 This is Classics of Liberty from Libertarianism.org and the Cato Institute, narrated by Caleb Brown. Today's classic is The Relation of the State to the Individual by Benjamin R. Tucker. At the end of the 19th century, the publisher and polemicist Benjamin R. Tucker became one of the leading exponents of libertarianism, perhaps the leading exponent. Published for almost 30 years, his journal Liberty championed a uniquely American individualism that combined economic populism with a consistent defense of free market competition. His philosophical anarchism was based on a plumb line case for the venerable libertarian principles of equal liberty and the absolute sovereignty of each individual. In this essay, adapted from an address delivered to the Unitarian Ministers Institute, Tucker condemns government as a form of invasion, explicating the classic libertarian position on the appropriate use of force. Here, Tucker argues that the state's essential function, the one that defines it, is aggression, not defense. That government is and always has been an invader rather than a protector. A genuine libertarian society would instead maintain a defensive association for the proper protection of individual liberty predicated on a voluntary compact between free and equal people. The definitions that Tucker sets forth in this speech are a hallmark of libertarian thinking on government, its proper role, and its relationship with the individual echoed in the writings of libertarian thinkers throughout the 20th century. Ladies and gentlemen, presumably the honor which you have done me in inviting me to address you today upon the relation of the state to the individual is due principally to the fact that circumstances have combined to make me somewhat conspicuous as an exponent of the theory of modern anarchism, a theory which is coming to be more and more regarded as one of the few that are tenable as a basis of political and social life. In its name then, I shall speak to you in discussing this question, which either underlies or closely touches almost every practical problem that confronts this generation. The future of the tariff, of taxation, of finance, of property, of woman, of marriage, of the family, of the suffrage, of education, of invention, of literature, of science, of the arts, of personal habits, of private character, of ethics, of religion will be determined by the conclusion at which mankind shall arrive as to whether and how far the individual owes allegiance to the state. Anarchism in dealing with this subject has found it necessary, first of all, to define its terms. Popular conceptions of the terminology of politics are incompatible with the rigorous exactness required in scientific investigation. To be sure, a departure from the popular use of language is accompanied by the risk of misconception by the multitude, who persistently ignore the new definitions. But, on the other hand, conformity there too is attended by the still more deplorable alternative of confusion in the eyes of the competent, who would be justified in attributing inexactness of thought where there is inexactness of expression. Take the term state, for instance, with which we are especially concerned today. It is a word that is on every lip, but how many of those who use it have any idea what they mean by it, and of the few who have, how various are their conceptions. We designate by the term state institutions that embody absolutism in its extreme form and institutions that temper it with more or less liberality. We apply the word alike to institutions that do nothing but aggress, and to institutions that, besides aggressing, to some extent protect and defend. But which is the state's essential function, aggression, or defense? Few seem to know or care. Some champions of this state evidently consider aggression its principle, although they disguise it alike from themselves and from the people under the term administration, which they wish to extend in every possible direction. Others, on the contrary, consider defense its principle and wish to limit it accordingly to the performance of police duties. Still others seem to think that it exists for both aggression and defense, combined in varying proportions according to the momentary interests, or maybe only whims of those happening to control it. Brought face to face with these diverse views, the anarchists, whose mission in the world is the abolition of aggression and all the evils that result therefrom, perceived that to be understood they must attach some definite and avowed significance to the terms which they are obliged to employ, and especially to the words state and government. Seeking then the elements common to all the institutions to which the name state has been applied, they have found them two in number. First, aggression. Second, the assumption of sole authority over a given area and all within it, exercised generally for the double purpose of more complete oppression of its subjects and extension of its boundaries. That the second element is common to all states I think will not be denied, at least I am not aware that any state has ever tolerated a rival state within its borders. And it seems plain that any state which should do so would thereby cease to be a state and to be considered as such by any. The exercise of authority over the same area by two states is a contradiction. That the first element, aggression, has been and is common to all states will probably be less generally admitted. Nevertheless, I shall not attempt to reinforce here the conclusion of Spencer, which is gaining wider acceptance daily, that the state had its origin in aggression and had continued an aggressive institution from its birth. Defense was an afterthought, prompted by necessity, and its introduction as a state function, though affected doubtless with a view to the strengthening of the state, was really and in principle the initiation of the state's destruction. Its growth in importance is but an evidence of the tendency of progress toward the abolition of the state. Taking this view of the matter, the anarchists contend that defense is not an essential of the state, but that aggression is. Now what is aggression? Aggression is simply another name for government. The essence of government is control or the attempt to control. He who attempts to control another is a governor, an aggressor, an invader. And the nature of such invasion is not changed whether it is made by one man upon another man, after the manner of the ordinary criminal, or by one man upon all other men, after the manner of an absolute