 Well, good morning and can I welcome everyone to this the 27th meeting of the Public Audit Committee in 2023? The first item on our agenda is for members of the Comitted to Agree On Orte to take agenda items3,4 and 5 in private, are we all agreed? We are agreed, thank you very much. Well, our main item this morning is a gender item 2, which is consideration of a briefing paper published at the end of September by the Auditor General on investing in Scotland's infrastructure. I'm pleased to welcome the Auditor General Stephen Boyle, who's joined by Ashley Magity. Gweinwch, Ashlee, Annabelle Darshie, Sansa Cwmmerin. Rydw i'r Audit Scotland, Ashlee is an audit manager and Darshie is a senior audit manager. Auditor general, we're going to begin the session by asking you to make a short opening statement and then we'll get into the questions that we've got to put to you. Auditor general. Many thanks, convener. Good morning committee. I am bringing today my briefing paper on investing in Scotland's infrastructure. Infrastructure is essential for growing the economy and delivering high quality public services. Using infrastructure effectively will also be key to the Scottish Government's public service reform agenda. The Scottish Government faces a challenging combination of reducing capital budgets, higher costs and increasing maintenance requirements. That means that it has said that it will no longer be able to deliver all of its planned £26 billion worth of investment in infrastructure or meet its ambition to double spending on maintenance to original timescales. It is having to make difficult decisions now about which projects to continue, pause or stop and will be publishing a revised infrastructure investment pipeline alongside the draft budget next month. Those decisions will have an impact on services now and in the future. Already parts of the public estate, such as Scotland's prisons and hospitals, need significant investment to remain fit for the future. It will be extremely challenging to also retrofit public buildings to meet net zero ambitions. The Scottish Government and other public bodies need to understand what they will require from their estate in the future. How their buildings can be used to support the transformation of services required and the opportunities available for co-location and closer joint working between public bodies. Their approach should consider all public buildings, but effective leadership and better information on condition, cost and occupancy is needed to carry out the reform at the scale and pace necessary. Finally, the Scottish Government needs to be transparent about the decisions that it makes on how investment in its estate is prioritised to support public service reform ambitions. That includes reporting how and why decisions were made and their expected impact on public services. As ever, Ashleigh Dalsh and I will do our best to answer the committee's questions this morning. Thank you very much indeed for that opening statement. I'm going to go straight away to questions and invite the deputy convener, Sharon Dowie, to put the first set of questions to you. You report that data limitations in the infrastructure investment plan meant that you've only been able to account for how £14.9 billion of the planned total £26 billion investment has or will be allocated. Can you tell us more about the data limitations? Just to say a bit more about some of the information that we looked at while compiling the report on what the Scottish Government has set out. I think that there are one or two factors before broadening out the response to your question, deputy convener, in that the Scottish Government has set out its ambitions in the longer term. I think that the narrative around how individual projects will contribute to its ambitions of inclusive economic growth, transition to net zero and sustainable places are the overarching plan. As we move through the duration of the infrastructure investment plan, you'll have more certainty in the early years and then clarity as you come towards later stages. Colleagues can set out for the committee about some of the data that is available and what's not. I appreciate that the committee is familiar with many aspects of major capital investment, given your own role that you've had on major capital projects scrutiny over a number of years. What we set out in today's paper is that there needs to be increasing transparency, that there's a better connection between individual projects, that you can track from one point of the project at the start and compare progress against individual projects and programmes in the round as we move forward in their development. The data is clear about what's actually being achieved and how that contributes more clearly to the Scottish Government's ambitions. I will turn to Ashleigh first of all and then bring Darshave in since you wish to add. The £14.9 billion is in the appendix to the IIP. The £26 billion is written in the text throughout and it's more descriptive text so we're not able to pull out from that the exact data of the projects and the programmes whereas in the appendix they set out the £14.9 billion. As we say in the report, we've struggled to follow projects through the major capital updates and a lot of that has to do with the format of the infrastructure investment plan and the updates. Things like the names of the projects change over time or a lot of it is quite text based rather than tabulous so it's difficult to then track clearly how projects have changed over time, whether the costs have gone up or time scales have changed. It's just to add that the committee will be familiar with the nature of the major capital project updates that the Scottish Government provides six-monthly and so it's really about that kind of consistency in the way that they report on progress with the projects and that's the thing that we find is lacking at the moment that enables us to kind of clearly map progress and to follow where the cost increases are, where the delays are so it's really about that kind of format and the consistency of the reporting that we're struggling with a bit now. Are we ever going to be able to track the £11.1 billion that's unaccounted for? I think you'll get a better idea of that, Deputy convener, before the end of this calendar year as the Government has committed to and I think it confirmed in its evidence to the committee in June when you last took evidence on major capital projects that because of the financial challenges that the Government has been clear about and we record in today's paper that they're having to recast their major capital investment programme along with the prioritisation of individual projects. If we set out in the paper that some of the significant projects, particularly referencing the national treatment centres for the NHS, some projects have been delayed, paused and reframing also in terms of timescales. We expect that to be the case to directly answer your question is that there needs to be real clarity with that prioritisation so that it's clear for economic growth ambitions, use of public services, what's going to be spent and when. More detail will fall over the course of 2024 with an updated medium-term financial strategy as well, but it's primarily the updated infrastructure programme that you'll see alongside the budget that the Government has committed to. Those connections are absolutely clear about what scale of funding is available and then what projects will be connected to that, both existing projects and any pipeline or newer ones as well. As it stands just now, are we able to see how much of the £26 billion has been spent? It's just unclear. What we're seeing in the report is to highlight to the committee's attention at paragraph 9. The first judgment there is that, as you mentioned yourself, Deputy Convener, of the £26 billion details are available for £14.9 billion. As we go further out, the precision around that becomes less clear. There is some degree of reasonableness about that. As projects are further into the future and the timing of them is uncertain, you won't have as much detail about projects that are in the here and now. What really matters now is how the Government plans to bridge some of that gap with its reprioritisation arrangements and the updated pipeline of projects that are due to be published alongside the budget. I think that will allow for the committee in the wider Parliament to have a perspective about what money is available for infrastructure projects and how those will sit alongside the Government's ambitions that they've set out for the impact that infrastructure should have on transition to net zero sustainable places and driving the economy. Who would be accountable for making sure that the budgets are followed in the track? You said in the comments earlier that you couldn't see the connection between projects. You can't track it. You struggle to follow projects through because they changed their name and everything. Who would be accountable for that? Highlight to the committee's attention exhibit 2 in today's paper, which is, we look to set out the governance arrangements for Scottish Government's infrastructure arrangements and associated accountabilities. Ultimately ministers will determine which projects are prioritised and presenting that information to Parliament for its consideration of the budget. In terms of accountable officer arrangements, there's a couple of factors that