 Okay, welcome everyone. Thanks for attending today. I know a lot of other competing pressures on the hill and hopefully we all caught caught the speech But but thank you for turning your attention to this still very important region that we're here to discuss today I'm Fred wary a senior associate in the Middle East program at the Carnegie endowment For international peace and I'm delighted to welcome you to this panel on future trends in the Gulf Those of you that follow this region may recall that about two years ago Carnegie convened an all-day conference titled dynamic Gulf forces of change in a in a in a shifting region in the premise of that Conference was really that you know in the midst of all these dramatic transitions. We were seeing elsewhere in the region Egypt in Asia Libya, Syria this Seemingly placid region the Gulf was in fact undergoing dramatic changes beneath the surface pressures from an increasingly youthful population new forms of information exchange aging rulers sectarianism and so that panel really tried to capture those dynamics and argue for Sustainable reforms moving forward I'm really pleased to to welcome back some of the panelists that participated in that conference to revisit some of those same themes themes and of course the region today is is no less Turbulent perhaps even more so with the rise of ISIS the worsening civil war in Syria the challenge from Iran But this region is also facing increasing challenges Succession obviously youthful populations many of the same themes, but also additional challenges And I think the the the focus of this panel is is really to to to examine and mark the launch of a very important report From Chatham house that that captures those themes. It's entitled future trends in the Gulf It's a really remarkable piece of research both for its breadth. It touches on economic factors demographics politics The Gulf's international relations, but also especially in that it brings in Gulf voices There's a number of Gulf scholars that participated in this study To save trees we haven't printed the entire version But the executive summary is is outside for you to to look at and I'm delighted to welcome two of the authors of that report to present their findings and then also to longtime friends and colleagues to comment On the report. I think many of them are known to all of us Jane Kinamot is a longtime scholar of the Gulf and also Iraq She's the deputy head and senior research fellow at the Middle East program at Chatham house She's joined by her her colleague Yameel de Dominicis. I think I got that somewhat Correct the coordinator for the Middle East program at Chatham house Also a longtime scholar of the Gulf and then commenting on the report is is Kristen Smith the one She's a visiting scholar at the Institute for Middle East studies At George Washington University Again an expert on the politics of the Gulf, especially Bahrain and Saudi Arabia And then rounding out the discussion is both an active scholar and a participant in this region's politics Matar Ibrahim Matar Bahraini activist former member of of Parliament in Bahrain and with that Jane I'll turn it over to you Thank you very much Fred and thanks to all of you for making the time to be here today As Fred says the starting point for our report is looking at the Gulf countries Which are often seen as bastions of stability in a rapidly changing Middle East And highlighting the dynamics of change inside These countries which will affect their interactions with the rest of the region And with their traditional Western allies in the coming years It's a part of the world that has undergone stunning economic and demographic Development in recent decades and for the young people the under 30s who make up the majority of the population today Their lives and the immediate world around them is radically changed from the world that their parents lived in And especially the world that their grandparents lived in Some of the Gulf countries have had the world's highest rates of population growth Qatar and UAE have by far the world's highest rates of inward migration And spending fueled by oil and gas resources has encouraged lavish and dramatic economic development propelling these countries to a much higher profile than they've ever previously enjoyed on the international stage And this rapid economic and demographic growth Has in many ways boosted living standards certainly in terms of Education health outcomes life expectancy and so forth life in the Gulf has improved But this rapid change has also generated various contests including contests over the distribution of wealth economic inequality corruption nepotism issues like land ownership And also the the immigration and economic change And globalization have raised issues of culture Identity and how to manage diversity There's been a dramatic expansion of education for this younger generation in the Gulf Especially for women one of the major drivers of social changes that across the Gulf the majority of graduates from universities are Female Gulf citizens and they're tending to get the best degrees But in many cases the employment opportunities that they expect are still lacking and this is going to be a major area to watch in the coming years It's no exaggeration to say there's been a a revolution in the availability Of information compared with the previous generation. These are countries that traditionally have sought to have a state monopoly Particularly on the the broadcast media and the rise of satellite television spearheaded in particular by Al Jazeera and of the the social media has dramatically Altered the information landscape that young people in the region encounter even if not always the quality of information We touch on social media in more depth in the reports But it is normalizing not just a consumption of ideas and information from the rest of the world But an expectation of participating in both local and global debates on a more equal footing Contrary to the stereotypes of Gulf youth as apathetic well off people We can see examining civil society and the academic landscape in the Gulf countries that there is a growing desire for For more active citizenship for participation in national development And sometimes that's not a political activism But just a desire to have more of a say and more in a role of a role in the world around them But we have seen also growing political mobilization Even during the time of plenty that the gulf has experienced since the onset of the 2003 oil boom We've seen in particular and at most high profile the protests in Bahrain the less noticed but still important protests in Oman where the government responded in some quite different ways We've seen protests predating the arab spring in q8 But it's also important to look slightly below the radar It's very easy for those of us in the west accustomed to images of protesters on television to pay too much attention to street demonstrations not always manifestations of deep change less to Changing discussions expectations and ideas So in places like Saudi Arabia and UAE where there's been far less protest mobilization You have seen people Reasserting the use of a very old tradition petitioning the ruler for demands And people using those petitions to mobilize politically and call Not always using the phrase constitutional monarchy But to call for more restrictions on the the powers of rulers often for a more independent judiciary stronger Institutions not always demands that get the headlines as much as saying down with the king but very very important changes in expectations At times in the past You've seen the gulf monarchies respond to and accommodate Changing demands of their citizens. They are countries that have been resilient throughout the the recent Decades and at times of crises such as the withdrawal of the british empire from the region the liberation of q8 or 9 11 You have seen moments where rulers have taken opportunities to liberalize to empower parliaments and so forth But during the recent times of crises in the region since the arab spring