 So the committee can look at. I'll just be honest. The reason I sent the memo to the full Senate was largely to say that we can and should act now on some elements of not only our ongoing collective work on criminal justice reform issues, but also additional considerations around reforming the way we handle law enforcement in the state. The sort of sweep of issues that I presented in that note to the full Senate were a reflection of work that's in progress in the Senate and in the house of the Senate. So I think that's one of the issues that have been hotly discussed in one chamber or the other, and that senators came to me saying they hoped it would be included for consideration. And I think we all acknowledge in the, that there's really a balancing act between the sort of complete exhaustive process that would normally accompany any piece of legislation that is in place at this time and struggling to get that right. It's obviously the great task before you. I do believe that the time is to act on some of these issues now, even if it requires some creativity in the manner in which it occurs. And I'll use the example of the use of deadly force as an example. I would probably be calls from the law enforcement community and the Attorney General's community and possibly others to say that it's complicated, let's delay, create a task force and so on. And I'm not here to diminish legitimate considerations of how we move forward. But I do believe we can adopt a policy now and let those same stakeholders come back in August or beyond with some of the most suggested modifications, essentially treating it like an emergency policy until such time as others come back with proposed modifications. And I, that kind of creativity would both help in terms of timing, give people confidence that there will be, that this is not a end of a conversation, but in some ways the beginning of an ongoing conversation. While ensuring that we don't do what happens too frequently, we have to do it by accident or by design, which is we set forward a committee to work on something, not a standing committee, but a external task force work group, study committee, whatever. And then fast forward six months, nine months, whatever the timeframe is that we give them and nothing happens. And so I believe that there is an opportunity to move quickly on some of the elements. I totally appreciate the, that balancing dilemma that I described earlier about making sure that we have an inclusive discussion in the coming weeks, while also moving towards acting and not just talking. Thank you. I want to emphasize something you just said and that is that we hope to hear from as many people as possible, but we only have really my goal would be to hear from people tomorrow, Wednesday and Thursday, and then vote a bill out on Friday. And I know that's a tight timeline line for the committee, but I think it's absolutely necessary to hear from as many people as possible, but we are limited in the amount of time to get this bill so that the house can at least look at it in a timely manner. We, we, these are not, many of these issues are issues that are not new. They've been going on for years. And we've talked about them many times. So this is not new, but it is the first time that I can remember the Judiciary Committee looking at some of these issues. The, I, but I do caution that zoom is going to make it more difficult to be as inclusive as possible. So people should contact Peggy Delaney at leg.state.bt.us. If they have a want to appear, want to have their voices heard, but they can also send the committee a letter and email whatever in order to express their views. But again, we do want to be as inclusive as possible, but we have a tight timeframe. And I, if I might add one last piece before I sign off, Senator Sears, the, the temptation by the various interests is usually to come in and try to buy more time. Understandably, it's their job to get the position as close to their own preferred one as possible. And by that, I mean every, every stakeholder group who might be interested in a bill. And the August session per our discussion this morning with the full Senate, it's not clear how long that will last. A lot of that will depend on how much information we have going into mid August, how closely aligned the administration, the Senate and the house are in terms of the full year budget. So some might say, oh, we'll come, you know, postpone everything until August and maybe you can work on it then and it'll give people more of a chance. I mean, I mean, we shouldn't, no one can count on that August's early September session being a place where we'll have the freedom to be working on substantial policies than any more than now, which is one of the reasons why I think trying to act now is really critical. Because otherwise it could very easily be that we find ourselves in late August. Everyone's in such a jack to get out that we kick the can to get out of there. And I feel like that would be a real abdication. So I'll leave it there and sign off and thank you. And by the way, next Tuesday is our day to try to finalize our response to the House's version of justice reinvestment too. Great. Yeah. So I think that that bill that you guys have worked on is so important and. Touches on so many other. Aspects of what we do. And I also want to say that without, it probably won't appear in a piece of legislation, but you know, part of the national discussion. Under the heading defund police. Which means different things depending on who says it, but I do want to emphasize that our investments in mental health in recent years. While not sufficient to dig out of a hole that really developed over a long period of time is a piece of. I mean, I think that we need for law enforcement to be essentially mental health workers on so many calls. So that's going to be a continued part of our. Collective work and the work of the next legislature is making sure that our response in mental health crisis situations. Is. You know, aligning mental health professionals as frequently as possible with the mental health crisis that's presented. But I think that we need to make sure that. We need to make sure that we have a mental health officer who has to play so many roles in the modern era. When they receive. A 911 call. And I think that. Our work on mental health really is a key compliment to all the work that you guys have been doing in the judiciary committee. Thank you. You know, it's hard to understand. It's hard to focus on what was in the budget. Before a pandemic hit. I mean, I think what was most happy about in his budget address. Was the addition of social workers in. In barracks in the department of public safety. And I think that's, that is a step in the right direction. We need, we probably should do more, but I. Like so many other things. I have no idea what's happened to that initiative. Yeah, we'll have to follow up on that. I mean, we've lost $100 million in state revenue. Yeah, the state police barracks that have had embedded mental health workers have the long, the state troopers themselves. Have been extremely positive on. The improvement and being able to respond. In mental health calls. So I really, I hope we can find a way to make sure that that doesn't get dropped, but that's a good one for us to flag for. Senator Kitchell to add to the 500 other things on her. That's a thing. Well, Tim, thank you for your leadership on this. Without that, it doesn't happen. Let's get it done. See you. Okay. See you later. Committee members, any kind of opening comments, anybody'd like to make them happy to hear them now. And then my plan was for, for him to go through the draft. And then us to have some committee discussion and begin taking testimony tomorrow morning. But if there's any opening comments from anybody on the committee, we'll be happy to hear them. Welcome back, Senator White. You missed it. Missed us. We missed you. I didn't mean you missed us. We missed you. I'm sorry. Came out wrong. Bryn. And Peggy, if you could put up the draft on our screens, because some. Of the members don't have two devices in front of them. So Bryn could walk through the draft starting with the. