 Today's lecture I am going to talk about Phenomenal Consciousness, Kualya and Coining Kualya. The Phenomenal Consciousness plays vital role in philosophy of mind. The Phenomenal Consciousness is one of the most important aspects of explaining the concept of mind because the Phenomenal Consciousness cannot be explained in terms of physicalistic or mechanistic way. Even if some philosophers and some scientists they are trying to explain it, those explanations are not acceptable. Why it is not acceptable? And I will be discussing in these lectures. As we know that conscious experience not only refers to the psychological concept of mind but also refers to the Phenomenal concept of mind. The Phenomenal concept of mind as conscious experience and of a mental state as a consciously experienced mental state and the psychological concept of mind as a causal or explanatory basis of behavior. But according to the psychological concept of, it matters little whether a mental state has a conscious quality or not. Here we find a fundamental distinction between both the conceptions. According to the Phenomenal concept of mind, mind is characterized by the way it feels and on the psychological concept of mind is characterized by what it does. For charmers this distinction between psychological and Phenomenal mind is absolutely necessary. Here he remarks I quote I will sometimes speak of the Phenomenal and psychological aspect of mind and sometimes of the Phenomenal mind and the psychological mind. At this early stage I do not wish to beg any question about whether the Phenomenal and the psychological will turn out to be the same thing. According to charmers every Phenomenal state is a psychological state in that it plays a significant role in the causation and explanation of behavior and every psychological state has an intimate relation to the Phenomenal concept of mind. Accordingly there is a conceptual distinction between the two notions what it means for a state to be Phenomenal is for it to feel a certain way and what it means for a state to be psychological is for it to play an appropriate causal role. The distinction between the Phenomenal and the psychological has a long history. It points out Descartes concept of mind. Descartes is partly responsible for this because Descartes held that every event in the mind is a cogitio or a content of experience. To this class he assimilated volitions, intentions and every type of thought. Every psychological that is earthly of being called mental has a conscious aspect. That is whatever is a mental content is necessarily according to Descartes a content of conscious experience. Therefore for him the notion of unconscious method state is a contradiction in terms. After Descartes a new objective brand of psychological explanation was developed with no room for consciousness in its explanation. This mode of explanation had only partly success but it established the idea that psychological explanations can be proceed while ignoring the Phenomenal. But behaviorist differed in their theoretical positions some recognized the existence of consciousness found it irrelevant to true psychological explanation and some denied its existence altogether. Many went further denying the existence of any kind of mental state. Behaviorist in general accepted that the mental states are irrelevant in the explanation of behavior which could be carried out entirely in external terms. The move from behaviorism to computational cognitive science for the most preserved the idea that there are no two intentional mental states although the move brought back a role for internal states which could even be called mental state and there was nothing particularly phenomenal about them. These states were admissible precisely on the grounds of their role in the explanation of behavior. The concept of mental therefore was taken to be synonymous with psychological. This explanation of phenomenal concept of lives it unclear why there is anything phenomenal at all. According to him there is no great mystery about how a state might play a causal role but what is truly mysterious is why that state should feel like something why it should have a phenomenal quality at all. In Chalmers word we can see I quote there is no great mystery about how a state might play some causal role although there are certainly technical problems therefore science what is mysterious is why that state should feel like something why it should have a phenomenal quality why the causal role is played and why the phenomenal qualities present are two entirely different questions. The functional analysis denies the distinction of these questions and therefore to be unsatisfactory. The phenomenal concept deals with the first person aspect of mind while psychological concept deals with the third person concept of mind. The dualism between the phenomenal and the psychological is the fact that the dualism between the first person and the third person perspective of the mind. Let us see the first person and the third person perspective of mind. The double aspect of mind or mental terms are psychological and phenomenal. The concept of pain provides a clear example. The term is often used to name a particular sort of unpleasant phenomenal quality. On the other hand there is also a psychological notion associated with the term. The concept of the sort of state that is causally connected with the damage to the organism the relation of the organism and so on. Both of these aspects are central to the common sense notion of pain. The reason why phenomenal and psychological properties often run together is