 Good morning to everyone here in the United States, and good evening to our friends who are joining us from Asia. Welcome to the United States Institute of Peace. My name is Jennifer Statz, I'm the director for East and Southeast Asia programs at USIP, and I am delighted to welcome you to today's discussion of ASEAN, the upcoming ASEAN Regional Forum, and the launch of USIP's new report on ASEAN, titled Built for Trust, Not for Conflict. ASEAN Faces the Future, which is now available on the USIP website, and we're thrilled to have the two authors of that report with us this morning. Now, as many of you know, the US Institute of Peace was founded by the US Congress in 1984 as a national nonpartisan independent institute dedicated to the pursuit of a world without violent conflict. We do that from our headquarters in Washington, DC, but also through our field offices in conflict-defected countries around the world, and through on-the-ground programming activities and partnerships around the globe. USIP has been active in Southeast Asia for decades, but we are currently ramping up our activities in the region in recognition of Southeast Asia's increasing centrality to U.S. interests and to its importance in shaping the future of the broader Indo-Pacific region. To help lead that work, Brian Harding has recently joined us as senior expert for Southeast Asia. We're thrilled to have him on board, and you will have a chance to hear from him later in the program as he'll be moderating our panel later today. Now, as I mentioned, USIP has partnered with various organizations in Southeast Asia, including our partner for today's event, the Center on Asia and Globalization at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. And in just a moment, I'm going to turn this over to Drew Thompson, who is a visiting senior research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School. And he has been our primary partner in this project, as well as one of the co-authors on the report and is well known to many of you for his work on China and the region. We're also very pleased to have Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, David Stillwell, with us this morning. Secretary Stillwell will offer opening remarks and join us for a brief Q&A before we turn to our panel discussion. The panel features a number of experts from the region, including Drew and his co-author on the report, Byron Chong. And they will be joined by two other experts who also participated in our joint workshop in Singapore last year, and I'm sure are familiar to many of you on the line, Dr. Mellie Cavallaro-Anthony and Ambassador Pham Kwong-Vin, who will receive a proper introduction later in the program. So we have a lot to get through. So with that, I will turn things over to Drew Thompson, who will introduce Secretary Stillwell. Thanks again for joining us. Thank you, Jennifer. So I had the great fortune to work with Assistant Secretary Stillwell when he was in the Department of Defense as both a uniformed officer and a civilian thought leader. He's a 35-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force, starting out as a Korean linguist before he became a fighter pilot. And he has over 2,000 hours flying F-16s. And if you know him, you know that the highlight of his career was becoming a pilot for the Pacific Air Force's demonstration team, where he flew from 97 to 99. And during that time, he had the opportunity to bring his F-16 along with his team to fly at the Asian Aerospace Exhibition 98 here at Changi in Singapore. So his career was downhill after that. And he ended up as the Defense Attaché to China from 2011 to 2013. And then after returning to the Pentagon from China, he served as the Director for Political Military Affairs responsible for Asia on the Joint Staff from 2013 to 2015, retiring as a Brigadier General. As a civilian, he led the Indo-Pacific Command's intellectual work on China as the head of the China Strategic Focus Group before being confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs in June 2019. And I'm sure, Secretary Stillwell, in your current job, there are days that you would rather be flying a fighter jet all by yourself. But I'm very glad that you're here. And I want to also conclude by thanking you for a lifetime of service to your country and for joining us today at this event to help roll out our report. So thank you again. And I turn it over to you. Hey, thank you, Drew. And back at you when I was in Beijing, I just finished my last flying tour and all I knew was operations. And I kept throwing up these wild ideas is why don't we do this with the PLA? Why don't we do this? And Drew, very patiently for six months explained to this thing called policy to me and seriously got me all my foundations on what foreign policy and China policy looks like. So, Drew, thank you for the introduction into the education, keeping out of hot water during that time. Also like to thank Ambassador Pham and Brian Harding, Drew, Jennifer, U.S. Institute of Peace and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy for this opportunity to explain and express our understanding and appreciation for ASEAN in its role for peace and stability in the region. Let me begin by noting that Secretary Pompeo very much looks forward to the events next week as he will again interact with his foreign ministers. We'd love to do it in person. That's the best way. And the paper mentions that these informal meetings off to the side of formal events is where a lot of the productive work happens, but we're all making do with Zoom and it's better than nothing. Today I'll offer U.S. perspective on ASEAN successes, the importance of ASEAN and its unified voice and our cooperation under the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific. So, for the United States, ASEAN is an obvious partner and one at the heart of the Indo-Pacific vision and our Indo-Pacific strategy. Drew and Byron's report demonstrates ASEAN's resilience and flexibility as it adapts to changing circumstances in the region. You know, going through the history from 67 on, you can see that ASEAN's purpose and in many ways cohesiveness has changed for the better over time. Certainly there are still things that need to be worked. ASEAN is still a work in progress just as most everything these days with corona, but the bonds that have been created by ASEAN's decades of trust in relationship building show that these disputes interstate and the others can be resolved peacefully. ASEAN has allowed its member states to focus on building their economies and improving the livelihoods of their people, again, built for trust but not conflict. Conflict is something you have to work with, though, in today's era. The United States and Southeast Asian countries share respect for sovereignty and pluralism in Asia. There was a speech last year we gave at Brookings on pluralism, the concept that you can have many ideas existing at the same time. You don't have to go all in on one. And nothing defines this better than what we've seen out of ASEAN. But the word pluralism and the informal U.S. motto, a pluralist unum, have much in common. And the diversity of ASEAN and our American diverse experience, I think, is one of the things that explains how we mesh so well and how our perspectives can coexist in the same place. We don't demand any commitments to a particular mindset. We're just all working toward improvement. We all support a pluralistic Asia, one in which the region's diverse countries can continue to thrive in the way they wish. In a pluralistic Asia, all countries are secure in their sovereign autonomy. They are free to be themselves, as Lee Kuan Yew famously said. No hedge amount of power dominates or commerces them. In a pluralistic Asia, countries enjoy open and shared use of the global commons. International waters and airspace belong to all. No one country can convert them into sole position or zone of exclusion. Pluralism is essential to our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific and also to ASEAN's vision for the region. The ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific emphasizes inclusivity while the ASEAN charter calls for upholding the principle of unity in diversity. You know, we share that perspective. These shared values have made partnership with ASEAN a logical choice since 1977. We were the first dialogue partner to open a permit mission in Jakarta a decade ago. And five years ago, we became a strategic partnership. ASEAN today is the number one destination for U.S. investment in the Indo-Pacific, totaling almost $329 billion. In just one area that is especially critical now amid the coronavirus, that one area is public health, the U.S. government has invested $3.5 billion in ASEAN in the last 20 years. Our young Southeast Asia leaders initiative, YSEALY has over 150,000 members or the 4,200 U.S. companies operate within ASEAN countries. And we now will soon be announcing plans for the opening of YSEALY Academy at Fulbright University of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh City, focused on developing leaders ready to tackle regional challenges in technology, innovation, public policy and entrepreneurship. U.S. ASEAN partnership is a forward-looking one. So let me discuss our hopes for ASEAN's continued success. As with any institution, ASEAN must evolve to meet the challenges of the 21st century global order. To do so, ASEAN needs to fully make use of its strong collective voice. When ASEAN member states