 Very warm welcome to this one hour webinar that is hosted by the IAEA, the Institute of International and European Affairs in Ireland, together with Think Tank and Hooper in Copenhagen. And this event is part of an international project called Europe's Digital Future, which is coordinated by the IAEA and supported by Google. And as part of this project and network of Think Tanks and Research Institutes in several European countries in Ireland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark and Estonia, I exploring what the concept of digital sovereignty means and what future it will herald for the EU and particularly for small and open economies. The network held its first joint event in Dublin in July this year, and today's event is the second in a series of project events taking place in member state capitals, with the first event actually taking place on Tuesday in Stockholm on the Digital Markets Act hosted by the Stockholm Free World Forum. And you can learn more about the project and you can see early events and publications on www.iea.com. And that brings me to the focus of today's webinar, which is the European Chips Act that was proposed by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her State of the Union address in September and as far as I understood that was also the first time that most people heard about it. The broader context of the European Chips Act is of course already well known to most of us, it is the debate about European strategic autonomy or sovereignty as we also heard French President Macron is his favorite way of putting it when he set out the French presidency conclusions yesterday. And what is motivated is this almost perfect storm of the COVID pandemic, America first rhetoric in the US, the remarkable rise of China as a technological superpower, which has made many Europeans, suddenly very aware of the shortcomings of our more than 30 year approach to, to almost untamed supply chains. And one of the things that make me very excited about this focus on the Chips Act today is that it's one of the today most concrete examples of how to put figures, how to put factory location discussions into this debate about strategic autonomy. But of course the most exciting thing is our three distinguished speakers that we have with us today. We have Kim Jörgensen, head of Cabinet of Commission Executive Vice President, my great best idea, representing so to say the architects behind the European Chips Act. We have Thomas Bustrup, Deputy CEO of the Confederation of Danish Industries representing the industry of a small open economy. And then we have Greg Slater, Vice President and Senior Director for Global Regulatory Affairs in Intel with us to give us also the perspectives from across the Atlantic. So proceed in this order of speakers and ask each speaker to give us a short introduction, and then we will follow in the end with possible questions also from you listening to the webinar. So please feel free to use the chat function on this Zoom call and we'll try to read out questions during the discussion. But that's it for me in terms of introduction. I'd like to give the floor to you Kim, thanks very much for being with us. Thank you very much, Katharina and also looking forward to have the discussion with Thomas and Greg. As you said, this is a very, very topical issue. The current global shortage have exposed clearly the critical importance of semiconductors across a broad range of European sectors from automotive to healthcare. And I think it's also clearly that the shortage is slowing down the recovery of key economic sectors in Europe, as we all have seen, it has forced automakers around the EU to hold productions here at the end of the year. And I think it could also have effect on other sectors and the shortage highlights the fragility of the semiconductor supply chain and the dependency of a limited number of companies and geographies in a tense geopolitical context. The supply chain largely relies on the US for general design and on Asia as a hub of semiconductor manufacturing. And this poses a risk to our global competitiveness and resilience. And this tendency has also is also separated by the extremely high barriers to entry and capital intensity of the sector as well as it's particularly relevance for existing and future security and defense applications. I've all seen a lot of rumors also about the and statements on the US and China already investing heavily in expanding their semiconductor capacity. We have seen it also in Japan, South Korea and we have seen that large foreign companies are also taking a lead in the investment. I was looking forward to hear you, Greg, but what we have already seen the TSMC in Taiwan plans to spend around 100 million billion US dollars over the next three years. And you are having plans around 80 billion but you can come back to that so it is, as you said a very, very tropical issue and it is extremely important, but it's not a new thing that we are also talking about the supply chain with the doctors at European level. We have we have had the key digital technologies joined on the tech taking founded by Horizon Europe, which focuses on research and development and here we have also been been looking at it we have also funded around 1.8 billion euros from the European Union for this. We have also launched an industrial alliance on processors and semiconductor technologies that was lounge I think in July this year. So, so, so it's not a new thing so to say. What we are doing it with the Alliance and then and other initiatives is to try to to focus on the current gaps in production of microchips and the technology development needed for companies and organizations to drive, no matter their size. And we have also support the Commission support member states in the process to set up the important project of coming in the European interest of micro electronics, which is also, and what the aim is to bring together knowledge and expertise, expertise, financial resources and economic access from across the Union, where the aim is to deliver the key breakthrough technologies and critical infrastructures needed to address big societal changes where the market alone is unable to do it. And we have also streamlined our state aid rules to to make it possible to help in this process. So, so, I think we have paid quite a lot of attention and that's where the European chip came up. And it's correct that