 Hello everybody. My name is Bryce Wakefield and I am the National Executive Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Welcome. Tonight is a very special night for us. It is of course our first, at least partially live event since the COVID crisis and it's the first event where we're engaging or re-engaging perhaps in the Northern Territory. So for our friends in the Northern Territory who have joined us tonight, let me quickly introduce the AWIA as an organization. We've been around for almost 100 years. We were founded in 1924. We have a presence in every state and territory capital in Australia. We're an independent, not-for-profit organization that believes in the value of public discussion of international affairs. And to do this we provide forums around the country for discussion and debate for those interested in doing so. To put it simply, we want Australians to know, understand and engage more in international affairs. And we're absolutely delighted to extend the service that we provide to the Northern Territory. And in order to kick things off there, I'm going to pass things over to our new Northern Territory Manager, Abbey Rajkumar. Abbey, can we unmute her please? Abbey, could you stand a little closer to the microphone? We're having trouble hearing it. Okay, sorry about the volume for those of you who are watching at home or wherever. And it is of course an absolute pleasure to have our very special guest here. Kevin Rudd was of course the 26th Prime Minister of Australia and he really needs no introduction, but I'm going to give him one anyway because of course he deserves it. He was born and raised in Country Queensland. Before entering into politics, he was a diplomat with postings in Stockholm and Beijing. He's a fluent speaker of Chinese. After resigning from politics, he was a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy Schools Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs. He's also held positions at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a prestigious think tank in Washington DC. He's held positions at the University of Chicago, Chatham House in London, and he's currently the President of the Asia Society Policy Institute, which is of course a think tank of the Asia Society. He's going to be speaking on the topic of facing north, the territories, global opportunities and current challenges. And I ask him to take the floor as it were to do so. Thank you very much, Mr Rudd. Well, good. Thank you very much, Bryce. And thank you very much, Abby. Please wave if I'm coming through clearly to you all. Okay, Luke Gosling, you didn't wave. I assume I'm not coming through clearly. Hello and the response, but nonetheless, finally accurate. Let me begin by acknowledging the first Australians whose land we meet on and whose cultures we celebrate as the oldest continuing cultures in human history. And I would also acknowledge my friends and colleagues from the Federal Parliament, Luke Gosling, the local member, as well as I understand joining us in the webinar is Warren Snowden. Both have been great advocates for the territory's future. And also representatives of the NT government. And I would acknowledge the efforts which Chief Minister Gunner has made in advancing of the territory's progress. Let me begin by saying that is a good thing indeed that you have decided to establish a Northern Territory chapter for the AWA. As Bryce indicated before, the Australian Institute of International Affairs is a venerable Australian institution. And its long standing mission statement going back to the days after the First World War was to encourage Australians to understand that we did not exist in some isolated domain in the distant South Seas, but that we were integrally affected by the affairs of the region and the world. And the AWA has been a continuing institution whose mission statement has been to take that beyond the rarefied environment of the professional foreign policy establishment and to engage all Australians and all intelligent Australians into the decisions we have to face about our nation's future in Asia and our future in the world at large. So for our good friends in the Northern Territory to welcome 100 years on the AWA's operations in the territory is long overdue. It's a great thing that it's happened and I wish you every success in the future. And I would encourage the government of the Chief Minister to continue its active engagement and support with the AWA's operations. Let me spend just a few minutes talking about what's happening in our wider region and the world. And then secondly, where I believe the territory has a role to play. And I make these remarks as someone who is not some fair with a friend of the territory as both Luke and Warren will demonstrate and attest. During our period in office, we have been strong supporters of the territory's economic development and strong supporters of social investment and infrastructure investment in the territory as well. When I think of the Royal Darwin Hospital, when I think of standing in Darwin and laying out the first installations of the National Broadband Network. And when I think of the road networks that we have built and upgraded and as well as medical facilities and Palmerston and the rest, it brings back to me many recent memories of our longstanding investment in the territory's future. And we have done that for a particular reason and the strategic reason for it is the territory in history and into the future is Australia's gateway to Asia. That is not a statement of political pap. It is a statement of simple strategic reality. And the those of you with a mind for history. It is the bombing of Darwin in 1941 1942, which brought that strategic reality home to all Australians. And that reality hasn't changed in the intervening 75 to 80 years. Darwin and the territory has loomed large in Australia's long term strategic planning. And therefore, in the mind of all sensible and intelligent Australian governments, having a viable Northern Territory economy linked with the infrastructure of the nation is essential to the territory performing its historic national security role for the Commonwealth of Australia at large. If we turn to the region at large, you know, as well as those who are professional analysts of international relations that we are now in a period of unprecedented great power competition. The unfolding dynamics