developed the ASEAN outlook for the Indo-Pacific, other countries took note. The outlook envisioned a region governed by the rule of law, transparency, openness, respect for sovereignty. This is a vision that the United States and our like-minded partners share. The June ASEAN Leaders Vision Statement is another example of ASEAN speaking with this unified voice. ASEAN leaders stated that any code of conduct negotiations between ASEAN and the PRC must comport with international law, including on-class. This was ASEAN standing up for its sovereign rights, their strength in this collective voice. ASEAN's centrality is strengthened when ASEAN speaks up for itself as a group. And when ASEAN members speak up for themselves as individual sovereign states. ASEAN also has important work in addressing humanitarian crises and instability that affect the entire region, such as the ongoing Rakhine crisis. And again, Drew and Byron's paper does a really nice job with that. ASEAN has made an important decision to give the AHA Center a mandate to engage on Rakhine. However, its initial efforts missed the opportunity to partner effectively with international experts like UNHCR and others, working to promote the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs. We believe deeper engagement between the international community, UN institutions and the AHA Center and ad hoc support team will yield better results for all. I'd like to return to the MECOM region if I can. This region is crucial part of Indo-Pacific that has deservedly received increased attention from ASEAN and the media. United States is paying attention to. There are troubling trends in this region. These include disruptions in the flow of the MECOM River, which is a beating heart of the region, plus transnational crime gambling, trafficking in wildlife, drugs, timber and people linked to PRC run economic zones. United States is also concerned by persistent reports of PRC weapons ending up in the hands of various armed groups in Milan. One especially urgent challenge is the PRC's manipulation of the MECOM River flows for its own profit at great cost to downstream nations. A recent report documented that the PRC has been manipulating water flows along the MECOM for the past 25 years with the greatest disruption in natural flows coinciding with major dam construction and operation. Right now the MECOM River is suffering from lowest water levels ever recorded, which is devastating harvests, threatening food and water security throughout the region. All these things have great potential to greater instability. The US is working with MECOM countries, MECOM River Commission and international partners to ensure calls for water data transparency from the PRC are answered. The United States will remain Ozion's strongest supporter as we confront these 21st century challenges together. We will continue our maritime cooperation efforts, helping Ozion address transnational crime, develop member states maritime capabilities and promote maritime science research, protect illegal unreported, protect against the illegal unreported and unregulated fishing. That's not happening just in Ozion. As you know, we've seen recent reports in the Colapagos as well. We will continue to support Ozion's sustainable growth. We helped develop the Ozion single window, which we hope to have linked to the US customs system as soon as possible to help reduce transaction costs and help build all of our economies. We are also working with women-led businesses to unleash women's full and equal participation in business. On connectivity, we will continue to build the US Ozion Smart Cities Network to build healthier, efficient, smarter cities. We will also continue to connect our people through YSEALY, spreading growth and partnership between us all. And we will support the development of the MECOM subregion with our partners and allies to promote economic integration, infrastructure development and health security. In closing, I'd like to reflect on just what a year this has been for us all. We all recognize that Ozion leadership has been exceptional this year. Vietnam's chair theme for Ozion is cohesive and responsive. COVID-19 presented Ozion with new challenges, significant challenges. The United States stands as partners. We continue to address those shared challenges through our US Ozion Health Futures Initiative. We've created a new Health Futures Alumni Network to bring together medical and public health alumni of US exchange programs to best share and share best practices of dealing with pandemic. The United States is also focused on human capital development in the region, building the futures of our shared one billion people. When Secretary Pompeo meets his Ozion counterparts next week, he will highlight what the United States has done to advance our shared visions for the Indo-Pacific and how we look forward to continue working with Ozion as equal partners under the principles enshrined in the Bangkok Declaration and the Ozion Outlook. Thank you all again for the opportunity and I look forward to a question and answer. Secretary Stilwell, thank you very much for those remarks. I'll take prerogative and ask the first question before opening it up for a second one. But let me ask you, Southeast Asian states are regularly and openly expressing concern about being forced to choose sides, particularly as US China competition increases. And you mentioned in your remarks earlier and it's been written in multiple publications and speeches that the US objectives in the Indo-Pacific strategy are to respect country sovereignty and build partner capacity so that those countries can protect their own sovereignty and rights that are granted in the international rules-based order. So my question to you is really, why is this narrative persisting here in the region? I was hoping you would tell me why that narrative persists. I don't remember in any of my interactions ever laying out a choice, you know, the choices for sovereignty, the choices for these countries to do what in this pluralistic framework best benefits themselves, their people and their international interests. Ozion reflects that in large part but individual countries have their own individual approaches. So I'll take you back to 2014, Sangra-La dialogue, which I think you were involved in. My secretary Hegel and Chinese rep General Wang Guangzong both stated they're very disparate in different positions on what security in the region would look like. And the headline from the new Straits Times from the paper the next day said China for prosperity, America for security. And that's a choice of sorts. But as we're discovering that prosperity comes with a cost, there are, I mean, we've seen the downside of some of the investment or some of the infrastructure we've seen that there is a choice. There's a choice of things, things that are beneficial to the country and those things that may not be so beneficial or things that look great on the surface but in the end don't pan out. This is a vision and what the U.S. puts out and what the ASEAN statement earlier this year said is that there are established rules and norms and those developed because they benefit all. And there's a choice there. The choice is to support those rules and norms and continue them or go with another approach that looks a lot more like might mix right. I don't see that as a choice. I think everybody would prefer the former over the latter. Finally, we support a strong independent ASEAN. We look for partners not supplicants. I think you've heard language and I know it's cliche but it just bears noting that you have a choice between, again, partnership or if I could quote a senior Chinese leader, China is a big country and you all are small countries and that's just a fact. I don't see that as a choice either. So help me understand how we can get that line of thought shuffled off to the side and make the more reasonable presentation of what those choices are than they're not being forced. Let me offer one more point. In Beijing when I was there as defense attaché my counterpart from Singapore was telling me a story where in one of his interactions with his Chinese counterpart, the host, he noted that in a harangue, a finger wagging harangue, he says, look, you're going to have to choose. Are you pro-America or pro-US? And he looked at him in disbelief. He goes, I'm pro-Singapore. What do you expect? So that's a choice, right? I'll leave it at that. Thanks for the question. Thank you, sir. I'm going to turn to Ambassador Pham for a question. Sir, you have to unmute. You're on mute. Can you hear? Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Assistant Secretary. I want to follow up with a question on US investment in the region. As we know, the US is a major investor in our side and in many cases even larger than investment from China. But the US investment is led by private sector and not always tragic as the Chinese investments. On the overall investment here in the region is welcome and this region does not want to see the US hindering China's investment that is needed and is in our interests. Now, we recognize that the US-China competition is increasing and here is my question. But what can the US do to ensure that this is, it is an equitable, virtuous competition, particularly in the areas of investment and trade. That is the question, Mr. Secretary. Ambassador Pham, thank you for that question. And it's a very important one, not just for the region, but for the world. I would say, I mean, I can answer that briefly with just one word, transparent. I mean, if these deals are in somehow include non-disclosure agreements or if they are done quietly in the background, if they include corruption and the like, then one, they don't bring the best value for the dollar or currency that benefit the people of the country. I point to, there are some great examples. Pakistan's probably been involved in the One Belt One Road and China-Pakistan Economic Quarter for the longest time. It goes and fits and starts as the costs go up. The loan payment timeframe is as unbearable in the Pakistan as to look for IMF and other bailouts for these things. Again, part of investment, in my mind, has to be appropriate to the need of the country. And we're seeing a lot of maybe gold-plated or excessive infrastructure that's either being built just because it increases the value for one side of the country or it's being built with other intentions to create infrastructure supporting not the national need but maybe the Chinese need as well, thinking ports and things like that. I would point to, instead of going to specifics, I'll just note that this investment on coming from the US and others, not just the US. I mean, look at what Japan has done in the region, Korea, Australia, all these partners, the Quad working with India and others show great promise. And these are all the investments coming through business have to support a business model. And so coming up with infrastructure ideas that are going to end up bankrupting a company without having done the due diligence to confirm it that infrastructure is needed, affordable and relevant leads you into what we're finding in Africa and other places where countries you have partially completed projects and enormous debt. So they don't get the benefit from the infrastructure and yet they're saddled with the financial burden that comes with it. And this is part of the effort with the Paris Club debt relief program to look at all these countries that just can't, given corona and economic slowdown can no longer afford to service their debt. Debt forgiveness or debt suspension is a great idea but it has to be equally applied. Otherwise you're going to have debt relief from many countries and the ability to pay will only service debt from one country. I'm not interested in that. It needs to be universal and it's, thank you. Thank you very much for your time. I hear there's ambulances in the background there. So maybe it's time to go. But I want to thank you very much for your time and for your remarks as well as for answering our questions. So we really appreciate and we'll take on your suggestion that we look further into the narratives in the region and why they persist. So thank you for that. I appreciate that. Thank you all for your participation and attention. Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Stillwell and also to Drew for really kicking us off. I think we'll, there's a lot to discuss there and I think we'll get back to it as our panel unfolds. As Jennifer mentioned earlier, my name is Brian Harding. I'm a senior expert on Southeast Asia here at USIP. I'm new around here and part of an effort to expand our work at USIP on Southeast Asia. So look for more coming from us at USIP on Southeast Asia, peace building, and U.S. relations. We're doing pretty well on time. We have about an hour and five minutes left to go and we have a fantastic panel to get to. What we're going to do here with the panel is take a step back a bit. We talked a lot about the very current issues in ASEAN, U.S.-ASEAN relations in the first portion. We're going to take a step back and have a little bit of a discussion about the state of affairs in ASEAN today. And on the basis of discussion, you're going to be hearing a lot about a new USIP special report that two of our panelists wrote that Jennifer mentioned early as well. So I'll introduce the panelists quickly in the order in which they'll speak. I've asked them to give about six, eight minutes of remarks off the top and then I'll ask a couple questions of the panel if we have time and then transition to audience questions which are being submitted to me virtually on our YouTube page and at usip.org and also if you were using Twitter, the hashtag ASEAN faces the future. Our first speaker is going to be Byron Chong. Byron is a research associate at the Center on Asia and Globalization at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. Byron has a really interesting background as an engineer in the energy sector but is now really writing widely on regional affairs at the Lee Kuan Yew School. To remain to our conversation today, Byron was a co-author with Drew Thompson of the special USIP report on ASEAN built for trust, not complex. So Byron is going to kick us off and discuss some of the findings. Our second speaker is going to be Ambassador Pham Kwan Vinh. Many in our DC audience remember Ambassador Vinh incredibly well as Vietnam's ambassador to the United States from 2015 to 2018. And he was really a key driver behind this increasingly close and important bilateral relationship. But prior to coming to DC, he served in numerous posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vietnam, including deputy minister for relations across much of Asia, including Southeast Asia, and served as Vietnam's ASEAN senior official. Since retiring from the Foreign Service, Ambassador Vinh has continued to be active in advising the ministry, including on Vietnam's current 2020 ASEAN chairmanship. And he's also now affiliated with the Asia group here in DC, although they have a new office in Hanoi as a senior advisor. Our third speaker is going to be Dr. Melly Caballero Anthony. Dr. Caballero Anthony is a professor and head of the Center for Non-Traditional Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. She is really an authority on the transnational challenges that face Southeast Asia and has really published extensively in academic press on this subject. Her most recent book, published by Columbia University in 2018, was Negotiating Governance on Non-Traditional Security in Southeast Asia and beyond. So it really is a perfect panelist to give us a view of how ASEAN is handling transnational threats today and into the future. Finally, fourth panelist will be Drew Thompson, who we've already gotten to know this morning. Drew is a visiting senior research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore. Before moving to Singapore, he's a recent arrival. He was from 2011 to 2018, the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia in the office of the Secretary of Defense, where, as he mentioned before, managed the military relationship with China. And before OSD, Drew was a China scholar at the Center for the National Interest at CSIS and also has really extensive, interesting experience working in the private sector in China. So as I mentioned, we're going to start off with remarks from these four speakers, starting with Byron. So with no further ado, over to you, Byron. Okay, thank you, Brian, and thank you for having me here today. So I thought I could start at the beginning with the formation of ASEAN. The group was founded back in 1967 by five members, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. And then at that time, Southeast Asia was a highly turbulent and unstable region. The members all faced internal threats from rebellions and separatist movements. And among themselves, some of the members had ongoing disputes with one another that could easily escalate into conflict. Such an environment created a sense of mistrust between the members. So for ASEAN to unite them into a cohesive group, it had to operate in a manner that could reduce this mistrust. This is why ASEAN advocated principles like non-use of force, non-interference, consultation and consensus, and respect for sovereignty. These principles were designed to strengthen trust among its members. Now the problem is that these principles also made it more difficult for ASEAN to manage conflict in the region. Non-interference prevents ASEAN from intervening in its members' domestic issues and respecting sovereignty prevents ASEAN from forcing its members to accept its decision. ASEAN has these problems because it was primarily designed for trust-building rather than dispute management. But this doesn't mean that ASEAN doesn't contribute to regional stability. The many meetings that ASEAN hosts every year allow officials to meet and work out their disagreements on the sidelines and diffuse any dispute before it escalates. So although disagreements still persist, they rarely escalate into armed conflict. This method of managing conflict has gradually become more complex as time passed. ASEAN's expansion in the 80s and 90s to its current 10 members brought in a whole new set of intra- and interstate disputes which had to be managed. And the rise of social media with the rise of social media disputes now easily become politicized and leaders have more to gain by responding in an assertive and highly public manner rather than resolving them quietly in informal discussions. The rise of China is another concern. China has been using its political and economic leverages to pressure ASEAN members into supporting its goals. We saw this in 2012 when ASEAN failed to issue a joint statement for the first time in its history due to Cambodia's refusal. The fact that a single member acting in its own interests could hijack the entire decision-making process