it's a new sort of the T the the term was was was done by the president in her state of the Union, speech on the 15 of September. And this will not be a short term initiative we will need to work on this for a long term focus. And I think the aim of the chips acts which have not been tabled yet, which we will table it in this first half of next year. We have three dimensions research and development and innovation that the first one and then production as the second one and international cooperation and partnership as the third dimension. I think it's extremely important also to to to focus to note that that we have already a very successful research and development in Europe. We have some of the leading research and development companies in on semiconductors in Europe we have a mark we have a found hope of we have CA and let's see and I think it's it's very important. Also to to to keep this and to develop a new generation of chips that can be produced in Europe, but it's also a key to accelerate the early adoption of innovative, innovative semiconductors technologies by the European industry. And I think it's it's also important to note. I mean, I think we have all at least I have learned a lot on chips here in the region's month. Also what is cutting edge chips. And we are not only need to produce the smallest chips, as I thought in the beginning, we definitely also need to produce so called legacy chips that the one we are using in a lot of the cars. We're using in fritz and coffee machines. So we need to produce a wide range of chips. And I think nobody can can produce everything themselves. As I said, the intro by years financially is extremely high. And we also need to do be able to make the chips productions also in a more energy efficient way. And that's also a very important part of this. But as I said, we need to have a clear picture also of the bottlenecks in the semiconductor supply chains in the different types of components for the main markets, it is necessary to anticipate the possible future disruption and to ensure resilience of the entire supply chains. And we also need to make sure that if and where it makes sense, the production can take place in the EU as well. And by a massive public and private investment as regards state aid, the Commission will continue to consider approving support to fill possible funding gaps in the semiconductor ecosystem in particularly for European first of a kind facilities. And this accepts assessment will be based on the EU treaty, which is what we always do if there are no state aid guidelines and can cover such measures. But what is also extremely important is is that the objective of the chips acts is not self sufficiency and self sufficiency in this area will remain a illusion. Because nobody can can do anything and I think that was also when we had the trade and tech council in Pittsburgh and ending of the September with the US. I think this was also the very clear message that we received from the US side. And I'm just coming back from Washington and I think it was also repeated in the meetings we had here in this in this week. And as I said, it's because the investments needed are so so so big and so huge that nobody can do everything together and that's also why international partnerships will be extremely important. And that's why the US are working on their US chips act, which I think will be adopted either at the end of this year or the beginning of next year. The European chips acts will be adopted in the first half of next year we have seen huge investment by Japan huge investment by by South Korea. And I think it's also fairly clear that that what what is needed is not a short term supply chain problem supply. I don't think we will be over it in a few months. We can also see that for example the numbers of chips in a in a normal car is around 500 I think in in in the electric car tomorrow will be 2000 chips. So so I think we need to establish a production of chips to be able to to have this secure supply chains. So I'll stop here and looking forward to the discussion. Thank you, Kim, very much for setting up the scene here and also come in touching upon your own journey and learning about chips in the recent months and my and it's also fascinating to hear your reflections on the US possible cooperation coming back having just been in the US and also that this would be a key part of the chips act. When we see a table next year, but my it seems that now now the focus is on getting the chips act going but the lack of semiconductors in Europe and Europe's small road in this seems to be only just one symptom of a broader strategic yet dependency of Europe and a number of areas today. How much do you see the chips act as part of a broader change in the approach of Europe industrial policy to, to having maybe more of a state or public role in in shaping what should be done and when do you have any comments on on the broader debate that we are part of. It's fairly clear that that there's a broader context. I mean we have we have seen that we had an updated industrial strategy we adopted last year we had just adopted a communication on competition policy. I think it's extremely important that we are also seeing supply chains here competition is also what makes us resilience. So basically so so we also need to to to to make sure that that that we are also focusing on on on the right areas and I think it's also very important with the chips act I think there's a particular problem and and and the supply chain of semiconductors and that's why I think we have, we will adopt the chips act that's also why we will be ready with all the things that we have when we give state aids we will even go as far as as how to to to give state aids for production here but I think this is because we think feel that this is a particularly area, but it's also very important that we make sure that this happens in an open environment. So that we don't pour money into only three member states and close it for for the rest, and that we don't ruin this excellent research and development environment we actually already have with with for example a mark in in in Belgium, and then we also know that we have the ASML production of of of microchip machines in the Netherlands. So we actually have already a good starting point in Europe, but but again, we have set the goal that we want to be able to produce 20% of of all the microchips in 10 years