 Section 31 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant Headquarters moved to Holly Springs, General McClendon in command, Assuming command at Young's Point, Operations Above Vicksburg, Fortifications About Vicksburg, The Canal, Lake Province, Operations at Yazoo Pass. This interruption in my communications north, I was really cut off from communication with a great part of my own command during this time, resulted in Shermans moving from Memphis before McClendon could arrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did not reach McClendon. Pemberton got back to Vicksburg before Sherman got there. The rebel positions were on a bluff on the Yazoo River, some miles above its mouth. The waters were high, so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leaving only narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and the high bluffs. These were fortified and defended at all points. The rebel position was impregnable against any force that could be brought against its front. Sherman could not use one-fourth of his force. His efforts to capture the city, or the high ground north of it, were necessarily unavailing. Sherman's attack was very unfortunate. But I had no opportunity of communicating with him after the destruction of the road and telegraph to my rear on the 20th. He did not know, but what I was in the rear of the enemy, and depending on him, to open a new base of supplies for the troops with me. I had, before he started from Memphis, directed him to take with him a few small steamers suitable for the navigation of the Yazoo. Not knowing but, that I might want them to supply me after cutting loose from my base at Granada. On the 23rd I removed my headquarters back to Holly Springs. The troops were drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion. Finding supplies abundant and no enemy following. The road was not damaged south of Holly Springs by Van Dorn, at least not to an extent to cause any delay. As I had resolved to move headquarters to Memphis and to repair the road to that point, I remained at Holly Springs until this work was completed. On the 10th of January, the work on the road from Holly Springs to Grand Junction and thence to Memphis being completed, I moved my headquarters to the latter place. During the campaign here described, the losses, mostly captures, were about equal, crediting the rebels with their Holly Springs capture, which they could not hold. When Sherman started on his expedition down the river, he had 20,000 men taken from Memphis and was reinforced by 12,000 more at Helena, Arkansas. The troops on the west bank of the river had previously been assigned to my command. McLernden, having received the orders for his assignment, reached the mouth of the Yau Zoo on the 2nd of January and immediately assumed a command of all the troops with Sherman, being a part of his own corps, the 13th, and all of Sherman's, the 15th. Sherman and Admiral Porter, with the fleet, had withdrawn from the Yau Zoo. After consultation, they decided that neither the Army nor Navy could render service to the cause where they were, and learning that I had withdrawn from the interior of Mississippi, they determined to return to the Arkansas River and to attack Arkansas Post, about 50 miles up that stream and garrisoned by about five or six thousand men. Sherman had learned of the existence of this force through a man who had been captured by the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and other supplies intended for his command. The man had made his escape. McLernden approved this move reluctantly, as Sherman says. No obstacle was encountered until the gunboats and transports were within range of the fort. After three days' bombardment by the Navy, an assault was made by the troops and Marines, resulting in the capture of the place and in taking 5,000 prisoners and 17 guns. I was at first disposed to disapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement, having no special bearing upon the work before us. But when the result was understood, I regarded it as very important. 5,000 Confederate troops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss of property while navigating the Mississippi. Immediately after the reduction of Arkansas Post and the capture of the garrison, McLernden returned with his entire force to Napoleon at the mouth of the Arkansas River. From here I received messages from both Sherman and Admiral Porter, urging me to come and take command in person and expressing their distrust of McLernden's ability and fitness for so important an intricate an expedition. On the 17th I visited McLernden and his command at Napoleon. It was here made evident to me that both the Army and Navy were so distrustful of McLernden's fitness to command that, while they would do all they could to ensure success, this distrust was an element of weakness. It would have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances into such danger. By this time I had received authority to relieve McLernden or to assign any person else to the command of the river expedition or to assume command in person. I felt great embarrassment about McLernden. He was the senior major general after myself within the department. It would not do with his rank and ambition to assign a junior over him. Nothing was left, therefore, but to assume the command myself. I would have been glad to put Sherman in command to give him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the December before, but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty for he was junior to McLernden. Sherman's failure needs no apology. On the 20th I ordered General McLernden with the entire command to Young's Point and Millican's Bend while I returned to Memphis to make all the necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind me secure. General Herbert with the 16th Corps was left in command. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad was held while the Mississippi Central was given up. Columbus was the only point between Cairo and Memphis on the river left with a garrison. All the troops and guns from the posts on the abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front. On the 29th of January I arrived at Young's Point and assumed command the following day. General McLernden took exception in a most characteristic way for him. His correspondence with me on the subject was more in the nature of a reprimand than a protest. It was highly insubordinate, but I overlooked it as I believed for the good of the service. General McLernden was a politician of very considerable prominence in his state. He was a member of Congress when the cessation war broke out. He belonged to that political party which furnished all the opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for saving the Union. There was no delay in his declaring himself for the Union at all hazards. And there was no uncertain sound in his declaration of where he stood in the contest before the country. He also gave up his seat in Congress to take the field and defense of the principles he had proclaimed. The real work of the campaign and siege of Vicksburg now began. The problem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of the river from which the troops could operate against Vicksburg. The Mississippi River from Cairo south runs through a rich alluvial valley of many miles and widths, bound on the east by land running from 80 up to 2 or more hundred feet above the river. On the west side, the highest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highest water. Through this valley the river meanders in the most torturous way, varying in direction to all points of the compass. At places it runs to the very foot of the bluffs. After leaving Memphis there are no such highlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until Vicksburg is reached. The intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in high water, many of them navigable for steamers. All of them would be except for overhanging trees, narrowness, and torturous course, making it impossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length. Marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible. Navigating it proved equally impracticable. The strategical way, according to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to Memphis, establish that as a base of supplies, fortify it so that the storehouses could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the Galabusha or to Jackson, Mississippi. At this time the North had become very much discouraged. Many strong Union men believed that the war must prove a failure. The elections of 1862 had gone against the party, which was for the prosecution of the war to save the Union if it took the last man and the last dollar. Voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater part of the North, and the draft had been resorted to, to fill up our ranks. It was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement as long as that from Vicksburg to Memphis would be interpreted, by many of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the Union, as a defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue, and the power to capture and punish deserters lost. There was nothing left to be done but to go forward to a decisive victory. This was in my mind from the moment I took command in person at Young's Point. The winter of 1862, 1863, was a noted one for continuous high water in the Mississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. To get dry land, or rather land above the water, to encamp the troops upon, took