are worth pausing on. Paragraph 11 to the paper, we note that accountable officers in individual public bodies are accountable for the delivery of individual projects. The committee has taken evidence from accountable officers on projects on many occasions. At a Scottish Government level, the director general for the Scottish Exchequer is tasked with overseeing infrastructure investment at a Scottish Government level. Alongside that, there's a couple of parallel governance arrangements, such as an infrastructure investment board, which oversees the totality of the programme. The Scottish Government executive team, which I appreciate that the committee will be familiar with, operates what they refer to as different modes depending on agenda. They also take the opportunity to operate in investment mode, as they refer to it. Accountabilities are clear at a local level for individual projects. At a Scottish Government level, there's a range of arrangements on that. Most fundamental of all, ministers will determine which projects are prioritised and share that information with Parliament. On the lack of transparency, is that a political or minister's choice not to share that information with us, or is it because the accountable officers haven't yet got a hold of their accounts? The lack of transparency is a combination of those factors. What we've seen in the committee's experience, if you share this, is that relatively simple things could be done to address this. The naming of projects, the consistency of reporting of individual projects from one timescale to the next, and the stronger indications of prioritisation. Those points feel like they are capable of being addressed, deputy convener. One of the judgments that we make in today's paper is that, with the clarity that the Government has provided that there isn't the capital funding available to the extent that previously existed, together with rising costs, transparency becomes ever more important to manage both Parliament and public's expectations about what is going on. What can be achieved by the Scottish Government and its partners? Your briefing appears to suggest that the Scottish Government did not fully implement the Infrastructure Commission for Scotland's recommendation to publish a framework for prioritising projects in its most recent infrastructure investment plan. Do you know why that was? I'll ask colleagues to come in and set in a bit more detail for the committee about the nature of recommendations and reviews that have existed in totality. What we'd like to do is to set out in the annex to today's paper some of the wider structure around reviews, papers, recommendations and so forth. In terms of the specifics of why the Government didn't implement those recommendations, I'll bring colleagues in. Our paper today tells part of the story perhaps the opportunity for the Government, should the committee wish to take evidence from it, for them to more clearly set out their assessment of their adoption of recommendations or otherwise. I don't know if we do know the detail of why they haven't yet done that, but they are in the process of developing a framework which they're planning to publish alongside the revised project pipeline in December. There's a revised project pipeline which they've gone through a prioritisation exercise which they'll publish in December. Alongside that, they're also working on a wider needs assessment, looking at different kind of scenarios of what Scotland will need in the future and how infrastructure might meet that. We're working with Scottish Futures Trust to deliver that for the next infrastructure investment plan, which is 26-27, I think. Go on to paragraph 11 and 12. You set out the Scottish Government's oversight arrangements for infrastructure investment and estate management for the administrative buildings of the Scottish Government and its public bodies. However, there are no similar oversight arrangements in place for operational buildings. Is that something that should be reviewed by the Scottish Government? We think that administrative buildings is only one component of how Scotland's public services operate. For absolute clarity, what that means is that it excludes operational buildings such as college buildings, NHS, the estate as well, and in order to make the best use of the totality of the estate, which will change. I think that there needs to be a consideration of the Scottish estate in the round. The adoption of a single Scottish estate for administrative buildings is a good first step, no question of that, but what it needs to do is go further to broaden out to look at how all of Scotland's public buildings are being used to best effect. Their use is changing. Many of those buildings will have existed for over 50 years, so what they were intended for originally might have been well and good, but if that is no longer the case of how public services are being delivered, they should also be brought into that assessment of how land and buildings are being used effectively and planned for the future. We think that it needs to go broader than administrative buildings. I will get more questions than that further on. We note that the Infrastructure Investment Board plays an important role in providing strategic direction, prioritisation and oversight of infrastructure activity. The executive team is also responsible for reviewing and challenging high-profile or high-value investments. Can you tell us more about how oversight arrangements work in practice, including how regularly the executive team provides review and challenge of high-profile or high-value investments? I am not sure that we have that level of detail with us today, Deputy convener. In terms of the Scottish Government executive team, perhaps we can offer the membership of that comprises. The executive team is led by the permanent secretary, supported by the director general of the Scottish Government. As I alluded to a few moments ago, the executive team operates in different guises, so it will be a delivery mode, a performance mode and an assurance mode, as I recall, alongside an investment mode. All that is fine, in terms of how they focus their time on a particular occasion. Beyond that, we may need to check our records or, indeed, the Scottish Government might be able to share more detail with the committee about the specifics of how that operates in practice, together with the nature of material that is shared with them. The executive team in investment mode is novel, contentious, high-value projects that consider the business cases for those that consider the economic case and the operational case. I think that they meet quarterly, but I can confirm that. The infrastructure investment board is more strategic at projects as a whole and at the programme as a whole. It considers things like the prioritisation exercise and the big risks that are coming through for the whole of the pipeline, but it does not look at individual projects or programmes. It supports the portfolio teams in delivering them. I am grateful for that additional detail on the two boards. The infrastructure investment board, as I recall, also has membership from non-executive directors of the Scottish Government. Again, that feels appropriate. I am drawing on the expertise that the Scottish Government has brought in on its corporate board and the Scottish Audit and Assurance Committee. Non-executives with relevant backgrounds will also join the infrastructure investment board to support some of the scrutiny, support and challenge function that you would expect from non-executive directors. Before we move on, can I just pick up this theme of transparency, which again you mentioned in your opening remarks? When I look at the briefing paragraph 9, which is where the Deputy convener started her questioning, which was the fact that details are only available for £14.9 billion of the £26 billion of infrastructure investment originally announced. That section also uses expressions, but it is not possible to compare. It makes it difficult to compare. It does not assess. There are a series of criticisms of the transparency of the data that is available. Have you had any initial response to that from the Scottish Government? As you would expect, convener, we share our data reports with the Scottish Government on any other relevant public bodies for clearance. It is a factually accurate statement on our position on that. In terms of public response, no, we have not heard anything further, nor have we any position yet from the Government on that. I think that the only thing that is maybe worth adding, and Darsie might want to say a bit more about that too, is that what comes next on the back of the update that the Parliament will see with the prioritisation is going to be really important. What we hope to see is something of a step change that addresses the points that we make in paragraph 9 and the detail of the bullets that accompany it, that the reporting to the Parliament—we have an interest in that as well. We have quite a long tail, as does the committee itself with the reporting, but it feels like it is ever more important now, given the fiscal challenges that relate to the delivery of the capital programme. Together with weaving in significant maintenance requirements alongside rising costs, is that everybody is absolutely clear what the intention is and what can be delivered with the reducing capital budget that is available. We hope that those points