 ... piloter og teknisjene til å enable dem til å ha F16. Det er mye vi må gjøre. Vi må holde og holde dette holdet. Men hvis vi stopper for en moment og tror på det som vi er i dag, kører vi til hvor vi tenker vi skulle være, vi er veldig tidligere av denne invasjonen. Jeg tror vi må rekonees for strengen og kommittementen, ikke mindre, som er nødvendig for EU-lager og NATO-analyse for our institutions to stand by Ukraine. Og det er extremt viktig å rekonees, for dette er noe som er nødvendig for å fortsette. Vores support har helpet å enable EU-lagerne til å launch det counteroffensive. Det er... EU-lagerne er graderligere i grunn, og det prøver det viktigste av vår support, og også vår utvikling og vildighet til å fortsette supporten, fordi dette er hård og svært, men de har vært klar til å bruke fensiv lagerne av russiske forster, og de er forstående. Og det var også klær kommittement og klærmessage fra NATO-summet i juni, at vi må fortsette å supporte Ukraine. Det har vært messaget fra EU again og again, og fensivt har bare hatt de viktigste forstående for dem. På NATO-summet, det meste som selvfølgelig supporter Ukraine. Vi var også able to make progress on Ukraine's path towards NATO membership. Vi rekommenderer at det EU har gjort i grunn i de kandidatstater. I NATO, at the Vilnius Summit, we made important decisions to help to move Ukraine closer to membership. We reiterated that Ukraine will become a member of NATO, but then we added three elements, which actually moved them closer to membership. First, we agreed a substantial package, and also funding for a substantial package to ensure full interoperability between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and NATO. Interoperability between our Armed Forces is really a way to, in practical terms, move Ukraine closer to NATO membership. The second thing we did was to strengthen the political institutionalized cooperation. We established something called the NATO-Ukraine Council, where we don't meet Ukraine as a partner. We meet as equals around the table, 31 Allies, 32, and then with Ukraine around the table as an equal. This council can make decisions. It can convene on a short notice. It can address crisis, as we did just after the summit, when the grain deal was suspended. And the plan is now to really develop the NATO-Ukraine Commission to a practical, to an important tool to strengthen the bonds between NATO and Ukraine. And the third thing we did at the NATO summit was the requirement for membership action plan for Ukraine to become a member. Because previously the idea was to grant the country membership action plan and that was a step towards invitation. At the Vienna summit we said that there is no need for membership action plan because Ukraine has only moved closer to NATO. So we turned now the membership process from a two-step process to a one-step process. And these three things, the interoperability, the NATO-Ukraine Council and the removal of the requirements for membership action plan for Ukraine, demonstrates that Ukraine has never been closer to membership in NATO than now. And let me just end by saying that this reflects the political reality that nations are sovereign, nations decide themselves, and Ukraine has, of course, the right to decide its own path, and it's up to Ukraine and NATO allies to decide when Ukraine becomes a member. Russia cannot veto membership for any sovereign independent state in Europe. The other main issue at the NATO summit was to strengthen our deterrence and defence. Because fundamentally NATO has two tasks when it comes to the war in Ukraine. One is to support Ukraine as NATO allies and NATO does do. The second is to prevent escalation. And therefore we have already increased our presence in the eastern part of the alliance to send a very clear message to Moscow to remove any room for misunderstanding, miscalculation that NATO is there to defend every inch of NATO territory, one for all, all for one. At the NATO summit we agreed new plans for the defence of the whole alliance. We also agreed to establish and identify more high redness troops, 300,000 troops on different levels of high redness, and also have more air and naval capabilities ready to quickly reinforce if needed. The purpose of this is to prevent war. The purpose of this is to ensure that NATO continues to be the most successful alliance in history because we have prevented any military attack on any NATO allies. And when there is a full-fledged war going on in Europe then becomes even more important that we have credible deterrence. And by strengthening of deterrence and defence we are preventing war, preserving peace for NATO allies. Because there is no room for miscalculation. And the third thing was that NATO allies have really now demonstrated that they are delivering on the commitment we made in 2014. Because the war didn't start in February last year. It started in 2014. The full-fledged invasion happened last year. But the war, the illegal annexation of Crimea, Russia went into East Donbas in 2014. Since then NATO has implemented the biggest adaptation of this alliance in modern history in decades. And part of that is to invest more in defence. I think I've told you before that I know it's hard to allocate money for defence. Because most politicians want to spend money on health, on education, on infrastructure instead of defence. But sometimes you have to invest in defence and when tensions are going up risks are increasing. They have had to invest more. And this year we expect NATO allies to increase defence spending by more than 8% in real terms. This is the biggest increase in decades. And it shows that allies are now... And of course, many of them, most of them are also EU members, are now taking this very seriously. More money for defence also enables to invest more in production of ammunition. Which is extremely critical. I welcome the efforts, I welcome the decisions by the European Union. Which goes hand in hand what we do in NATO. In NATO we have different arrangements for joint procurement of ammunition. We have done that for many years. We have something called NATO support and procurement agency. I welcome efforts by EU members, NATO allies, to join the ramp up production. And we work closely with the defence industry throughout the alliance in EU. But also in non-EU allied countries to produce more. And more spending is a precondition for also increased production. Lanslig, on Sweden, as first of all, it is historic that now Finland is a member of the alliance. And we have to remember the background. The background was that President Putin declared in the autumn of 2021, and he actually sent a draft treaty that he wanted NATO to sign, to promise no more NATO enlargement. That was what he sent us. And that was a precondition for not invade Ukraine. Of course we didn't sign that. The opposite happened. He wanted us to sign a promise never to enlarge NATO. He wanted us to remove our military infrastructure in all allies that have joined NATO since 1997. Meaning half of NATO, all the centre of Eastern Europe. We should remove NATO from that part of our