 The commanding general, Continental Army Command, says the foot soldier can't be replaced by anything that fissions, flies or floats. What do you think? Yes, what do you think? I'm Sergeant Stuart Queen, your host for the big picture. To broaden our perspective of the role of the infantrymen and his importance to the defense of our country, we will present something of his mission in the past and a penetrating insight into his importance today and in the foreseeable future. Army presents The Big Picture. An official report produced for the armed forces and the American people. It's certainly heard in about ten minutes. Boy, I've had it. Say, Sergeant, you take this reserve training pretty seriously, don't you? We have you men here for two weeks, so we make the best of it, see? Yeah, I see, but I don't know why we keep training with rifles and grenades and things when everybody knows that this push-button warfare is right about here. What, with hydrogen bombs, maybe even bigger bombs? What about these nuclear warheads and guided missiles? That makes holding on to a rifle seem pretty futile, doesn't it? That just proves you don't realize that the ultimate weapon in any war is the infantry. Sergeant, we know you guys slugged it out with a rifle during World War II when a rifleman counted. But a war of the future, why, the infantry will be as antique and as obsolete as the horse cavalry. You think so, huh? Yes, I do. All right then, you answer this question if you can. Supposing that war you mentioned does come along, and supposing nuclear warheads are used, then what? Then what? Well, then it's all over, isn't it? Is it? What else is there? Somebody has to go in there and secure the area. Probably end up fighting for it with rifles. Now, who do you suppose is going to do all that? Well, you mean that... Exactly. The infantry. Now, that's why they call the infantry the ultimate weapon. Hey, how about that, you guys? We are pretty important. Why, you guys are ten times more important than you ever were before. All right, now, let's suppose that nuclear war you mentioned does break out. Why, it'll happen so fast that you're not going to have years or even months to train the troops. They've got to be ready right now, trained and equipped and ready to go. Well, that's one of the main reasons for the whole reserve training program. You know, Sergeant, that does make a little sense. I just never thought of it that way. It makes a lot more than just sense. It's like having a defense insurance policy all paid up and waiting for you. Yeah, but now look, if this next war does come along, it's going to be a lot different than World War II. None of you men are old enough to remember when Pearl Harbor was hit. But I'll tell you here and now, we weren't ready for any long, tough fight. Yeah, we were pretty lucky. We were lucky we had allies to fill in the gap till we got ready. They bought time for us so we'd train the troops that were eventually needed. Well, we won, didn't we? Isn't that the important thing? We won, all right. Well, we spent a lot of time training citizen soldiers, guys just like yourself, that were needed for those final victories. And I'll tell you this, all during those years while we were getting ready, it was always touch and go. So we dug in and did the best we could. I know, I was in there from the beginning. You were in the Pacific, weren't you, Sergeant? Yeah, I was up in New Guinea. If there was ever a campaign that was fought with few soldiers with little training, it was New Guinea. I remember New Guinea from one end of it to the other. Now, one thing I always remember, we never had enough trained troops. How come? Whose fault was that? There's nobody's fault. It's just we didn't have enough reserve outfits training and ready to go when Pearl was hit. I was up in Hawaii at the time. One of the first outfits sent to Australia, then up to New Guinea. I'll never forget those days. Water and mud were the things that dominated our lives. This was New Guinea. There were months at a time when the rain fell every day until after a while we didn't even notice we were wet. We lived with it all day and vetted down in it at night. Yes, every time I see mud, I remember New Guinea. New Guinea is the second largest island in the world, situated directly north of Australia. By September 1942, the enemy had moved down from Boone to a distance 20 miles from Port Moresby. Our GIs were not yet in the battle, but the Australians were, moving up the famed and treacherous Kakota Trail from Moresby over the Owen Stanley Mountains. Native carriers were a great help. The Aussies slowly pushed the enemy back over the Kakota Trail over a terrain without roads or reason, never knowing where the enemy was concealed. The problem of supplying the Australian troops in the Owen Stanley Mountain Range, which ascends to 14,000 feet, was solved only by air. But there were no airstrips on which to land and unload the needed ammunition, food and medicines. The astonished natives watched the aircraft fly in low and drop supply containers in open fields. These Australian allies had been fighting alone in New Guinea from the start. But in the fall of 1942, we began to arrive. First at Port Moresby, where we loaded into aircraft to be airlifted over the Owen Stanley to