are taken on board and addressed, and the committee will see from the paper that we make recommendations to that effect. As I say, we will return to some of those themes over the course of the next 45 minutes to an hour. I am going to bring in Willie Coffin next, who has got some questions to put to you. Willie Coffin Thank you very much, convener, and good morning, Auditor General and colleagues. You mentioned it yourself. There, Stephen, the driver behind all of this is the significant cuts to the capital budget coming to the Scottish Government from the UK Government. Your Exhibit 3 gives us some kind of information on that, but I would like to ask you for some of the figures behind that, if I may. You talked about a 7 per cent cut. You talked about, in paragraph 15, an 11 per cent gap next year and a further 16 per cent gap the following year. Are you able to quantify the value of what those percentage figures actually mean to the budget? Stephen Caffey The percentage that you quoted, if I may, to add a bit of emphasis, is significant reductions on the funding that the Scottish Government expected to have available when it last recast its capital programme ambitions. Three numbers, just for the risk of repeating, is that there is expected to be a 7 per cent real terms reduction in the capital budget. In the 24-25 financial year, the Scottish Government expects to have 11 per cent less capital budget than originally anticipated, and that increases to 16 per cent the following financial year, 25-26. Other relevant factors also influencing the budget to highlight to the committee is the availability of financial transactions budget. This was another source of funding that the Government made available to private sector enterprises to deliver capital programmes or individuals. Some of that would have been used for part of the delivery of housing programme ambitions, for example. It is anticipated that that will also come to an end in the next year or so. Real downward pressure on the Government's capital programme budget. In terms of the totality of what that means, Mr Caffey, I am not sure that we have an up-to-date number yet as to what the new budget will be. That is likely what we will see with the update information that is going to come to the Parliament before the end of the year. No quantifiable figures in pound notes with that 11 per cent and 16 per cent will look like, just in terms of hard cash. The overall capital budget is about £6 billion. You can see in Exhibit 3 how that is less than was expected. That is set out in the Scottish Government's medium-term financial strategy that was published in May. As the Auditor General said, we are expecting updated figures in the next budget. I will come back to that issue, because it is really important to understand what that means in terms of hard cash for all the various projects that members and the public will be interested in. Stephen, you also said in your report about the financial transactions after 24-25 that we have been unable to budget for those. What is the reason behind that? Is it just because of the uncertainty of the allocation? I think that it is more certainty that they are not going to be available, Mr Coffey. The updated information that the Scottish Government has in forming its budget is that financial transactions have been with us for a while now as a source of funding. Part of the condition of financial transactions is that they go beyond the boundary of public sector bodies. I mentioned that they are provided as part of loans to individuals or private enterprises. Sometimes housing associations, for example, as a means of furthering Government policy intent. It is typically what you would lump together as part of the overall capital provision. The Scottish Government's understanding is that those will also not be available. It is again that, to deliver the same ambitions from the capital programme, whether it was delivered from core capital budget financial transactions or indeed from the committee, I wish to explore further, Revenue-financed capital programmes is that the financial transactions element of that is also not going to be available. Further reason for prioritisation and recasting of the budget to deliver programmes in future, Mr Coffey. In terms of the challenges that we face, the kind of extending the timescale for delivery, pushing that out, is that actually assisting and helping to deliver, but over a longer term, using the same money? Is that a helpful feature or is it something that we should be concerned about? I think that it can be both. First of all, it has to be a realism about the delivery of capital projects. The committee knows only too well about where large capital projects are not delivered either on time or with effective budgets. We have to be clear and transparent when we set out the delivery of large-scale capital projects. It has to be a margin of error. Of course, capital projects are now unimpossible to pin them down to a particular day or month in terms of delivery. There are so many variables that can influence the delivery of a large complex project over many years. In terms of expecting delay, in the little base terms, if there is going to be less money available than previously anticipated, what that will mean is either fewer projects or projects being programmed to take longer in delivery or more likely to be phased differently than was originally intended. That prioritisation work that we know that the Government is working through at the moment. For me, Steven, you mentioned that there are three other factors that drive up construction costs that are important for the record. Can you tell the committee what the three other factors are? You also mentioned that it has resulted in increased costs already for the 45 projects that you mentioned and a significant number of delays. Can you explain what the other factors are that are causing this? Perhaps I highlighted to the committee a couple of the exhibits in today's paper. Exhibit 4 references increased construction costs and some of the factors behind that. We have all seen that inflation is higher than historically we would have recognised over the past 15-20 years. Supply chain challenges are also relevant for the delivery of capital projects attributable to the war in Ukraine and result in shortages in materials and services to support infrastructure projects. Building standards are increasing. Net zero obligations upon the delivery of projects for public bodies and elsewhere, and labour supply shortages are also relevant factors. How is that influencing today? You rightly mentioned 45 projects. Mr Coffey, when we set out a number of examples of the implications of the budget challenges in exhibit 5 of those projects that were identified in the infrastructure investment plan that has been affected by costs or delays. Of the 45, we have reported that 13 have been delayed. Three are currently paused. Today we are seeing costs of an increase of £55 million from the progress report from the end of December 2022 to June 2023. I am happy to make any specifics on those projects, Mr Coffey, but what we are seeing across the piece is real challenges, both from budget arrangements and external factors such as inflation, supply and availability of materials, all of which are driving real prioritisation that the Government is now committed to. Do you finally get the sense that the remaining projects are deliverable or are really difficult decisions ahead of us? There is no question about whether there will be difficult decisions that will have to be made. Again, I am sure that the committee wants to discuss further, but I think that looking at some of those challenges, none of them exist in isolation of the other projects. They exist for purpose to support the Government's ambitions, but the national treatment centres are a very clear example about some of those difficulties. Under the committee knows us feel well and the NTCs were part of the Government's core response to tackle the aftermath of Covid in terms of the provision of healthcare tackling waiting lists. We said that six of the 11 NTCs are facing delays. Clearly, that has difficult implications for everybody who is relying on them for the delivery of healthcare. A particularly challenging period, Mr Coffey. On that figure of the 45 projects, eight had seen costs increase, 13 have been delayed, three have been paused. That does not mean that less than half are on track in terms of cost and timescale. I think that we hear what you said about you can't be too precise about cost and you can't be too precise about delivery date, but presumably people build in a degree of flexibility when it's an indicative date of completion for an infrastructure project, isn't it? You might make allowances for snagging and so on as part of that process. We are talking about a substantial number of infrastructure projects that have these problems associated with them. Yes, that's correct, convener. I'm happy to clarify my comments. Although you can't be precise, all projects of this nature will build in contingency of some degree to allow for unforeseen factors. Those numbers illustrate the scale of challenge that is existing in the delivery of large capital projects for the various factors that we set out in the paper. A lot of those that are delayed, they are waiting for business case approvals, so a lot of this is tied up with the prioritisation exercise as government are considering