alliance. Introducing some kind of E and B, a second class membership. We rejected that. So he went to war to prevent more NATO across his borders. He has got the exact opposite. He has get more NATO presence in the eastern part of the alliance. And he has also seen that Finland has already joined the alliance. And Sweden will soon be a full member. At the Venus Summit agreed a statement where it was clearly expressed how Sweden will do more, follow up the agreement we had in Madrid on fighting terrorism. And also address issues related to export of military equipment. And then Turkey may declare that they will ratify as soon as possible. This has been reiterated by the president several times. So I expect that when the Turkish parliament reconvins later this autumn, the ratification will happen as soon as possible, which has been stated again and again. And then we will be 32 allies and both Sweden and Finland will be members. This is good for the Nordic countries. It's good for Finland and Sweden. And it's also good for NATO. And it demonstrates that when President Putin invaded a European country to prevent more NATO, he's getting the exact opposite. I think I used my 10 minutes or even more so. So I think I stopped there to allow as much time as possible for comments and questions. I'm looking forward to our discussions. So thank you so much. Thank you very much, Secretary-General Stoltenberg, for your introductory remarks. That was good input for our Q&A session. I now first give the floor to our Chairman of the Delegation for Relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Tom Fundenken de Lade. Tom, the floor is yours for three minutes. Thank you for the floor, David. I also appreciate holding this very timely, important, and indeed already traditional exchange of views with the NATO Secretary-General. Mr. Stoltenberg, I want to congratulate you for another year at NATO's helm, but also pay tribute to your leadership dedication and your commitment to keep us as Europeans free and safe. And if I look back at the Vilnius Summit, I was glad to see the sustained demonstration of transatlantic unity and determination in responding to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. I think in Vilnius, the alliance came up with the right responses to the challenges we're facing together. It is clear that NATO remains essential for the security of our continent, the EU, and the partners in Europe and all citizens involved. And that's why I think we should continue to focus on the partnership, the strong partnership between the Union and NATO. Allow me three short questions in that regard. The first one, beyond the obvious need to continue working together in supporting Ukraine, what indeed would you describe as the most urgent priorities of EU-NATO cooperation after the signature of the joint declaration? The second question with regard to our alleged live ambition on the joint procurement of military equipment, EDIRPA, and the act in support of ammunition production, ASAP, as well as to NATO's new defense and production action plan, what would be your assessment of the coordination between EU and NATO concerning the delivery of military assistance to Ukraine, precisely the coordination between the two? And thirdly, and lastly, and I've already asked this question to you before regarding the protection of democracy, how would you assess the feasibility of effectively establishing the envisaged NATO Center for Democratic Resilience still under your term in office? It's an institution which Congressman Gerald Connolly and I have been pleading for already in the past. Thank you so much for being here with us today and for the frank exchange. Thank you, Tom. And now I hand over to Natalie Loiseau. She will chair the second part of our meeting. Thank you, David. Now I will give the floor to you colleagues, starting with AFET and SEDEC coordinators for two minutes each. And the first is Michael Gala for EPP AFET. Thank you very much, Secretary-General, for your input here and your continuous presence in our committees. I think that's very valuable for us and also particularly also as the standing reporter for Ukraine. Thank you for your continuous and relentless efforts and policies to strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities and to motivate our member states to deliver constantly and more as definitely more is needed. I wonder, as you referred, that it was referred to to our ongoing legislation in DERPA and ASAP, when it comes to better standardization and also the efforts to get the common procurement better. Do you see potential in our legislative parts that we can deliver better for the common cause? Do you see the concrete points where we should embark on in the immediate future? One question. Another totally different one when it comes to the grain corridor. What Ukraine has unilaterally declared as the Black Sea is not an exclusive Russian domestic sea, but an international waters. How do you see how could we help Ukraine secure this, let's say for the area at soon as we enter either Romanian waters or the international waters that they could be, well, near further south. Of course, I thought you were you're involved included there, but my point is to say that we in international waters and Romanian and Bulgarian waters, we can definitely be present. Is there a plan to secure such a grain in the future? And last appeal behind the scenes, please push on all hesitating governments and in my German case, please push behind the scenes, the German Chancellor in person to deliver the Taurus missiles. That is my concrete plea to you. Thank you. Thank you. Now we go to Tonino Pizzola for SNDs. Merci. Welcome to Africa Secretary General. It's good to see you here since the timing of exchange is very, very relevant. Unfortunately, I would say. Thank you for your introductory remarks. For the more I would like to ask you more information on following questions. As my colleagues mentioned already, the European Union is fully embarking on a mission to strengthen its own defence industry and encourage joint production and procurement of defence products, notably with the recent EDIRPA and ASAP regulations. Hva og hvordan planer Natto på å gage i en simulare projekte? Og hvis så, vil det koordine med EU for å ønske interoperabiliteten, og en smart og mer effektiv spennende. En annen aspekt. Jeg er interessert. Hva er det mediet som skjønner Natto for i Black Sea i kontakt med russiske vare på ukraine? Og det er også interessant å høre med deg. Kan du provide oss mer informasjoner om et alliance kooperasjon med asienpartner? Først av alle i Japan og i Korea, med en mer assertivt China-polisi i regionen, som også Pyeong-Yang, som går i deelser med Kremlin. Takk for å renoe Europa, Tras Ausrevisius. Takk, Nathalie. Generalsekretær, velkommen til EU. Det er always a pleasure to have an open and frank exchange with you. We're facing absolutely new security situation whatsoever. And with the Russian missiles, at least parts of them falling on the NATO territory, it's something we have to reflect appropriately. This is nothing about theory. It's a