time, whether that's doable or not. I don't know because in 10 years times, the production will be most probably four times as much as today. So it's part of a broader picture but I think it's very important that we also make sure that this happened in an open environment, and where the aim is to make sure that we have a secure supply chain and a secure supply chain is not only one factory. That's the whole point that it doesn't mean that we have to do everything in Europe, because when it comes to tips that's not possible. And do you think this balance and keeping the focus on on where there are critical lacks in Europe is somehow has it become more difficult to sustain after Brexit is there also some kind of. Is this also part of the process of the EU having so to say lost its one of its most free trade oriented members or is this simply this almost perfect storm I was sitting out before about post pandemic post America first and so forth. But Americans are also saying that they cannot do everything on their own and the UK would not be able to do everything on their own I think we need to work together, but it's also clear that the balance on sort of free trade has already changed before or it at least started at least I've been working on these matters for quite some years. And I think it has shown that we can no longer depend on only one factory, but that doesn't mean that we have to bring home production in all areas to Europe because I don't think that's the way to do it. We just have to diversify our supply chain. So it's correct that that that maybe the free trade balance has has altered a bit with UK leaving the EU but it has already, it would have changed anyway, because of China and because of other things around in the group. Great. Thanks very much Kim we'll get back to you in the discussion part but I think that is a very appropriate point for turning to Thomas boost hook deputy CEO of the Confederation of Danish Industries, because Thomas what we hear often from from the Danish point of view is how important it is to to to not throw all the values out on the European internal market and how we have been used to doing things for many years because it has really tremendously benefited especially a small open economy such as the Danish. I would be very curious to hear your perspectives on this including how worried you are that this might be a lasting development towards more state aid and that kind of development in Europe, but over to you Thomas. Yes. Thank you. And also, good to be with you, Kim and Greg, looking forward to to also the question and answers afterwards. You are 100% correctly in your introduction. Thank you very much, I think, as we know that coming from a business organization in a small open economy with a lot of members being extremely dependent on the internal market. This is something that we have our focus on. On the one side, on the other side, we just asked our members that are dependent on on on microchips, you know, to what extent does this lack of microchips actually affect severely. They are eternal right now and they are the possibility of meeting the demands and 75% of them said that there's a huge problem in this in this shortage of microchips that we're seeing right now. So, this is this is truly a serious challenge for for many of our members at the one side and at the other side we need to to safeguard some of the, the things that we have built up with the internal market and less state aids in Europe for many, many years. And just a few comments on what are they doing right now. How are they coping with this situation. Many of them are trying to diversify their supply chains. But of course, as this is a global problem, global challenge, this is not very easy. Some are trying to redesign their products so that they are, they are less dependent on microchips, or that they are less dependent on certain microchips that they think are even tougher to get than others. So there's happening a lot in the research and development departments around in in all the companies and I think this is is valid for all Europe. We actually have a discussion here in Denmark or an issue. Some companies are correctly connecting this to the to the pandemic. So they are also asking for compensation schemes. This is what we have seen during the pandemic that restrictions on certain sectors in certain areas have led to the Danish government give giving compensation schemes and and some of our members are now asking for the same. Of course, this is a, this is, again, a balance because this is not this lack of microchips is not coming out of restrictions it's simply coming out of the situation where demand and supply is is in in an imbalance. And what have we done. We tried to set up a group of companies together with some of the companies that we also have in Denmark that that that are supplying microchips not because they are producing it, but because they are, they are agents for some of the big microchips practices around in the world. This doesn't solve the problem but at least it, it allows them to to share best practices it allows them to share experiences on how to to handle this situation this very very difficult situation. Then you mentioned also the microchip act. And I mean, it really, it makes sense in, in, in, in many ways also as Kim just explained. Of course, it will, it will, it will not, it will not. It will not solve the acute shortage of microchips that we have right now. That doesn't mean we shouldn't look into the future, but it's just it's very important to say that that it's, it's not something that will solve the situation right now. Probably you could say some of the existing producers are I presume and I have heard that they are investing already heavily in boosting their production capacities. And this is not new production capacities is boosting the existing ones and that will probably be ready earlier than, than if Europe were to, to, to, to set up new production capacities. So this is just to, to mention that there will be some kind of market correction to this, and the ones that will probably be able to, to solve the market situation quickly will probably be the, the producers the factories that are already now producing microchips. So the chips act is also, and this is also what Kim mentioned. It's, it's, it's not only to solve the demand situation in the long run. It's also a strategic outlook. I mean, it is, it is a way of