really highlights the underlying problem with ASEAN's consensus-based approach. And with the intensifying competition between China and the US, ASEAN seems to be gripped by a sense of fear and fatalism that it will be forced to pick sides that would further fracture the group and weaken its regional relevance. So I really believe that ASEAN has to adapt itself in order to manage these changing norms. In all, ASEAN needs to adapt itself in three ways. Firstly, ASEAN needs to regain its strategic ambition. It needs to remember that it has successfully managed great power competition before during the Cold War and prospered without taking sides. So in today's context, instead of worrying about having to choose between China and the US, ASEAN should focus instead on how it can once again become that organization that can stand its ground and protect the collective interests of its members. But to do that, ASEAN must be united and cohesive. And this necessitates bold changes to its current culture and way of operating. This means reviewing and strengthening its legal mechanisms, its bureaucratic structure, and perhaps moving away from its consensus-based approach. Second, ASEAN needs the acceptance and support of the public. For ASEAN to reduce its dependence on a single trade partner, it needs to diversify its trade, investment, and supply chain linkages. Intra ASEAN trade is currently only at 23 percent, so greater regional integration would be one way to go. Such trade liberalizing policies are going to initially hurt parts of the economy. So governments will need to communicate and engage with their people to gain their support. A well-informed public will give ASEAN greater agency. ASEAN should also reach out to civil society groups and academic institutions, which would be a good source of feedback and perhaps fresh ideas to push forward ASEAN's agenda. Lastly, ASEAN should really bring back its informal gatherings, which has been slowly replaced by more institutionalized and official meetings. The strength of ASEAN is in its informal gatherings, where officials can discuss issues and settle disputes in an amicable manner between rounds of golf and karaoke. So to end off, I guess it really takes a brave policy report to propose that ASEAN actually needs even more golf and karaoke sessions in its meetings. Thank you. Thanks, Byron. That's a great start. Maybe Ambassador Pham Khorng Vinh can tell us about how we do karaoke and golf in the virtual era. So over to him. Thank you very much. Can you hear? Thank you very much. Actually, at my time, 10 years ago or 13 years ago, there was no more karaoke and golf. But anyhow, there are a lot of meetings. So thank you. Happy to join the conversation. I do highly appreciate the special report on ASEAN faces, the future. To me, it is comprehensive, analytical, and very much valuable reference. I do on several important points. 10 in the report. The observation ASEAN is designed, a trust-bounding mechanism, not a platform for conflict resolution. So this is where we will start looking into the future of ASEAN. The second is the observation on the changes of the security environment surrounding us in the region. There's a lot of challenges emerge, rivalry between the US and China, for example, or continue interstate frictions or other non-traditional security issues, including climate change. And technology, you have mentioned that one. And the observation that ASEAN has been doing good, but in face of the future challenges, it may be not up to the map. And we have to look into the country, the structure, and the way of doing things by ASEAN. So this is a very good reference as contained in the report. To me, indeed, ASEAN has been at a very good juncture. And as at every turn of history, ASEAN faces two regions in ASEAN of the emerging environment. And we have to think of all this in order to lay out recommendations for the future of ASEAN. Certainly, we all want ASEAN to be strong, especially at this time of challenges. To me, why ASEAN is more trust-building organization rather than one that resolve conflict? But its influence has been throughout the 53 years of history has been different now and growing. Its influence has been growing during its interactions or increased interactions with the major powers. And its influence also increased with its development of institutional arrangement or we call it regional processes in the region. And also, ASEAN has developed greater sense among the members of regionalism. So all this combined, ASEAN can be somewhat stronger than in the old day. But certainly, it has weaknesses here and as mentioned in the report. The second point I want to share here is about the U.S. and China competition. It is comprehensive and we think it will be long. But there's a question that people often talk about a new Cold War. I'm not quite sure how the new Cold War will be, but certainly it will not be the time of the old Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviets. One of the things which is very much different is this competition will not lead to two disintegrated and opposing blocs. So the question of touring size or not will run than the old days. And again, as mentioned in the report that I share very much is that ASEAN do not have to choose just either between the U.S. and China. There's many of the things that ASEAN can do. ASEAN can still partner with both of them, but ASEAN can have other major players in the region as well. And even with ASEAN itself, he can have some say to not to say influence, but to make others heard, others to hear his voices as well. So with regard to the recommendations in the report, I would like to share my comments on some of the followings. First, I do agree that ASEAN need to revitalize its strategic ambition and relevance. This is very recommendations from the report. Certainly, ASEAN have to look into itself and look into the changes of the global and regional environment to see how it will be developing further to take out the challenges. And the second point is to relate it to trade. The recommendation in the report that say that ASEAN should better distribute its external trade and reduce economic dependence on any single trading partner. I think this is very much important, but it cannot be done by way of wishful thinking, but it needs to be done by way of economic measures. So it's time for ASEAN to think very carefully and seriously into this one. One of the points that we can rate here is that maybe ASEAN look into its economic integration and upgrade its economic linkages beyond the current after or what they call it now, the ASEAN economic community. So the future of ASEAN integration should be based on high standards as well. This is very much important. If we can have a high standard FTA within ASEAN, then we can link ASEAN with the different measures it can make central of the world. By that way, we can have both China, European Union and Japan and Americans certainly. The third recommendation that I share very much is related to legal instruments. The report mentioned about the TAC, the ASEAN chapter and the ASEAN protocol on the SM dispute settlement mechanism. I think that looking into the TAC will be a very critical issue to be considered. You have to be very much careful to open up this one because it's not just ASEAN now, it's more than 30 countries joining together opening it up may not be right time right now. But one of the things that I think we can start with right away is the reviewing of the ASEAN chapter. In the provisions of the chapter itself, that ASEAN will be reviewing both the implementation and the provisions of the chapter after five years. So it is time to see how ASEAN within itself will develop a stronger legal instrument before opening up to the dialogue panels that ASEAN have worked hard to have them engage with ASEAN. So another one which is very much important to me is to improve and retain to retain and improve ASEAN informal processes. This is very much important for ASEAN as of now and in the future because so informal processes ASEAN can achieve very substantive decisions. But one of the things that I observe these days in ASEAN is they have too much or too many formal meetings after the chapter has been adopted. So this is time for ASEAN to reactivate the leaders led meetings in the retreat format so they can have strategic discussions, candid discussions on important issues and substantive issues as well as that. So that's what we do want ASEAN to be strong in face of challenges now. But at the same time, the diversity in ASEAN, we have to think very carefully in working along the lines and along the interests of the ASEAN member states. Thank you very much, then. Thank you very much, Ambassador. I think there's a lot we'd like to come back to in the discussion. But next is Dr. Mellie Kabir on AMP. Thank you. Take another take from Southeast Asia and you're muted. Thank you very much, Brian. And thank you to USIP for inviting me to join this conversation on ASEAN. In this very crazy COVID days, it's always good to step back and just reflect on where we are, where ASEAN is and what we need to do to do things better. And I've been asked by Brian and Drew to talk about ASEAN's work or response to transnational challenges. So, but before that, I was a bit intrigued by the report. I mean, there's a lot of it that really there's looking into and I think this will be fleshed out, but in light of the limited time that we have, I obviously, I'm tempted to talk a lot