very gloomy practice we have to reflect by our decisions. My first question, Secretary General, is about the lessons from the Russian aggression against Ukraine or lessons from the Ukrainian front. What the member states of NATO and those interlinked with EU must learn. We see a different level of using drones. I would say the war went drone-iced and it's not a limit which is reached. Are we learning? Are we taking into consideration a different situation in the skies? At least small flying objects which change, as well as mining. The density of different mines used in a war is something which hasn't been predicted by many experts. So that's why the Ukrainians are completely right. Once they say that they fight something like in between World War I and World War III. So we have to probably understand this. My second point, Secretary General, is about the hybrid threats which come from so-called private military formations. They are not private. I mean they are mostly state supported. But sometimes, from my point of view, we simply deny and do not take into full consideration the existence. What can be done and what can be done for us and the city coordinators, Sven Mixer? Yes. Thank you. Thank you very much, Secretary General, for being with us. A question to you regarding could you expand on two points in the final communique of the Billions Summit. That you briefly also mentioned in your introduction, first the defence spending pledge, which was originally made in 2014. We've seen significant progress with regard to increasing defence spending, but there's still a very long way to go. So how do you see the current state of implementation and what are your expectations of getting where we want to get? And the same question about the new sort of high availability of the new pool of high readiness forces. I mean NRF has been there for quite some time. Now we have a different structure that we have set up by the Madrid Summit communique and Vilnius Summit communique. How do you see the progress in the implementation, what do you expect to happen by the end of this year and beyond when it comes to getting to these 300,000 pool of high readiness forces? Thank you for ECR, Vital Vashikovsky. Sorry. Thank you, Natalie. I'm here, Secretary-General. First of all, congratulations for the extension of your mandate. We are happy and appreciate your service and performance as NATO chief. I would like to express couple critical remarks about the summit, but please don't take it personally. Vilnius was a good summit, but not as good as Warsaw summit for the eastern flank. Eastern flank security is not enhanced by the additional presence of NATO troops. We were expecting that NATO battalion groups turn into brigades or even higher. Nothing happened. Secondly, we got additional, more detailed, elaborated, contingent plants. But who is going to manage the plant? Who is going to command the defense of the eastern flank? There is no regional NATO command to defend eastern flank. So what are the benefits for eastern flank, which is 250 km away from Russian border and more than 500 km away from the force located somewhere in the western part of your two-defend eastern flank? Thank you. Thank you for the left, Mick Wallace. Thanks very much, Natalie. Mr. Stortenberg, NATO has been vocal in identifying China as a threat. The Vilnius summit declaration states that China is trying to subvert the so-called rules-based international order and criticizes China for being opaque about its strategy and intentions. My first question is, how is it possible to subvert an order that has no constitution, no basis whatsoever in international law? If you think it does in fact appeal to or have a standing in international law, why then do NATO and NATO members repeatedly violate international law without any consequence? Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, for example, China has not illegally invaded and bombed a sovereign country in over 40 years, while the US and our allies are hardly stopped in the same period. Killing millions of civilians, displacing millions more, and illegally sanctioning dozens of countries to the point where tens of thousands of men, women and children are extraditionally executed each year for simply existing in a country targeted by western imperialism. Is it not time to return to multilateral international forums based on diplomacy and international law like China has repeatedly urged the US to do? In July, NATO called on China to play a constructive role as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and to abstain from supporting the war effort in any way. The reality is that their positioning has allowed them to play a constructive role as a potential mediator for peace. It was NATO, the EU and the US who dismissed their peace plan. You yourself ridiculed the plan saying that China didn't have much credibility. Credibility is about consistency and being believable. China has stayed neutral in the war, did not impose sanctions, still trades with Russia and Ukraine, and has flatly stated that they would not supply weapons to either side in the conflict. The EU has armed one side in the conflict, imposed massive sanctions, but continues to be one of Russia's biggest trade partners. Tell me, Mr Stottenberg, who has the most credibility? I get the floor to Antonio Lopez Histuris White, who is a Fed reporter on NATO, for two minutes. Merci beaucoup. Thank you, Mr Secretary General. I wanted to tell you, of course you only had ten minutes for your presentation. Let me tell you that I fully share your priorities that were shown during these ten minutes. But there is one thing, sorry to say, I'm a little bit obsessed and some of our colleagues here also, which is our southern flank. I might want to hear from you, maybe in the answers, a little bit more about this strategy. There are very warning signs coming with eight coup-de-tats in three years in Africa. We have been kicked out of many countries. Let's put it in a diplomatic way. So what's your point of view, the top priority we should be addressing in this question? Second, I come from Spain. As you very well know, Secretary General pays only 1.26 of our budget to NATO. Do you think this is a good figure? Could we improve it? Should we improve it? I think that's also important to know from your perspective. And third, we have received during these weeks information that the Cuban Army is now present in Russia. Ready to take action against Ukraine. Do you have any intelligence or information about it? The Cuban Army is not very effective, but in Cuban intelligence it is. So it is for us a matter of worrisome that they are present. We would like to know if you have any kind of thought or information about it. Thank you very much. Thank you. Now we have many colleagues who want to have the floor. So in order to have all of you speaking, and more importantly, even to have the Secretary General able to answer, I would really ask you to limit your intervention to one and a half minutes, starting with Zeliana Zovko. Thank you, Secretary General. I will ask you the questions that may be a bit forgotten. There