monarch, or by all other men upon one man, after the manner of a modern democracy. On the other hand, he who resists another's attempt to control is not an aggressor, an invader, a governor, but simply a defender, a protector. And the nature of such resistance is not changed when it is offered by one man to another man, as when one repels a criminal's onslaught, or by one man to all other men, as when one declines to obey an oppressive law, or by all other men to one man, as when a subject people rises against a despot, or as when the members of a community voluntarily unite to restrain a criminal. This distinction between invasion and resistance between government and defense is vital. Without it, there can be no valid philosophy of politics. Upon this distinction, and the other considerations just outlined, the anarchists frame the desired definitions. This then is the anarchistic definition of government, the subjection of the non-invasive individual to an external will. And this is the definition of the state, the embodiment of the principle of invasion in an individual or a band of individuals, assuming to act as representatives or masters of the entire people within a given area. As to the meaning of the remaining term in the subject under discussion, the word individual, I think there is little difficulty. Putting aside the subtleties in which certain metaphysicians have indulged, one may use this word without danger of being misunderstood. Whether the definitions thus arrived at prove generally acceptable or not is a matter of minor consequence. I submit that they are reached scientifically and serve the purpose of clear conveyance of thought. The anarchists, having by their adoption taken due care to be explicit, are entitled to have their ideas judged in the light of these definitions. Now comes the question proper. What relations should exist between the state and the individual? It is a question of expediency, of knowledge, of science, the science of living together, the science of society. The history of humanity has been largely one long and gradual discovery of the fact that the individual is the gainer by society exactly in proportion as society is free, and of the law that the condition of a permanent and harmonious society is the greatest amount of individual liberty compatible with equality of liberty. The average man of each new generation has said to himself more clearly and consciously than his predecessor, my neighbor is not my enemy, but my friend, and I am his, if we would mutually recognize the fact. We help each other to a better, fuller, happier living, and this service might be greatly increased if we would cease to restrict, hamper, and oppress each other. Why can we not agree to let each live his own life? Neither of us transgressing the limit that separates our individualities. It is by this reasoning that mankind is approaching the real social contract, which is not, as Rousseau thought, the origin of society, but rather the outcome of a long social experience, the fruit of its follies and disasters. It is obvious that this contract, this social law, developed to its perfection, excludes all aggression, all violation of equality of liberty, all invasion of every kind. Considering this contract in connection with the anarchistic definition of the state, as the embodiment of the principle of invasion, we see that the state is antagonistic to society, and society being essential to individual life and development, the conclusion leaps to the eyes that the relation of the state to the individual and of the individual to the state must be one of hostility and during till the state shall perish. But it will be asked of the anarchists at this point in the argument, what shall be done with those individuals who undoubtedly will persist in violating the social law by invading their neighbors? The anarchists' answer to the abolition of the state will leave in existence a defensive association resting no longer on a compulsory but on a voluntary basis, which will restrain invaders by any means that may prove necessary. But that is what we have now as the rejoinder. Do you really want that, then, only a change of name? Not so fast, please. Can it be soberly pretended for a moment that the state, even as it exists here in America, is purely a defensive institution? Surely not, saved by those who see of the state only its most palpable manifestation, the policeman on the street corner. And one would not have to watch him very closely to see the error of this claim, why the very first act of the state, the compulsory assessment and collection of taxes, is itself an aggression, a violation of equal liberty, and as such violates every subsequent act, even those acts which would be purely defensive if paid for out of a treasury filled by voluntary contributions. How is it possible to sanction, under the law of equal liberty, the confiscation of a man's earnings to pay for protection which he has not sought and does not desire? And if this is an outrage, what name shall we give to such confiscation when the victim is given, instead of bread, a stone, instead of protection, oppression? To force a man to pay for the violation of his own liberty is indeed an addition of insult to injury. But that is exactly what the state is doing. How thoughtless, then, to assert that the existing political order is of a purely defensive character. This leads to another consideration that bears powerfully upon the problem of the invasive individual who is such a bugbear to the opponents of anarchism. Is it not such treatment, as has just been described, that is largely responsible for his existence? I have heard a read somewhere of an inscription written for a certain charitable institution. The hospital, a pious person built, but first he made the poor wherewith to fill it. And so it seems to me it is with our prisons. They are filled with criminals which our virtuous state has made what they are by its iniquitous laws, its grinding monopolies, and the horrible social conditions that result from them. We enact many laws that manufacture criminals and then a few that punish them. A half hour is a very short time in which to discuss the relation of the state to the individual, and I must ask your pardon for the brevity of my dealing with a succession of considerations, each of which needs an entire essay for its development. If I have outlined the argument intelligibly, I have accomplished all that I expected. That was The Relation of the State to the Individual by Benjamin R. Tucker. Find more classics of liberty at libertarianism.org.