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Do you want me to make you the coast so you can share it? Or do you. And go through it or do you want me to do it? Why don't you, why don't you do it, Peggy? So that, that'll probably be a faster. Okay. So good morning committee for the record, Bryn here from legislative council. I'll just wait until the draft gets posted before I begin. Can you guys see it now? Yes. Yes. Thank you. Yeah. But is it also on our webpage? Yes, it is. If people have some center, I don't think all senators have the. Enough devices to read both. On the webpage or the. I'm, I'm reading it on my phone, but so it's great to have it on the screen. Yeah. Well, why don't we start going through it on the screen? And then if any questions just, you know, shout out if I don't see you because I've got a, obviously. Go ahead, Bryn, please. Okay. So. Good morning committee. This is draft 1.2 of S2 19. This draft has several sections that come from different places. I'll try and talk about that as I go through. I'll try and talk about that as I go through it as I go through it. There are a lot of reader assistance headings to sort of guide you through the different sections. The first three sections of the bill deal with law enforcement race data collection. Those are statutes. This committee should be pretty familiar with since you've worked with them throughout your work on fair and impartial policing. Section one and two are the sections of the bill of S2 19. As it came out of Senate appropriations. Section one, this tasks the secretary of administration or their designee with reviewing all state grants to law enforcement and ensuring that the law enforcement agency that is going to be the recipient of the grant has complied with the race data reporting requirements that are set forth in statute, which we're going to look at in section three within six months prior to the secretary or the secretary's designee approving that grant. Section one section takes effect on January 1st of 2021. So it's got a, it's got an effective date that's bumped out a ways. And if you turn to the next page and you see section two, it's sort of, um, uh, uh, another requirement to the secretary to notify all law enforcement agencies of this new grant funding contingency that's set forth in section one. So this section takes effect on passage. Any questions about those two sections before I move on? I guess. Yes, I mean, it just seems like, um, I'm not sure what if all this goes the way it should be. I mean, I mean, I mean, I mean, I mean, I mean, I mean, I mean, I mean, I mean, I mean, I mean, I mean, like, um, I'm not sure what, if all this goes the way we want it, and it gets passed and the governor signs it, um, there may only be days for them to do this notice requirement by July 1, if they're even our days. I think this has a different effective day. This section section two is effective on passage. It does make the requirement. On July 1st of this year, they're supposed to get out that notice by July 1st. So if that's if we want to make that back that out of ways. I thought there was a discussion and appropriations about that. There was, but the ultimate decision was that there was six months from July 1st to when the next section kicked in. But Alice makes it a decent point that there wouldn't be a lot of turnaround time for the secretary of administration. If any. Yeah, well, we could, we can certainly flag that as one issue to resolve. Okay. Okay. I'll move on to section three then. This is the race data collection statute set forth in section three. This requires the collection of data at all roadside stops and this all this language should look pretty familiar. So the changes here require some additional data collection. Peggy if you scroll down to the next page top of page three. So that along with having to report or collect and report the age, gender and race of the driver, the reason for the stock, the type of search that was conducted, any evidence located, and the outcome of the stop. It would also require law enforcement to collect data about whether any force was employed in effectuating the stock. And if so, what type of force was employed and whether the force resulted in bodily injury or death. So that's a bit more and also you'll see on the next page we'll get to that it defines force what force means, and that is refers to the force employed by a law enforcement officer to compel a person's compliance with the officer's instructions. Just a quick question there. It seems as though the definition includes the term to be defined. And so, in a certain sense it doesn't really define force. Right, I think that maybe a better word for what is happening here is it put some context around what force means rather than defining the word force. Yeah. Okay. So staying on this page you'll see that it also adds the executive director of racial equity to some of these requirements for law enforcement. So in subdivision two, it directs law enforcement agencies to work with the executive director of racial equity in addition to the criminal justice training council. With the goals of collecting uniform data and adopting uniform storage methods and ensuring that the data can be analyzed. And that is because in the next subsection subsection three, could I ask a question about that. Does this assume that there will be a single vendor chosen that all law enforcement agencies will have to use. Yeah, so that's that is how it's set forth and current law that there is one vendor that is chosen by the by the council to work with law enforcement. That is how it's set forth currently. Because I know that there are two different reporting systems in the state and I don't know if this means that we're going to require people to go to, to one reporting system and one vendor. That hasn't come up in the past that I know of. It does so the, the language of the statute says that it's the criminal justice training council's job to select a vendor to work with. So, I don't think it necessarily restricts it to one vendor there, it may be that the, that the council would select one vendor for certain law enforcement agencies and another for others and I don't think that the statute necessarily restricts that. So what we, I guess we've said this in the past I guess this isn't new but we're saying that the just the training council is the one that should choose the vendor for the particular agencies. I know that right now the agencies choose their own vendor and there are two of them. They don't, the training council doesn't choose a vendor for them. If we're talking about the reporting system that's used. Because right now, for example, they use stillman and Val core and I, I, the state police have always been using stillman but my understanding is that they're considering moving to Val core, most of the sheriff's use Val core. So, I, but I don't think the training council is the one that told the state police that who they should choose. So I'm wondering, this is really the agency that receives the data. Are those, are those organizations that the vendors that receive the data in order to analyze it. You mean like BCIC. Well my understanding is that the vendor. This is current law, right. I know I'm just confused by it because I'm confused by what it means. Well you wrote it. I don't know. Well, I don't know where it came from. Yep, this, this is, um, I believe I 419 I can, I can look up the, the act number. This did come from this committee and the house judiciary committees work on the fair and impartial policing policy. I believe the last act that amended it was in 2018. I'll, I'll try and clear that up in my own mind. So, I don't, we don't need to spend any more time on it all. When I said you wrote it, I meant, we wrote it, by the way. Yeah, we went through, I mean, it's all current law. So I don't know that's, that's something that needs to be changed. We certainly can change it. I'd just like to hear from the training council and the agencies about what it really means because I might be confused by what it really means. Okay. So in subsection three, it talks about the this vendor again, the vendor that is tasked by the council with receiving the data in order to analyze it and make it public. And the way the language is currently written it provides that that vendor chosen by the council receives the data, unless that vendor is unable to continue receiving the data again this is existing law you can see it on line 16 and 17. And it changes what is existing law provides that if the vendors no longer able to receive that data than the data goes to the criminal justice training council, and