is a book called My War Has Gone By A Missing So by a famous journalist who was a war reporter in Bosnian Herzegovina. What shall we do about Bosnian Herzegovina? You said that you are jumping over this membership requirement. For so many years, NATO was asking so many questions and posing, and we have so many crisis situations there. Recently, Bakker Zovegovic called the Muslim world to unite and help against the US and Western allies in this electoral period. So is there any chance that we are having attention there and doing some preventive diplomacy before this area becomes again hotspot? Thank you. Thank you, and thank you for being so concise. Now I give the floor to Elena Jonsheva. Thank you, Mr. Stoltenberg, in advance for your answer. My question is specifically about the Black Sea and the Black Sea countries. The Black Sea is about to become a conflict zone in which Bulgaria in Romania to NATO countries can be directly involved in the war. How would you comment on such situation, on such development? Do you expect a revision of the Montreal Treaty? How do you intend to implement a possible increased NATO-navel presence in the Black Sea, if the war will escalate? In brief, what is your strategy for the Black Sea? Can we expect a full scale war in the Black Sea region? Thank you, Nadans. Thank you. Next is Katarina Che from Renew. Thank you, Secretary-General, and thank you very much for this frank conversation that is possible to conduct with you here. First of all, we would very much look forward to welcoming Sweden in the alliance, for which my party in Hungary has been calling for repeatedly. I would like to ask you two brief questions. First of all, here in the European Parliament, the foreign affairs and the human rights committees are working very hard to assist Ukraine in uncovering, documenting and sanctioning crimes against humanity that is committed by the Russian aggressor against Ukrainian civilians, often minors. And of course, our goal is to help bring justice to the perpetrators of these heinous crimes. So if you could elaborate a little bit on the most severe types of crimes committed against these civilians, that would be very much appreciated. And also how effective do you think Ukrainians are in torting those crimes, and how could the Euro-Atlantic community help improve these capabilities? And another question, and I think a lot of us are being worried about, is the situation around the Isaporizia nuclear power plant that is currently running on very limited capacity. And based on the expert data provided by the atomic energy agency and intelligence, how would you assess the current level of threat? And if the front lines move in the area of the Nipro River, how do you think the Ukrainians can take it back safely? Do contingency plans exist for the different scenarios in this very dangerous environment, and also for the wider central eastern European region? Thank you very much. Thank you. Next is Hermann Hirsch for NCR. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Stoltenberg. It was a very interesting year exposition. I have two short questions. One of them is about Turkey. We have in Turkey a NATO member who has a very special role in this crisis. And some of us wonder where it is in every moment with this special connection, which it has indeed with Moscow and the special operations they handle between Erdovan and Putin, which are more or less outside the common front of the NATO policy. And the other one is the connection, which was referred by my colleague Sturid, Lopati Sturid, with Cuba. We know now, we confirm that we have, we have soldiers on the front in Ukraine, on the spot Cuban soldiers. We wonder how long it will take that we have other people of the followers of power like Venezuelans or Nicaraguans in this, in this part of the world, as we have Russians, as we have Russians in their countries. So isn't it necessary that the NATO takes really an overall look on what we are doing with some Latin American countries as Cuba, which we are supporting after knowing this kind of actions? Thank you very much. Can we switch off your microphone? Sure. Thank you. Next is Clare Deili. Thanks, President. Mr. Stoltenberg, you asked us to look at where we are today compared to when the invasion started. I'm not really sure what you meant by we. I know you spent a lot of time on NATO. Maybe that's the we about the expansion with Sweden and Finland. But you were considerably quieter about the bitter disappointment experienced by Ukraine in Vilnius, that the hopes that they thought of a path into NATO didn't actually work out according to plan. Our chair said that aid somewhat compensated, which others have kind of said, is that Zelensky's silence was basically purchased. But in essence, really, haven't you let Ukraine down in terms of the pathway to membership? And on the subject of Ukraine, is it not the case that your rhetoric and reality are going in opposite directions and the world is beginning to notice? Because you said that Ukraine is gradually gaining ground. That's not true. Since you were here the last time, Ukraine has lost territory. A half a million men are dead. Ukraine has had to resort to conscription. There's reports of signing people up with disability, with mental illness, men paying money to get out of the country, hiding in their houses. We're now in a bloody war of attrition. And it's simply cruel for it to go on. Now, senior U.S. military personnel are even getting into the pages of the Washington Post and so on, echoing the call made by General Millie last November that there should be peace and a real peace. If you care about Ukraine, what's your attitude for a peace plan to save Ukrainian lives? Thank you. Next is Fabio Castaldo. Thank you. Thank you very much, Madam President. Dear Secretary-General, thank you for being with us today this morning. Both you and NATO, as you underlined, have recently released significant documents, such as also the strategic compass in our case, which may have been partly overtaken by the events due to the Russian aggression in Ukraine, but remains highly relevant. And the NATO strategic concept. Historically, you and NATO have so to operate with great coordination and a complementary perspective. My first question is about the new opportunities and synergies that do you see of possible further improvements in this partnership. I'm thinking particularly about the NATO Innovation Fund and the Diana program, which should undoubtedly synergise with the efforts that the U is making to strengthen its defence industrial base and to develop its strategic and technological autonomy, primarily through the European Defence Fund, among other existing and future initiatives. Are there existing or planned coordination platforms for this aspect? Also, I wanted to ask you how can we ensure that our efforts to achieve greater interoperability at the European level remain aligned with NATO's interoperability efforts? And I would like also to ask you if you would support a stronger and more structured coordination within NATO, among the countries that are also EU member states