where their priorities are. They're not approving the business cases at this point until they've gone through that exercise, so that's causing some of the delays that we're reporting. Right, so these are not projects that have got work on the ground underway or construction has commenced. These are in a pipeline, which includes sign-off of business case. So it's a mix. It's taken from the major capital projects update that you saw in June, and it's a mix. So some of them are on the ground and some of them are awaiting business case approval. Okay, thanks. That's helpful. Graham Simpson, you want to comment on this point? Yeah, just to follow up on this line of questioning, convener, because in Exhibit 4 and 5 you say that 13 projects have been delayed. Have we got a list of those projects? I do. It's taken from the major capital projects update. Like I said, there's a bit of judgment taken about whether it's delayed, whether it's waiting for a business case. I do have that list. I could maybe share it afterwards. I'm not asking you to read all 13. That might take some time. Just while we're on Exhibit 5, if that's okay, convener, one of the projects that you mentioned there is the A9 dueling. You give examples in the other three projects that you mentioned in that exhibit. You give figures of how much cost has increased, but you don't do that for the A9. Is it possible to produce a figure of how much cost has increased over time from when the project was first announced? I'm not sure it's possible for us to give that figure. I think that that will be for the Government as part of its recasting and re-prioritisation to set out how costs and timescales have changed for various reasons for that and other projects. If anything, I think that that emphasises the points that we make about the need for clearer transparency to allow this committee, absolutely, and others to track projects over the lifetime of their delivery phase. So it's really clear about what is being achieved, what's being spent alongside that, Mr Simpson. I don't think that we have the most up-to-date figure for costs and timescales for the A9. You give a figure in that exhibit of £3 billion. I think that we know that that's an estimate. I'm not sure that we could give you assurance that that's the most up-to-date number for the delivery of that project. Is it an estimate of what? Of cost of the delivery of the project. I think that there's probably not terribly much more that we can signal, given that we draw that from publicly available sources. The delivery of that project, as others are of real public interest, I think that the Government themselves would be the best place to provide what their forecast would be for it. Do you know what the original figure was? So that £3 billion there is the original figure. That's the 2011 estimate. Okay, so we can expect it to be far more than that. Yep, in the last major capital update, they gave some more information on the Tomato and Tamoy section, but that doesn't include any costs either. They're in preparation for a new procurement for that, so maybe when they see the cost of that, that'll be indicative of the whole length. The Government has said that they're committed to doing the full road, although it's fair to say that they have dithered over this, and that dithering, in my view, has led to this increase in costs. So we're going to expect, I think that it's fair to say, that when they make the announcement in December, that £3 billion cost will have soared. It's fair to say that, isn't it? I think that we'd rather await to see what the detail of the announcement is before making any comment on it. Just for completeness, we haven't audited the delivery of the A9 project. This is a more high-level briefing that looks to point out in the round the challenges that the Government will have to deliver upon its wider capital ambitions with the availability of funding, not what was originally intended. But we do recognise the genuine and real public interest in the delivery of such a significant project as the A9 dualling, Mr Simpson. So we'll await to see that and then consider what that means if anything for any future work we undertake. If it does go ahead at an increased cost, given what you've said already, is that likely to impact on other projects? I think that it is fair to say that there will be some difficult choices that the Government will have to make as it prioritises the delivery of a range of different capital projects to meet a number of its priorities. What we've said in our paper is that how individual projects contribute to the delivery of policy intent could also be clearer. The committee just to highlight the evidence that you've already taken on net zero following our climate change paper before summer recess. We noted in there, for example, that it wasn't clear how capital net zero related projects were contributing to either carbon emission and also less emphasis upon adaptation work. But prioritisation will require difficult choices. Mr Simpson, I think that that is clear and that will be about both timescale cost and the delivery of individual projects. Convener, that's all my questions on that particular section. That's fine. I'll bring you back in shortly. I'm going to move things on now. You've mentioned a couple of times the issues around revenue finance projects and Colin Beattie has got some questions to put to you on that. Colin. I'm looking at paragraph 17, 18 and 19 primarily here. I do note that there have been no private finance projects since 2018 and there appears to be no immediate plans to fund in that way. However, as has been alluded to, the capital budget has been cut. There is anticipation, I believe, that it might be cut again this year. So it's going to put a lot of pressure on the government as to how it delivers projects. Now, private finance is obviously more expensive, especially at the moment. In spite of that, in spite of the greater cost for private finance, the briefing states that the Scottish Government cannot, I quote, rule out using alternative financing arrangements to deliver investment beyond its capital budgets, unquote. Does that give you any cause for concern? You're writing your quoting of the paper and again maybe highlight to the committee the evidence you took from the Scottish Government and your meeting in June on the major capital projects where the director noted that the Government is considering revenue financed capital projects as part of its wider suite of funding arrangements. We note in the paper that the Government's position had broadly been that revenue financed capital projects were unlikely to deliver value for money, as you alluded to, Mr Beattie. The prevailing interest rates that we are seeing at the moment are higher than would have been the case when PFI-based projects were introduced 20-plus years ago. With that in mind, I think that the Government's position is largely consistent that revenue-based projects aren't likely to deliver value for money. In terms of the responsibilities around value for money, I know that the committee is familiar with that ultimately it will be for the accountable officer to take a view on whether or not different funding mechanisms provide value for money. We also have a role in that assessment, but looking at the scale of challenge that exists to the capital budget, all of those factors have to be weighed up. We are noting it as a potential route at the moment, but clearly I think that the Government has also been pretty transparent on the fact that revenue-based models are likely to cost more in the longer term, and that comes with an opportunity cost for other decisions that they might wish to make. Other than that general comment, there's no real indication that they're going to go down that road. When the evidence that you took in June, the director was clear that because of the scale of challenge that they were facing, and I'm paraphrasing, but my interpretation of the evidence was that it felt necessary for the Government to broaden its reach and to look at all potential sources of funding. Like the committee, I await to see what the prioritisation exercise produces and what that means in terms of sources of funding. I think that only until we're clear about the Government's next steps for delivering its programme will we be able to take a view on what that might mean in terms of value for money, but I'm very clear that that will be part of Government's own thinking. As I mentioned, it has already stated that it will be much harder and more unlikely to be able to make a strong value for money case using revenue-based models, as opposed to core capital budget. I'm still keeping with private finance. If we look at paragraphs 30, 31, 32, it talks about the number of private finance contracts in Scotland, and it says that there's 130 with a capital value of £9 billion. You've also highlighted that 22 PFI contracts with a value of £900 million will end by 2030. There's quite a difference in the contracts, the PFI contracts, and what happens at the end of the contract, whether there's a purchase agreement or whatever. If I'm looking at 130 in total, which presumably some of them will still have a life of 20 years or so in them, others are rather less, are those individual contracts? What is behind them? For example, you might build a school and that would be a PFI contract. My understanding is that there's a degree of bundling at some points. Does that mean that any of those 130 contracts are actually a bundled contract that would have a greater value and therefore a greater risk when it comes to maturity? Yes, you're largely right that there were some bundling, to borrow your expression, primarily in respect of schools contracts, where the delivery of school replacement projects. There's a publicly available list of projects that are operating to timescale and value. Our analysis of those projects that are due to expire by the end of the decade includes some of those grouped projects, for example, around different local authority schools programmes. Beyond that, the purpose of us mentioning it in the report is another important factor for public bodies to consider as part of their estate's planning arrangements. You rightly say that they're not all the same, so some will involve outlay from public bodies to secure use of the asset, final payment or so forth. Then there's the factoring that into asset management estate plans, about how they plan to maintain use of the asset. 