 Your Excellency, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, Dr. Martin Atalagoa, Dean of the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Professor Andrew McIntyre. Your Excellencies, representatives of the diplomatic community. Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, a very warm welcome to the Centre for Democratic Institutions' 2012 annual address. At the outset, let me acknowledge the first Australians on whose land we meet and whose cultures, which are amongst the oldest continuing cultures in human history, we celebrate the none-a-while people. My name is Stephen Sherlock. I'm the Director of the Centre for Democratic Institutions, or CDI. CDI is Australia's leading democracy promotion organisation. We were established by the Australian government in 1998, a year of great change in Indonesia. Our mandate is to focus on the strengthening of parliaments and political parties in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Our particular emphasis is on Indonesia, and East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji. CDI is funded by AusAid as part of the Australian Overseas Development Assistance Programme. And we are hosted here at ANU in the Crawford School of Economics and Government in the College of Asia and the Pacific. Now the movement for political change, free expression and democracy has made great strides over recent times. The exciting, inspiring and yet sometimes tragic events that have occurred in North Africa and the Middle East have been the cause of great hope, yet concern and speculation. And one of CDI's roles is to consider and discuss about how Australia's democratic experience might be helpful to countries in our region. We do this through training courses in parliamentary governance and political party development, through applied research and scholarship. Australia in turn will learn and be enriched through this interchange. Now as part of our effort, each year we host an annual address delivered by a leading political figure or scholar. Now a speaker this afternoon fits not one, but both of those categories. And it's our pleasure to give him the opportunity to return to his own intellectual home here at ANU and to exchange ideas with people on the campus today. And I'm very pleased that Dr Nuttal Gawa has agreed to take questions from the audience following this address. The CDI address is an opportunity to bring key issues relating to democracy in the region and democracy around the world to an Australian audience. Because today it is not only long established democracy such as our own that are joining the effort to assist the forces of change in new democracies. Indeed many Democrats in Africa or in the Middle East for example are sometimes more comfortable when seeking inspiration from the experience of countries such as Indonesia, countries that have transformed themselves in the last decade or more. Arguably Indonesia has not received enough credit both in Australia and internationally for the great progress that it has made in rebuilding and then consolidating its own democratic institutions since the late 1980s, 1990s. And so it's for reasons such as this that we have invited and are very glad to welcome our distinguished guest here this afternoon. We are honoured to have an eminent national leader from our near neighbour to address us. Ladies and gentlemen, I have pleasure in calling upon our Dean Professor Andrew McIntyre to introduce our speaker this afternoon. Thanks Stephen. Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia Dr. Marty Nathalagawa, Ibu Srania Nathalagawa, Indonesian Ambassador Primo Louis Julianto, High Commissioner of Malaysia Mr. Salman Ahmed, High Commissioner of Papua New Guinea Dr. Charles Lapani, Honourable Julie Bishop and anyone else in the room who's distinguished. Welcome. Great pleasure to have you here, great pleasure to have you here at the Australian National University and particularly for the annual CDI address. It's a personal pleasure for me on behalf of the Vice-Chancellor to be able to introduce Papu Marty. He was appointed as the Foreign Minister of Indonesia on the 22nd of October 2009. Prior to his appointment as Foreign Minister he served as the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations in New York from 2007 to 2009. Among his responsibilities as the Permanent Rep for Indonesia was as the President of the Security Council in November 2007, Chairman of the Security Council's Sanction Committee on the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 to 2008. See if this helps. Chairman of the Asia Group in October 2008, co-facilitator of the President of the General's Assembly for the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Chairman of the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation for 2008-2009. Papu Marty has also led Indonesia's delegations at just innumerable, innumerable multilateral negotiations and meetings of one sort or another. He has a Bachelor of Science from the Long School of Economics, a Master of Philosophy from the University of Cambridge, and as you would guess I'm delighted to say a Doctor of Philosophy from the Australian National University. Colleagues, that's the official stuff it says here on the script I've been given, and that's all true and important. But Papu Marty, Ibu Sranja, on behalf of everyone here in this room, I just want to say how delighted we are to have the two of you with us, particularly at this university given it's just a historic role globally in work on Indonesia. In this country and more broadly, you're recognised as one of the outstanding foreign ministers of your country. You're recognised as one of the outstanding foreign ministers going around in this part of the world today. And I would say it's not just the citizens of your country, but also the citizens of this country and a number of other countries in the region are really fortunate that you're in the job that you are. You're seen as a voice of reason, a voice of principle and a voice of wisdom in regional and international affairs. So official stuff aside, that's what I really want to say, and to welcome you warmly back to the ANU. Dr Stephen Sherlock, the Director of the Centre for Democratic Institutions, Professor Andrew McIntyre, Dean of the College of Asia and the Pacific, the Honourable Julie Bishop. Thank you for being here Honourable. And Excellencies from the various diplomatic missions here in Jakarta in Canberra. I had just arrived about 45 minutes ago, if I seem a bit incoherent, please take that into