about the report, but just from a particular point that Byron mentioned that we should really have more informal processes, bring it back. You know, karaoke and golf. And I wanted to, it's interesting to say that because I thought we have gone beyond karaoke and golf and really do business. I mean, come on, we have an ASEAN chart. We have a rules-based institution. That requires us to do more, right? So, and that was a criticism before of ASEAN, especially when dealing with transnational challenges and that there was too many of this informal processes that they were not much serious about really coming out with more rules-based measures and agreements to really get the region more equipped to deal with challenges that are no longer possible for just one state to deal with. So, where are we as far as ASEAN's response to these challenges? I mean, if you look back, Byron talked about the history of ASEAN. I think, yes, it was built for trust and confidence building. And in the first 30 years of ASEAN, they wanted to focus on what key drivers of conflict and insecurity that they could possibly deal with. And in that particular instance, there was a lot of confidence building measure and focus really inward in building the economy. But that, of course, changed 30 years later, particularly during the late 1990s. And the 1997 financial crisis was a watershed event because it actually triggered, I mean, that was the beginning of a lot of transnational challenges. As a result of whether unregulated enthusiasm over financial liberalism, that's one. And when there was that you had Asian financial crisis and then followed by very soon, but 9-11, when you had problems with some extremism, religious extremism. And then you had the Hays crisis as a result of environmental degradation. And then you had SARS in 2003. So that really triggered the change, if you like, in the orientation of ASEAN to then adopt what we call an ASEAN political security community. And I think it is important to bear that in mind because the adoption in 2003 of the ASEAN political security community, which was an intentional move to raise the level of political and security cooperation to a higher plane was a recognition that many of the challenges that ASEAN faces now are transnational in nature, right? They could come from a country, you know, is if you, for example, you abuse the environment, then you have all these forest fires that affects many things. If you have, for example, outbreak of infectious disease that you cannot contain, and we're facing that, we face that in SARS and we're facing that with COVID. So, but in dealing now with putting now more attention to transnational challenges, apart from, of course, the need to prevent conflict, ASEAN therefore had to retool, right? The retooling is important when you talk about bureaucratic reforms that you want ASEAN to adapt and certain mechanisms that you want because it is important to be mindful about the mechanisms that ASEAN established over the years, particularly in the mid-2003 to pursue and advance the thrust of raising the level of political security to a higher point. So very briefly, if you look at what it has done, I mean, it also had to choose second, choosing what, and the pragmatic approach incremental of what is actually possible, you know, there's so many things we desire for ASEAN to do, but there are not many things that are doable. So if you focus on the things that are doable, so, you know, if you talk about since 2000 and since 1997, 1998, they needed to make sure that the financial health of the region is, you know, is being monitored that they're more aware of the crippling effect of a financial crisis. So they established a mechanism, you know, to monitor. They call it the surveillance mechanism, which is now it's called the ASEAN Monitoring Research Office, which is the AMRO office that looks at health, right? So those are, that looks at financial health. Now, for infectious diseases, and this is really very relevant in light of what's happening now. There are actually multiple mechanisms that have been put in place to facilitate exchange of information, very important, you know, reporting disease surveillance, and many of you would have not know this, but some of you may know, but as early as January, there were a lot of movements in the region in as far as information sharing is concerned with regard to the outbreak of COVID. You had all the health ministers working together, not just among themselves, but with the other ministers in the plus three countries, China, South Korea, and Japan, looking at issues of enhancing laboratory capacity, you know, being able to share information on the very nature of COVID, the spread, the therapeutics that you did to go, and the measures that national countries have to adopt in order to contain it. Now, many of these measures or mechanisms that ASEAN is doing are there to support national efforts, right, because we have the norms. I mean, how much can, you cannot tell a country to do this. Unlike other regional organizations, maybe the EU, ASEAN doesn't have carrot and stick to impose on its own members. So you can, you only work to the extent that is possible. In dealing with food crisis, which is very important, we're going to have that now, they're able to come up with a mechanism of emergency rice reserve. And in dealing with the impact of climate change, particularly the extreme weather events, because the frequency of other cyclones, et cetera, then you have, as the Secretary Steelworth have said, the AHA Center, which is, I think, one of the best manifestation of the ability of small, despite the limitation in capacity to have a mechanism that then coordinates this. And this is when you talk about getting itself known to the community, et cetera, this is really one of the mechanisms. So quite quickly. So you have these mechanisms that are trying to do things, move things, but they are really meant for what? Very, you know, it's meant for increasing the capacity of member states, right? Because many of the, you know, it requires collective effort, but you cannot have collective effort if some member states do not have the capacity. So you raise the level of capacity by having all these mechanisms and empowering, right? All these sectoral bodies to do the things that they're supposed to do. Are there problems? Yes, there are. You know, you want to implement things, but you do this, you know, in a pace that is comfortable for others, because you need to have the buy-in of member states, right? But having said that, it doesn't mean that you cannot do things better. Surely you can. But unless you're able to really understand and identify what are the needs of these people, you know, of your different member states, then you cannot move further. And the third thing is really, what is important is the focus on building resilience of member states, right? And resilience doesn't only mean that you equip or you help build the capacity of governments, but you also help communities do so. And this is where the recommendation of getting, right, the buy-in and the participation of the civil society organizations is very critical. Is that happening? Yes, you can say it is happening in the field of the environment, for example. You do get all these very active NGOs that then do some reporting of the extent to which, you know, some forest has been raging in fires. And when it comes to just providing some kind of early warning information for what it's worth, about health, yes, you have very, very good NGOs in the region that are providing the very valuable help of promoting information, making sure that citizens actually wear a mask and wash hands and ensuring that you don't suffer from infodemics, that you get the right information of why you needed it to do this, because unless you get the people well informed, you'll be able to, you know, to contain the disaster. When it comes to dealing with the impact of climate change, this is where you have the AHA Center working with a partner group, civil society groups in helping communities. Particularly, it's good to not, when you're talking about conflict, because they are displaced population, not just as a result of natural disasters, but they're also displaced because it's a double whammy. There's the conflict that they are facing, and there's also the natural disasters. So if you assess it, well, it's, they are, they are movements in as much as possible. As I said, pragmatism helps, but it doesn't mean that you cannot be more ambitious. In the field of health, I have been pushing for the need for ASEAN to really be bolder in trying to be part of, you know, have an ASEAN CDC, right? Because we need that, and perhaps work together now in light of what's happening, as far as vaccine is concerned, a lot of countries, rich countries, including the United States, you know, already, you know, having all this bilateral arrangements with the drug companies. And unfortunately, did not join the WHO, or COVAX facility, right? So we are now worried about vaccine nationalism, and it is only through a platform like ASEAN where you can push for this, right? So you need all of these things, and you, this is where you talk about, you know, racing, the strategic relevance of ASEAN, the strategic, what is the word? Sick relevance and strategic voice. This, that is where I think you really make yourself most relevant by ensuring that ASEAN is really dealing with these issues. And overall, what do you say? Yes, ASEAN is dealing with these issues in the best way they can. But of course, there's always room for improvement. Thank you. Thank you, Malli. That's fantastic. And those are some really important points, especially, I think, for our U.S. audience. You know, ASEAN famously has over a thousand meetings a year. Yet Americans tend to only focus on ASEAN when a senior U.S. official goes to the region, or there's something about a communique regarding the South China Sea. And you can be sure that those thousand meetings are not all political meetings about great power competition in the South China Sea. ASEAN is doing all sorts of useful things to bring experts together to talk about rising sea levels and pandemics, et cetera, et cetera. So while I'm sure we'll get back to the South China Sea, great power competition and things we would like to see out of ASEAN, I think it's really important to remember that there's a whole lot more going on here within ASEAN than these broader political strategic issues. But finally, we're going to go to Drew Thompson, who's a China specialist, American China specialist living in Singapore. So it couldn't be better positioned to talk to us about how the region is seeing these big picture issues. Thank you, Brian. So my assignment for the panel was to talk about U.S.