taking into account that now there is almost a complete overlap. Less question. We have news of massive movements of troops, military equipment and missions from Azerbaijan towards the border with Armenia that are very worrisome. There is a real risk of a new criminal war of aggression by an authoritarian regime against the democracy, not only in the disputed region of Karabakh, but also in Zangisur and Southern Armenia. Azerbaijan received weapons system from several NATO countries. What is your position, NATO position, on this risk of escalation? Thank you. Thank you. Next is David Lega. Thank you so much, Chair. And thank you, dear Secretary General, for taking the time to be with us here today. I just have to start by saying that as a Swede, I am very grateful for all the hard work that you have put in to finally make a Sweden a member of the NATO family, so thank you for that. We had a lot of questions today and interventions about the southern flank and the eastern flank. I wanted to focus on the other, the last flank because of the recent increasing tensions between the USA and China and also its threats against Taiwan. So I would like to ask you, what do you think NATO's role against new transnational threats like foreign interference on China is and also about AI? How can AI play an effective role in this and actively combat the misuse of AI? Thank you. Thank you. Next is Dietmar Küste. I would like to speak in German. Thank you, General Secretary, for your presentation. I would like to address two questions. The first is the issue of radiation ammunition. At the invasion of Russia into Ukraine in the previous year, 916 dead and injured were registered by radiation ammunition. Most attacks are on the basis of the Russian troops. But also the Ukraine uses radiation ammunition, which is now delivered by the USA. Around 95% of all killed and injured belongs to the civilian population. In May 2009, in a resolution, the European Parliament welcomed this Oslo Convention for the prohibition of radiation ammunition and all EU members were asked to sign. They were even the first signers of this convention. Now they have made themselves a spokesman. How do you explain your opinion? Second, what is Plan B, because the Ukrainian counteroffensive has not reached its goals? Over the years, a long-term bloody war at which many people are left alive and Ukraine will be destroyed. What escalation danger is in a long-term war? When will the war be turned into a war of Europe? And what do we have to do against it? Thank you. Next is Javier Naert, for a new... I spoke in Spanish. My wish is that Ukraine recovers all its territory, including Crimea. My wish is that Ukraine be part of the European Union and NATO. But there is a question that is my wish and then there is reality. The reality is that if Ukraine is part of NATO, we have to declare the Russian war by having a member country that has been invaded. Therefore, it is absolutely impossible that Ukraine be part of NATO until the war does not end. And now let's go to the war. The Kursk 1943 offensive showed that even the best troops of the German army, of the Baffen-SS and the Spanker units, could not penetrate some defenses that had 40 km of depth in the Kursk salient. In consequence, not even without aerial superiority, it was evident, and I said it a thousand times, that Ukraine could not advance in its offensive, many times announced. We have the Rasputitsa, which will start in the month of October-November. Therefore, they have a month and a peak to deepen towards Tomak and towards Mariupol. But they have to pass some defenses that have not been able to penetrate, except at a very short level. In consequence, my question is, we are going to meet before a conflict, a frozen conflict. What will be NATO's policy for a frozen conflict, which is the reality of what we are going to find in Ukraine, except that vital events occur in the Russian leadership. A thing that does not seem predictable. Next is Martin Gyongyosi. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you very much, Mr Stoltenberg, for being with us here today. And a special thank you for bringing into your introductory remarks. The reference to the 2021 autumn Russian draft agreements that were sent to NATO and the United States, which were not accepted, but which very clearly show the Russian intentions and Putin's intentions. And I think when we are talking about this war, this is where the argumentation should start. What are the Russian intentions? It is crystal clear what Vladimir Putin's design is, and Ukraine is only the first step in this strategy. And all those people, prime ministers, who within the alliance are talking about accepting Vladimir Putin's peace terms, forget this. And they should be reminded of Russia's intentions. What Vladimir Putin sent to NATO and to the United States is the revival of the Brezhnev doctrine. And all those people who lived for 50 years behind the Iron Curtain should know what the Brezhnev doctrine is. What Vladimir Putin sent to NATO and the United States is exactly this. So when we are talking about the war in Ukraine, then we should talk about this draft agreement and remind all those who within the alliance are speaking Putin's narrative wrong, and they should be getting on the side of Ukraine. So my question is, Mr. Stoltenberg, is does NATO have the instruments to fend off these internal Trojan horses and those who want to weaken the alliance from within by playing Putin's narrative? Because NATO, when it was designed after the Second World War, it was designed for a classical war-like situation for a cold war, but it was not designed to fend off this type of hybrid attacks against the alliance from within. Thank you very much. Next is our colleague Milan Mon. Gracias, president. I'm going to speak in Spanish. Voy a hablar en español señor secretario general y darle las gracias en primer lugar por su presencia y su presentación. Se hablado ya mucho de la guerra de Rusia contra Ucrania, yo quería cambiar un poco el punto de interés y centrarme en el Sahel. Sobresto el comunicado, el apartado 22 de su comunicado en Vilnius, abordó la situación en el Sahel y después vino el golpe de Estado en Nijer. Me parece que ya nos queda amigos de Occidente solamente a Mauritania en el Sahel. ¿Cómo ve la situación? Y el segunda pregunta muy breve también es algún comentario sobre la reciente ampliación de los Brix con países tradicionalmente cercanos Occidente como Emiratos árabes o Arabia Saudí en ese cóctel tan extraño, con Irán, por ejemplo. ¿Qué valoración hace? Gracias. Thank you. Next is Roy Chan. There it is. Thank you, thank you, chair. And thank you, Secretary Jale, for being here. And let me thank you also that in a bad moment I sometimes watch the clip of your previous visit here that you posted yourself after being here because it encourages us to stay focused. And my first question relates to Ukraine because we need to give Ukraine what it needs to win instead of not just not to lose. And therefore I want to ask you, we knew we needed to give them the tanks. We started asking for that a year ago