account. I hope I'm more coherent on the substantive matters. But most of all, all colleagues whom I would not be able to acknowledge each and every one of you. Ambassador High Commissioner of Singapore, it's good to see you again. We were together in London, of course. But most of all, not least, I would like to acknowledge Indonesians, students who are here at the ANU. I hope what I'm about to say will not dissuade you from joining the public service, the service of our great country, and I hope and I'm sure all of you in different shape and form will contribute to the Indonesia's future. Both Dr. Sherlock as well as Professor McIntyre have been too generous, I must say, in introducing myself in the way that they have done. Actually, the privilege and the honour is mine. In having this great opportunity to be able to speak before such an August forum and before such a collective wisdom of knowledge and all that. So I am really grateful for this opportunity and I wish especially to acknowledge the important role of the Centre for Democratic Institutions in Australia, no doubt, but beyond to the region as you have just now described, Dr. Sherlock. We in Indonesia as we transform, we are only too aware of the importance of capacity building, democratic capacity building, the institutions of democracy, because even with the very best of intentions, political will and conviction and determination in the final analysis, all those must be translated, transformed and manifested in actual institutions on which the whole enterprise will be built. And that is why I wish to acknowledge the importance of the CDI in promoting the development and the capacity building of democratic institutions, including in my own country. I would like if I may speak on the theme of change, especially democratic change and how that subject may have or has had an impact on Indonesian forum policy, because I think this is one of the most important issue, how change is responded to, how change is managed, but I prefer not to simply respond or manage change, but rather to be an agent for change, to actually bring about change, to be more proactive role in actually promoting change for the better, for the promotion of democracy in a way that we have been trying to do over the past one year. Now, all of you no doubt in this August hall would be very much aware that if we speak of change, transformation even, Indonesia is one country that you can say over the past decade or so has gone through plenty of those. As a matter of fact, Indonesia from 1998 onwards, we have not only undergone changes, but also I would believe, I would argue, fundamental transformation. The facts are obviously well known, but just to recall, 1998 onwards, the original financial crisis, the economic crisis, the multi-dimensional crisis that Indonesia went through, both first economic and then became political have been truly of a staggering nature, and we Indonesia have been trying to manage that process in as good a manner as possible, but I think 10 years, hence a decade or so after the initiation of those changes, I can say that the scorecard in so far as Indonesia is concerned is not too negative or too pessimistic. We have, for example, in the political domain, a fundamental transformation of a political system from what was then an authoritarian country to what is now the third world's third-largest democracy. Now, we are the first one to acknowledge that ours is not a democracy that is absent of problems and challenges. As a matter of fact, day in and day out, we are constantly reminded of the shortcomings and the failings and the challenges that we still face in terms of our democracy, in terms of our governance issues, but on the whole, it is, I think, to the benefit, to the advantage of the region to have witnessed and to have had this democratic transformation taking place in Indonesia to, as I said, what was once an authoritarian state to what is now the world's third-largest democracy and at the same time, the world's largest Muslim population country which proves that Islam, democracy, and modernity can actually go hand in hand. When we recall that developments in Middle East, North Africa just now, the very difficult process of change that is taking place in some of the countries in that region, then clearly what had transpired in Indonesia can be of some relevance to those countries. Now, the democratic transformation in terms of political system and governance have had its democratic dividend in various domains and areas. In the economic area, for example, we had transformed ourselves from a country that went through very difficult economic conditions. The IMF had to come in to basically rescue our economy to what is now a permanent member of the G20 group of nations. Now at the same time, for example, at a time when much of the world is undergoing, going through difficult financial crisis, Indonesia's economy, as the rest of the South East Asian economies and Australia have remained largely resilient to those difficult situations. In other words, the democratic dividend has been obvious in the political domain, certainly as well in the economic domain as well. I should have mentioned just now in the political domain in terms of the dividend that we have been able to harvest is also the resolution of various internal conflict situations. Acheh comes especially to mind, 30 years, three decades also of conflict. We were able to resolve in a manner that is satisfactory to all concerned. Timur Leste's own separation from Indonesia admittedly extremely difficult and sometimes painful process, but the change that was taking place in Indonesia concurrently with the change that was taking place in the status of East Timur made it possible for both of us to move on, to move forward rather than looking back. In other words, the economic dividend, economic domain, political domain has been the democratic dividend of our transformation. But in my line of work, I am really looking for the dividend in its foreign policy. I have been tasked with this responsibility as Foreign Minister of Indonesia only relatively recently, but very much had an opportunity in previous capacities, almost like a blank canvas. I remember even when I was still in the SPR in New York or Ambassador in London, being invited to come today and you to speak at one of the forum here, I think I spoke about the democratization of Indonesian foreign policy then. And I think now we are trying to put that into effect. And let me give some examples how the democratization, the transformation