25 years, things change. What might be in the occupancy or use of the asset, as originally intended, may no longer be the case. Just for completeness, Mr Beattie, as we know in the paper, that public bodies are being supported in this by the Scottish Futures Trust, providing advice, guidance to them about how to plan for and anticipate the reintroduction of the PFI asset into their estate. Do we have any sort of risk analysis on these individual projects, because they will all be different in terms of the financial risk involved at the end of the project? That will be a matter for the public bodies. The public bodies are managing their relationship. I wouldn't want to present that as an impending problem. Public bodies are using these assets. They have relationships with whether it's a private service company provider who is running the asset. They know when the asset PFI contract ends, but it's identifying and planning for the points about whether it's a final payment, what it means for the future provision of the asset and so forth. We haven't categorised those in terms of risk. Mr Beattie, information is available, so the individual public body to manage and plan for the next stage of the use of the asset. The Scottish Futures Trust is helping the public bodies and local authorities to manage the transition at the end of the contracts. You said that there are 22 PFI contracts coming up. Have you identified if there is any particular years when a larger number of these might be coming up, and obviously that's a greater risk, or any particular part of Scotland, area of Scotland that's particularly at risk? Of the analysis that I have in front of me, the two largest years will be 2026 and 27, and the majority of those assets that expire before the end of this decade will return to public ownership. I'm very happy to share that information and detail with the committee that sets out the project name, the public body who will be procuring the asset and the capital value of the project. Other than a few assets towards the end of the decade, those two years of 2026 and 2027 must appear to be the most significant years to get it right, so I'm very happy to share that with the committee. I'll pick up the role of the Scottish Futures Trust. I'll come back to Willie Coffey who wants to come in on this point. In the briefing it talks about their role in advising the Government in advance of difficult decisions around prioritisation of projects. It's not just about the contractual terms that might be negotiated around a PFI arrangement or PPP, or coming to an end. They also offer an advisory role to the Government in establishing some kind of prioritisation framework, I think, is the expression that's used in part 10 of the briefing. Can you elaborate that a little bit more? I suppose that we've spoken about prioritisation being necessary, about funding being challenging and difficult decisions having to be made. Do we know how the Government's going to make those decisions? Have we seen this framework, for example? Your last question, convener. No, we haven't seen it. We're not clear yet about what the prioritisation framework criteria that it will use. What we've set out in the paper is that that needs to be the case and linked clearly to how the Government will deliver its policy ambitions. I've mentioned already this morning that, using the example of net zero, it wasn't always clear how a particular infrastructure investment project related to the delivery of net zero ambitions across the piece. That has to be clearer. On respect of the Scottish Futures Trust, I also appreciate that the committee has taken evidence from the Futures Trust on a number of occasions about its roles and responsibilities. For me, that feels appropriate that the Government is using expertise at its disposal in the SFT, both on the prioritisation framework, as it relates to the different investment models. Perhaps, in particular, we're looking at the scale of budgetary challenges that exist. The Government is fair in my view that it considers a range of alternatives at its disposal, whether those are capital budgets or revenue. Not necessarily pinning on one or particular, but it is using a complete suite of information before deciding on which best represents value for money. On the role of the reabsorption of those assets into public ownership, SFT will be familiar with contracts. It feels like an end-to-end process for the SFT from the start about the ironic nature of projects through to advice and then rounding that off, supporting public bodies to get good value for when they are brought back into it. Beyond that, I'm not sure that we've got much more to share with the committee about how the SFT is interacting with Government throughout those projects, but I think that they may be in a well place. On the PFI expiry, they've got a small team working on the expiring contracts. One of those is based within NHS Assure, so they're working with the NHS contracts on that. They've also set out guidance and done some work looking at condition of assets before they come back and really recommend that bodies consider the condition of the asset very early in the process so that there's no surprises coming at the end of the contract. Can I just clarify that, in all cases, the consideration is absorption into the public sector, so the Scottish Futures Trust is not advising the Government on other options, which might be either extending the PFI deal or bringing in a different contract. I realise that a lot of those contracts were billed as well as operate contracts, but I wonder whether that's consideration as well. The SFT and the Government are best placed to talk through the specifics of individual contracts. The reason I say that is that the contracts were so varied, convener, as to whether or not the asset returned automatically to the public body at the end of the contract, whether there was a payment. It's worth clarifying that I don't have that information to hand about whether that was an automatic absorption. For the most cases that will be, but I wouldn't like to be absolutely complete on that point as to whether there were other options available to the public body given just the wide range of contracts that were used. That's very helpful. I think that you're raising questions that we probably do need to be put in directly to the Government, so that's very helpful. Just one quick-ish question from me before I bring Graham Simpson back, I think, and I think that I'll bring Willie Coffey in first, then Graham second. You've mentioned a couple of times, I think, the national treatment centres and the role that it was hoped that they would fulfil, but I think it's recorded in the report that the cost of the programme has more than doubled while the delivery of the programme is at least three years late and counting. Do you think that that suggests that the national treatment centre programme will be or needs to be scaled back? We're certainly highlighting in the paper the extent of delays, rising costs, that business cases await approval, so the original ambitions for the operational nature of the national treatment centres and the resultant intended impact that that would have on the throughput of cases to tackle the Covid-related waiting list backlog won't be met as originally intended. What it means in terms of prioritisation, I think, is exactly the area that the Government is now in, as it looks at its capital budget and what it can achieve, whether it's part of its policy objectives for the provision of health services and weighing that up against other factors. We await to see where that goes, convener. The other thing that's worth—if I may just to emphasise the point that I've discussed with the committee on a number of occasions—there will be difficult choices. What we've tended to see in terms of the Scottish budget use so far is that health spending has been more protected than other areas of public service, but that again will be weighed up, I'm quite sure, as part of the prioritisation that's currently on going. That's a very fair point. Willie Coffey wanted to come in around the revenue finance projects question, I think. Thank you, convener. Auditor General, you mentioned some of the prison estate in your report in page 19, and one of your items is HMP commandment, affectionately known as Bow House, locally, to my constituents. I think the contract is up next year, I think it is. That's its 