 Section 35 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant Movement Against Jackson, Fall of Jackson, Intercepting the Enemy, Battle of Champions Hill. When the news reached me of MacPherson's victory at Raymond about sundown, my position was with Sherman. I decided at once to turn the whole column towards Jackson and capture that place without delay. Pemberton was now on my left with, as I supposed, about 18,000 men, in fact, as I learned afterwards with nearly 50,000. A force was also collecting on my right at Jackson, the point where all the railroads communicating with Vicksburg connect. All the enemy's supplies of men and stores would come by that point. As I hoped in the end to besiege Vicksburg, I must first destroy all possibility of aid. I therefore determined to move swiftly towards Jackson, destroy or drive any force in that direction, and then turn upon Pemberton. But by moving against Jackson, I uncovered my own communication. So I finally decided to have none. To cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward. I then had no fears for my communications, and if I moved quickly enough, could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me in the rear. Accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on the 13th were annulled by new ones. Jackson was ordered at daylight to move on Clinton, ten miles from Jackson. Sherman was notified of my determination to capture Jackson and work from there westward. He was ordered to start at four in the morning and march to Raymond. McLernden was ordered to march with three divisions. By Dillon's, two Raymond, one was left to guard the crossing of the Big Black. At the tent, I had received a letter from Banks on the Red River asking reinforcements. Porter had gone to his assistance with a part of his fleet on the 3rd, and I now wrote to him describing my position and declining to send any troops. I looked upon side movements, as long as the enemy held Port Hudson and Vicksburg, as a waste of time and material. General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson in the night of the 13th from Tennessee and immediately assumed command of all the Confederate troops in Mississippi. I knew he was expecting reinforcements from the south and east. On the 6th, I had written to General Halleck. Information from the other side leads me to believe the enemy are bringing forces from Tallahoma. Up to this time, my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each other, as far as the nature of the country would admit. Reconnaisances were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case a union became necessary. McPherson reached Clinton with the advance early on the 13th and immediately set to work destroying the railroad. Sherman's advance reached Raymond before the last of McPherson's command had got out of the town. McClendon withdrew from the front of the enemy at Edwards' station with much skill and without loss and reached his position for the night in good order. On the night of the 13th, McPherson was ordered to march at early dawn upon Jackson only 15 miles away. Sherman was given the same order, but he was to move by the direct road from Raymond to Jackson which is south of the road McPherson was on and does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed the line of entrenchments which, at that time, defended the city. McClendon was ordered to move one division of his command to Clinton, one division a few miles beyond Mississippi Springs following Sherman's line and a third to Raymond. He was also directed to send his siege guns, four in number with the troops going by Mississippi Springs. McClendon's position was an advantageous one in any event. With one division at Clinton, he was in position to reinforce McPherson at Jackson rapidly if it became necessary. The division beyond Mississippi Springs was equally available to reinforce Sherman, the one at Raymond could take either road. He still had two other divisions further back now that Blair had come up, available within a day at Jackson. If this last command should not be wanted at Jackson, they were already one day's march from there on their way to Vicksburg and on three different roads leading to the latter city. But the most important consideration in my mind was to have a force confronting Pemberton if he should come out to attack my rear. This I expected him to do, as shown further on, he was directed by Johnston to make this very move. I notified General Hallick that I should attack the state capital on the 14th. A courier carried the dispatch to Grand Gulf through an unprotected country. Sherman and McPherson communicated with each other during the night and arranged to reach Jackson at about the same hour. It rained in torrents during the night of the 13th and the four part of the day of the 14th. The roads were intolerable and in some places on Sherman's line where the land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water, but the troops never murmured. By nine o'clock, Crocker of McPherson's Corps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets and speedily drove them in upon the main body. They were outside of the entrenchments in a strong position and proved to be the troops that had been driven out of Raymond. Johnston had been reinforced during the night by Georgia and South Carolina regiments so that his force amounted to eleven thousand men and he was expecting still more. Sherman also came upon the rebel picket some distance out from the town but speedily drove them in. He was now on the south and southwest of Jackson confronting the Confederates behind their breastworks while McPherson's right was nearly two miles north occupying a line running north and south across the Vicksburg Railroad. Artillery was brought up and reconnaissance made preparatory to an assault. McPherson brought up Logan's division while he deployed Crocker's for the assault. Sherman made similar dispositions on the right. By eleven a.m. both were ready to attack. Crocker moved his division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line. These troops at once encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body when they returned to their proper regiment and the whole division charged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this main line. This stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside of his main fortifications. McPherson followed up with his command until within range of the guns of the enemy from their entrenchments when he halted to bring his troops into line and reconnoitred to determine the next move. It was now about noon. While this was going on, Sherman was confronting a rebel battery which inflated the road on which he was marching, the Mississippi Springs Road, and commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which he had to pass. By detaching right and