile Consequently every corporeal substance being the substratum of extension must have in itself another extension by which it is qualified to be a substratum and so on to infinity and I ask whether this be not absurd in itself and repugnant to what you granted just now to it that the substratum was something distinct from and exclusive of extension Hile I but Philanus you take me wrong I do not mean that matter is spread in a gross literal sense under extension the word substratum is used only to express in general the same thing with substance Phil Well then let us examine the relation implied in the term substance is it not that it stands under accidents Hile the very same Phil but that one thing may stand under or support another must it not be extended Hile it must Phil is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity with the former Hile you still take things in a strict literal sense that is not fair Philanus Phil I am not for imposing any sense on your words you are at liberty to explain them as you please only I beseech you make me understand something by them you tell me matter supports or stands under accidents how is it as your legs support your body Hile no that is the literal sense Phil pray let me know any sense literal or not literal that you understand it in how long must I wait for an answer Hile Hile I declare I know not what to say I once thought I understood well enough what was meant by matter supporting accidents but now think of it the less can I comprehend it in short I find that I know nothing of it Phil it seems then you have no idea at all neither relative nor positive of matter you know neither what it is in itself nor what relation it bears to accidents Hile I acknowledge it Phil and yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or accidents should really exist without conceiving at the same time the support of them Hile I did Phil that is to say when you conceive the real existence of qualities you do with all conceive something which you cannot conceive Hile it was wrong I own but still I fear there's some fallacy or other pray what to think you of this it has just come into my head that the ground of all our mistakes lies in your treating of each quality by itself now I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind color cannot without extension neither configure without some other sensible quality but as the several qualities united or blended together form entire sensible things nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist without the mind Phil either Hiles you are jesting or have a very bad memory though indeed we went through all the qualities to name one after another yet my arguments or rather your concessions nowhere tended to prove that the secondary qualities did not subsist each alone by itself but that they were not at all without the mind indeed in treating of figure and motion we concluded they could not exist without the mind because it was impossible even in thought to separate them from all secondary qualities so as to conceive them existing by themselves but then this was not the only argument made use of upon that occasion but Bracket to pass by all that hath been hitherto said and reckon it for nothing if you will have it so close Bracket I am content to put the whole upon this issue if you can conceive it possible for any mixture or a combination of qualities or any sensible object whatever to exist without the mind then I will granted actually to be so Hile if it comes to that the point will soon be decided what more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself independent of and unperceived by any mind whatsoever I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner fill I'll say you high less can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen Hile no that were a contradiction fill is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is unconceived Hile it is fill the tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you Hile how should it be otherwise fill and what is conceived is surely in the mind Hile without question that which is conceived is in the mind fill how then came you to say you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever Hile that was I own an oversight but stay let me consider what led me into it it is a pleasant mistake enough as I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place where no one was present to see it we thought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of not considering that I myself conceived it all the while but now I planly see that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree or a house or a mountain but that is all and this is far from proving that I can conceive them existing out of the minds of all spirits fill you acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise then in the mind Hile I do fill and yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you cannot so much as conceive Hile I profess I know not what to think but still there are some scruples remain with me is it not certain I see things at a distance do we not perceive the stars and moon for example to be a great way off is not this I say manifest to the senses fill do you not in a dream to perceive those or the like objects Hile I do fill and have they not then the same appearance of being distant Hile they have fill but you do not then conclude the apparitions in a dream to be without the mind Hile by no means fill you ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are without the mind from their appearance or manner wherein they are perceived Hile I acknowledge it but does not my sense deceive me in those cases fill by no means the idea or thing which you immediately perceive neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually exists without the mind by sense you only know that you are affected with such certain sensations of light and colors etc and these you will not say are without the mind Hile true but beside all that do you not think the sight suggest something of outness or distance fill upon approaching a distant object do the visible size