 Section 10 of an Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 2 by John Locke. This is a LibreBox recording. All LibreBox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibreBox.org. Recording by Emanuel Zornberg. Chapter 15 of Duration and Expansion, Considered Together. 1. Though we have in the precedent chapters, dwelt pretty long on the considerations of space and duration, yet they being ideas of general concernment that have something very obstruc and peculiar in their nature, the comparing them one with another may perhaps be of use for their illustration, and we may have the more clear and distinct conception of them by taking a view of them together. Distance or space in its simple abstract conception to avoid confusion I call expansion, to distinguish it from extension, which by some is used to express this distance only as it is in the solid parts of matter, and so includes or at least intimates the idea of body, whereas the idea of pure distance includes no such thing. I prefer also the word expansion to space, because space is often applied to distance of fleeting successive parts, which never exist together, as well as to those which are permanent. In both these, these expansion and duration, the mind has this common idea of continued lengths, capable of greater or less quantities, for a man has as clear an idea of the difference of the length of an hour and a day as of an inch and a foot. Two, the mind having got the idea of the length of any part of expansion, let it be a span or a pace or what length you will can, as has been said, repeat that idea, and so adding it to the former enlarge its idea of length and make it equal to two spans or two paces, and so as often as it will till it equals the distance of any parts of the earth, one from another, and increase thus till it amounts to the distance of the sun or remotest star. By such a progression as this, setting out from the place where it is or any other place, it can proceed and pass beyond all those lengths and find nothing to stop its going on, either in or without body. It is true, we can easily in our thoughts come to the end of solid extension, the extremity and bounds of all body we have no difficulty to arrive at, but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless expansion. Of that it can neither find nor conceive any end, nor let anyone say that beyond the bounds of body there is nothing at all, unless he will confine God within the limits of matter. Solomon, whose understanding was filled and enlarged with wisdom, seems to have other thoughts when he says, Heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee, and he, I think, very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding, who persuades himself that he can extend his thoughts farther than God exists or imagine any expansion where he is not. Just so is it in duration. The mind, having got the idea of any length of duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it, not only beyond its own, but beyond the existence of all corporeal beings, and all the measures of time taken from the great bodies of the world and their motions. But yet everyone easily admits that though we make duration boundless as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all being. God, everyone easily allows, fills eternity, and it is hard to find a reason why anyone should doubt that he likewise fills immensity. His infinite being is certainly as boundless one way as another, and methinks it ascribes a little too much to matter to say, where there is no body, there is nothing. Four. Hence, I think we may learn the reason why everyone familiarly, and without the least hesitation, speaks of and supposes eternity, and sticks not to ascribe infinity to duration, but it is with more doubting and reserve that many admit, or suppose, the infinity of space. The reason whereof seems to me to be this, that duration and extension being used as names of affections belonging to other beings, we easily conceive in God infinite duration, and we cannot avoid doing so. But not attributing to him extension, but only to matter, which is finite, we are apt to doubt the existence of expansion without matter, of which alone we commonly suppose it an attribute. And therefore, when men pursue their thoughts of space, they are apt to stop at the confines of body, as if space were there at an end too, and reached no farther, or if their ideas upon consideration carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the limits of the universe imaginary space, as if it were nothing, because there is no body existing in it, whereas duration antecedent to all body, and to the motions which it is measured by, they never term imaginary, because it is never supposed void of some other real existence. And if the names of things may at all direct our thoughts towards the originals of men's ideas, as I am apt to think they may very much, one may have occasion to think, by the name duration, that the continuation of existence, with a kind of resistance to any destructive force, and the continuation of solidity, which is apt to be confounded with, and, if we will look into the minute anatomical parts of matter, is little different from hardness. We're thought to have some analogy, and gave occasion to words near of kin as Durare in Durham essay, and that Durare is applied to the idea of hardness, as well as that of existence. We see in Horus, Epod 16, Ferru Turavit Sikula. But be that as it will, this is certain, that whoever pursues his own thoughts, will find them sometimes launch out beyond the extent of body, into the infinity of space or expansion. The idea whereof is distinct and separate from body, and all other things, which may, to those who please, be a subject of farther meditation. Five. Time in general is to duration, as place to expansion. They are so much of those boundless oceans of eternity and immensity, as is set out and distinguished from the rest, as it were by landmarks, and so are made use of to denote the position of finite real beings in respect one to another, in those uniform infinite oceans of duration and space. These rightly considered are only ideas of determinate distances, from certain known points fixed in distinguishable, sensible things, and supposed to keep the same distance one from another, from such points fixed in sensible beings we reckon, and from them we measure our portions of those infinite quantities, which, so considered, are that which we call time and place. For duration and space being in themselves uniform and boundless, the order and position of things without such known settled points would be lost in them, and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable confusion. Six. Time and place, taken thus for determinate distinguishable portions of those infinite abysses of space and duration, set out or supposed to be distinguished from the rest by marks, and known boundaries, have each of them a two-fold acceptation. First, time in general is commonly taken for so much of infinite duration, as is measured by and co-existent with the existence and motions of the great bodies of the universe, as far as we know anything of them. And in this sense, time begins and ends with the frame of this sensible world, as in these phrases before mentioned, before all time, or when time shall be no more. Place, likewise, is taken sometimes for that portion of infinite space, which is possessed by and comprehended within the material world, and is thereby distinguished from the rest of expansion. Though this may more properly be called extension than place, within these two are confined, and by the observable parts of them are measured and determined, the particular time or duration, and the particular extension and place of all corporeal beings. Seven. Secondly, sometimes the word time is used in a larger sense, and is applied to parts of that infinite duration, not that we're really distinguished and measured out by this real existence, and periodical motions of bodies that were appointed from the beginning to be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and years, and are accordingly our measures of time. But such other portions, too, of that infinite uniform duration, which we, upon any occasion, do suppose equal to certain lengths of measured time, and so consider them as bounded and determined. For if we should suppose the creation, or fall of the angels, was at the beginning of the Julian period, we should speak properly enough and should be understood, if we said, it is a longer time since the creation of angels than the creation of the world, by 7,640 years, whereby we would mark out so much of that undistinguished duration as we suppose equal to, and would have admitted 7,640 annual revolutions of the sun, moving at the rate it now does. And thus, likewise, we sometimes speak of place, distance, or bulk, in the great inane beyond the confines of the world, when we consider so much of that space as is equal to, or capable to, receive a body of any assigned dimensions as a cubic foot, or do suppose a point in it at such a certain distance from any part of the universe. 