it changes that from the council to the executive director of racial equity. So, again, that's a little, it's a little confusing, but if that vendor chosen by the council is not able to continue to receive law enforcement agency data in order to analyze it and make it public, then that data would go to the executive director of racial equity. So if you scroll down again at the bottom of the page there there's a, there's, there's an additional requirement that that data has to be posted in a manner that's analyzable and user friendly. And then if you scroll that scroll on a bit more, it adds an additional requirement to the receiving agency to report that data annually to the general assembly. So either the vendor chosen by the training council or the executive director of racial equity would be tasked with reporting that data annually to the legislature. And can I throw in a question, the executive director. Is that a limited time position. Yes, it is. I believe it's a five year duration. So I believe there for more years. Okay, I can double check that though and confirm. Again, they're in subdivision five their lines three to five is that context around what force means with respect to gathering data about use of force. And that's it for section three. Can I ask a question. Of course I can. The question is on use of force and that definition. If an officer uses. Let's say it's a situation, and the officer uses force that does not involve restraint physical restraint but I don't know. Taser. Other forms to restrain. Is that included in that use of force. So, or is it just physical restraint. That's what I, I don't know. I don't know. I don't know if this force can take many. The, the idea here was physical force. So I think that we do have a word missing in that subdivision five to make it clear that force. Would refer to any physical use of force. That would be used to compel a person to do something. So it may take the form of a restraint of some kind or the use of a. Physical force. But it wouldn't necessarily mean throwing a. Persons driving and they want to stop them. We've had cases where they've thrown those spikes into the road. That's not force. I don't see that as being physical force. But if you wanted to include that, we could certainly. No, I'm just asking what. Is it clear. And I think the word physical probably would help. I think that without the word physical, that would, I would read that sort of content contextual language to include spikes or some other sort of methodology of compelling compliance. But without, but with the word physical, I think that would be excluded. And Bryn. Is it right to assume that that would include the use of canines? In other words. You know, the canine squad is called. And in addition to using them to locate drugs. Sometimes law of authorities do use them to. Compel. Actions on the part of the people. That are the object of the stop. You know, that's an interesting question. I think the intimidation tactics, I don't think would be implied. But I think that's a good question. I think that's a good question. I think that's a good question. I think that's a good physical force. If that's what you mean, like having a dog at the end of a short leash. Whereas if the. You know, I think it should be. Yeah, I guess I'm getting into a, you know, you called it intimidation. I'm thinking also of. You know, the Rodney King. Beating in Los Angeles. I think that's a good question. But I think that's a good question. I think that's a good question. I think that's a good question. In what they called the approved come along manner. And that phrase is always stuck with me. So the idea that you can use a. A baton in a, in a come along manner. To compel somebody. To, to move it. In the direction you want. Could be a baton, could be a dog. But it seems to me, whether they make contact with you or not, they're using something that leaves you no choice. But to, to do something. You know, you bring it. My, my image. Of. And this was way back to the 60s. But bull corner was the. Chief of police and I think it was Birmingham, Alabama. And I think it's a good question. I think it's a good question. Who a sick group of a dog on a protester in that. Picture. Was so embedded in people's. Mines that went, you know, around the country and newspapers. Obviously we didn't have other forms and on television, but that picture. Still is in my mind from the 1960s. When that was. When it was. When it was. When it was. When it was. Trying to compel the protesters to stop. I agree with, I think maybe we want to make sure that any. Any effort to intimidate. Would also be included in use of force. Could it. Is it opening it too much to say. Shall refer to the force employed or threatened. By a law enforcement. Officer, because. If, if you take out a baton and you, if you take away a baton and you, if you take it out of your head. And then they do what you want. We would want to know that. As much as we would want to know if they actually struck them. I would think. So during a, during a normal stop. An officer doesn't, doesn't threaten you with physical force, but there's a level of ex escalation, where they do. know, get out of the car or I'll drag you out of the car or something like that. So there's a, there's an area that I'm looking to have included, maybe intimidation tactics, maybe threatened use of force, or, or maybe we detail the things we're talking about the Tom's dogs, etc. Let's flag that for future discussion. But I think it's a point that so at this point, we're trying to get information about the use of force. And I think all of us would like that information about what type of forces being or what type of tactics are being used to get the person to comply with the officer's instructions. Okay, so I've got that flagged. Go ahead. If we're ready, I'll move on to the next section. Yeah, section four. Oh, I'm sorry. Senator Nica. I'm a little bit mixed up, Bryn from when you were talking about section five. Do we have different numbers than you? I have that as she's talking about five on line three at page four. Sorry, subsection subsection five. Oh, okay. We were just looking at on page four. Okay, thank you. Now we're on to line 12 of of page four. Right. So the next section of the bill, section four is a statewide law enforcement policy on the use of deadly force. And much of this language is drawn from a California assembly bill number 392 as it was introduced in 2019. So essentially what this section does is it sets forth. It creates a statutory statewide policy regarding when it is appropriate for law enforcement to use deadly force in its interactions with with civilians. So bottom of page four sets starts out the definition section. This is a pretty important section because the policy, the important segments of this policy will refer to these words. So I'm just going to go through those first. So deadly force means any use of force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury. And that includes the use of the firearm improper restraint. You'll see this define the bill. Could I ask a question about the discharge of the firearm? Yes. Okay. Okay. So if if somebody shoots is trying to get the attention of people and shoots in the air, is that a discharge that would be considered deadly force? I think if it is a discharge of a firearm in a way that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury. So that would if it were sort of straight up into the air, I'm not sure it would create that risk. Whereas it's modified by create the creating the substantial risk. Okay. Yes, it is. Okay. So the second definition is is improper restraint. And you'll see this a few different times in the bill means the use of any maneuver on a person that applies pressure to the neck, throw windpipe or cartoid artery carotid sorry carotid artery that may prevent or hinder breathing reduced intake of air or impede the flow of blood or oxygen to the brain. Moving on to the next. If you could just flag that I some might argue that other restraint procedures can cause serious injury may not be death. But I know that doing certain things to the spine can call cause permanent paralysis. So we may want to I get it's been so long since I have my restraint training. I probably ought to get an update just so I know an idea about how it's done properly. But there is there is a concern about any form of restraint that it not also result