and figure change perpetually or do they appear the same at all distances Hile they are in a continual change fill sight therefore does not suggest or any way inform you that the visible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance or will be perceived when you advance farther onward there being a continued series of visible objects succeeding each other during the whole time of your approach Hile it does not but still know upon seeing an object what object I shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance no matter whether it be exactly the same or no there is still something of distance suggested in the case fill good Hiles do but reflect a little on the point and then tell me whether there be any more in it than this from the ideas you actually perceive by sight you have by experience learned to collect what other ideas you will bracket according to the standing order of nature close bracket be affected with after such a certain succession of time in motion Hile upon the whole I take it to be nothing else fill now is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind was on a sudden mean to see he could at first have no experience of what may be suggested by sight Hile it is fill he would not then according to you have any notion of distance and next to the things he saw would take them for a new set of sensations existing only in his mind Hile it is undeniable fill but to make it still more plain is not distance aligned turned end wise to the I Hile it is fill and can a line so situated be perceived by sight Hile it cannot fill does it not therefore follow the distance is not properly and immediately perceived by sight Hile it should seem so fill again is it your opinion that colors are at a distance Hile it must be acknowledged they are only in the mind fill but do not colors appear to the eye as coexisting in the same place with extension and figures Hile they do fill how can you then conclude from sight that figures exist without when you acknowledge colors do not the sensible appearance being the very same with regard to both Hile I know not what to answer fill but allowing that distance was truly and immediately perceived by the mind yet it would not sense follow it existed out of the mind for whatever is immediately perceived is an idea and can any idea exist out of the mind Hile to suppose that were absurd but inform me Philonus can we perceive or know nothing besides our ideas fill as for the rational deducing of causes from effects that is beside our inquiry and by the senses you can best tell whether you perceive anything which is not immediately perceived and I ask you whether the things immediately perceived are other than your own sensations or ideas you have indeed more than once in the course of this conversation declared yourself on those points but you seem by this last question to have departed from what you then thought Hile to speak the truth Philonus I think there are two kinds of objects the one perceived immediately which are likewise called ideas the other are real things or external objects perceived by the mediation of ideas which are their images and representations now I own ideas do not exist without the mind but the latter sort of objects do I am sorry I did not think of this distinction sooner it would probably have cut short your discourse Phil are those external objects perceived by sense or by some other faculty Hile they are perceived by sense Phil how is there anything perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived Hile yes Philonus in some sort there is for example when I look on a picture or statue of Julius Caesar I may be said after a manner to perceive him though not immediately close bracket by my senses Phil it seems then you will have our ideas which alone are immediately perceived to be pictures of external things and that these also are perceived by sense in as much as they have a conformity or resemblance to our ideas Hile that is my meaning Phil and in the same way that Julius Caesar in himself invisible is nevertheless perceived by sight real things in themselves and perceptible are perceived by sense Hile in the very same Phil tell me Hylis when you behold the picture of Julius Caesar do you see with your eyes any more than some colors and figures with a certain symmetry and composition of the whole Hile nothing else Phil and would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Caesar see as much Hile he would not have his sight and the use of it in as perfect a degree as you Hile I agree with you Phil whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman emperor and his are not this cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of sense by you then perceived since you acknowledge you have no advantage over him in that respect it should seem therefore to proceed from reason and memory should it not Hile it should Phil consequently it will not follow from that instance that anything is perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived though I grant we may in one acceptation be said to perceive sensible things immediately by sense that is when from a frequently perceived connection the immediate perception of ideas by one sense suggests to the mind others perhaps belonging to another sense which are want to be connected with them for instance when I hear a coach drive along the streets immediately I perceive only the sound but from the experience I have had that such a sound is connected with a coach I am said to hear the coach it is nevertheless evident in truth and strictness nothing can be heard but sound and the coaches not then properly perceived by sense but suggested from experience so likewise when we are said to see a red hot bar of iron the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of sight but suggested to the imagination by the color and figure which are properly perceived by that sense in short those things alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense which would have been perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred on us as for other things it is plain they are only