within Indonesia is manifesting itself in its foreign policy outlook and foreign policy action as well. In terms of process, for example, the process of foreign policy making in Indonesia is now far more complex than it has ever been. Now we have to involve stakeholders beside the government, parliament, civil society and other stakeholders must be engaged and involved in the promotion in the formulation of foreign policy so that we create a sense of ownership in the foreign policy that emanates from that policy making process. But in terms of the actual substance, let me just turn to our own immediate neighborhood namely Southeast Asia. I remember when Indonesia chaired ASEAN in 2003, about three or four years after the beginning of our reform process, when we began to do foreign policy once more because the internal difficulties, I think to be honest, had caused us in the initial period of the reform, reformercy period to turn inwards. But when we began to look at ASEAN once again, we decided then that to bring about the language and the issues of democracies and good governance to ASEAN consideration. We would recall for example, back in 2002-2003, ASEAN was speaking of an ASEAN economic community not of security community and not of social cultural community. It was Indonesia together with the ASEAN colleagues, countries that introduced the notion of ASEAN security community bringing on board issue of good governance, democracy, and human rights to ASEAN. I remember very clearly that effort was often questioned and sometimes wondered why it is that we are bringing what is actually internal political issues onto the ASEAN setting. But we were thinking not of ASEAN 2003 but ASEAN of 2020 and 2015 in terms of ASEAN community. We were keen to ensure that the democratic transformation taking place in Indonesia is not an aberration disconnected from the region at large because if we were to have a democratic Indonesia in a sea or an environment where there is a democratic deficit, that disconnect can create all kinds of complications for all concerned. That is why purposefully and deliberately we brought the subject of democracy, human rights through the ASEAN security community into the ASEAN portfolio ever since 2003 to ensure that there is a synergy in terms of the transformation taking place in our country with the rest of the region. Not by way of extrapolating or exporting even less our national experience because if there is one lesson learned that we had drawn is that democracy must be homegrown, it cannot be imposed from outside but nonetheless we felt it was important that we proceed in that manner. Now of course since then 10 years later or so we have seen the capacity building institutions of ASEAN on democracy. In other words not only have we been building national democratic institutions concurrently and at the same time not sequential concurrently and at the same time at a different pace perhaps we are also building ASEAN democratic institutions. There was that very self-absorbed motivation that I had mentioned just now to ensure that developments in Indonesia is not disconnected from developments in the region but there was also a more real politic reason as well. We felt that the absence of an ASEAN layer on human rights and democracy means that whenever there is an issue to do with democracy and human rights we will quickly see situation developed from the national level to the global level. Not unlike Indonesia's own case. When Indonesia faced the situation on Timor-les or East Timor the issue was immediately brought to the United Nations. There was no ASEAN construct, there was no ASEAN layer to be able to address the issue. Having such an ASEAN democratic institutions and capacities is consistent with Indonesia's outlook but at the same time it makes sense it is not only smart but also it is right because it also provides ASEAN with another option in dealing with that type of issues. Now contrast developments elsewhere nowadays in North Africa and the Middle East where the democratic deficit quickly becomes security issues and ASEAN while we have been developing in a very relatively steady pace but it is one, a pace that is comfortable to all and one that is I think in the long run going to have a greater sense of ownership than would otherwise be the case. But the promotion of democratic values and the promotion of democratic principles, human rights and good governance is not only about institution capacity building. We wish sometimes it was because if that was the case then it can be brought about overnight. It can simply be legislated and just happen very quickly but it is a process not an event. And here I think is where Indonesia has been trying to also influence the course of events by providing our own case study, case as a reference, as a lessons learned for others to be able to see its relevance to their own national situations. I use those terms in a very guarded way because as I said before there is no one size fits all. Every country has a unique situation and conditions but we have not been shy in ASEAN to present our problems in the hope that problems, not success. We have not been shy in presenting our problems to the ASEAN forum in the hope that it will engender a new kind of a more transparent and willingness to share problems type of attitude within ASEAN. And I think in the long run it has worked in different circumstances in ASEAN. I'm looking I'm thinking especially here of developments in Myanmar as you have been aware you would be aware we have been seeing over the past one year a significant not only significant I think quite profound pace of change in Myanmar. Now I recall for many years on Myanmar it has become countries cancelling one another's efforts. A group of countries believe that it is engagement that works, other group of countries believe it was sanctions that works. But in the final analysis we work diligently and patiently with the authorities in Myanmar sharing lessons learned, problems encountered and hopefully engender peer encouragement as we have been doing and now it is beginning to see the positive outcome. So in terms of our forum policy once again democratization within Indonesia finding its manifestation in the regional outlook of Indonesia, institution building, formal institution building within ASEAN, less formal in terms of sharing lessons learned and problems encountered so that other countries within ASEAN hopefully can adapt and adopt Indonesia's learning experience. But beyond ASEAN we have been also gradually expanding our