securing that we will not get into the same situation that we are in now, because of, you could say, strategic decisions made by other superpowers. Let's put it in that way. So we think that it makes, it makes sense. Of course, it's extremely important that we, that we develop this production in Europe in, in the way that we think also solves the demand that European companies have in the future. I'm not a, I'm not a microchips expert, but as far as I understand it, that a lot of the demand from, from European producers are sort of less advanced microchips that you see in, in other products. So this should of course be put in very much into consideration when, when developing the chips act and implementing the chips act. Yes. Just a little bit on the long term, political measures. Yeah, Kim also mentioned this, maybe the objective should not be to be sort of the global leader in advanced manufacturing of microchips, but it should be a position where we are at least in the game. And whether it's 20% or less or more. Yeah, I don't know either. But, but yeah. An ambition to be in the game without of sort of being the, the, the leader of it. Also again, because I mean, I think other regions are really, really massively boosting their production right now. And, and from a market perspective, of course, so there's, there's a risk of, of overcapacity. And, and then when you have overcapacity, it will, it will lead to, to protectionism and it could lead even to anti dumping duties and stuff like that. And, and probably the production in Europe will, at the end of the day, not be fully compare, comparative with, with productions taking place in Asia, for example. So to conclude, yes, European industry, Danish companies severely impacted at the moment by shortage of microchips. We need to try and find some short term solutions to the problem, even though they are very, very difficult to find. And we also need of course look at the long term. And also the security for European companies of, of having access to microchips in the, in the future. And again, it's still very important that these solutions are tailored in the way that it is in line, you could say with the overall ideas and, and of the, of the internal market in Europe. Thanks, that would be my introduction. Thank you very much, Thomas, also for pointing out in quite a dramatic figure you found in your study that 75%. To correct of Danish companies today have some shortage of other of your members. And, and, but also the, the gap between the current shortage and then what's being proposed right now it's it's too different. It's two different things we're talking about. But now that's that. And I think I also heard, I mean quite backing for from your side to the initiatives being taken right now to avoid such crisis in the future. But actually Denmark is one of the few member states who have not set aside resources in the recovery fund after covert for joining these guys that came spoke about these important projects of common European interest, which are a way to give state aid to to develop to to respond to any need any dependencies. And also we have not specifically any plans to join the, the microchip in the micro industry, because it's that Thomas in your view. Do we have to somehow realize that now this is the new Christmas tree and we need to put our to put everything we can to decorate that or, but you think it is, it is okay to to somehow stand. It would be one of the member states who are on the sidelines here and even though others might be ahead on the case and another these brothers but what would be your concerns from the industry perspective. Well, I think it's, it's, it's a signal of the way that we look at state aid in in Denmark it. Both the government the Danish government but but also they're dependent on on on on our view on this and we have we've we've discussed this with the without with our members, whether to join this or not. And despite the fact that so many of our members are actually lacking microchips right now they don't feel that they are sort of part of the solution. They don't feel they have the competences and the knowledge and the background for actually being part of a project European project with with state aid that they can can contribute to. So I think their viewpoint is a bit idealistic but it's not so far from its truth is that you know we should give the state aid to the companies in Europe that are best able actually to solve this problem in the future. And they don't think that they are among those companies. They are demanding the projects, the product sorry but but they don't think that they are part of the solution of actually producing microchips in the future. I think that's, that's a signal that the Danish business environment is giving here we're backing up the project. But we think that there are companies in Europe that are more capable of actually solving solving this than than the Danish companies. And then there are other projects on on on hydrogen and where we're Danish business community to a very, very high extent is sort of putting themselves available to actually solve that on a European level, but not apparently not when it comes to to production of microchips. I think so it is, it is not just a bandwagon you have to jump on at any price or any cost is a question about the strengths in the country, but we see here now there might also be a tie on on health issues so it might be many to consider in the near future. I would thank you very much Thomas and also we will get back to to discuss more in a little while, but we'll turn to to break Slater. You're joining us if I understood correctly from California. So it's actually three a.m. if I understood correctly maybe three 30 right now. It's very impressive that you're with us your vice president and senior director of global regulatory business for Intel. We already heard about the US perspective from Kim just back from the states about the trading tech council, and also Kim's commission on the recent speech talk very much about possible cooperation quite concrete initiatives and proposals for collaboration on something like chips and how to to make sure that the US chips and the European chips act somehow speak together and promote the same values. I would, I'm very keen to hear from you Greg what your perspective is in this discussion of a European chips acts. So the flow is yours. Thank you and I'll come back