8. Where and when are questions belonging to all finite existences, and are by us always reckoned from some known parts of this sensible world, and from some certain epochs marked out to us by the motions observable in it? Without some such fixed parts or periods, the order of things would be lost to our finite understandings, in the boundless invariable oceans of duration and expansion, which comprehend in them all finite beings, and in their full extent belong only to the deity. And therefore, we are not to wonder that we comprehend them not, and do so often find our thoughts at a loss, when we would consider them either abstractly in themselves, or as any way attributed to the first incomprehensible being. But when applied to any particular finite beings, the extension of any body is so much of that infinite space, as the bulk of the body takes up, and place is the position of any body, when considered at a certain distance from some other. As the idea of the particular duration of anything is an idea of that portion of infinite duration, which passes during the existence of that thing, so the time when the thing existed is the idea of that space of duration, which passed between some known and fixed period of duration, and the being of that thing. One shows the distance of the extremities of the bulk or existence of the same thing, as that it is a foot square or lasted two years. The other shows the distance of it in place or existence from other fixed points of space or duration, as that it was in the middle of Lincoln's infields or the first degree of Taurus, and in the year of our Lord, 1671, or the 1000 year of the Julian period, all which distances we measure by preconceived ideas of certain lengths of space and duration, as inches, feet, miles, and degrees, and in the other, minutes, days, and years, etc. 9. There is one thing more where in space and duration have a great conformity, and that is, though they are justly reckoned amongst our simple ideas, yet none of the distinct ideas we have of either is without all manner of composition. Footnote. It has been objected to Mr. Locke that if space consists of parts, as it is confessed in this place, he should not have reckoned it in the number of simple ideas, because it seems to be inconsistent with what he says elsewhere that a simple idea is uncompounded and contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception of the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas. It is further objected that Mr. Locke has not given in the 11th chapter of the second book where he begins to speak of simple ideas, an exact definition of what he understands by the word simple ideas. To these difficulties, Mr. Locke answers thus, to begin with the last, he declares, that he has not treated his subject in an order perfectly scholastic, having not had much familiarity with those sorts of books during the writing of his, and not remembering at all the method in which they are written, and therefore his readers ought not to expect definitions regularly placed at the beginning of each new subject. Mr. Locke contents himself to employ the principle terms that he uses, so that from his use of them, the reader may easily comprehend what he means by them, but with respect to the term simple idea, he has had the good luck to define that in the place cited in the objection, and therefore there is no reason to supply that defect. The question then is to know whether the idea of extension agrees with this definition, which will effectually agree to it, if it be understood in the sense which Mr. Locke had principally in his view, for that composition which he designed to exclude in that definition was a composition of different ideas in the mind, and not a composition of the same kind in a thing whose essence consists in having parts of the same kind, where you can never come to a part entirely exempted from this composition, so that if the idea of extension consists in having parts extra parts as the schools speak, it is always in the sense of Mr. Locke a simple idea, because the idea of having parts extra parts cannot be resolved into two other ideas. For the remainder of the objection made to Mr. Locke with respect to the nature of extension, Mr. Locke was aware of it, as may be seen in 9 chapter 15 of the second book, where he says that the least portion of space or extension, whereof we have a clear and distinct idea, may perhaps be the fittest to be considered by us as a simple idea of that kind, out of which our complex modes of space and extension are made up, so that according to Mr. Locke, it may very fitly be called a simple idea, since it is the least idea of space that the mind can form to itself, and that cannot be divided by the mind into any less, whereof it has in itself any determined perception, from whence it follows that it is to the mind one simple idea, and that is sufficient to take away this objection, for it is not the design of Mr. Locke in this place to discourse of anything but concerning the idea of the mind, but if this is not sufficient to clear the difficulty, Mr. Locke hath nothing more to add, but that if the idea of extension is so peculiar that it cannot exactly agree with the definition that he has given of those simple ideas, so that it differs in some manner from all others of that kind, he thinks it is better to leave it there exposed to this difficulty than to make a new division in his favor. It is enough for Mr. Locke that his meaning can be understood. It is very common to observe intelligible discourses spoiled by too much subtlety in nice divisions. We ought to put things together as well as we can, Doctrine Causa, but after all several things will not be bundled up together under our terms and ways of speaking. End of footnote. It is the very nature of both of them to consist of parts, but their parts being all of the same kind and without the mixture of any other idea, hinder them not from having a place amongst simple ideas. Could the mind, as in number, come to so small a part of extension or duration as excluded divisibility that would be, as it were, the indivisible unit or idea, by repetition of which it would make its more enlarged ideas of extension and duration. But since the mind is not able to frame an idea of any space without parts, instead thereof it makes use of the common measures which by familiar use in each country have imprinted themselves on the memory as inches and feet or cubits and parisangs. And so seconds, minutes, hours, days, and years in duration. The mind makes use, I say, of such ideas as these, as simple ones, and these are the component parts of larger ideas which the mind, upon occasion, makes by the addition of such known lengths which it is acquainted with. On the other side, the ordinary smallest measure we have of either is looked on as an unit in number when the mind, by division, would reduce them into less fractions. Though on both sides, both in addition and division, either of space or duration, when the idea under consideration becomes very big or very small, its precise bulk becomes very obscure and confused, and it is the number of its repeated additions or divisions that alone remains clear and distinct, as will easily appear to anyone who will let his thoughts loose in the vast expansion of space or divisibility of matter. Every part of duration is duration too, and every part of extension is extension, both of them capable of addition or division in infinitum. But the least portions of either of them, whereof we have clear and distinct ideas, may perhaps be fittest to be considered by us as the simple ideas of that kind out of which our complex modes of space, extension and duration are made up and into which they can again be distinctly revolved. Such a small part of duration may be called a moment and is the time of one idea in our minds in the train of their ordinary succession there, the other wanting a proper name. I know not whether I may be allowed to call a sensible point, meaning thereby the least particle of matter or space we can discern, which is ordinarily about a minute and to the sharpest eyes seldom less than 30 seconds of a circle, whereof the eye is the center. Expansion and duration have this farther agreement that though they are both considered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not separable one from another. No, not even in thought. Though the parts of bodies from whence we take our measure of the one and the parts of motion or rather the succession of ideas in our minds, from whence we take the measure of the other may be interrupted and separated as the one is often by rest and the other is by sleep, which we call rest to. But there is this manifest difference between them, that the ideas of length, which we have of expansion, are turned every way and so make figure and breath and thickness. But duration is but, as it were, the length of one straight line extended in infinitum. Not capable of multiplicity, variation, or figure, but is one common measure of all existence whatsoever, wherein all things whilst they exist equally partake. For this present moment is common to all things that are now in being and equally comprehends that part of their existence as much as if they were all but one single being and we may truly say they all exist in the same moment of time. Whether angels and spirits have any analogy to this in respect to expansion is beyond my comprehension and perhaps for us who have understandings and comprehensions suited to our own preservation and the ends of our own being but not to the reality and extent of all other beings. It is near as hard to conceive any existence or to have an idea of any real being with a perfect negation of all manner of expansion as it is to have the idea of any real existence with a perfect negation of all manner of duration and therefore what spirits have to do with space or how they communicate in it we know not. All that we know is that bodies do each singly possess its proper portion of it according to the extent of solid parts and thereby exclude all other bodies from having any share in that particular portion of space whilst it remains there. 