25-year. It's over next year. Just a wee correction, it's not returning to the public sector, it's going to the public sector. It's not a return, just a wee minor correction there. Is your comments there in relation to the transition from private sector to public sector, or have you got a concern about future capital investment? I haven't seen any mention of the capital element, which this report is really all about. Yes, I'm happy to note that point that you make, Mr Coffey. First of all, HMP Kilmarnock, it's worth noting that this is the first PFI prison that will either return or join the public sector estate formally, and that happened in 2024. Not just the building, but also the workforce and the facilities management services, just to elaborate slightly. Many, many PFI contracts had a staff and employee component. Many of the support services were provided by people who were working for the private company, so there is an important factor to consider more widely beyond just the buildings themselves about people, terms and conditions, into public service work or otherwise. On the HMP Kilmarnock, we know that Scottish Prison Service, and we set out in the paper, is working closely with the Government in anticipation of the arrangements that we need to have in place for that asset. That's something that we are following up closely as part of our annual audit of the Scottish Prison Service. If I may convener just to broaden the point out about prisons, Mr Coffey, we know in the case study on page 19 that there are some very real challenges with the prison estate in Scotland. We're drawing on the work of the chief inspector of prisons in her reporting, highlighting that there are significant health and safety human rights concerns in some of Scotland's prisons that will require significant capital investment to resolve. One of the next steps around that particular concerns that she's raised about HMP Barlinnie is that that replacement for Barlinnie hasn't yet had business case approval from the Scottish Government. As we've talked about in the round this morning, the longer that delays are experienced, the risk is that costs increase further, with supply chain labour and all the more capital prioritisation that will be required, Mr Coffey. The risks that you mentioned, Stephen, they surely don't apply to Barlinnie in the same way that they have been applied to Barlinnie. You're quite right. There's a clear distinction between Victorian prisons that Scotland is still using and HMP Barlinnie, which is the newest part of the estate and part of public ownership in very short order. Addie Well is newer, presumably, than Kilmarnock, isn't it? I'm going to now invite Graham Simpson to put some more questions to you. You've just mentioned Barlinnie and the lack of a business case for a replacement. Why is that all being produced yet? Do you know? Colleagues of an additional position, I don't think that the business case hasn't been produced, it's awaiting approval rather than production. So there is a business case but it hasn't been approved? I think it's due to be considered by ministers this month, that's my understanding. When was the business case produced? I don't think we have the detail on when it was prepared. I think it's fair to say that the prison service is facing considerable challenges with its capital budget and estimated costs for Barlinnie have increased since the original estimate in 2014. So that will probably be part of the reason why there have been delays to approval of the business case. Do you know what the increase in costs is? I think the estimate is that it has gone from 100 million to 400 million. That's extraordinary. I wasn't expecting that. I will move on to another line of questioning after that bombshell. I want to ask you about net zero. You mentioned it earlier and of course you mentioned it in your report. If I can get you to look at paragraph 9 in your report and the last bullet point in paragraph 9, which I'll just read out, says that June 2023 progress report describes how some projects are considering their impact on climate change. It does not assess the overall impact projects will have on net zero targets. Can you explain the difference? I think that this is consistent with the report that we produced earlier this year that said as much, Mr Simpson, that the Government's capital programme wasn't clear enough in terms of the intended impact that it would have on carbon emission reductions. The evidence that the committee took, I think that Director General was pretty clear that that was something that they recognised they needed to improve upon and have committed to taking those steps. It's really that consistency and transparency. It's not just on net zero but really how are all of the capital projects contributing to the Government's policy ambitions? That's something that we set out in today's paper and would you expect to see as part of the updated programme that is produced for consideration alongside the budget? It's reasonable to say and you're right that we've explored this before but the Government seems to be struggling to say how projects affect net zero. It's absolutely the case that it's not being clear enough up until now about the intended benefits impact that capital projects that relate to net zero ambitions. How do you think that they should address that? I think that it's for the Government to decide how they wish to set that out but perhaps drawing on some of the wider points in that paragraph, there needs to be a consistency from end to end from projects. Both in terms of cost and timescales and then what contribution those projects will make to net zero ambitions. The specifics of it of course will be for the Government to address but in a complex policy area like this it needs to be explained quite clearly for the public that the impact that they make. So the specifics of it can be for Government to decide what we are calling for is that there's transparency around that. You're basically saying that they should decide but it's up to them how they decide it. I think that that's consistent with our role as not far as to get into policy matters or procedural but nonetheless what we haven't seen up until now is that clarity of the impact that individual projects will have on net zero. Is that struggle that they're clearly having? Is that holding up any projects? I'm not sure we've made that connection. I think that the bigger impact on the delivery of individual capital projects is the provision of funding. There isn't the money that was intended to deliver the totality of the programme, hence the prioritisation exercise that we're currently seeing. Inevitably there will be a range of factors on top of funding as to why a project hasn't progressed in terms of anticipated timescale. Whether it's ground conditions, public interest matters, which I think is an important factor in terms of HMP barlinny replacement, planning consents and so forth, all of these will influence the delivery of a programme. What we are saying is that in that communication with the Parliament the Government can be clearer about the various factors that cause delays. I'll move on. I'm going to talk about the condition of the public sector estate. Your briefing repeats a call that you and this committee have made consistently for a consolidated account covering the devolved public sector in Scotland to be produced. What stage is the Scottish Government at in responding to this recommendation? I'll be able to report further on this before the end of this calendar year, convener, when I publish my latest section 22 report on the Scottish Government's consolidated accounts. What we'll do in that report is to set out the progress that the Government has made to fulfil their commitment that they made seven years ago to produce a consolidated account for Scotland. If the committee are agreeable, I'm perhaps content to await the briefing that I gave you on that paper before saying further. Why have we waited seven years? Have they provided a reason for that? You've taken evidence many times on the reasons for the lack of progress. You've also heard many commitments to address this and produce it. I'm perhaps not going to all of the various factors, Mr Simpson, but there have been elements of identifying capacity constraints, prioritisation interruptions caused by the pandemic in particular. Together with the most recent evidence that you took on cited challenges that the UK Government was having in producing the whole of Government accounts delays and software issues. There have been a range of reasons given for the delay. As we say in today's paper, and again I'll say further when I speak on the section 22 in the consolidated accounts, this is a really important publication that will set out what Scotland owns, most relevant for today's paper, that will help to make some of the choices about the use and the value of the estate into the future. Sharon Dary asked an interesting question. She asked lots of interesting questions. This one was about the condition of the public sector estate. She said and you answered that the single Scottish estate programme survey is limited to just administrative buildings. What's the rationale behind that? Government are probably better placed to explain the rationale for why one factor to that than the other. You might want to say a bit more about the thought process that Government have gone through. It's important to be balanced from my