the trend in the gulf has rather Being the opposite the focus has been on spending more money But generally on closing down political space and narrowing the boundaries of what is deemed to be politically acceptable discourse The report argues these strategies are short termist and that they are not sustainable in the years ahead Because one of the major drivers of change in the gulf Is the lack of sustainability Of the current economic deal between citizens and the state this varies hugely between the different gulf countries UAE and kata with their tiny citizen populations and large sovereign wealth funds face perhaps the least pressure Bahrain and oman the most oil poor have seen already the greatest Uh protests around the time of the arab spring and face the most pressing fiscal crunch Saudi Arabia too Even if the oil price returns to a hundred dollars a barrel will face great difficulty balancing its books Governments are very much aware that they need to move their economies beyond oil. They all have extensive Impressive strategic visions for moving their economies Towards what most of them would aspire to to call a knowledge Economy rolling back the role of the state making the private sector the employer of choice Any of you who visit the gulf would do business there will be very familiar with these kinds of ideas But one of the core recommendations of our reports is that these visions need to be matched by parallel public discussions about The political implications of the changing role of the state And what a new deal with citizens will mean in terms of politics Not just expectations over the provision of economic benefits and jobs Currently the lack Of a political vision of this kind is making it virtually impossible for these governments to implement The economic policies that they would like to implement and what we've seen since the unrest of 2011 around the region Has been a reversion to short termist policies a focus on new fiscal spending pay rises the creation of New public sector jobs, etc 150 billion of new public spending was announced across the gulf in 2011 alone or around 13 of gdp And we've seen the new saudi king cement his succession to the throne by offering new Handouts and spending estimated to total around 32 billion Although the imf estimates that their fiscal deficit will be at least 14 percent of gdp this year So we are also arguing that the gulf countries have an important opportunity to engage with their own populations on the nature of political change in the future Because most of their populations aren't seeking revolution and that's probably all the more so as Some of the arab transitions have turned violent and turned sour We're all too aware of the risks of radicalization and extremism emanating from the gulf countries But it's important to emphasize that supporters of al-qaeda and the islamic state Are in the minority The gulf countries have been tending in recent years to generalize about their oppositions and to place Peaceful oppositionists in the same camp when it comes to repression and punishment as Terrorists and violent groups, but they would be well served to isolate The violent rather than radicalizing the middle The crisis elsewhere The crises elsewhere in the region do show some of the risks of radical change But they also show the risks that come from having weak institutions and repressing opposition so that you have no way to manage transitions if extreme pressures do come up So we also recommend to gulf governments that they decriminalize peaceful opposition activities From online criticisms of government policies to things that are deemed as insulting institutions of state That they renew a focus on transparency and accountability in government As more and more scrutiny of their public spending is going to come Particularly if oil prices are lower, but also through the social media They should strengthen some of their existing institutions, particularly judiciaries and parliaments, but fundamentally Institutional change could be only cosmetic if the deeper informal institutions that govern politics are not also reformed and ultimately that means thinking hard about the future role of the ruling families and preparing the younger generation of those families to expect somewhat less of a share in politics and in the economy In the years ahead A sensitive issue perhaps, but one that is going to determine how realistic and how meaningful reforms at the more into more formal institutional level are In terms of western policies towards the gulf countries The report is certainly not arguing for western countries to come to impose new political systems or western values on the gulf countries Rather, it's arguing that there are significant internal pressures for change coming from inside those societies Western governments need to do a better job at listening to the priorities that come from inside those societies Not just from their governments, but from a wider range of civil society groups And when it comes to many issues from human rights to women's rights Remembering that the issues westerners prioritised are not always the same ones that are priorities for local people We also advocate rethinking economic engagement with the gulf that much of the current economic engagement with the gulf is in terms of defense sales energy and finance These are all sectors that create very few jobs for gulf nationals and in terms of defense spending in particular are often viewed as Wasting resources that could otherwise be spent on health care and education more sustainable economic engagement Requires helping the gulf countries to develop the jobs and training that they need for their nationals and we also look at security cooperation with the gulf countries arguing that It's a misconception to think that we should ignore internal issues Simply because we know that gulf countries are going to be ongoing important allies in counterterrorism in the region The relations between citizens and states in the gulf countries will be a fundamental element of how secure and how stable those countries themselves are In the future and rather than relegating those issues to be the purview of human rights officials only They need to be seen really at the center of security and defense work with partners in the gulf countries I'm going to turn now to my colleague umil who will explore in some more depth this particular issue of citizen state Relations in the gulf and of course we'll be happy to hear your comments and to answer any questions that you might have On the report. Thank you very much Thank you jane So yeah, as jane said, I'll I'll focus briefly on on this aspect of citizenship in the gulf and How the relationship between citizens and states? Is being redefined I would like to say that I think one of the major drivers of change throughout the region since 2011 has been this desire by citizens throughout the Middle East To sort of redefine the role within their states so from being You know subjects to to really becoming active participating citizens And this has been true in the gulf as well However, what we've seen as well since 2011 in the gulf is that the sort of space for Meaningful constructive political dialogue has been sort of closing down And one of the ways that that has um that has happened is by is through Gulf governments revoking The citizenship of some of its of some of its nationals And I would like to focus on this specific aspect because I think it is a very important one that poses very important questions Both in terms of human rights, but also in terms of how Gulf governments are dealing with political dissent And you know what that means in terms in terms of the this, you know long term Redefinition of citizen-state relations in the gulf So as you may know since 2011 several Gulf governments have revoked the citizenship of numerous dissidents I think the latest example was in Bahrain in Just this this past january Where the ministry of interior issued a decree Which withdrew the nationality of 72 Bahrainis And as is often the case the list included You know