 to think tech. I'm Jay Fidel. This is Global Connections and today we're going to talk about Australia, New Zealand and that area of the world with Carl Baker, who is Senior Advisor Pacific Forum. So welcome to the show, Carl. I think there's a lot to cover here. And in fact, people aren't covering it enough. So good for us. Sure. And it's good to be back. And it's always fun to talk about Australia, New Zealand and the rest of Oceania or the Pacific, whatever we want to use the term, whatever term we want to use today. But it's certainly an important part of the world that does tend to get forgotten. I guess antipodes is sort of a moniker that sticks and has some resonance today, given that even though we're not British, we still tend to forget that there's another side to the world. In a funny way, it's the most remote place of the civilized world. It's way down, way south, and it's very, very, very remote. And I told you before the show that it reminded me of On the Beach with Gregory Peck, 1959 Black or White movie where he commands an American submarine and it is completely remote. And they don't know what happened to the U.S. and this is after a nuclear war. And so this is the most remote part of the world for a nuclear submarine. And that's the experience in a sictitious scenario. But it does emphasize how far away Australia, New Zealand really are in so many ways. And yet when you think about what the Americans today are talking about, the Indo-Pacific is very much central to that part of the world. It's the Indian Ocean, the nexus between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. And hence, I think, why it still matters to the United States. Oh, it's got to, because it's in the periphery of China. And China is, what do I say, our most effective, most advanced competitor. Would you agree with me, Carl, that our interest in that area, our interest in being in the Quad, in bringing those countries into our national security, global security effort, is based largely around China? Sure. I think it is. I mean, the whole idea of expanding the focus from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, I think, is part of an effort to sort of broaden the security picture, to force China into recognizing that the Americans have influence in a much broader area than just the Asia-Pacific. And we actually extend our influence and interest into the Pacific Ocean. Now, I think what has surprised the United States is, first, the willingness of the Chinese to engage in the Pacific Islands. For so many years, the United States just always kind of considered the Pacific Islands as captive territory for the United States, with the Compact of Free Association, with Micronesia, Palau, and Marshall Islands, that we just sort of felt that that was ours, and we somewhat neglected those countries. And including in Melanesia, the Solomon's, and Valoatu, and Tuvalu, we sort of neglected those countries. And I think as China saw that as an opening, the United States sort of recognized that, ooh, maybe we shouldn't be quite so confident that this is really our backyard and going to remain our backyard. So what you've seen over the last couple of years is we've reinstated embassies in some of those small countries. We've certainly shown more interest. We've certainly hustled to get the Compact of Free Association agreements finished. And I think that there's a recognition that there is competition for the interests of those countries. And so the last show we did, we talked a little bit about this. And I don't think it's just purely on the part of Chinese. I don't think it's purely security interests. It's our military security interests, as much as it is economic interests. I think that it's fair to say that there are economic interests for China in the South China Sea, or I'm sorry, in the South Pacific. There's a lot of fish out there. There's a lot of resources in the Pacific Ocean that are legitimate targets for Chinese interests. So I don't want to portray it as purely a military security sort of competition. It's also an economic competition. And that's where I think the United States gets nervous, because we don't do economic competition as well as we do military competition. So true. So I think you spell that with an M, by the way, manganese. M stands for manganese. Someday there'll be a song about manganese. It's all down there. And we build more cell phones, more computers, more exotic electronic equipment. We need rare materials like that. And it's down there at the seabed. And they are way ahead of us. They are way ahead of us in fishing, too, I might add. But you're right. And the problem is that it's hard to... Are we matching them stroke for stroke in this competition? Or is this ketchup? Because to me, it sounds like ketchup. They already have a significant presence in Fiji. I know that. We've had a show about that. And they have a significant presence, developing even a more engaged presence with the Solomon Islands right now, in the subject of some news. So they are reaching east across all of these areas. And I agree that it's largely, what do you want to call it, economic, but it also extends their security, doesn't it? Sure, it does. And don't forget, the other player here is Taiwan. Because there were several Pacific Island countries that had maintained the relationship with Taiwan. Now, you can say that it was because Taiwan was feeding them money. And it was really a