 I love this larger conversation here about the virtues of that strong unilateral executive versus the congressional sort of driven model, right? You know, what is more inclined to liberty? We've seen how the Jacksonian model provides very concrete victories, but you can't really reconcile a strong man leader with secession, right? You know, whether it's Jackson or Caesar or Napoleon or any of those sort of figures, if you have this role where you create this personality cult that allows you to kind of restructure, you know, government, you know, a corrupt government, out of control government and bend it to your will, it is not within your personality to allow South Carolina to leave. And it's difficult to reconcile those two because here you have on the economic side of things, this is great. But on the political side of things, obviously, the importance of political self-determination and the virtues of political decentralization, you know, it's, you know, I don't know how to, you know, this is, to me, the greatest failing of Jacksonians, you know, that Jacksonian period. Again, even though there wasn't, you know, troops were not marched on South Carolina over this, great. But, you know, this conflict, it's something that I don't know how to resolve internally. I just think it's really fascinating. Yeah. And this is, I mentioned it in my book that this is a weakness of the Jacksonians reform through the executive branch is that when you're concentrating power in the executive branch to try and attack cronism in other directions, of course, power tends to corrupt, right? We've been through this time and time again ad nauseam. So Jackson's force bill and his is basically attacks on South Carolina or his criticism of what they're doing. It looks like an imperial proclamation. Okay. And this sort of portends maybe what James K. Polk is going to do during the Mexican war and his heavy handed imperialist invasion of Mexico, right? So this is, it's, it's, it's, it's something that every, every strategy has a weakness and this is ultimately the weakness of the Jacksonian executive strategy. But the important thing is that in this sometimes I think gets overlooked in this struggle for free trade, particularly regarding South Carolina, free trade during this time period was a broad based movement. There was a Philadelphia free trade convention. Okay. Before the compromise tariff was pushed for of both free trade Southerners and free trade Northerners. You've got Albert Gallatin. He's there. You've got Philip Barber. He's there. You've got all of these economists who are influenced by a John Baptiste and Adam Smith, et cetera. So this, this was something that was going to be pushed through by the Jacksonians. South Carolina was kind of going through its own political turmoil and they were upset that tariffs weren't being lowered fast enough, not belittling that complaint. Because of course this is, you know, by, by, by not defaulting on the debt and using revenue to pay it off, you're getting pissed at people who are paying those taxes, right? So that it is a valid complaint, but the Jacksonian coalition, including Van Buren, the Van Burenite supporters, et cetera, they were able to negotiate a crisis that really, excuse me, to negotiate a resolution to the crisis that lowered government, you know, lowered government involvement really in, in, in all, in all aspects, right? Because they were able to lower tariffs. All right. They were, so they were able to get a significant decrease in tariffs over 10 years, not the two year decrease, the decrease in two years that, you know, the New Yorker supported. They, Jackson vetoed Henry Clay's distribution bill to distribute revenue to the states that kind of prolong tariff reduction. So Jackson's like, nope, vetoing. And even the force bill ended up, South Carolina said, no, we don't like this, but Jackson decided not to do anything about that. All right. So that's significant in itself. And it's, this all happened, you know, right around the beginning of the, the, the second Jackson administration or the, the transition from the first to the second. And so the significance is that, you know, the, the, the move to free trade was going to be accomplished by the Jacksonians without South Carolina, but the South Carolina nullifiers did use a state's rights reform to sort of speed up this process more. Now it could have caused the major constitutional crisis, but now where's the fun in politics if it doesn't? So that's the way I look at it. I think that, well, maybe Jackson doesn't come out the best in this. The Jacksonians, certainly they, they still do succeed. It seems like it's almost necessary to have a, a moment of political crisis, not to get anything significant done. Right. And, and here's a case of it being done in a, in a good way. Usually this goes in the wrong way, particularly after the 20th century. But yeah, there is something to be said about the, the virtues of political crisis.