left, the stream was forced and the enemy flanked and speedily driven within the main line. This brought our whole line in front of the enemy's line of works which was continuous on the north, west and south sides from the Pearl River north of the city to the same river south. I was with Sherman. He was confronted by a force sufficient to hold us back. Appearances did not justify an assault where we were. I had directed Sherman to send a force to the right and to reconnoitre as far as to the Pearl River. This force, Tuttle's Division, not returning, I rode to the right with my staff and soon found that the enemy had left that part of the line. Tuttle's movement or McPherson's pressure had no doubt led Johnston to order a retreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he was getting away. Tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lines without resistance, came up in the rear of the artillery's confronting Sherman and captured them with ten pieces of artillery. I rode immediately to the State House where I was soon followed by Sherman, about the same time McPherson discovered that the enemy was leaving his front, an advance crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that they could not move their guns or destroy them. He captured seven guns and, moving on, hoisted the national flag over the rebel capital of Mississippi. Stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat, but was too late or not expeditious enough. Our loss in this engagement was, McPherson 37 killed 228 wounded, Sherman 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing, the enemy lost 845 killed, wounded and captured, 17 guns fell into our hands and the enemy destroyed by fire their storehouses containing a large amount of commissary stores. On this day Blair reached New Auburn and joined McClendon's 4th Division. He had with him 200 wagons loaded with rations, the only commissary supplies received during the entire campaign. I slept at night in the room that Johnston was said to have occupied the night before. About four in the afternoon, I sent for the corps commanders and directed the disposition to be made of their troops. Sherman was to remain in Jackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad center and manufacturing city of military supplies. He did the work most effectually. Sherman and I went together into a manufacturing which had not ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of Yankee troops. Our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either the manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls. We looked on for a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of the looms with CSA woven in each bolt. There was an immense amount of cotton in bales stacked outside. Finally I told Sherman I thought they had done work enough. The operatives were told they could leave and take with them what cloth they could carry. In a few minutes cotton and factory were in a blaze. The proprietor visited Washington while I was president to get his pay for his property, claiming that it was private. He asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his property had been destroyed by national troops so that he might use it with Congress where he was pressing or proposed to press his claim. I declined. On the night of the 13th, Johnston sent the following dispatch to Pemberton at Edwards' station. I have lately arrived and learned that Major General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton. It is important to establish communication that you may be reinforced. If practicable, come up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachment would be of immense value. All the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all important. This dispatch was sent in triplicate by different messengers. One of the messengers happened to be a loyal man who had been expelled from Memphis some months before by Hurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. There was a good deal of parade about his expulsion. Ostensibly as a warning to those who entertained the sentiments he expressed, but Hurlbut and the expelled man understood each other. He delivered his copy of Johnston's dispatch to MacPherson who forwarded it to me. Receiving this dispatch on the 14th, I ordered MacPherson to move promptly in the morning back to Bolton, the nearest point where Johnston could reach the road. Bolton is about twenty miles west of Jackson. I also informed McClearndon of the capture of Jackson and sent him the following order. It is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and cross the big black and beat us into Vicksburg. We must not allow them to do this. Turn all your forces towards Bolton Station and make all dispatch in getting there. Move troops by the most direct road from wherever they may be on the receipt of this order. And to Blair, I wrote, their design is evidently to cross the big black and pass down the peninsula between the big black and Yauzu rivers. We must beat them. Turn your troops immediately to Bolton. Take all the trains with you. Smith's Division and any other troops now with you will go to the same place. If practicable, take parallel roads so as to divide your troops and train. Johnston stopped on the Canton Road only six miles north of Jackson the night of the 14th. He sent from there to Pemberton dispatches announcing the loss of Jackson and the following order. As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. Can Grant supply himself from the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off from it and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for one of supplies, beat him. The concentration of my troops was easy. Considering the character of the country, McPherson moved along the road parallel with and near the railroad. McClendon's command was one division hovies on the road McPherson had to take, but with a start of four miles. One, Osterhouse, was at Raymond on a converging road that intersected the other near Champion's Hill. One, Cars, had to pass over the same road with Osterhouse, but being back at Mississippi Springs would not be detained by it. The fourth, Smith's, with Blair's division was near Auburn with a different road to pass over. McClendon faced about and moved promptly. His cavalry from Raymond seized Bolton by half-past nine in the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men. The night of the fifteenth, Hovy was at Bolton. Car and Osterhouse were about three miles south but abreast, facing west. Smith was north of Raymond with Blair in his rear. McPherson's command, with Logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock and by four reached Hovy and went into camp. Crocker bitwacked just in Hovy's rear on the Clinton Road. Sherman, with two divisions, was in Jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and military