to that point about collaboration in a minute. Actually, in Arizona, California is one hour behind us. It's 2 am 230 am there. Arizona is where we have our largest manufacturing site and that's where I'm based, but I've been to Ireland, of course, because we have a large operation there. But the short answer to the thought thought provoking question for this panel is that the EU chips act will put the EU at the center of the next gen semiconductor ecosystem if it is properly shaped and effectively implemented. And for me to watch both the US the development of the US and EU chips act is fascinating because both we've faced the same problem. Significant decline in manufacture of semiconductors and vulnerability to one small area of the world where nearly all our semiconductor supply comes from. And as you mentioned Katrina yesterday at an event in the US, you commissioner investor and knowledge the urgent need to increase some manufacturing capacity in the EU as did Kim. You commissioner right on also strongly supports this effort labeling as one of the three dimensions for a successful view chips act. And others have slightly different, slightly different approaches. The important point is that they see a common problems with our critical industry and a share a common vision on how to fix them. At Intel we're very supportive of the vision behind EU chips act. It's a critical critical or crucial initiative by the EU to restore resilience in the supply chains. And second, we believe it should focus on stimulating capability as well as capacity because of the synergistic effects that happen between them that need to be captured to achieve technology leadership. The EU chips act will help the you meet its 2030 digital targets by accelerating your leadership and important areas like energy energy efficient data centers, communication infrastructure and artificial intelligence. All resources should be mobilized and and the entire policy toolbox should be used to under an over my understanding is what it would be an overarching framework to set up to including a dedicated European semiconductor fund. As Kim said, and I believe commissioner commissioner also said that the goal shouldn't be to be completely self sufficient, because in their words that's an illusion in our complex and highly specialized industry with a global supply chain. Rather, it should be to create strategic autonomy in in the semiconductor supply chain where where there are single points of failure that matter the most from an economic and national security perspective. We welcome the new competition rules that Kim mentioned. It is important to align the chips act with the existing funding vehicles like ipsy or it kind of that was mentioned, which is a great tool but it's not very well suited for a strategic private commercial production. And also to line, align the chips act with financial instruments like national recovery funds and horizon Europe while pursuing other needed solutions, like the dedicated funding to fill critical ecosystem gaps by supporting first of a kind facilities that Kim mentioned. So we have three recommendations for a successful EU chips act first strengthen the world class semiconductor research capabilities that already exist in the EU by creating a collaborative mechanism. And then on your premier institutes institutions like I'm at Franhofer and see a Latte. One of the lessons learned so far in the new you chips. Sorry, the new US chips act is that it sets up legislatively a number of R&D programs but doesn't really tie them together to more effectively bring innovation from the lab to the fat. The US Commerce Department has asked the US Semiconductor Industry Association to do an inventory of the pre competitive R&D that is being done by government programs and universities to help identify the gas that should be addressed by the R&D programs that the US chips will set up and fund. Maybe the European semiconductor lines can do the same thing. Second, the US chips actually support increased capacity, especially for leading edge technologies. Leading edge semiconductors are are the building blocks for key emerging technology such as AI 5G autonomous driving photonics and quantum computing to be at the forefront of innovation and minimize supply chain disruptions. Europe needs to invest in both both the design and manufacture of leading edge chips I think Kim mentioned this too. This is a short forecast that the demand for leading edge semiconductors in Europe will grow at 15% Kaggle through 2030, much faster than demand, the growth of demand at lagging nodes, even though that's also important, as Kim mentioned, leading edge design and chip when they're located near each other are much stronger together because of the synergistic effects that happen and investing in both will fulfill the US goal of restoring tech leadership in our industry. So the EU needs to make investments to continue to protect current leadership in areas like R&D and toolmaking, but also make investments with the private sector where it needs to catch up such as an advanced chip making. I think Kim already alluded to this building new leading edge fabs is not cheap 17 billion euros for two fabs and 11 billion euros to operate those two fabs over 10 year period. And we face these economic headwinds with the massive subsidies that are given elsewhere. And so there will need to be a private public investment to close that cost gap. And the difficulty here is that technology continues to get more and more expensive right now 30% increase with each new generation. The last recommendation we have is that the EU chips actually promote collaboration, we're helpful to Europe's goals and Kim already mentioned this so I will just mention two possibilities here that the US chips act creates the that act has a what's called as a multilateral security fund, where with allies, the allies can share funds to develop collaborative research pre competitive research and develop standards that help like common export control standards or regulations. And so that's an interesting concept. In addition to us chips act sets up the national semiconductor technology center and allocates a fair amount of funding to that. I know the US commerce Intel is certainly supportive of the what the nstc national semiconductor technology center collaborating with iMac finding gaps in R&D to and collaborating together so that it's less expensive to