 We spoke about, Anders mentioned the presidency of the European Union, next year is also the year where Japan will host the G7 and of course pandemics have been very high on the G7 agenda for the last few years. So maybe Aruka, can I turn to you now? Thank you. Okay, yes. Hi, hello everyone. Thank you very much for giving me this opportunity today. So today I would like to talk about more like the security perspective for the global health, especially for the medical countermeasures. So the COVID-19 pandemic is now nearly three years and then its social economic impact has been so significant that it would have become clear that public health crisis like the global pandemic would lead to a national security. So while so-called non-pharmaceutical interventions are of course essential, the game changes are likely to be vaccine diagnostics and therapeutics, the so-called medical countermeasures or MCM. At the same time, the political global security risk of medical countermeasures became clear again. So in general, when considering the value chain of MCMs, the flow can be divided into the three part, the upstream, midstream and downstream part. The upstream part is a surveillance or intelligence function, which is to quickly grasp the information in the event of some infectious disease outbreak. The midstream corresponds to actual research and development, and the final downstream part involves clinical trials, regulatory approval, manufacturing, procurement and allocation of the MCMs. The important point is that such an MCM value chain cannot be completed in a single country. In the past, the semiconductor industry has shifted from a vertically integrated model in which a single major company was responsible for the entire value chain to a horizontal division of labor. Similarly, the pharmaceutical industry is also shifting from a vertically integrated model to a horizontal division of labor in which each process is divided into separate companies and organizations. The horizontal division of labor was also the mainstream in the vaccine production during the COVID-19, and then this type of production structure will continue to be the mainstream for rapid vaccine R&D in the future. At the same time, it is quite important how to establish and diversify a value chain system that can't be completed among like-minded companies. As I said previously, that MCM value chain cannot be completed in any one country. In particular, since access to the vaccine isn't marked as that directly affects the lives of its own citizens, it is very important security matter for any country and geopolitical risks should be reduced as much as possible when securing MCMs for their own citizens. So for example, currently it's a low material for all kinds of medicines that are mainly dependent on China and India. In other words, it is presently quite challenging to complete in any pharmaceutical value chain without China and India. It will become more important to complete a diversified supply chain, taking into account the cost and the environment impact. Also, in addition to the security perspective, in the case of a pandemic on the scale of COVID-19, there is an issue of how to prepare the capacity to manufacture vaccines for the entire population on the global scale. Another production of COVID-19 vaccines took place outside of western countries, mainly in India, Africa and the Asian countries. Without the manufacturing capacity of these countries, it would not have been possible to rapidly manufacture and distribute as many vaccines worldwide as it did for COVID-19. And technological transfer is critical during the global pandemic. On the other hand, technological transfer to low-income countries is not always easy, mainly due to the intellectual property rights. In the past, even if western countries developed new pharmaceuticals, the transfer of technology to low- and middle-income countries was limited because they had been a strong stance for protection of intellectual property rights, and then there was an absolute gap in access to pharmaceuticals between high-income and low- and middle-income countries. This time of COVID-19, China has re-returned the power structure. They actively provided the COVID-19 vaccine to countries that traditionally would not have had access to western medicine due to price issues by offering home-grown vaccines at a lower price and actively transfer technologies. So in the field of pharmaceuticals, which is a major industry for many countries, there is a desire to continue to protect the industries with intellectual property rights, but there also moves to restrain rulemaking by China and the sphere. So how 200 IP and technology transfer, especially in times of emergency, will continue to be an important issue to be considered. So in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a trend toward shifting coordination body from the global level. So the status of each region was already introduced by the other panelists, but in the earlier pandemic control, including R&D for new medical countermeasures, is expected to be controlled jointly at the regional level. So regarding the regional level, but it should be noted here that in Asia, where Japan is located, it is a complicated region to establish a single regional body. So for example, the WHO has a six-regional office, but Asia is an only region where the WHO has a two-regional office because of the historical and political reasons. Also, Asia includes larger countries in terms of population size and economies, such as Japan, China, Korea, Australia, and India, as well as in smaller countries with smaller populations, such as in island nations. So while we generally have the coordination by the regional body or at the regional level, how to unite Asia in terms of the pandemic control will be a major issue in the future. So the G7 presidency in the UK focused on R&D for the medical countermeasures, and the Germany G7 focused on the intelligence and human resource for pandemic preparedness. So the G7 in Japan, which will start soon, is expected to focus on the growth of health governance, including the promotion of regional bodies and pharmaceutical R&D and innovations based on the discussion in the UK and Germany, although the full agenda is not yet known. The G7 summit will be held in Hiroshima, and the G7 Health Minister's meeting will be in Nagasaki. For cities, experience in the public health crisis is a different sense than infectious diseases, namely, the health hazards caused by the atomic bombs and the post-sursymbol cities of the peace. So I hope that the Japanese government will actively lead the discussion in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the cities of the peace, on how we should confront the global health challenges, amid increasing challenges that continue to threaten our lives based on our lessons from the COVID-19. Thank you very much for your attention. Thank you. Thank you very much, Haruka, for these perspectives and also giving us already a flavor of the forthcoming G7.