and still we waited. We knew we will need to deliver fighter jets at some point to secure, let the Ukraine secure their airspace and still we were hesitating. And now we know that they need these attakems, the long range missiles. Can you explain the rationale behind accepting that Russia can attack from everywhere? Ukrainian hospitals, schools and what have you. But that we are engaging in debates with producers of these long range missiles to limit the range. Can you explain the rationale behind that to me? The second question relates to what our colleague said. Members engaging still with Russia, playing lip service to Russian narratives. But also non-members that are exercising with a member state of NATO like Serbia that regularly almost weekly visits Russian high level diplomats or even visits Russia. Can you comment on that and last thing, you met with President Vucic, did you unequivocally said that is absolutely unacceptable to engage or ignite violence against NATO personnel. Thank you. Thank you. Next is Vlad Georg from Renew Europe. Thank you. Very specific questions on a very specific matter. At least a Russian drone exploded on the territory of Romania a couple of days ago, NATO member. First of all, the Ukrainian side has told us three days ago, at least three days ago, that this happened. But the Romanian authorities didn't find it or didn't admit it until yesterday. First question, did the Romanian authorities inform NATO that indeed there was no Russian drone explosion? Did they afterwards inform NATO that they found the Russian drone that exploded on NATO territory? And third and very important, what is NATO doing to defend that piece of border of NATO border? Because we have a lot of citizens living there and the Russians are attacking nearly every night on that piece of Danube border near the port of Ismail, more exactly. So what is NATO doing for its citizens in order not to have those Russian drones exploding more and more on our territory? Thank you, Secretary-General. Thank you. Next is colleague Aleksandarov Yondanov. Thank you. I will speak in Bulgarian. Mr. Stoltenberg, thank you for the questions you have answered in our commission. I have two questions I will try to give you briefly. The first one is related to what Russia has done as a prerequisite for creating a new zone. It is not for security in the Black Sea. It is called the new zone for prevention. This zone attracts the exceptional economic zone in Bulgaria and puts the risk of security not only in Bulgaria, but all over the region. The question is, what specific actions are being taken in order to absorb the Russian aggression in the Black Sea and specifically how in these actions and with what opportunities is Bulgaria included. And the second question is the context of what some colleagues have said here. This is the first war in Europe, which has always been like this, in which only one side bears the whole terrible war, the end of it. Russia has not experienced the terrible war. She has created this terrible one. The question is, when and Russia will begin to experience the terrible war that begins. When will the end of the war begin to fall into Russia? Thank you for your attention. Next is Nikos Papandreou. Many colleagues said it's a very sad situation. We find ourselves here and from SND supporting a war and supporting more weapons. It's something that I didn't expect to do in my lifetime, but here I am supporting a war. Being Greek, I can't help but hope that you bring your considerable prestige and status to ensure that when Sweden joins, it should not become a bargaining tool for it to reduce its governance. Sweden is one of the highest levels in the Scandinavian countries that Greece is jealous of. I hope that the bargaining tool that is being used by Turkey does not reduce Sweden's democratic principles simply because there is a strong bazaar as they say in Greece going on. I know you've done much to get in that direction and I hope you use your considerable prestige to ensure that Turkey remains the NATO member that we wanted to be. Thank you. Thank you. Next and last is Georgios Kertos for RENU. Thank you very much. I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his presentation and for his excellent work. Maybe he should not become a central banker. He should stay in NATO. I have a question concerning the economic performance of Russia. It seems to me that the Russian economy is more resilient than we anticipated. There is a successful shift towards India and China and Asia in general. They are producing more weapons with the help of different countries like for instance Iran. They have a good understanding with Saudi Arabia and the OPEC Plus so they keep raising, try to keep raising the price of oil and according to what I read, what I read, their GDP is going to increase from 4% to 5% in 2023. This doesn't mean that they don't have a lot of problems but it means, in my view, that they are in a position to keep financing this aggressive war for the years to come. Does the Secretary-General share this assessment with me? Thank you. Thank you colleagues. A lot of precise and diverse questions, Mr. Secretary-General. I'm sure that, thanks to you, we will have precise answers. The floor is yours. You have 10 minutes. Thank you so much. I will really try to address as many as possible of the issues you have raised. But there are so many precise and concrete answers and questions that I'm not able to go into all of them. I will try to group them. I'd like to thank you for the questions for the interest. I think that this session and all the questions you have asked demonstrates the value of NATO-EU cooperation because most of the issues you have raised are issues related to how NATO and the EU has to work together to address common challenges. And many of you ask questions about Ukraine and how we can support Ukraine and what we can do more for Ukraine. And first of all, there is coordination going on at the political level, but also in the very practical level. We have a coordination cell in Viesbaden, where NATO-analyse EU members are together and very practically coordinating the aid and the support. Both identifying the needs from Ukraine and then approaching different countries, ensuring that we build packages of support. Because you need to understand that when you deliver military support, it's not only about delivering a can, it's about delivering that artillery piece, but also the ammunition, the spare parts, the training and maintenance facilities so we can ensure that the whole system can work. And some of you asked me what is the top priority and I think that in one way the top priority now is to ensure that all the systems which are already in Ukraine actually works. Because there is an enormous need to provide ammunition, maintenance, spare parts, to ensure that the systems which are already delivered actually function. I'm not saying that we should not consider to deliver new systems, and we are now in the process of delivering F-16s, but in the public debate it's perhaps a bit too much focus on new systems, instead of ensuring that all