many miles of river front. We had to occupy the levees and the ground immediately behind. This was so limited that one core, the seventeenth under General McPherson, was at Lake Providence, seventy miles above Vicksburg. It was in January the troops took their position opposite Vicksburg. The water was very high and the rains were incessant. There seemed no possibility of a land movement before the end of March or later, and it would not do to lie idle all this time. The effect would be demoralizing to the troops and injurious to their health. Friends in the north would have grown more and more discouraged and enemies in the same section, more and more insolent in their jibes and denunciation of the cause and those engaged in it. I always admired the south, as bad as I thought their cause, for the boldness with which they silenced all opposition and all croaking by press or by individuals within their control. War at all times, whether a civil war between sections of a common country or between nations ought to be avoided, if possible, with honor. But once entered into, it is too much for human nature to tolerate an enemy within their ranks to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing section or nation. Vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to the river's edge, below that on which Memphis stands. The bluff, or high land, follows the left bank of the yazu for some distance and continues in a southerly direction to the Mississippi River, thence it runs along the Mississippi to Warrington six miles below. The yazu river leaves the high land a short distance below Haines's Bluff and empties into the Mississippi nine miles above Vicksburg. Vicksburg is built on this high land, where the Mississippi washes the base of the hill. Haines's Bluff, eleven miles from Vicksburg on the yazu river, was strongly fortified. The whole distance from there to Vicksburg and thence to Warrington was also entrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle pits connecting them. From Young's Point, the Mississippi turns in a northeasterly direction to a point just above the city, when it again turns and runs southwesterly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade, exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the city, before they were in range of the upper batteries. Since then the river has made a cut-off, leaving what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island. North of the yazu was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up with bayous and much overflowed. A front attack was therefore impossible and was never contemplated, certainly not by me. The problem then became how to secure a landing on high ground east of the Mississippi without an apparent retreat. Then commenced a series of experiments to consume time and to divert the attention of the enemy of my troops and of the public generally. I, myself, never felt great confidence that any of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. Nevertheless, I was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did. In 1862, General Thomas Williams had come up from New Orleans and cut a ditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep straight across from Young's Point to the river below. The distance across was a little over a mile. It was Williams' expectation that when the river rose it would cut a navigable channel through. But the canal started in an eddy from both ends and, of course, it only filled up with water on the rise without doing any execution in the way of cutting. Mr. Lincoln had navigated the Mississippi in his younger days and understood well its tendency to change its channel in places from time to time. He set much store accordingly by this canal. General McLernden had been, therefore, directed before I went to Young's Point to push the work of widening and deepening this canal. After my arrival the work was diligently pushed with about four thousand men, as many as could be used to advantage, until interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke a dam at the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water out until the excavation was completed. This was on the 8th of March. Even if the canal had proven its success, so far as to be navigable for steamers, it could not have been of much advantage to us. It runs in a direction almost perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the opposite side or east bank of the river. As soon as the enemy discovered what we were doing, he established a battery commanding the canal throughout its length. This battery soon drove out our dredges, a number which were doing the work of thousands of men. Had the canal been completed, it might have proven of some use in running transports through under the cover of night to use below. But they would yet have to run batteries, though for a much shorter distance. While this work was progressing, we were busy in other directions trying to find an available landing on the high ground, on the east bank of the river, or to make waterways to get below the city, avoiding the batteries. On the 30th of January, the day after my arrival at the front, I ordered General McPherson, stationed with his corps at Lake Providence, to cut the levee at that point. If successful in opening a channel for navigation by this route, it would carry us to the Mississippi River through the mouth of the Red River, just above Port Hudson, and 400 miles below Vicksburg by the river. Lake Providence is a part of the old bed of the Mississippi, about a mile from the present channel. It is six miles long and has its outlet through Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, Mises, Washita and Red Rivers. The last three are navigable streams at all seasons. Bayou's Baxter and Macon are narrow and torturous, and the banks are covered with dense forest overhanging the channel. They were also filled with fallen timber, the accumulation of years. The land along the Mississippi River, from Memphis down, is in all instances highest next to the river, except where the river washes the bluffs, which form the boundary of the valley through which it lines. Bayou Baxter, as it reaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears entirely in a cypress swamp before it reaches the Macon. There was about two feet of water in this swamp at the time to get through it, and with vessels of the lightest draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavy timber wide enough to make a passageway. As the trees would have to be cut close to the bottom underwater, it was an undertaking of great magnitude. On the 4th of February, I visited General McPherson and remained with him several days. The work had not progressed so far as to admit the water to the river into the lake, but the troops had succeeded in drawing a small steamer of probably not over 30 tons capacity from the river into the lake. With this, we were able to explore the lake and Bayou as far as cleared. I saw then that there was scarcely a chance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troops through an enemy's country. From Lake Providence to the point where vessels going by that route would enter the Mississippi again is about 470 miles by the main river. The distance would probably be greater by the torture of Bayou through which this new route would carry us. The enemy held Port Hudson below where the Red River debauches and all the Mississippi above to Vicksburg. The Red River, Washita, and Tensis were, as has been said, all navigable streams on which the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstruct our passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters. I let the work go on. Believing employment was better than idleness for the men, then too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a better prospect of success. This work was abandoned after the canal proved a failure. Lieutenant Colonel Wilson of my staff was sent to Helena, Arkansas to examine and open a way through Moon Lake and the Yazoo Pass, if possible. Formerly, there was a route by way of an inlet from the Mississippi River into Moon Lake a mile east of the river thence east through the Yazoo Pass to Coldwater along the ladder to the Tallahatchie, which joins the Yalabusha about 250 miles below Moon Lake and forms the Yazoo River. These were formerly navigated by steamers, trading with the rich plantations along their banks. But the state of Mississippi had built a strong levy across the inlet some years and the only entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by way of the mouth of the Yazoo several hundreds of miles below. On the 2nd of February this dam or levy was cut. The river being high the rush of water through the cut was so great that in a very short time the entire obstruction was washed away. The bayous were soon filled this pass leaves the Mississippi River but a few miles below Helena on the 24th General Ross with his brigade of about 4500 men on transports moved into this new waterway. The rebels had obstructed the navigation of Yazoo Pass and the Coldwater by felling trees into them. Much of the timber in this region being of greater specific size than water and being of great size their removal was a matter of great labor. But it was finally accomplished and on the 11th of March Ross found himself accompanied by two gunboats under the command of Lieutenant Commander Watson Smith confronting a fortification at Greenwood where the Tallahatchie and Yala Bushah unite The ruins of the river are such at this point as to almost form an island scarcely above water at that