a mix of of names from, you know radical islamist clerics to one of Bahrain's most prominent bloggers Ali Abdul Imam And in a way that's you know that creates a sense sometimes when looking at at it from the outside that Gulf governments are doing something in order to Counter the sort of the extremist threat But really, you know, we forget often to see that, you know, some of the people targeted are also Um peaceful dissidents And you know Bahrain is not the only example. This has happened in Kuwait in 2013 alone 33 people have lost have lost their citizenship in Kuwait including Several high-profile opposition figures This is something that has Has been introduced in Oman as well last year the Omani government passed a law That allowed the authorities to revoke citizenship based on broad National interests interest grounds and In discussions that we've had with Analysts in the Gulf there was this sort of sense Particularly last year that in a in an environment where relations between Gulf states has, you know has Have have have not been that good Um The one area where there has been an probably increased cooperation has been on internal security matters And so and this the revocation of citizenship was cited as one One very important example of this Um Now this is not new And I think it has happened in the Gulf a lot before And in a way it can be seen as the logical conclusion of the sort of Transactional relationship between states and citizens as Jane explained before that is based on you know an economic bargain whereby citizens receive as I expect to receive certain economic benefits and in return For limited political rights However, I think that where whilst it's not new the timing Of these revocations is very important And the fact that they have been happening Particularly Since 2011 means that Gulf governments have identified You know political dissent as an issue that they need to they need to clamp down on And this has important implications I think because um In a way it Is consolidates the current relationship that exists between states and citizens in the Gulf At the time when a lot of people in the Gulf are trying to redefine that relationship And so that has the potential to create Um a lot of tension and again in discussions that we've had with analysts in the Gulf and I should say that we've engaged with a lot of sort of new generation analysts so young people who are journalists political analysts entrepreneurs and one of the things that Has come up quite a bit Is that um a long-term approach Um to political stability in the Gulf would seek to sort of begin to redefine the current relationship between the Between states and citizens in a way that is sort of it bases it on On citizen aspirations To go beyond the material accumulation of wealth And in this sense the state's strength in the Gulf would no longer be just based on its ability to Sort of give or take citizenship As as it pleases but rather on its legitimacy in the eyes of of all its citizens um so I would just say in terms of the sort of international outlook um, it is quite interesting that the united kingdom has um started revoking citizenships as well as a way of dealing with uh potential terrorists um and This I think is sort of something that the international community should really consider Because it potentially can create a legitimizing effect um Elsewhere and also it diminishes the The sort of the influence or the credibility of western states trying to um You know criticize some of these Some of these aspects such as citizenship revocation Great, okay, um Kristen hi everyone So I want to start by thanking fred wary and the Carnegie endowment for inviting me to participate on this panel And it's a particular honor to be able to share in the introduction of this report by my colleagues at chatham house Um, which I think is a mention or maybe they haven't yet is the fruit of really a three year Commitment to study in this region. And I think that's really amazing to see sort of the commitment and this um really Thorough product that has emerged from that um And I really recommend that all of you Go beyond the executive summary and actually take a look at the report because it is really very rich As they mentioned I kind of read one of the key recommendations coming out of the report At least towards western policymakers is for them to start to view the gulf beyond the lens of oil and security And to take seriously the opinions and demands of of gulf publics As well a more rapidly maturing publics I should say And I think one of the more commendable aspects of the report is that they really do follow their own advice in this aspect I know the development of this report came about Modeled on this new norm of public interaction Which is reflected in the real integration of of local voices particularly younger voices Not only in the workshops that contributed to the analysis that went into the report But also in the report itself and a number of small kind of brief Writings and commentaries that really touched on a lot of diverse topics From fiscal sustainability expatriates in the gulf labor market reform New media and its impact and even the emergence of young artists in the gcc And I think this is just a wonderful illustration of not only demonstrating Kind of the the desire and the you know ability of young people in the gulf to contribute to the ongoing Discussion about the the changes that are happening in the gulf and to interact But also of the the broadening kind of a society and its willingness and and so many different aspects of society that can That we can draw upon and interact with Now and this really maturing gulf At the same time though, there's so many diverse and novel topics that It's kind of difficult for me to know where to interact and to come into with my comments So I decided to really focus on this main theme of the report about The gulf society becoming much more assertive public and the need for a corresponding evolution of Their western allies and interacting with them beyond state-state relations And while i'm in total agreement with the spirit of this assessment and suggestion to to broaden these contacts I want to focus in my comments on some of these political trends perhaps short term Um that My colleagues have discussed that gulf governments. They're doing that are going to make this practice to actually Approach the gulf in this way More difficult. Um, and these are new tactics as already been mentioned that have come about As a government response has responded to the emergence of really unprecedented demands that emerged In the days after the airspring in 2011 and continued Definitely through 2012 and also in response to the new security environment that has emerged with the eruption of this new islamic state and other transnational movements and challenges Through weakening states across the region And if we look at these tactics, I mean, I think there's one thing I can draw upon that happened Just this week. That's really illustrative of the tactics This week the most prominent and vocal quady opposition leader. Um, selma barak was sentenced to a two-year prison term Which stems from his Directly challenging the amir at a public rally that took place in 2012 That was protesting the unilateral change in the electric election law electoral law by the amir in kuwait And it's worth noting of course that that his arrest and now jailing follows very closely on the Arrest and now prosecution of shekali salman In bahrain who has also been charged or has been charged with Promoting the overthrow of the regime in bahrain And I think these two leaders are really symbolic because I mean not five years ago Both of them were firmly ensconced in their nation's parliaments. They're both parlementarians Shekali salman leading the largest opposition group, uh, or the largest group actually in bahrain's parliaments And um, selma barak receiving the largest number of votes of any Representative in kuwait's parliaments And today they're both in jail And there's no question that both of them have been outspoken