in permanent bodily injury like paralysis or something in that nature. But this is good. But I want to flag that too for perhaps there'll be discussion further about that. Okay. I know that we also have the it may want to look at the suit that was filed by the Vermont Protection and Advocacy and I believe the Defender General's office regarding Woodside restraints and Judge Crawford has several rulings regarding restraint in that. Okay. Okay. So the top of page five the imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury definition is based on the totality of the circumstances when a reasonable officer in the same situation would believe that a person has the present ability, opportunity and apparent intent to immediately cause death or serious bodily injury either to the law enforcement officer or to another person. And it sort of limits that by saying it's not merely a fear of future harm, no matter how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm. But it's a threat that from appearances must be instantly confronted and addressed. So, Bryn, if I could just stop there. So, you know, we've all seen endless video of law enforcement officers, usually or almost exclusively white confronting black men. And often in court, part of the defense is that the defendant is a large person physically. And that's used sort of in the way this definition works. It says the ability, opportunity and apparent intent. So let's say an officer is six inches shorter than the person that they've that they're facing. So the argument could be made by a defense attorney for the officer that the suspect had the ability and cuffs were not on yet. So they had the opportunity. And then if they take one step toward the officer, even though their hands are empty, they have no weapons, or maybe their hands are up and they take a step toward the officer, I could see a defense attorney arguing that all three of these conditions are met in that case. If one took a kind of expansive view of them. So I'm wondering, is there any way to tighten that a little bit? I like the language that follows it a lot, because the defense is usually, well, I feared for my life. And so I was free to do anything I wanted in terms of responding to what I feared was a threat of bodily injury. But can you just talk about that for a second? To what extent does the physical size of someone and the fact that they could theoretically win a physical fight with the officer, allow the fall officer to use force under this? You know, I think that's a great question. I do think that the second sentence isn't is intended to to say that the the fear of the law enforcement officer is not what matters. It's whether or not a reasonable person in the same situation would have been threatened in a way that must be instantly confronted and addressed. And again, it does rely on the reasonable officer standard, which, which means that the officer's subjective feelings are not what is to be considered, but rather, if a reasonable person in that situation would have felt the need to use would have felt an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. But I do I do think that what your what you're raising is is an issue that that people have been grappling with. So it's really the apparent intent is the well, the actuating thing because the other two could you could claim them in many, almost all circumstances. In fact, the Rodney King incident, which I referenced before the officer's defense was that even though it was all captured on video, and even though he was restrained and even though he had been beaten many, many times, at certain points, he moved aggressively, even so, but they were off camera. And so that justified further force. This is actual California law or the law that was proposed. Oh, this is the laws that was introduced. I have I don't I think that actually this definition remain the same, but I would need to double check that. Could you and there may be some experience there, but I'm also thinking that if an officer, for example, Phil used the description of a of a large person, but what about if the person has a firearm and they're firing at the officer? That would be the totality, correct? I mean, I'm thinking of the Arlington situation where officers were confronted with a person shooting at them. Yeah, so totality of the circumstances is defined a little bit further down. Arlington, Vermont, for those that may be listening. So all facts known to the law enforcement officer at the time. And that includes the conduct of the officer and the subject leading up to the use of deadly force. So I think that's an important thing to note. It includes that the officer's conduct leading up to that use of force as well as as well. If you could check the California law, and maybe they did change that definition when they when they passed it, but yeah, I would help. Sure. So we've gone through the totality of the circumstances definition. Law enforcement officer has a pretty broad. This is how we typically define law enforcement officer when we're looking to go broad. So I'll move on to the statewide. Does that does that include game wardens, members of the Department of Motor Vehicle Force constables, everyone? I can read all I can read you the list. It includes a member of the Department of Public Safety who exercises law enforcement powers. That's Vermont State Police, a member of the Vermont State Police, a Capitol Police officer, a municipal police officer, constable who exercises law enforcement powers, a motor motor vehicle inspector, an employee of the Department of Liquor and Lottery who exercises law enforcement powers, an investigator employed by the Secretary of State, a board of medical practice investigator employed by the Department of Health, an investigator employed by the Attorney General or state's attorney, a fish and game warden, a sheriff, a deputy sheriff who exercises law enforcement power, a railroad police officer, or a police officer appointed to the University of Vermont's Department of Police Services. Thank you. Okay, so the Section B is the statewide policy that sets forth sort of some broad statements about what the statewide policy is on the use of deadly force. I'm not sure if you want me to I can go through it sort of. We can read it. I think we should change color of law. And my thinking there is it's a it's a kind of painfully ironic phrase given what we're trying to deal with. So I think it should be under the auspices of the law. Yeah, we could also use under authority of law, which is what we use elsewhere. Yeah. This is how valuable it is to have an English professor on that. Okay, I got professor of English is that the proper title? Yeah, I respond to anything at Nealtons. Thanks, good pickup. My 19. Yes, so long, this provides that law enforcement officers may use deadly force only when it's necessary in defense of human life. And in determining whether that deadly force is necessary, it directs officers to evaluate each situation in light of the particular circumstances of the case, and she'll use other available resources and techniques if reasonably necessary, or if reasonably safe and feasible to the objectively reasonable officer. And we will get more into that there. There's some more language about when it's appropriate to use deadly force in the second in subsection C, which is so subdivision three says that law enforcement has to evaluate carefully and thoroughly every time they use force in a manner of reflects the gravity of their authority and the serious consequences of the use of force by law enforcement in order to ensure that their use of force is consistent with law and agency policy. There's some grammatical trouble there in New York. Bryn, yes, it now says in order to ensure that officers use force consistent with that officers use force consistent with law and agency. Subdivision four provides that that decision to use force has to be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer in the same situation, again, saying that it's not about the subjective experience of the officer. Based on the totality of the circumstances, again, all the facts known to the officer at the time, rather than with the benefit of hindsight, and that that totality of circumstances accounts for occasions when officers may be forced to make judgments about using force. So unless there are questions there, I'll move on to the actual use for good. Could