competition between China and Taiwan for who was going to provide the best economic package to some of these countries. And to some extent, that's true. But it was also Taiwan recognizing that there's a lot of resources out there and that it was an opportunity for them to maintain some diplomatic ties with countries that are part of the United Nations. So China wouldn't say that we're really playing ketchup as much as we are recognizing that China is catching up. And so I think that's the difference. So again, going back, we were so confident that we didn't have to do anything that we sort of let it deteriorate. And now we're recognizing that we do need to do something. So it's not so much catching up as realizing that China is catching up. Well, let me add some thoughts and see how you feel about this. Number one is, Barack Obama was doing the pivot. But the pivot didn't last that long as such, because we wound up pivoting shortly thereafter to the Middle East and Europe, which is where we're spending a lot of time and money, not enough in my opinion, but we're spending a lot of time and money there. And so we haven't really been as engaged in the West Pacific, the South Pacific as perhaps we should have been. And so the pivot is like old already. The other thing is that the Quad is kind of old too. The Quad is not a picture of excitement and heavy collaboration. The U.S. is the center of it and it holds it together. But why only four of them? Why not other countries too? Why doesn't the U.S. bring in others? And when you ask the members, they say, this is a very loose association. This is not like NATO or anything like that. We're just sort of hanging out together. And so this gives me a certain level of concern that the Quad and the pivot are old news. Well, I mean, the pivot, I would agree. I think the Quad is an evolution. But to me, the Quad is mostly about figuring out how we can integrate India into our defense posture in the broader region, again, called the Indo-Pacific. I think that's the real motivation behind the Quad. Back in the early 2000s, it was the idea that these are four democracies that can work together, including India as one of the big democracies. And this was really Shinzo Abe back in 2007 that sort of tried to start the Quad. I think the Quad has new residents, but not so much about the context of the pivot as it is in the context of the recognition that we need allies and partners to deter, if you will, China. So I think that's really what the Quad is about. But what we've seen, I think, let's just say post-Trump administration in the Indo-Pacific region. Now, Trump is the one that actually started the idea of the Indo-Pacific, or it started during Trump's administration. But what Biden has done with it is he has really, I think, focused the attention on broadening the partnerships in Asia to the extent that we now no longer say United States is dominant. So in some ways, I have to disagree with your characterization of United States driving the Quad. The idea behind the Quad is to get buy-in from Japan, Australia, and India for the defense cooperation in Asia and the Indo-Pacific broader, because I think the United States recognizes it can't do it by itself. So in some ways, the current version of the Quad is a reflection of the recognition in the United States that it needs help to actually deter China in that region. Do they see us as strong as they used to see us? I mean, I'm thinking that we really haven't backed up Taiwan enough. Although I read that Biden is offering some huge multi-billion-dollar incentive to the Taiwan semiconductor company, SMC, TMSC, and I say to myself, gee, I hope the Chinese don't invade and take all that over. We lose the investment. Well, the news of today is that he's providing that money for them to build a third fabrication plant in Phoenix. So not to worry. I'm feeling better. I'm feeling better. Thank you. As soon as the better, they do that. But anyways, so we haven't really defended and shown support of Taiwan as much as they wanted. I thought we were moving a lot of troops into either Okinawa, maybe away from Okinawa. There were troop movements. Guam was it, and we were moving into Pearl Harbor from the mainland, and we were building our security forces, our military in the Pacific. But I'm not sure that that actually happened yet. And maybe we're spending more time in Europe and the Middle East. What do you think? Well, yes, we are. But we're also building the relationship with Australia. I think that's where the real change is occurring, is that we're much closer with Australia now, with putting that marine training area in Darwin. We're doing a lot more rotations into fighter aircraft bombers and just ship visits and all that sort of stuff into Australia. So there's a much more robust defense relationship between the United States and Australia, you know, including, let's talk about AUKUS, you know, with providing a very, very controversially providing nuclear submarines to a non-nuclear weapons state, Australia, which is significant because that basically gives them the technology to develop nuclear weapons. Not that Australia is going to do that, or at least we don't think they are, but I mean, it's a dramatic change in the mindset in the United States. And again, I think that all goes back to the effort to integrate Australia at least into this broader deterrence package that the United States sees necessary as China