factories. I rode in person out to Clinton. On my arrival I ordered McClendon to move early in the morning on Edwards' station, cautioning him to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he felt very certain of success. I naturally expected that Pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of his superior, which I have shown were to attack us at Clinton. This indeed I knew he could not do, but I felt sure he would make the attempt to reach that point. It turned out, however, that he had decided his superior's plans were impracticable and consequently determined to move south from Edwards' station and get between me and my base. I, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a week before. On the fifteenth Pemberton had actually marched south from Edwards' station, but the rains had swollen Baker's Creek, which he had to cross so much that he could not forward it, and the bridges were washed away. This brought him back to the Jackson Road on which there was a good bridge over Baker's Creek. Some of his troops were marching until midnight to get there. Receiving here, early on the sixteenth, a repetition of his order to join Johnston at Clinton, he concluded to obey and sent a dispatch to his chief informing him of the route by which he might be expected. About five o'clock in the morning, sixteenth, two men, who had been employed on the Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad, were brought to me. They reported that they had passed through Pemberton's army in the night and that it was still marching east. They reported him to have eighty regiments of infantry and ten batteries in all, about twenty-five thousand men. I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson another day in order to complete his work, but getting the above information I sent him orders to move with all dispatch to Bolton and to put one division with an ammunition train on the road at once with directions to its commander to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. Within an hour, after receiving this order, Steel's division was on the road. At the same time, I dispatched to Blair, who was near Auburn, to move with all speed to Edwards' station. McLernden was directed to embrace Blair in his command for the present. Blair's division was a part of the 15th Army Corps, Sherman's, but as it was on its way to join its corps, it naturally struck out left first, now that we had faced about and were moving west. The 15th Corps, when it got up, would be on our extreme right. McPherson was directed to get his trains out of the way of the troops and to follow Hobie's division as closely as possible. McLernden had two roads about three miles apart, converging at Edwards' station over which to march his troops. Hobie's division of his corps had the advance on a third road, to Clinton, still further north. McLernden was directed to move Blair's and AJ Smith's divisions by the southernmost of these roads and Osterhouse and Carr by the middle road. Orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front to feel for the enemy. Smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounter the enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. Osterhouse, on the middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found the enemy's pickets, and forced them back to the main line. About the same time, Hobie encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon road from Jackson to Vicksburg. McPherson was hastening up to join Hobie, but was embarrassed by Hobie's trains occupying the roads. I was still back at Clinton. McPherson sent me word of the situation and expressed the wish that I was up. By half past seven, I was on the road and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in front of troops off the road. When I arrived, Hobie's skirmishing amounted almost to a battle. McLernden was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distance to march to reach the enemy's position than McPherson. I sent him word by a staff officer to push forward and attack. These orders were repeated several times without apparently expediting McLernden's advance. Champions Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. It is one of the highest points in that section and commanded all the ground in range. On the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a ravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at Baker's Creek. It was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it difficult to penetrate with troops even when not defended. The ridge occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly, where the ravine turns westerly. The left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. The Bolton and Edwards' station wagon road turns almost due south at this point and descends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile, then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to Baker's Creek, nearly a mile away. On the west side, the slope of the ridge is gradual and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. There was, when we were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road. From Raymond, there is a direct road to Edwards' station, some three miles west of Champions Hill. There is one also to Bolton. From this latter road, there is still another, leaving it about three and a half miles before reaching Bolton and leads direct to the same station. It was along these two roads that three divisions of McClendon's Corps and Blair of Sherman's, temporarily under McClendon, were moving. Hovey of McClendon's command was with McPherson, further north on the road from Bolton direct to Edwards' station. The middle road comes into the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and descends to Baker's Creek. The southern road is still several miles south and does not intersect the others until it reaches Edwards' station. Remberton's lines covered all these roads and faced east. Hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed parallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left. By eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard contested battle. Hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. But he was not able to hold his position and had to abandon the artillery. McPherson brought up his troops as fast as possible, Logan in front, and posted them on the right of Hovey and across the flank of the enemy. Logan reinforced Hovey with one brigade from his division. With his other two he moved further west to make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads would admit. Hovey was still being heavily pressed and was calling on me for more reinforcements. I ordered Crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. McPherson ordered two batteries to be stationed where they nearly inflated the enemy's line, and they did good