thoughts on this. A single Scottish estate for administrative buildings is important and that's a welcome development. The use of administrative buildings is changing. The working patterns are changing where people work. The adoption of digital technologies means that the office, as we would have recognised, is no longer the dominant place that people will provide administrative services. That means it's likely to be an overcapacity. Government is working through that with public bodies at the moment. What we want to see is to factor in operational buildings to make the best use of the estate in the round more sharing of services between public bodies, sharing of sites so that we can maximise the benefits that we get from public spending and public assets. The single Scottish estate programme at the moment is focused on bodies that come under the Scottish public finance manual. That excludes NHS colleges, for example. They are primarily looking at core Scottish Government and Scottish Government public bodies operational estate. They are hoping to extend out into other bodies like colleges and NHS, but it would be more advisory rather than having the ability to mandate changes in the wider estate because of the Scottish public finance manual's terms. It's a really important first step to look at the administrative state, particularly given the impact of the pandemic on the ways that people work and what that means for the totality of the office buildings in the public sector and how they're used. The programme, along with the Scottish Futures Trust, will be working to support public bodies to explore options for co-location and for sharing services and all of those things to make the public sector estate more efficient and effective. The briefing is a consideration of the totality of the estate, because operational buildings such as hospitals and colleges, without having an overall picture of the condition of that estate, are difficult for the Scottish Government to then factor in when they're thinking about new infrastructure projects. They also need to understand what is the state of the infrastructure that exists and what the requirements to maintain that estate and to make it fit for purpose, not just now but in the future. A really important part of the Scottish Government's public sector reform ambitions is to use the estate more effectively to deliver services, and they can't do that without an overall picture. So, when you talk about the public sector estate, are you only talking about Scottish Government buildings, or are we including things like councils, because that's a large part of the public sector? We haven't looked at councils as part of this work, but we would like to see the Scottish Government taking a broader view in collecting that data and understanding the wider estate. The work to date has actually set out, and it covers administrative buildings. We think that it should go further into operational buildings, but that's about artificial, Mr Simpson, just to say that we can't look at certain sectors. Public services exist in the round. They overlap the provision that the committee is well aware of and straddle many different sectors of public service. If we're serious about adopting a place-based approach to the provision of public services, that also has to include all parts of public service. It's also true that there are some very good examples already of where public bodies are coming together and sharing services in different parts of Scotland, sharing buildings. That needs to continue, but at scale, having better data, a complete picture of assets and sharing that information across public bodies will be part of the next step, so we can make some of these important decisions with the right information at disposal. You probably agree with the general thrust of my question that if we're going to do a survey of the public sector, it should be the entire public sector, not just Scottish Government buildings, but include what councils you've mentioned, health authorities, should be everything. Yes, there needs to be that rounded understanding of what assets we currently have, their condition and how they might be used in the future, and not artificially delineate between one part of the public sector or the other. As well as Dush is absolutely right to emphasise the public sector reform component of this, decision makers also need to consider the impact on individual communities. Public bodies and their estate are vital to the provision of public service. As we saw through the pandemic, public bodies and their estate stepped in. We've seen more recent examples of where public bodies are offering their buildings during the cost of living crisis as a safe, warm place for people to go to in times of crisis. Planning for different scenarios matters, and that is best done across the piece, not just administer to buildings, but broadening out into operational too, and then looking across public bodies in Scotland. I completely agree with that. Given all that we've heard so far and what's in your report, do you think there's a risk? I guess the answer has to be yes to this, but you can tell me, is there a risk that some key public buildings could close in future years? The use of the estate, the analysis of it, is now what needs to happen. As we sit in the paper, some buildings are no longer being used as originally intended. Occupancy rates for them weren't what they would have been before the pandemic or decades before that. Public bodies are facing difficult choices. As well as the capital budget, there are revenue budget challenges as well. Even in the past few weeks, we've seen some public bodies make choices about library services, leisure centres and so forth as well. Those are the challenges that public bodies are facing. Those challenges are extremely difficult at the moment, but doing that on a body-by-body basis makes those even harder. Our position in today's paper is that the provision of public bodies estate is significant. If that's done on a joined-up basis, that makes some of those difficult choices less prevalent, but it's inevitable that the state that we currently have won't be the state that will operate in years to come. That's a fair point. You make a really good point about the use of buildings. Let me give an example. Some councils have been considering closing leisure centres. If you close a leisure centre, the NHS may turn around and say that if you close that, that's going to impact on people's health. That's going to cause more problems for us. Is that the kind of joined-up approach that should be taken? If a council is considering doing that sort of thing, it should be talking to the health service. I won't comment on individual circumstances in local authorities, which is beyond my responsibilities, but the totality of that example is one that leisure provision could be considered as a preventative activity that allows people opportunities to maintain good health. However, there is a giant comparison with acute services in the NHS. We have also spoken about that already this morning. There will be places where people in general terms will access when they experience poor health. The whole preventative spending agenda is one that is designed to keep people healthier for longer and finding that right balance that covers both different parts of public service. Make those decisions in a joined-up way beyond traditional boundaries will help to ensure that we have the estate that we need into the future. We are coming towards the end of our session. Willie Coffey has a couple of questions to put to you on maintenance. I have a final question to put to you. It is probably just to round off that conversation there, Stephen, about the backlog maintenance picture. Is it clear enough? Is it also subject to pushing it out along longer timescales, do you think? Of course, RAC has entered the debate. Are we clear enough about the extent of the public buildings that may or may not have RAC that is a matter of concern at all? I am happy to start on that point. I will bring colleagues in to address your points, Mr Coffey. We do not have a precise figure on backlog maintenance across the public sector estate in Scotland. What we have is a number of sectoral analysis. Paragraph 26 from today's paper sets out that the NHS has reported that it has backlog maintenance requirements of £1.1 billion. Contrast that with an annual capital budget of £578 million. We discussed some of the Scotland's colleges requirements meeting last week and we touched on that today that between 2018 and 2022 capital funding for colleges maintenance has fallen short by £320 million against the £437 million. We have also covered Scotland's prisons already. That wider condition assessment is also needed to inform capital maintenance understanding investment prioritisation into the future. RAC is part of the emerging challenge that exists. Darshay can say a bit more about some of the detail of RAC, but it is a factor of still running 1950s, 1960s properties as part of Scotland's public sector estate investment that is required. On a high level, we conclude in today's paper that public buildings require ongoing maintenance and investment, but with the challenges to the capital budget, that is likely to be pushed back even further. That brings more risk to the provision of effective public services. I emphasise that it is a major part of the financial challenge that the Scottish Government and public bodies are facing. It is not just about the money to invest in new infrastructure and which projects are going to go ahead and which ones will be delayed, but also managing the investment in the existing estate and dealing with backlog maintenance. As you touched on Mr Coffey, there is not the budget to invest in the maintenance, and as we say in paragraph 26, the NHS backlog maintenance is currently estimated at £1.1 billion, and it is the highest that it has ever been at. The impact of not having the money to address that runs the risk of there being interruptions to the delivery of public services. Consequently, larger investment is being needed further down the road to bring those assets up to reasonable condition. We have seen the impact with, for example, the Victoria hospital in Cercodi and wards having to be closed because of issues with the condition. Ashly will be able to say a bit more on the RAC question and what we know about that. We do not have an overall picture of RAC either, and it highlights the importance of understanding the estate. We found some information mainly pulled from parliamentary questions and the like. We know that 14 fire stations are likely to have RAC, and we will need replacing. 