I just ask a question here? So in every other instance, we've talked about deadly force or excessive force, but starting with the section that says the decision of a law enforcement officer to use force. Have we changed the standard here? Because in everything else we use either deadly or excessive. And here we just from there on out, we just use force use of force. So under B that the statewide policy, it talks generally about use of force. The if you if you look back on page five, the authority to use physical force is a serious responsibility that should be exercised judiciously in subdivision two, then we talk about when it's appropriate to use deadly force only when necessary human life. And then three and four on page six, again, go back to just the use of force. It's I see the section is sort of saying doing some broad brush policy about when it's appropriate for law enforcement to use force generally. And then the next we get into use of deadly force. Okay, thank you. So subsection C and now I'm on page six line 14. So this sets out this sort of specific parameters about use of deadly force. One says any law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe that a person to be arrested has committed a crime may use objectively reasonable, reasonable force to affect the arrest prevent escape or overcome resistance. Again, that's sort of a general statement about when the use of force is appropriate. And then two says that a law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly force only upon sorry, but office law enforcement officers justified in using deadly force upon another person, only when the officer reasonably believes based upon the totality of the circumstances, that such force is necessary to for one of the following. Now I'm on the top of page seven. Can I stop you again? Go back to line. Let's see. Just got skipped. So if you scroll up, Peggy, scroll up a little bit, Peggy. One more scroll up, please. Thank you. Any law any law enforcement officer who has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime suggests that if an officer pulls up on a street corner and is suddenly approached by someone out of the blue who is threatening to use force upon them I'm thinking that doesn't quite fit within this description because they not necessarily have committed a crime. It's past tense. And I'm just rolling through my head. There are situations where an officer, for instance, goes into a crowd and all of a sudden is faced with some act of an individual that may be threatening to them in some fashion. And I'm trying to see how that fits within this description. I don't think it does. Joe, do you mean it should also include someone who seems imminently to be about to commit a crime? Well, I think the actual commission of a crime is not the concern. The actual threat of force upon the officer is what we are trying to address. And so, you know, you can't be dealing with this because the person has simply shoplifted or passed a $20 counterfeit bill. The actual thing we're addressing here is whether or not the officer is in a reasonable position of being harmed as interpreted by the rest of this language. So I'm well, it's dealt with elsewhere. I read this a little differently. I read it that this wasn't so concerned with force against the officer, but rather you have somebody who's committed a crime. Are you allowed to use force if they won't get into the car if they won't present their hands for handcuffs? You see what I mean? Yeah, I see what you mean. But this section is called use of deadly force. Yeah, I don't want to exclude a situation where the person is not necessarily subject to an arrest for a crime that has been committed because you're effectively saying that the law enforcement officer is prevented from using deadly force. And once I haven't gotten to another provision on this scroll down, which drives me crazy when somebody else is scrolling down for me. Joe, you can go to their committee web page and pull. Yeah, I was there for some reason or other at zeroed out on me and I don't know why. But the bottom line, Brian, for you is, is there another section under use of deadly force where the officer has the ability to repel an aggressive, potentially deadly act upon the officer? Yes, that's where that's a throughout the remainder of the section. Okay. I understand that it's a little strange saying that language right below the subsection use of deadly force since it's not talking about deadly force. Yeah, I guess I would. The first thing I would have put under this heading of use of deadly force is the officer's ability to use force when threatened with an actual aggressive action upon themselves. Then I would talk later about a crime that's been committed and what authority do they have to use deadly force in the point of trying to arrest someone? That may just be my preference on how I would list this, but Brian, let me see how it comes out and the rest of it. If I could just go back to Joe's got me thinking about whether I'm reading objectively reasonable force correctly. So as Joe notes, there have been a number of high profile cases where usually black suspects have been followed. They let's say cross the center line, don't use their blinker. Very, very technically, they have committed an offense, but then the amount of force that's used against them can escalate to deadly force. So the person is in effect being killed by an officer because of an extremely minor offense. So I read objectively reasonable force as a kind of scaled consideration. In other words, I read that to be saying you could not kill somebody who didn't use their blinker because they wouldn't get into the car and then you used force to get them into the car. And in so doing, you wound up ending their life. Can you speak to that just for a second? Well, I see that I see sort of two things in what you're talking about. One is whether the crime that was committed influences whether whether the use of force to effectuate that arrest, how that how that sort of leads an objectively reasonable person to decide how much force should be used in effectuating that arrest. Or if a person who commits a nonviolent offense, like not using their, you know, it's sort of a very minor offense, like not using a turn signal, who then resists arrest. Does that make the reasonable, objectively reasonable force necessary to effectuate that arrest? Is that change that calculus? And so I sort of see it as those those two, there are two questions there. And I'm I'm not sure that I'm the right person to answer how that should be, how that should, what the policy should be. Well, I'm, I'm, you know, I'm responding as recently as this morning on my newsfeed, there was a story about a delivery person for Amazon, an African American delivery person who parked the wrong way on the street, delivered the package and as they were getting back into the truck were tackled by police officers and arrested for parking the wrong way on the street. So speaking only for myself, by the time we're done with our work here, I hope somewhere in the draft, it will address this sort of vastly disproportionate use of force when considered against the offense for to which the officer is responding. So maybe that's not in the purview of this bill and maybe it is, but I think it is. And I mean, it's in the that is part of the calculus when determining what is reasonable force. If you look at Supreme Court case law about police use of force when they talk about a reasonable person in that situation, one of the guide posts is what was the crime that was committed. OK, maybe, maybe objectively reasonable cat gathers that in. Well, it brings up the simple question of George Floyd. Should that particular alleged defense justify the use of deadly force? And I don't know how to categorize every single crime we have and may at the end of the day have to be left to the jury to decide whether it was reasonable in the circumstances. You know, that that's an interesting this whole discussion. And I would I do plan to hear from law enforcement. But I know generally there's a policy on, you know, high speed chases on all kinds of other things that law enforcement does based upon the criminal act. So a twenty dollar counterfeit bill is much different from somebody threatening a police officer with a firearm or some other behavior that that's where I so I I hope where whatever we pass reflects that. So