of the US-China relationship have a profound impact on our region's future and on our country's future and therefore on the territory's future. It was with a mind to these unfolding developments that I was proud to be part of the government, which negotiated with the United States to bring about the additional positioning and basing of US Marines in the territory and the enhancement of our national defense infrastructure in the territory as well. And since then that relationship has grown. And as we look to the future, and given the shadows which are increasingly being drawn across the US-China relationship, the strategic significance of Darwin will become more and more acute. That is simply a reality. Secondly, however, beyond the US-China relationship and our alliance obligations to the United States, there is the critical role which Darwin plays in our separate engagement with the countries of Southeast Asia, principally the Indonesian Republic, but that has never forget our good friends in East Timor and Timor-Lest, as well as our good friends in Singapore. But I wish to highlight in particular the importance of the Indonesia relationship. Indonesia is a vast country. Everyone in the territory knows that. Its economic potential is slowly but surely being realized, most recently at the government of President Widodo. And prior to that, under President Bambangirayana. And what we see emerging in the Indonesian Republic in this vast country of hundreds of millions of people to our immediate north is a country driven by a vibrant middle class, a country which of course like Australia suffers from the current challenges of COVID-19. But a country which is not going to leave or depart from its immediate geographic proximity from our country Australia. And that's where Darwin continues to play such a critical role. The economic opportunities which the Northern Territory has at its disposal in terms of the unfolding economic phenomenon that is Indonesia is something from which the Territory can be advantaged and be advantaged fundamentally. The medical facilities at Royal Darwin, the education facilities which were alive, not just at Charles Darwin University but also in Darwin TAFE. The broader investment opportunities which present themselves in Darwin for investors out of Indonesia. This is a critical relationship for Australia's future where Darwin very much represents the frontline. And I would encourage therefore our friends in the Territory to very much take that relationship seriously into the future. Sometimes governments in Canberra lose focus on the centrality of the Indonesia relationship. We never did, but what I'm saying is whether federal governments do or don't, the ongoing mission statement of governments of the Northern Territory has to keep the relationship with the government in Jakarta front and centre. I noticed that Chief Minister Gunnar has made it his business to meet with President Widodo. I would encourage that contact into the future and I would encourage a broad based political and economic engagement between the Territory government and all branches of the Indonesian government, but most critically the business community. And so therefore when we look to the long term future of Australia's strategic environment, could I draw these two threads together? The US, China, Australia dynamic and separately the economic dynamic between Australia, Indonesia and the Territory as well. These I think form the foundation stones for what should be a continuing high level strategic discourse in Darwin and through the AWIA about the Territory's future. One third dimension is this. None of this will work unless we continue to have economic dynamism in the Territory. And part of that dynamism will lie in ensuring that we have long term secure sources of renewable energy in the Territory as well. And that's why I would strongly support the Territory government's efforts to secure long term renewable energy projects in the Northern Territory. In particular its plans for large scale solar in the Territory. The Territory is a land of vast area, but also of brilliant sunshine and given recent developments in terms of solar energy storage overcoming the challenges which lie in making the final links to the national transmission system. I believe will place the Territory in an excellent position in the future in terms of secure sources of clean energy supply. So I commend the Territory government for taking bold steps in that direction. So therefore if we draw these threads together, the China challenge, economic opportunities in Indonesia and securing the energy base of the Territory long term. These are critical and fundamental pillars for the future. For the Australian Defence Force, as Luke Gosling well knows through his own military experience. Ensuring that we have a long term credible Australian defence strategy and a long term credible Australian defence infrastructure plan. And therefore the long term development of RAF based Tindall, RAF based Darwin, the port of Darwin, as well as our military resources at our military base at Robertson. All these are critical pillars into the for the future as well. The Australian government has recently announced its further plans for long term defence expenditure in Australia. In part I have been supportive of that strategy. In part I've been critical of some of the things which have not been done so far in the six to seven years that the current government has been in office. I point particularly at what is yet to unfold in terms of the practical realisation of the additional units in Australia's submarine force for the future. But for the Northern Territory and for the Australian nation at large, unless the territory is front and centre in the future manifestation of Australia's national defence strategy, then the nation will be poorly served. Therefore for the Army, for the Air Force both in RAF based Darwin and at Tindall and also for our naval facilities. It is critical that the territory form a central part of the layout of Australia's future defence infrastructure. I would hazard a personal observation as well. I was part of the cabinet which drew up the 2009 Australian defence white paper. It's the white paper which outlined the expansion of the Australian surface fleet by one third and the doubling of the Australian submarine fleet. It's also the defence white paper which confirmed the