efforts to what is called the Bali Democracy Forum which is now entering its fifth year. This is wider than ASEAN this encompasses the Asia Pacific in general again very modest in terms of not wanting to pontificate but rather to compare notes to share lessons learned and we have been doing that over the past five years with very varied group of countries deliberately and purposefully this is not one of those friends of gathering, gathering of the converted, gathering of like-minded. It is deliberately countries with varying agenda, different outlook so that we can truly get maximum value-adding benefit from the process of discussion among them. So ASEAN capacity building, ASEAN lessons learned efforts and then we have the Bali Democracy Forum as well. A footnote in the region, I don't want to expand on this too long, too deeply but I wish to say it nonetheless. Another change, greater change in our outlook following our democratic transformation is in terms of our views on the geopolitics of the region. They may, a question may be posed on this, it's not about democracy issue per se but our belief that the geopolitics of our region with the Asia Pacific environment would benefit from avoidance of Cold War type of competition and conflict. The management or the containment of a rising country we believe would see the return of old style Cold War power politics type of conditions which would not be conducive to any one of us. That is why Indonesia has been promoting what we call dynamic equilibrium for our region. ASEAN propaganda power not brought about by coalition of forces but rather through concepts such as common security, common prosperity and common stability. Again I believe this is a product of our democratization and transformation within Indonesia. One final point that I would like to say before if we have the opportunity to have a question and answer session. I have spoken about democratic transformation within Indonesia. I have not gone at length because I am sure all of you are quite aware of it. I have tried to make the case that the democratic transformation within Indonesia has had its forum policy impact in terms of ASEAN by bringing issue of democratization onto ASEAN and as well as beyond ASEAN through Bali democracy forum and even in multilateral setting. But I believe that our conversation would be incomplete if we stop at the issue of democratization only at the national level or at the regional level. Instead we must also speak of democratization at the global level namely here the issue of governance, the issue of reform of various multilateral institutions whether it be United Nations, whether it be United Nations Security Council or the IMF, the Bretton Wood system. We do sincerely believe that the effectiveness and the efficiency of some of these institutions are being affected by its sometimes outmoded way of work as well as its membership as well. So we are keen to be able to translate, transform and project the democratization force and sentiment beyond national, beyond the region but also to the global governance as well so that we can have truly possibility for countries large and small to be able to contribute to the promotion of international peace security as well as prosperity. One final note from me, from my own very limited experience and knowledge, I do believe that change can be brought about, positive change can be purposefully and deliberately brought about with strong intent and strong determination. We have been trying, I have been trying over the past two years or so to change certain dynamics from a vicious circle to a virtuous one. I have spoken at some length on the democratization path but the similar effort is being done elsewhere on the South China Sea for example over the past one year when Indonesia chaired ASEAN, I hope we have begun a new, more virtuous cycle in that part of the world through the agreement on the guidelines on the South China Sea. Now we are working on the Code of Conduct. We are doing likewise by ratifying the CTBT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Indonesia is one of the annexed two countries whose ratification is required before the CTBT comes to effect. By doing so I'm trying to have a positive infectious impact to create others pressures, peer pressures for others to do likewise. South China Sea, Myanmar, I have spoken a little bit about on the CTBT and even on the subject matter of my thesis here at NU on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone over the past one year we have made finally concluded the negotiations with the nuclear weapon states so that they are able to exceed to the Southeast Asian nuclear weapon free zone. In other words I think we can make a difference, foreign policies can make a difference in various areas of endeavor and it's just a matter of getting down to doing it. We have a term in Indonesia just now about this, it's about waging peace. Waging peace means we are as aggressive and as purposeful and as deliberate and as strong will in promoting peace as we are often the case in trying to promote more less benign intentions. Those are some of the ideas that I wish to share and I hope I have not spoken too long and I would be very happy if there was to be any questions, hopefully not too much complaints. Comprehensive presentation, and what struck me most about what you were saying was the phrase that you used that Indonesia's transformation has been not an event but a process and what really struck me when thinking and listening to what you were saying was the complexity and the multifaceted nature of that transformation. The internal changes that had to happen in Indonesia, the economic recovery, the rebuilding of democratic institutions after the years of authoritarian government, then the establishing relationships within ASEAN that you talked about many of the issues that are being dealt with regionally through ASEAN and through various other regional forums. And then of course what is so exciting is that by day, day by day now Indonesia becoming more and more a player on the world stage. You mentioned the BDF is of course one of the key instruments to which that has been used and we at CDI are very glad to have a close partnership with the Institute of Peace and Democracy which is closely associated with the BDF. But if I may be frank with you, I think you've set us a very challenging task. And when I say us, I mean people such as ourselves in this room, people who work on Indonesia all the time, we think about Indonesia all the time. One of the challenges that