 Thank you very much for that introduction. It's an honor to be here. I'm very glad that you invited me. And as he mentioned, I am working in economic sociology. Before I came to the Stockholm School of Economics, I was at the sociology department at Lund University. So I'll talk a little bit about what I'm doing, what I've done previously, and what I'm doing right now, and what I plan on doing in the future. And the main theme of my research is climate policy in a financialized world. And the main question I'm trying to answer is, how do we change the industrial system in a financial world? Because in order to move to a low-carbon economy, we have to change the industrial system. But that gets more difficult. The more financialized our economy has become. And this basic idea is based upon combining Joseph Schimpeter with Keynes and Schimpeter's student, Minsky. And as you probably know, Schimpeter had this theory of creative destruction that capitalism moves in an evolutionary way through competition between incumbents and challengers. And the challengers, they unseat the incumbents and they change the industrial system this way. And according to Schimpeter, finance is needed in order for these newcomers to enter the scene because they don't have any money to start with. So they need to base their revolution, so to speak, on borrowed money. But then Keynes and Minsky pointed out that although finance is needed for innovation, it finance may decouple from the industrial system. And it may become completely self-serving instead of serving industrial change. And as Minsky pointed out, innovation within the financial sphere itself will cost this kind of decoupling. So there's a tension there that makes it a bit more difficult than what Schimpeter imagined, I think. And there are many ways to demonstrate that financialization is going on. But this is one chart that I found from Josh Mason at the Roosevelt Institute. And this chart shows how borrowing has decoupled from investment. So it used to be that firms borrowed money to invest. But somewhere around the early 80s, you can see that this link was severed. And now companies, they borrow money, but they don't invest. They instead pay it out to their shareholders, which is what he found in different ways through stock buybacks and things like that. And this makes industrial change more difficult. Yeah, this is what I talked about before, that innovations are financed by borrowed money and the money markets are the headquarters of capitalism. The money markets decide which new innovations get to be developed. And financiers are needed to enable entrepreneurs to engage in creative destruction. And this kind of dynamic where new entrepreneurs borrow money and invest and then unseat the incumbents. This causes capitalism to oscillate between inflation. And then there's a lot of inflation when people borrow money and they build these new industries, sort of like the tech boom, for instance. And then when there's a boom and then it's followed by a bust, which causes deflation. But according to Schimpeter, it always leads to industrial change. There's no, it's hard to explain why the Great Depression occurs with only using Schimpeter's theories. And this is because he used a full employment model of the economy that he inherited from Leon Valras and the earlier neoclassical economics. So there are no purely financial unproductive investments. And then, of course, Keynes realized that it is possible for resources to be unemployed, that not all resources are always unemployed in changing the industrial system. Because by hoarding money, you can leave resources unemployed in the economy. And there are always two price levels in the economy. There are capital goods and financial assets. And if you can make more money speculating on financial assets, then capitalists will choose that path. And this means that we can have prolonged periods of economic stagnation where the industrial system doesn't change at all. And the institutional structure of the financial system determines whether people will borrow money and invest in new innovations or whether they will speculate with the money instead. So to summarize my theoretical framework, it's an economic framework based on Schimpeter, Keynes, and Minsky, and all of them view capitalism as a monetary and evolutionary system, and then coupled with economic sociology to account for factors like social construction, embeddedness, power, and institutions. I will explain a little bit more about this later on. First, I'll just talk about how I investigated this question empirically. This is how the theory can be put to use on different levels. So I investigated, how do we change the industrial system to engineer a low-carbon transition? So I looked at cases where we might see a beginning of such a transition, so the development of low-carbon technologies like solar energy, for instance. So I looked at Japan and the US and how solar energy developed in these two originator nations between 1973, the oil crisis, and 2005. And that's because these were the first two biggest producers of solar cells. And in the beginning of this period, after the oil crisis, the US was the major producer, and the US was also the place where the solar cell was invented originally. But then, eventually, Japan overtook the US. So what I wanted to explain with my dissertation was why did this shift occur. And so I looked at a whole bunch of different factors. My starting point, you could say, was kind of a state-centered view, where I compared the Japanese industrial policy bureaucracy, which is very famous, to the Department of Energy. And the Ministry for International Trade and Industry which is called METI, was responsible for developing solar energy in Japan. And it was a very famous book by Charles Johnson about METI and the Japanese miracle. And he kind of explains the Japanese miracle by looking at this economic bureaucracy engineering industrial change. And so that seemed like a very good starting point that in Japan, you had this great model of developmental state that could develop this technology. In the