12. Duration and time which is a part of it is the idea we have of perishing distance of which no two parts exist together but follow each other in succession as expansion is the idea of lasting distance all whose parts exist together and are not capable of succession and therefore though we cannot conceive any duration without succession nor can put it together in our thoughts that any being does now exist tomorrow or possess at once more than the present moment of duration yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the Almighty far different from that of man or any other finite being because man comprehends not in his knowledge or power all past and future things his thoughts are but of yesterday and he knows not what tomorrow will bring forth what is once past he can never recall and what is yet to come he cannot make present what I say of man I say of all finite beings who though they may far exceed man in knowledge and power yet are no more than the meanest creature in comparison with God himself finite of any magnitude holds not any proportion to infinite God's infinite duration being accompanied with infinite knowledge and infinite power he sees all things past and to come and they are no more distant from his knowledge no farther removed from his sight than the present they all lie under the same view and there is nothing which he cannot make exist each moment he pleases for the existence of all things depending upon his good pleasure all things exist every moment that he thinks fit to have them exist to conclude expansion and duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other every part of space being in every part of duration and every part of duration in every part of expansion such a combination of two distinct ideas is I suppose scarce to be found in all that great variety we do or can conceive and may afford matter to farther speculation End of section 10 is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Chapter 16 of number 1 amongst all the ideas we have as there is none suggested to the mind by more ways so there is none more simple than that of unity or one it has no shadow of variety or composition in it every object our senses are employed about every idea in our understandings every thought of our minds brings this idea along with it and therefore it is the most intimate to our thoughts as well as it is in its agreement to all other things the most universal idea we have for number applies itself to men angels, actions, thoughts everything that either doth exist or can be imagined 2 by repeating this idea in our minds and adding the repetitions together we come by the complex ideas of the modes of it thus by adding one to one we have the complex idea of a couple by putting 12 units together we have the complex idea of a dozen and so of a score or a million or any other number 3 the simple modes of numbers are of all other the most distincts every the least variation which is in units making each combination as clearly different from that which approaches nearest to it as the most remote 2 being as distinct from 1 as 200 and the idea of 2 as distinct from the idea of 3 as the magnitude of the whole earth is from that of a might this is not so in other simple modes in which it is not so easy nor perhaps possible for us to distinguish betwixt to approaching ideas yet are really different for who will undertake to find a difference between the white of this paper and that of the next degree to it or conform distinct ideas of every the last excess in extension 4 the clearness and distinctance of each mode of number from all others even those that approach nearest make me apt to think that demonstrations in numbers if they are not more evident and exact in extension they are more general in their use and more determinant in their application because the ideas of numbers are more precise and distinguishable than in extension where every equality and excess are not so easy to be observed or measured because our thoughts cannot in space arrive at any determined smallness beyond which it cannot go as in unit and therefore the quantity or proportion of any the least excess cannot be discovered which is clear otherwise in number where as has been said 91 is as distinguishable from 90 as from 9000 though 91 be the next immediate excess to 90 but it is not so in extension where whatsoever is more than just a foot or an inch is not distinguishable from the standard of a foot or an inch and in lines which appear of an equal length one may be longer than the other or more comparable parts nor can anyone assign an angle which shall be the next biggest to a right one 5 by the repeating as has been said the idea of an unit and joining it to another unit we make there of one collective idea marked by the name 2 and whosoever can do this and proceed on still adding one more to the last collective idea which he had of any number of a name to it may counts or have ideas for several collections of units distinguished one from another as far as he hath a series of names for following numbers and a memory to retain that series with their several names all numeration being but still the adding of one unit more and giving to the whole together as comprehended in one idea a new or distinct name or sign whereby to know it from those more and after and distinguish it from every smaller or greater multitude of units so that he that can add one to one and so to two and so go on with this tale taking still with him the distinct names belonging to every progression and so again by subtracting an unit from each collection retreat and lessen them is capable of all the ideas of numbers within the compass of his language or for which he hath names though not perhaps of more for the several simple modes of numbers being in our minds but so many combinations of units which have no variety nor are capable of any other difference for more or less names or marks for each distinct combination seem more necessary than in any other sort of ideas for without such names or marks we can hardly well make use of numbers in reckoning especially where the combination is made up of great multitude of units which put together without a name or mark to distinguish that precise collection will hardly be kept from being a heap in confusion 6. This I think to be the reason why some Americans I've spoken with who were otherwise of quick and rational parts enough could not as we do by any means count to 1000 nor had any distinct idea of that number though they could reckon very well to 20 their language being scanty and accommodated only to the few necessaries of a needy simple life unacquainted either with trade or mathematics had no words in it to stand for 1000 so that when they were discourse with those of great numbers they would show the hairs of their head to express a great multitude which they could not number which inability I suppose proceeded from their want of names the Tuapannambos had no names for numbers above 5 any number beyond that they made out by showing their fingers and the fingers of others who were present and I doubt not but we ourselves might distinctly number in words a great deal farther than we usually do would we find out but some fit denomination to signify them by whereas in the way we take now to name them by millions of millions of millions it is hard to go beyond 18 or at most 4 and 20 decimal progressions without confusion but to show how much distinct names conduced to our well reckoning or having useful ideas of numbers let us set all these following figures in one continued line as the marks of one number VG the ordinary way of naming this number in English will be the often repeating of millions of millions of millions of millions of millions of millions of millions which is the denomination of the second six figures in which way it will be very hard to have any distinguishing notions of this number but whether by giving every number a number it will be very hard to have any distinguishing notions of this number but whether by giving every six figures a new and ordinary denomination these and perhaps a great many more figures in progression might not easily be counted distinctly and ideas of them both got more easily to ourselves and more plainly signified to others I leave it to be considered this I mention only to show how necessary distinct names are to numbering without pretending to introduce new ones of my seven thus children either for want of names to mark the several progressions of numbers or not having yet the faculty to collect scattered ideas into complex ones and range them in a regular order and so retain them in their memories as is necessary to reckoning do not begin to number very early nor proceed in it very far or steadily till a good while after they are well furnished ideas and one may often observe them discourse and reason pretty well and have very clear conceptions of several other things before they can call twenty and some through the default of their memories who cannot retain the several combinations of numbers with their names annexed in their distinct orders and the dependence of so long a train of numeral progressions and their relation one to another are not able all their lifetime to reckon or regularly go over any moderate series of numbers for he that will count to twenty or of any idea of that number must know that nineteen went before with the distinct name or sign of every one of them as they stand marked in their order for wherever this fails a gap is made the chain breaks and the progress in numbering can go no farther so that to reckon right it is required one that the mind distinguish carefully ideas which are different from one another only by the addition or subtraction of one unit to that it retain in memory the names or marks of the several combinations from in unit to that number and the not confused Lee and at random but in that exact order that the numbers follow one another in either of which if it trips the whole business of numbering will be disturbed and there will remain only the confused idea of multitude but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be attained to eight this farther is observable in numbers that it is that which the mind makes use of in measuring all things that by us are measurable which principally our expansion and duration and our idea of infinity even when applied to those seems to be nothing but the infinity of number for what else are ideas of eternity immensity but the repeated additions of certain ideas of imagine parts of duration and expansion with the infinity of number in which we can come to no end of addition for such an inexhaustible stock number of all other our ideas most clearly furnishes us with as is obvious to everyone for let a man collect into one some as great a number as he pleases this multitude how great so ever lessons not one jot the power of adding to it or brings him any near the end of the inexhaustible stock of number where still there remains as much to be added as if none were taken out and this endless addition or add ability if anyone like the word better of numbers so apparent to the mind is that I think which gives us the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity of which