 So the the title of the talk, if it has a title, it's really just some reflections comes from the book that Joel and I wrote together a couple years ago. It actually took us about 10 years to write. Joel is a professor at Ohio State, both a colleague and a very close friend, and a really brilliant guy. So many of the really good ideas I, if there are any, I'll say, if there are any really good ideas that I say today that you're impressed by, they probably came from him. He's a really wonderful scholar and also a really committed guy, and I always want to flag everything along the way that he was involved in all this. It wasn't just me. So my goal today is to just sort of very briefly review a little bit of the science where we're at. You all know that, but just to kind of underline it and to give you some very recent data. And then I'm going to talk quickly about the framework that Joel and I put together, and which is a sort of four-fold framework of political futures, you might say. And then I'm going to reflect this briefly, explain each of them. And then I'll move on to the critiques and perhaps some reflections on what we might know, what we might think about concerning the virus and how we might think about climate change in the world that follows the pandemic. So here we go. So this is a graph from the IPCC's report last year, the International Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. You probably all know about it. The IPCC's report last year, they have a regular assessment reports that they released, but they released this in a special sense on its own. It's kind of a supplement last year. You probably heard about it. And people have been calling it the 1.5 degree report because it's a reflection on the actual effects of 1.5 degrees, which at the Paris meetings in 2015 was agreed to be this sort of the goal we were aiming for, the target, the overall temperature change target. And it was seen to be a kind of especially good one, you know, in the sense that much of the conversation prior to this had been that we would aim for a two degree change. But at Paris, you know, led by the, in my opinion, quite empty leadership of Justin Trudeau, the agreement came to 1.5, at least as a target. So the IPCC has done some work to tell us what that would actually look like. And this is what it would look like right here. If we want to hit 1.5 degrees, on the current trajectory, we will hit 1.5 degrees sometime between 2030 and 2052. To avoid going any higher, we'll need to drastically reduce clearly emissions on a trajectory like this, which will clearly require, I shouldn't laugh, you know, a fundamental transformation of not only our energy system, but certainly Joel and I would argue with our political economic arrangements and arguably with even perhaps the material structure of the planet, given the kinds of energy system construction and development we'll need. So this is a, you know, a daunting prospect. But we need to take it seriously, of course, because the news is not good. Again, I won't go too on and on about this. Clearly, this is stuff that you will mostly know or at least know the shape of, but this is data from ice cores, from dome C and Antarctica, which has been glaciated for millions of years and hasn't melted. And so therefore provides a really excellent sort of and consistent place to measure temperature change on the planet over the last 800,000 years. And you can see from the data up until quite recently, that's at the bottom of the slide, that clearly the temperature and concentrations of carbon dioxide have varied a great deal over time, but in a rather consistent sense, they've mostly varied between about 180 and 280 parts per million over the last 800,000 years. Now, this next slide will not surprise any of you, but this is where we're at right now as of last year. And this is where the IPC suggests we might end up at the top there at 800 at the end of the century. So a little bit about 80 years away, my children's lifetime. So this is a big deal in terms of where we're at. And it presents, obviously, and this is the origin of the book, it presents an enormous challenge for what we might think of, blandly as civilization, but certainly for the leadership of the various units of the planet to kind of confront both at their own jurisdictional level, but also clearly requires it's a global problem that requires some form of global coordination. Now, the fact that this is an enormous challenge may seem obvious, but I think we need to think hard about why it presents such an enormous challenge. The scale of the technological changes and introduction and innovation alone, of course, is daunting. Let's set that aside right now and speak more clearly about the kind of political and social structural issues that we might face. The first challenge, and I think it's perhaps amongst the biggest, if not the biggest, even bigger perhaps than technological change, is basically global inequality. This is a chart that shows the per capita emissions and wealth. You can see it's a very, very clear relationship here, which is to say something that you all already know, I'm sure, that the wealthiest people on the planet emit the most, which is also to say that the most powerful people on the planet are those who have to change their behavior and lifestyles the most. That is a big, big ask. And our previous challenges we've faced when the wealthiest have been forced to sacrifice the most have rarely gone well and rarely gone peacefully. And that's something I think we need to take really seriously. The other thing that we might sort of ask ourselves when we look at a graph like this is to say, well, of course, then this is an argument for carbon taxes, which of course it is. Everything we see today is arguably an argument for carbon taxes. And any of you who've seen Paquetti's new book will know that a big part of his plan is a progressive carbon taxes. And certainly I would endorse that and probably many of you as well. But it also must be, we all have to look at the facts. And the