US, you had the Department of Energy, which was very politically contested. And it was created by Carter in 1977. And then Reagan wanted to dismantle the whole thing. And he didn't quite do that, but he kind of dismantled a lot of the solar programs. So that is one way of looking at this difference between the two countries. Yes. And as Charles Johnson writes, in the 1970s, Americans began to experiment with industrial policy bureaucracies, such as the Department of Energy. But they are still rather wary of such organizations whose prestige remains low. I also looked at comparative capitalism. You can have sort of a varieties of capitalism framework to study this issue, where differences between Japanese and American firms and the financial system and things like that might explain this difference. Alliance capitalism is what Michael Gerlach calls the Japanese system, where firms are interconnected tightly and they invest for the long term, instead of in the US, where it's more fluid and short term. And but my main focus that I developed later in the article that you talked about was this transformation of corporate control, where in the US, in the late 1960s, corporations became financial conglomerates. And then in the 1980s, these financial conglomerates were broken up in the corporate takeover wave. And since these large corporations were the ones investing in solar energy, this transition really played a crucial part in undermining the prospects of American solar energy. That's what I found. And also in Japan, there was a very, after the war, there was a very, there was an economic purge that kind of got rid of their rentiers, or the old Zaibatsu who made money on speculation and things like that. And the new ruling class was kind of more of industrialists that were focused on industrialization. And also the financial system was consciously based upon Schimpeter's principles, is what I found in this very interesting book called Capital as Will and Imagination, Schimpeter's Guide to the Post-War Japanese Miracle. So that kind of led me to develop the theory that I have in my latest article. And I divided up into nine theoretical propositions, which the editor or one of the reviewers recommended, which was probably a good idea to kind of get some structure in there. And this is where a lot of the economic sociology comes in. So the first proposition is that innovation is uncertain. And there's no way of knowing beforehand what an innovation will yield. So therefore, you need to base your investments on some kind of vision of the future. You kind of have to have a fictional view of where this is going. And this is a new book by the economic sociologist, Jen Speckert, who writes about this thing, that you need to imagine a future in order to invest. There's no way to rationally calculate what an innovation will yield. And so entrepreneurs and financiers, they need to have a shared vision. And this vision is socially constructed between them. And to do this, they need to work closely together. So they need cooperation. And what sociologists call embeddedness, they need to work tightly together. And another social aspect of investment is that it has signaling effects. So others will look at your investment and base their investment decisions upon that. If they see a lot of others doing similar investments, they think, oh, we better get in on this. Or if they see others avoiding this area, they want to stay out of it. So that contributes to the boom and bust nature of capitalism. And number four, financial flows are shaped by power configurations between incumbent and challenger firms. And this also means that financial entities don't want to lend money to small firms that have very powerful competition. And this undermines the Schumpeterian creative destruction. And this also means that infant industries need protection. There's an old classic argument that in the very early phase, small firms developing new technology need to have some kind of protection for market forces, either by states or by large firms. And in the case of the American solar industry, you could say that there was both. There was both the state policy and also large corporations that gave them a sheltered home. Number six, and this is what Minsky wrote about, that finance and production have different logics driving them apart. And this is the sociologist Jeffrey Ingham who writes that it is a definitive characteristic of capitalism that all property, including raw materials, money capital and physical capital, has a dual character as a means of production and as a marketable financial asset. And this means that even corporations themselves are financial assets. You can speculate on their stock price, or their stock price can, boosting the stock price by financial engineering can take precedence over investing for the long term. And the balance between what you may call financial and production capital shapes the strategy of the firm. So is it shareholders who control the firm or is it managers who control the firms and which kind of group is in control of the firm? There are also different kinds of shareholder control. You can have very engaged shareholders and you can have arms length control. And this also affects the relation between management and labor. So you need to have a little bit of a Marxian perspective as well. And of course, both the managers and shareholders are both capitalists. So they have an interest in working together. But at the same time, managers and labor have similar interest in that they are both long term invested and they are tied down whereas financial capitalists fluid and can shift. So different alliances are possible between these groups. And in Japan, you could say that labor and management were more of an alliance than in the US where more of finance came to dominate or the shareholders came to dominate. And these tensions that are inherent in this process are governed by different institutional arrangements in different countries. So this is where the varieties of capitalism perspective comes in. And these are also past dependent. So once you've arrived upon