 Yeah, thanks a lot and then we move immediately to the second paper on internal capital targets of banks that is presented by Cyril Coalier from the ECB Thanks So thank you very much for inviting me to present this paper and before I start let me remind you that It is of course my views and does not necessarily reflect the views of the ECB So in this paper and this presentation, I will talk to you about bank capital Targets and the capital ratios. So of course, this is an important question in general For any type of firm how they set their capital structure and how they move to reach their capital structure But it's even more important for banks Why is that? Because as the main credit providers of our economies So that's for a given quantity of capital the ability to expand or shrink the balance sheet is of course extremely important for the funding of the real economy and second because Regulators have imposed a set of capital regulations on requirements Sorry on banks to avoid their costly default and to tackle more hazard due to a deposit insurance And so police makers would like to know how this regulation affects banks behavior And how it makes them adjust their capital structure in particular since the great financial crisis It has been clear that we need to make bank capital more Contraciclic on so having banks increase their capital in good times when it's relatively cheap and use it in bad times Absorb losses rather than restricting credit and It's important to know if banks consider those Contracical terms kept on turns to be indeed usable or if they just interpret them as Additional strict capital requirements that they should never touch The problem is that until recently banks did not Announce publicly there are the capital targets so that researchers had to estimate implicit targets Which are of course noisy and makes it more difficult to Draw firm conclusions on those issues and here comes this paper So in this paper I for this paper I collected on banks websites Their targets that they announced to the investors Publicly as part of their strategic planning along with other other targets, and I use it I use this new data set to revisit Many questions that could have on bank capital and when capital targets first how they set their targets And here I find two important reasons. So first banks do react to capital requirements The higher the common the higher the targets Which is obviously expected, but they do not react one for one Meaning that when we increase requirements They partially adjust their targets by reducing the target capital headroom over the requirements It's not one for an adjustment slower than unity and second important lesson The impact of strict minimum requirements on usable buffers are Not different. They're the same statistically which means that banks do not seem to interpret the buffers Relatory buffers introduced after battle three to be more usable than Then the minimum requirements contrary to the intention of battle three before Next I show that banks do take that targets are usually it's not that just something that they announced to the investors They do they do not take care about later They do converge towards their targets over time But the convergence rate is much higher when they're initially below their targets Which suggests that it's much more important for them to reach a certain level of Seventy because it's a primary concern of the investors rather than when they're above their targets Rebues to redistributing quickly there as a capital to to the investors public because investors know that the capital if Is there and could be distributed later? And third I should I explore how banks converge toward their targets and I see that they adjust both Through c to an outstanding capital on through the assets two-third adjustment occurs through Capital so the increase their outstanding amount of capital when there are below their targets But one-third still occurs through assets within particular important impact on their corporate credit supply and this I particularly explore in more details during the covid crisis by using the creature justice data of of the ECB and I show that banks that were that had lower capital headroom or where they were below their targets So had negative capital headroom if you want to compare their targets during covid or the entrance of the outbreak of the crisis Expanded less credit than other firms over the banks to the same firms so that they had lower Create supply because they wanted to preserve their their capital or even better to increase the capital ratio to reach their targets So this is what the targets I collected look like on the right-hand side. You have two examples one from BNP Paribas or they are from a cake sabanc where they basically both of them announced that they target Citroen capital ratio of 12% for different point in times and this is exactly how I collected data set going through their quarterly or yearly financial reports strategic planning slide decks and I have to say that More and more banks and on these targets before the great financial crisis was very rare Basically, it's impossible to be on this data set before but since 2014 more and more banks have been announcing such such targets as part of their standard planning because probably The good regulatory environment is more stable and also because after the great general crisis They have realized that capital is really important so it's important to communicate on it. And so that's why is that since 2018 my data set covers about 60% of total assets in the euro area starting from about 40% in 2014 at the beginning of of the of the sample Importantly banks and on targets in two different types either in Levence like we want to be at 15% Or as a capital headroom over requirements in particular over the what is called the MDA trigger So the amount of capital the recapital ratio three below which they are constraining capital payout dividends shall buybacks Which already gives you a sense that of course targets are dependent on capital requirements So before I jump to econometrics Let me present you a few key stylized facts The first one is the distribution of capital targets over time since 2014 And we you see that after a period of a few years three years of increase