and decrying corruption and what they see is growing autocracy in their countries And very forceful and their demands for reform But contrary to any accusations, um, neither of them called for the overthrow of the monarchies Um, and neither resorted to violence um, and I think uh In keeping with this, you know, kind of seeing that these leaders who once had a very public platform For pushing for reform within their societies Um, we can also see that the parliaments themselves are now much less representative than they were earlier Due to the boycott of oppositions both in bahrain and in kuwait Due to the repression and due to their increasing demands for for greater inclusion um, so what this means is that the institutional landscape and political landscape of People that can be interacted with in the in these regions is is more restricted as they said Not only um from the voices that you can hear but actually people that are available to talk to um in the represent Representativeness or the full kind of scope of the political Opinions that used to be in the parliament are no longer there Um, I think it's important to note too that that these new policies of cracking down on peaceful opposition both, you know, some violent opposition, but also in this case peaceful opposition um Has been taken a step further to uh Through the creation of a new legal environment, uh by these states Um, that has seen not only uh muslim al-barak and shekali salman tied up in the courts But many of their supporters and fellow activists Who have now been jailed or tied up in prosecution? um And really there's this pattern of a new prosecution strategy or strategy and creation of new legal frameworks We can see this through an amended terrorism law in bahrain We can see this through new terrorism legislation that was undertaken in saudi arabia and the ua e And also the aggressive or much more aggressive enforcement of these majest laws And patrolling of media and social media in kawait and attempted new media law there as well um So the strategy the tactics of the government is almost like a strategy of exhaustion to keep political and rights activists either Jailed or tied up in courts And I think it's been facilitated I think as was mentioned as well by the changing regional environment Which sees some of the gulf publics as being rather exhausted with Kind of ongoing protests or some might see them even as lawlessness An anxiety about the regional situation they find themselves in a fear of encroaching chaos With what's going on in iraq and in syria um But this New sort of legal cover Also can play a role in sort of deterring criticism coming from foreign governments Or it gives kind of a way of arguing that that you know, we are Undertaking all of these things under the the laws of our of our countries And that has also been furthered by governments and the criminalization in some cases actual criminalization Of citizens having an interaction with foreign contacts without prior permission by the government And in some cases as well They refuse entry of scholars and policy makers even policy makers Into into the country So all of this means that there we see a narrowing of the public sphere A narrowing of the expression coming out of the You know once very lively institutional political institutions and a more fraught environment for this sort of public interaction I think as well, it's it's interesting to see and I think yamiya kind of spoke on this a little bit Or jane as well that this similar dynamic is also taking place In foreign affairs. They mentioned the interest in citizens and playing a larger role in discussing Their country's policies, but as gulf governments have become much more assertive and engaging in foreign policy Um, and in trying to basically reshape the regional environment to their interests You have the same tactic of legal enforcement That has been applied as well to any public commentary and criticism of foreign policy um, so that now The koi yamiya himself Has announced a zero tolerance policy towards any sort of criticism of fellow gulf governments and allies And we've seen active prosecution of court cases coming up against former imp in koi who had criticized A koi policy towards egypt another who had criticized An official in the united arab Emirates another imp And also activists on social media Being hauled into court for their criticism or ridicule following the death of king abdallah in saudi arabia And this as well is backed up by A legal new institutional framework Um, in particular, we have the gcc security agreement, which has not been publicized But which there have been sort of leak copies among some people um that Allows for the extradition of citizens or at least allegedly allows for the extradition of citizens that are wanted by fellow gulf states um As well as we know it's been announced the creation of a new gcc Gcc police force and more coordination and tracking or denying the free travel of activists between these countries Which is I guess right in line with what yamiya was talking about earlier um So I was going to mention as well the topic that yamiya threw out there about the withdrawal of citizenship And I agree with him that it's it's Both highly effective Because in some of these states The withdrawal of citizenship is extremely costly I mean the value associated with citizenship economic value is huge And the withdrawal of citizenship means not only the punishment of the individual but the punishment of his progeny going into the future So it's a very effective strategy But it's also I think highly symbolic that I think yamiya really hinted about And it's in a way a real expression of a reversal that has happened in gulf states under the current trying times Where we had uh previously attempts to kind of engage citizens more which are represented by By the parliaments that I discussed earlier that had active, you know opposition members pushing for reforms It's also indicative in saudi arabian countries like that and national dialogues That we're attempting to be plague take a more inclusive Approach and I think now sort of this withdrawal of citizenship is very much indicative of a more Exclusionary policy that's taking hold under these trying times And I think we might see one one concern I guess Looking towards policy is Is how the sort of exclusion I mean kind of has the opposite effects or more inclusive policies right allow for the engagement of a broad Shape of all of the citizens But as you have kind of exclusion of particular citizens very much represented by this withdrawal of citizenship I think we might see A reemergence of the sort of transnational movements that we saw that were very evident In the 1980s that kind of went more into remission as as the gulf states were trying to make more of an effort to engage And to resolve some of these conflicts And of course, that's very concerning in a time when we have people transnational Heading to some of these States which have you know less control over their state territories Whether we're talking about iraq or syria the rise of militias and of course the rise of the islamic state As well stop there. Thanks Thank you for having me today here and I would like to thank karniggy for their commitment Toward the situation and the gulf usually if there is A major event about the gulf you will find it here and karniggy I would like to thank them and a special thank for fred for for for this commitment Also, I would like to thank Chatham house for their effort and for their recent product and Their focus about the potential in the gulf and the inspirations of The oath in the gulf toward a liberalization And I mean by liberal liberalization and the gulf in term of democratization and freedoms It's really At topics that really you will find it having enough kind of focus To explore the potential inside the gulf I remember story for my brother. He he is a exilofacial surgeon. He did his Residency in Saudi Arabia He went with the impression that he will go to a place Where you will rarely will find a sophisticated expert and Very