move R&D forward and develop leadership and and that's an important payment and an important function. So those are just two examples of where the US and the EU could collaborate to to address common problems. Thank you. Thanks, very much great for these very concrete recommendations for the European chips act and I would love obviously to hear Kim say reactions I think they fit very well into some of the three aspects components of the chips act that we set out to maybe. I don't know if it's part of it, but the research and development and the, and the cooperation ones but but I'll give the floor to you in a bit but great maybe just for, for everyone. When was the first time you heard of a European chips act and what were your main, what was your initial thought. At 3am I'm not sure my memory is great, but it was mid September, and I'm not sure if it was President von der Leyen's announcement, or if it was before then, and my reaction was this is this is great. This is what they should be doing. And as I mentioned already I think if it's properly shaped and implemented effectively implemented it will be a, it will be a big success. So that's, that's a nice way to hand over to Kim with this support from from Greg in Intel but can you maybe just and I will also just ask Thomas afterwards to just give a few maybe reactions also to the different speeches. We've heard before we have some questions from the audience but Kim what would be your, your response to to hearing these. Thanks a lot and I completely agree, but just again to repeat that that that just as I mean the US chips act the European chips acts. I mean it's a way to put the political focus on the shortage of supply for semiconductor because we could actually do all the different elements in it in what is going to be the chips act we could do that with different programs of course we would to to we can do state aid based on the treaty we can do it guys and we can do research and development we have a rise in Europe program we have connectivity, a Europe program but but it's a way to say this is extremely important politically and therefore we put it together. And I think it's very important that we do cooperate as I said, with the US but not only the US with other like minded partners because we simply need to also work very closely with Japan with South Korea with with with with other other third countries. And as Greg rightly said, it's what what the US are doing in research and development is basically to make a federal system where you connect all the different research institutes and companies and we should do the same at European level. And it would also not be wise if we just just duplicate each other. And I think in Europe we have really one of the power leading where we are leading that is actually on research and development and we should not ruin that by by taking away customers or taking away part of what is the strength of, for example, a mark, and we should not just move a mark or created second a mark in you in the US we should cooperate. And I think that that's very important and of course, the money needed. I saw also one of the questions in the chat. What would be the expenditures between EU and member states. It's fairly clear that that the EU budget. I mean we can find money in at Horizon Europe we can find money in connectivity Europe, but when it comes to the actual production. There, the EU budget cannot it that will have to be member states that will have to go in with and company and private capital of course. And I think the team also for highlighting the question I think it was from Paul, do you hear about the tip sac whether it's in the balance between members to the funding, but Thomas, before we go back to the questions, your reflections and listening to, to keep to Greg here. And I mean, how much are you convinced that this is a necessary long term investment or do you think that that this transitory problem you were mentioning is is something that that's quite different from from what we are. We're engaging on with these much longer and much more committing plans. Do you have any reactions to the to what you've heard so far. I think it's. I mean, the world is changing. Right. And, and, and raw materials in general, not only semiconductor, but world materials in general is is is is is going to be an even more important part of of developing our economies and developing our businesses so so so that that we as a continent will need to look at how to ensure supplies of of raw materials in general here by also semiconductors is a natural step. And, and I think that, especially also hearing Greg, even though it's three o'clock in the morning Greg it's this is very clear what you're saying and I think it's, it's, it shows that that a strong Alliance between Europe and the US also in this is something that we that we need to develop. I mean, they are much better platforms for for developing the transatlantic cooperation now than then before and I think this is one of the issues where we have to do it. Thanks very much, Thomas, I will, I will turn to a question now from a member of the audience here immediately close with Nelson asks, will the European Chips Act give birth to EU financial support to new production facilities in Europe. For instance within the R&D capabilities, thus still aligning EU state aid rules. I wonder if that is mainly for keep to to consider. I can also just throw in another question from Seamus Evan. I think that's maybe mainly to Thomas. Do you think this current semiconductor, we actually touch a bit about that is mostly a short term transitory problem that will be resolved by itself in a number of years, even without the Chips Act. And also what other speakers thought about this we heard a little bit about that already. And then for Greg Slater, what seems to be the differences and similarities in the approach and emphasis for a Chips Act in the EU and the US. So I hope that is giving you a few inspiration for some, some future. There's some further discussion here. I think maybe let's turn to to Greg and see if you want to start on some of this. Great. So I have not seen the EU Chips Act yet, but I'll base my comments on what I've, the announcements about it. And I think I will go back to something that Kim mentioned that all the existing tools enable the European Commission to incentivize and fill the market to help fill with private investment, the supply chain