facts are right now that the carbon tax has been effectively meaningless, certainly in terms of changing behavior and the energy system. And tax avoidance and tax evasion are only increasing. So we're seeing a situation where not to mention taxes are falling all over the planet, which Paquetti also details quite closely. So that is to say that, sure, taxes would help a lot, but right now they're not doing anything. And partly that, of course, it's because of the fact that the most powerful and the wealthiest are also those who have the most capacity to influence that. Now, you might ask yourself, like I do all the time, because my hope is that any kind of massive transition is itself not totally disruptive, like anyone else. Much of the discussion on the sort of tech side is to say, well, can we not change the energy mix? Maybe a social or a political economic transformation of the scale we're talking about is impossible. But certainly we have our technological capacities or projected technological capacities to change the energy mix such that we can reduce the impact and perhaps even roll back the effects of emissions induced climate change. But again, if we're sort of, for lack of a term, better term being somewhat realistic, these calls for a shift in the energy mix or energy system have been fairly loud since I would say the 1970s. And the shift is really not happening. Now, we can look at a chart like this, which comes to me the energy. I can't even think of the name right now. EIA energy. Anyway, it's the global energy NGO that's sort of operated by large energy producers. I think for some reason I'm blanking on the name right now. But anyway, the point here is that we can see that since between 1971 and 2014, there's been a drastic increase in non fossil fuel energies, which is fantastic, of course. And we would only want the yellow part of that bar to grow and grow over time. But the problem that we face right now is that the only thing that matters for the climate is the size of the blue bar. The overall fossil fuel energy production is growing and continues to grow right now. It doesn't matter how much the yellow grows if the blue continues to grow as well. The key goal has to be to leave fossil fuels in the ground. You can, as Joel and I say somewhat jokingly, you can drive to hell in a Tesla just as easily as an F-150. And this mix itself is not meaningful as long as the blue is growing. Now, to change this again is a radical demand. It's asking in many ways to some of the world's most powerful, wealthiest states and their most wealthy citizens to give up what has been at least until quite recently the most, some of the most valuable assets the world has ever known. The effects of the oil price change on this, I wouldn't, I'm not in a position yet to assess. I'd really like to hear what other people are thinking. I think that's a factor in where we'll be at the end of the pandemic if there is an end. That is very interesting and I'd love to hear people's thoughts on that. Another reason I think that we face such a significant challenge among many others, I'm just picking a few here, is that I would argue that there is a, perhaps I might even use the word drastic, but certainly a systematic underappreciation or underestimation of the scale of the problem ahead of us here. We are already in quite bad shape and the momentum of the system is such that even if we were to cut off emissions now, we still will have a great deal of negative impacts. And so as an example of this underestimation, I just wanted to pull up this graph. This is also from the IPC's most recent AR-5, the assessment report five and this comes from its working group two, which looks at the social and economic dimensions of the problem. And this is a chart that's put together. It sometimes gets called the burning embers diagram because it does sort of look like that. And we can see here that they've outlined what they call five reasons for concern, RFCs. And I just wanted to point your attention to reasons for concern three and reasons for concern four. In both cases, you'll see that the IPC see judges us at 1.5 degrees as being in the moderate zone, which they would also define as so-called severe, but sorry, detectable, but not severe. And this is the, the RFC three distribution of impacts is effectively what you might think of as the climate justice or the environmental justice dimensions of the distribution of the climate impacts, such that, of course, the concern would be that the vast majority of people who pay the costs both with their lives and their livelihoods for climate change are those who have had very little to do with the production of the problem itself. They are the poor, especially in the poorest parts of the world. And they are the most vulnerable, but they will pay the costs more than anyone else. And so that's the concern. And the IPCC judges that concern to be moderate. Both Joel and I, from a detailed and long-winded reading of the literature, would suggest that's a massive underestimation of the inequality of the impacts that are already existing, let alone those to come. And the second is that we're looking at 1.5 degrees of global aggregate impacts of, according to the IPC's measures, again, of a moderate degree. That seems to me totally untenable at this moment, even with the momentum, even with, again, if we caught emissions entirely, the momentum inside the system of the already existing changes we expect from past emissions would push us past any kind of moderate situation. We're looking at having to deal with drastic changes in our livelihoods, even if, again, as we stop now. And I happen to have the good fortune of having a colleague at Simon Fraser, who is one of the authors of the IPCC's scientific side of things, Kirsten Zickfeld. And she would, she laughed when I showed her these graphs. This is a, you know, a considerably milder estimation of where we're at. So with all this in mind, bad news, I apologize. Though, again, I'm betting that everyone on the call has more, has read more and more