the north coast. The Australians had taken from the enemy a short while before. It was here in this vicinity that the Yanks received their baptism of fire at Boona and San Ananda. Though each one of the troops fought well, we engaged the enemy with little equipment and soon discovered our training had not completely prepared us for the brutal battles which lay ahead. Sometimes we found ourselves with our backs to the sea when the tide of battle would suddenly change. Boona Mission and San Ananda Point, all desperate battles, fought in one by desperate troops. These first victories were secured as the new year 1943 commenced. And we had a chance to look around at the scenery. It was downright attractive if you could concentrate on it, which you couldn't because there were snipers everywhere. So we increased our patrol activities around the clock. On all roads of any consequence along the north coast of New Guinea and since the jungle grew in a stubborn tangle right down to the beaches, we started to leapfrog from shore to shore westward by small craft and rubber boats. We advanced slowly, hitting enemy concentrations where we found them. After losing Boona, the enemy loaded 15,000 troops into ships and headed for New Guinea and us. The Allied Air Forces spotted the convoy in the Bismarck Sea. We had 15,000. The Air Force was also softening up our next objective, westward from Boona, the Lae Salamawa sector. Many troops in New Guinea at this time, we did have some highly specialized ones such as the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment. The jumpers were thoroughly trained in parachute techniques. They packed and carried what they needed for combat. At the airstrip in Morsby, a parachute is loaded into aircraft for their first combat jump. The objective of the parachutist was to seize the airstrip in the Markham Valley, a few miles inland from Salamawa. A smoke screen was laid to deny the enemy observation of the drop zone. No mistake about the parachutes. They are only a means of transportation. The airstrip was seized by these infantrymen on the ground after the jump. The Australians were continuing their push westward along the north coast toward Lae and Salamawa. In 1943, the sector was secured. In December of 1943, with a few more troops, ships and planes, we staged our biggest amphibious landing today. We leaped up to the island of New Britain to secure our New Guinea victories. On the northeast coast of New Britain, the enemy had his largest base of the southwest Pacific, Raubool. We sealed off Raubool by taking the southwest sector of the island at Arawe in Cape Gloucester. It took us a year to advance 240 miles north from Buna. I had left 2,240 miles of island hopping before we reached Manila. At the rate we were going, it would take us about 10 years before we reached the capital of the Philippines. We didn't have enough trained troops to go any faster. That's why the United States was lucky to have time to train more troops. You know, I'm beginning to see what you mean when you say it is important to have trained troops ready for action when they're needed. That's right, but remember this. The few battles we had won in New Guinea by the end of 1943 were all actually won by the infantry, that ultimate weapon. Of course, the Air Force and the Navy did a great job, that's for sure. But it was always the man with the rifle that went in, took over and secured the area. Well, by 1944, troops began arriving in New Guinea, trained, equipped and ready to go. But these same troops were either green or non-existent two years before Pearl Harbor was hit. But by the beginning of 1944, they began arriving in the staging areas of New Guinea. I bet they looked pretty good. They sure did. Well, things were beginning to look a lot better all around. We weren't kidding ourselves. We still faced the toughest enemy stronghold in New Guinea. Eh, Red, we whacked in Madang, pulled a garrison armed with the teeth and waiting for us. But the brass had no attention to hitting the big enemy concentration head on. The new strategy devised a whole new concept of island fighting. We called it hit them where they ain't. It all started when we leapfrogged up to the Admiralty Islands. Now this is the way it works. First, the Air Corps clobbered the enemy airstrip on Los Negros, a small island in the Admiralty's. The Admiralty's is composed of the large island of Manus and many smaller islands such as Los Negros. We needed the Admiralty's to deny the enemy air bases from which to strike at our advance westward along the coast of New Guinea. But we couldn't be certain of the enemy's strength, so before the decision was made to invade Los Negros, we flew in a squad of Alamo scouts to reconnoiter and report back. These specially trained troops landed, looked around and returned to New Guinea, unobserved by the enemy. The disposition of the enemy was reported as unorganized and inadequately prepared. The Air Force and Navy were sent in to soften up Los Negros for invasion. Our reconnaissance and force was convoyed to the Admiralty's. This reinforced battalion won assured to seize the Los Negros airstrip with a commander in chief on hand to observe the operation. With the airstrip and our possession, we advanced our own air bases to extend our bomber range