clear. It is because the relevant properties tend to co-occur. When the processes resulting from tissue damage leading to discomfort take place some sort of phenomenal quality arises. That is when psychological pain is presented some sort of experience of pain is also present phenomenal. Chalmers says that it is not a conceptual truth that the processes should be accompanied by the phenomenal quality it is a fact about the world. Once we have this state of co-occurrence of properties in everyday situations it is natural that our everyday conception of things will bind them together. From the above discussions we find that many mental concepts lead a sort of double life. For example, perception can be taken as a psychological process involving cognitive response to the environment. On the other hand it may also be taken phenomenally involving the conscious experience of what it is perceived. Chalmers holds that some of these concepts lean more strongly toward the phenomenal and some lean toward the psychological. The concept of sensation which is close to the concept of perception has both phenomenal and psychological components. The phenomenal component is more prominent in sensation than in perception sensation is something like perception's phenomenal counterpart. The another question is can there be a mental concept but not phenomenal? That is, is it the case that the psychological and the phenomenal are factually co-occurrent but are independent causally? Chalmers endures the factual co-occurrence of the psychological and phenomenal but not their necessary relation. It is evidence in his analysis that the propositional attitudes like beliefs, desires, etc. In the case of propositional attitudes the central feature of these mental states is their semantic content or intentionality. Phenomenal experience thus is not directly associated with a propositional attitude. However, a belief though psychological is still a state unconscious such that as Chalmers says the intentional content of a belief depends entirely on the associated state of consciousness that the belief can be can bring about without consciousness all that is present is as if intentional. What Chalmers intends to say is that the belief is always associated with consciousness because non-conscious machines have no beliefs. A conscious mind alone has the capacity of intentionality about the world. Chalmers argues with solve on the analysis of propositional attitudes. Chalmers has shown that all mental states have a psychological and a phenomenal aspect and we need not legitimate which is primary although a strong case might be made for a psychological analysis. There is no aspect of this state that outstrips both the psychological and the phenomenal. Thus psychology and phenomenology together constitute the mind. In spite of togetherness between phenomenology and psychology we cannot identify the phenomenal with the psychology. There are two distinct aspects of the mind. The phenomenal is picked out as the experience that tends to accompany psychological. We can coherently imagine a situation in which the phenomenal quality occurs without the psychological properties. This distinction between the phenomenal and the psychological is source of the distinction between the easy and the hard aspect of the human mind. Why it is easy and why it is hard? It is easy because it is a phenomenal consciousness. It is a conscious experience which cannot be explained in the functional terms. It is hard because it cannot be explainable in the phenomenal consciousness. It is easy because it can be explainable in the scientific way and if it is explanation in the scientific way then it is a easy problem. But actual the problem of consciousness is one of the hard problem of consciousness according to David Chalmers. Let us see the phenomenal consciousness As you have seen, mental terms are dual in nature. There are two concepts of consciousness psychological consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. One may put forward an explanation of consciousness by emphasizing the phenomenal quality of consciousness but will end by giving an explanation of some aspect of psychological consciousness such as the ability to introspect to think and to perceive, etc. There are varieties of psychological consciousness such as awareness, introspection self-consciousness, attentions voluntary content, knowledge and many other mental states. These are holds that all largely functional notions and this can be seen from a psychological perspective. Although many of them are associated with the phenomenal state it is clear that there is a phenomenal and a psychological property in the vicinity of each of these concepts. The phenomenal and the psychological properties in the vicinity of these notions tend to occur together but as with other mental concepts they should not be conflated. They should also be careful not to conflate the phenomenal sense of these terms with phenomenal consciousness in general. We may point out that psychological perspective of consciousness can be analysable in terms of phenomenal perspective but phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained in terms of psychological perspective in terms of irreducibility and non-compulsory nature or non-mechanical nature. For chalmers, the reductive explanation of consciousness is not possible because consciousness cannot be logically supermanient on the physical. This non-reductive aspect of consciousness is naturally supermanient Chalmers writes that to make the case against reductive explanation we need to show that consciousness is not