and more about this than anything I'm telling you here. But in reaction to this, Joel and I, in about 2008 or 2009, got together and started to think about, you know, what, what are the, what does the world look like in the face of these challenges? How do, how, how could we even imagine even just the two of us, but clearly talking to lots of other people, how could we even imagine confronting this problem? What would the futures look like as a way of managing this in some way at all? And then the second question that we wanted to ask, which I think we need to ask is what if we don't? What if we, what if we aren't up to the task? What, what, what if emissions, what if concentrations hit 800 to 1000 at the end of the century? What does the world look like? What does the, and what does the world look like? Not so much environmentally or ecologically. We were concerned with what does the world look like politically? What politics is produced by a world that is on fire? And if we can avoid that, what politics will produce a world that doesn't light on fire? And so these are our two questions. Taking the 1.5 degrees seriously. If we're to achieve a 45 percent reduction in carbon emissions by 2030 and 99 percent reduction by 2050, which is the IPCC's recommendation, one might say, then how would we do so? What political process can make that happen? What, what possibly could make that happen? And let alone not making it happen, but what could make it happen in a, in a manner that we consider just? And then secondly, as I said, if we do not achieve this and climate change reaches some threshold that which is globally impossible to ignore, which is a, I think already here in much of the world and certainly coming where we live, then what are the likely political outcomes? What, what processes or strategies will emerge in that world? These are the two sort of motivating questions. And after a lot of discussion and this, you know, this summary will mean you never have to read the book probably, but we developed what seems, I think, probably like a somewhat simplistic approach, a kind of heuristic. But I think it, at least for us, it helped us think about the sort of possibilities that in a broad set of trajectories that may be ahead of us, at least as a way of framing the problem. So the first thing we said to ourselves is, and we're not the only ones saying this, of course, many of you are probably saying it and certainly many, many other authors are saying this. And this is the question of the relationship between a world undergoing rapid and accelerating climate change and capitalism, the existing, you know, dominant mode of economic organization. Many people, both the defenders of capitalism and its greatest critics, you know, argue that climate change poses a threat to the very functioning of that way of organizing our economic lives. And I think that that's sort of undeniable whether or not capitalism can survive it. That's not a question I'm in the position to answer. But I do think that the capacity of global capitalism to persist in its existing form without radical transformation in the face of climate change is a question that we have to ask. And part of that question, of course, has to be asked purely because of the geopolitical conditions under which we're facing this problem with the, some would say rise or perhaps even, you know, imminent hegemony of China, which is capitalist in some ways, but then in fundamentally important ways, of course, not quite capitalist, at least as the sort of standard theory would take it. So in this four two by two table, we have a capitalist and non capitalist sort of future trajectory. And I'll try and explain why we've been so heavy handed there beyond just the heuristics of it all. And then the second axis, you might say, is this the question of planetary sovereignty, which is only to put a name to the problem that thousands of people have identified, which is the fact that the problem is global. Global coordination is essential to facing it. Individual responses have thus far proven either futile and the ecology of the planet would suggest that that's quite a reasonable expectation. But also that the there is a need in the order in the very possibility of stabilizing a social order, whether or not it's in a world on fire or a world that's cooling will require a kind of planetary organization. Now we use the term sovereignty, but we could be if sovereignty makes you think of a monarch, then, then scale that back a little bit and just think about some form of enforceable global order that could be an agreement, coordination, but it would have the capacity to impose and enforce rules around energy systems or emissions, that kind of thing, a sovereign in that sense on the climate front. And if you divide the world up as we did in this four by four table, for the uses of thinking about the future, we came up with four systems, you might say, or four trajectories, let's say for the future, looking at the world as it as it warms up. And these are all I should step back a second here and say, so many of you have heard the term, heard the phrase climate change is the greatest collective action problem the world has ever known. The most famous phrasing of it is by Nicholas Stern in the Stern Report. But many people have said something like it suggests, of course, that the problem facing us is the individualized, not just at the personal level, but also at the nation state level, sense of the experience of the problem, the lack of global coordination and the lack of a framework within which the collective action problem as famously framed by Olson in 1970, the collective action problem might be solved by some realization of a collective interest that trumps for unfortunate term to use, sorry, a collective interest that might dominate individual responses. And so we could think of each of these as even though I would argue that they don't necessarily think of themselves this way, except for climate leviathan, we could think of these as answers to the collective action problem