execution. From Logan's position now, a direct forward movement carried him over open fields, in rear of the enemy, and in a line parallel with them. He did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. Up to this time I had kept my position near Hovey, where we were, the most heavily pressed. But about noon I moved with a part of my staff by our right around until I came up with Logan himself. I found him near the road leading down to Baker's Creek. He was actually in command of the only road over which the enemy could retreat. Hovey, reinforced by two brigades from McPherson's command, confronted the enemy's left, Crocker, with two brigades covered their left flank. McClendon, two hours before, had been within two miles and a half of their center with two divisions, and the two divisions, Blair's and AJ Smith's, were confronting the rebel right. Ransom, with a brigade of McArthur's division of the 17th Corps, McPherson's, had crossed the river at Grand Gulf a few days before and was coming up on their right flank. Neither Logan nor I knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. Just at this juncture a messenger came from Hovey asking for more reinforcements. There were none to spare. I then gave an order to move McPherson's command by the left flank around to Hovey. This uncovered the rebel line of retreat which was soon taken advantage of by the enemy. During all this time, Hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from Logan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker, gallantly coming up with two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults. The last one, about the time the road was open to the rear. The enemy fled precipitately. This was between three and four o'clock. I rode forward or rather back to where the middle road intersects the north road and found the skirmishers of Carr's division just coming in. Osterhaus was further south and soon after came up with skirmishers advanced in like manner. Hovey's division and McPherson's two divisions with him had marched and fought from early dawn and were not in the best condition to follow the retreating foe. I sent orders to Osterhaus to pursue the enemy and to Carr, whom I saw personally, I explained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as the big black and to cross it if he could. Osterhaus to follow him. The pursuit was continued until after dark. The battle of Champions Hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose to the dignity of battle. Every man of Hovey's division and of McPherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle. No other part of my command was engaged at all except that as described before. Osterhaus's and A.J. Smith's divisions had encountered the rebel advanced pickets as early as half past seven. Their positions were admirable for advancing upon the enemy's line. McClendon with two divisions was within a few miles of the battlefield long before noon and in easy hearing. I sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully competent to explain to him the situation. These traversed the woods separating us without escort and directed him to push forward, but he did not come. It is true in front of McClendon there was a small force of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravine obstructing his advance. But if he had moved to the right by the road my staff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back or been cut off. Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey who belonged to his corps to join on to his right flank. Hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle at the time. To obey the order he would have had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClendon had to advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground. Of course I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his immediate superior. We had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged. This excludes those that did not get up, all of McClendon's command, except Hovey. Our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing. Hovey alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing more than one third of his division. Had McClendon come up with reasonable promptness or had I known the ground as I did afterwards I cannot see how Pemberton could have escaped with any organized force. As it was he lost over 3,000 killed and wounded and about 3,000 captured in battle and in pursuit. Loring's division, which was the right of Pemberton's line, was cut off from the retreating army and never got back to Vicksburg. Pemberton himself fell back that night to the Big Black River. His troops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before the general retreat commenced and no doubt a good part of them returned to their homes. Logan alone captured 1,300 prisoners and 11 guns. Hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500 sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1,200. McPherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their cartridge boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. The pursuit was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. The night of the 16th of May found McPherson's command, bibbed whacked from two to six miles west of the battlefield along the line of the road to Vicksburg. Carr and Osterhouse were at Edwards' station and Blair was about three miles southeast. Hovey remained on the field where his troops had fought so bravely and bled so freely. Much more material abandoned by the enemy was picked up on the battlefield, among it 30 pieces of artillery. I pushed through the advancing column with my staff and kept in advance until after night. Finding ourselves alone, we stopped and took possession of a vacant house. As no troops came up, we moved back a mile or more until we met the head of the column just going into Bibwack on the road. We had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house which had been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled with wounded and dying who had been brought from the battlefield we had just left. While a battle is raging, one can see his enemy mowed down by the thousand or the ten thousand with great composure. But after the battle, these scenes are distressing and one is naturally disposed to do as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend. End of Section 35. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Little Rock, Arkansas. Jim at JOCCLEV.COM Section 36 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant. Chapter 36 Battle of Black River Bridge Crossing the Big Black Investment of Vicksburg Assaulting the Works We were now assured of our position between Johnston and Pemberton without a possibility of a junction of their forces. Pemberton might have made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the bridge there and by moving north on the west side have eluded us and finally returned to Johnston. But this would have given us Vicksburg. It would have been his proper move, however, and the one Johnston would have made had he been in Pemberton's place. In fact, it would have been in conformity with Johnston's orders to Pemberton. Sherman left Jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th and reached Bolton, 20 miles west, before halting. His rearguard did not get in until 2 a.m. to 17th, but renewed their march by daylight. He paroled his prisoners at Jackson and was forced to leave his own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants. At Bolton, he was informed of our victory. He was directed to commence the march early next day and to diverge from the road he was on to Bridgeport on the Big Black River, some 11 miles above the point where we expected to find the enemy. Blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon train as early as possible. This movement brought Sherman's Corps together and at a point where I hoped a crossing of the Big Black might be affected and Sherman's Corps used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening a crossing for the remainder of the army. I informed him that I would endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river. The Advanced Division, CARS, McLernon's Corps, resumed the pursuit at half-past 3 a.m. on the 17th, followed closely by Osterhaus, McPherson bringing up their rear with his corps. As I expected, the enemy was found in position on the Big Black. The point was only six miles from that where my advance had rested for the night and was reached at an early hour. Here the river makes a turn to the west and has washed close up to the Highland. The east side is a low bottom sometimes overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. A bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which, however, is above the surface of the Big Black at ordinary stages. When the river is full, water runs through it, converting the point of land into an island. The bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had felled into the ditch. At this time there was a foot or two of water in it. The rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this bayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing dirt over them. The hole was thoroughly commanded from the high west of the river. At the upper end of the bayou, there was a strip of unclear land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men. Car's division was deployed on our right, Lawler's Brigade, forming his extreme right, and reaching through these woods to the river above. Osterhouse's division was deployed to the left of Car and covered the enemy's entire front. McPherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to come in wherever he could be of assistance. While the troops were standing as here described, an officer from Banks's staff came up and presented me with a letter from General Hallick dated the 11th of May. It had been sent by the way of New Orleans to Banks to be forwarded to me. It ordered me to return to Grand Gulf and to cooperate from there with Banks against Port Hudson and then to return with our combined forces to besiege Vicksburg. I told the officer that the order came too late and that Hallick would not give it now if he knew our position. The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought to obey the order and was giving arguments to support his position when I heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that direction, saw Lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon the enemy. I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the charge and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch, I think, not even to this day. The assault was successful, but little resistance was made. The enemy fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him and leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our heads. Many tried to escape by swimming the river. Some succeeded and some were drowned in the attempt. 18 guns were captured and 1,751 prisoners. Our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded, and three missing. The enemy probably lost, but few men except those captured and drowned. But for the successful and complete destruction of the bridge, I have but little doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent his occupying his defenses around Vicksburg. As the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to be built. It was but little after nine o'clock a.m. when the capture took place. As soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for the construction of three bridges. One was taken charge of by Lieutenant Haynes of the Engineer Corps, one by General McPherson himself and one by General Ransom, a most gallant and intelligent volunteer officer. My recollection is that Haynes built a raft bridge. McPherson, a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers for pontoons, and at Ransom, felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting only on one side of the tree so that they would fall with their tops interlacing in the river without the trees being entirely severed from their stumps. A bridge was then made with these trees to support the roadway. Lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins, and were ever found for this purpose. By eight o'clock in the morning of the eighteenth, all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing. Sherman reached Bridgeport about noon of the seventeenth and found Blair with the pontoon train already there. A few of the enemy were entrenched on the west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered. Two divisions were crossed that night and the third the following morning. On the eighteenth, I moved along the Vicksburg Road in advance of the troops and as soon as possible joined Sherman. My first anxiety was to secure a base of supplies on the Yazoo River above Vicksburg. Sherman's line of march led him to the very point on Walnut Hills occupied by the enemy the December before when he was repulsed. Sherman was equally anxious with myself. Our impatience led us to move in advance of the column and well up with the advanced skirmishers. There were some detached works along the crest of the hill. These were still occupied by the enemy, or else the garrison from Haines' Bluff had not all got past on their way to Vicksburg. At all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick and fast for a short time. In a few minutes Sherman had the pleasure of looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the December before on the ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action. He turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive assurance of success. This, however, he said, was the end of one