we have is that Indonesia is running so fast ahead of Australia. Not necessarily people such as ourselves, I hope, but popular attitudes in Australia are still a long way behind. Many people in Australia do not, I think, give due credit, as I said in my earlier presentation, what Indonesia has achieved and popular perceptions in many ways are about a decade behind. So it really is a statement to the interesting achievements of Indonesia that you're leaving the Australian community behind. So for us here in this room, the CDI included, it's a task to have the Australian community to catch up on some of those changes. So with those few observations, let me throw an open question in on the floor. Lady there, she was the first with her hand up. So, and the gentleman next to her was next, please. Thank you very much. The lady first. My name is Yusuf Sawaki. I'm a PhD student here at the Union. I'm the linguistics from this popular Indonesia. My question is, you mentioned about democratic change and possible reasons that I agree are going on. You mentioned also about perceptions in Indonesia about the case of Ache and also East Timor. But we don't hear about the West Papua that are still conflict. And my question is, how do you see the conflict and how Indonesia government deal with the conflict in West Papua? And also a couple months ago, the Indonesian pressure mentioned about dialogue between central government and West Papua. How do you see that dialogue and how is it going to happen in the near future? And last question is, why is West Papua politically still restricted from international journalists and human historians, workers and organizations till now? Thank you very much. Well, thank you very much for that question and congratulations on your studies here at ANU and good luck to your research. I know I have not mentioned Papua in my remarks, but purposefully and deliberately because I knew there was going to be a good question. Rather than creating, you know, without half-trick presentation, I would have actually addressed a specific question. And thank you for that. Yes, I have mentioned a number of democratic defendants in Indonesia post-reformacy in terms of political internal situation. I have mentioned how we were able to move on, move forward on Timor-Restez. That would have been far more difficult, I believe, if Indonesia had remained what it was, as Timor-Restez said, when in its own way. Likewise, I have mentioned Aceh. I think it would not have been possible if we do not have popularly elected government with a strong mandate from the people that we would be able to deliver in bringing about this to Aceh. Papua, a number of dimensions on the issue, where is Papua? The issue of sovereignty, the issue of sovereignty issues, the legal status of Papua, I think that is no longer an issue for any one of us, including especially in the international community. I think, as a matter of fact, over the past few years especially, I have begun to notice increasingly even countries that had previously had less than full knowledge and appreciation of the nature of the problem in Papua, have begun to come around to be able to appreciate what is the actual nature of the problem or challenge in Papua. We have, for example, established a very close and positive relations with countries such as Bailatu over the past one year. They are about to open an embassy in Jakarta. Likewise, we have become a very active member of the Pacific, observer of the Pacific Island Forum as well, observer of the Malaysian Spirit Head Group, which in the past we have kept some of the distance. In other words, so far as the diplomacy of the issue, I think it is quite the formal legal sovereignty issue, diplomacy I think is quite steady and quite a non-issue. But there is still a challenge in Papua in terms of other aspects of problems, challenges. One obvious dividend, one obvious democratic dividend in so far as our addressing of the challenges in Papua is that we have now done away with the so-called security approach. Time and time again we have the government had said as a matter of fact, as a matter of policy, not only policy but as a matter of fact, the emphasis on the so-called prosperity approach in Jakarta and to bring about better governance, to better empowerment of the special autonomy, better development and addressing of injustice issues over the past in a better way. Now one concrete manifestation of such prosperity and insecurity approach is that whenever, and there's been quite a few still, occasions or incidences of abuses takes place because of overzealous, over-exuberant enforcement of the law by certain individuals, policemen or members of the DNI, in the past that kind of issue would have been swept under the carpet. But now contrary to the past the issue is tackled head on not only by people like myself but also even by persons such as the president himself. And no impurity, accountability is always made as a priority, as a matter of principle. Of course in the course of that effort there is always room for improvement, space for doing things better. And we would like to invite and encourage civil society and others to be able to point us the way how we can deliver better in that prosperity approach. Having said that, the reality is, the reality where we like to talk about, the reality is in West Papua there are still elements who are actually waiting and fighting for separation to arm the use of armed violence. Now you have to tell me what can anyone, anyone of you perhaps can tell me, if there is any country in the world that would allow, when challenged in that way, when individuals, non-state entities and actors pick up arms, it is the responsibility of the state to be able to maintain public order, to be able to maintain law. I don't want to use the term law and order because it sounds so, whatever, public order I think is the best terminology. That is the reality. That is why we have certain management procedures for our friends to visit the province including journalists. It is primarily to ensure that we do not bring discomfort and safety issues to those who are in Papua because there is the best way I guess for anyone to bring global worldwide attention to the issue in Papua would be to bring arms to, for example, journalists. But by the way on this issue, I have on various occasions in Jakarta asked our foreign media colleagues who had applied and who had been able to go and who had not been able to go. In most instances, the record is not as negative as one would like to think. But that's my