a kind of Sophisticated skills and and and fields, but he was surprised when he went there and find That the Saudis there are participating in Conferences international conferences held in Saudi Arabia and you will see the Saudis are Under focus Because of their skills and because of their argument and because of their knowledge, which is Something that rarely we will We will have the kind of focus we rarely Exeplore the potential of of the people in the gulf The same if if we follow for example the the social media I I get surprised if I see the youth are following economists so What the economists are saying about the Saudis Saudi economy Is not just followed by expert and by intellectuals. You will see the debate by the youth About very sophisticated issues And the debate is very wide, which is something really very special Even here in the united state if I'll see for example Accounts for experts and intellectuals You will see the interactions with the expert coming from very elite group, but not from The the wider public, which is the case in Saudi Arabia, which is something really And inspiring And I I wasn't in touch with one of the Saudi activists on the social media He focused on The trends on on the social media and what the new users of Twitter accounts are following in Saudi Arabia I was surprised with his finding because he told me that After they were studying the new accounts on on on Twitter. They found that most new users of Of Twitter are following hashtags and topics related to human rights and democracy And specifically they are focusing to follow up the news of of hasm, which is a group of A human right activists who are advocating for a transition in Saudi Arabia A gradual transition toward a constitutional monarchy So there is a potential which does not usually have kind of a focus Returning back, let me Talk with you about the situation on the ground and and and the Gulf and maybe I'll focus a little bit about Bahrain Um Things are are deteriorating in the region As christian spoke about the arrest of sheikh ali salman. We will see also Threats against the human right activists who are speaking openly such as nabir rajab Just two days ago. He was summoned and he went to police station And he may face new charges and he also have a case on the court and he he already sentenced For just tweeting about The torture in Bahrain and this had been considered as insulting for the Interior ministry and he is charged by by this Charges and If we'll go to the to the situation on the ground, we'll find also The new cases of of torture coming back for certain period The torture had been reduced in Bahrain, but nowadays we find the new cases Of of torture recently One one of the protesters he was killed under torture His name is hassan a sheikh Everybody was shocked with with the images of his body after After he After he died This really raised the concerns about about the torture Also, there are Some prisoners they were leaking Videos from the prison they were able To to record the videos and leak them outside and they were talking about about The very tough period they were facing to give confessions about Explosions and so on Another major deterioration is banning the protest after the arrest of sheikh Ali Salman and Bahrain There is the government does not provide any They don't accept any request for marching in Bahrain Before his arrest you will see the opposition are protesting in in tens of thousands on on monthly basis Nowadays Such kind of activities are banned and you will see People are protesting Inside the villages and and scattered kind of a protest around around the country Of course, this situation is not sustainable The government having this idea that Even Bahrain is a small country. It can divided to two countries They are trying to divide a country for a region Which will have the protest going on on daily basis and you will see the clouds of tear gas Around those villages for for for those who are protesting And you will see the business as usual in the commercial areas and in other places This equation is not sustainable Uh, simply because the government Are having a really a serious problem with the economy and with the debt Part of the major strategy to deal with the debt had been presented by the crown prince in his strategy 2030 and this strategy He was relying on bringing investment to Bahrain All indicators are saying that Investors are leaving the country So even if you are able to have a commercial areas that running as usual The business are leaving the country and you cannot create job opportunities without having A really a settlement and a resolution for this conflict in Bahrain Let me talk about how to move forward in the region in the Gulf We have three scenarios. The first scenario Is just to go Without a change as the situation currently is Where the Saudis are not moving toward any kind of change the Bahrainis Are also and the same for Saudis and and and Emirates in general This situation as I said it will not be sustainable and delaying the the the change in Bahrain will make it much more complicated and the price will be high and All side will lose use government will lose If this kind of a transition had been delayed and the same for monarchs And of course the same for the victims who are the people here in this region This is the first scenario. The second scenario is to see the change in Saudi Arabia And after the change in Saudi Arabia this change can propagate to other countries in the region That's the third scenario that i'm advocating for Is to have the change in a small country like Bahrain That can bring a model and this model Can bring solutions for the problems that jain was Exploring and and and talking about in her paper Saudis are not facing debt currently But Bahrain are The the debt in Bahrain Is considered to be unsustainable by 2017 After just two years. It is unsustainable debt so Bahrain need to act now while Saudis may can delay their acts in the in the future Bahrain can bring a model for this change Because when when the opposition was past participating in the parliament They were able to advocate for solution for these deep problem in our economy Bahrain was one of the countries who were having the debate about Redirecting the subsidies Saudis cannot think in this policy at this time After the uprising in Bahrain what Saudis did they doubled the salaries for their citizenship They cannot touch Issues related to economic reform all what they can do is just provide the people more and this is unsustainable policy The solution can start in Bahrain because they they need to act now and there are the powers Such as the pro-democracy movement in Bahrain al-wifak and other political parties Who are really realizing these challenges and would like to have a painful policies That secure the future of the country so al-wifak and the others were Supporting the idea of redirecting the subsidies also The opposition in Bahrain was the first group in the Gulf who was Accepting and supporting the idea of introducing the taxation in the Gulf Bahrain have one percent Taxations that goes to a fund for the unemployed This idea had been supported by by by the Gulf and without this idea of redirecting the subsidies and Introducing the taxation to the Gulf difficult to find a solution Saudis cannot do it nobody in the Gulf can do it the Bahraini government cannot do it But if there are forces in power that the people can trust These policies can Start it and you can find a model that can Bring a kind of a light to the region to move forward and thank you Great. Well, thank you all for that very comprehensive overview of both the findings of the report and then also On the ground developments as well. We're going to turn it over to questions now. We'll take three at a time Please identify yourself when you ask a question and please do ask a question Sir Thank you very much. Michael Lee from the german marshal fund here in washington I wanted to come back to A comment of christians, which was The fear of encroaching chaos from the situation in syria and iraq