shall I move on to subdivision to that this is the subdivision to talks about the policy regarding the actual use when an law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly force. Yes, please. OK. So to provides again, we use this objectively reasonable standard. Only when the officer reasonably believes based on the totality of the circumstances that the force is necessary to achieve one of two objectives here. The first is a defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury either to the officer or to another person or to apprehend a fleeing person that the officer reasonably believes will commit another or will cause death or serious bodily injury to another person unless that officer immediately apprehends the person. So again, go ahead. I'm sorry. I all of these things trigger memories of videos over the last few years where the end of the video is usually a young black man being shot. And I'm thinking of several where there's a minor traffic offense. Person gets out of their car and runs and the police officer shoots them in the back as they're fleeing. So I just want to make sure so that right. I'm sorry to interrupt. No, go ahead. So subsection B, when it talks about a fleeing person, there are a couple of limitations here. The first is that the person had to have committed a felony. Officer has to reasonably have believed that the person committed a felony that threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury. So it has to be a violent. The officer has to have believed that the person committed a violent felony and that officer also has to reasonably believe that unless the person is immediately apprehended, that person will cause death or serious bodily injury to another person. OK, great. So that's two different ways as far as what I taught. Right. So the fleeing. Yeah. And go ahead. Sorry, I'm curious as to why this section comes after the previous section. This sort of to me looks like the first section you should be looking at under the heading use of force. You know, this may have just I may not have read it carefully enough. This is how it was laid out in the California version. So it's how it's laid out here. But I would just think about it around. That's a good point, Joe. But I, you know, the image I have is when the police saw the two things I wanted to mention. One is an image that we all tragedy that happened in Montpelier, during where the young man was shot and killed. He was at Montpelier High School. So there was an imminent threat, obviously to students, etc. that they saw. But on the other hand, the law enforcement wasn't aware of what type of weapon he has. So there is a shooting there. Clearly, it was a mental health issue. And the person was killed. But then one of the things that I know comes up is the investigation. And who does the investigation into these? So do we get to this later? Well, that is one of the things that in we have in the in Gov Ops around the training council and when they do investigations and how they do it. And it's been pretty clearly laid out about how that happens. And we're going to look at that to see if it can be beefed up a little bit. Well, there's a lot. I've heard a lot of concern about it being, you know, the investigation into the shooting being done by a state's attorney who, you know, I'm not demeaning in any way state's attorneys, but they have relationships with police officers. They rely on police officers for a testimony they rely on police officers for reports. They rely on police officers for charging advice and other things. And so that would be one concern I know many people have. And this is not just in Vermont. This is nationwide, where so often and even in the case in Minneapolis, where the attorney general is taken over his discussion of how it went, the investigation, he ended up taking over the investigation. And down in Georgia, with the case of Aubrey murder, where the local state's attorney recused himself and then the next state's attorney in the neighboring county recused himself and so on, the attorney general ends up with it. Just a thought. I don't know if that's a government ops thing or. So later in the bill, we do talk about conduct that would lead to an investigation by the criminal justice training council. OK. But maybe I should maybe I should let you keep walking through the bill. Well, it doesn't we don't this bill doesn't address how that investigation is undertaken by the council. So we're not we're not going there. But as Senator White mentioned, that's typically something that government operations can be worked on. Yeah. Can we get back to the bill and we've interrupted you several times for it? And they're good questions, good comments. Could you remind us where we are exactly? Sure. So we just went through that subdivision to the talks about when the use of deadly force is justified by law enforcement officers. So now I'm in subdivision three on page page seven, line seven. OK, good. Thank you. So this provides that a law enforcement officer when it's feasible prior to the use of force make reasonable efforts to identify him or herself as a law enforcement officer and to warn that they may be using deadly force unless the officer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe that the person is already aware of these facts. The following subdivision four provides that law enforcement shall not use deadly force against a person based on the danger that that person poses to themself. And then it provides a qualifier if that object if an objectively reasonable officer would believe that the person does not pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to somebody else. Is that clear? Yep. Yeah. Five provides that a law enforcement officer who makes an arrest or attempts to make an arrest does not need to retreat or desist from their efforts if the person resists or threatens to resist. Law enforcement officers shall not be deemed an aggressor or lose their right to self defense by the use of objectively reasonable force. And that objectively reasonable force is talked about in subdivision one and two. To affect that arrest or to prevent the person from escaping or to overcome resistance of the person. And then a clarification that retreat doesn't mean tactical repositioning or other de-escalation tactics. Lastly, a subdivision six. I'm on the top of page eight, line four. This is not a part of the California bill as it was proposed. This is new language. A law enforcement officer shall not use an improper restraint on a person for any reason. And law enforcement officers have a duty to intervene if they observe another officer using an improper restraint on a person. So, Bryn, very quickly. Subsection five, line 17 on page seven. Need not retreat or desist from his or her efforts by reason of the resistance or threat and resistance of the person being arrested. So, that seems to cover a lot of ground. In other words, somebody says, I don't want my car searched. You don't have the authority to make me get out of my car. What are the limitations on that first sentence? Could I ask where we are? We lost our power and I got booted out. Page seven, line 17. Thank you. So, in other words, it begins to remind me of stand your ground laws. In other words, I'm empowered not to retreat and I can move forward with the arrest, regardless of any resistance. That seems to cut against other pieces of the bill. Right. This is an interesting, this is interesting language. So the person is still bound by the other parts of the policy, meaning that objectively reasonable standards still applies to any use of force that's employed by the officer. But, you know, I think you're identifying where that objectively reasonable standard is informed by what the person has actually, what the officer believes that the person has done, what criminal activity the officer believes the person has committed. So I would say that the rest of the policy still applies. So I think that the intent of this section is to say that if a person does resist arrest, the officer may, does not have to retreat as long as they are still using objectively reasonable force in effectuating that arrest. Does it say the officer can, I mean, basically use proper restraint. Thinking of that type of thing. Yes. I mean, the, right. This section defines what it doesn't, doesn't say the officer can't use proper restraint. To arrest the person. Right. Any restraint