going forward. And if we did think of that, and I'll explain why in a couple seconds, we might say that I would say that climate leviathan is a poor answer to that question. Climate behemoth is no answer to that question. Climate Mao is a bad answer to that question, which leaves us with climate X as potentially an answer to the question. And Joel and I have left that box largely empty because it's in Coate and information. So let me explain a little bit about each of these. Then I'll reflect briefly on some connections, perhaps, to the to the virus. And then I'd love to hear what people are thinking and having to say. So this is, I'm sure most of you are familiar, but but if you're not, this is the cover from Hobbes's 1651 book, Leviathan, which was written, as most of you probably know, in the midst of the English Civil War. And it was an argument for a supreme power, not necessarily because Hobbes was a monarchist, though he was. But it was an argument that the collective action problem, we might say, could only be solved by having everyone submit to one power. And that one power, Hobbes said, would allow the the ongoing reproduction of civil society. And we might even think of it as a modern economy. Insofar as it abandoned the political or the political questions of rule to the one power. And that would prevent what Hobbes was most afraid of, which was civil conflict. So the social order's persistence depended, and the world around him seemed to suggest this. The social order's persistence depended upon all submitting and obeying one power, in whom would be vested the capacity to force obedience, but the obedience would be bought with the promise of peace. This was the world that Hobbes was proposing. And you can see here that his vision, insofar as the drawing captures it, really was intended to to describe the way in which the sovereign was an individual, a mortal god, he called him, but also was composed of the submission of the others. So you can see that his body is made up of hundreds of people looking toward him, all facing toward him in their own interests. And we, without in any way meaning to take all of Hobbes's messages, called the Book Climate Leviathan, because we see the dominant response, the one we we think is unfolding or beginning to unfold right now, perhaps in the form of the COP meetings that we see in Paris at any rate, as an attempt to kind of build or to or as a sign of a kind of emergent force toward which something like a Leviathan like power in the climate realm might come to be. And we actually would argue that there's a significant proportion, especially of sort of educated, concerned, and reasonably well off folks in the Western Europe and North America, who are really invested in this idea that the council of parties will come up with an idea that does impose in some senses a not quite Leviathan like, but certainly a regime, a carbon regime on the planet that will save us. And so you may remember the desperation that seemed to disseminate through what Americans would call the liberal community, you know, around the time of Copenhagen. When people are really hoping that the world would come together and make up some rules about how we could live in a way that would help us. And we see the desire for this as being very much a kind of caught up in the political moment. The reason that it has to confront, you know, the planetary problem, of course, is again the collective action problem, you might say. Climate change clearly puts pressure on the lack of a global rulemaking or enforcement mechanism. And also, it relies to some extent, as perhaps we might expect, on a division that Hobbes made fundamental to this situation, which is the division between political society, which is the realm of the rulers, and civil society, where individuals enjoy some freedom on the premise that the rule makers will be free to make the rules as they see. And this is clearly, you know, sort of imposable, we might think of on a global carbon regime. One of the problems, and I'll get to this in a second, is that I would say one of the sort of fundamental problems is that we get ourselves in a situation here in which the collective action problem is understood to be an incentive problem, effectively. So in other words, this mode of organization, which is dedicated to the persistence of the existing order, we might say, existing liberal capitalist societies. If that is to persist, then the collective action problem is understood effectively as an incentive problem, which is to say that it kind of denies, not even kind of, it does deny, in many ways, the very possibility of a solidarity in the interests of a self-interested obedience, one might say. And the possibilities of that are limited, I would argue, insofar as the problem ahead requires more than just a better directed self-interest. As an example of how this thinking is going, I pulled up this, this is kind of drawn from, though it's not a direct clip, but it's drawn from Edna Hofer and Stern's 2010 document toward a global green recovery recommendations for immediate G20 action, which they wrote and published and was widely circulated amongst the G20 folks in 2010 and 2011. And what it describes in many ways, I would argue, and this is one way in which there's some very strong parallels, I believe, with how we're thinking about how to deal with the post-pandemic condition. What it does effectively is it looks at the problem in what Joel and I would say is a vaguely green Keynesian mode. It understands the state's sort of options at this point as being of two-fold effectively. One would be to step into the economy, take over not the whole thing, but certain industries or sectors or whatever, straighten things out, and remove private actors from the field, at least temporarily, to allow for the solution to the collective action problem. And we can see here that in some ways this is what's unfolding in a kind of punctuated Keynesianism, is that the state might step in, do the work that it can do, and then in phase two it slowly steps