stage of the river. This island was fortified and manned. It was named Fort Pemberton after the commander at Vicksburg. No land approach was accessible. The troops therefore could render no assistance towards an assault further than to establish a battery piece of ground which was discovered above water. The gunboats, however, attacked on the 11th and again on the 13th of March both efforts were failures and were not renewed. One gunboat was disabled and we lost six men killed and 25 wounded. The loss of the enemy was less. Fort Pemberton was so little above the water that the eyes of two feet would drive the enemy out. In hope of enlisting the elements on our side which had been so much against us up to this time a second cut was made in the Mississippi levee this time directly opposite Helena or six miles above the former cut. It did not accomplish the desired result and Ross with his fleet any second he met Quimby with a brigade at Yazoo Pass. Quimby was the senior of Ross and assumed command. He was not satisfied with returning to his former position without seeing for himself whether anything could be accomplished. Accordingly Fort Pemberton was revisited by our troops but an inspection was sufficient this time without an attack. Quimby with his command returned with but little delay. In the meantime I was much exercised for the safety of Ross not knowing that Quimby had been able to join him. Reinforcements were of no use in a country covered with water as they would have to remain on board of their transports. Relief had to come from another quarter. So I determined to get into the Yazoo Fort Pemberton. Steels Bayou empties into the Yazoo River between Haines' Bluff and its mouth. It is narrow very torturous and fringed with a very heavy growth of timber, but it is deep. It approaches to within one mile of the Mississippi at Eagle Bend 30 miles above Young's Point. Steels Bayou connects with Black Bayou Black Bayou with Deer Creek Deer Creek with Rolling Fork Rolling Fork with the Big Sunflower River and the Big Sunflower with the Yazoo River about 10 miles above Haines' Bluff in a right line but probably 20 or 25 miles by the winding of the river. All these waterways are of about the same nature so far as navigation is concerned until the sunflower is reached. This affords free navigation. Admiral Porter explored this waterway as far as Deer Creek on the 14th of March and reported it navigable. On the next day he started with five gun boats and four mortar boats. I went with him for some distance. The heavy overhanging river retarded progress very much as did also the short turns in so narrow a stream. The gun boats, however, plowed their way through without other damage than to their appearance. The transports did not fare so well although they followed behind. The road was somewhat cleared for them by the gun boats. In the evening I returned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements. I went in person on the 16th taking with him Stewart's Division of the 15th Corps. They took large river transports to Eagle Bend on the Mississippi where they debarked and marched across to Steel's Bayou where they re-embarked on the transports. The river steamers with their tall smokestacks and gun boats got far ahead. Porter, with his fleet, got within a few hundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and free from the obstructions caused by felling trees into the water when he encountered rebel sharpshooters and his progress was delayed by obstructions in his front. He could do nothing with gun boats against sharpshooters. In the afternoon when he was on the boat he had sent in about 4,000 men many more than were sailors in the fleet. Sherman went back at the request of the admiral to clear out Black Bayou and to hurry up reinforcements which were far behind. On the night of the 19th he received notice from the admiral that he had been attacked by sharpshooters and passed on until he met a steamer with the last of the reinforcements he had coming up. They tried to force their way through Black Bayou with their steamer, but finding its slow and tedious work debarked and pushed forward on foot. It was night when they landed in intensely dark. There was but a narrow strip of land above water and that was grown up with underbrush or cane. The troops lighted their way through this with candles carried in their hands for a mile and a half. When they came to an open plantation here the troops rested until morning. They made 21 miles from this resting place by noon the next day and were in time to rescue the fleet. Porter had fully made up his mind to blow up the gunboats rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy. More welcome visitors he probably never met than the boys in blue on this occasion. The vessels were backed out and returned to their rendezvous on the Mississippi and thus ended in failure the fourth attempt to get in rear of Vicksburg. End of Section 31 Recording by Jim Clevenger Little Rock, Arkansas Jim at JOC Section 32 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Jim Clevenger Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant Chapter 32 The original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of March. The effort to make a waterway through Lake Providence and the connecting bayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable about the same time. The original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of March. The effort to make a waterway through Lake Providence was also impracticable about the same time. At Millican's Bend and also at Young's Point bayous or channels start which, connecting with other bayous, passing Richmond, Louisiana entered the Mississippi at Carthage 25 or 30 miles above Grand Gulf. The Mississippi levee cuts the supply of water off from these bayous and all behind the levee at these points is carried through these same channels to the river below. In case of a crevasse in this vicinity the water escaping would find its outlet through the same channels. The dredges and laborers from the canal having been driven out by overflow and the enemy's batteries I determined to open these other channels if possible. The effort would afford a route away from the enemy's batteries for our transports. There was a good road back of the levees along these bayous to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over whenever the water receded a little and after a few days of dry weather. Accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other plans for reaching a base here to foredescribed the new one was undertaken. As early as the 4th of February I had written to Halick about this route stating that I thought it much more practicable than the other undertaking the Lake Providence route and that it would have been accomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had got all over the country. The upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply further than the rainfall back of the levees was grown up with dense timber for a distance of several miles from their source. It was necessary, therefore, to clear this out before letting in the water from the river. This work was continued until the waters of the river began to recede and the road to Richmond, Louisiana emerged from the water. One small steamer and some barges were got through this channel but no further use could be made of it because of the fall in the river. Beyond this it was no more successful than the other experiments with which the winter was wild away. All these failures would have been very discouraging if I had expected much from the efforts but I had not. From the first the most I hoped was the passage of transports to be used below Vicksburg without exposure to the long line of batteries defending that city. This long, dreary and for heavy and continuous rains and high water unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged about Vicksburg. The river was higher than its natural banks from December 1862 to the following April. The war had suspended peaceful pursuits in the south further than the production of army supplies and in consequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and the whole country was covered with water. Troops could scarcely find dry ground on which to pitch their tents. Malarial fevers broke out among the men. Battles in smallpox also attacked them. The hospital arrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that the loss of life was much less than might have been expected. Visitors to the camps went home with dismal stories to relate. Northern papers came back to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated by visitors. They pronounced me idle, incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency and clambered for my removal. They were not to be satisfied many of them with my simple removal, but named who my successor should be. McClendon, Fremont, Hunter and McClellan were all mentioned in this connection. I took no steps and continued to do my duty as I understood it to the best of my ability. Everyone has his superstitions. One of mine is that in positions of great responsibility everyone should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned by competent authority without application or the use of influence to change his position. I had very great interest the operations of the army of the Potomac looking upon that as the main field of the war. I had no idea myself of ever having any large command nor did I suppose that I was equal to one but I had the vanity to think that as a cavalry officer I might succeed very well in the command