develops its influence in the region. But part of that package is a very interesting piece that I saw. And it's about how the United States is asking Australia to manufacture weapons in Australia for use in Ukraine to give the Ukrainians or sell whatever the case may be. And I find that a very interesting kind of global connection, if you will. The U.S. likes to think that it can manufacture more than before, but here it's asking Australia to manufacture. And to the extent that somebody has to pay for that, the money for the manufacture, the manufacturing, winds up in Australia, not in the U.S. So, I guess you make policy only to make exceptions to policy. Well, yeah, but I think, again, that that's part of that recognition that the United States is finding it important to have strong partners. And of course, Australia has traditionally been that strong partner in Asia. So, what happened to New Zealand? I can hardly tell the difference when they talk to me. I mean, if you have a fine ear, you can probably tell one from the other, but usually I cannot do that. And I like them in terms of their personalities and their social skills, but they're really different in terms of diplomatic relations and national policy, aren't they? Yeah, sure. They are, although they're both fairly dependent economically on their relationship with China. I mean, when you look at New Zealand, they do probably twice as much trade with China as they do with the United States. And over the past couple of years, Australia has realized how economically dependent it's become on China for providing raw materials. From New Zealand, it's mostly agriculture products from Australia. It's mostly mining and resources of rares and whatever. They're mining out of the outback in Australia. So, both of them are fairly dependent on China in terms of their economic well-being. But there's a difference. I'd like to say, we've got a difference, but there's a difference. You know, they don't feel the same way about nuclear weapons, for example. They're not in the Quad. And why not? Well, they're not in the Quad. More importantly, although we talk about the ANZUS Treaty, we don't consider New Zealand, the United States, does not consider New Zealand as a treaty partner. Because in 1986, they said that we are a nuclear-free country, which means you and your nuclear submarines are not welcome in our waters. And so in 1986, the United States broke off that relationship. And so to this day, now there's talk just in the last months that there's a push to integrate New Zealand back into that defense relationship. And I think that there has been movement over the last couple of years where New Zealand is now much more of a defense partner than it was, say, 10 years ago. So, they now regularly participate in the RIMPAC exercise here in Hawaii. They've established a consul general here in Hawaii. So, you know, so they're making these moves. And mostly the consul general is really for the purpose of better coordination within the backup. Moving to India. India is a democratic country. It's almost as big, or maybe now it's bigger than China in population. It's very prosperous in many ways. It's got, of course, as old democracies, it's got social issues and problems. And right now, it seems to have leadership problems in terms of Modi moving to the right, slightly more autocratic than he was at the outset. And he's got a very kind of, what do I say, erratic, charismatic style that may be good for India, but it may not be good for alliances and his relationship with the U.S. Not sure how that's unfolding. Not sure why he is with the Quad. Why the Quad is with him. But it sounds like he's a kind of iffy member of the Quad. What do you think? Well, certainly they have been the outlier in terms of the relationship because Japan, United States, and Australia have other partnerships. They have the trilateral, literally the U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral that has been in existence for some time. They certainly are better aligned than with India because India does have a strong defense relationship with Russia. It's dependent on Russia for its military equipment for some time, partly just historically. They've been friends with the Soviet Union and then subsequently with Russia. And so they have a lot of Russian military equipment. Russia, or I'm sorry, India and Australia haven't always gotten along real well. There's been a bit of animosity for whatever reason between India and Australia. So there's a history of why India is much more independent. India has always been sort of the biggest proponent of the Group of 77 or the non-aligned movement. So it's always resisted developing a stronger relationship with everyone, including the democracies that we're talking about. So I think for all those reasons, yeah, India continues to be the outlier. But I think, as I said earlier, the United States and increasingly Australia and Japan recognize that India is becoming an important partner in developing a deterrence network in the Indo-Pacific region, the broader Indo-Pacific region, to deter China. Yeah. What I hear, though, is that the Quad is really not devoted to military security. Right. And also that China is very good at, what do we call it, trade diplomacy. In other words, you have a lot of trade with the country, as such as you mentioned, with New Zealand. And that brings you closer. And that's the way they enter its relationships. That's