acquisition of Australia's two helicopter carriers. My own judgement given the deteriorating strategic circumstances of our wider region is that we should look not just to having fleet base east operating out of Sydney. We should not just have fleet base west operating out of HMAS Stirling off Perth. We should also look to developing fleet base north operating out of Darwin for the long term future as well. So that given our multiple strategic contingencies as a Royal Australian Navy and as an Australian defence force writ large, we see ourselves as operating out of three fleet centres for the future. I remember as Prime Minister engaging in some difficulty with the Navy establishment in Australia for suggesting that fleet base east be moved from Sydney to Townsville. I've not changed my personal view on that at all, not least because steaming time between Townsville and the island countries of the south-west Pacific is several days shorter. If your exit point is Townsville as opposed to your exit point being Sydney. But of course some of our Navy friends prefer to be in Sydney than in Townsville and I'll leave that discussion for another day. But I do take the defence of Australia seriously. I take the defence of northern Australia seriously. And the truth is our areas of direct military importance are the south-west Pacific, are the archipelagic waters to our north just off Darwin. As they are the waters of the north-eastern Indian Ocean. And in my own strategic judgment that makes it essential that we operate from three fleet base centres, one of which in the future should be Darwin, where you are. And so therefore for the future, I would strongly recommend that in the deliberations of the AWA, the Northern Territory Government, the Australian Defence Force and whoever constitutes the future government of Australia. That not only do we look at the further enhancement of our existing base structure in the territory, but that we fully upgrade the port of Darwin to becoming fleet base north for the operations for the future of the Royal Australian Navy. To that pillar I would then add again what I've said already in terms of the essential importance of enhancing the territory's economic engagement with the Republic of Indonesia. Not forgetting Singapore and not forgetting Timor-Lest. And what I said before about the general economic strategy for the development of the Northern Territory's critical economic infrastructure led by energy and the renewable energy projects which the territory government has under consideration at present. So to my friends and colleagues in the territory, knowing me you have a continuing friend, supporter, advocate both nationally and internationally. I've always enjoyed my times in the territory. I regard Territorians as a bit like Queenslanders with manners. That was a joke Luke. Perhaps we are simply of kindred spirit. And we've always had a view that the best decisions in Australia are not all made in Canberra. They're actually made in centres beyond Canberra. And the further north you go, my experiences, the more practical people tend to become. I'll leave my comments there. Back to you, Bryce. And I look forward to answering any questions which those participating in this webinar may wish to raise. Over to you, Bryce. Thank you so much, Mr Rudd. And we're actually going to go to our Northern Territory friends. Abby, are you there? Yes, I am. Just going to make sure. Can you hear me? Yes, we can. Perfect. Does anyone have a question in the room? Yeah. Okay. You might need to come up. Yes, you will need to come up. Now, just before we do that, for those of you watching at home or in your office or wherever, of course, you can type your question into the Q&A and I will read it out for you. So you can prepare your question now while you're listening to the Q&A in Darwin. Before COVID hit and, you know, a couple of years ago, there was real understanding that Australia, as far as international affairs, was somehow in the balance with security with the US and trade with China. And there was a question of whose side we go to in a time of challenge. And taking the current events internationally into account, do you think it's obvious now that Australia has sided with the US? Well, the historical wisdom of success of Australian governments is not to land Australia in some final binary choice. That was the attitude of my government. And I believe it was probably the attitude of the Abbott government. It was probably the attitude at least initially of the Turnbull government. And the reason why is that on the US-China dynamic, we're not, we're not Robinson Crusoe. You listen to the debate in this country, you seem to think we're the only country in the world which has an economic relationship which is significant with China and a security relationship with the United States. I don't know which of you have recently visited Japan, but Japan has number one economic relationship with China and last time I looked still has a defence treaty with the United States. When I look at the Republic of Korea, it has a number one economic relationship with China and a security relationship with the United States. When I look at our European friends, Germany, number one economic relationship with China and a NATO partner of the United States. When I look at the UK and I look at France. So sometimes when I hear this debate conducted in Australia, a product of perhaps the parochial nature of the debate, I seem to think that we are some unique phenomenon. Well, that's just nonsense. Secondly, go to Japan. Japan has a much more acute security tension with China, not just because of the historical tensions arising from the Second World War and the issues left over from the war, but it has an ongoing security, an ongoing territorial dispute with China as well in the East China Sea. And so not only is there a bilateral security treaty with the United States, not only is there a profound economic relationship with China, not only is there this historical animosity proceeding from the events of the Second World War and back to that to the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, you have this live set of security issues in the East China Sea. And guess what? The government in Tokyo seems to conduct the relationship with China without daily history on its public history on its. My therefore, I do not for the moment, diminish how difficult