 We could have been sitting here a month ago if we hadn't had to spend as long as we did arguing about the content and format of these final two chapters. In order to do it, departing from the usual methodology, we had to be very clear about the major messages of the book. These drew, in particular, on the chapter about the political implications for Ireland by Tom Arnold and James Kilkors, and on the two chapters on the implications for the UK and for the European Union by Brendan Halligan, which outlined in very considerable detail, often stark detail, some of the consequences of what we're facing. In, for example, in the chapter on the implications for the UK, there's implications of the UK of a British exit. There's a list of the negotiating points on pages 203 and 204, covering elements like agriculture, business, free movement, social dumping, financial services. Almost you name it. It's a very considerable list, and there would have to be very hard bargaining indeed, and there would be on these issues if it came to an exit. In the same way, we take account of the way in which the other chapter looks at the implications for the European Union of a British exit. And what would happen within the European setting? We argue that there would be a more powerful Germany. There would be an eastward direction of the system. It would probably be less liberal in the sense of open and free trading. The whole question of the core would change and shift because most states, in the event of a British exit, we think are likely to join the euro, and therefore it would become probably less variable. There's also, in those chapters, a look at the implications for the UK globally of an exit, including its role of the Security Council and its world institutions. And we take a rather bleak view of that. So in the final two chapters, we set out after a short intro by myself, which reprises the arguments of the book, an agenda for Europe and an agenda for Ireland. The European Council conclusions of June, 2014 are very instructive. Sorry, 2014 are very instructive. They refer to the ever closer Union norm that's been there since the 1950s. And they make the point that under the notion of variable geometry, that is that there may be different interpretations and even different directions within the one united organization, this doesn't have to apply in the same way to every state. It's almost as an acknowledgment and certainly a gesture towards British particularism or exceptionalism. In the same way, Junker's program for the new commission sets out a number of areas, including an energy union, including a capital markets union, including the whole question of subsidiarity and abolishing red tape in the so-called refit program, which are really very strong gestures towards the British negotiating agenda. And we take account of these developments and say that if you want a multilateral solution to this problem, you create an entity, the European Union, which has a number of cores and not only the eurozone core, so that Britain can be a member of three of them, and that it's possible to be inspired by the protocols that were applied when Ireland had to renegotiate after rejecting several treaties and referendums. It's possible to find legal means of expressing the way in which you either freeze commitments, allowing a state to join only when it chooses to, or even to opt out. And the argument here would be that it's better to have Britain in than out, and a lot of work must go into that in order to create the setting in which that negotiation can take place. There are, of course, limits. And Brendan has identified a number of them. And there will be argument in this room and in any negotiation about that. And our contribution to that debate is to raise the issues rather than fully to resolve them. But what we argue, finally, in the agenda for Ireland, is that if it's very much in our interest to keep Britain in the EU, we should use forceful arguments, smart alliances around the system, and a multilateral strategy to achieve that. We can take, if we want to, a lead in mediating between the UK and the EU. Ireland is trusted and has a good record around the system in order both to interpret and perhaps to take a lead in those areas. Looking for multilateral solutions to the UK's problems and using a daring and imaginative approach to reach that. And we use the phrase a bespoke solution, which we very much prefer to see within the system rather than without the system. As I would put it, we want to preserve the universality of the system and its multilateralism as far as possible. But we have to recognize the uniqueness of this problem as much as necessary in order to reach a solution. And we think that it's worth doing. It's worth being patient to reach that outcome, knowing that the UK debate will take time to mature and become more fully informed, including on the economic consequences that John Bradley has referred to. So we end off the book on that note. Thank you very much. Thank you.