more in the following chapter I end of section 11 recorded by joseph hottinger section 12 of an essay concerning human understanding book 2 by john lock this is a LibriVox recording a LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org chapter 17 of infinity one he that would know what kind of idea it is to which we give the name of infinity cannot do it better than by considering to what infinity is by the mind more immediately attributed and then how the mind comes to frame it finite and infinite seem to me to be looked upon by the mind as the modes of quantity and to be attributed primarily in their first designation only to those things which have parts and are capable of increase or diminution by the addition or subtraction of any of the least part and such are the ideas of space duration and number which we have considered in the foregoing chapters it is true that we cannot but be assured that the great god of whom and from whom are all things is incomprehensibly infinite but yet when we apply to that first and supreme being our idea of infinite in our weak and narrow thoughts we do it primarily in respect to his duration and ubiquity and I think more figuratively to his power, wisdom and goodness and other attributes which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible etc for when we call them infinite we have no other idea of this infinity but what carries with it some reflection on and imitation of that number or extent of the acts or objects of god's power, wisdom and goodness which can never be supposed so great or so many which these attributes will not always surmount and exceed let us multiply them in our thoughts as far as we can with all the infinity of endless number I do not pretend to say how these attributes are in god who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities they do without doubt containing them all possible perfection but this I say is our way of conceiving them and these our ideas of their infinity 2. finite then and infinite being by the mind looked on as modifications of expansion and duration the next thing to be considered is how the mind comes by them as for the idea of finite there is no great difficulty the obvious portions of extension that affect our senses carry with them into the mind the idea of finite and the ordinary periods of succession whereby we measure time and duration as ours days and years are bounded lengths the difficulty is how we come by those boundless ideas of eternity and since the objects we converse with come so much short of any approach or proportion to that largeness 3. everyone that has any idea of any stated lengths of space as a foot finds that he can repeat that idea and joining it to the former make the idea of two feet and by the addition of a third three feet and so on without ever coming to an end of his addition whether of the same idea of a foot or if he pleases of doubling it or any other idea he has of any length as a mile or diameter of the earth or the orbits Magnus for which so ever of these he takes and how often so ever he doubles or any otherwise multiplies it he finds that after he has continued this doubling in his thoughts and enlarged his idea as much as he pleases he has no more reason to stop nor is one jot nearer the end of such addition than he was at first setting out the power of enlarging his idea of space by farther additions remaining still the same he hence takes the idea of infinite space. 4. This I think is the way whereby the mind gets the idea of infinite space. It is a quite different consideration to examine whether the mind has the idea of such a boundless space actually existing since our ideas are not always proof of the existence of things but yet since this comes here in our way I suppose I may say that we are apt to think that space in itself is actually boundless to which imagination the idea of space or expansion of itself naturally leads us for it being considered by us either as the extension of body or as existing by itself without any solid matter taking it up for of such a void space we have not only the idea but I have proved as I think from the motion of body its necessary existence it is impossible the mind should be ever able to find or suppose any end of it or be stopped anywhere in its progress in this space how far so ever it extends its thoughts any bounds made with body even adamantine walls are so far from putting a stop to the mind in its further progress in space and extension that it rather facilitates and enlarges it for so far as that body reaches so far no one can doubt of extension and when we are come to the utmost extremity of body what is there that can be put a stop and satisfy the mind that it is at the end of space when it perceives that it is not nay when it is satisfied that body itself can move into it for if it be necessary for the motion of body that there should be an empty space though ever so little here amongst bodies and if it be possible for body to move in or through that empty space nay it is impossible for any particle of matter to move but into an empty space the same possibility of a body's moving into a void space beyond the utmost bounds of body as well as into a space interspersed amongst bodies will always remain clear and evident the idea of empty pure space whether within or beyond the confines of all bodies being exactly the same differing not in nature though in bulk and there being nothing to hinder body from moving into it so that wherever the mind places itself by any thought either amongst or remote from all bodies it can in this uniform idea of space nowhere find any bounds any end and so necessarily concludes it by the very nature and idea of each part of it to be actually infinite 5 as by the power we find in ourselves of repeating as often as we will any idea of space we get the idea of immensity so by being able to repeat the idea of any length of duration we have in our minds with all the endless addition of number we come by the idea of eternity for we find in ourselves we can no more come to an end of such repeated ideas then we can come to the end of number which everyone perceives he not but here again it is another question quite different from our having an idea of eternity to know whether there were any real being whose duration has been eternal and as to this I say he that considers something now existing must necessarily come to something eternal but having spoke of this in another place I shall say here no more of it but proceed on to some other considerations of our idea of infinity 6 if it be so that our idea of infinity be got from the power we observe in ourselves of repeating without and our own ideas it may be demanded why do we do not attribute infinite to other ideas as well as those of space and duration since they may be as easily or as often repeated in our minds as the other and yet nobody ever thinks of infinite sweetness or infinite whiteness though he can repeat the idea of sweet or white as frequently as those of a yard or a day to which I answer all the ideas that are considered as having parts and are capable of increasing by the addition of any equal or less parts afford us by their repetition the idea of infinity because with this endless repetition there is continued an enlargement of which there can be no end but in other ideas it is not so for to the largest idea of extension or duration that I at present have the addition of any the least part makes it but to the perfectest idea I have of the widest whiteness if I add another of a less or equal whiteness and of a whiter than I have I cannot add the idea it makes no increase and enlarges not my idea at all and therefore the different ideas of whiteness etc. are called degrees for those ideas that consist of parts are capable of being augmented by every addition of the least part but if you take the idea of white which one parcel of snow yielded yesterday to our site and another idea of white from another part of snow you see today and put them together in your mind they embody as it were and run into one and the idea of whiteness is not at all increased and if we add a less degree of whiteness to a greater we are so far from increasing that we diminish it those ideas that consist not of parts cannot be augmented to what proportion men please or be stretched beyond what they have received by their senses but space, duration and number being capable of increase by repetition leave in the mind idea of endless room for more nor can we conceive anywhere a stop to a farther addition or progression and so those ideas alone lead our minds towards the thought of infinity 7. though our idea of infinity arise from the contemplation of quantity and the endless increase the mind is able to make in quantity by the repeated additions of what portions thereof it pleases yet I guess we cause great confusion in our thoughts when we join infinity to any supposed idea of quantity the mind can be thought to have and so discourse or reason about an infinite quantity for instance an infinite space or an infinite duration for our idea of infinity being as I think an endless growing idea by the idea of any quantity the mind has being at that time terminated in that idea for be it as great as it will it can be no greater than it is to join infinity to it is to adjust a standard measure to a growing bulk and therefore I think it is not an insignificant subtlety if I say that we are carefully to distinguish between the idea of the infinity of space and the idea of a space infinite the first is nothing but a supposed endless progression of the mind over what repeated ideas of space it pleases but to have actually in the mind the idea of a space infinite is to suppose the mind already passed over and actually to have a view of all those repeated ideas of space which an endless repetition can never totally represent to it which carries in it a plain contradiction 8 this perhaps will be a little plainer if we consider it in numbers the infinity of numbers to the end of whose addition everyone perceives there is no approach easily appears to anyone on it but how clear so ever this idea of the infinity of number B there is nothing yet