back by providing the private sector with incentives, allowing for subsidization, the movement of median term measures to provide the private sector with better incentives, this kind of thing. So it's a kind of punctuated Keynesianism that we might see, I think, and almost certainly we'll see as a suggestion for how we deal with the post-COVID world. And this is all, in some senses, caught up in the frame of market failure. So the state can produce collective action problems solution via solving or remediating market failure here, and information problems. So this is all part of what we understand to be the climate leviathan strategy. Oops, sorry. This is effectively the simplest way to make sense of what we call climate math, which you may remember is in the bottom left corner, it's the trajectory we describe as both invested in some form of planetary sovereignty or coordination, but a non-capitalist sense, in a non-capitalist sense. And insofar as it's non-capitalist, I really want to flag here, and Joel and I do a lot of work in the book to try to make this clear, that we are not, climate math is not a code for climate China, nor is it a code for climate Xi Jinping. This is actually meant to point toward the sort of radical Maoist tradition that has never gone away in East Asia. And so insofar as that's true, nothing like climate Mao currently exists. But we do think it's possible. And it's possible precisely because of this. This is a map of people with livelihoods at risk from severe climate change. And you can see that Asia is just balloons relative to the rest of the planet. And we would argue that this combination, a sort of combustible set of relatively increasingly fragile livelihoods, much of which are based in rural quasi-peasant conditions, puts that mixed with a sort of agrarian political radical tradition that drove both Mao and also the Maoists in Nepal and North India and other parts of East and Southeast Asia, mean that there's a political culture that makes it quite possible that the response in the medium term to climate devastation will be a political radicalism that perhaps takes a Maoist form or at least is inspired by Mao. Now, whether that'll happen, of course, we may be totally wrong, but we do see the seeds of this there. And it's not necessarily the Chinese Communist Party that is the best indicator of that right now. Climate X, sorry, I forgot about climate behemoth. Climate behemoth, so when we wrote the book, it was during the Obama years. And for us, climate behemoth was sort of instantiated by Sarah Palin and the drill baby drill nationalist, often quite racist framing that claimed both that any kind of non-national sovereignty was illegitimate, but also that for the most part climate change was a hoax imposed by other powers or some global conspiracy. We never could have imagined the form that it is taken now. I think we thought Palin was about as bad as it could get. We were clearly wrong about that. The extent to which Trump has kind of enacted the worst version of what we thought behemoth would be is, you know, one might argue that we were sort of prescient. I don't think Joe and I were prescient. We were as astounded as the rest of the world in some senses, not so much by the election of Trump as by the way in which this has been normalized. But at any rate, behemoth is meant to mark an order that refuses international coordination of any sort of any kind of imposed or enforced rules. And but a but a complete and utter dedication to the maintenance of the current capitalist order. That's the up top right corner. And then the final bottom right is what we call Climate X, which we see as a sort of inchoate but unfolding or emergent refusal of the other three orders. We don't know where that will take us. This is from India in January. We we we don't know where this will take us. It could take us really emancipatory places, local responses, plethora of movements and and energy system structure restructuring in that is locally specific and historically and culturally meaningful, coordinated as need be at different scales, or it could of course take very, very different forms. It's unclear. But it also seems to be in many ways a logical response to what thus far are the glaring failures or terrifying prospects of the other ones. This is why what I meant when I said Leviathan is a poor answer. Behemoth is no answer. Mao is a bad answer. This is an answer. It's unclear what this will mean. But but but it is very clearly a response, I would argue, to to Leviathan's plans to control this from the elite sphere, to incentivize, to provide, to to administer this in this kind of non-disruptive but also non-distributionally equalizing process. Because if we return, say, to this question here, when we look at the Global Green Recovery, the question behind it that never gets asked is who does this? Who does the improving? Who does the upgrading? Who does the incentivizing? Who does the providing? One might argue that individual states are doing this, but individual states to solve the collective action problem require a coordinated and enforceable mechanism that would take a Leviathan-like form. So we need to think about what's behind all that. We don't know at present. And I would argue that that at least thus far nothing adequate has arisen. Okay, I'm pretty much done. So just to give you a flavor of some of the critiques, a couple, a couple that really have mattered to us. The first is that I have a great, I have a significant number of colleagues caught up in the Green New Deal movement in an effort to kind of, you know, work that out, figure that out. And I have an enormous amount of sympathy for it. And their critique of our proposal is that we can't abandon the state entirely, or at least we can't lose hope in the state entirely at this moment because the state is all we have. Progressives, liberals, however you want to think about it. Our only hope for addressing this problem is the state, and we need to embrace it as the power that however limited it is, is at least, you