the bilateral relationship between Australia and China can be. When I was in office, we had many challenges. I was often criticized for either being too hard or too soft, depending on the issue and depending on the constituency. Those structural tensions are still alive. But what I'm saying is we don't have to turn every day's controversy into a public shouting match. The business of diplomacy is about how you conduct complex and difficult relationships. And other countries have been doing that. Now, that's my second point. Thirdly, on the question of the alliance with the United States, as the Prime Minister, who began the negotiations with Washington, which resulted in the pivot, which resulted in the additional marine deployments to Darwin and the Northern Territory, I'm no shrinking violet on the question of our alliance with the United States. And the track record demonstrates that. In my earlier remarks, I also referred to the 2009 Defence White Paper, which pointed directly at China's additional activities in the South China Sea. And as a consequence, announced the increase of the Australian surface fleet by one third and the doubling of the submarine fleet. So I'm no shrinking violet on these questions. However, on the pragmatic day to day conduct of the relationship, I do believe that when we choose to conduct our relationship with Beijing on the assumption that there should be a public shouting match every second day, I'm not sure that's the most productive way in which to proceed. So therefore, to go back to the question which was asked, I do not believe that we should talk ourselves into making binary choices between Washington and Beijing every second day. I don't believe that's in our national interests. I don't believe it's consistent with Australia's long-term alliance commitments to the United States. And nor do I diminish our alliance obligations to the United States. I believe what's required is the same sort of balance strategy that we see in Tokyo, in Seoul, in various European capitals as well. I'll leave my comments there. Back to you, Bryce. Great. Thank you very much. We do have a number of questions along a similar line, but on that point, Nick asks about the recent defense strategic update. And in particular, he asks about the language in the update of holding of adversarial forces and their infrastructure at risk. And he's asking about how you think that might be perceived in Asia, the messaging around that. In a similar light, I guess, we've got a lot of questions about tensions in the South China Sea and what the Northern Territory's role in that would be and what you think of the recent announcement by Australia that China's expansive maritime claims are illegal. Well, there's a bundle of questions contained in that, Bryce. Let me go to the overall question of, I don't know why Bryce has left the screen. I haven't even given the answer yet. I presume that wasn't a strategic walkout by the AWIA, but I'm sure he'll be returning fairly soon. He's back. Well done. Let me try and go to the question of how you frame defense policy documents. In defense policy documents like foreign policy white papers, defense policy white papers, these are what is known in the business as declaratory statements of policy intention. They're important. They frame a debate domestically. They frame a debate internationally. More importantly, they're about providing the public rationale in Australia for the future force structure of the Australian Defence Force. That's why we have white papers. I gave an example before. Back in 2009, way before it was fashionable, I might add, we said there's a change in the Australian strategic environment and we pointed to what was unfolding in the South China Sea back there. And as a consequence, we said to the Australian people, we are going to have to invest in a significant expansion of Navy. That's what we said. We said a whole bunch of other things as well, by the way, on the cyber security and the establishment of the Australian Cyber Security Centre in Canberra, which the current Australian government seems to convey the impression that it was uniquely a product of its own wisdom. It wasn't, it actually was established by us. And because we identified early changes in the cyber domain, which were problematic for Australia's circumstances as well. However, here is the overall point I wish to make. Outlining clearly our alliance obligations in the United States, outlining clearly what we identify as being aggregate changes in our strategic environment and outlining clearly what changes that should result in in terms of overall force structure is one thing. Providing what I describe as unnecessary granular detail about operational considerations is something else. No other government in the world gets into the business of, shall we say, parading the operational detail of what it would choose to do in given defence scenarios. I believe there is an important threshold to be observed here, which is to keep confidential those things which should probably be kept confidential about how Australia would engage operationally under given scenarios into the future. And there's a reason for that. One is you don't want to telegraph your punches. And secondly, you don't want to unnecessarily aggravate your neighbours, your immediate neighbours by the public language that you engage in. So I've always seen a great wisdom in lying in being clear in your declaratory strategy on the one hand to the extent that that is necessary to justify the continued allocation of large scale public resources. And on top of that, you don't want any changes to those resource allocations in the force structure. But secondly, being deeply prudent about what you then outline in terms of specific operational scenarios and what that may mean for various of our friends and neighbours. So I'm cautious, therefore, and always have been about what you insert into the latter. The second point I'd make is the recent Defence Force update is this. It is easy in strategic and defence policy documents at a political level to sound hairy chested. But my challenge, for example, with the most recent Defence Force statement by the current Australian government is this. I announced the doubling of our submarine fleet 11 years ago. We haven't laid down the keel on a single boat yet. It is very easy to sound hairy chested about this stuff. But the