of a brigade. I got this to my staff officers all of whom were civilians without any military education whatever. I said that I would give anything if I were commanding a brigade of cavalry in the army of the Potomac and I believed I could do some good. Captain Hillier spoke up and suggested that I make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry. I then told him first and mentioned this superstition. In time of war the President being by the Constitution commander in chief of the Army and Navy is responsible for the selection of commanders. He should not be embarrassed in making his selections. I, having been selected my responsibility ended with my doing the best I knew how. If I had sought the place or obtained it through personal or political influence my belief is that I would have feared to undertake any plan of my own conception and would probably have awaited direct orders from my distant superiors. Persons obtaining important commands by application or political influence are apt to keep a written record of complaints and predictions of defeat which are shown in case of disaster. Somebody must be responsible for their failures. With all the pressure brought to bear upon them both President Lincoln and General Halick stood by me to the end of the campaign. I had never met Mr. Lincoln but his support was constant. At last the waters began to recede. The roads crossing the peninsula behind the levees of the bayous were emerging from the waters. The troops were all concentrated from distant points at Millican's Bend preparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious and discouraging labors with success. I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land from which to operate subject only to the possible but not expected success of some one of the expedience resorted to for the purpose of giving us a different face. This could not be undertaken until the waters receded. I did not therefore communicate this plan even to an officer of my staff until it was necessary to make preparations for the start. My recollection is that Admiral Porter was the first one to whom I mentioned it. The cooperation of the navy was absolutely essential to the success even to the contemplation of such an enterprise. I had no more authority to command Porter than he had to command me. It was necessary to meet below Vicksburg if the troops went there. Steamers to use as ferries were also essential. The navy was the only escort and protection for these steamers all of which, in getting below, had to run about 14 miles of batteries. Porter fell into the planet once and suggested that he had better superintend the preparation of the steamers to run the batteries as sailors would probably understand the work better than soldiers. I was glad to accept his proposition not only because I admitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from the enemy a little longer our designs. Porter's fleet was on the east side of the river above the mouth of the yazu entirely concealed from the enemy of the forests that intervened. Even spies could not get near him on account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands. Suspations of some mysterious movements were aroused. Our river guards discovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously up the river near the east shore from the direction of Vicksburg towards the fleet. Calling the boat, they found a small white flag not much larger than a handkerchief set up in the stern, no doubt intended as a flag of truce in case of discovery. The boat, crew, and passengers were brought ashore to me. The chief personage aboard proved to be Jacob Topson, secretary of the interior under the administration of President Buchanan. After a pleasant conversation of half an hour or more, I allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to return to Vicksburg without creating a suspicion that there was a doubt in my mind as to the good faith of Mr. Thompson and his flag. Admiral Porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers for their hazardous passage of the enemy's batteries. The great essential was to protect the boilers from the enemy's shot and to conceal the fires under the boilers from view. This he accomplished by loading the steamers between the guards and boilers on the boiler deck up to the deck above with bales of hay and cotton and the deck in front of the boilers in the same way adding sacks of grain. The hay and grain were all planted below and could not be transported in sufficient quantity by the muddy roads over which we expected to march. Before this I had been collecting from St. Louis and Chicago yalls and barges to be used as ferries when we got below. By the 16th of April Porter was ready to start on his perilous trip. The advance Flagship Benton, which started at ten o'clock at night followed at intervals of a few minutes by the Lafayette with a captured steamer the price lashed to her side the Louisville Mound City Pittsburgh and Caron Delay all of these being naval vessels. Next came the transports Forest Queen Silver Wave and Henry Clay each towing barges loaded with coal by the naval and transport steamers when below the batteries the gunboat, Tuscumbia brought up the rear Soon after the start a battery between Vicksburg and Warrington opened fire across the intervening peninsula followed by the upper batteries and then by batteries all along the line the gunboats ran up close under the bluffs delivering their fire in return at short distances probably without much effect they were under fire for more than two hours and every vessel was struck many times but with little damage to the gunboats the transports did not fare so well the Henry Clay was disabled and deserted by her crew Soon after a shell burst in the cotton packed about the boilers set the vessel on fire to the water's edge the burning mass, however floated down to Carthage before grounding as did also one of the barges in tow the enemy were evidently expecting our fleet for they were ready to light up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firing houses on the point of land opposite the city on the Louisiana side the site was magnificent but terrible I witnessed it from the deck of a river transport run out into the middle of the river and as low down as it was prudent to go my mind was much relieved when I learned that no one on the transports had been killed and but few if any wounded during the running of the batteries men were stationed in the holes of the transports to partially stop with cotton shot holes that might be made in the holes all damage was afterwards soon repaired under the direction of Admiral Porter the experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this however during the war Admiral Farragut had run the batteries at Port Hudson with the flagship Hartford and one Ironclad and visited me from below Vicksburg the thirteenth of February Admiral Porter had sent the gunboat in Denola Lieutenant Commander George Brown commanding below she met Colonel Elliott of the Marine Brigade below Natchez on a captured steamer two of the Colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries producing the greatest consternation among the people along the Mississippi from Vicksburg to the Red River the in Denola remained about the mouth of the Red River some days and then started up the Mississippi the Confederate soon raised the Queen of the West and repaired her with this vessel and the Ram Web which they had had for some time in the Red River and two other steamers they followed the in Denola the latter was encumbered with barges of coal in tow and then quickly could make but little speed against the rapid current of the Mississippi the Confederate fleet overtook her just above Grand Gulf and attacked her after dark on the twenty-fourth of February the in Denola was superior to all the others in armament and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away but for her encumbrance as it was for an hour and a half but in the dark was struck seven or eight times by the Ram and other vessels and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinking condition the armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore officers and crew then surrendered I had started McLernden with his core of four divisions on the twenty-ninth of March by way of Richmond, Louisiana to New Carthage hoping that he might capture Grand Gulf before the balance of the troops could get there but the roads were very bad scarcely above water yet some miles from New Carthage the levee to Bayou Vidal was broken in several places overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles boats were collected from the surrounding bayous and some constructed from the spot from such material as could be collected to transport the troops across the overflowed interval by the sixth of April McLernden had reached New Carthage with one division and its artillery the latter ferried through the woods by these boats on the seventeenth I visited New Carthage in person and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we were doing was obvious that a better method must be devised the water was falling and in a few days there would not be depth enough to use boats nor would the land be dry enough to march over McLernden had already found a new route from Smith's plantation where the crevasse occurred to Perkins's plantation eight to twelve miles below New Carthage this increased the march the Americans bend from twenty-seven to nearly forty miles four bridges had to be built across bayous two of them each over six hundred