that falls outside of that definition. I don't, I'm not sure. Then we certainly look at it more and hear from witnesses on it, but I think it. It just says you still have a right to. Detain the person to. Provide reasonable restraint as long as it follows. So. The proper. I don't think it says. I mean, I know. When somebody refuses to use proper restraint, I don't think it says. I mean, I know. When somebody refuses to allow them to search a car, they. There's been some cases on this. In Vermont where. Don't be refused to let them search the car and they have the. They get, they detain the car until they can get a search warrant. You know, There was a case out of Rutland County, I believe on that. Yeah. I understand it's trying to balance the. The rights of the officer and the rights of the accused. And this is the section where it seems we're laying out the right of the office officer to. Continue with the arrest, even if there is resistance. And I guess. You have to assume that. That's in the context of the other pieces of the bill. I just, I just. I don't know. I just, again, I'm thinking about. If I'm defending an officer in court, I might point to this sentence and say. He had no. There was no reason for him to retreat. He has the right not to retreat. And he has the right not to desist. Which means he has the right to move forward. Over any resistance. So maybe. I don't know. Is there. Yeah. I do see this language as through being drawn directly from that balance that fourth, that fourth amendment of the constitution balance in the government's interest in providing effective law enforcement. Yeah. With the interest of the person, the person's fourth amendment right now. To be free of unreasonable search and. I think. On, on line for a page eight, a law enforcement officer shall not use. An improper. Brain on a person for any reason. Clearly. While the law enforcement officer doesn't have to retreat. They shall not use an improper restraint. Right. Again, you know, as I said, that the, any force employed is the person is still, the law enforcement officer is still bound by the rest of the policy, which requires that any force that they employ has to be reasonable. Let's, let's, we're getting. Can we go on to chapter. Section five. Before you jump there, that section you just referred to. I'm looking at lines four through six on page eight. Right. I would take that second sentence and make that a number seven because it's talking about a different. Individual just for logistics purposes. Okay. Probably a good idea. Okay. That was not part of the California law. Correct. That's correct. Okay. Then we get into improper restraints on professional conduct. Right. So as I mentioned before. I'm going to talk about unprofessional conduct in the bill. Section five. The men's this sub chapter two. Of chapter 151, which governs the criminal justice training council. So you'll see a starting online 11. These are the definitions set forth about what constitutes unprofessional conduct. And I've included this category a conduct for you for, for your reference to see what category a conduct includes. No changes are made to that. But if you scroll down to page nine. You'll see the category B conduct. And that's where we've added. Some, some new. The law enforcement conduct, which is included in category B conduct. So category B conduct gross unprofessional misconduct, amounting to actions on duty or under color of authority or both. There's a word color again. Yeah. And we can, we can work with that. Then involve willful failure to comply with a state required policy or a substantial deviation from professional conduct. As defined by that law enforcement agencies. Polly policy. Or by council policy. And shall include the first change you see as online 19. Subdivision C excessive use of force under color of authority. There's that word again. I'm making a note of those places. We'll see what we can do there. So it's under existing law. This exact excessive use of force under color of authority is considered category B conduct only if it's a second offense, the law enforcement officer's second offense. So this changes it to category B conduct for, if it's a first offense of excessive use of force. And this comes from Senator White will correct me if I'm wrong. I believe it's S 124. Yes. So I'm confused here about whether we're going to put this. In here because we're, we've. Passed 124. And we're also looking at all of the. Issues around investigations and misconduct. In. So we just need to make sure we're doing the same thing. Because that's already on our agenda. Well, the thing that we're trying to do here. And we figure it out any way you want. Is make sure that a person who. Uses an improper restraint. Right. Yeah. Yeah. There's a criminal offense created in the next. Section. So this sets up that criminal offense when. Right. So this makes it unprofessional conduct to. To put a person in an improper restraint. Or not intervene when an officer, another officer is using unnecessary force. So that's why it's here, I think. And should be here. It's a. It's a. It's a. It's a. It's a. It's a. It's a. We can deal with it any way you want, Senator. No, no, no, I just thought I just was surprised to see it here since. Yeah, we're already. Looking at it. Okay. The reason, the reason I made that change here was because to make it consistent with what had already come out of your committee, Senator. I think it's a little bit different. I think it's a little bit different. I think it's a little bit different. I think it's a little bit different when we've got multiple bills moving that amend the same section of law. We try and put the same changes in. Oh, no, no, no, I, I, I get that. I just. Okay. So. Okay. Okay. Sorry. I just want to be clear there about why not. Because we are looking at the way investigations are conducted. And. So. Okay. And this is where. Add the new two, two new conducts. Law enforcement or law enforcement officer conducts that would constitute. Unprofessional conduct under category B. The first is placed in an improper restraint, which we define further down on line nine. Also subdivision G failing to intervene when the officer observes an improper restraint or using excessive force. So if you've looked down at line nine, there's the definition of improper restraint. You've seen that earlier in the bill. Use of any maneuver on a person that applies pressure to the neck, throat, windpipe, carotid artery that may prevent or hinder breathing, reduce and take a bear or impede the flow of blood or oxygen to the brain. Same definition you saw in the excessive. Unprofessional conduct under category B. The first is placed in an improper restraint. And the second is placed in an improper restraint. In the case of forest policy in the, in the last section. But you're looking at that, right? Just. For Senator Sears. We talked about. Pressure to the spine and stuff. Yeah, it sounds like maybe. Covered by the serious bodily injury. Because that the restraint. Would be improper. Could be improper. The Woodside case involved. I can't remember all the details, but I believe involved. Need of the spine or the back. That would be that was ruled by Judge Crawford improper restraint. So clearly. You already have a court ruling on that. And I want to make sure that it's not just the chokehold that we're talking about. Okay. So I've made a note that that definition may need to be expanded throughout. So. Section two 407. Chapter. This limits the council's ability to sanction an officer for a first defense of the cat of category B conduct. You'll see that first sentence existing law. The first sentence. The first sentence. The first sentence. The first sentence. The first sentence. The first sentence. Alleging law that law enforcement. Committed a first offensive category B conduct. Directs the council to take no action. So the new language here carves out that new category. Those two new categories of category B conduct. From that limitation. So the count that says specifically that the council can take action for a first defense. Of either placing a person in an improper restraint. If an officer witnesses another officer using excessive force or placing a person in proper restraint. That makes sense. Mm-hmm. Yep. So. I'm going to move on to section six now. And this is the, this is a new crime. Establishes a new crime of law enforcement use of improper