in those Targets they are broadly the distribution is broadly stable since 2017-18 and most Targets are between 12.5 and 15% which is related to the Stabilization of the regulatory framework capital requirements in Europe, but it doesn't mean that the targets at the bank level having stable This overall aggregate distribution masks some heterogeneity Over time at bank levels, that's sometimes target increase. Sometimes they Reduced typically banks move their targets every two three years What's interesting also is that the great the COVID crisis did not induce a massive change in those targets except a bit on the tens and the higher term what change is actually more of the distance to Between the actual capital ratio on the targets So here a positive value means that banks are above their targets when it's negative It means that they're below the targets and you can see three clear Periods first in 2014 until 2016. There are below the targets They are trying to rebrand their balance sheet after the great financial crisis after the European surveillance crisis And they did and then As I meant as point of the target is they stopped So between 2016 and 2020 The distribution is well centered at zero both in terms of yeah The mean of the media now quite close to to zero which means that on aggregates They were happy with where they were and then COVID crisis Occurred meaning that as I said that I did not move a lot but the capital ratios increased Thanks to some credential support thanks to also Fiscal support that reduced the risk rates on some corporate credits which Increase your capital ratio mechanically so that now many banks most banks are above their capital Targets and it's in line with no more announcement of higher capital distribution because they have extra capital to distribute to their investors Third stylist fact here. I plot the distribution of overall capital requirements in city one terms By a bucket of 20 basis points against the target capital ratio and see here you see two clear things first The relation is positive. So the higher the targets the requirement series the higher the targets second as I announced in the beginning of this presentation The relation is not one for one clearly The slope is lower than one meaning that when you increase requirements banks tend to absorb past part of this increase By reducing their target capital hedgerow which suggests that they see a trade-off between the risk of bridging requirements and What they perceive at cost of running high capital ratios? Finally here. I plot the evolution of the distance to the target over time depending on whether Bank initially was below or above the target and you see two very different patterns on both On both sides There is a convergence meaning that the distance Decreases over time, but it's massively faster when they are below their targets Meaning that they are really under pressure to reach This target to be solvent and to reassure the investors while when they are above their targets Apparently they have more time to redistribute the capital the money is still here at some point They will they will give it back to investors or inflate the balance sheet Now let's turn to the econometrics I will be fast on this slide but just to explain that my work Contains four steps contains four steps first. What are the determinants of the targets? meaning that I regress the targets on a bunch of of Bank-level variables that include of course the overall capital requirements size profitability liquidity business model of deposits quality and asset quality and also on macroeconomic Viables in particular economic forecasts Because you can expect that how they see the economy to evolve in the next few years will affect what kept on target They they they want to reach and also monetary policy and Surrender rates, so I won't show you all those Controversial for the sake of time, but I will comment on the main ones Second step I assess whether banks do take their targets are usually so do they to converge towards their targets Do the distance between actual and target capital ratio falls over time? Third step, how do they adjust towards their targets so that here I will regress a bunch of balance sheets and PNL variables on The distance between actual and target capital ratios Let's go to violence and finally as I said I will do a deep dive into the COVID crisis at bank firm levels not at bank level here But regressing the great growth between Bank B and firm F on this bank level credit sorry bank level capital headroom Controlling for the same variables on adding firm fixed effect to control for firm demand credit So before I start and let me also Quickly present you what you probably already know, but let's let's still good to have a reminder about bank capital requirements So after the great financial crisis as I said We wanted to make bank capital more counter cyclical Meaning that we now have three blocks main blocks in terms of kept of capital requirements in the euro area So first one what which is called TSCR is also known as minimum requirements that should be met at all times and Yeah, it's extremely costly for banks to breach it on top of them lie what are called the Combined buffer requirements that are meant to be met in good times But to be used in bad times that banks should draw on those capital on those capital buffers in bad times rather than a cut lending And finally on top of this lies what is called the pillar to guidance which is not a requirement per se It's a capital demand so that the bank should be able to fully use it. It just that's the supervisor would like them to to meet it in in normal times, but breaching it. It's not a bridge per se But not meeting it is does not entail any automatic restriction of any kind so that you could expect that those three layers of capital requirements have different impacts and targets the more stringent the capital requirements the higher should be the coefficient because the higher would be the cost of breaching those requirements Okay, so let's turn to the results now first How do banks set their other targets and here I want to comment on two main types of of type of variables On the first row you have what I call the overall capital recommends plus P2g so the overall capital demands