And my question is what response that is provoking on the side of the governments Particularly as citizens or of Gulf countries at least in a private capacity if not in official capacity are thought to be amongst those financing some of the more extreme groups and Considering that in the end Such destabilization could be seen as a threat in the Gulf itself So how are the governments responding? Is there any effort to clamp down on the financing of such groups by citizens of Gulf states? Okay, great. Thank you. Hi. I'm ryan silo independent consultant when I was in Bahrain a couple years ago I spent a lot of time with the transnational workers the expats And I think that and we mentioned citizenship a little bit But we didn't talk about what role they might have in the in the future kind of political changes or realizations in the Gulf countries I know the situation in Bahrain is similar, but not the same as the other Gulf countries So I think that'd be an interesting discussion. Thank you Ali lami from the center for democracy and human rights here in washington dc Uh, what are the Saudis have been looking for an opportunity to annex Bahrain for at least 60 years And now they have their chance Jane you mentioned that the Gulf states Are going to be allies and fighting terrorism allies of the west In fact king king salman just last week awarded king faizal a prestigious award To zhakar naik one of the most anti-democratic anti-humans rights anti-human rights a preacher in the world Yet king salman gave him King faizal prize with 200 000 dollars attached to it For his surface to islam. How do you reconcile? Fighting terrorism with rewarding people who promote terrorism Okay, so we've got the question on Gulf financing you want to take the first I think the rise of the islamic state And its takeover of mosul was a real wake-up call for the gulf countries So I think there were some in those countries who did see jihadi groups as potentially having some strategic benefits in In fighting Assad countering iran potentially encountering maliki and Then it's become abundantly clear that There really is a serious risk of blowback once again. Let's not forget. Of course the gulf countries have been here Before as well with al-Qaeda the interior minister of south arabia himself narrowly escaped an al-Qaeda assassination attempt six years ago So this certainly are important people in government who who realize the threat that this poses to their own countries it's also important to them that they That the west sees them as counterterrorism allies if you think back to the period after 9 11 that was one of the toughest times for US-Saudi relations and there was a lot of debate here in washington about whether the country was actually fueling extremist ideologies through rewarding preachers of the the kind that you discuss That was a real test for relations. The relations pulled through it. But I think it remains of of critical importance to Saudi Arabia in particular that the west sees them as very much onside And I think for the gulf countries those sorts of concerns that might get raised by western governments are Are seen as being much more important than the human rights concerns that are raised by western governments But often dismissed as just being a kind of of routine thing There the debate is quite fractious now over Where the responsibility lies for fueling extremist ideology and quite often when one speaks with saldis or indeed with people from turkey There's a a response that fighters are coming now from europe from belgium from You know indonesia china and therefore this isn't our problem But clearly there does need to be some introspection The saldi state sanctioned brand of islam isn't a revolutionary form of islam You know the ideology of islamic state does deviate from it But there are questions that need to be asked about intolerance and tachrysum and sectarianism That can sometimes appear to have an official stamp of approval Um On the migrant workers We've focused more in our report on the gulf nationals than on the important issue of the migrant workers, but Of course the they're kind of the third dimension of relations between citizen and the state citizen and the state and the other um The and there's a lot of conflict and debates within the gulf countries over whether you continue to pursue And a model of economic growth, which is predicated on cheap foreign labor Or whether you're pursuing a model of growth that is more about employing nationals and trying to change the the population mix uh I think the very high numbers of migrants in in ua e and kata means that the political debate about democracy is uh unique in those countries Uh in that citizens themselves are such a small minority that they have very little interest in some kind of majority rule uh, and Yeah, the migrants play a very important role in helping the countries to define national identity helping citizens to feel that the governments protect their privilege and so on and we do have uh a couple of the Uh writers from the gulf that have contributed to the report have focused on that issue in more depth I'm sure I mean, I think it's kind of Hard at this early stage to draw a lot of conclusions about the interaction between gulf states and the islamic state I mean, it's still evolving and a lot of it is sort of murky and hard to read. Um I think if we look at some of the more prominent, um Gulfies who have gone over um to the islamic state Uh, they tell kind of interesting stories though. I mean one of the most prominent ones Um As a gentleman named turkey albin ali who actually came He or his family came from within the bahraini interior ministry, right interior ministry, I believe um, and is now one of the leading, uh religious ideologues for the islamic state Um, and I think this speaks to kind of the empowering that we saw in the last four years of a really strong kind of sectarian rhetoric that came about And sectarian policies that came about due to the fears of saudi arabia and other states such as bahrain About sort of how the opening the public opening would affect them both in terms of pressure for for reform and even maybe You know real pressure to change the government and also of iran, of course And how iran might be able to take advantage of that situation And they promoted then kind of an environment Where the sort of thinking a sectarian thinking was allowed to thrive even within government institutions And I think that's one thing to be concerned about now as we see the rise of islamic state Which draws very much on the same kind of sectarian ideology um, the second person just recently who's emerged, um, uh, is This guy there calling jihadi jo amwazi. I believe Who does have the story of of coming from the uk and probably most likely a lot of his, uh, you know radicalization occurred there But his origins were actually in kuwait where he was a kuwaiti bedouin Which again speaks to this issue of unresolved, uh citizens These are people who were never given full citizenship within the country and have this kind of, um Tiniuest existence being in the state but not part of the state And again that kind of speaks to what I was talking about the fears about the rising of kind of transnationalism When you have all of these citizens that are dissatisfied and have a lot of islamic movements and other groups That they can come into both whether it be shia coming from shia militias and And other sorts of movements or sunnis from islamic state and other sorts of appeals Great i'm actually going to insert myself here. I've got a question. I'm jane on the last page I mean you argue I think quite sensibly for you know reshaping Uh security cooperation in the gulf and this new discourse about a more inclusive and sustainable security, um If we were to go after this panel over to the pentagon and and you were to introduce this Finding to them, how would you how would you start that conversation? And what specific recommendations would you make because My sense is in you know that over there at do d and their heart of hearts they get this I