more evident than the absurdity of the actual idea of an infinite number whatsoever positive ideas we have in our minds of any space duration or number that then be ever so great they are still finite but when we suppose an inexhaustible remainder from we remove all bounds and wherein we allow the mind an endless progression of thought without ever completing the idea there we have our idea of infinity which though it seems to be pretty clear when we consider nothing else in it but the negation of an end yet when we would frame in our minds the idea of an infinite space or duration that idea is very obscure and confused because it is made up of two parts very different if not inconsistent for let a man frame in his mind an idea of any space or number as great as he will it is plain the mind rests and terminates in that idea which is contrary to the idea of infinity which consists in a supposed endless and therefore I think it is that we are so easily confounded when we come to argue and reason about infinite space or duration etc because the parts of such an idea not being perceived to be as they are inconsistent the one side or other always perplexes whatever consequences we draw from the other as an idea of motion not passing on perplex anyone who should argue from such an idea which is not better than an idea of motion at rest and such another seems to me to be the idea of a space which is the same thing a number infinite that is of a space or number which the mind actually has and so views and terminates in and of a space or number which in a constant and enlarging and progression it can in thought never attain to for how large so ever an idea of space I have in my mind it is no larger than it is that instant that I have it though I be capable the next instant to double it and so on in infinitum for that alone is infinite which has no bounds and that the idea of infinity in which our thoughts can find none nine but of all other ideas it is number as I have said which I think furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity we are capable of for even in space and duration when the mind pursues the idea of infinity it there makes use of the ideas and repetitions of numbers as of millions and millions of miles or years which are so many distinct ideas kept best by number from running into a confused heap where in the mind loses itself and when it has added together as many millions etc as it pleases of known lengths of space or duration the clearest idea it can get of infinity is the confused incomprehensible remainder of endless addable numbers which affords no prospect of stop or boundary ten it will perhaps give us a little further light into the idea we have of infinity and discover to us that it is nothing but the infinity of number applied to determinant parts of which we have in our minds the distinct ideas if we consider is not generally thought by us infinite whereas duration and extension are apt to be so which arises from hints that in number we are at one end as it were for there being in number nothing less than a unit we there stop and are at an end but in addition or increase of number we can set no bounds and so it is like a line where of one end terminating with us the other is extended still forwards beyond all that we can conceive but in space and duration it is otherwise for in duration we consider it as if this line of number were extended both ways to an inconceivable undeterminate and infinite length which is evident to anyone that will but reflect on what consideration he have of eternity which I suppose he will find to be nothing else but the turning this infinity of number both ways a part on the and a part a post as they speak for when we would consider eternity aparthe ante what do we but beginning from ourselves and the present time we are in repeat in our minds the ideas of years or ages or any other assignable portion of duration past with the prospect of proceeding in such addition with all the infinity of number and when we would consider eternity aparthe post we just after the same rate begin from ourselves and reckon by multiplied periods yet to come still extending that line of number as before and these two being put together are that infinite duration we call eternity which as we turn our view either way forwards or backwards appears infinite because we still turn that way the infinite end of number namely the power still of adding more 11 the same happens also in space where in conceiving ourselves to be as it were in the center we do on all sides pursue those indeterminable lines of number and reckoning anyway from ourselves a yard mile diameter of the earth or orbits Magnus by the infinity of number we had others to them as often as we will and having no more reason to set bounds to those repeated ideas then we have to number we have that indeterminable idea of immensity 12 and since in any bulk of matter our thoughts can never arrive at the utmost the visibility therefore there is an apparent infinity to us also in that which has the infinity also of number but with this difference that in the former considerations of the infinity of space and duration we only use addition of numbers whereas this is like the division of an unit into its fractions where in the mind also can proceed in infinitum as well as in the former additions it being indeed both the addition still of new numbers though in the addition of the one we can have no more a positive idea of a space infinitely great than in the division of the other we can have the idea of a body infinitely little our idea of infinity being as I may say a growing or figurative idea still in a boundless progression that we can stop nowhere 13 though it be hard I think to find anyone so observed as to say he has the positive idea of an actual infinite number the infinity where of lies only in a power still of adding any combination of units to any former number and that as long and as much as one well the like also being in the infinity of space and duration which power leaves also to the mind room for endless additions yet there be those who imagine positive ideas of infinite duration and space it would I think be enough to destroy any such positive idea of infinite to ask him that has it whether he could add to it or know which would easily show the mistake of such a positive idea we can I think have no positive idea of any space or duration which is not made up and commensurate to repeated numbers of feet or yards or days and years which are the common measures where of we have the idea in our minds and whereby we judge of the greatest of those sorts of quantities and therefore since an infinite idea of space or duration must needs be made up of infinite parts it can have no other infinity than that of number capable still of further addition but not an actual positive idea of a number infinite for I think it is evident that the addition of finite things together as our all lengths where of we have the positive ideas can never otherwise produce the idea of infinite than as number does which consisting of additions of finite units one to another suggests the idea of infinite only by a power we find we have of stilling precinct the sum and adding more of the same kind without coming one jot nearer to the end of such progression 14 they who would prove their idea of infinite to be positive seem to me to do it by a pleasant argument taken from the negation of an end which being negative the negation of it is positive he that considers that the end is in body but the extremity or superficies of that body will not perhaps be forward to grant that the end is a bear negative and he that perceives the end of his pin is black or white will be apt to think that the end is something more than a pure negation nor is it when applied to duration the bear negation of existence but more properly the last moment of it but if they will have the end to be nothing but the bear negation of existence I am sure they cannot deny but the beginning is the first instant of being and is not by anybody conceived to be a bear negation and therefore by their own argument the idea of eternal aparthe ante or of a duration without a beginning is but a negative idea fifteen the idea of infinite has I confess something of positive in all those things we apply to it when we would think of infinite space or duration we at first step usually make some very large idea as perhaps of millions of ages or miles which possibly we double and multiply several times all that we thus amass together in our thoughts is positive and the assemblage of a great number of positive ideas of space or duration but what still remains beyond this we have no more a positive distinct notion of than a mariner has of the depths of the sea having let down a large portion of his sounding line he reaches no bottom whereby we know the depth to be so many fathoms and more but how much the more is he has no distinct notion at all and could he always supply new line and find the plummet always sinking without ever stopping he would be something in the positive idea of infinity in which case let this line be tin or one thousand fathoms long and equally discovers what is beyond it and gives only this confused and comparative idea that this is not all but only may yet go further so much as the mind comprehends of any space it has a positive idea of but in endeavoring to make it infinite it being always enlarging always advancing the idea is still imperfect and incomplete so much space as the mind takes a view of in its contemplation of greatness is a clear picture and positive in the understanding but infinite is still greater one then the idea of so much is positive and clear two the idea of greater is also clear but it is not a comparative idea namely the idea of so much greater as cannot be comprehended and this is plainly negative not positive for he has no positive clear idea of the largeness of any extension which is that sought for in the idea of infinite that has not a comprehensive idea of the dimensions of it and such nobody I think pretends to in what is infinite for to say a man has a positive clear idea of any quantity without knowing how great it