that banks face and as you see the coefficient is Strongly positive both in poor progression on these firm fixed effects But it's lower than unity which confirms what we saw in the charts and meaning that banks trade off the risk of in an intended breach of requirements with The cost what is the other cost of holding high capital ratios What's interesting is what when we break down those? Capital demand into three is a three blocks minimum comments usable buffers on P2g We do not have the hierarchical effect that we would have expected minimum requirements on buffers have the same impact on column three and Minimum comments are not significant in column four which So which include bank fixed effect which is very unlikely because it's Strict the structure forms of requirements is probably due to the fact that with bank fixed effects It's difficult to estimate the impact of those requirements because they do not vary a lot So everything is absorbed by the fixed effect But still you mean you see that there is no difference between the two or if anything the impact of buffer is larger than Minimum comments for the P2g I do not identify any impact, but here I have to say that we should be cautious on this because again the P2g Is does not showcase a lot of variation across banks so that a lot could be absorbed by firm Think by a by fixed effects or even pooled intercept, but overall it suggests that that banks do not distinguish between those different form of requirements at least not between buffers on your requirements, which is The opposite of what we'd like to to see on what was intention of battle three The second key viable I want to comment on here is a GDP growth forecast You see that it has a negative impact Meaning that when GDP growth is expected to be higher use banks expect good times then they reduce that target capital The target capital ratios which means that it's typical of kind of complacency that they can leverage more It's typically what have seen what a lot commented be in the run up to great financial crisis As you contrary during a crisis when GDP growth forecast falls Then they tend to raise their targets so that to commit to being solvent and to navigate the crisis without fail second step I regress Distance between actual on target capital ratios on its own lag I basically assess how it evolves and you see here on the table that it falls over time So coefficient is strictly below one it's between zero and one which means that this distance reduces over time What's interesting is in column two you see that the coefficients at both coefficients when you start from positive or negative values are Again below zero and one but the question is much lower when you're below Your target which means that you adjust much faster to your target again You're under higher pressure from your investors to reach your target Third step of result how you adjust and see here. So I regress On those variables that you see coming into the table on the on the gap between actual target capital ratio and you see that banks use a vast range of Variables to adjust of course the coefficient on the city on the ratio is negative So that when you're above target you tend to reduce the capital ratio to reach your target and you do it by reducing your amount of capital through both issued capital earnings and by increasing your risk-weighted assets in particular you increase your loans to To households and your loans to even borrow your loans to corporates and using those figures one can estimate what's the contributions of capital and LWA and two-thirds of the adjustment occurred through capital But still one-third occurred to risk-weighted assets Which means that this distance to target has important impact on the credit supply policy of banks and It's even more important when again when they're below their targets as you can see the positive impact of Of the distance to target is statistically significant only for On capital, sorry on credit to loans and to households to firms and household Sorry only for firms that started below their their targets And also the overall coefficient on the first column is larger If you're below your targets and if you're above it, which is consistent with previous results finally deep dive on the Jump that deep dive on the COVID crisis. So Here banks faced a huge credit demand shock due to a lockdown to a high liquidity needs for firms and This Could have waited a lot on their capital Ratios because you have to extend a lot of credit So those that were below their targets were under higher pressure not to extend as much credit as those are banks to preserve Their capital ratios and so they did you see again on table on the right-hand side that the target As a distance to your target had a positive impact on your credit growth So if you were above your target You tended to extend more credit and this effect is actually concentrated on banks that were below their target So if you're above your target a lot or little it doesn't matter But if you're below your target you really contract your credit or you extend it less to preserve your capital ratio and to Even reach your your target So overall these papers introduces capital data set of Announced capital targets that European banks communicate to the investors removing the need for estimation of those targets it shows that targets are Determined largely affected on determined by capital requirements But not one-for-one banks reduce their capital headroom when capital requirements get higher and banks do not distinguish between Different types of capital requirements Thanks to the take the targets are usually they are just toward their targets And in particular it has a strong impact on create supply in particular during the crisis And these has important lessons for policymakers first because it shows that monitoring those targets has important Those important lessons for them because knowing that a bank is Above or below its target provide insight on how it will Adjust its lending policy in the next few years Second it shows that banks do not seem to consider regulatory buffers to be usable which is in stark contrast to the intention of battle three Answered it suggests that there is a need for Puntersical buffers, so it's not that buffers are usable But