existing systems have all the maintenance they need to actually function. There is coordination. I've been there myself. It's very impressive how NATO-EU allies, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, but also of course a lot of EU members are together and in a very practical way coordinate and ensure we will continue to do so. Second on standardisation and procurement. Again, I welcome the things that the EU does. NATO has also different programmes. We realized last fall or last summer that this was going to be a war of attrition. So then production becomes extremely important. In the beginning we depleted our stocks to provide support to Ukraine, but our stocks are not big enough, so we need to ramp up production. The reality is that our production capacity is not as big as it should be. That's the reason why we now actually see some good progress in new investments and more production throughout the Alliance in EU and non-EU NATO allied countries. I welcome the efforts of the European Union. NATO, as I mentioned, we have done joint procurement for many, many years through the NATO support and procurement agency. And also groups of allies, EU allies, are going together and doing joint procurement, and some are just doing it individually as allies. To be honest, the most important thing is not the framework where we decide to ramp up production and procure ammunition. The most important thing is that we actually do it, be it in the EU framework or the NATO framework or a group of countries or individual allies. The thing that really matters is to sign contracts. We need a nation to sign contracts because that enables the industry to invest under ramp up production. Standardisation is of course key. That has been an issue for NATO for decades. We have now stepped up our efforts to ensure standardisation because we have also seen some gaps there. Of course, this has to be a NATO effort because 80% of NATO's defence spending comes from non-EU allies. We need standardisation across the Alliance, and therefore we welcome the increased efforts by NATO to do more on standardisation. On the offensive, and whether the Ukrainians are gaining ground or not. I had to remember that no one ever said that this was going to be easy, the offensive. It was clearly stated that this was going to be a bloody, difficult and hard offensive. Because what we have seen is of course that the Russians have prepared defensive lines, layers of defensive lines. We trench us with obstacles to battle tanks, dragon teeth and mines. Enormous amounts of mines. Hardly any time in history we have seen more mines on the battlefield than we see in Ukraine today. Så det var obvious at this was going to be extremely difficult. But the Ukrainians decided to launch the offensive, because they are going to liberate the land. And they are making progress. Not perhaps as much as we hoped for, but they are gaining ground gradually. Some hundred meters per day, meaning that when the Ukrainians are gaining ground, the Russians are losing ground. And we have to remember the starting point. The starting point is that the Russian army used to be the second strongest in the world. And now the Russian army is the second strongest in Ukraine. And that's quite impressive by the Ukrainians. And that's the courage, the will, the commitment, the determination of the Ukrainian soldiers that are making this possible. And we also need to remember the starting point. The starting point was that when the invasion happened, the full-scale invasion happened in February, we were told by most experts that Kiev would fall within days and Ukraine would fall within weeks. The Ukrainians proved them wrong by pushing back the Russian invaders, liberating the north around Kiev, the east around Harkiv, and then bigger territories in the south around Herzog. And now they are gaining more ground, liberating more Ukrainian territory. And then the same experts that told us that Ukraine will fall within weeks are complaining about the speed of the offensive. The reality is that the Ukrainians are actually exceeding expectations again and again. And we need to remember what's our responsibility, our responsibility to support them. We can advise them, but it has to be the Ukrainian commanders, the soldiers on the ground, that make the difficult decisions. We cannot sit here in Brussels in the NATO headquarters on the EU headquarters and tell them exactly how to fight. That's their task, their risk in their lives, and we just support them. And we praise them for their courage. And then I said this also because wars are per, by nature, unpredictable. No one knows exactly where we are in a week or two or a month or a year from now. And hardly any war we will see only, as I say, victories for the side we support. There will be bad days and good days. We need to be with Ukraine, not only good times, but also bad times. So those who are conveying a kind of message that, well, only if they win, we will continue to support them. No, we support them when they win and if they lose. We are there with Ukraine. Because to support Ukraine is not an option. It's a necessity to ensure that we preserve peace for our members, for our countries, and to ensure that authoritarian regimes doesn't achieve what they want by violating international law and using military force. So I just tell you that of course sometimes it's hard to imagine how brutal this war is. But we need to never forget our responsibility to provide support to Ukraine. Then I had a concrete question about the drone, the possible drone. The Romanian authorities have confirmed and informed NATO about that debris from a potential possible drone have been found near the border with Ukraine. They informed NATO Allies in their regular meeting yesterday about all their findings and investigation is going on. And it demonstrates the risk of incidents and accidents. We don't have any information indicating any intentional attack by Russia. And we are awaiting the outcome of the ongoing investigation. Regardless of that outcome, what we have seen of course is a lot of fighting and also air attacks close to NATO borders. And we also had other incidents in Poland and elsewhere. And therefore we have increased our visions. We are closely monitoring what's going on, close to our borders. And we have also increased our presence in the eastern part of the Alliance. There were questions about the Black Sea. The Black Sea is of great importance for NATO. We condemn that Russia has withdrawn from the Black Sea grain deal. We welcome the efforts by Turkey to try to reestablish the grain deal. And of course the best way to ensure safe and secure shipment of grain from Ukraine is to end the war. The reason why we have these problems is because of the war. And then the grain deal is a way to try to mitigate some of the consequences of the war. Let me also say that we have increased our presence in the region. We have done that over a long period of time, but especially since the war, with more maritime patrol aircraft, with battle groups in Bulgaria, in Romania. And we are closely monitoring the whole