mean they understand the need for sustainable reforms that that's that's a crucial part of security over the long term But as you mentioned, I mean we've got these competing priorities. We need the gulf states for access We're focused on capacity building their important coalition partners So what should do do differently and then this question about you know, how do you operationalize this? This recognition or this discourse. I mean should do d start leveraging its You know, what tools does it have to to maybe nudge reform forward? I think the The us and perhaps especially the the defense establishment do enjoy significant soft power I think that They can send a lot of messages Not just with what they say rhetorically But with their behavior and I think for instance in the the case of Bahrain There has been rhetorical pressure on human rights But at the same time the us is embarked on this very large-scale expansion of the military base And the uk has announced the opening of a much much smaller Base there so the behavior is sending quite a clear message that no matter what we say About political reform and human rights and so forth We are going to intensify the relationship. We're here for the long haul and therefore Ultimately these issues that we're raising don't really matter So I think at the same time those western governments have rather been able to kid themselves that they don't have leverage Because they say oh we say these things we bring up these issues, but it doesn't they don't do anything But I think it's because they are really sending mixed messages I think also another important element of soft power, which is a bit more long term, but very important is the The the training the capacity building the interactions that take place through military academies and universities and so forth I think there is an opportunity there to try to develop together a different sense of what leadership means a different sense of What security actually means You know whether that it's really a sustainable security model to have armed forces where you systematically exclude large portions of your population or whether there's ways to bring people in more inclusively Um, I think it's also about setting the priorities in terms of western strategy How central are the gulf states to your wider regional strategy? And there is a bit of give and take here as well. I think to have a real partnership with the gulf countries We have to acknowledge that for many people in the region the islamic state is just one of many problems. It's resonated Uh, you know, it's killed a lot of people in iraq and syria, but it's not the only group that's done that And for many people in the region they feel that westerners are obsessed with the deaths of westerners and with threats to religious minorities But that our governments are not doing enough on issues like the the continuing conflict in syria and the success of Syrian iraq and palestinian refugee crises So acknowledging some of those concerns that the gulf governments and populations have is also really fundamentally important If they are going to listen to us, we have to listen to them Thank you, uh, hanif kashani center from middle east policy at the brookings institution Uh, I know matar. You briefly touched upon uh, Bahrain and subsidiary reform in Saudi Arabia But I wanted to ask the panel um, and I know that each country has its own distinct sent uh circumstances, but How can the governments of the these gulf countries Basically, um, institute subsidiary reform, whether it's cash or fuel in a socially and politically feasible manner If at all possible. Thanks. Hi matt frankel to dovetail on fred's question that he just asked This is a great report and reads very well for um appealing to folks here But how do you incentivize gulf states to act on these? What incentive is there to act on these suggestions when the feeling in these capitals is they've weathered the storm That um the moves that they saw in other countries in the region are just destabilizing and that there are these threats out here They're not just imagining them right there are Terrorists and other threats and this is what's prompting this crackdown. So how do you get the governments in riyadh and doha and manama to to Accept the argument that more openness is a uh, the just the optimal longer-term strategy. Thank you Hi kelly plan again from iraq's. Um, I just wondered if you had any insights on Um, whether there are ways that youth are learning advocacy either in school or online That might help facilitate a more democratic environment in the countries and in the government. Thank you I guess these are all to you These are great questions. I'm going to start with this important question of you know What's in it for them? What's in it for the government in the gulf and I think here we need to look at their own interests their own stated objectives and their own history, I think it is a Very fundamentally important issue that all these countries know that there's a need to restructure the economies and they do have very real aspirations to have world-class knowledge economies to have The best universities in the world not only taking their students over here, but coming to the region Uh subsidy reform is just one part of this of this picture, but it is part of it. Um, but it's But but there are going to be trade-offs and having a knowledge economy For example does require having some level of academic freedom and access to scholars and so forth And it also affects the expectations that your own citizens are going to have because I think fundamentally That's what it's about. I don't think it is really about outsiders advocating online for democracy in the region I think that fundamentally those pressures are going to be coming from inside Although people inside will be looking at models of democracy as it's practiced in the west And sometimes seeing it as a model and sometimes not, you know, there's a lot to be said for It we can say what we like about western democracy, but it's what people see of it and sometimes seeing You know violence and human rights abuses and perceptions of islamophobia in western countries also undermine the status of those countries as models another uh critical issue I think is Yes, the gulf countries feel they weathered the storm of the arab spring They do have anxieties about transnational movements and about the the influence of Iran in the region one of the arguments that we make in the report is that having a more Solid and inclusive national system is a critical Counterweight to transnational Identities we've seen this before q8 has feared iraqi expansionism for decades before 1990 One of the reasons for the establishment of their parliament was to have a real national arena for politics And again, they made a deal with the opposition during the iraqi occupation To say we are a genuine Solid nation state that everybody buys into iraq cannot use arab nationalism as a tool Against us. So I think there are lessons from their own histories. I think there are constituents within ruling families who see Uh a different future, but right now they are generally speaking on the back foot subsidy reforms Question on subsidies how we do that. Yeah I I think it just is part of this bigger picture I mean you're seeing some tweaking around the edges You're seeing you know UAE for instance making the real cost of water and electricity more transparent to nationals on the electricity bills There's a lot of awareness raising campaigns But if you look at a country like oman where there's a particular fiscal squeeze at the moment Whenever governments are saying We've got to clamp down on public sector pay and what citizens get You are now seeing a pushback from citizens on social media saying let's examine government waste Let's examine corruption. We're not going to be the ones that take all the burden of of cuts on ourselves So I think it is part of a bigger picture of making the public finances somewhat more transparent and making some tough choices about what the the ruling families themselves can