the way they get closer to all countries that way. And who could complain? I mean, we should be doing the same thing, actually. So you wonder how solid the Quad is. You wonder how influential the U.S. is among these countries, because China's working competitively against us. And because we can't really control, it's not like NATO. It's not like there's a section five of mutual self-defense. I'm not sure where it all goes. How far can you go with an organization that is not NATO, that doesn't have mutual self-defense, but is nevertheless interested in mutual security? But deterrence is your word. Yeah. I'm going to continue to use that word, because that's a very American word. India and Australia and Japan aren't quite as convinced that deterrence is the best policy. And that's why they hold out this economic relationship with China as something that influences how they interact with China. And so what you're seeing now is after China basically cut off Australia, Australia has backed away from some of its more strident advocacy for stronger deterrence, because China has resisted it. And so the economic relationship with China is going to continue to play a part. And I think that's what Secretary Yellen has acknowledged in her trip to China, is that you cannot ignore that economic relationship. The United States can't, and certainly when you look at Australia, India, and New Zealand, they can't. They can't simply ignore the fact that China is a huge economy and that it is a center for economic well-being in that part of the world. Let's talk about Japan. Japan may be one of our most, I don't know, connected countries. Because of the war, because of what happened after the war, because of their development since the war. And because we get along with the Japanese in large part, calling it citizen diplomacy. But the fact is that they're building up their military, they're spending money on that. They're trying to tell China that they're serious and did not to be trifled with. Their economy may not be as good as it was a few years ago. Their bell curve shows that the population is actually declining. So, Query, where does Japan fit in this? Are they a leader in the Quad? Are they a leader among the, what do you want to call it, the democracies, the enlightened countries of our influence in Asia? Are they going to be more or less in the future? I think they're going to be more in Asia. And in fact, while they're an important security partner, military security partner with the United States, they're a huge economic partner for everybody in Asia. And I think that that's where Japan has shown real leadership. Is they're the ones that after the United States walked away from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, they're the ones that really work to get the comprehensive and progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership back in shape. And so now you have Australia, New Zealand, and some of the Southeast Asian countries that are now promoting this CPTPP and China is knocking on the door trying to get in. So I think that Japan has been very successful in demonstrating and providing economic security leadership in Asia along with its development programs, along with its investments in the region, and it's promoting free trade agreements in the region. So I think Japan has very much stepped up in basically in a vacuum that the Americans left when they walked away from the TPP. Interesting. So here now I have a comprehensive question for you. We have Joe Biden, who is troubled domestically, who is troubled in terms of defending and supporting Ukraine, who is in a constant contention with Netanyahu about Israel, who is in a growing contention with the proxies of Iran. I mean, these are complicated problems. Any one of those would take the whole State Department to figure it out. And he's got it every day. And on top of that, he's running for office. And on top of that, he's got Southeast Asia and he's got the Quad. And this whole area with Australia, New Zealand. I don't know how one individual leader can do all of that. It's like you go on a cruise ship and they have two captains. One captain navigates the ship and the other pays attention to the passengers. It's almost like they should have two presidents. One who navigates the country and the other pays attention to the passengers. But we don't have that. He's going to have to do it all. And the oxygen is being sucked out of the room. Furthermore, as one of our hosts said, Donald Trump is looking like a president to be. And he's talking like a president to be taking positions on international issues and trying to upstage Biden. So you have a confusion as to who is really speaking and going to speak for the country. Here we are about six months away from an election that could turn the whole thing upside down. And these countries, Australia, New Zealand, other countries are in and around the Quad. They know that. They're watching like a hawk. How does all of that affect them? Not an easy question. Well, let me start off with a somewhat snide answer. We have the Vice President. Thank you. More importantly, I think that what the Biden administration has done is it's made it more difficult for the United States to simply walk away from the Indo-Pacific region by working with the allies, by developing some level of multilateral interaction with these countries. I think it's made it more difficult for an incoming