an institutional arrangement, it kind of tends to reproduce itself at least for a while until it becomes undermined by something else. So all of these propositions can be used to study industrial change and development of low-carbon industries in particular. And this is what I used to study the US and Japan. How much time do I have left? Is it? Oh, you're going to probably. Am I? Yeah. Yeah, this is what I mentioned that production capital and financial capital are, production capital is fixed as is labor and financial capital is fluid. I can move around. So then I can talk a little bit about what I found in the study. And American solar was first used in the space program. So the early stage was state financed by NASA, you could say. And then there was a small group of entrepreneurs who wanted to bring this technology down to Earth. And after the oil crisis, they kind of received attention from the state and others. And there were two visions dominating the industry in the early era. There was this small-scale vision that the entrepreneurs favored because they didn't have a lot of money. So what they focused on was bringing it slowly up to scale, starting in the off-grid markets and then moving slowly to more mainstream markets. And then there was a large-scale vision which was favored by the energy bureaucracy and by the large corporations and the utilities. And they wanted centralized energy generation. They wanted this technology to be used in the grid as nuclear power or coal. And this shaped the strategy for developing the technology. They wanted to really quickly bring it up to mass production scale. And arguably before, the technology was really ready for that kind of rapid scale-up. And this, I think, undermined the potential of the solar industry from the very beginning because this large-scale vision was, of course, the one that won out in the end. And as I mentioned, the financial conglomerates, which was the form that most American corporations took at this time, they were formed in the merger wave in the late 60s. And their strategy was to be involved in all kinds of markets so they would invest into other businesses sort of like a stock portfolio. They would have a lot of different divisions governed from the central headquarters. And if it was going well, they would keep it. If it wasn't, they would get rid of it. So they weren't really invested for the long term. There wasn't really any technological reason that they invested in solar, many of these companies. It was just they wanted to place a bet on that technology if it would become mainstream. As I said, yeah, investment in solar, a risky bet was motivated by a potentially massive return if it went mainstream. They aimed for the big picture of centralized energy generation. And this meant that the small entrepreneurs had a hard time attaining finance. There was a lot of venture capitalists that were kind of speculating in on whether they should fund them, but ultimately none of them ever did. What I found because of these large corporations were in competition with them. And this resulted in that the large corporations bought up most of the small independent firms by the late 70s. And so by the late 70s, solar energy in the US was concentrated among these large conglomerates. And then what happened was the whole takeover wave of the 1980s where these financial conglomerates were dismantled. And this meant that corporations had to get rid of their divisions that weren't part of their core competence. And they also had to defend themselves against corporate raiders. So they sold off their divisions, they took on a lot of debt, and they used the debt to buy back their own stock to push up their stock price in order to defend themselves against takeover. So this kind of turmoil really harmed the solar industry in the US. And in contrast with Japan, where cross-shareholding between firms, they held each other's share, so this kind of hostile takeovers wasn't possible in Japan. There was no market for corporate control, as it was called. And they had a shampaterian notion of competition where they sought to maximize long-term market share instead of short-term profit. And the reason that Japan eventually overtook the US in solar was one of the main reasons was that in the 1970s, they had already conquered a lot of the semiconductor and electronics markets, and these firms were then investing in solar because semiconductors and solar are very closely related, so it's very easy to move from one to the other. And then they integrated solar cells with consumer electronics, like calculators and watches and things like that. So they kind of took this small step strategy where they slowly moved into these really small consumer electronics markets, and then eventually they moved up to the residential solar markets and then centralized energy production later on. So yeah, financialization changed corporate governance and organization in the US, first by conglomeration, which was financialization from the inside, and then deconglomeration in the 80s were just where the companies were financialized or were hit by financialization from the outside by corporate raiders and financial markets. So this process imputed the American solar PV industry, which became concentrated among a few large conglomers which then were broken up. This did not happen in Japan where corporations were insulated from financialization. Yes, this is pretty much the same thing. And according to the sociologist Greta Krippner, the ultimate underlying cause behind financialization is what she calls the difficult world, depoliticization, which is that you move decision-making from overt political control to kind of technocratic or market control. So instead of rationing credit between different groups, you say let markets decide and they will ration credit. Although of course, since banks can, since they don't ration a finite amount of money, but that money is actually created when they extend credit, this means that there is no such thing as markets rationing credit. It will just lead to a credit expansion. So financial deregulation was