 Now, I begin by just setting up a framework of the things that typically are involved in regulation, what I call what things regulate as a way to understand something more general than what lawyers typically understand when they think about the nature of regulation. So in the center of this picture is the pathetic red dot, this target of regulation, which will be the subject of the analysis which we present here. The target of this regulation, the red dot, is obviously, and as lawyers think, primarily regulated by the law. Probably the most important in many societies is the way that norms regulate behavior. The norms of a society will impose rules on individuals within that society about how they must behave or what their behavior with respect to other individuals must be. Those rules are governed not so much by strict absolute requirements, but often are governed by understandings of members within a community. This is the regulation of the market. The market sets conditions on which you're allowed to interact with others through property and contract. These conditions set, for example, prices that establish the relationship between the amount of one good that you get in exchange for another. Finally, and most importantly, in thinking about the way cyberspace will be regulated, is the regulation of what I'm calling architecture. Now by architecture, I mean the way in which we find the world or the physical space within which we find ourselves. Even if the way we find the world has been constructed by individuals, not just by nature, these constructions impose constraints on our freedom. And those constraints are in many senses a kind of regulation. As the architecture of the internet changes, or what I call the code of cyberspace changes, then those changes can change the consequences that I described that the internet has. So for example, as governments or the laws and the market or commerce change the relative anonymity of cyberspace through technologies such as this technology here, cookies. We will see changes in the consequence of what markets and governments can do. So for example, the original architecture of the internet made it so that when you went with a browser to a website, that was a stateless transaction. Meaning that the web server had no automatic way to know who you were and therefore no way automatically to know that you were the person who was there five minutes ago or you were the person who was looking at a different book on a different page of the website. This stateless architecture of course protected relative anonymity. But the problem was that it made it hard for the technology to enable the web server to track the desire of customers to, for example, consume or purchase items. And so to respond to this particular problem, what the designers of early net architecture did, was to develop a technology which we have called cookies. To enable the website to track what people are doing within the context of the website. But the important point to recognize is that that small change in the design of the network had a very important consequence to the relative anonymity of people behaving in the network. Because it made it much easier for computers on the network to begin to monitor behavior of people on the network. Because we now had a relatively automatic way to identify people and to track what they do, at least within the context of a particular website. The relationship between the need to use architecture to regulate to achieve a certain end and the law is interactive. One technology might be unnecessary if there were an effective law. Or an effective law put differently might make irrelevant or unnecessary many technologies or many norms that would be used otherwise to protect people from the burdens of spam.