president to simply walk away from the Indo-Pacific and say, China, it's all yours. So I think that that's what they've done. Now, whether the Indo-Pacific economic framework is successful or not, I think it's an open question. We certainly haven't done enough on trade. But again, Japan has. Japan has kind of filled that vacuum. The United States has done IPF, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and at least it has put in some components of that program. And just the fact that the Quad, the AUKUS, the other relationships that we've developed with the Southeast Asian countries and certainly with Japan and improved relations between Japan, South Korea, and the United States, I think the current administration has made it more difficult for anybody to follow on and simply walk away from it. So I think that I'll say that and then I'll again give Japan credit for sort of taking up the economic piece. So if one of these countries in the Indo-Pacific should come to you, let's make you the State Department today, the whole enchilada, the whole State Department, the Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, and say, you know, Carl, we're a little concerned about what happens in this election. We don't know where we stand with Trump. We know his machinations. We see, we read the same papers you read. And we don't know what to do. How do we see this? How do we look at this in terms of the very real possibility there'll be a change in regime that will be profound in 2025? And again, I go back and say, you know, just continue to build resiliency to integrate into a broader multilateral framework that entices the United States to stay engaged economically and that build that economic framework that makes it important for the United States to stay engaged if they want to maintain the economic relationship in Asia. And because right now we're dependent on those other countries to do that. Right now, without a free trade agreement with anybody in Asia other than, you know, Japan, it's very different, or in South Korea, it's very difficult to maintain that economic relationship. So I think that that's the angle I would tell those countries to take for Australia. I think it's a little bit different. Australia just isn't a big enough economy to matter in some ways to the United States. And so their part is much more focused on security, build the security relationship with the partners that the United States has now, Japan, Philippines, to some extent New Zealand. You know, but I think that that's that's the angle that I would recommend that Australia take. There isn't a one size fits all. Japan, certainly the economic side, Australia, the security side, others find a way to force an integration of economic interests with the United States. Yeah, it was an article in foreign affairs that I saw a few days ago. It was about how you have to maintain your morality. And we haven't always done it. Sometimes we've capitulated for practical purposes, for, you know, the self interest of the United States. And of course, those are regrettable instances where we have shoved off from our own morality. But there should be, don't you think, whatever we do, there should be a fundamental level of the world, liberal world order and morality. And whatever we do with any country has to reflect that. Am I right to supply here? Well, it does apply here. And I mean, and the glaring example, of course, is while, you know, the United States wants to find the difference between what's happening in Ukraine and what's happening in Israel and Gaza, the rest of the world doesn't quite see it that way. You know, and so that's a perfect example of what is seen in the rest of the world as American hypocrisy, you know, and it extends back into history. I mean, there's, there's any number of articles that have been written about how we were friends with the South Korean regime back in the 70s and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan. These people weren't exactly shining examples of democracy. Yeah. So now I change the facts on you. I think you've already told us what Joe Biden should do if he's reelected. But what about Trump? Well, A, what would Trump do from his remarks, his comments so far, you know, Indo-Pacific? And what should he do? What would he do? What should he do? Well, I think what he would do is, remember, he's the one that actually came up, or his administration is the, is the administration that came up with the idea of promoting this Indo-Pacific. So, you know, I think the way, the way Trump views it is big, strong military, whatever that means, it's really a marketing term for him. And so, you know, so just, just say you have a big, strong military and everything will be okay. And if China gets out of line, well, we'll, we'll threaten them with nuclear weapons or something. You know, I mean, I think that's sort of the mindset of Trump. And I don't think it goes much beyond that. What he should do, of course, is continue to do what we've been doing only integrate a better economic box. You know, it strikes me that, you know, deterrence is an interesting concept if you are the biggest kid on the block. Yeah. But if you're not the biggest kid on the block and everybody's doing escalation of weapons and preparation for war, you have the, the Barbara Tuckman Guns of August scenario where, you know, everybody gets more weaponized and in one day there's a trigger and it, it, it, everybody