39 schools have RAC at some place in them. 254 NHS buildings may contain RAC, and there are further surveys going on to fully understand the extent of that. We know that 24 university and college buildings may have RAC as well. Again, there is no overall estimate of how much that will cost, but the fire service expects that it will cost them £70 million to replace those 14 fire stations. Westlothian has done an estimated cost across their estate, and they estimate £77 million to address RAC. Eastlothian has published a cost of addressing RAC in one school, and that was £3.8 million. There are still big numbers at a time when funding is really quite tight. The other thing to add is that the Scottish Government wrote to the UK Government a couple of times about funding and any funding support for that, but we have not seen any response on that. I think that the Scottish Government has either. Is it your view that, if a building has got RAC, it has to be replaced? That is not the expert opinion that we heard at the Housing and Local Government Committee. The material is safe, but it has to be monitored regularly for any signs of movement and so on. Can we just clarify that for the record? Are we saying that all RAC must be replaced or not? No, that is not our position. It is certainly not appropriate for us to take a position on whether RAC should be replaced otherwise. Infrastructure experts will take that view. I think that we are public bodies are identifying that they have to spend public money, and the purpose of including it in today's paper is that it is another cost pressure. On top of the wider point about we haven't maintained our buildings or public buildings properly for decades, so hence why we have over £1 billion needed to invest in the NHS and more on top of that in other sectors. No, we are not advocating a particular solution one way or the other. Colin Beattie has a very short question in this area, Colin. We hear quite frightening figures for backlog maintenance. How much of that backlog maintenance potentially will be dealt with or removed with new builds and so on that are in the pipeline? Obviously, there is a timing issue here, but if you are going to build a new building, a new hospital, a new whatever, then the old one, which needed backlog maintenance, then goes out the picture. We don't have the calculation of that, Mr Beattie, but I agree with your line of argument that that figure will change both depending on new builds that come into substitute for an older property and also for any other estate choices that a public body makes around either disposal entirely or if the asset moves to a different style of ownership. That number will probably change at the margins, but I don't think that it will address the totalities. Even if there are new buildings that replace those of older nature that have large backlog maintenance, we are still going to be in the region of many hundreds of millions of pounds that are still needing spent to bring those assets up to proper, compliant safety building standards. My final areas of questioning are just twofold. The first one is you mentioned about the importance of assessing the impact on communities of any changes to infrastructure. My question on that is, to your knowledge, have there been any impact assessments? Related to that, one of the other highfalutin duties, which exists in footnote 5 of the report, refers to the Equality and Fairer Scotland duty. There is a statement that is on the Government website that was published about how that duty applies to infrastructure investment. Is there any evidence of that assessment being undertaken in regard to infrastructure projects, so community and equality and fairer Scotland duty? Last call is to come in on the Equality and Fairer Scotland duty, convener, if we have any examples or any further information that we can share. On the point about communities, given perhaps a couple of examples that ultimately people use buildings, it is not just about public sector workers and some very strong examples, both of where public bodies assets were needed in real time during either pandemic or cost of living crisis of wind. We have also seen examples of where public bodies have taken choices as part of community empowerment legislation to dispose of assets, to sell them to community groups. All of those things are important and relevant considerations. Given the assessment that is going on of the public sector estate, it is never just about money. It has to be a decision that is informed by community legislation that public bodies understand. They properly consult about the impact of choices that they are facing. Difficult choices, no question. What we make in the judgment of the recommendation in today's report is that those impact assessments are very clearly set out for when decisions about the estate are taken and in advance of that effective and clear consultation that takes place. I will pause and turn to colleagues if there is anything further that we can add about the equality duty that you mentioned. So, we haven't looked at the equality for individual projects, but we do say in paragraph 8 that the statement explains that all projects and programmes will be assessed against the duty. We just haven't seen anything pulled together at an IIP level that sets out how that's happening. I was going to add that, from the Scottish Government, we've also heard that, as part of the single Scottish estate programme, that they are undertaking work on impact assessments for the programme, including fair Scotland duty and equality impact assessments. We don't have any detail on timescales for that, but that is something that they are considering. In terms of their advice to public bodies, the Scottish Government is advising public bodies that they have to ensure that outcomes are appropriate for the communities affected by any proposed action in terms of the estate. I mean, just going back to the equality and fair of Scotland duty, I'm looking at this statement that was authorised in March 2021, so it's been in place for over two years, but when I read it I just wondered how is it going to be done? How are those assessments going to be made? It says that plans will have to be fully equality and fair of Scotland impact assessed. How are they doing that, or have you seen any evidence of them doing it at all? I think that it's probably fair to say that we haven't considered the detail of that for today's briefing paper, convener, but as we follow up and we've discussed how we are doing that with the committee, we'll factor that into our consideration, the extent to which the Government is complying with its own requirements on to adopt these revised arrangements and we'll build it into our future reporting. Thank you. My final question then perhaps picks up some of that, which is, there's a statement in the briefing where you point out that strong leadership is needed to deliver reform ambitions, which echoes a theme certainly the session 5 public audit committee felt was a recurring theme that there was an absence of strong leadership or how important strong leadership was to drive some of these improvements and reforms through. That's your sense of where we are with that. Again, have you seen much evidence of that? Leadership is going to be required at all levels and consistently to deliver the challenges that are needed to support the Government's public sector reform ambitions. The context is absolutely clear, though, as it relates to capital. We'll brief the committee shortly on our other more recent publication on the Scottish Government's employment arrangements for public sector workforce. Those factors don't exist in isolation, so there has to be clear, effective plans for the workforce, for the estate that just probably just speaks more relevantly to Mr Simpson's line of questioning, is that this goes beyond just the Scottish Government, it goes into all parts of public service that we can strike upon a clear, effective plan for the delivery of the estate and what that means for public service. There's much to do, convener, but there are examples of very clear, effective leadership around the country. Bringing that together will deliver on that programme. Thank you.