gaps that they deem most important. I think one of the things I would say is, time is of the essence there is a there's a sense of urgency here. And in that are investing in the semiconductor industry or private or usually public companies, most of them, except the startup R&D companies, and they have, they're under a tremendous competitive pressure because it's a very dynamic industry and so decisions have to be made on where to So whether it's the US or the EU Chips Act, they have to be effective in their implementation. And maybe that's something that the EU Chips Act can do better than by tying all these pieces together that Kim mentioned in an effective way that complies with the state aid restrictions. The EU Chips Act is, it's a piece of legislation that is pretty high level in a lot of respects and will require rulemaking, and that will slow things down. Hopefully the EU Chips Act, again I have not seen it, but hopefully it will maybe a mix of instruments, some of which will speed up the acceleration of these, the use of these tools that already exist. So that we, because the decisions are being made right now and where to invest and you can't take years to do that so those are sort of some general comments, similarities there's a there's a desire to collaborate to do a project that nobody can do at all. I already mentioned a couple of examples for that. Differences is in the US you have a piece of legislation in the EU hopefully maybe there's there's room to to use already the existing toolbox in a more effective way. Thanks. Could you, could you just comment a bit on how how the US you think we'll go about finding partners in terms of this. Other than Europe. So the, the one fund, the multilateral security fund, Katrina talks about allies that have common export control views. That's pretty narrow. All right, that's pretty narrow. I wouldn't be surprised if under this administration, the current administration that got that was broadened a little bit in terms of the criteria for finding allies to use multilateral funds to achieve common objectives. But that's all that's been discussed so far. And that's all that's on in the legislation so far. All right, thanks. Kim, can I turn to you also maybe with a comment on the ally partner ideas that that you have in the commission and also maybe elaborate a little bit there's another question in the audience about the shortage of raw materials for chips and how much that the plan itself, the chipsack itself might turn to to proposals and solutions to address the raw materials shortage. I mean, the question of raw material, it's not going to be an item in itself but that's also part of the international partnership because what we also need is to map and to have some kind of and what is it called alert mechanism that when we can see that in some months times, if the current situation continue then we will have a shortage of supply of lithium or some other raw materials and what can we then do to see if we can find alternative places to buy some of the smaller items. So raw materials is certainly also a very important part of the whole thing on and then, as Greg said I completely agree that there is a sense of urgency, but at the same time, it's also correct what what Thomas said that in the current situation, if there's not much you can do to help the current shortage of supply because here you can only try to to to encourage and to to get the companies that are already there to boost their production, because you know what I mean it takes time to build a new fab and therefore I mean it's it's it's a bit complicated and we also when we are doing our chips acts as I said there are several chips as I have now been learning we have in the beginning I thought that the cutting edge that was what everybody wanted the smaller ones the very small ones on two nanos that that even even Apple are just trying to design a tree nano one for their new iPhone so they're not even down to two yet, but I think where the strength of Europe is actually more in what we call legacy chips, and that we also need to produce. So we really need also to to have. So a very important part of both the US chip tax but also the European chip tax is also to mapping the market, so that we don't pour in all the money in in the wrong place so to say, I think that's the extremely important part of the exercise. And I'm glad that Greg haven't seen the chip sack yet because I haven't seen it either. It's in the making. What would be your biggest hope that would be in a chip sack and your biggest fear of what would be in it and maybe also just comment on some of the other questions you've heard. Thomas are you there. I think my biggest fear will be exactly what what Kim just mentioned here is that that that we're putting up production in Europe of chips which are not. In line with the with the demand of the European producers so so I think we need to be to be very clear on on what it is that we need. And basically we have to try and be clear on what is it that we need in five years, because this is probably the time span that we're looking into. And you also mentioned another question before. I mean, I basically believe in the market, also in a global in a global sense so so I think there will be. There will be long term market corrections in the way that that that the supply will actually meet the demand, even though that the demand will continue to increase over the years. I mean, even more we've seen a big increase in demand for for microchips for the last 10 years and that will just continue continue and continue but I still believe in in that the market will make the corrections and that the supply will be there. The thing is that most of the increase in the production that we've seen over the last 10 years have taken place in China. And, and I think it's just to fair and to say directly that you know if we come into a situation like this, and most of the huge part of production will take place in China we will meet. We export restrictions from China and so they will say that, you know, if everybody is lacking microchips that then the Chinese companies should be first in line. I think that's probably what we're going to see and this is why that that this chips act, both in the US and in Europe, makes sense. Thanks and that brings me also to a question from the audience in terms of how much of the European chips act is actually motivated by China so quite a