suggested to the mind by experience grounded on former perceptions but to return to your comparison with Caesar's picture it is plain if you keep to that you must hold the real things or archetypes of our ideas are not perceived by sense but by some internal faculty of the soul as reason or memory I would therefore feign know what arguments you can draw from reason for the existence of what you call real things or material objects or whether you remember to have seen them formerly as they are in themselves or if you have heard or read of what you did Heil, I see Philanus you are disposed to railery but that will never convince me Phil, my aim is only to learn from you the way to come at the knowledge of material beings whatever we perceive is perceived immediately or immediately by sense or by reason and reflection but as you have excluded sense pray show me what reason you have to believe their existence or what medium you can possibly believe it either to mine or your own understanding Heil, to deal ingenuously Philanus, now I consider the point I do not find I can give you any good reason for it but thus much seems pretty plain that it is at least possible such things may really exist and as long as there is no absurdity in supposing them I am resolved to believe as I did till you bring good reasons to the contrary Phil, what is it come to this that you only believe the existence of material objects and that your belief is founded barely on the possibility of it being true then you will have me bring reasons against it though another would think it reasonable the proof should lie on him who holds the affirmative and after all this very point which you are now resolved to maintain without any reason is in effect what you have more than once during this discussion seemed good reason to give up to pass over all this if I understand you rightly you say our ideas do not exist without the mind but that there are copies images or representations of certain originals that do Heil, you take me right Phil, they are then like external things Heil, they are Phil, have those things a stable and permanent nature independent of our senses or are they in a perpetual change how on are producing any motions in our bodies suspending, exerting or altering our faculties or organs of sense Heil, real things it is plain have a fixed and real nature which remains the same not withstanding any change in our senses or in the posture and motion of our bodies which indeed may affect the ideas in our minds but it were absurd to think they had the same effect on things existing without the mind how then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed and constant or in other words since all sensible qualities as size figure, color, etc that is our ideas are continually changing upon every alteration in the distance medium or instruments of sensation how can any determinate material objects be properly represented or painted forth by several distinct things each of which is so different from and unlike the rest or if you say it resembles someone only of our ideas how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy from all the false ones Heil, I profess Philanus, I am at a loss I know not what to say to this Phil, but neither is this all which are material objects in themselves perceptible or perceptible Heil, properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas all material things therefore are in themselves insensible and to be perceived only by our ideas Phil, ideas then are sensible and their archetypes or originals insensible Heil, right Phil, but how can that which is sensible be like that which is insensible can a real thing in itself invisible be like a color or a real thing which is not audible be like a sound in a word can anything be like a sensation or idea but another sensation or idea Heil, I must own, I think not Phil, is it possible there should be any doubt on the point do you not perfectly know your own ideas Heil, I know them perfectly since what I do not perceive or know can be no part of my idea Phil, consider therefore and examine them and then tell me if there be anything in them which can exist without the mind or if you can conceive anything like them existing without the mind Heil, upon inquiry I find it is impossible for me to conceive or understand how anything but an idea can be like an idea and it is most evident that no idea can exist without the mind Phil, you are therefore by our principles forced to deny the reality of sensible things since you made it to consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind that is to say, you are a downright skeptic so I have gained my point which was to show your principles led to skepticism Heil, for the present I am if not entirely convinced at least silenced Phil, I would feign know what more you would require in order to have a perfect conviction that had the liberty of explaining yourself all manner of ways were any little slips in discord laid hold and insisted on or were you not allowed to retract or reinforce anything you had offered as best served your purpose has not everything you could say being heard and examined with all the fairness imaginable in a word, have you not in every point being convinced out of your own mouth and if you can at present discover any flaw in any of your former concessions or think of any remaining subterfuge any new distinction color or comment whatsoever why do you not produce it Heil, a little patience Philanus, I am at present so amazed to have seen myself ensnared and as it were imprisoned in the labyrinths you have drawn me into that on the sudden it cannot be expected I should find my way out you must give me time to look about me and recollect myself Hark, is not this the college bell? Heil, it rings for prayers Phil, we will go in then if you please and meet here again tomorrow morning in the meantime you may employ your thoughts on this morning's discourse and try if you can find any fallacy in it or invent any new means to extricate yourself Heil, agreed End of section 3 and end of the first dialogue recording by Jeffrey Edwards