you should reduce them in in crisis time because you should reduce your their targets So that makes them having more capital headroom with a positive impact on create supply during crisis And this is it for the presentation. Thank you Thanks Lord Cyril and the discussant is Loren Heider from Goethe University, Frankfurt Okay, hi everybody and thanks a lot for having me at the conference gives me an opportunity To come back to a place that was my home for nearly 20 years. So um, but No disclaimer for me anymore. So It's not so obvious because if in be malactic you've tried to put in this little thing at the end of the bottom I mean, you know what I'm talking about. It doesn't fit the normal academic presentations very well. So I'm Let me give you the One slide summary of the paper That I was very happy to discuss because it brought me back to some stuff that I was looking at more than 10 years ago But the headline is really that Cyril uses this new amazing hand-collected data Which is he looked at what the banks tell you? regulators markets other banks what they think is The target for their regulatory capital. So this is this is really a an amazing novelty and The paper then goes into arguing that well, we could also get these targets from observed data You know, there's fluctuations. You try to get some trend or some average, but it's much better To to listen to what the banks tell you right then rather than figure out what they do And There's a couple of messages here and let me just run quickly through them not going to go into detail Yes, these target exists either meaningful. It's not just that they announce anything They seem to announce something that they take serious their bank specific Okay, fair enough and their prosyclical ie that when times are tough They seem to tell you that they're gonna aim for the higher targets Which then probably means that if these things are costly to achieve They will have to cut down somewhere and this would make things worse and this ties nicely into this other Prosyclical things that we want to avoid but somehow cannot There's a very nice obvious point I think well, but it's nice It's nice to see is that if you're above the target well, you know life is good If you're below you will feel the heat and you try to get out of there Then how do you achieve that? You know, how do you close the gap because it's you know There's a numerator and a denominator and there's an asset side and liability side So which of those things are gonna you're gonna play on and the message is a little bit on everything You try to do something on the equity and you're trying to do something on the risks on the equity You know, this is not my biggest comment, but I was just wondering how they do that because they do not issue much new equity Particularly when they're in tough times. We have seen that this doesn't work usually So is it retained earnings because they seem to not cut dividends So I would have loved a little bit more detail there and then there is what they call the deep dive They're basically showing the in the COVID-19 crisis Banks that had a large gap and it's mostly the action below so banks that were below what they had announced Covid hits they say oh bad And they cut lending. Okay, so that's that's that's that's a nice part at the end So I really like that paper because it brought me back to something that I was looking at like many years ago And I want to bore you with my old outdated research But the idea was is that there was a time when people thought Banks are super boring because they're regulated regulated regulation determines their capital structure being go no need for research and That just was at that time just showing the histogram of the versus this Basel one So not bank specific you should have at least 4% you see that Distribution is truncated at 4% nobody was below 4% and but some we're holding 25% That seems not really in line with regulation determines it all and so this paper is in this tradition that we really I think there's a really a need to Understand at the bank level what they're doing So one of so we're going to my comments there's a lot of right-hand side variables I was missing the most obvious one which is risk and maybe I haven't looked hard enough But we know that risk is I mean there are risk measures in there But not the one that I would have liked to which is measure of acid risk some measure of unlevering the the financial risk And we know that this is super super important. Why so this is a paper from to be as back and just mean Gita And they do something very very simple. You just plot acid risk so unlevered financial risk um against Leverage and you do that for corporates and you do that for banks and you really see that as actually there aren't really much outliers here There's a nice negative relationship. If you have more risk, you hold less debt Why do hold banks so much debt? Because at least on that measure They're pretty safe. They're pretty boring. I mean that diversified I mean that doesn't quite square with financial crisis because you also see that there's always a couple of outliers I mean we want to worry about because that's built over to those guys But risk matters. That's my bottom line and it's it's it's not it's not in the paper There's another thing that's not in the paper that I would have loved to see more about is it's all about Regulatory capital, but there's also economic capital. So just take equity over assets or something like that. How does it interact? There are differences. I mean when I had looked the last time at this thing and you know That's very outdated ten years ago. The correlation coefficient is like zero point six between equity of assets and and something like tier one Capital ratio, so I think that would have been it's a mist of opportunity a little bit I'm gonna be a bit harsh. I'm gonna dispense with most of the paper in one slide. I'm not a big fan of these Capital structure adjustment partial adjustment, whatever you want to call these things because first I think intellectually It's very different difficult to figure out. I have a target. That's moving and that's why I see certain things happening or Maybe the target is the same and just you're adjusting to the target according to economic conditions