is is as reasonable as to say he has the positive clear idea of the number of the sands on the seashore who knows not how many there be but only that there be more than twenty for just such a perfect and positive idea has he of an infinite space or duration who says it is larger than the extent of duration of ten one hundred one thousand or any other number of miles or years whereof he has or can have a positive idea which is all the idea I think we have of infinite so that what lies beyond our positive ideas towards infinity lies in obscurity and has the indeterminate confusion of a negative idea wherein I know I neither do nor can comprehend all I would it being too large for a finite and narrow capacity and that cannot be but very far from a positive complete idea wherein the greatest part of what I would comprehend is left out under the undeterminate intimation of being still greater for to say that having in any quantity measured so much or gone so far you are not yet at an end is only to say that the quantity is greater so that the negation of an end in any quantity is in other words only to say that it is bigger and a total negation of an end is but carrying this bigger still with you in all the progressions your thoughts shall make in quantity and adding this idea of still greater to all the ideas you have or can suppose to have of quantity now whether such an idea as that be positive I leave anyone to consider 16 those who say that they have a positive idea of eternity whether their ideas of duration includes in it succession or not if it does not they ought to show the difference of their notion of duration when applied to an eternal being into a finite since perhaps there may be others as well as I will own to them their weakness of understanding in this point I acknowledge that the notion they have of duration forces them to conceive that whatever has duration is of a larger continuance today than it was yesterday if to avoid succession in external existence they return to the punkdom stands of the schools I suppose they will thereby very little mend the matter or help us to a more clear and positive idea of infinite duration there being nothing more inconceivable to me than duration without succession besides that punkdom stands if it signify anything being not quantum finite or infinite cannot belong to it but if our weak apprehensions cannot separate succession from any duration whatsoever our idea of eternity can be nothing but of infinite succession of moments of duration wherein anything does exist and whether anyone has or can have a positive idea of an actual infinite number I leave him to consider till his infinite number be so great that he himself can add no more to it and as long as he can increase it I doubt he himself will think the idea he has of it too scanty for positive infinity 17 I think it unavoidable for every considering rational creature that will but examine his own or any other existence to have the notion of an eternal wise being who has no beginning and such an idea of infinite duration I am sure I have but this negation of a beginning being but the negation of a positive thing scarce gives me a positive idea of infinity which whenever I endeavor to extend my thoughts to I confess myself at a loss and I find I cannot attain any clear comprehension of it 18 he that thinks he has a positive idea of infinite space will when he considers it find that he can no more have a positive idea of the greatest than he has of the least space for in this ladder which seems the easier of the two and more within our comprehension we are capable only of a comparative idea of smallness which will always be less than anyone where of we have the positive idea our positive ideas of any quantity whether great or little have always bounds though our comparative idea whereby we can always add to the one and take from the other have no bounds for that which remains either great or little not being comprehended in our positive idea which we have lies in obscurity and we have no other idea of it but of the power of enlarging the one and diminishing the other without a pestle and murder will as soon bring any particle of matter to indivisibility as the acutus thought of a mathematician and a surveyor may as soon with his chain measure our infinite space as a philosopher by the quickest flight of mind reach it or by thinking comprehend it which is to have a positive idea of it that thinks on a cube of an inch diameter has a clear and positive idea of it in his mind and so can frame one of one half one fourth one eighth and so on till he has the idea in his thoughts of something very little but yet reaches not the idea of that incomprehensible littleness which division can produce what remains of smallness is as far from his thoughts as when he first began and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and positive idea of that smallness which is consequent to infinite divisibility 19 everyone that looks toward infinity does as I have said at first glance make some very large idea of that which he applied it to let it be space or separation and possibly he worries his thoughts by multiplying in his mind that first large idea but yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a positive clear idea of what remains to make up a positive infinite then the country fellow head of the water which was yet to come and past the channel of the river where he stood rusticus expect that doom transient hot ealy in only volubilis 20 there are some I have met with that put so much difference between infinite duration and infinite space that they persuade themselves that they have a positive idea of eternity that they can have any idea of infinite space the reason of which mistake I suppose to be this that finding by a do contemplation of causes and effects that it is necessary to admit some eternal being and so to consider the real existence of that being as taken up and commensurate to their idea of eternity but on the other side not finding it necessary but on the contrary apparently absurd that body should be infinite they forwardly conclude that they have no idea of infinite space because they can have no idea of infinite matter which consequence I conceive is very ill collected because the existence of matter is no ways necessary to the existence of space no more than the existence of motion or the sun is necessary to duration though duration uses to be measured by it and I don't not but that a man may have the idea of ten thousand miles square without any body so big as well as the idea of ten thousand years without any body so old it seems as easy to me to have the idea of space we have body as to think of the capacity of a bushel without corn or the hollow of a nut shell without a kernel in it it being no more necessary that there should be existing a solid body infinitely extended because we have an idea of the infinity of space then it is necessary that the world should be eternal because we have an idea of infinite duration and why should we think our idea of infinite space requires the real existence of matter to support it when we find that we have as clear an idea of an infinite duration to come as we have of infinite duration past though I suppose nobody thinks it conceivable that anything does or has existed in that future duration nor is it possible to join an idea of future duration with present or past existence any more than it is possible to make the ideas of yesterday, today, and tomorrow to be the same or bring ages past and future together and make them contemporary but if these men are of the mind that they have clearer ideas of infinite duration than of infinite space because it is past doubt that God has existed from all eternity but there is no real matter co-extended with infinite space yet those philosophers who are of opinion that infinite space is possessed by God's infinite omnipresence as well as infinite duration by as external existence must be allowed to have as clear an idea of infinite space as of infinite duration though neither of them I think has any positive idea of infinity in either case for whatsoever positive idea a man has in his mind of any quantity he can repeat it and add to it the former as easy as he can add together the idea of two days or two paces which are positive ideas of length he has in his mind and so on as long as he pleases whereby if a man had a positive idea of infinite either duration or space he could add two infinites together may make one infinite infinitely bigger than another absurdities too gross to be confuted 21 but yet after all this there being men who persuade themselves that they have clear extensive ideas of infinity it is fit they enjoy their privilege and I should be very glad with some others that I know who acknowledge they have none such to be better informed by their communication for I have been hitherto apt to think that the great and inextricable difficulties which perpetually involve all discourses concerning infinity duration or divisibility have been certain marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the comprehension of our narrow capacities for whilst men talk and dispute of infinite space or duration as if they had as complete and positive ideas of them as they have of the names they use for them or as they have of a yard or an hour or any other determinate quantity it is no wonder if the incomprehensible nature of the thing they discourse of or reason about leads them into perplexities and contradictions and their minds be overlaid by an object too large and mighty to be surveyed and managed by them 22 if I have dwelt pretty long on the consideration of duration, space and number and what arises from the contemplation of them infinitely it is possibly no more than the matter requires there being few simple ideas whose modes give more exercise to the thoughts of men than these do I pretend not to treat of them in their full latitude it suffices to my design to show how the mind receives them such as they are from sensation and reflection and how even the idea we have of infinity how remote so ever it may seem to be from any object of sense or operation of our mind has