general answer to the remarks. I appreciate very much your question. It is something that I think is very fair for us to be concerned about developments in Papua, western Papua. We appreciate very much the position of countries like Australia that supported us as a better place to go. But we need to ensure that we not simply abuse that trust but try to be on our own. We need to be able to deliver by bringing better governance, better human rights and respect for the province of Papua. Thank you for your question. Thank you for the opportunity. My name is Pugir Sosudamon. I'm currently the head of Indonesia Project. Pugir, would you just like my microphone? Thank you for the opportunity. My name is Pugir Sosudamon currently the head of Indonesia Project. Last year we had an update with the title Indonesia's Place in the World. So recently we do it because it seems to many observers that there has been an demand in Indonesia playing a much major role in international politics and international trade, while in reality it doesn't seem that Indonesia is doing that kind of role. And one of the reasons is a policy constraint in which, you know, exactly what you have mentioned, that you put the stress that the way that Indonesia leads the world is to aid ASEAN, one of them, ASEAN, in which some of us think, could think that, well, it is a longer path that could lead us to the world, meaning that actually it could be a constraint. So my question is that, you know, putting those emphasis on using those layers before reaching the world, is it really necessary? Or you mentioned that you were afraid a little bit because there would be if at a situation in which we are going through questions we could have caught up in the situation, you know, like a Cold War situation. Probably you think about China at the moment. But, you know, that's probably the challenge that we have to take. Or there's other concern that you have in mind, probably domestic concerns, you know, even resources that we cannot control what happened. So why is it really in which, you know, what I would like to convey is that international people do want Indonesia to move faster? Well, thank you very much for the question. We can actually, actually, we can walk and whistle at the same time. These are the seals, I'm going to tell you. In other words, what I'm trying to say is that actually, in practice, it is not an either or, thankfully. It is not as if, do ASEAN, don't do the world. Do the world, don't do ASEAN. ASEAN is concerning. A good form policy of the 21st century is to be able to connect the dots, to be able to move up and down the continuum, national, regional, global, national, regional, global. Going up and down that level. If one is stuck at one level, and I say there will be one moment in time when somehow you are enlightened. Okay, we can shut this one and then we move on to do the world. That time will never come. And I think there is one strength of Indonesia's diplomacy. Baba recalled this now. I have mentioned when Indonesia transformed 1980 to 1998 onwards, democracy has it, and therefore in a very humble, low-key, not quantifying, comfort level, everyone on the same page been trying to bring ASEAN together with us, at least to ensure sympathy. Democratization as a topic in Indonesia, democratization with some lesser speed perhaps in ASEAN, at least synergy. I am aware of this so-called dilemma that some of our colleagues in Jakarta became very excited about two or three years ago. As if we are now G20, let's not no longer do ASEAN. As I said, it is a misnomer. It is a misplaced dilemma. Why? Because it would be impossible, impossible for Indonesia to be going to do the world, so to speak, without having a strong grounding in our own region. Not a stepping stone, because the region is our family. A stepping stone is as if you need that pedestal to be able to move on. Now, Indonesia is very proud of its multilateral tradition, but even in 1955 we were barely independent and sustainable. We were able to organize the Asia-Africa conference that brought together Asia and Africa, and that tradition remains. But what we have been doing in ASEAN, and this is where I want the point that I wanted to make, in early ASEAN in November 2011, we adopted what we call Bali Comfort 3, ASEAN community in a global community of nations. How to ensure that ASEAN speaks with greater voice on global issues, climate change, food security, etc., etc., not overnight, but in the same way as ASEAN Community Building in 10 years time, 2022. What is that? It is an attack to ensure that as Indonesia is doing increasingly global multilateral outlook, at the same time there is no leaving anyone behind. It is actually all of us moving together. It is a strategic, deliberate, synergistic win-win. No one loses out ever. Look at some other subregions, Baba. I don't want to mention the subregion concern because I don't want to be unfriendly to any particular visitors. There is another subregion here to South East Asia with some other large countries with it. And that country can be so profoundly important that the regional architecture does not have a chance to develop. It is suffocating. Too much is being embraced that is suffocating. Indonesia's diplomacy is less is more. By this time we are allowing things to prosper and develop. Tell me of another situation, like Indonesia. Indonesia is one of the largest countries in South East Asia. I don't use the word the largest but certainly one of the significant one. But when the problem arises between fellow Asian countries, as you did just now, Asia, Thailand, Cambodia, they turn to Indonesia to help facilitate. This is not often, I think, when the larger country in the subregion is the country that is seen to be most able to bring others. This quality of diplomacy, this quality, we earn this. Earn it through our diplomacy, not through our objective conditions per se. It is a process. And I hope colleagues can understand the need to be able to manage this development. The President used the term Indonesia is a region of power with global interests and with global concerns. We are a region of power but we have global interests and global concerns. So pick any subject you wish to pick and see where we are on the subject matter. So this dilemma, it is a misnomer, it is misplaced. As I said before, we can walk and whistle at the same time. We don't have to switch from one walk before doing the other. I wanted to follow up on the point you just made about as Indonesia rises to become a globally more significant power. And