unfolding of the Australian submarine project has been deeply flawed. I don't make a particular, you know, negative commentary on the government of France or on the French contractor or that. I simply make an aggregate judgement that I don't see boats being built at this stage. That is defence policy incompetence seven years down the track. My third point would be about the South China Sea, which was specifically raised. And I make this as a broader foreign policy observation. The redefinition recently by the United States, Secretary of State, illuminated further by the Assistant Secretary of State East Asia on America's position on China's maritime claims in the South China Sea. Not its territorial claims, its maritime claims is a deeply significant development. It changes previous US policy. Previously, the United States had been studiously neutral on the question of the contending claims of the various claimant states of which there are five or six across the South China Sea. By the United States changing its posture, it is also foreshadowing a changing posture in terms of the operation of its own defence assets within that region. Of all the difficult scenarios which we can outline in terms of US-China relations for the future, scenarios arising out of Hong Kong and the new Hong Kong national security law, scenarios arising out of the East China Sea and the application of the US-Japan defence treaty to territorial claims there. Of all the scenarios we could outline, emerging out of Taiwan and the application of the Taiwan Relations Act, it is the South China Sea, which in my judgment, and the judgment of other strategic analysts, which represents the greatest volatility, the greatest single volatility in the US-China relationship. There is no reason for it. There are no rules for the road. Zero. We are in a jungle. We are in a maritime jungle. And whereas agreements have been reached on the management of incidents at sea and in the air during the time of the Obama administration and memorandums of understanding agreed for memory in 2014-2015, I've got to say that the increased tempo of the US activity in the South China Sea, the increase in Chinese activity in the South China Sea means that on a quantitative basis there is more metal flying around the place than we have seen before, either in terms of ships and aircraft. There is therefore in my judgment an increasing probability as each day passes all of an incident, by which I mean a collision. And when a collision occurs, we are therefore in an environment where we are either faced with the politics of a decision to escalate or de-escalate. The last time we had a physical collision was in 2001 in the early days of the Bush administration when the EP-3 landed in an emergency on Hainan Island after the crash of a Chinese aircraft following a mid-air collision. That was managed down by both sides at the time. That was 19 years ago. The political dynamics of the US-China relationship have turned around fundamentally since then. The politics and diplomacy of the relationship have now been stripped bare. It is a very raw relationship today. If an incident occurs again of that type, I am therefore deeply concerned about the likelihood of escalation. Given the politics of where we are now, domestically in the United States and domestically in terms of PRC politics as well. Therefore, we should be proceeding very cautiously as Australia on this question at this deeply volatile time. I am not saying not to honour our alliance obligations. I would never say that as someone throughout his public policy career has been one of the biggest defenders of the US alliance. I am just saying right now we should be proceeding very cautiously indeed. All right. Thank you very much. We will now hand things over to Abby again to take a question from the floor in Darwin. I think we've got this mic working again. Was anyone else got a question from the floor? It's got to be mine. If not, then I think we'll come back to our live question. Can you mute Abby, please? So there's a question here from Heath McNichol who is the branch president of our ACT branch. He says, hi, Kevin. Good day, Heath. Heath and I joined the Department of Foreign Affairs together. Oh, wow. Great. Yeah, that's right. Good day, Heath. I hope you're not drinking as much now as you used to back then. Okay. He says, or he asks, your government injected much needed funds towards Asian language learning in Australia. Do you think the Northern Territory's long-standing priority on Indonesian language learning in schools be made or should be made a national education goal? And if I could perhaps broaden that out and ask about your impression of the current state of education on Asia and Australia. Yeah, at a time when, let's call it, our strategic neighborhood is becoming more relevant to Australia's national interest day by day, not just China, Japan relationship. Relationship with Southeast Asia, in particular Indonesia. It, for me, is a source of growing despair that we are observing, declining Asian language competency in Australia rather than increasing, at least on the part of, let's call it, European Australians. Sure, we have large numbers of the Chinese-Australian diaspora in Australia. We have a smaller number of the Japanese-Australian diaspora, much smaller, and there is a good, goodly-sized Indonesian-Australian diaspora. But at a time when our economic interests with just those three countries, China, Japan, and Indonesia, are front and centre. And where our strategic interests in those three countries are front and centre, I genuinely despair at the fact that this ball has been comprehensively dropped by the current Australian government. On the specific question of Bahasa Indonesia, which Heath has raised, can I just say that if the other state governments of Australia are not going to run with the ball, and that's a rugby league term in the territory, I know it's against the rules in AFL, but unless you bounce it in that strange way that you do up there, if the other governments of Australia and the federal government are not going to run with the ball in Indonesian language training, then you guys in the territory must for the Australian national interest. If you can generate hundreds of Indonesian language graduates each year through the territory school system, you'll be doing the nation an enormous service long-term. Turn yourselves