and to provide fighter cover for further operations. But the battle wasn't over yet. More troops and artillery were needed to overcome the enemy resistance. The success in the Admiralty's created new opportunities. The Supreme Commander's, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, met to plan new strategy. It was decided not to invade Wewack and Medang. Instead, we would leapfrog 800 miles to Itapi in a Hellandia, bypassing the enemy strongholds. We kept the enemy guessing about our next move as we continued airstrikes against all of those bases. It would be the big prize with three enemy airstrikes. By April 1944, we were ready for Itapi and Hellandia. Early morning in April 1944, we invaded Itapi. At the same time Itapi was invaded, we hit Hellandia from two sides. Tama Hammera Bay and Humboldt Bay. Both approaches led inland to Lake Santanee for the airstrikes lay. Starting from the landing beaches, the terrain rose steeply and the loose wet underfooting made the ascent hazardous. We managed to get our Amtrak up in inland to the lake. These armed water tactics were a welcome sight after climbing the jungle encrusted slopes up to the lake. And we rode for a change to the enemy positions. But what small pockets of resistance we did find were quickly overcome. The rest of the enemy fled to the hills. We surveyed our prize, the three airstrikes littered with enemy aircraft which would never again attack us. This Hellandia operation was a classic example of the new strategy. Bypass the enemy strongholds and hit them where they ain't. We had bypassed the huge enemy naval, air and army bases and we whacked and medained. We kept moving fast. We leapfrogged up to Arara. Then secured a small island offshore and placed our artillery and commenced firing at Wakti Island. Wakti is a small island and after the relatively easy success of Hellandia we half expected a push over here. But we were wrong. There was no room to maneuver. We hugged the narrow strip of beach but the enemy dug in solid coral fortified and looking down our throats. Yes, again, our objective was another airstrip. To deny the enemy its use and to provide our air force with an advanced base from which to extend our bomber and fighter range. Even before the fighting was over, our combat engineers were getting the strip in shape for our fighter aircraft. Twelve days after we hit Wakti, another task force hit Biak, a larger and more strongly fortified island. Of the troops hitting the beaches at Biak, many were now veterans of amphibious warfare. But many more were getting their first combat experience. The Biak campaign was to become one of the most difficult in the battle for New Guinea. On Biak, we had paid a heavy price. It was a necessary price. But nevertheless, we were sobered by the number of gallant Americans we had to leave behind. Wherever we were, there was also our ever-present companion, Rain, keeping us in a wet and soggy embrace. From a staging area at Moffin Bay, another task force started out for Sanzipore on the westernmost tip of New Guinea. Receding the landing, the air force and navy worked the area over. Sanzipore turned out to be one of those unexpected surprises. We were prepared for a rugged fight with the enemy, what there was left of them, just melted away into the jungle. And we grabbed the airstrip without too much trouble. So here we were at Sanzipore. We had sealed up New Guinea, trapping an estimated 150,000 enemy troops with no chance of escape. They could either surrender or starve. New Guinea was ours. We took Sanzipore two years and eight months after Pearl Harbor. By that time, more troops, trained, equipped, and many of them combat veterans were available and loaded for the next big operation, Leite in the Philippines. And that's the way it went, uphill all the way. And I mean uphill, because we didn't until 1944 have enough trained troops in New Guinea. Ah, it's true we did alright in the final phase of the New Guinea scrape, but we could have done better. We don't want any more battles like New Guinea. That's all behind us now. I see what you mean. I hope you do, because that's exactly why we have you men here training now. To be ready just in case anyone does blow the whistle. Well, I don't mean just for nuclear wars, but any brush fire conflict that may come along. Like Korea? That's right. This reserve training program shows any aggressor that we mean business. And that's exactly why we mean business during your two weeks here. Okay, here comes the truck. Let's go. I'm the double. Hey, Sarge. Hey, Adams, how you doing? Not bad. Now, you know, after two weeks of reserve training, well, I feel pretty good. There are more ways than one, I bet. How do you mean? Well, you got a couple of weeks of training under your belt. And? Well, I think you understand your role as an infantryman better now, right? Yeah, I know. I'm the ultimate weapon. That's right. If you don't think the Army feels that way, look over there. Hey, let's take a look. Statue in your honor, you and all the other infantrymen, past or present, were the ultimate weapon in any war. A big picture is an official report for the armed forces and the American people. Produced by the Army Pictorial Center. Presented by the Department of the Army in cooperation with this station.