 There is a real risk that terrorists and criminals could try to get nuclear or other radiative materials and use them for malicious purposes such as dirty bombs. For example, an amount of Cobalt-60 or Caesium-137 used widely in medical and industrial practices if combined with conventional explosives could seriously harm health, environment, could have also political, economical, and psychological consequences. There is a risk that nuclear and other radiative materials could be stolen while in use in nuclear power plants, in other nuclear installations and also in medical and industrial facilities, for example in hospitals. So therefore such material has to be continuously protected while in use and in transport. But also that when the material is no longer in use it has to be disposed of in a safe and secure manner. We're doing a lot to help our member states establish and maintain an effective nuclear security infrastructure. For example, we're establishing guidance and standards that codify all what is needed and how to establish such infrastructures. But we also help member states upon the request in training their professionals, regulators, police, custom officers, and others and also help them to assess the effectiveness of their systems and measures. We also assist countries organizing major public events like World Cup or Football Championship or the Olympics. We also provide equipment for detection purposes. We train people and also we help them to have a secure event. And we had many examples and we gained very good experience through all these major public events. Member states and world leaders have recognized the importance of nuclear security and put the nuclear tourism high on the international agenda. At the same time, recognized the central role and the essential responsibility of the IAEA in promoting and coordinating international efforts on nuclear security. Certainly, a lot has been done in our member states to improve nuclear security and the agency has been working with over 160 member states to help them establish and maintain an adequate nuclear security infrastructure. But still much remains to be done. For example, the amendment to the physical protection convention of nuclear material, the so-called CPM, has not yet entered into force. Our director general has been assigning high priority to this amendment, talking to the member states to speed up the process. This amendment, when it enters into force, it will provide protection of nuclear material in use, transport, and storage. So this is an area where we need collective action to improve nuclear material protection.