into the absolute fulcrum of Bahasa Indonesia language training so that you're producing perfectly bilingual school graduates of whatever the ethnic background the kid happens to be, to serve the nation. You'll also fundamentally strengthen the business links that we were talking about earlier in our discussion this evening, but you'll also be providing enormous assets in terms of the Australian political class in the future as well and our wider engagement, not just with the national government in Jakarta, but also right across provincial Indonesia as well, right across Java, right across Sumatra, right across NTT province, which is just up the road for you guys. Every time I've been to NTT province, either to Kupeng in West Timor or to Dili in East Timor, obviously sovereign country these days, but other parts of Indonesian archipelago, Darwin is your natural point of entry to regional Indonesia, and once we're through this COVID reality, it will return that way. So if I could simply say to our friends in the territory government, in the Territory Chamber of Commerce, in the Charles Darwin University, in the Territory Education Department, get backing out of Canberra to turn yourselves into the locus of Indonesian language expertise for the nation. You guys get it. A lot of the rest of the country doesn't. If the ball's been dropped in Canberra, run with the ball up there. Great. Well, I can see you guys in the Northern Territory in Darwin, so if you do have a question, please do wave at me, and I'll turn to you. At the moment, though, yes, we do have a question. It's Ned Kelly up the back there. I don't need to. It's just a long beard, like Ned Kelly. Oh, it's not. Hi, Kevin. This is Naza. You might remember me. I have a question going back. Yeah, good. Thanks. Your beard looks pretty good too, by the way. I stuck it on this morning to make myself look more intellectual. I have a question going back to your point about linguistic discipline in handling the Australia's bilateral relationship with China. This is something Senator Wong, Shadow of Foreign Affairs Minister, insists on and has done for quite a while. In fact, she's called and Labour's called repeatedly for DFATs to come up to the Hill and brief all parliamentarians, all senators on the intricacies of the relationship with China in order to provide a level sort of playing field and understanding of the fact that it is extremely delicate. The government has consistently refused. But my question is to the role of the media in this because Chinese diplomats, when they demolish Australian diplomats or when they come up to talk to politicians during a bilateral incident, will always have this talking point that the Australian side should correct incorrect perceptions. It's your role as Australian officials to tell the media what the right point of view is. So that's something which always comes up. And secondly, in terms of the media's role, the journalistic coverage of these tensions often delves into yellow journalism. So very black and white, polarising and inflammatory rhetoric, which the back benches who have an interest in being hairy-chested and beating their chest play into. So my question is how do we handle the aspect that we have a free media, which is part of our democratic system that plays into these tensions? Yeah, well, thanks, mate, for the question. Let me reflect on that for a moment. I think the first reality is that our Chinese friends have been their own worst enemies in terms of their wolf warrior diplomacy. I'm saying something here, which I've said directly to Chinese friends and colleagues. And whether it's the Chinese ambassador in Canberra, the Chinese ambassador United Kingdom, Chinese ambassador. In Germany, France, I could give you, you know, half a dozen examples. The briefing sheet out of Beijing these days is basically soccer to them as opposed to what I describe as the Dale Carnegie School of International Diplomacy, which is how you go about winning friends and influencing people. And I think that's in part a reflection of changing politics in Beijing and the reassertion of the role of the party and the centrality of Chinese foreign policy determination, whereby the score sheet for Chinese diplomats abroad is how many times you whack your host government for having an incorrect position, as opposed to how you go about effectively explaining the Chinese government position on issue X and how you go about, as it were, arguing to Beijing how China from time to time is going to need to change its own posture on questions in order to maximize the effectiveness of its own international relations. The reason I say that is that I'm old enough to have remembered when Chinese diplomacy was exactly the reverse. And the Chinese diplomats actually saw their job as winning friends and influencing people and not maximizing differences with the rest of the world in their public language. So our Chinese diplomatic representatives in many countries around the world, in my judgment, are doing a disservice to their own country. But they're doing so under clear direction of a new set of priorities within Beijing, which are about asserting China's definition of its core interests in Xinjiang, in Tibet, in Taiwan, in Hong Kong, in the South China Sea, in the East China Sea, et cetera, and defining anyone who has a contrary view as having an incorrect position. Secondly, in a seminar recently, actually hosted by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which was entitled where I spoke together with the Chinese Foreign Minister and Henry Kizinger. The title of the seminar was Towards a New Correct Understanding of U.S.-China Relations. And so I began by saying, I love the Chinese word correct. 正确 is the Chinese word for correct. It's a particularly Marxist concept. You either have a correct understanding of history or an incorrect understanding of history. That's a bit like what I describe as secular Roman Catholicism. You have a correct view of theological orthodoxy or an incorrect view of theological orthodoxy. Well, I've always had a slightly more heterodox view of both. I've grown up as a good Roman Catholic lad. And that is, as I said to our Chinese friends, how about we use the word sustainable future for U.S.-China relations, as opposed to correct. Because let me tell you, a Marxist definition of a correct U.S.