Because the target is unobservable so this paper here, of course, then goes okay It's just observable because the banks tell you what it is But that doesn't really do it to paper justice because I think it's then all about measurement error And there's so much in there. I want to spend my reminding three three or four minutes and and you know for the econometricians You know Blondel Bond is a painter estimate so So I you know I I'm not a big fan of that But I think there's a lot of stuff that still can do in follow-up papers with the data Because I would have really loved to know is why on earth do they tell you the things that they do, you know What's the difference between the announce? Why do they announce something different than the actual target? I mean see it'll show that there's a difference Are the different drivers are the driven by the same factors? Are there are the permanent transition transitory differences like very often you could communicate the same thing and then every now and then there are special circumstances that the bank seems compel to tell the world Capital are you announcing the denominator the risk are you announcing both? Who to announce this to is it the regulator? You know, he's he's already said some capital ratio for you. Is it other banks? Is it the markets? So I would have loved to know a lot more. I think there's a lot of cool stuff you could do. Why is that? Why do they do that? Because it's a little show this graph here. So what do you see? So you're in the x-axis you see The actual capital ratio and on the y-axis you see the The announced one and you would imagine maybe you know as a benchmark Let's say they should all lie on the 45 degree line you announce What's there, but they typically ounce more which so far so good But I think the surprising thing is why is it the banks? With the lowest capital ratio, so the ones on the left lowest regulatory capital ratio fine on earth Do they announce the biggest targets? You know, you would think that these are that the ones that have the toughest time reaching those if you think that always the low Equity banks or the low capital ratio banks are sort of the bad ones. So I think this is the really interesting I think there's a lot of stuff in there that you could push further. I I'm gonna finish with a little deep dive on this covert exercise, which I like a lot. There's a lot of work in there So the regression is the usual Quadramian style. So you have the change in lending during covert time So pre-post you look at the company you look at the company of the firm's Credit then you say there's a firm specific component. So that takes care of demand because you know covert times less demand and then this firm has borrowed from different banks and They differ in their gaps. It's just that what here I've done is I've spelled out what the gap really is or how it's composed and The gap in here was a bit unclear. So the gap as far as I understood is the difference between what you announced and what's the actual It wasn't quite clear to me which time they were and were looking at because the actual at least Cyril seemed to at least What I could see in the paper measure send them email, but I didn't So the actual the actual capital ratio is the one already with the covert Modifications, you know with being able to draw down that the the the buffer and everything and that to me was a little awkward Because you know, you'd normally want that, you know, the treated bank is one where the gap is large But then suddenly now you're treated if you if you received a lot of relief, right? You've announced 10% your recline was eight the regulator says don't worry covert six your gap goes up Suddenly you lend less. Hmm. Not sure what's going on there. So that was that was a question I had but I think that's also something that you could really Build on and make another separate paper out of that. I think it's a little bit, you know under plate So my comment my summary, I think it's great data. I think it's there's a lot of work I just think that these applications on the on the target capital structures and this dynamic stuff It's very very difficult to tease that out and I don't think it does the data any justice I think there's just so much more in there and I just would have loved to take a step back and really Are they now saying and when they do and you know from then I think there will be a lot of insights about this, you know banks exist in a nexus between the regulator the overall macro-nuclear environment and And investors Yeah, there's a lot story on it now. We have time for our four questions Please be as concise as possible in the interest of time. So we go from left-hand side and then Yeah, and at least I would have from the bank of Italy again very fast because it's very related with the main point of the Discussing so maybe something you should look at is which are the banks that do not Signal their capital got target and whether they are different and whether they behave differently So that could shed some some light on what the what banks are communicating when they decide to communicate. Thanks All the question in the middle. Yes Hello, I'm Heather Gibson from the Bank of Greece I was wanting to ask a question because I think it's quite interesting if you look at the way in which banks Meet their targets or meet the requirements. However, we want to put it Do they do they actually change the capital or do they change? They're risk-weighted assets and I was wondering if given that you've been looking, you know at banks websites whether you've noticed that some banks do Manipulate if you like their assets the risk-weighted assets through synthetic securitizations and the question is as Supervisors does it matter to us whether banks are effectively increasing their capital ratios by doing these Securitizations should they securitize the whole of the balance sheets in order to reduce the risk-weighted assets? So I was just wondering if you know, it's perhaps a bit of an extension to what you've been doing. Okay. Thank you Thank you. So I'm gonna say having worked in a bank I think targets are taken seriously and you are communicating to investors what you're trying to achieve now You may fail, but I would still think that you're on to something here