feet long making about two thousand feet of bridging in all the river falling made the current in these bayous very rapid increasing the difficulty of building and permanently fastening these bridges the Yankee soldier was equal to any emergency the bridges were soon built of such material as could be found nearby and so substantial were they that not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army with artillery, cavalry and wagon trains except the loss of one siege gun a thirty-two pounder this if my memory serves me correctly broke through the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across the peninsula these bridges were all built by McClearnedon's command under the supervision of Lieutenant Haynes of the Engineer Corps I returned to Millican's bend on the eighteenth or nineteenth and on the twentieth issued the following final order for the movement of troops headquarters the command of the Tennessee Millican's Bend Louisiana April twenty eighteen sixty three special orders number one ten eight the following orders are published for the information and guidance of the army in the field in its present movement to obtain a foothold on the east bank of the Mississippi river from which Vicksburg will be approached by practicable roads first the thirteenth army corps Major General John A. McClearnedon commanding will constitute the right wing second the fifteenth army corps Major General W. T. Sherman commanding will constitute the left wing third the seventeenth army corps Major General James B. McPherson commanding will constitute the center fourth the order of march to New Carthage will be from right to left fifth reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps or an entire army corps will be held as a reserve as necessity may require when the reserve is formed by divisions each division will remain under the immediate command of the respective corps commander unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency sixth troops will be required to Bivouac until proper facilities can be afforded for the transportation of camp equippage seventh in the present movement one tent will be allowed to each company for the protection of rations from rain one wall tent for each regimental headquarters one wall tent for each brigade headquarters and one wall tent for each division headquarters corps commanders having the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary but not to exceed the number allowed by general orders number one sixty comma a dot g dot O series of 1862 eighth all the teams of the three army corps under the immediate charge of the quarter masters bearing them on their returns will constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordinance and the authorized camp equippage of the army ninth as fast as the 13th army corps advances the 17th army corps will take its place and it in turn will be followed in like manner by the 15th army corps two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corps commanders to guard the lines from Richmond to New Carthage 11th general hospitals will be established by the medical director between Fort and Millican's Bend all sick and disabled soldiers will be left in these hospitals surgeons in charge of hospitals will report convalescence as fast as they become fit for duty each corps commander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer to remain behind and take charge of the convalescence of their respective corps officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge into squads and companies without regard to the regiments they belong to and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to command them will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates the force so organized will constitute the guard of the line from Duckport to Millican's Bend they will furnish all the guards and details required for general hospitals and with the contraband that may be about the camps will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats 12th the movement of troops from Millican's Bend to New Carthage will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of 10 days supply of rations and one half the allowance of ordinance required by previous orders 13th commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all the beef cattle corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march but wanton destruction of property taking of articles useless for military purpose insulting citizens going into and searching houses without proper orders from division commanders are positively prohibited the regularities must be summarily punished 14th Brigadier General J. C. Sullivan is appointed to the command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line from here to New Carthage his particular attention is called to general orders number 69 from adjutant general's office Washington of date March 20, 1863 by order of general U.S. Grant McClendon was already below on the Mississippi two of McPherson's divisions were put upon the march immediately the third had not yet arrived from Lake Providence it was on its way to Millican's bend and was to follow on arrival Sherman was to follow McPherson two of his divisions were at Duckport and Young's Point and the third under steel was under orders to return from Greenville, Mississippi where it had been sent to expel a rebel battery that had been annoying our transports it had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by a wagon train over the single, narrow and almost impassable road between Millican's bend and Perkins's plantation accordingly six more steamers were protected as before to run the batteries and were loaded with supplies they took 12 barges in tow loaded also with rations on the night of the 22nd of April they ran the batteries five getting through more or less disabled while one was sunk about half the barges got through with their needed freight when it was first proposed to run the blockade at Vicksburg with river steamers there were but two captains or masters who were willing to accompany their vessels and but one crew volunteers were called for from the army men who had had experience in any capacity in navigating the western rivers captains, pilots mates, engineers and deckhands enough presented themselves to take five times the number of vessels we were moving through this dangerous ordeal most of them were from Logan's division composed generally of men from the southern part of Illinois and from Missouri all but two of the steamers were commanded by volunteers from the army and all but one so manned for instance as in all others during the war I found that volunteers could be found in the ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet every call for aid with a mechanical or professional Colonel W. S. Oliver was master of transportation on this occasion by special detail end of section 32 recording by Jim Clevenger Lillarock, Arkansas Jim at joclev.com section 33 of personal memoirs of U.S. Grant this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Jim Clevenger personal memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant chapter 33 attack on Grand Gulf operations below Vicksburg on the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at Perkins's plantation reconnaissance were made in boats to ascertain whether there was high land on the east shore of the river and above Grand Gulf there was none practicable accordingly the troops were set in motion for hard times 22 miles further down the river and nearly opposite Grand Gulf the loss of two steamers and six barges reduced our transportation so that only 10,000 men could be moved by water some of the steamers that had got below were injured in their machinery so that they were only useful as barges towed by those less severely injured all the troops therefore except what could be transported in one trip had to march the road lay west of Lake St. Joseph three large bayous had to be crossed they were rapidly bridged in the same manner as those previously encountered on the 27th McClendon's core was all at hard times and McPherson's was following closely I had determined to make the attempt to effect the landing on the east side of the river as soon as possible accordingly on the morning of the 29th McClendon was directed to embark all the troops from his core that our transports and barges about 10,000 men were so embarked the plan was to have the Navy silence the guns at Grand Gulf and to have as many men as possible ready to debark in the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the Navy and carry the works by storm the following order was issued Perkins Plantation Louisiana April 27, 1863 Major General J. A. McClendon commanding 13th Army Corps commenced immediately the embarkation of your core or so much of it as there is transportation for have put aboard the artillery and every article authorized in orders limiting baggage except the men and hold them in readiness with their places assigned to be moved at a moment's warning all the troops you may have except those ordered to remain behind send to a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf where you see by special orders of this date General McPherson is ordered to send one division the plan of the attack will be for the Navy to attack and silence all the batteries commanding the river your core will be on the river ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below the promontory first brought to view passing down the river once on shore have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best the ground will admit of and take