-China relations in Southeast Asia and ASEAN and how it fits in. So, I mean, the report itself purposefully emphasizes Inter and intra-ASEAN security dynamics and it minimizes the discussion of external forces and U.S.-China competition. That section only takes up about a page and a half out of the 23 pages. So just to give an indication how hard we tried to do that. But that effort is somewhat artificial, partly because there are ubiquitous concerns in the region about U.S.-China competition. And as that deteriorates, what effect it will have and how the region might be harmed. So that concern is visceral because in my opinion, it's not a new phenomena for ASEAN. And as Byron pointed out at the beginning, ASEAN was formed during a period of considerable great power competition that did embroil the region. There were effectively three ongoing major conflicts at the time in the region that ASEAN was formed. You had a hot war between South and North Vietnam that was fueled by external powers. You had Kamprantazi, which was an undeclared war between Indonesia under President Sukarno against Singapore and Malaysia from 63 to 1966. And the third conflict was essentially a communist-backed insurgency that existed in each of the five original founding members of ASEAN. So we've now returned to a period of heightened great power rivalry that once again threatens to upset regional balances. And with that, it threatens to upset the Cold War prosperity, the post-Cold War prosperity that's been enjoyed by the region since the end of the Soviet Union. Hang on, I'm having computer issues here. So the paper highlights that there are still animosities and sensitivities and unresolved conflicts between ASEAN members. And then, just like now, they're still driven by domestic politics and nationalistic sentiments, just as Kamprantazi was at ASEAN's founding. And that's really what we wanted to capture in the paper. And I think we made the point that ASEAN exists to reduce the mistrust and build trust between its members. And we argue that it continues to serve that purpose today. But as we've also discussed in these panels, the limits of ASEAN become more apparent, particularly as great power competition heats up. And I think those local animosities were exacerbated by external great power rivalries in the past, which is one of the reasons, I think, why Southeast Asian states are so concerned about U.S.-China competition intentions today. And if you look back, historically, U.S. interest in Southeast Asia during times of peace, such as the 1990s, I think the U.S. largely ignored the region. And Mellie mentioned the 1997 Asian financial crisis, where the U.S. didn't really step up and didn't help Thailand out. It's treaty ally at a time when it really needed it. So during that peaceful period, the U.S. was somewhat disengaged. But if you look historically too, when Southeast Asia is a contested space, when it's contested by external powers, such as during World War II by Japan, or the spread of communism during the Cold War, then the U.S. became much more engaged. And during that period, there was overt military conflict during those periods. So, as Byron mentioned, the expansion of ASEAN in the 1990s also very much changed the organization's dynamic and brought into it not only those bilateral conflicts of Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Cambodia, but also considerable expansion of China's influence. And that was painfully evident in the 2012 failure to release a communique after the ASEAN summit, which ASEAN managers call the 2012 Cambodia incident. And we discussed that in the paper. So I think what you've seen is the China-backed communist insurgencies of the 1960s have been replaced by concerns about foreign interference and influence operations today. But the fundamental issues and insecurities still remain. So I think, as I said, great power rivalry exposes some of ASEAN's shortcomings and that's not at the expense of its considerable successes. But I think we are able to see more clearly some of the organization's limitations and its inability to respond both to opportunities as well as provocations that come from the outside. I mean, we certainly saw that in the lack of really response to support the international rule of law reflected in the 2016 South China Sea orbital decision, orbital tribunal decision. I think we also failed to see that last week when four ballistic missiles were lobbed into the South China Sea. So I think we talked with Secretary Stillwell about choosing sides. And I think many people in the region really do see U.S.-China attention as a zero-sum competition where gains by one side come at the expense of the other, which leads to this downward spiral of confrontation. And that makes it possible in the minds of many people that Southeast Asia, again, once again, becomes a theater for competition, which, as I said, historically included contests for influence, access, but also outright military conflict as occurred in World War II and the Cold War. So to end on a more optimistic note, I think Ambassador Fama mentioned this, and I'm glad he pointed it out, that ASEAN centrality does really provide a very effective mechanism for external engagement, which includes the U.S., its allies, China, the ASEAN-plus regimes. And that engagement with the region, which we'll see next week with Secretary Pompeo making his conference calls in the middle of the night because of the time difference, we think that's really important. But even though that's positive, I think nothing to address the fundamental issues and causes of the U.S.-China rivalry, which have nothing to do with Southeast Asia in general. So I'll stop there so we can get to questions. Thanks, Drew, and thank you to everybody for sticking to the time. So I will continue with a couple of questions and then go to the audience again. If you're watching the event at USIP.org, you can put questions into the box there and also on Twitter. We can collect them there as well. But first, let me just pick up on where Drew ended and go back to Ambassador Pham Quang Vinh. How's the U.S. doing? And I'd be curious to hear your thoughts as a former senior ASEAN official. If it were a few years ago, you and Assistant Secretary Stowell would have been counterparts at some meetings. What do you make of his comments that the United States is not asking countries in Southeast Asia to choose? What would be the ASEAN response to that? You're on mute. I think that both the U.S. and China will be very much important to ASEAN. Since the beginning, ASEAN has been looking forward and looking outward, not only within itself, but it needs engagement and assistance from others, especially the major powers to help it in its development and also in the preservation of stability in the region. Now, the question here is that for many years, we have been looking to the U.S. as a guarantor of security. And we see the opportunities when Chinese rise give us an opportunity for economic engagement. But now things to be different these days when the U.S. is competing with China and China seems to change its way of its rise, change the course of its rise. So this is the time for ASEAN to look into itself. I think institutionally, there are a number of things that ASEAN can strengthen itself. But changing the fundamental issue of its principles like consensus-based decision-making, we need to think it very carefully because I remember the time when we were drafting the ASEAN challenge. This issue had been raised at the point in time since discussion and recommendations had been put forward also. But ASEAN now has been enlarged in close stage of different political and social systems. And it seems that ASEAN not quite comfortable with coming out of its form of the principles of non-interference and the principles of consensus. So everybody's also on the point in time that on that issue, then we have to work around the consensus-based principles on how to strengthen ASEAN. I'm thinking of the ways that ASEAN can work both within its institutional framework and beyond its institutional framework. In the past, we have seen some ASEAN countries volunteer to do the job of sort of diplomacy. For example, ASEAN