logically supermanient on the physical. In principle, we need to show that it does not superven globally that is that all the micro physical facts in the world do not entail the facts about consciousness In practice, it is easier to run the argument locally argument that in an individual micro physical fact in the world do not entail the facts about consciousness When it comes to consciousness local and global supermanience plausibly stand and fall together So, it does not matter much which we run the argument if consciousness supervenance at all. It almost certainly supervences locally if this is disputed However, all the arguments can be run at the global level with state forward alternations This is because the phenomenal property of consciousness makes it different from all other properties If phenomenal consciousness would have been logically supermanient on the physical body then it would have been functionally identical with the letter In that case, consciousness would be explained completely in terms of physical properties. As Chalmers argues Of course, there is a sense in which the physics of the universe most entails the existence of consciousness If one defines physics as the fundamental science from whose facts and laws everything else follows, this control of physics however trivializes the questions involved If one allows physics to include theory developed specially to deal with the phenomenon of consciousness to be unmotivated by more basic considerations then we may get an explanation of consciousness but it will certainly not be a reductive one For our purpose, it is best to take the fundamental science developed to explain observations of the external world. If this kind of physics entails the facts about consciousness without invoking consciousness itself in a crucial role then consciousness would truly be reductively explained. For the reason that Chalmers have given there is a good reason to believe that no such reductive explanation is possible Therefore, one cannot reduce facts about consciousness to physical facts and cannot explain the occurrence of consciousness Chalmers argues that there is little hope that a purely physicalist or materialistic theory can explain consciousness at all especially the phenomenal or qualitative aspect of consciousness We may say that our knowledge of consciousness comes from our experience and not from external observations The existence of the external world is not enough for us to assume our experience It is only the first person experience of consciousness which possesses the problem of non-computationality in consciousness Therefore, it is subjective character of experience which is not analyzable through any explanatory systems of functional state or human behavior It is logically supervenient There would be no such epistemic asymmetry A logical supervenient cannot be detected state-forwardly and there is no special role for the first person Therefore, it is subjective character of experience which is not analyzable through any explanatory system of functional state or human behavior If it is logically supervenient on this then there would be no such epistemic asymmetry A logical supervenient can be deleted state-forwardly and there is no special role for the first person case Chalmers shows that consciousness is a first person phenomena and cannot be inferred or defined from the physicalistic or mechanistic way This is because there is a gap between physical level and the level of conscious experience Consciousness cannot be explained reductively because it can be explained in its one terms because the conscious mental states as distinguished from the physical facts have a subjective aspect The mental state of pain which is not the same as the state of the brain Since there is subjective experience of pain is not explainable in terms of the computational functions of the brain Thus, conscious experience can be reductively explained in terms of physical and functional laws of the brain Now we have to see the concept of Kualya and how Kualya is explained in the phenomenal consciousness because the conscious experience is nothing but the phenomenal Kualya The term Kualya means the qualitative character of experience Every experience has a distinct qualitative character The subjective or qualitative feel of a conscious experience is characterized as something that the organisms necessarily have in order to be conscious Thus, Kualya are the qualitative subject to the experience of mental state and the properties of conscious experience Now the question is Are these subjective experiences or Kualya real? It is a controversial question among philosophers whether Kualya are definable and whether Kualya are the psychological states of the brain The most important argument is that Kualya are the functional states of the brain and thus are real only as the physical states of the brain Opposed to this is the argument that Kualya are the qualitative feel of the conscious states and so are subjective in character Subjective experience thus have Kualya inherent in them In other words, an experience is a conscious experience if and only if there is some raw feel in which is subjective Kualya are experiential properties of sensations, feelings, perceptions or the way it feels to have a pain or the way it feels to see According to net block, the Kualya or Kualya that include the ways it feels to see here and smell the way it feels to have a pain more generally what it is like to have mental states Kualya are experimental properties of sensations, feelings perceptions and thought and desire as well also The first