nevertheless as all our other ideas its original there some mathematicians perhaps of advanced speculations may have other ways to introduce into their minds ideas of infinity but this hinders not but that they themselves as well as all the other men got the first ideas which they had of infinity from sensation and reflection in the method we have here set down end of section 12 section 13 of an essay concerning human understanding chapter 2 by John Locke this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recorded by Larry Wilson chapters 18 to 19 of other simple modes and of the modes of thinking of other simple modes one though I have in the foregoing chapter shown how from simple ideas motion taken in by sensation the mind comes to extend itself even to infinity which however it may of all others see most remote from any sensible perception yet at last hath nothing in it of what is made out of simple ideas received into the mind by the senses and afterwards there put together by the faculty the mind has to repeat its own ideas though I say these might be instances enough of simple modes of the simple ideas of sensation as suffice to show how the mind comes by them yet I shall for method's sake though briefly give an account of some few more and then proceed to more complex ideas two to slide roll tumble walk creep run dance leap skip and abundance of others that might be named are words which are no sooner heard but everyone who understands English has presently in his mind distinct ideas which are all but the different modifications of motion modes of motion answer those of extension swift and slow are two different ideas of motion the measures whereof are made of the distances of time and space put together so they are complex ideas comprehending time and space with motion the like variety have we in sounds every articulate word is a different modification of sound by which we see that from the sense of hearing by such modifications the mind may be furnished with distinct ideas to almost an infinite number sounds also besides the distinct cries of birds and beasts are modified by diversity of notes of different length put together which make that complex idea called a tune which a musician may have in his mind when he hears or makes no sound at all by reflecting on the ideas of those sounds so put together silently in his own fancy for those of colors are also various some we take notice of as the different degrees or as they are termed shades of the same color but since we very seldom make assemblages of colors either for use or delight but figure is taken in also and has its part in it as in painting weaving needle works etc those which are taken notice of do most commonly belong to mixed modes as being made up of ideas of diverse kinds this figure and color such as beauty rainbow etc five all compounded tastes and smells are also modes made up of the simple ideas of these senses but they being such as generally we have no names for are less taken notice of and cannot be set down in writing and therefore must be left without enumeration to the thoughts and experience of my reader six in general it may be observed that those simple modes which are considered but as different degrees of the same simple idea though they are in themselves many of them very distinct ideas yet have ordinarily no distinct names nor are much taken notice of as distinct ideas where the differences but very well between them whether men have neglected these modes and have given no names to them as wanting measures nicely to distinguish them or because when they are so distinguished that knowledge would not be of general our necessary use I leave it to the thoughts of others it is sufficient to my purpose to show that all our simple ideas come to our minds only by sensation and reflection and that when the mind has them it invariously repeat and compound them and so make new complex ideas but though white red or sweet etc have not been modified or made into complex ideas by several combinations so as to be named and thereby ranked into species yet some others of the simple ideas viz those of unity duration motion etc above instanced in as also power and thinking have been thus modified to a great variety of complex ideas with names belonging to them seven the reason whereof I suppose has been this that the great concern of men being with men one amongst another the knowledge of men and their actions and the signifying of them to one another was most necessary and therefore they made ideas of actions very nicely modified and gave those complex ideas names that they might more easily record and discourse of those things they were daily conversant in without long ambages and circumlocutions and that the things they were continually to give and receive information about might be the easier and quicker understood that this is so and that men in framing different complex ideas and giving them names have been much governed by the end of speech in general which is a very short and expedite way of conveying thoughts one to another is evident in the names which in several arts have been found out and applied to several complex ideas of modified actions belonging to their several trades for dispatch sake in their direction or discourses about them which ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men not conversant about these operations and thence the words that stand for them by the greatest part of men of the same language understood. For example culture, drilling, filtration cohabation are words standing for certain complex ideas which being seldom in the minds of any but those few whose particular employments do at every turn suggest them to their thoughts those names of them are not generally understood but by smiths and chemists who having framed the complex ideas which these words stand for and having given names to them or receive them from others upon hearing of these names in communication readily conceive those ideas in their minds as by cohabation all the simple ideas of distilling and the pouring the liquor distilled from anything back upon the remaining matter and distilling it again thus we see that there are great varieties of simple ideas as of tastes and smells which have no names and of modes many more which either not having been generally enough served or else not being of any great use to be taken notice of in the affairs and converse of men they have not had names given to them and so pass not for species. This we will have occasion hereafter to consider more to large when we come to speak of words. Chapter 19 of the Modes of Thinking 1. When the mind turns its view inwards upon itself and contemplates its own actions thinking is the first that occurs. In it the mind observes a great variety of modifications and from thence receives distinct ideas thus the perception which actually accompanies and is annexed to any impression on the body made by an external object being distinct from all other modifications of thinking furnishes the mind with a distinct idea which we call sensation which is as it were the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses. The same idea when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory is remembrance. If it be sought after by the mind and with pain and endeavor found and brought again in view it is recollection. If it be held there long under attentive consideration it is contemplation. When ideas float in our mind without any reflection or regard of the understanding it is that which the French call reverie. Our language has scarce a name for it. When the ideas that offer themselves for I have observed in another place whilst we are awake there will always be a train of ideas succeeding one another in our minds are taken notice of and as it were registered in the memory it is attention. When the mind with great earnestness and of choice fixes its view on any idea considers it on all sides and will not be called off by the ordinary solicitation of other ideas it is that we call intention or study. Sleep without dreaming is rest from all these and dreaming itself is the having of ideas whilst the outward senses are stopped so that they receive not outward objects with their usual quickness in the mind not suggested by any external objects or known occasion nor under any choice of conduct of the understanding at all and whether that which we call ecstasy be not dreaming with the eyes open I leave to be examined. These are some few instances of those various modes of thinking which the mind may observe in itself and so have as distinct ideas of as it hath of white and red a square or circle I do not pretend to enumerate them all nor to treat at large of this set of ideas which are got from reflection that would be to make a volume. It suffices to my present purpose to have shown here by some few examples of what sort these ideas are and how the mind comes by them especially since I shall have occasion hereafter to treat more at large of reasoning judging volition and knowledge which are some of the most considerable operations of the mind in modes of thinking. Three. Perhaps it may not be an unparter bold digression nor holy impertinent to our present design if we reflect here upon the different state of the mind in thinking which those instances of attention, reverie and dreaming etc before mentioned naturally enough suggest that there are ideas some or other always present in the mind of a waking man everyone's experience convinces him though the mind employs itself about them with several degrees of attention sometimes the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness on the contemplation of some objects that it turns their ideas on all sides remarks their relations and circumstances and views every part so nicely and with such intention that it sheds out all other thoughts and takes no notice of the ordinary impressions made them on the senses which at another season would produce very sensible perceptions. At other times it barely observes the train of ideas that succeed in the understanding without directing and perusing any of them. And at other times it lets them pass almost quite unregarded as faint shadows that