 Ladies and gentlemen, the President of the United States. I just wanted to come in here to tell you that I'm deeply concerned over the breach of security in our Moscow embassy, and while all the facts are not known, it is clear that security implications are widespread and that additional quick action is required to prevent further damage to our national security. Two weeks ago, when the severity of the situation became clear, I convened a meeting of my national security advisors and ordered Frank Carlucci to immediately begin an internal assessment of the damage. Today I want to announce some additional actions. The United States will not occupy our new embassy building in Moscow unless and until I can be assured that it is safe to move into a secure embassy environment. Likewise, the Soviet Union will not be allowed to occupy their new facility in Washington until a simultaneous move by both countries is possible. I have instructed the Secretary of State to make embassy security a major agenda item during his upcoming talks in Moscow, and I have asked former Defense Secretary Mel Laird to chair an assessment review panel under the general authority of the Secretary of State. In addition, I have instructed the Chairman of my Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Ambassador Ann Armstrong, to examine the procedures and practices used in our embassies worldwide to protect American facilities. I have requested that both reports from the Secretary of State and PIFIAB be transmitted to me within 90 days. Specifically, both the Secretary of State and PIFIAB have been tasked to evaluate the condition of our new building and ascertain whether it will ever be secure or whether it may be necessary to destroy and rebuild it. Finally, I have instructed the Secretaries of State and Defense to recommend to me the future management of security personnel at the U.S. Embassy in the USSR and elsewhere with respect to length of assignment, selection of personnel, and their supervision. These reports will be coordinated by the National Security Council, which shall, in turn, make comprehensive recommendations to me on counterintelligence and security policies, procedures, and accountability. Henry Kissinger said that it is humiliating for George Schultz to go to Moscow right now, that he should be meeting instead in Helsinki, perhaps, because we should not be going under these circumstances without having secure communications. Well, I have great respect for Henry and great friendship, but I have to oppose him on this. I just don't think it's good for us to be run out of town. Mr. President, how can you, as the Secretary of State, to do business with the Soviets on arms control when they have apparently compromised the U.S. position in Moscow so badly? How can you deal with them under these circumstances? Well, I think the whole business of espionage worldwide is something that we have to recognize takes place, and counterespionage is employed by everyone, but at the same time, you don't stop doing business. Business as usual, sir. Business as usual? Well, not just a minute. As usual, we have sent 81 of their agents in this country home, kicked them out of the country, and they're still willing to talk arms with us. Mr. President, has this changed the way you look at the Soviets? Is this changing our relations with them? Well, I think I've been rather realistic about the Soviet Union for quite some time, and believe me, it doesn't surprise me a bit, and no, I haven't changed my view of the Soviet Union. It's a new problem, Mr. President, has this been going on a long time, and haven't you had reports? I mean, how long have we had Soviet employees in our embassy? And we understand that you have received reports in, say, 85. And we have ordered, then, the beginning of actions to try and find out and establish if such a thing was going on. Chris Lee. Can I follow up specifically on that, because it was a report in 85 by your own foreign intelligence advisory board that you're calling on now for another report, and they told you that the embassy was vulnerable and specifically called on you in 85, the spring of 85, to get rid of Soviet personnel, yet you did nothing about it, and one of the members of the H-Lost World quits. This report did come in, and we immediately started and did accomplish a reduction of the personnel in stages that were there. And I must say we did run into some embassy problems and opposition, because it isn't exactly a place where you can just go out and hire Americans to go and take jobs like that in the Soviet Union. But as we were continuing with that, then the Soviet Union took the first lead and ordered their people out. But, Mr. President, well, if Gorbachev changes his mind, will you then allow Soviets to become re-employed at our embassy there, and how extensive is the problem in other Soviet block embassies? We are investigating the whole area of embassies. So listen, Frank is going to take all of your questions, unfortunately, and I'm not ducking you. I tried to answer a few. What should we hire them, sir, if Mr. Gorbachev changes his mind? No, I think we should have our own person. What about the nine contract employees that were sent home, Mr. President? When? Do you think Colonel Norris take orders from Mr. Casey at any time in terms of contrary? I don't know. Mr. President, what about the nine contract employees, American contract employees, who were sent home within the last two months, and were just exposed today by the State Department? Well, I have just told you what our position is going to be about that embassy building. I'm sorry to leave you to him, because this was run in the middle of my schedule, and honestly, I am... Are you interested in the new test ban proposal from the Soviets? Is that at least an encouraging sign? We think that it's encouraging there's their whole attitude to arms, which has never before been proved with any of the other previous Soviet leaders. Mr. President, Richard Allen says that in 1981, he recommended that all the Soviet nationals be dismissed from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and that the State Department blocked that. Well, as I've told you, it was not an easy problem. But when the second report came in with us here, we did start, and we did make some reductions, and we're proceeding. Was Ambassador Harman responsible, sir? Is Ambassador Harman responsible? I'm not going to uncancelize or determine any individual with... Thank you. Do you want to take a filing break? Five-minute filing break.