can have peer pressure not only in the group by collective pressure, but also by individual countries. So it is very much important for ASEAN to continue to do as such. Another point is that nowadays the standard of regionalism not only for the region, but for each of the countries in the region. And I see that each of ASEAN member states will now see greater interest for itself when ASEAN is stronger. Certainly there will be times of differences and ASEAN may not be able or may not be comfortable be able to reach consensus, but we in ASEAN try to reduce whatever the differences and the damages that may cause by that sort of divergence. Number three is that Drou has mentioned about ASEAN's centrality and engagement with the major powers including the U.S. and China. Certainly for the time being I don't think that any other regional groupings or platform will be better than ASEAN for the U.S. and China to engage in the region. That have been suggestions of forming or thinking of forming some other regional groupings including the QANTS for example, but to stay there more formalized we continue to be solely ASEAN. Thank you. Well I would fully agree that ASEAN is the only possible real central node to bring the region together and it's in U.S. interests to for ASEAN to develop to integrate even if we're going to deliver certain things that we need through bilateral relationships we have to work with ASEAN and keep ASEAN at the center. I'd like to turn back to Byron quickly because you also mentioned the need to review ASEAN's culture including the issue of consensus. From your approach of not having spent a long time in an ASEAN forum ministry do you really see ASEAN moving away from this long-standing approach and do you see any groupings within ASEAN that could push for reform together? So as I mentioned I do think that the consensus building approach has its problems. The principle means that even if one member disagrees for whatever reason an entire proposal can be delayed or even scrapped but there's a reason why this principle has endured for so long it assures members that their national interests will not be ignored in a favor of in favor of a majority decision and it is partly because of these assurance that members are willing to stick with ASEAN so I agree that resistance to this change would be very strong. The geo-strategic environment would have to be so adverse, so dire that members are willing to give up these assurances in order to change this situation and I would say in a way Beijing's behavior is pushing them towards that conclusion that ASEAN needs to change in order to resist the growing pressure from China. 2012 was a traumatic experience for ASEAN one that they will remember for a very long time so I believe that if China continues on its present path of very assertive, very hard-aged foreign policy decisions perhaps that would one day push ASEAN into making that change. Thank you. Melio, I was about to turn to you with a question but you looked as if you might want to jump in there, did you? Well if you allow me. By all means. You know this thing about consensus building and you know you need to move away from it. I think it's important that in other areas for example in the economic sphere there is the minus ASEAN minus X formula that means you don't all have to do it at the same time so you do allow for some kind of you know minus it doesn't have to be on consensus basis right but mainly an organization that doesn't work with consensus right and there's a reason why you know in as much as you want to move things when it comes to very important issues that as Byron has mentioned is important for national interests etc. I cannot think of any organization that doesn't work on consensus and it's you know you wish you wouldn't have but there's a reason why it's happening. I'm not saying it's good but when you talk about you know being torn between this two cuts or you're in a position now where it's really as the Singaporean leader had mentioned it's an endangered Asian century. Yeah it's there we have all these tensions right in front of us and you do have really a power that's becoming more militarily assertive but there's really a limit to what you can do as an organization right and the best I think is to continue with what you do best and that is to advance the kind of platforms that you have where you're able to bring you know this parties together to the extent that you can be successful in bringing them together and you know maybe in this conversations in these platforms you are able to express your concerns and this is really the platform that is important and that is what they did before. I know when ASEAN was formed in this in 1967 it wasn't just major power rivalry at the time between the US and the US there was also the issue about countries coming out of their colonial experience that needed to build their economies and you can imagine what's happening now in the post-COVID world right where the economies all the gains that you've had over the 10-15 years have been decimated as a result of this crisis and then you have this what can you realistically do as an organization so you step back and say what is what has worked best perhaps what is missing is you know the need to to be more to come up with joint statements in calling out China for its aggressiveness so go back by statements that underline principles right because you agree in the EES you adopted these principles right even Russia adopted these principles and this is what Indonesia has been saying with or Indonesia and the rest of ASEAN countries when they say the ASEAN Indo-Pacific God look go on on on principle basis because militarily you know as ASEAN as small man small mid countries you are no match and I don't think you should even go that way because this is not really what you are right so I I think we have to be in we are understand that there are this constraints but at the same time there are avenues that you can you can sort of how to say that you can tap that you can work and I think going ahead and using this platforms is is necessary but at the same time you know having to be able to generate the need for joint statements is I think very important as you mentioned yeah so we have about 15 minutes left and there are some questions coming in online so I'd like to get to at least a few of those Mellie I'll start with one that I think is Taylor made for you question online was transnational crime such as money laundering wildlife trafficking and arm smuggling says the question says that ASEAN leaders haven't paid much attention to these issues asking how the United States could encourage ASEAN to work more on these issues so I'd say at first view and maybe Ambassador Vin if you want to offer a thought on that as well would be great there is there is work that's ongoing on just national crime but yeah it's right about did you say wildlife trafficking yes this there's a lot of work on human trafficking in fact the U.S. has has provided a lot of support in in you know they have this can't remember the name of the program which actually promoted you know awareness of human trafficking right so they've had this and there's a lot of work done by you know the the different the sectoral body you know your your home ministries your immigration officials there's a lot of work on that but on on wildlife trafficking yes I I don't think that's perhaps an area that that should be added into the list of transnational crime on on illicit trafficking yes so there is of course a slew of transnational crimes that you really want ASEAN to work on there's of course the issue of cyber security etc but as I said all this are important in you know in ensuring that you know ASEAN is is mindful and is able to you know to act in perhaps in a coordinated way and really building up that capacity because we see more and more of this happening should so at the end of the day what should you do I think it's a question of getting you know there is a ASEAN meeting on transnational crime and getting this this agencies or the the right ministries and sectoral bodies to come together and say where are we as far as this is concerned? Ambassador to the to the point of how can the United States US leaders get ASEAN leaders more focused on these issues or for any other you know how how would you take that question? To me on such issues as non-traditional security issue or on on on corruption as this one that's been this issue has been on the age of us when we talk about combating and individual ASEAN members states also is also doing on this issue also and at the UN there has been a convention on on rivalry and then corruption as well so we can combine the national regional and and global issues into whatever we can do within ASEAN and ASEAN US mechanism but I think this issue has been discussed between ASEAN and US and ASEAN and other dialogue partners as well so if we think that this is time for for us to highlight that issue then now on many other issues including when we talk about the Ben and Roe initiative and projects when we say high standard transparency and others we also share a lot of understanding on what we envisage as good standard and conditions for this region in terms of infrastructure projects and funding thank you so we have a question about the Quad here and that's interesting that hasn't come up to this point I think their Deputy Secretary of State Began made some remarks the other day that I think were actually reported a bit