possession of the most commanding points but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself the first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain themselves until such time as preparations can be made and troops collected for a forward movement Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicated to you a few days ago and to bring over with them such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city out of range of the gun boats so as to make it desirable to run past Grand Gulf and land at Rodney in case this should prove the plan a signal will be arranged and you do informed when the transports are to start with this view or it may be expedient for the boats to run past but not the men in this case then the transports would have to be brought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches to below Grand Gulf re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place there will be required then three signals one to indicate that the transports can run down and debark the troops at Grand Gulf one that the transports can run by without the troops and the last that the transports can run by with the troops on board should the men have to march all baggage and artillery will be left to run the blockade if not already directed require your men to keep three days rations in their haversacks not to be touched until a movement commences US grant major general at 8 o'clock a.m. 29 Porter made the attack with his entire strength present eight gunboats for nearly five and a half hours the attack was kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy all this time McLernden's 10,000 men were huddled together on the transports in the stream ready to attempt a landing if signaled I occupied a tug from which I could see the effect of the battle on both sides within range of the enemy's guns but a small tug without armament was not calculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were being assailed themselves about half past one the fleet withdrew seeing their efforts were entirely unavailing the enemy ceased firing as soon as we withdrew I immediately signaled the admiral to board his ship the navy lost in this engagement 18 killed and 56 wounded a large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship and most of these from a single shell which penetrated the ship's side and exploded between decks where the men were working their guns the side of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as I boarded with sickening Grand Gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very foot of it it is as defensible upon its front as Vicksburg and at that time would have been just as impossible to capture by a front attack I therefore requested Porter to run the batteries with his fleet that night and to take charge of the transports all of which would be wanted below there is a long tongue of land from the Louisiana side extending towards Grand Gulf made by the river running nearly east from about three miles above and nearly in the opposite direction from that point for about the same distance below the land was so low and wet that it would not have been practicable to march an army across but for a levee I had had this explored below as well as the east bank below to ascertain if there was a possible point of debarkation north of Rodney it was found that the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon Porter as was always the case with him not only acquiesced in the plan but volunteered to use his entire fleet of transports I had intended to make this request but he anticipated me at dusk when concealed from the view of the enemy at Grand Gulf McClendon landed his command on the west bank the navy and transports ran the batteries successfully the troops marched across the point of land undercover of night unobserved by the time it was light the enemy saw our whole fleet iron clads gun boats river steamers and barges quietly moving down the river three miles below them black or rather blue with national troops when the troops debarked the evening of the twenty night it was expected that we would have to go to Rodney about nine miles below to find a landing but that night a colored man who informed me that a good landing would be found at Bruinsburg a few miles above Rodney from which point there was a good road leading to Port Gibson some twelve miles in the interior the information was found correct and our landing was affected without opposition Sherman had not left his position above Vicksburg yet on the morning of the twenty seventh I ordered him to create a diversion by moving his core up the yaw zoo and threatening an attack on Haines's Bluff my object was to compel Pemberton to keep as much force about Vicksburg as I could until I could secure a good footing on high land east of the river the move was eminently successful and as we afterwards learned created great confusion about Vicksburg and doubts about our real design Sherman moved the day of our attack on Grand Gulf the twenty ninth with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which Porter had left above Vicksburg he debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attack the enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at Haines's Bluff this move was made without a single casualty in either branch of the service on the first of May Sherman received orders from me sent from hard times the evening of the twenty ninth of April to withdraw from the front of Haines's Bluff and follow McPherson with two divisions as fast as he could I had established a depot of supplies at Perkins's Plantation now that all our gunboats were below Grand Gulf it was possible that the enemy might fit out boats in the big black with improvised armament and attempt to destroy these supplies McPherson was at hard times with a portion of his corps and the depot was protected by a part of his command the night of the twenty ninth I directed him to arm one of the transports with artillery and send it up to Perkins's Plantation as a guard and also to have the siege guns we had brought along moved there and put in position the embarkation below Grand Gulf took place at Deshrunes, Louisiana six miles above Bruinsburg, Mississippi early on the morning of thirtieth of April McClendon's corps were speedily landed when this was affected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equaled since Vicksburg was not yet taken it is true nor were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves I was now in the enemy's country with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me and my base of supplies but I was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the enemy all the campaigns labors, hardships and exposures from the month of December previous to this time that had been made and endured were for the accomplishment of this one object I had with me the thirteenth corps General McClendon commanding and two brigades of Logan's division and Crocker's division of the seventeenth corps General McPherson commanding in all, not more than twenty thousand men to commence the campaign with these were soon reinforced by the remaining brigade of Logan's division and Crocker's division of the seventeenth corps on the seventh of May I was further reinforced by Sherman with two divisions of twenty thousand men the enemy occupied Grand Gulf Haines's Bluff and Jackson with a force of nearly sixty thousand men Jackson is fifty miles east of Vicksburg and is connected with it by a railroad my first problem was to capture Grand Gulf to use as a base the bottom at that point is higher than most of the lowland in the valley of the Mississippi and a good road leads to the bluff it was natural to expect the garrison from Grand Gulf to come out to meet us and prevent, if they could our reaching this solid base Bayou Pierre enters the Mississippi just above Bruinsburg and as it is a navigable stream and was high at the time in order to intercept us they had to go by Port Gibson the nearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon this more than doubled the distance from Grand Gulf to the high land back of Bruinsburg no time was to be lost in securing this foothold our transportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the river at one trip or even two but the landing of the 13th Corps and one division of the 17th was affected during the day April 30th and early evening McLernden was advanced as soon as ammunition in two days rations to last five could be issued to his men the bluffs were reached an hour before sunset and McLernden was pushed on hoping to reach Port Gibson by the bridge spanning the bayou pierre before the enemy could get there for crossing a stream in the presence of an enemy is always difficult Port Gibson too is the starting point of roads to Grand Gulf Vicksburg and Jackson McLernden's advance met the enemy about five miles west of Port Gibson at Thompson's plantation there was some firing during the night but nothing rising the dignity of a battle until daylight the enemy had taken a strong natural position with most of the Grand Gulf garrison numbering about seven or eight thousand men under General Bowen his hope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under Lorring could reach him from Vicksburg but Lorring did not come in time to render much assistance south of Port Gibson two brigades of McPherson's corps followed McLernden as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued and were ready to take position upon the battlefield whenever the thirteenth corps could be got out of the way the country in this part of