one of the results of depoliticization and also changing macroeconomic policy to the central bank, which was also harmed the solar industry because of the extremely high interest rates of the late 70s and early 80s. Relaxing antitrust policy, and this also led these large conglomerates buy up the small independent firms and also refraining from proactive industrial policy. There was a little bit of that under Carter, even though his industrial policy favored this large-scale strategy, which I find flawed. But then under Reagan, he kind of went back to having the Department of Energy only correcting market failures by investing in R&D and no commercialization efforts. And this is where most advanced economies are today. You could say more or less they are financialized and they have limits to fiscal and industrial policy. These are kind of out of the political discourse, out of the Overton window. And you have monetary policy deciding macroeconomic policy instead of fiscal policy. So how do we change the industrial system under these very constrained conditions? And this is my new project that I'm working on together with a colleague at the Oslo Business School, which could be called QE for the climate or quantitative easing for the climate. There's a lot of people have suggested that monetary policy should be aligned with the goal of transitioning to a low-carbon society. But they focus mostly on financing green infrastructure and building out solar panels and wind turbines and smart grids and things. But our proposal focuses on the next generation of clean technology. Or actually it addresses the problem that in order to roll out renewable energy, there's a lot of innovation that has to take place still because there's still intermittency problems. So these two go hand in hand. And what's pictured here is a new MIT report that says that venture capital is the wrong model for clean tech. The venture capital industry doesn't work for clean tech because there is too much competition by established firms and there are too few exit opportunities for venture capitalists because in the computer industry or in pharmaceuticals, it's easy to exit either through an IPO or through a large corporation buying up the startup. But this, for various reasons, this is not the case in energy markets. So what we propose in this new article that I would appreciate some feedback on is that we would have a committee of technical experts that decided certain criteria for venture capital or for startup firms that they have to pass, they have to have some efficiency standards or some kind of technical criteria. And when they reach that, they are eligible for being bought by the central bank. So the central bank will buy equity in these startups and by doing so, they will provide an exit opportunity for venture capitalists. And this means that by knowing that the central bank ultimately might buy this firm or buy equity in this firm, if it's successful, it will induce a lot of investment. That's the idea. And since central banks are already involved in buying equities of major corporations, a lot of them in totally unsustainable industries. This is not actually a very far-fetched step from where we are today with unconventional monetary policy. And that's one of the upsides that it's building on structures that are already in place. And another upside is that it would insulate climate policy from political cycles. You may have heard that Trump now wants to withdraw from the Paris Agreement and by placing a responsibility for climate policy within an independent central bank, this would kind of avoid that kind of problem. Yeah, it fits perfectly with the idea of an independent central bank tied to the mast of long-term public interest against the siren song of short-term politics, which was the argument that they used to get independent central banks in the first place to set monetary policy. But if monetary policy should be independent, then I think climate policy is, the case is even stronger for climate policy because it requires a lot longer timeframe to work for the public good when it comes to climate policy. Downsides of this proposal is that it might be difficult to put on the political agenda and it will only be as good as the committee deciding which equities to buy. So there's a risk for insider trading and things like that that you would have to work out. But in many countries, this expertise is available. In the US, you have ARP by E, which is the Department of Energy's Advanced Research Department. There's a lot of technical experts that could be put in this committee to decide which startups passed their tests. And as I said, central bank policy is already unconventional as it is and it's very opaque. Nobody really knows how they buy, how they choose to buy which equities, which of course is part of the plan because they want to avoid insider trading and they want to keep it opaque for a reason. But I mean, it's already infused with politics and special interests and rating agencies have a lot of power in deciding which equities will be bought. So by tying the central bank's financial asset purchasing programs to the Paris Agreement, we could make it more democratic and more in line with the democratically agreed upon Paris Agreement. It's what we argue. And I'll end on some future projects that I'm thinking about working on that might be interesting to some of you. So one is to write about the developmental states and solar energy in China because after Japan, China became the giant in solar energy. And there's a lot of debate about the state's role in that and I'm thinking about writing an overview article of what the state did and didn't do in this case and how it fits in with previous developmental states in Japan and Korea, Taiwan. And I also plan on studying the Swedish solar industry which is very, very small but there's a lot of advanced research going on in Swedish laboratories but it doesn't really translate into businesses. So I want to kind of study why that is and if there is anything you can do policy-wise to kind of change that to make Swedish solar an export