out of context but but about some sort of NATO-like security structure in Asia but it does raise some very important questions about how the United States balances its alliances and its engagement with the region and also the notion of ASEAN centrality and clearly at the onset of the beginning of the Trump administration the administration's focused on the Quad as opposed to ASEAN was alarming I think the administration at least in its rhetoric has certainly put ASEAN very much at the Senate you look at any you look at the speeches from 2017 versus 2018 2019 you know there's a lot more ASEAN they got the point but I'd like to turn to you Drew just maybe just give a little bit of an explainer you know how do we you know you're again you're an alliances guy you're but you're living in in Singapore working writing a report on ASEAN how would you describe how the United States approaches this question of whether it's alliances first what does ASEAN centrality mean and what about you know where does US-China relations at a strategic level fit in everything Sure Brian that's a great complex question and actually it kind of links to the previous question as well about transnational crime I mean one example to give you know the US is is you know a partner in one of the more interesting in my opinion ASEAN centric investments in the Information Fusion Center at Changi Naval Base here in Singapore which is while not an ASEAN mechanism it's essentially a Southeast Asian collaboration between countries to monitor maritime issues maritime piracy maritime illegal and unregulated fishing and the US Japan South Korea and other ASEAN Southeast Asian partners are also involved so that's a really good example of the centrality of the region and Singapore in particular as a hub for multinational coordinated efforts to tackle to tackle essentially an issue that everyone agrees is is a problem in transnational crime on the sea maritime crime so from that perspective I think that's important regarding sort of the alliance perspective I mean of course there's certainly concerns about President Trump who is ambivalent about allies partly because they don't serve sort of the immediate needs I think but there is a steady demand signal here in the region for the US to maintain a very robust presence now I think the region also prefers for it to be a quiet presence a low-key presence but there's definitely a demand for US to continue to be the provider of security in the region so the question is the security of what and I think most countries in the region would like simply the security that creates stability not the presence that creates conflict with China and I think that's where that's where the difference occurs the quad of course is is somewhat amorphous I think there was a great deal of enthusiasm as you noted there's been lots of speeches but there's also a lot of anxiety because it is a consensus-based organization between four very disparate countries with very different approaches towards alliances particularly with India so I think there was a lot of uncertainty to the quad as it was conceptualized and as it was beginning to be enacted it exists on many different levels but at the same time it's kind of there as much as you want it but then it's not there when you don't so in some ways it doesn't necessarily compete with ASEAN as a mechanism because it's not inclusive and it is smaller and it certainly creates the anxieties that we've heard very clearly nothing's going to replace ASEAN nor ASEAN centrality and I think it's unfortunate that those insecurities are there particularly when the U.S. interest is very much aligned with what I'm hearing in the region which is we want stronger independent states that can defend their own sovereignty that can stand up for their own interests and can continue to protect rule of law I mean I don't see the South China Sea as being a place where you've got inherent conflict between the U.S. and China either because the U.S. aren't interests aren't territorial they're temporal it's the need to get through the South China Sea to get past it on molested the fear I think of the U.S. is that if China controls the South China Sea then the U.S. and other countries that are reliant on it as a sea lane have a real problem but if Southeast Asian littoral states can maintain their sovereignty protect their own rights then the U.S. interest is essentially assured and that's why the Indo-Pacific strategy emphasizes building partner capacity and then upholding those international rules and norms that preserve those small states rights because they're inherently aligned with the U.S. and I think the Quad is consistent with that so the tensions are there but I think they're a little bit overblown and certainly you saw you saw those fears come out of the headlines from from Beagans remarks Deputy Secretary Beagans remarks where he was sort of talking about enhancing the Quad and suddenly it became in the minds of commentators a potential proposal for an an Asian NATO which I don't think is welcomed here Thanks Drew we have about five minutes left so just scanning the questions that we have online I'm gonna take one of them and pull the whole panel so someone asks somewhat provocatively or perhaps just an interesting thing to consider 15 to 20 years from now will organizations like ASEAN be more influential or less influential so let me start back at the first panel and you can you can take that on say more or less and why or anything any other final words you might have so let's let's start with Byron So I believe that ASEAN will be more influential I believe that ASEAN is doing everything it can to remain central to remain important and to remain integral to this region and I believe that in the future it will just become more and more important thank you Ambassador Ambassador you're up Oh thank you very much I do believe that ASEAN with experience of 50 years and it has been dealing a lot with the major powers it can come up with recommendations for this time especially how much it can harmonize between national and regional interests this is very much important I think that each member's states of ASEAN will feel its interest serve more in building ASEAN strong then make it less thank you very much Ali what do you think 15-20 years from now will ASEAN be still be around in influential my answer is yes ASEAN has a very compelling story and it has to be more compelling if it really wants to be more relevant so yeah I mean you know 20 years ago 1997 I'm sorry I don't know whether I said it earlier on when ASEAN countries were you know crippled as a result of the economies were crippled as a result of the financial crisis they were saying ASEAN is a sunset organization you know it will never survive because it's not equipped to deal with this crisis 20 years later ASEAN is still around and so of course 20 years from from now it will definitely be around and if if if we keep the work if we keep if we focus on what we do I think ASEAN will continue to be influential Drew over to you so I I mean I hate to simply agree with everybody because I think the audience wants to see tension and conflict between scholars and experts but I think over the last eight years I mean we've seen probably the most dramatic change in Chinese foreign policy since Deng took over after Mao died in in in Xi Jinping and his you know Fen Fai You Wei you know socialism with Chinese characteristics and in the new era and I think that presents the challenge to ASEAN and I don't think ASEAN is an organization nor many Southeast Asian states don't yet appear to recognize how fundamental that change in Chinese foreign policy really is so I think that the the issue will be whether or not ASEAN recognizes the new challenge that that a fundamentally different China presents the region and how it adapts to it I mean do I think China can adapt to it? Yes, I think the region will adapt I think Southeast Asian states have a long history in some cases thousands of years of history hedging against or with China so I I think it will prevail in that respect but I think it faces a pretty dramatic challenge that it's not yet ready for Well I think we've captured things well ASEAN's here to stay we all wish it could be a little more effective there's always room for improvement but there's nothing else that can be at the center of Asia Pacific Indo-Pacific regionalism so we all have a stake here from a U.S. policy perspective ASEAN engagement's really been institutionalized within the Asia bureaus at the at the in the key places in the U.S. government there are people working on ASEAN that weren't doing that 10 years ago there's a lot more discussion in the think tank community we're all learning a lot glad we got a chance here today to not just talk about the engagements next week but also to take a step back I would really encourage everybody to read Drew and Byron's report that's at usip.org I'd like to thank everybody for tuning in in Washington across the United States one of the great things about this era is we got a diverse audience we have four panelists sitting in Southeast Asia and we really value your time it is late in Singapore almost as late in Hanoi so I think it's about time to let you go but thank you again for everybody for joining I think this has been a great discussion the video will be posted on usip.org and again really encourage you to read the new special report on ASEAN by Drew and Byron two of our panelists so thank you very much everyone