a comment which your illustrious former finance minister made in a public lecture here last year, Dr. Srimoyani Ingrawanti, the point that she made was that as Indonesia becomes globally more significant, as is clearly evident, it is going to need the kind of deep analytical understanding of the world in a sense to be able to be a more effective player in the world. She lamented, for example, the fact that you have recently lost probably your most knowledgeable person outside of government in East Asia. That is the late Dr. Hades Sosastro. And she pointed out, she argued for the case for saying that Indonesia needs deep scholarship, deep analytical understanding of India, of China, hopefully also Australia, in many other countries. And that's outside government. So the diplomatic work that you and your partner do is the most important, but in a way to be more effective, you have to draw on that deep base. And I wonder what you think about that. These things can't be switched on quickly. They take, you know, a generation. But I wonder if you think you're moving quickly enough in the direction of establishing that strong... I agree fully with her analysis just now, as this type of you are. Interactual leadership is as important as diplomatic leadership. We must be at the forefront in recognizing the big issues of the day of our region and coming up with answers. I am not a solicitor of facts. I'm not talking here of numbers, but certainly of quality of our academics and researchers. Very much our strong partners in the operation of our foreign policy. But we must not be neglectful. I have been saying to my colleagues at the Minister of Foreign Affairs, we must have a good scorecard, a snapshot of who is what and who is what and what is the kind of research interest that they have to be able to ensure that there's good synergy between the practitioners, so to speak, and the academics, so that we can support one another and come up with good policies. Notwithstanding that challenge, I would like to think if you were to look at the region, for example, we have been trying and I believe we have provided the kind of intellectual leadership over the recent past. Of course, just now, ASEAN Security Community Building, Democracy, Human Rights, I had mentioned, and beyond. And also the whole debate on the regional architecture building, the East Asia Summit's edition of U.S. and Russia, the Bali Principles adopted at the last East Asia Summit, similar to the DAC, the Lithuania Media Corporation, but covering the entire East Asia Summit participants. These are some issues that I think are evident of our intellectual contribution to our regions, his course on method to do better relations. My name is Chris Rollins from the National Security College. Thank you for a very eloquent presentation, which I think is exemplary of the kind of achievements that Indonesia has made on the Democratic front. My question follows from how it builds, but sort of in the reverse, in the sense that I think Australian-Indonesian relations are very positive at the moment. There are, of course, a way to see ups and burglars and caveats. But also with the Democratic nexus in mind, the values of Indonesia are a major way, so I think I agree with the earlier statement that a sort of not fully appreciated perhaps, just how foreign Indonesia has come, particularly in its foreign policy, look at, for example, the wording of the Institute of Peace and Democracy and those terms as compared to, say, my own college at the National Security College and the terminology or emphasis there. So I guess my question is, human that there's actually getting convergence of values between two countries, what opportunities and also constraints do you see in terms of the Australian side of the picture, Australian bilateral relations with Indonesia actually improving even further in the future? What can Australia do to build a better relationship and a better understanding of Indonesia? Thank you. Thank you very much. As a matter of fact, I'm here in Canberra for the purpose of having a bilateral with my colleague, the recently appointed Minister of Affairs of Australia, Ms. Boca, as well as to initiate a new process. It's called a 2 plus 2, where for the first time, the foreign ministers of Australia and Indonesia will be meeting in a forum together with the Defence Ministers. So it's 2 plus 2. So this is a new forum in recognition of the close interlinkage between defence issues and foreign policy issues that will take place tomorrow. Australia is a very important partner of Indonesia, comprehensive partner is how we describe it. We have a long book treaty, it's the foundation of our bilateral relations. You are quite correct in recognizing that at the same time we have had our issues and we need to manage in recent years and no doubt there will be many more to come because we are after all neighbours. But to be honest, I have been able to work where it was before with Pak Levinran, previously in the civil smith when he was the Foreign Minister of Australia in a very, very effective way. I could not think of an issue where we confront a problem driven by a wedge between us. Actually we were able to immediately see the big picture that this is an issue that we both need to address in a holistic, comprehensive, mutually beneficial way and that kind of outlook we are trying to preserve. In terms of challenge, I think we have a perception challenge. On the one hand, relations actually are quite robust and quite strong, government to government, but sometimes among the public, both in Australia and Indonesia, is either one of lack of knowledge, lack of awareness or if there were to be some awareness, it tends to be a little bit of the usual stereotype kind. That's my problem and my business to address, but it is a process again. There's no shortcut to this. We must have a better people-to-people interaction and exchanges among students, among academics so that we understand one another better what keeps or what motivates our two countries in terms of issues. But all in all, I think all in all, I must say the relations between our two countries have never been as close as they are today and I am very confident that whatever problems or challenges you face, we will be able to address them. But we have now an annual leaders meeting between the Prime Minister and the President. We took place last time in Bali last November. We'll be having another one hopefully in Australia come next May and then we have the 2 plus 2 and then we have the people-to-people contacts