 So we've had kind of a problem with not only the Eutherford Dilemma, but the other dilemma posed by the same, you know, premises. So we had the Eutherford Dilemma, we talked about this last time, and it has a conclusion that theists really don't like that either morality is arbitrary or morality is independent of the divine. And the other dilemma that's caused by this is that something that atheists and agnostics really won't like, namely that there is a divine. So a question is, can we avoid either dilemma? One way to avoid the dilemma, you know, these are both, these are both the duckly valid arguments. So if we're going to reject the conclusions, we have to reject the premises from which they come. Well, let's look at, you know, what they have different. Dealing with the premises two and three, can we reject either premise two or three? Well, we'll look at that one. You know, this is what the premises look like rejected, right? This isn't what they were originally. This is what they look like rejected. Well, if we reject premise two, then what we have is that what is moral is moral because it's commanded by the divine and morality is not arbitrary. Well, how would it not be arbitrary? The only thing to divine command to morality is that it's commanded by divinity. Well, that seems to be just as arbitrary as if it's just commanded by anything else. Or if the divine commanded one thing, okay, but could the divine have commanded something else? So it's hard to see how this rejection of two could possibly be true. And three, divine commands what's moral because it's moral and it's false, that the morality is independent of the divine. Okay, but you got to tell the story. How is it that morality is not independent of the divine? After all, the divinity apparently is going to morality to figure out what the divinity can or cannot command. Well, that's not going to help the theists out very much. Well, let's look over at five and six. What is moral is moral because it's commanded by the divine and it's false that there is a divine. This looks like a direct logical contradiction. It's a lot like saying the elephant is sitting on my bed and there is no elephant. It's at least an absurdity if not an out and out direct self-contradiction. The same thing is true for six. The divine commands what's moral because it's moral and it's false that there is a divine. So we have direct contradictions of both five and six and it looks like direct contradictions of two or three when trying to reject them. So rejecting two, three, five or six isn't going to get anybody anywhere. What are we going to do? Well, the only premise that they have in common is the first one. Either what is moral is moral because the divine commands it or the divine commands what is moral because it's moral. This is the first premise for both the limits. So if the theist, the atheist and the agnostic are kind of get their way out of this, they got to figure out a way to reject that first premise and at least on its surface it looks like these are the only two possibilities. In order to reject this premise, we got to figure out a third or fourth or a fifth possibility regarding the relationship between morality and divinity. How are we going to do that? Well, one way is we could start or maybe the idea is we could start looking at these other theories that have already been given to us by these philosophers and ask ourselves is morality either arbitrary or independent with these other theories? And if they're not arbitrary or independent, if they escape the horns of the dilemma that way, can we talk about these theories with the divinity?