restraint. Um, Starts out by some definitions. Um, These will look familiar. Law enforcement officer is defined the same way as it's defined earlier in the bill. That broad definition that I read to the committee. Um, serious bodily injury, you know, is defined already in statute improper restraint. I'll make a note that this definition may change, but this is the same definition you've seen throughout the bill. Um, It provides in subsection B that a law enforcement officer acting in the officer's capacity as law enforcement. Who employs an improper restraint on a person that causes serious bodily injury or death to the person. Shall be imprisoned for. Not more than 20 years or find not more than $50,000 or both. I, I hope we get a real good definition of. Um, But I realized that there's a qualifier there that causes serious bodily injury. Um, But I think we 20 years is. Pretty hefty. So I hope we get a really good definition of improper restraint. Thank you. Um, I did. This was. Um, Totally my responsibility. Um, to create a criminal offense. I said for the purposes of this draft. To consider that it's certainly up to the committee. Um, whether you included or not. But I thought that at least for discussion. Um, when something is so egregious as what we saw in Minneapolis. Um, that. I know he's been charged with murder and I suppose that could be, Um, I mean, I think it's a great way to, uh, I think it's a great way to, um, To, to continue to look at this. I just put it in. It's not more than 20 years. I realized that I just, um, I would. I don't know. I would like to look at whether it already would be considered a crime. Certainly if they cause death. It could be if it was. If it was considered improper, it could be a crime. Um, and, uh, so I just want to make really clear here. I'm not trying to defend them, but I want to make really clear that we know what we're talking about. I appreciate that. And I'm sure we'll hear. On testimony. On this particular section. But I want to. I accept responsibility for being here in the draft. I have a question about, um, um, the, um, the, um, the public section on body cameras. It says that body cameras shall be, um, Shall be. Uh, functioning. Um, make sure that the device is recording whenever the officer is engaged in law enforcement. So there's a, there's a law saying that it shall be done, but it doesn't make clear what happens. Uh, and I think we, we passed that law a few years ago. Is there a penalty? I don't know. There, there would be if it was, um, if it was a category A, B, or C, um, um, offense, there would be a penalty for it. It could be a sanction. It could be depending on the circumstances. It could be a decertification. Um, it depends on what category it falls into, um, it depends on what category it falls into. Um, it depends on what category it falls into. In the. Would you like a copy of the act? Uh, well, yeah, the context around the body cameras would be good. But, but I guess what I'm getting at is. We see this. You know, again and again and again, where. There's a violent incident. Bystanders say that the police used excessive force. You know, you know, if, if the penalty is basically a professional penalty, a sanction or something like that, I think an officer going into a certain situation might choose to risk that as opposed to recording themselves, committing what might be a crime. Um, so in other words, I think we have to get more serious about the offense of not being able to do that. Okay. So can I just suggest that. Can I suggest that if, if we make it. A law that they have to use it, then it will be in, it will be in the category A, B, or C. From the training council and there will be consequences and it will depend on where we put it in the category A, B, or C, but there will be consequences and being decertified is not. Um, I, I would just to slap on the hand. That means they can't ever practice as a law enforcement officer again. They may. Um, anyway, I, I just want to make sure that we don't get, um, boy out. This is a very strange thing for me to be saying, because if you had asked me this, um, in the sixties or early seventies, I would have told you you were crazy because I had very particular. I had a lot of, I had a lot of, I had a lot of, I had a lot of, I had a lot of, I had a lot of, I had a lot of, I had a lot of, I had a lot of, I had a lot of enforcement. But, um, I think we need to make sure that we don't fall into. Responding to rhetoric and what's happening elsewhere. And I, I just, um, and I know this isn't exactly. Uh, what we're talking about right now, but I did a search of all the. People who had been killed by police officers since 1977. And then, um, one of them involved aggravated domestic assault with hostages or with somebody, um, fleeing and shooting at the police. So I just want to make sure that we don't. Act in a way that, um, That seems like we're, we're, um, Responding to rhetoric and not to what's happening here. First off, whenever they're engaged in law enforcement activities, if they're sitting in the barracks filling out paperwork, that's a law enforcement activity. There are other situations that I'm thinking now of Carl Drega up in Northumberland and Stewartstown and then crossing over the border into Vermont, where he just walked in and started shooting. And does somebody have the ability to react and slap on a body camera button instead of defending themselves from the immediate threat? It's one thing to say that if they purposely toyed with or purposely did not turn on the microphone or the device when they should have, that's one thing. But I'm afraid what this is calling for is pretty wide. Well, let's, OK, we're running out of time, but I also want to point out that what you don't have in front of you is the law that was passed in, was it 2018, Bryn? I think it was 2016. 2016 on the use of body cameras. So maybe we should refresh ourselves in that bill if you could send out a copy to the committee of that law so that this I'm not suggesting that we change it. My biggest thing is every member of the Vermont Department of Public Safety who's active duty should have a body camera when they're engaged in whatever you want to call it, however you want to define it. Maybe we just refer to the law, which has all the policies of when you turn it on when you don't turn it on. And then we can talk about the consequences. But that's my big concern is we have been talking about state police having body cams for five years. I think it's time that they get them. And I believe we have the Commissioner of Public Safety will be talking with us tomorrow about it. And I believe there's a general agreement. So as long as they follow the law and we look at what the consequences are for not turning them on, that's fine. With me, we can always suggest that law, but we should at least take a look at the law that we passed in 2016. We did also in, I don't know if it was in the same bill or not, but I think maybe not. But we required any department or any law enforcement agency that is going to use body cameras or is going to use tasers to have a written policy on the use of them. So anybody out there who's already using them has to have a written policy on their use. Well, I believe there is a model policy, and then you can go beyond the model policy. But the model policy was the minimum, as I remember what we wrote on the body cameras. But I do know there's certain sections we did put in when you can use them and when you can turn them off because there were certain cases where police officers are going into a home and becomes a public record. And the concern about future break-ins to that home for valuable artwork, for example, that there was also a concern about victims of domestic violence, particularly, and that becoming a public record. So we did make some amendments there. Anyway, I think it would be great to review that. OK. Anything else on this draft? You see, the effective date is the section on the original Baruch Bill 219 is effective January 1, 2021. So it does give them time to get the reports in. And section 7 is August 1, 2020. That's the bit of go recording. And the remaining sections are effective on that. It's a good bill, Dick. It's got some tweaking to go, but it's a good bill. Thank you. I agree. You did a good job putting it all together in a short period. It certainly did. Yeah. All right. We'll see you all tomorrow morning at nine.