of the greatest campaigns in history and I ought to make a report of it at once. Vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what might happen before it was taken. But whether captured or not, this was a complete and successful campaign. I do not claim to quote Sherman's language, but the substance only. My reason for mentioning this incident will appear further on. McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came into the Jackson and Vicksburg road which Sherman was on, but to his rear. He arrived at night near the lines of the enemy and went into camp. McClendon, moved by the direct road near the railroad to Mount Albans, and then turned to the left and put his troops on the road from Baldwin's Ferry to Vicksburg. This brought him south of McPherson. I now had my three corps up to works built for the defense of Vicksburg on three roads, one to the north, one to the east, and one to the southeast of the city. By the morning of the nineteenth the investment was as complete as my limited number of troops would allow. Sherman was on the right, and covered the high ground from where it overlooked the yazoo as far as southeast as his troops would extend. McPherson joined on to his left and occupied ground on both sides of the Jackson road. McClendon took up the ground to his left and extended as far towards Warrington as he could, keeping a continuous line. On the nineteenth there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better position. The enemy had been much demoralized by his defeats at Champion Hill and the Big Black, and I believed he would not make much effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly, at two o'clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy. The twentieth and twenty-first were spent in strengthening our position and in making roads in rear of the army from Yazoo River or Chickasaw Bayou. Most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days rations issued by the commissary. They had an abundance of food, however, but began to feel the want of bread. I remember that in passing around to the left of the line on the twenty-first, a soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a low voice, but yet so that I heard him, hard tack. In a moment the cry was taken up all along the line, hard tack, hard tack. I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with everything they needed. The cry was instantly changed to cheers. By the night of the twenty-first all the troops had full rations issued to them, the bread and coffee were highly appreciated. I now determined, on a second assault, Johnston was in my rear only fifty miles away with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one I had with me, and I knew he was being reinforced. There was danger of his coming to the assistance of Pemberton, and after all he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison, if indeed he did not prevent the capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the state. But the first consideration of all was, the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try. The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock a.m. on the twenty-second with a furious cannonade from every battery in position. All the corps commanders set their time by mine so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them. But at no place were we able to enter. General McLernden reported that he had gained the enemy's entrenchments at several points and wanted reinforcements. I occupied a position from which I believed I could see as well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see the success he reported. But his request for reinforcements being repeated, I could not ignore it, and sent him Queenby's division of the seventeenth corps. Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a diversion in favor of McLernden. This last attack only served to increase our casualties without giving any benefit, whatever. As soon as it was dark, our troops that had reached the enemy's line and been obliged to remain there for security all day were withdrawn, and thus ended the last assault upon Vicksburg. End of Section 36. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Little Rock, Arkansas. Jim at JOCCLEV.COM I now determined upon a regular siege to out-camp the enemy, as it were, and to incur no more losses. The experience of the 22nd convinced officers and men that this was best. And they went to work on the defenses and approaches with a will. With the Navy holding the river, the investment of Vicksburg was complete. As long as we could hold our position, the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men, and munitions of war to what they had on hand. These could not last always. The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg commenced April 30. On the 18th of May, the Army was in rear of Vicksburg. On the 19th, just 20 days after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had been made. Five distinct battles, besides continuous skirmishing, had been fought and won by the Union forces. The capital of the state had fallen, and its arsenals, military manufactories, and everything useful for military purposes had been destroyed. An average of about 180 miles had been marched by the troops engaged, but five days' rations had been issued and no forage. Over 6,000 prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been killed or wounded. 27 heavy cannon and 61 field pieces had fallen into our hands, and 400 miles of the river from Vicksburg to Port Hudson had become ours. The Union force that had crossed the Mississippi River up to this time was less than 43,000 men. One division of these, Blair's, only arrived in time to take part in the Battle of Champions Hill, but was not engaged there, and one brigade, Ransom's, of McPherson's Corps, reached the field after the battle. The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gull, Jackson, and on the roads between these places over 60,000 men. They were in their own country, where no rear guards were necessary. The country is admirable for defense, but difficult for the conduct of an offensive campaign. All their troops had to be met. We were fortunate to say the least in meeting them in detail at Port Gibson, 7 or 8,000, at Raymond, 5,000, at Jackson from 8 to 11,000, at Champions Hill, 25,000, at the Big Black, 4,000. A part of those met at Jackson were all that was left of those encountered at Raymond. They were beaten in detail by a force smaller than their own, upon their own ground. Our loss up to this time was Port Gibson, 131 killed, 719 wounded, 25 missing. South Fork Bayou Pierre, 1 wounded. Skirmishes, May 3, 1 killed, 9 wounded. 