product because that's our greatest hope of reducing emissions is not by reducing our own emissions within Sweden because we're a small country which uses nuclear and hydro but by exporting new technology we could have a bigger impact worldwide. So that's what I plan on doing in the future. Thank you for listening. Thank you very much. I wanted to ask if there's any questions from people in the room and also did we have anyone online? No questions yet. No questions yet online. So anyone in the room? I saw two simultaneous hands but Lukas. All right, there you go. Thanks, very interesting. I had, yeah, let's start with two quite general questions because this is sort of a new field to me but financialization. I was just wondering, I mean, what's the basic driver? It's basically, you get a higher return if you make financial speculations rather than invest in real production. You had some terms up there. So I was wondering what's the latest on the discussion on Tobin tax, for example, like increasing the cost of financial transaction and would that reduce financialization? Would there be some kind of effect? Yes, I guess that's the idea behind the Tobin tax that it would reduce short-term speculation and I'm no expert on it but I would guess that it would be a good idea maybe to make things more long-term focused instead of short-term. So yeah, it would probably be a good idea. The problem is if it will be instituted, I guess there are some resistance to it. The reason I must say, I mean, it was on the agenda still as a kind of utopian option, I think, when climate finance was starting to be discussed. So I was just wondering where the debate has gone since then but maybe the second very general question is you said something about, you know, political control versus market control and also something about dysfunctional credit that it doesn't really, the market doesn't select where to target its credit but it just expands overall. But I was just, if you could connect this to Swedish climate policy now, what can you see is the effect of setting a goal? I mean, the new way of doing politics not necessarily designing regulations but just setting a goal aspiration is the market gonna, yeah, exactly, so do you think is the market gonna respond and how? I mean, I guess it's a good thing to set a goal and I guess that does induce confidence in that there will be a shift and I guess it will shape investment flows but without anything more specific than just saying we will reduce emissions. It's, I think we need something a bit more specific. I think it's better to set a target for certain sectors maybe or certain industries but I'm no expert on Swedish climate policy and that's why I plan to do this study of the Swedish solar industry to see if there is any way to make this particular sector more competitive and can we expand this sector faster with some kind of industrial policy or innovation policy or something like that. But it's, yeah, I can't really speculate too much on other sectors besides that. Yes, thanks, I mean, fantastic topic in general, I think. And I found very interesting the proposition of saying monetary policy, we have agreed that that should be independent from our big political processes be partisan if you want and you could argue that climate policy should be similar so let's set up something in the same direction that's quite intriguing. But going back to more the role of the central banks, one element that I would like to ask you about is my understanding is one of their key reasons to be is financial stability and hence they have a target inflation. I mean, that's what most of our central banks actually work for, whether it's right or not. That's what they claim they do. So I'm just wondering, when you start putting things like and I've asked myself the same question, you could have quantitative easing, you're doing that, do that at the same time as you're trying to green the system, right? But in your implications of supporting venture capitalism, basically supporting what ultimately we would like it to be a disruption of the system. So then logically the two things start becoming a bit opposing in my mind. We are trying to have an institution whose role is to have stability over time actually to play a role of a disruptor. Now somewhere in there, something is not adding up but I don't know the mechanics of how they work, right? But even just at the mandate level, that would be quite complex to pass conceptually. That's kind of the question and comment. Yes, most central banks or some central banks have only one mandate, which is inflation or price stability, the ECB for instance. Other central banks have a dual mandate that they should promote employment. And some argue that they should promote economic growth and some also argue that they should promote financial stability, which that is not actually part of their mandate, but it might get there because they're wary of fueling asset bubbles. And about price stability, I think they've failed to reach their target for some time. Some of them now maybe are reaching 2% inflation but it's pretty clear that they have failed on that their own terms. And if this, if by supporting new ventures, new industries, economic growth, that would lead to full employment and then inflation beyond that. So they would help them reach their goal. I mean, if they're undershooting inflation this could help them reach 2%. So I guess it's not impossible to square this with their existing mandates. It could be just an additional mandate. They don't have to change their other mandates which are pretty good price stability and employment. And then about financial instability. Since most of the economic growth in the advanced world has been driven by credit bubbles recently and arguably now in Sweden we have very high economic growth but we also have a huge debt load for the private sector. By instead investing in something real, a new production then it would help switch over from an asset speculating based economy to a more new industrial economy although the industrialization will be not as polluting as the one we've had