as well. But this is a relationship that needs to be nurtured, that needs to be developed and I think that must be made contemporary and modern as well. Thank you so much. My name is Nathana Ramya. I'm the Prime Minister of International Relations here at the Indian University. As an eye-opener and eye-opener literature, the ASEAN is no more than a talk shop. The architecture is the ASEAN way, the nothing-to-be-in-one-interference authority. How do U.S. act as a term at the ASEAN diplomacy? How do you interpret the principle of sovereignty and especially ASEAN way? Because you talk about democratization and one of the principles of democratization is transparency and also in the context of global independence, do you see a change in that? Thank you. The first point is that the principle of sovereignty and non-interference, etc., they are not an ASEAN monopoly. Funnily enough, all the 190 odd countries, members of the UN, all of them also subscribe to this. Non-interference, sovereignty, internal, external, so everyone does so. But nonetheless, despite that principle, other countries and other regions have been able to develop concern and sensitivity about matters to do with human rights and good governance and democracy. In other words, there is nothing inherently inimical, nothing inherently in conflict between human rights concern, democracy and non-interference and sovereignty. What we have been doing over the past 10 years or so in ASEAN is precisely to drive home that message. Please don't be too self-absorbed. Don't think there is anything especially unique about ASEAN. All of us have those concerns. Literally speaking, as a matter of law, as a matter of basic principles, but we can still do the things that we need to do in terms of mutual concern, etc. But we have not gone overboard in suddenly becoming, pontificating, telling anyone what to do. As I said, when Indonesia began its transformation, we purposely and deliberately tried to have a positive impact by disclosing our problems, simply by sharing the problems that we have, not our successes, our problems from ASEAN, from war, many, many other human rights situations, so that it can create a comforting effect that actually all of us can do the same and over the past 10 years and especially over the past 2 or 3 years we have seen a real, real paradigm shift within ASEAN. Now when ASEAN from Indonesia has come together, it is the norm, yambaku, it is the norm to share problems, to expect support and etc. So the so-called ASEAN way is not carved in stone, it is evolving. And now I think it is evolving in a more positive direction to suggest and to impress that there is no disconnect. As I said before, look at the developments now happening in Myanmar, very, very illiterate. Sometimes you accelerate, sometimes you decelerate, sometimes you push, sometimes you pull back. Very, very well timed and very nuanced. Sometimes, you know, in generating patience on the part of other countries who are far more inclined to do the big, you know, pairing, huge stick or even offering, and I say, carrot. But countries are not donkeys. You don't do stick and you don't do carrot. You encourage, you have clear encouragement. That's what I think what ASEAN is all about. Look at what has happened over the past three decades or so. Almost every decade, South East Asia has provided net benefit, net contributor to democracy. From Thailand and from Philippines in the 80s, Indonesia in the 90s and in the first decade of the 2000 to the present century and now Myanmar. And a part of all ASEAN, although they are all national development, ASEAN have made possible or created quite not conducive for those national development take place. When I meet with Aosan Suji on a number of occasions recently, some of the conversation that we went through and discussed is how to avoid, you know, extreme pressures, pressures amongst extremes. The kind of gut-shed and destruction that you see in many other parts of the world. It's better to do things in a steady way but in a purposeful way at the same time so that when we get to the destination, everyone is on board. And I think ASEAN should not be apologetic about that. I think it's a way that has gone for us. But it certainly doesn't mean that we become very inactive on human rights issues. So basically, it is complementary. Nothing seems to be there, we can do both. Like I said just now, walking and listening at the same time. Thank you very much. I'm afraid it seems that our audience now has just warmed up and there's a series of questions being asked but unfortunately we really haven't heard from you all the time. We have a request for one more question. There was a gentleman before we had his hand up last time Thank you very much and welcome to the show. My name is Paul. First of all, I'd like to express your insight, insight through and precise presentation. The whole scope of transformation and changes of Indonesia is really wonderful. We learned a lot from Indonesia. We still learn from Indonesia. And at the same time, your anxiety already mentioned that each and every country has a unique and special reality situation. We have also the same. We are among the national community. At the same time, we'd like to express our sincere appreciation that you input to activate our transformation. I met you about two, three times in Yangon before and at that time still stuck in that same situation. But now our transformation is doing smoothly and peacefully. By the support of yourself and also by the support of our last colleagues. So we do believe and hope that your input, your voice that you may see will continue input to our activation of transformation. And particularly in our call of transition asian and more than that in other regional and international communities. We do believe that you will continue not only present time but also in the future of our process. We really appreciate you for that. Thank you very much. I just wanted to put a record if I may once again how all of us are very much encouraged in the developments in Myanmar. I think it's a two-way process. All of us are learning from one another. Especially our problems. No use, I mean we as I said we have been learning from one another experience and we wish Myanmar well and we will have Indonesia your strongest supporter in this democratization path. Or ASEAN family members. You will be out there in 2014, sir. ASEAN community in 2015. So now by 2014 Myanmar more than any other ASEAN countries will be out there championing democracy for our region. Thank you very much.