-China relationship is never going to fly in Washington. It won't fly in Canberra. It will never fly in Tokyo. I'm not sure it will fly in many other countries either. So there is a problem with the language which is used as well in the formal articulation of Chinese foreign policy positions. And it's a product of a, as I said, a Marxist worldview, a Marxist-Wilton shun on how they see these things. Certainly, on our side of the equation, I'm disappointed that DFAT is not being allowed to brief members of parliament. I mean, for God's sake, the Australian government should be relaxed about informing at least the Joint Intelligence Committee of the parliament. Certainly, I would think the Foreign Affairs Committee of the parliament and other relevant groupings of MPs on basic information, the unfolding dynamics of the relationship. It creates a common information base for members to engage. I suspect that part of the reason, I mean, I know DFAT well enough that professionally they would be more than relaxed in doing so. I presume the political reason for not doing so is that part of the agenda, which I see often alive in the current Australian government's handling of the Australia-China relationship, is an underlying political agenda which is to define themselves as hard line on China and the Australian Labor Party as soft line or a softer line on China. Or, shall I say, in more maximal articulation, their position, the Australian Labor Party, they would wish to define as a bunch of appeasers of China. Well, the history doesn't bear that out. Look at what my government did on the China relationship, for which I was then attacked by both Abbott and Turnbull as being an old coal warrior, for God's sake. So the history actually doesn't bear this out at all. But I think that has been an element in the dynamic of the current, shall I say, government's approach to the China relationship domestically within Australia, which is to tone it into not just a binary of RU for China or for the United States, but a binary in Australian politics that the Liberal Party has your best interest at stake on China and the Labor Party or a pack of lefty appeasing peaceniks. And looking at Luke Gosling in the front row there as someone who has worn the uniform, the Australian Defense Force, I actually don't see it in those terms. But I think that's part of the complex reality we're dealing with. My appeal to the Australian government would be, for God's sake, the Australian Labor Party has led Australia during the First World War and the Second World War and the First Gulf War. And for God's sake, we've been in the business of building up the Australian military at various points in our history when we've judged it to be necessary given the evolving nature of our national security circumstances. So let's have a faired income debate about the best way to prosecute our national interests given the real challenge that China represents and given, therefore, the sophisticated set of national security, foreign policy and international development assistance policy responses which that required in the field. And speaking of that last point, I will just add one footnote. It is a disgrace the disinvestment engaged in by this Australian government in our international aid relationships in the South Pacific in the period between 2013 when we left office and until about 2018. The so-called quote Pacific step-up by the Australian government in terms of its aid relationships with the 13 states of the Pacific Island foreign countries as of 2020 has restored the bilateral aid relationship with the South Pacific only now to the nominal level that we had when we left office in 2013. It has taken that long to recover the aid delivery level over the last seven years having cut it in half in the 2014 budget. So, Bryce, before I become utterly partisan in this, you better take another question. I will indeed, but I'm not sure where it will lead actually. This one from your extensive discussion of China there in the beginning of that answer, we're going to go to the United States. There's a question here from Tony Caledine who doesn't actually state it outright but asks essentially about the Trump administration. And he's asking whether you think that the United States may go back to a more constructive relationship after the 2020 election and the presumption of his question, I suppose, is that Biden wins that election. Do you see ties improving between China and the United States or has that ship already sailed as it were? I think fundamentally that ship has sailed. You have to observe closely, for example, the debates in the United States Congress on the U.S.-China trade war and most riskily on the Hong Kong question in the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of the U.S. Congress 2019 and the Hong Kong Autonomy Act of 2020 passed and adopted by the Congress nine days ago. Virtually all of these debates are now bipartisan. The numbers in the Congress, both the House and the Senate for the passage of both the Hong Kong bills was virtually unanimous. Therefore, what I see emerging in the U.S. body politic is a bipartisan view that Xi Jinping's China has fundamentally changed. Therefore, the age of strategic engagement quote-unquote has passed, that the new age of strategic competition has now begun and that there is now a real debate about the form that that competitive relationship will now take under a new Biden administration as opposed to a continuing Trump administration. So the fundamentals of the ship to use your analogy, Bryce has indeed sailed. Secondly, therefore, my judgment, given I run an American think tank, I'm normally in New York, I'm not here in the People's Republic of Queensland and my job is to work with congressmen and senators and U.S. diplomats current and serving, current and previous and prospective, is that an incoming Democrat administration under President Biden would be hard line on China, deeply hard line. Remember, the pivot to Asia and the deployment of Marines to the Northern Territory occurred under not just an Australian Labour government, but U.S. Democrat administration. That was pre-Xi Jinping. So we need to bear that in mind in terms of what will happen with a new Biden, a new Democrat administration, particularly involving President Biden, who is vice president within that Obama administration. So it'll be hard line. Thirdly, I think what the Democrat administration will seek to do is to evolve a doctrine which I describe as managed strategic competition as opposed to chaotic strategic competition, which is what we've got at the moment, depending on the presidential mood swing of the day. Sometimes Obama, sorry, sometimes Trump describes Xi Jinping as his best friend. Sometimes he describes China as a government dealing effectively with the COVID crisis at home and abroad. And on other days, you see precisely the reverse language emanating from the White House. And this is a highly volatile, shall we say, period in the U.S.