know, gives us some purchase on things. And that's a very important point. I still am very concerned that at least the last 20 years would suggest that that's not going to get us anywhere near where we need to go. The IPCC has made that very clear where we need to go. And I think the state is in the way in a lot of ways right now. But the question, of course, is what I would propose to put in its place. And I don't have a good answer for that. The second, of course, and it's predictable, but also very sound, has been voiced by many, but most recently in a conversation Joel had with Bob Cohane, many of you will probably know him, but a very prominent and senior political scientist. And his concern, he endorsed our diagnosis of climate leviathan 100% and then said, the political feasibility of X is zero. And that is of course, you know, a judgment, one that I think is not necessarily to be taken as truth. But it does. But the idea that it's unfeasible clearly needs to be taken seriously, because if people believe it's unfeasible, then the movements that might produce the adequate response to climate change won't emerge because people won't believe they're possible. And that might, as I say, be quite a reasonable reaction. So finally, just a couple of reflections on what we might learn from this from about the virus. And I anticipate that I have nothing more innovative to say than any of you. So I'll be very interested to hear what you have to say. This is just my reflections. But I do think that, you know, one of the defining features of where we are in dealing with the pandemic is the extraordinary uncertainty that persists. Nothing innovative to say that at this moment. But it is to say, I think therefore, that those who claim they know where we're headed at this moment are wrong to say that they can know. I think things are still coming together. And there are a great deal of forces, like those Rob identified earlier, actually, that are what we might think of as dilemmas, their contradictory or they have sort of complicated possibilities, some of which we might be very excited about and others of which we have great concern about. So for example, the national introversion we've seen right now has often been framed as something good, you know, people are taking care of their own or nations are doing their best, or not their best in some cases, to take care of their own people to deal with their problems internally, to build up some self-sufficiency, to shorten supply chains, to figure out a way to kind of manage this so that we're more crisis prepared as we're moving forward, which would clearly be supposedly a good thing for climate change. But that national introversion obviously also has a very dark side in not only a nativist kind of fear of the other and the creation of an enormous part of a country that can be unwelcome, but also the idea that just like climate change, the pandemic is a structurally global problem, and individual responses will, even for those who are fortunate enough to figure something out, leave a great deal of the world at risk, a great deal of the world without resources, at a great deal of risk. And I think that that's a very real fear with the pandemic. In fact, one of my main concerns is that once the wealthiest part of the world is out of this, we forget about the fact that it will still be probably rampaging through Africa, Latin America, and Asia. And we will, for us, the problem will be over. And I think that will be both a humanitarian but also an ethical disaster and political disaster. I think the other thing that we have to think about when we try to compare this to climate change, some people have told me it's a dress rehearsal for, is that I think that the timeline, the temporality of this crisis is very, very different, and it produces a whole set of both emergency measures and political reactions that are very different than from climate change. And it also actually makes room for a role for science that thus far, climate change has not been able to impose itself via the tax system or various other kinds of energy transition mechanisms. So the timeline of the pandemic puts it in a kind of qualitatively different mode. I also think Rob is right that the outcome of this is going to be very bad for the climate movement. I think the climate will get and totally understandably get pushed down the priority list the long way. And I also think that at least at the beginning of the crisis, the environmental movement did itself no favors by arguing that if we can do this for climate, we can do this. If we can do this for the virus, we can do this for climate. Insofar as we're comparing the reactions and the necessary responses between the virus and climate, I think that is a disastrous move strategically insofar as this process has been entirely joyless and devastating for hundreds of millions of people. And to promise them that this is what we have to do to deal with climate is not at all going to bring people on board for that process. And finally, I would just say that to reiterate something I said just a couple of minutes ago, I think that perhaps the most important lesson we can learn right now is to be sharp eyed and wary more than imagining that there are specific lessons, the approach to the pandemic can teach us about how we might deal with climate change. I think that in particular, the way in which many of our political economic structures have been built around sort of fairly rigid decision rules, if you might think of it as sort of an inflation targeting central bank large across political economic regulation, I think those things will crumble. I think that responses have to be more temporally and geographically specific. I think our economics needs to try to make sense of where we're at in any one moment as opposed to some long run promise. And I think that because I think that the world of the long run promise has been pretty much entirely legitimized by this promise, by the virus, and climate change will require a similar kind of alertness, let's say.