situation in the Black Sea region, including the literal states. There were a question about the difference between the Vilnius and the Warsaw Summit. And we thought, yes, also I will not compare two very successful summits. But there is a difference. You are right that in Warsaw we decided to deploy new battle groups. What we did actually before Vilnius was that when the morning of the invasion, we activated NATO defence plans. And by activating NATO defence plans we give Sarkozy authority to deploy more forces where and when he deems that necessary. So he has increased the presence in Eastern part of the Alliance. We have doubled the number of battle groups from four to eight. And we have more air and naval forces available. So we will do what is needed to defend every inch of Allied territory. This is part about forward presence, but it's also very much about our ability to reinforce. And that's the reason why more high-readness forces is the key to address any potential threat caused by the war in Ukraine and Russia's aggressive actions. Then I need to move on. I have so many questions about that. The south is of course of great importance for NATO. The instability in North Africa, Middle East, creates threats and challenges for the whole Alliance, not only for the southern Allies. We have our presence in Iraq to help them train and equip their forces to fight terrorism, ISIS. We work with countries like Mauritania, Tunisia to help them fight terrorism. Stavend Jordan, another close partner of NATO. But I think we need to realize that this is also very much about economic and diplomatic efforts. There are also other institutions that NATO has to play a key role. So again, an area where we work together, NATO and the European Union. We don't regard China as an adversary, but we are concerned about the challenges that China poses to our values, to our interests and to our security. China doesn't share our values. They don't believe in freedom of speech, democratic values, and they have expressed that quite clearly. They have cracked down on journalists, on opposition, on dissidents across the country. We have seen how they have cracked down on democratic rights in Hong Kong. We see how they are threatening Taiwan. And we see how China is investing heavily in modern nuclear weapons, more military capabilities and also long range missiles. And how they also work more and more closely together with Russia. Just before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia and China signed an agreement where they promised each other a partnership without any limits. And China has not condemned the invasion of Ukraine. So I think what we need to realize is that security is not regional, security is global. What happens in Ukraine matters for Asia, and what happens in Asia matters for us. And therefore we welcome the stronger partnership we have with Asia Pacific countries. Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea participated in the NATO summit. And we are ready to do even more, to do as much as possible to work together with these countries. Then I had several questions about defence spending. Well, of course, I would like to see all Allies meet to present a guideline. That is not the case. But I am encouraged by what Allies are doing. There are ramping up spending and since 2014 all Allies have increased defence spending. Back in 2014 when we made the agreement we had only three Allies meeting the 2% guideline. Now 11 Allies meet the 2% guideline and almost all Allies have plans in place to be there within a few years. And even those Allies are not at 2% have significantly increased. Germany is one example where actually spending is going significantly up. Yes, I see progress and I welcome that progress. Then I think since my time is really running out. Okay, then I can say one thing about this paradox about weapons. Because you said the representative from Greece said that in a way he never believed that he would support the delivery of weapons to Ukraine. And I think for many people that's a paradox. It is a paradox. Because we all want peace. We all want to invest in something else than weapons. But the problem is that sometimes you need to invest in weapons to ensure peace. That's the basic thing. And that lesson we learned again and again. And I remember very well the end of the Cold War where we were able to reduce defence spending. I don't know exactly defence spending in Greece, but I know that defence spending in my country was 3% of GDP at the end of the Cold War. And then we reduced it to just about 1%. And I was responsible for that. I did not all of that but part of it. Because I was Norwegian politician and across the lines a government parliament reduced defence spending. Because tensions went down. We saw less threats. We believed in a new partnership and we believed in the possibility of working with Russia. And I was a strong believer in that. Because we have seen again and again in history that old enemies can become friends. You see that in Europe, France, United Kingdom, Germany and France fought each other for centuries. Now they are close friends and allies in the European Union. And if you go to the Nordic countries, we have been fighting each other since the Viking Age for hundreds of years. And now Swedes and Danes and Finns and Norwegians are the best friends. So it's possible. So I believe it was possible also to overcome as we have done in Europe for most European countries within the framework of the European Union and NATO. To also overcome that relationship with Russia. Russia didn't choose that path. Russia decided to control neighbours. To try to re-establish swear influence. And saying that there was a provocation if a country decided to join NATO. It's not a provocation. It is a democratic sovereign right of every nation to choose their own path. And therefore we had Georgia in 2008. We had Crimea in 2014. And then the full fledged invasion in 2014. Russia has walked away. And I regret that. But then there is no other option for us. Than to ensure peace for NATO allies, for EU members, by investing in defence. Supporting Ukraine. Because if President Putin wins in Ukraine. Is a strategy for the Ukrainians. But it's also dangerous for us. It sends a message that when they use military force they get what they want. Authoritarian leaders. So it's in our security interest to support Ukraine. And therefore I'm extremely grateful for all the support that EU members, the European Union and NATO allies are providing to Ukraine. Thank you so much. Dear Secretary General, also on behalf of Natalie Loiseau, let me thank you for attending our joint meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee and our subcommittee on security and defence. We very much welcome that you take your time to come to the European Parliament on a regular basis and your input is very valuable for our work. Colleagues, I would like to ask you is there anything to raise under any other business? If that's not the case, our next meetings will be on the 20th and the 21st of September. Thank you for attending and your good participation.