direct question and also a question from Seamus Allen from the IEA. It seems to be directly mostly at a new break but it's I think it's brought us well in terms to the cooperation between the US and the EU on the chips act. So, he's asking, what seems to be the differences and similarities in the approach and emphasis for a chips act in the US and the EU. And does all the speak yours because do you have perspectives on and how we can ensure that these acts complement each other, or if there are any risks of regulatory contradiction and unnecessary duplication, and maybe even harmful state back competition between the EU and the US resulting as a consequence of this. So I think looking at the time that will actually bring us to the final round of comments from from the three of you. I think we will do this. We'll do the same order as we did the, the speeches and so if you can perhaps please reflect on these questions and also make any concluding remark you might want to make that would be great. Thanks. And over to you. Yeah, I mean the question on on on sort of the competition and overlap I think we've already touched upon this quite many times it's clear that that I think we want to do to make production in Europe and it's also fairly clear that the US are already now building factories in Arizona also where Intel and they want to do their own production so so there will there will be we will when we there will be areas where I think we want to do the same, but I hope that we can also make sure that that that it will be not very wise if we if all of us want to make exactly the same chip. And then we will not do all the other chips that is necessary for the for the business environment so I think that that's where, where the kind of the the cooperation and coordination comes into place. And I think it's, it's a very, I mean, the reasons why we are we are having this discussion today the reasons why the US are making their chips that we're doing ours is of course that that we can all of us can see that it's not very healthy. If all the words production of microchips is taking place in the same place. We simply need to diversify the supply chain and so so yes, there is, of course, an element of China in this place and then what we have seen of Chinese behavior in other areas and and that's also why I think as an important part of the US chips actually is also export control. That's also an area that's the one of the themes for one of the 10 working groups in the trade and tech council between the EU and the US. That's also one of the areas where we've been discussing a spot controls with the US and the. Great. Tavis. Yeah. On the question on competition between a chip acts and us and then EU. I mean I think it's, it's a very fair question. I mean the thing is with with microchips it. It takes a lot of time and a lot a lot a lot of money to set up the production. And, and, and this would also mean that if you have an over capacity, then it will cost a lot a lot of money to to sort of slow down the production. So there is a risk of sort of this state aid production of chip acts of microchips will sort of continue continue continue. I mean that we shouldn't go into it. It just means that we need to to cooperate very well together and I think especially between the US and and and Europe. Excellent and break your final remarks. Maybe I can build on those comments, given the shortness of time. I think one of the differences between us and the US. The US is stronger design. The US is not as strong. He's to strengthen that, but there's certainly ample room for collaboration and cooperation maybe the TCC TTC can help there, and it definitely needs to happen. I'm not so worried at this point about a race to the bottom from a subsidy perspective or redundancy perspective because the US and Europe so far behind, at least in the manufacturing area that does. And it's so expensive to set up those factors and we need so many of them that I think that's that's a problem that a challenge that we need to worry about down the road on more than today. I would just refer again to the Kearney report that estimates that leading edge demand in you will grow 15%. Whereas lagging edge as important as it is it will grow about 3%. And the US check recognizes the same issue where it's funding lagging notes but only not not a whole lot it's more focused on on other things so I think there's some differences and similarities and the TTC can actually help smooth those out and fill in and help collaborate, promote the spirit of collaboration. Thank you great that gives me a positive note to conclude on as well and I, I think we've, we've heard from from Kim Janssen we've heard about the main components of a still unseen chips act, what it will focus on we've heard from from the perspective of the English industry I think being pragmatic on this being being cautious but also accommodating on the need for for longer term resilience but still also remembering that there is a current shortage that this is completely a different story. And three concrete recommendations for for what Europe should put in its chips act from from across the Atlantic Ocean from from you great. I think that that has tied very well together in terms of trying to make more sense of the European chips act and what it's about. I think it's about tech sovereignty that was the term under which it was presented by the Commission president. It's certainly not nice not to be sovereign so I think the, the, the share code and the joint aims of this will certainly be something that we will continue to hear about in the coming months and years. Thank you to everyone very much for their contributions thank you very much great, especially I think waking up in the middle of the night and being able to talk about tips production and research and development and all this it's been it's been fascinating to hear. Thank you Thomas for for coming with the, with the inputs from a from the small open economy, and thank you keep for for having turned up straight after your US journey to share your perspectives with us and set out. Make us make us all a lot wiser and what what will be in this document that we all looking forward to to see him next year. So that will that concludes our webinar it has been recorded so you will be able to turn back to to hear some of the details. So for now thank you for listening and have a great day and night wherever you are.