-China relationship because the presidential temperament has been volatile. The underpinnings of Republican strategy have been hard line. Look at the U.S. National Security Strategy on China mandated from the end of 2017. But the execution of it has been all over the place because the president episodically intervenes, either positively or negatively, to pour oil on the flames or else to douse the flames of the relationship, depending on the period that we're talking about. So what I see under Biden is a hard line strategy emerging, but one which is likely to be executed on a much more consistent basis, comprehensively across the administration. But with this caveat, in areas of strategic cooperation necessary globally on climate change, pandemic management, and perhaps global financial management, that the Biden administration will elect to cooperate with Beijing. Bilaterally, it's going to be, however, a very hard relationship. U.S. alliances will be repaired around the world. U.S. will cease to be absent from the institutions of multilateral governance from which the Trump administration has withdrawn itself, whether it's the WTO, the WHO, the Human Rights Commission, or Council in Geneva. But the fundamentals will remain a brice hard line. That ship has sailed. Thank you very much. We are over time, but I'll just quickly ask Darwin to speak to us. Is there anyone there who would like to have a final word perhaps? Thank you, Bryce. As you can all see, for everyone who's tuning in and everyone who's here today, we're incredibly lucky to have our federal member for Solomon, Luke Gosling, throwing us today. I'd just like to acknowledge that Luke's been an incredibly huge supporter of the A, W, I, and T starting out, and I will get him to say a few words and to say thank you. Thank you, Abby, and first I want to thank you for taking on this great challenge of setting up the NT chapter of the A, W, I, A. Bryce, I want to thank you, and if you could pass on to your board. Thank you very much for having us on board. We are going to make a great contribution into the future towards the organisation and encourage everyone here to please sign up and talk to your friends. This isn't a partisan organisation, so talk to your friends from every political stripe because the more diversity we have in this discussion, the better it will be for us to understand where different organisations are coming from, whether they be government or non-government, and also we're all after the Australian interests. Finally, I want to thank our guest speaker, Kevin Rudd, for your ongoing work in the Australian interests. Kevin, whether it be in New York, whether it be joining us here today, or I understand working on your PhD on the important topics that so many people are thinking about, and that is issues to do with China. It's essential that we have a deeper understanding, so thank you for your contribution via your PhD, via sessions like this to increase our knowledge and understanding of these very important dynamics of our age. Can I say when it comes to your idea about Darwin becoming a capital for Indonesian expertise, we are working on that very well. We have a new Consul General. We've, on Friday night, had an art exhibition that celebrated Indonesian and top-end art, and we connected through Zoom, Jakarta, Canberra, Melbourne, Bali and Darwin for an art exhibition event. I myself led a delegation to Jakarta in February, had a crack at a Bahasa Indonesia press conference, and it wasn't all bad. So we are taking our place in the world seriously. And finally, Kevin, can I just say thank you from Territorians for your ongoing support of the Territory and for yours and Terazer's work with the Apology Foundation, and I just want those here with us in Darwin and those that are listening from around Australia and perhaps around the world, that it was only two or three weeks ago that Kevin and Teraz were doing a Zoom with Nana Lorna Fijo to celebrate her 90th birthday, and Nana Fijo was down at nightcliff looking over the ocean and having Kevin and Teraz come onto a Zoom call to wish her a happy birthday. So the reverberations of that leadership with the National Apology are very warmly felt here in Darwin. We appreciate your work on the national and international stage in the national interest, and very much thank you for your time with us tonight, Kevin. Thank you and our regards to Teraz and the family. Okay, thank you, Luke. Now, for those of you who are in the Northern Territory, we're now open as an organization to you, so please do sign up with us. If you go to our website, that's internationalaffairs.org.au. That's internationalaffairs.org.au. Don't go to membership yet. If you see the opening banner on the website and you click on Read More, maybe can you do that for me? Thank you. You'll see a Northern Territory subscriber page. If you hit register and follow the instructions, you will be able to sign up, and you will get free access to all of our webinars across the country, and, of course, members' access to any events that we hold in the territory. Thanks. Yes, so all that's left for me to do is to thank you for watching at home. Thank you in the Northern Territory for joining us. We're really excited, again, to have you here, and thank you especially to our very special guest, Kevin Rudd. It's been an honour, sir. Good to be with you, and I think you looked for those kind remarks before. All the best to our friend in the top end. Wonderful part of Australia. Look forward to be back with you soon. I'm still not going to go down on that bloody crocodile cage, which is what you tried to get me to do last time. All right. Well, that's... Well, we're over time, actually, so that's all the time we have for today. Of course, we have an increasing schedule of events, so we'll leave you here with a taste of what's to come.