Mississippi stands on edge as it were the roads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass from one ridge to another where there are no clearings the sides of the hills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and with undergrowth and their veins are filled with vines and cane breaks almost impenetrable this makes it easy for an inferior force to delay if not defeat a far superior one near the point selected by Bowen to defend the road to Port Gibson divides taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or two at the whitest point these roads unite just outside the town this made it necessary for McLernden to divide his force it was not only divided but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character above described one flank could not reinforce the other except by marching back to the junction of the roads McLernden put the divisions of Hovey, Carr and A. J. Smith upon the right-hand branch and Osterhaus on the left I was on the field by 10 a.m. and inspected both flanks in person on the right the enemy if not being pressed back was at least not repulsing our advance on the left however Osterhaus was not faring so well with some loss as soon as the road could be cleared of McLernden's troops I ordered up McPherson who was close upon the rear of the 13th Corps with two brigades of Logan's division this was about noon I ordered him to send one brigade General John E. Smith was selected to support Osterhaus and to move to the left and flank the enemy this movement carried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge and when Smith's troops were seen well through the ravine Osterhaus was directed to renew his front attack it was successful and unattended by heavy loss the enemy was sent in full retreat on their right and their left followed before sunset while the movement to our left was going on, McClernden who was with his right flank sent me frequent request for reinforcements although the force with him was not being pressed I had been upon the ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging all the men he had we followed up our victory until night overtook us about two miles from Port Gibson then the troops went into Bivouac for the night of section 33 recording by Jim Clevinger Little Rock, Arkansas Jim at joclev.com section 34 of personal memoirs of U.S. Grant this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Jim Clevinger personal memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant chapter 34 capture of Port Gibson Greerson's Raid occupation of Grand Gulf movement up to Big Black Battle of Raymond we started next morning for Port Gibson as soon as it was light enough to see the road we were soon in the town and I was delighted to find that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the bridge which he had burned the troops were set to work at once to construct a bridge across the south fork of the bayou pier at this time the water was high and the current rapid what might be called a raft bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden buildings stables fences etc which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely Colonel J. H. Wilson a member of my staff planned and super intended the construction of this bridge going into the water and working as hard as anyone engaged officers and men generally joined in this work when it was finished the army crossed and marched beyond to the north fork that day one brigade of Logan's division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel battery which had been left behind with infantry supports to prevent our repairing the burnt railroad bridge two of his brigades were sent up the bayou to find a crossing and reach the north fork to repair the bridge there the enemy soon left when he found we were building a bridge elsewhere before leaving Port Gibson we were reinforced by Crocker's division McPherson's corps which had crossed the Mississippi at Bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days rations McPherson still had one division west of the Mississippi river guarding the road from Millicons Bend to the river below until Sherman's command should relieve it on leaving Bruinsburg for the front I left my son Frederick who had joined me a few weeks before on board one of the gun boats asleep and hoped to get away without him until after Grand Gulf should fall into our hands but on waking up he learned that I had gone and being guided by the sound of the battle raging at Thompson's hill called the Battle of Port Gibson found his way to where I was he had no horse to ride at the time and I had no facilities for even preparing a meal he therefore foraged around the best he could until we reached Grand Gulf Mr. C. A. Dana then an officer of the War Department accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign and threw a portion of the siege he was in the same situation as Fred's so far as transportation and mess arrangements were concerned the first time I called to mind seeing either of them after the battle they were mounted on two enormous horses grown white from age each equipped with dilapidated saddles and bridles our trains arrived a few days later after which we were all perfectly equipped my son accompanied me throughout the campaign in siege and caused no anxiety either to me or to his mother who was at home he looked out for himself and was in every battle of the campaign his age then not quite 13 enabled him to take in all he saw and to retain a recollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years when the movement from Bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagon train the train still west of the Mississippi was carried around with proper escort by a circuitous route from Millicons Bend to Hardtime 70 or more miles below and did not get up for some days after the battle of Port Gibson my own horses headquarters' transportation servants, mess chests except what I had on was with this train General A. J. Smith happened to have an extra horse at Bruinsburg which I borrowed with a saddle tree without upholstering further than sterips I had no other for nearly a week it was necessary to have transportation for ammunition provisions could be taken from the country but all the ammunition that can is soon exhausted when there is much fighting I directed therefore immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draft animals whether horses, mules or oxen in the vicinity should be collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition quite a train was collected during the 30th and a motley train it was in it could be found fine carriages loaded nearly to the top with boxes of cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously drawn by mules with plough hornets straw collars, rope lines, etc long coupled wagons with racks for carrying cotton bales drawn by oxen and everything that could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation either for use or pleasure the making out of provision returns was stopped for the time no formalities were to retard our progress until a position was secured when the time could be spared to observe them it was at Port Gibson I first heard to a southern paper of the complete success of Colonel Greerson who was making a raid through Central Mississippi he had started from La Grange 17th with three regiments of about 1,700 men on the 21st he had detached Colonel Hatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between Columbus and Macon and then return to La Grange Hatch had a sharp fight with the enemy at Columbus and retreated along the railroad destroying it at Oklahoma and Tupelo and arriving in La Grange in 1926 Greerson continued his movement with about 1,000 men breaking the Vicksburg and Meridian railroad and the New Orleans and Jackson railroad arriving at Baton Rouge May 2 this raid was of great importance for Greerson had attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against Vicksburg during the night of the 2nd of May North Fork was repaired and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy from a commanding position but they were soon driven off it was evident that the enemy was covering every street from Grand Gulp to Vicksburg every commanding position from this grindstone crossing to Hankinsons Ferry over the Big Black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our progress McPherson however reached Hankinsons Ferry before night seized the ferry boat and sent a detachment of his command across and several miles north on the road to Vicksburg when the junction of the road going to Vicksburg with command and Jackson was reached Logan with his division was turned to the left towards Grand Gulp I went with him a short distance from this junction McPherson had encountered the largest force yet met since the battle of Port Gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle but the road Logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right flank and soon gave way McPherson was ordered to hold Hankinsons Ferry and the road back to Willow Springs with one division McClendon who was now in the rear was to join in this as well as to guard the line back down the bayou I did not want to take the chances of having an enemy lurking in our rear on the way from the junction to Grand Gulp where the road comes into the one from Vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out I learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on their way to Vicksburg I left Logan to make the proper disposition of his troops for the night while I rode into the town with an escort of about