goes to war all at the same time. And so when the United States says, oh, we're going to be, we're going to spend a trillion dollars a year on defense, we're going to have every weapon known. I'm not sure that solves the problem in the world where there are people who are trying to outsmart us on weapons and, and prepare just as we prepare for the possibility of war, quality, deterrence or preparation either way. And that, and that with that in mind, perhaps all those determinants is really a path to war. Your thoughts? Yeah. I mean, I agree. And I mean, and that's, that's why that's sort of the, the, the emptiness of, of Trump's version of deterrence is just build more, just build more weapons and say you have a big military and you're strong and you, you, you have this aura about yourself. I mean, it's much, it's much of a, of a, of a, a, what's what I'm looking for, a transference of his own grandness onto the, onto the country, you know, which sort of it fits his, his model of what he, what he sees, his relationship with the United States. Sometimes I think that, that he envisions the United States as an extension of himself. And, you know, and just, just talk big, talk, or talk like a bully and everybody will be deferential to and, you know, and that doesn't work in the world, in the world today. As you say, you know, when you've got a Russia that continues to develop its military, you've got a China that has the resources to develop a very big, strong military and have influence in the region, then that sort of deterrence, exactly. It is ultimately a self-defeating concept because deterrence only works as long as you are the biggest bully in the valley. And, and it's been, it's become very clear that we're not. And that's why I was talking about, you know, what, what the Biden administration has recognized is the importance of developing true security partners, not security partners that will tell you what to do, now go do it. It's, it's true partners who actually have a say in how we develop those plans, how we develop our, our relationship. And so, you know, that's why the economic piece becomes so important and why Japan has become such an important player because they are the, the country today that is carrying that economic mantle in Asia to integrate those Asian economies so that they're not completely dependent on China, that they have some resilience on their own. You know, an IPF plays a part of that by developing a supply chain resilience and a recognition of the importance of rules and, and, and governing green and green energy and things like that. But it takes more than just that. It takes a true partnership with all these countries to develop an economic approach that can compete with China rather than letting China be the big economic engine that, that is the focal point for everybody in Asia. And so it's not like a full-time job to me. You know, foreign affairs diplomacy has never been so complicated and nuanced and required so many relationships and the maintenance of so many connections and dealing with so many issues around the world. It's really a head ringer. And I'm hoping that whoever is in office they can handle this because the stakes are, are so high. Have you ever seen foreign affairs, diplomacy, foreign relations, all these issues so complicated as they are right now? Well, no, I haven't because, you know, because we grew up, you and I grew up in the Cold War, you know, and so we recognize that and it was, it was about security, about military security. And the economic piece was always, well, the United States is big and it can absorb any amount of goods that people can deliver. And now we're to the point where we, the Americans are limiting, we have limited resources. We recognize that we can't absorb all the product that the country, the world can grow. And so now we have to find partners who are willing to do that. And that's why China becomes important because it can absorb that, that economic growth. India can absorb that. And we have to acknowledge that, that those are becoming the areas that need to be integrated into that global economic system. And we can't, we can't limit ourselves through industrial policy by saying we're going to exclude those countries or we're going to exclude those economies. We need to figure out how to build an economic security mechanism that allows us to integrate ourselves into that economy, into that global economy. And that's, I think, the challenge. The military security, we've got that down. What we don't have down is how we develop a global economic strategy that allows us to do something other than just absorb product from it, from the rest of the world. And we can't do any of that if we're going to be isolationist. We really have to have a better narrative. Carl Baker, thank you, Carl Baker, as senior advisory to Pacific Forum. These are really great discussions and enlightening, thoughtful comments. Thank you. Thank you. Aloha. We want to announce that ThinkTech Hawaii is moving into a new phase and will not be producing regular talk shows after April 30. We will retain our website and YouTube channel and will accept new content on an ad hoc basis. We are also developing a legacy archive program to provide continuing public access to our content. If you can help us cover the costs of the transition and the development of our legacy archive program, please make a donation on ThinkTechAway.com. Thanks so much. Aloha.