14 Mile Creek, 6 killed, 24 wounded. Raymond, 66 killed, 339 wounded, 39 missing. Jackson, 42 killed, 251 wounded, 7 missing. Champions Hill, 410 killed, 1,844 wounded, 187 missing. Big Black, 39 killed, 237 wounded, 3 missing. Bridgeport, 1 wounded. Total, 695 killed, 3425 wounded, 259 missing. Of the wounded, many were, but slightly so, and continued on duty. Not half of them were disabled for any length of time. After the unsuccessful assault of the 22nd, the work of the regular siege began. Sherman occupied the right, starting from the river above Vicksburg, McPherson, the center, MacArthur's division, now with him, and McLernden, the left, holding the road south to Warrington. Lawman's division arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of the line. In the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22nd, roads had been completed from the Yazoo River and Chickasaw Bayou around the rear of the army to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition. Ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to be encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. The troops had been without these from the time of crossing the Mississippi up to this time. All was now ready for the pick and spade. Prentice and Hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. Cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the Big Black and to observe Johnston. I knew that Johnston was receiving reinforcements from Bragg who was confronting Rosecrans in Tennessee. Vicksburg was so important to the enemy that I believed he would make the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege even at the risk of losing ground elsewhere. My line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from Haines' Bluff to Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was about seven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson in our rear who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second line of defense facing the other way. I had not troops enough under my command to man these. General Halleck appreciated the situation and without being asked forwarded reinforcements with all possible dispatch. The ground about Vicksburg is admirable for defense. On the north, it is about two hundred feet above the Mississippi River at the highest point and very much cut up by the washing rains. The ravines were grown up with cane and underbrush while the sides and tops were covered with a dense forest. Further south, the ground flattens out somewhat and was in cultivation, but here too it was cut up by ravines and small streams. The enemy's line of defense followed the crest of a ridge from the river north of the city eastward, then southerly, around to the Jackson Road, full three miles back of the city, thence in a southwesternly direction to the river. Deep ravines of the description given lay in front of these defenses. As there is a succession of gullies cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line was necessarily very irregular. To follow each of these spurs, with entrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have lengthened their line very much. Generally, therefore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully, nearly straight to the head of another, and an outer work, triangular in shape, generally open in the rear, was thrown up on the point, then in this outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely. The work to be done, to make our position as strong against the enemy as his was against us, was very great. The problem was also complicated by our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. We had but four engineer officers with us. Captain Prime, of the Engineer Corps, was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. His health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by Captain Comstock, also of the Engineer Corps. To provide assistance on such a long line, I directed that all officers who had graduated at West Point, where they had necessarily to study military engineering, should, in addition to their other duties, assist in the work. The Chief Quartermaster and the Chief Commissary were graduates. The Chief Commissary, now the Commissary-General of the Army, begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good for unless he would do for a sapper-roller. As soldiers require rations while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and as we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sapper-roller, I let him off. The General is a large man, weighs two hundred and twenty pounds, and is not tall. We had no siege guns, except six thirty-two pounders, and there were none at the West to draw from. Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with a battery of Navy guns, of large caliber, and with these and the field artillery used in the campaign the siege began. The first thing to do was to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commanding positions, then establish the camps, undercover from the fire of the enemy, but as near up as possible, and then construct rifle pits and covered ways to connect the entire command by the shortest route. The enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. Probably their artillery ammunition was short, and their infantry was kept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works. In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than the ordinary parapet. To give additional protection, sandbags, bulletproof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enough apart to make loopholes for musketry. On top of these, logs were put. By these means the men were unable to walk about erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters. The enemy used in their defense explosive musket balls. No doubt thinking that bursting over our men in the trenches, they would do some execution. But I do not remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of these shells. When they were hit, and the ball exploded, the wound was terrible. In these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. They were used as barbarous because they produced increased suffering without any corresponding advantage to those using them. The enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, because we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon and used it freely. Splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the men behind. There were no mortars with the besiegers except what the navy had in front of the city, but wooden ones were made by taking lobs of the toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve pound shells and binding them with strong iron bands. These answered as co-corns and shells were successfully thrown from them into the trenches of the enemy. The labor of building the batteries and entrenching was largely done by the pioneers assisted by Negroes who came within our lines and who were paid for their work, but details from the troops had often to be made. The work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible and when an advanced position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy the batteries were advanced. By the 30th of June there were 220 guns in position, mostly light field pieces, besides a battery of heavy guns belonging to manned and commanded by the navy. We were now as strong for defense against the garrison of Vicksburg as they were against us, but I knew that Johnston was in our rear and was receiving constant reinforcements from the east he had at this time a larger force than I had had at any time prior to the battle of Champions Hill. As soon as the news of the arrival of the Union army behind Vicksburg reached the north, floods of visitors began to pour in. Some came to gratify curiosity, some to see sons or brothers who had passed through the terrible ordeal. Members of the Christian and Sanitary Associations came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. Often those coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. They did not know how little the gift would be appreciated. Many of the soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys without bread during the march that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite, but the intention was good. Among the earliest arrivals was the Governor of Illinois, with most of the state officers. I naturally wanted to show them what there was of most interest. In Sherman's front the ground was the most broken and most wooded and more was to be seen without exposure. I therefore took them to Sherman's headquarters and presented them. Before starting out to look at the lines, possibly while Sherman's horse was being saddled, there were many questions asked about the late campaign about which the north had been so imperfectly informed. There was a little knot around Sherman and another around me, and I heard Sherman repeating, in the most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first looked down from Walnut Hills upon the land below on the 18th of May, adding, Grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign. I opposed it. I wrote him a letter about it, but for this speech it is not likely that Sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of. His untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitled him to a full share of all the credit due for its success. He could not have done more if the plan had been his own. On the 26th of May I sent Blair's division up to Yazoo to drive out a force of the enemy supposed to be between the big black and the Yazoo. The country was rich in full of supplies of both food and forage. Blair was instructed to take all of it. The cattle were to be driven in for the use of our army and the food and forage to be consumed by our troops or destroyed by fire. All bridges were to be destroyed and the road rendered as nearly impassable as possible. Blair went 45 miles and was gone almost a week. His work was effectually done. I requested Porter at this time to send the Marine Brigade a floating nondescript force which had been assigned to his command and which proved very useful up to Haynes' bluff to hold it until reinforcements could be sent. On the 26th I also received a letter from Banks asking me to reinforce him with ten thousand men at Port Hudson. Of course I could not comply with his request nor did I think he needed them. He was in no danger of an attack by the garrison in his front and there was no army organizing in his rear to raise the siege. On the 3rd of June a brigade from Hurlbut's command arrived, General Kimble commanding. It was sent to Mechanicsburg some miles northeast of Haynes' bluff and about midway between the big black and the Yazoo. A brigade of Blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already on Blair's return from the Yazoo been sent to the same place with instructions to watch the crossings of the big black river, to destroy the roads in his Blair's front and to gather or destroy all supplies. On the 7th of June our little forests of colored and white troops across the Mississippi at Millican's Fend were attacked by about three thousand men from Richard Taylor's Trans-Mississippi command. With the aid of the gun boats they were speedily repelled. I sent Mohr's brigade over with instructions to drive the enemy beyond the tenses by you and we had no further trouble in that quarter during the siege. This was the first important engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire. These men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning of the siege, but they behaved well. On the 8th of June a full division arrived from Horbrit's command under General Suey Smith. It was sent immediately to Haynes' bluff and General C.C. Washburn was assigned to the general command at that point. On the 11th a strong division arrived from the Department of the Missouri under General Heron, which was placed on our left. This cut off the last possible chance of communication between Pemberton and Johnston as it enabled Lawman to close up on McClendon's left while Heron entrenched from Lawman to the water's edge. At this point the water recedes a few hundred yards from the high land. Through this opening no doubt the Confederate commanders had been able to get messengers undercover of night. On the 14th General Park arrived with two divisions of Burnside's corps and was immediately dispatched to Haynes' bluff. These latter troops, Herons and Parkes, were the reinforcements already spoken of, sent by Halleck in anticipation of their being needed. They arrived none too soon. I now had about seventy one thousand men. More than half were disposed across the peninsula, between the Yazoo at Haynes' bluff and the Big Black, with a division of Osterhaus watching the crossings of the Ladder River further south and west from the crossing of the Jackson Road to Baldwin's Ferry and below. There were eight roads leading into Vicksburg along which, and their immediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced, but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected. On the 17th I received a letter from General Sherman and one on the 18th from General McPherson saying that their respective commands had complained to them of a fulsome congratulatory order published by General McClernden to the 13th Corps which did great injustice to the other troops engaged in the campaign. This order had been sent north and published and now papers containing it had reached our camps. The order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside of McClernden's command until brought in this way. I at once wrote to McClernden directing him to send me a copy of this order. He did so, and I at once relieved him from the command of the 13th Army Corps and ordered him back to Springfield, Illinois. The publication of his order in the press was in violation of War Department orders and also of mine.