twenty cavalry Admiral Porter had already arrived with his fleet the enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place when I reached Grand Gulp May 3 I had not been with my baggage since the 27th of April and consequently had had no change of underclothing no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes at other headquarters and no tent to cover me the first thing I did was to get a bath borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers and get a good meal on the flagship then I wrote letters to the general in chief informing him of our present position dispatches to be telegraphed from Cairo orders to General Sullivan commanding above Vicksburg and gave orders to all my corps commanders about twelve o'clock at night I was through my work and started for John's Ferry arriving there before daylight while at Grand Gulp I heard from Banks who was on the Red River and who said that he could not be at Port Hudson before the 10th of May and then with only fifteen thousand men up to this time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulp as a base of supplies detach McClendon's Corps from Banks and cooperate with him in the reduction of Port Hudson the news from Banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the one intended to wait for his cooperation would have detained me at least a month the reinforcements would not have reached 10,000 men after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all high points close to the river for 100 miles the enemy would have strengthened his position and being reinforced by more men than Banks could have brought I therefore determined to move independently of Banks cut loose from my base destroy the rebel force in rear of Vicksburg and invest or capture the city Grand Gulp was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities that Washington were notified I knew well that Haleck's caution would lead him to disapprove of this course but it was the only one that gave any chance of success the time it would take to communicate with Washington and get a reply would be so great that I could not be interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was practicable who afterwards ignored bases of supplies other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four states of the Confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine at this time wrote me from Hankinsons Ferry advising me of the impossibility of supplying our army over a single road he urged me to stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons and then act as quick as possible for this road will be jammed as sure as life to this I replied I do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulp I know it will be impossible without constructing additional roads what I do expect is to get up what rations of hard bread coffee and salt we can and make the country furnish the balance we started from Bruinsburg with an average of about two days rations and received no more from our own supplies for some days abundance was found in the meantime a delay would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify McClendon's and McPherson's commands were kept substantially as they were on the night of the second awaiting supplies sufficient to give them three days rations in haversacks beef mutton poultry and forage were found in abundance quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was also secured from the country but bread and coffee could not be obtained in quantity sufficient for all the men every plantation however had a run of stone propelled by mule power to grind corn for the owners and their slaves all these were kept running while we were stopping day and night and when we were marching during the night at all plantations covered by the troops but the product was taken by the troops nearest by so that the majority of the command was destined to go without bread until a new base was established on the yazoo above Vicksburg while the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations I ordered reconnaissance's made by McClendon and McPherson with the view of leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the big black and attack the city at once on the sixth Sherman arrived at Grand Gulf and asked his command that night in the next day three days rations had been brought up from Grand Gulf of the advanced troops and were issued orders were given for a forward movement the next day Sherman was directed to order up Blair who had been left behind to guard the road from Millican's Bend to Hard Times with two brigades the quartermaster at Young's Point was ordered to send 100 wagons with Blair and the commissary was to load them with hard bread coffee, sugar salt and 100,000 pounds of salt meat on the third Hurlbot who had been left at Memphis was ordered to send four regiments from his command to Millican's Bend to relieve Blair's division and on the fifth was ordered to send Lowman's division in addition the latter to join the army in the field the four regiments were to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be no delay during the night of the sixth McPherson drew in his troops north of the big black and was off at an early hour on the road to Jackson the Iraqi springs, Utica and Raymond that night he and McClurndon were both at Rocky Springs ten miles from Hankinson's Ferry McPherson remained there during the eighth while McClurndon moved to Big Sandy and Sherman marched from Grand Gulp to Hankinson's Ferry the ninth McPherson moved to a point within a few miles west of Utica McClurndon and Sherman remained where they were on the tenth McPherson moved to Utica Sherman to Big Sandy McClurndon was still at Big Sandy the eleventh McClurndon was at Five Mile Creek Sherman at Auburn McPherson five miles advanced from Utica May twelfth McClurndon was at 14 Mile Creek Sherman at 14 Mile Creek McPherson at Raymond after a battle after McPherson crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry Vicksburg could have been approached and besieged by the south side it is not probable however that Pemberton would have permitted a close besiegement the broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the Big Black retaining possession of the railroad to that point it was my plan therefore to get to the railroad east of Vicksburg and approach from that direction accordingly McPherson's troops that had crossed the Big Black were withdrawn and the movement east to Jackson commenced as has been stated before the country is very much broken and the roads generally confined to the tops of the hills the troops were moved one sometimes two corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel to the railroad and only from 6 to 10 miles from it McClendon's corps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all the crossings 14 Mile Creek a stream substantially parallel with the railroad was reached and crossings McClendon and Sherman with slight loss McPherson was to the right of Sherman extending to Raymond the cavalry was used in this advance in reconordering to find the roads to cover our advance and to find the most practical routes from one command to another so they could support each other in case of an attack in making this move I estimated Pemberton's movable force at Vicksburg at about 18,000 men with smaller forces at Haynes' Bluff and Jackson it would not be possible for Pemberton to attack me with all his troops at one place and I determined to throw my army between his and fight him in detail this was done with success but I found afterwards that I had entirely underestimated Pemberton's strength up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition my line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad and about 7 miles south of it the right was at Raymond 18 miles from Jackson McPherson commanding Sherman in the center on 14 mile creek his advance thrown across McClendon to the left also on 14 mile creek advance across and his pickets within 2 miles of Edwards' station where the enemy had concentrated a considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack McClendon's left was on the big black in all our moves up to this time the left had hugged the big black closely and all the fairies had been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear McPherson encountered the enemy 5000 strong with 2 batteries under General Gregg about 2 miles out of Raymond this was about 2 p.m. Logan was in advance with one of his brigades he deployed and moved up to engage the enemy Logan ordered the road in rear to be cleared of wagons and the balance of Logan's division and Crocker's which was still further in rear to come forward with all dispatch the order was obeyed with alacrity Logan got his division in position for assault before Crocker could get up and attacked with vigor carrying the enemy's position easily sending Gregg flying not to appear against our front again until we met at Jackson in this battle McPherson lost 66 killed 339 wounded and 37 missing nearly or quite all from Logan's division the enemy's loss was 100 killed 305 wounded besides 415 taken prisoners I regarded Logan and Crocker as being as competent division commanders as could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much higher command Crocker however was dying of consumption when he volunteered his weak condition never put him on the sick report when there was a battle in prospect as long as he could keep on his feet he died he died not long after the close of the rebellion end of section 34 recording by Jim Clevenger Little Rock, Arkansas Jim at joclev.com