person experience such as pain color, sensation and the sensation of touch and smell, etc. are the qualitative experience of mental states These mental states are the common stuff of mind For example, in having the smell of flower or the taste of ice cream We cannot describe these things but we cannot describe them because these experiences have a distinctive phenomenal character Our color experience are such that there is something like to have them with a phenomenological image A Kual is thus a mental state that has the property of being a phenomenal experience Kualya constitute the essence of conscious states For example, the Kualya pain is the feeling of a pain rather than a mere bodily sensation Thus, the Kualya are the raw feeling association with the conscious state The type of conscious experience is something we cannot do without if we are to generated and test hypothesis We cannot describe the links between the phenomenological and the psychological The psychological and the neural The qualitative experiences like experiences of color, smell, taste, pain, etc. can be explained in neuroscientific terms These experiences play a causal role in the domain of mental state The experience of pain, for example We believe that he is in pain and he acquires a desire to take steps to recapture it When he is in pain, he is in a state that definitely has a range of causal or dispassional properties However, in addition to their functional role the qualitative experiences have a characteristics phenomenal field called Kualya Sol argues that every conscious state has certain qualitative field to it For example, the conscious experience of testing beer is very different from hearing some music and from smelling arrows or watching a movie Both of these have a different qualitative character Hence, there are the different qualitative features of conscious experiences Thus, Kualya considers the essential properties of conscious experiences That is why one cannot derive pleasure of drinking beer by listening to music or the pleasure of witness sunset by smelling arrows That is a logical, not an empirical truth and Chalmers characterizes it as a subjective quality of experience A mental state is conscious If there is something it is like to be in that mental state To put it another way we can say that a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative field or a qualitative experiences These qualitative fields are also known as phenomenal qualities or Kualya for short The problem of explaining these phenomenal qualities is not the problem of explaining consciousness According to Chalmers, phenomenally conscious states are not functional states but can be realized through our experience like the experience of red The phenomenal consciousness does not superven metaphysically on low level facts That is to say, even though two functional states are isomorphic they differ in phenomenal consciousness or other mental entity is phenomenal conscious only when there is something to be like to be that state For example, perceptual experiences like testing, seeing, feeling, etc are cases of such experiences The qualities available to us in conscious experience are the qualities which represent objects in the world Thus, Kualya are conceived as the qualitative characteristics of mental state which include perceptions, sensations, affections desires, thought and beliefs For every conscious experiences or conscious mental state there is something which is like for the subject to have it or to be in it They have a phenomenal field or raw feeling Hence, problem of phenomenal consciousness is the problem of explaining how subjective field is instantiated in the brain Phenomenal consciousness is a form of state consciousness It is a property with some but not other mental states possess Specifically, it is a property which mental states have when it is like something to undergo them Phenomenal consciousness states have distinct subjective fields Some would say they have Kualya Phenomenal consciousness properties are experiential properties For example, we have phenomenal consciousness states what we see, hear, smell, taste and have pains These properties are the experimental properties of sensations, feelings and perceptions and thoughts etc. Thus, the phenomenal feature of the mind is characterized by what it is like for a subject to have that feature Phenomenal experience is not merely a succession of qualitative, distinguished sensory ideas but rather the organized cognitive experience of a world of objects and of ourselves as subject within that world However, according to the functionalist minds are complex arrangements of functional states states that bear the right kinds of causal relation to one another and to inputs and outputs A functionality may therefore asserts that experiences themselves lack qualities of their own qualities indefinable independently or qualities of object experienced or although an experience may have qualities these are not qualities we are in any sense aware of in understanding the experience This subjective quality of experience or qualitative experiences is very difficult to get from the psychological aspect of mind This distinction is very applicable to philosophy of mind It is because there is a phenomenal and psychological distinctions The phenomenal consciousness is a kind of conscious experience or qualitative experience and that is called as qualia and because of this qualia it is very difficult to explain consciousness in mechanistic or functionalistic way and some of this qualia I will be explaining in the next lectures Thank you