before. So, but I agree with your point that a someone who should be a glanter of stability promoting disruption is a bit paradoxical maybe. But at the same time, nothing will be more disruptive than climate change. So if we can somehow stave off the worst consequences of climate change then that would promote stability I guess. It's probably also the time left for the stability is it a short term meet the long term stability? Yes, exactly. It all depends on which timeframe to use. But I mean if you want to reduce emissions 40 years in the future you have to start now because that's how long the CO2 will remain in the atmosphere. So we've got question on line but also Aaron, before that one came up I think. I was very quick anyway. I'm just wondering the role that you're imagining for the central banks, how similar is it to the role that for instance, export credit agencies play now? I'm given, I mean not in the same economy they're supporting exports obviously or an investment in another country. Export credit agencies that are providing sort of some of the missing finance for, it could be brown industries, it could be green industries but it's usually tied to a condition that some of the, if you take the case of a coal mines or some of the maintenance operation will be done by a Swedish company. If it's the Swedish Export Credit Agency providing funding but as an agency sort of set up with public funds to in that case promote the exports of the host country and at the same time, some kind of development outcome in another country. Yes. It might be getting quite far from on the model you had in mind but it just struck me as you were talking that there's something there. So you're saying that you could also have an export import bank that would have the same mandate and some people have suggested that you should have a state development banks that have these green agendas but the reason that we're focusing on the central bank is that in countries like China or Brazil and Korea you can have these, the state development banks, they have a powerful role to play so that might be the right vehicle in those countries but in Western economies, central banks is where the real power is and if you compare the power of the ECB with the power of the European investment bank, it's uncomparable. So the central bank would be at the very top of the financial structure. So that's why we focus on that. Addis writes, what implications do you see for the future of solar technology? For example, now we see that in some places, for example, India, solar energy is more cost efficient than coal. If we assume that prices will continue to fall, do we need to manage the markets? Okay, that's a good and difficult question. Yes, prices are falling very fast and in places like India, they are out competing coal but there's still the problem of the fact that the sun, you can only use it when the sun is shining and otherwise you have to store the energy or you have to transport it on a smart grid. So I think there's still a lot of innovation needed for it really to kind of come into the mainstream and that's what we try to address with this proposal. But yeah, countries like India and China are really the ones that are accelerating the development of solar these days and I guess that will be the first countries where it will go mainstream probably but it's hard for me to speculate really but it's been developing really fast but it has to develop faster still I think and there are a lot of difficult issues that have to be solved before it can replace fossil fuels would be my answer. So I'm gonna ask one question myself and then we can wrap up and is it true you can stay after? Okay, so if anybody wants to talk about what we might do potential for collaboration and so on so Max will be here and some of us will be talking but my question is this. So in one of our initiatives, one of the projects is looking at finance along supply chains and so my question there is in addition to labor capital management, there's also I see an increasing power struggle between the buying company and suppliers along the supply chain and I just wonder if there's something from the economic sociology perspective that might shed some light on power relations across the supply chain. Okay, that's an interesting topic. I guess there is. I haven't studied it myself in detail. I know there's when I read a lot about Japan there was this debate about the large Japanese companies and their small satellite suppliers and there was a lot of debate about what the relationship really is between these two if they're hostile or if they are collaborative and if these small suppliers are exploited by the large companies because I mean they can drive a pretty hard bargain with them and they can force them to take on excess employees and stuff like that. But so I guess in the Japanese case there's a lot to read. The book that was up on the Alliance capitalism could be a good source. But outside of that context I really haven't read too much about it but there are quite a few at MISM working on supply chain management but I'm not sure that they have much of a power perspective to be honest but it's definitely an interesting topic. There's quite a fascinating book on the global coffee sector that on the global political economy analysis the formation of the International Coffee Organization and how it came into being that producers and suppliers decided to sit together and create an organization that would regulate production price, effectively helping to set prices in the market. So it's a great book that talks about its formation and then its demise and the different political conditions in the producer countries and in the buyer countries that in the 70s and 80s allowed it to actually ferment and then again dissipate nearly 90s. What was the book called? It's... I'll check it out for you. It's called... Yeah, it's... I'll have to look it up. Yeah. All right, well thank you very much. Any other questions? No? Okay, then let's thank the speaker. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Yeah, thanks. Cool stuff. I hope I wasn't...