right now Two points though You keep being surprised by the fact that the banks owners don't make a distinction between the buffers and the rest, right? I'm just gonna say I buy equity. I buy equity. I don't get to choose which part I own, right? So capital is just capital and I want my money back so to speak So I'm a little bit. I wouldn't expect to find anything So I'm glad you don't find anything because you really shouldn't right Shouldn't be there, right So I guess The the other thing I had and this is again the supervisory thing you you keep mentioning investors appetite And an impact on guiding bank management to doing this that the other right I would have thought that you're You're you're finding that when you're below a target You move quicker up and you released you shown intent to do that Well, if you're well above that you were less Quick and bringing it down. I would have thought that the many supervisors in the room here will recognize that they might have a role here Then in fact the supervisors not the regulator, but the supervisors may be the main obstacle Because at least having said on the other side telling the supervisor that I'd like to lower capital because I got too much He's not normally a well-received message, right? It's like really We don't like it, you know, so I think you know before you write supervisors out of the equation I think they have a role to play here. So I think that's maybe worth looking at. Yeah Thank you Okay, then we look at the chat or the online Participants more general and reist we have any One question in the chat now I if I am allowed to indulge in a question to both author and discussant Says cost us that's our own is How do announced targets compare to those inferred by the econometrition i.e. implied in behavior of banks? That's all Okay, good, and I give back to To the presenters. Yeah, thanks. I will also work Backward to answer the questions. So on the on the last one. It's so it's not something that I've Presented today for the sake of time, but actually it's in the paper. I compare estimated targets to the actual ones and actually the The distribution of the estimation error is well centered on zero So on average the econometricians do not make an error on average when they estimate as a target But the distribution is very large. So that's sometimes they are well below sometimes well above What are the actual capital target that banks announced to their investors? The question Drives the fact that it takes time to decline for banks to Distribute their capital, it's a very fair point. Indeed. I should include this in the paper It's probably as you said the main obstacle not some banks own desire fair point However, and the other point that capital is And shareholders should not be interested in whether The minimum requirements or the buffers or the P2G it's true that it doesn't matter for them They own capital but the same overall capital requirements does not entail the same cost of breach if it's only composed of minimum requirements that's Should never breach or if it's comp or if it has a layer of buffers that they could Do on just at the cost of not being able to issue dividends for some time or if there is an extra layer of P2G They can freely use so you should still Expect that they react differently in terms of capital targets To those different types of requirements even if for given shareholder, of course His hero or hero is not allocated to any of those precise layers Regarding question of whether banks adjust with capital or LWA to reach your targets Maybe I was I was fast on it But it was I think it was in the presentation. So that they are just two-thirds of the distance the closer gap by Tuesday, yeah, two-thirds of the gap that the close is with a higher capital all the way targets on one third is with LWA or in particular with loans to firms and to households and So you raise the point of whether it works through Securitization that I didn't check honestly But it would matter for the supervisor. That was your last point because if they reduce their credit supply or if they keep the same but But then securitize it of course matter at least for macro prudential perspective Maybe not from the mic for the bank, but for the total environment it matters a lot and finally and at this point on Assessing which bank not another targets and how do they behave to similar banks that do It's a fair point. I haven't done it. I could it's true that virtually all the targets Because most of them are listed and when you're listed you have to communicate to new investors at some point Typically quarterly and they tend to announce turn start it. Okay, so no one have heard anything of what I've said And so I don't have to repeat myself. Oh, yeah, much better Yeah, so if you have heard it as that would have been my that is my answer so fair point Thanks for suggestion. I will explore this thanks and regarding Florence question remarks Then so the point on asset risk right having it as a contra viable so I have the risk rate density So the ratio of with created a set of a total assets. That's usually a measure of Of asset risk then I indeed it's a fair point. I could add more but as I was this one to Proxies this on the impact of boot capital indeed my suggestion. I will explore this So why do they announce that there are targets It's the same points. I think that's the same answer I have to to check that and on the chart that Okay, I don't have the presentation anymore, but the scatter plot I think there might be a Misunderstanding because it's not the actual capital ratio versus the target. It's a requirements Versus the targets. So that's those that were at the left-hand side as they have the lowest requirements Not the lowest targets. So this may clarify Because yeah, they just They're the target a higher capital headroom, but still lower lower overall ratio than those that have higher requirements But then if it's unclear, maybe you can discuss later and For your question on COVID. So I took as a capital in 2019 Q4 so before the impact of of the skeptical requirement releases on Yeah, monetary support fiscal support Yeah, I could check with the business with other Other dates, but I think this one was really how they stand at the break of the crisis. So it makes sense