expect to spend Just if I just one point on that too one thing that you see linked to the idea expatriate or migrant workers too is that because the pressure comes from citizens not to Take on these additional costs the initial costs are pushed over a lot on migrant workers So they seem to equate a lot of restrictions on sort of access to healthcare even access to driving and different things like that put on expatriate workers And added fees to try to get some of the revenue coming from that side as well Yeah, I'll just add regarding the the issue of subsidies and inside this report. There is a contribution from Abdullah abdel al and ghassan shihabi phd students who participate in this work Who who tackle this issue where they were saying that it's very hard to move to a really A dramatic change is Touching the subsidies or introducing the taxations Without having really powers that are trusted by the people in other words without a political participation Those things should go together. Otherwise The the the people in the Gulf will reject any ideas like this Becca laster rand corporation You've talked a lot about how these future trends in the gulf are going to influence the relationships between the gulf states And the west but you've talked a little bit less about how these trend lines are going to impact The relationships between the gulf states themselves Do you think that these trends are going to exacerbate existing rivalries or create new ones? Or do you think that it will actually have A bit of a unifying effect effect for the gcsa Oh wait, I didn't say sorry. Sorry Thank you, michael kerzig formally of the department of agriculture I just listened to prime minister bibina tanyao Make a very compelling case about the threat of iran's nuclear Capacity in the middle east Talked also about asbala and hamas. What's going on in syria the hooties in yemen Do you in the gulf Countries see that as an existential threat to you Are the gulf countries? Of course, Saudi rapes include going to respond with some time of nuclear energy Nuclear armament are we looking at an arms race or a nuclear race in the middle east? Thank you Mahfuz dadros retired Jane made an excellent point about the need to diversify the gulf economies To expand the role of the private sector create jobs and the rest of it subsidy issue What do you see the effect of the lower oil prices on this would the gulf countries move forward with this or they will Respond it and take it any check for the next round. Thank you get in reverse the you want to go with the Internal divisions question. Yeah, thank you. Um I think if the gulf countries are going to possibly embark on renewed period of Development and liberalization then that would necessarily take them off in different directions I think there's no one-size-fits-all model and I think there's a tension within the gcc over whether they should try to Have very different models or whether they should all converge Which would probably keep them all at a fairly low level when it comes to participation You've seen obviously the greatest divisions between ua and qatar being you know fundamentally about about regional policy But I also reflect their very different assessments of whether the muslim brotherhood is Domestically a threat Uh, I don't I think now you're seeing the gcc states tried to pull together to have more credibility Internationally, but I think you still get very different views internally about Whether political Islam is something that can be accommodated as has often happened in the past Um, or whether it's something that can be sort of cut out of the The picture and deemed to be entirely a threat you also see quite different views in the gulf about iran It's not an issue where there is any unity So you've seen on one hand Oh man brokering the talks between the us and iran for some of the gulf countries They they can be more concerned about Saudi Arabia Potentially trying to push them around than about an iranian nuclear weapon being a direct threat to them But there is an open discussion, especially in Saudi Arabia about potentially If there is an iranian nuclear Sort of threshold capability or weapons capability whether Saudi too Should develop a deterrent one of the problems that they have is there they're behind So this would take quite some years to catch up on Something else that I would advocate for is that there really needs to be some parallel track to the nuclear negotiations That looks at the the issues that are fostering regional conflict between iran and the gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia That that needs to take in Syria iraq yemen a host of very complex issues But if those issues are seen as being ignored or sidelined by the international community Then even if there is a historic nuclear deal with iran this summer You could really see a backlash in the gulf in the wider sunni world And that's something that groups like islamic state are already using as a recruiting tactic I'll take up the question of diversification I think it's It's worthwhile to at least acknowledge that there has been a quite a bit of degree diversification of the economies of the gulf states If you look at the last oil boom It looks quite different from the first oil boom in the way that the money was invested a lot more of it went inside of the gulf states We've seen the Saudis making a big push towards Diversification into petrochemicals that they've been quite successful internationally in that And of course the examples of dubai that have been taken up by Abu Dhabi and also Qatar Which they can use their extreme wealth to kind of push into different Areas so so there has been some of that the bigger challenge of course is is In meeting the demands for jobs not in those smaller gulf states but in states like Saudi Arabia and getting citizens to move from Public sector jobs which are have much larger benefits to private sector jobs Um, I think there's also a question though about the the means of diversification and what you're really diversifying to I mean, I think a lot of that diversification has gone into sort of large Projects and these sorts of things and big name things. I don't quite they've been pushing now again for a long time talking about a new Becoming a center for you know international finance like the gulf needs another international finance center And one thing that was Interesting and keeping with this theme of integrating new voices is that when Kuwait Government took on a project of trying to listen to Kuwait youth and to have them communicate their own priorities through a program They called a Kuwait Tismat In fact, the young people this is one of the things they were really irate about and they're like, why are we even talking about another Financial center, which is just replicating things that are already there. That's just going to benefit sort of the elite And this is the big critique of a lot of these big Diversification projects is that they go to these state-run companies or to Elite family business families that are linked and that the wealth isn't distributed as broadly And their solution was to push more and to make Kuwait a center for small and medium enterprises And more in keeping with this idea that young people want to be more involved in the economy and more entrepreneurial industries and this sort of thing And so I thought that was interesting And I think Kuwait has responded actually by creating this huge fund for small and medium enterprise We'll see if the government can actually manage it But I think it's another issue is like not just a diversification but at the type of diversification and who it's trying to reach within society I think we've got time for one more question if we have it So okay, so we've actually ended on time I actually asked my panelists to our panelists to end on an optimistic note, but i'm not sure if we're We're there yet, but I will say they cause a cause for optimism is this excellent report and hopefully the gulf will Take it into account. So please join me in thanking our panelists for an excellent