make no impression. Four. This difference of intention and remission of the mind in thinking with a great variety of degrees between earnest study and everyone I think has experimented in himself. Trace it a little farther and you find the mind in sleep retired as it were from the senses and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense which at other times produce very vivid and sensible ideas. I need not for this instance in those who sleep out whole stormy nights without hearing the thunder or seeing the lightning or feeling the shaking of the house but in this retirement of the mind from the senses it often retains as yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking which we call dreaming and last of all sound sleep closes the scene quite and puts an end to all appearances. This I think almost everyone has experience of in himself and his own observation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hints is that since the mind can sensibly put on and at several times several degrees of thinking and be sometimes even an awakening man so remiss as to have thoughts dim and obscure to that degree that they are very little removed from none at all and at last in the dark retirements of sound sleep loses the sight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever. Since I say this is evidently so in matter of fact and constant experience I ask whether it be not probable that thinking is the action and not the essence of the soul since the operations of agents will easily admit of intention and revision but the essences of things not conceived capable of any such variation but this by and by. End of section 13 Section 14 of an Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 2 by John Locke This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Chapter 20 of Modes of Pleasure and Pain 1. Amongst the simple ideas which we receive both from sensation and reflection pain and pleasure are two very considerable ones for as in the body there is sensation barely in itself or accompanied with pain or pleasure so the thought or perception of the mind is simply so or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble. Call it how you please. These like other simple ideas cannot be described nor their names defined. The way of knowing them is as of the simple ideas of the senses only by experience. For to define them by the presence of good or evil is no otherwise to make them known to us then by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds as we are differently applied to or considered by us. 2. Things then are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain that we call good which is apt to cause or increase pleasure or diminish pain in us or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil and on the contrary we name that evil which is apt to produce or increase any pain or diminish any pleasure in us or else to procure us any evil or deprive us of any good. By pleasure and pain I must be understood to mean of body or mind as they are commonly distinguished though in truth they be only different constitutions of the mind sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body sometimes by thoughts of the mind. 3. Pleasure and pain and that which causes them good and evil are the hinges on which our passions turn and if we reflect on ourselves and observe how these under various considerations operate in us our passions or tempers of mind but internal sensations if I may so call them they produce in us we may then form to ourselves the ideas of our passions. 4. Thus anyone reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him has the idea we call love for when a man declares in autumn when he is eating them or in spring when there are none that he loves grapes it is no more but that the taste of grapes delights him let an alteration of health or constitution destroy the delight of their taste and he then can be said to love grapes no longer. 5. On the contrary the thought of the pain which anything present or absent is apt to produce in us is what we call hatred. We are at my business here to inquire any further than into the bare ideas of our passions as they depend on different modifications of pleasure and pain I should remark that our love and hatred of inanimate insensible beings is commonly founded on that pleasure and pain which we receive from their use and application any way to our senses though with their destruction but hatred or love to beings capable of happiness or misery is often the uneasiness or delight which we find in ourselves arising from a consideration of their very being or happiness thus the being and welfare of a man's children or friends producing constant delight in him he is said constantly to love them but it suffices to note that our ideas of love and hatred are but the dispositions of the mind in respect of pleasure and pain in general however caused in us. 6. The uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of anything whose present enjoyment carries the idea that his delight with it is that we call desire which is greater or less as that uneasiness is more or less vehement where by the by it may perhaps be of some use to remark that the chief if not only spur to human industry and action is uneasiness for whatsoever good is proposed if its absence carries pleasure or pain with it if a man be easy and content without it there is no desire of it nor endeavor after it there is no more but a bear valiety the term used to signify the lowest degree of desire and that which is next to none at all when there is so little uneasiness in the absence of anything that it carries a man no farther than some faint wishes for it without any more effectual and vigorous use of the means to attain it desire also is stopped or abated by the opinion of the impossibility or unattainableness of the good proposed as far as the uneasiness is cured or allayed by that consideration this might carry our thoughts farther where it's seasonable in this place joy is a delight of the mind from the consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a good and we are then possessed of any good when we have it so in our power that we can use it when we please thus a man almost starved has joy at the arrival of relief even before he has the pleasure of using it and a father in whom the very well-being of his children causes delight is always as long as his children are in such a state in their possession of that good for he needs but to reflect on it to have that pleasure eight sorrow is an easiness in the mind upon the thought of a good lost which might have been enjoyed longer or the sense of a present evil nine hope is that pleasure in the mind which everyone finds in himself upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight him ten fear is an easiness of the mind upon the thought of future evil likely to be flawless eleven despair is the thought of the unattainableness of any good which works differently in men's minds sometimes producing uneasiness or pain sometimes rest and indolency twelve anger is uneasiness or discomposure of the mind upon the receipt of any injury with a present purpose of revenge thirteen envy is an uneasiness of the mind caused by the consideration of a good we desire obtained by one we think should not have had it before us fourteen these two last envy and anger not being caused by pain and pleasure simply in themselves but having in them some mixed consideration of ourselves and others are not therefore to be found in all men because those other parts of valuing their merits or intending revenge is wanting in them but all the rest terminating purely in pain and pleasure are I think to be found in all men for we love desire rejoice and hope only in respect of pleasure we hate fear and grieve only in respect of pain ultimately in fine all these passions are moved by things only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain or to have pleasure or pain some way or other next to them thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject at least if a sensible or voluntary agent which has produced pain in us because the fear it leaves is a constant pain but we do not so constantly love what has done us good because pleasure operates not so strongly on us as pain and because we are not so ready to have hope it will do so again but this by the by fifteen by pleasure and pain delight and uneasiness I must all along be understood as I have above made it to mean not only bodily pleasure and pain but whatsoever delight or uneasiness is felt by us whether arising from any grateful or unacceptable sensation or reflection sixteen it is farther to be considered that in reference to the passions the removal or lessening of a pain is considered and operates as a pleasure in the loss or diminishing of a pleasure as a pain seventeen the passions too have most of them in most persons operating on the body and cause various changes in it which not being always sensible do not make a necessary part of the idea of each passion for shame which is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of having done something which is indecent or will lessen the value to steam which others have for us has not always blushing accompanying it eighteen I would not be mistaken here as if I meant this as a discourse of the passions they are many more than those I have here named and those I have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger and more accurate discourse I have only mentioned these here as so many instances of modes of pleasure and pain resulting in our minds from various considerations of good and evil I might perhaps have instanced in other modes of pleasure and pain more simple than these as the pain of hunger and thirst and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them the pain of tender eyes and the pleasure of music pain from uninstructive wrangling and the pleasure of rational conversation with a friend or of well-directed study in the search and discovery of truth but the passions being of more concern to us I rather made choice of instance in them and show how the ideas we have of them are derived from reflection and reflection End of section 14