 Section 72, Part 3 of 4, of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevenger. Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant. Report of Lieutenant General U.S. Grant of the United States Army's 1864-1865. Continued. Kingston, Georgia. October 11, 11 a.m. Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and Cedartown and is now on Cusa River south of Rome. He threw one core on my road at Acworth and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the 20th core and have strong detachments along my line. This reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain here on the sea. With the 25,000 men and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city, send back all my wounded and worthless and with my effective army move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive. Instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full 25%. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee. Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long. W. T. Sherman, Major General, Lieutenant General Grant. City Point, Virginia, October 11, 1864, 11.30 p.m. Your dispatch of today received. If you are satisfied, the trip to the sea coast can be made. Holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly, you may make it. Destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga as you think best. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, Major General W. T. Sherman. It was the original design to hold Atlanta and by getting through to the coast with the garrison left on the southern railroads leading east and west through Georgia to effectually sever the east from the west. In other words, cut the would be confederacy into again. As it had been cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River, General Sherman's plan virtually affected this object. General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch Hood. Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadston across Sand Mountain, General Sherman sent the fourth corps, Major General Stanley Commanding, and the 23rd Corps, Major General Scofield Commanding, back to Chattanooga to report to Major General Thomas at Nashville, whom he had placed in command of all the troops of his military division saved the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee, or in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman should start for the sea coast. Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. His coming out point could not be definitely fixed. Having together his sustenance as he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement and sending Hood's army, the only considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the Mississippi River, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open and Sherman's route to his own choice. How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of Fort McAllister on the Savannah River, and the occupation of Savannah on the 21st of December are all clearly set forth in General Sherman's admirable report. Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg, Mississippi were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's lines of communication with Mobile and detain troops in that field. General Foster, commanding Department of the South, also set an expedition via Broad River to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah. The expedition from Vicksburg under command of Brevet Brigadier General E. D. Osmond, Colonel, Third United States Colored Cavalry, captured on the 27th of November and destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroad Bridge and Trestle work over Big Black River near Canton, 30 miles of the road and two locomotives besides large amounts of stores. The expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results. The expedition from the Department of the South under the immediate command of Brigadier General John P. Hatch, consisting of about 5,000 men of all arms, including a brigade from the Navy, proceeded up Broad River and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November from where it moved to strike the railroad at Graham'sville. At Honeyhill, about three miles from Graham'sville, the enemy was found and attacked in a only fortified position which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of 746 in killed, wounded, and missing. During the night General Hatch withdrew. On the 6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah Railroad between the Kusawachi and Tullafini Rivers. Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, what seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting. On the 26th of October the advance of Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama but failing to carry the place withdrew towards Cortland and succeeded in the face of our cavalry in affecting a lodgement on the north side of the Tennessee River near Florence. On the 28th forest reached the Tennessee at Fort Hyman and captured a gun boat and three transports. On the 2nd of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gun boats and eight transports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place and was replied to from the gun boats and the garrison. The gun boats becoming disabled were set on fire as also were the transports to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million and a half dollars worth of store and property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. On the 5th the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River above Johnsonville, moving towards Clifton and subsequently joined Hood. On the night of the 5th General Schofield with the advance of the 23rd Corps reached Johnsonville but finding the enemy gone was ordered to Pulaski and was put in command of all the troopers there with instructions to watch the movements of Hood and retard his advance but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command from Missouri and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted. On the 19th General Hood continued his advance. General Thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements. The enemy, coming up with our main force, commanded by General Schofield at Franklin, on the 30th assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night but were in every instance repulsed. His loss in this battle was 1,750 killed, 702 prisoners and 3,800 wounded. Among his losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was 2,300. This was the first serious opposition the enemy met with and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. During the night General Schofield fell back towards Nashville. This left the field to the enemy, not lost by battle but voluntarily abandoned so that General Thomas' whole force might be brought together. The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his line in front of Nashville on the 2nd of December. As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Tennessee River and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A.J. Smith's command and such other troops as he could spare. The advance of this reinforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of November. On the morning of the 15th December General Thomas attacked Hood in position and in a battle lasting two days defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion leaving in our hand most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners including four General Officers. Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had set a force of cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive I started west to superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City I received General Thomas's dispatch, announcing his attack upon the enemy and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied. But that General Thomas immediately upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville and before he had time to fortify should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle instead of waiting to remount his cavalry which delayed him until the inclement sea of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so complete that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment. After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry and infantry to the Tennessee River being forced to abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. On the 28th of December our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the river. About this time the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and North Alabama making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee River. A small force of cavalry under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th Pennsylvania Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance, capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's pontoon bridge. The details of these operations will be found clearly set forth in General Thomas's report. A cavalry expedition under Brevet Major General Gerson started from Memphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he surprised and captured forests dismounted camp at Baronia, Mississippi on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, destroyed the railroad, 16 cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for Hood's army, 4,000 new English carbines and large amounts of public stores. On the morning of the 28th he attacked and captured a force of the enemy at Egypt and destroyed a train of 14 cars. Thence turning to the southwest he struck the Mississippi Central Railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at Bankston and the machine shops and public properties at Grenada arriving at Vicksburg January 5th. During the operations in Middle Tennessee the enemy with a force under General Brecken Ridge entered East Tennessee. On the 13th of November he attacked General Gillum near Morristown capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners, Gillum with what was left of his command retreated to Knoxville. Following up his success Brecken Ridge moved to near Knoxville but withdrew on the 18th followed by General Allman. Under the directions of General Thomas General Stoneman concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillum near Beans station to operate against Brecken Ridge and destroy or drive him into Virginia, destroy the salt works at Saltville and the railroad into Virginia as far as he could go without endangering his command. On the 12th of December he commenced his movement capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces wherever he met them. On the 16th he struck the enemy under Vaughn at Marion completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville capturing all his artillery trains and 198 prisoners and destroyed Wytheville with its stores and supplies and the extensive lead works near there. Returning to Marion he met a force under Brecken Ridge consisting among other troops of the garrison of Saltville that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning, but morning found Brecken Ridge gone. He then moved directly to Saltville and destroyed the extensive salt works at that place a large amount of stores and captured eight pieces of artillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions he returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillum to Knoxville. Wilmington, North Carolina was the most important sea coast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad and to send cotton and other products out by blockade runners besides being a place of great strategic value. The Navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The nature of the outlet of Cape Fear River was such that it required watching for so great a distance that without possession of the land north of New Inlet or Fort Fisher it was impossible for the Navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade runners. To secure the possession of this land required the cooperation of a land force which I agreed to furnish. Immediately commenced the assemblage in Hampton Roads under Admiral D. D. Porter of the most formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point. This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy as well as that of the loyal north and through the imprudence of the public press and very likely of officers of both branches of service the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers both north and south. The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it. This caused a postponement of the expedition until the latter part of November when, being again called upon by Honorable G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once and went myself in company with Major General Butler to Hampton Roads where we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and the time of starting. A force of 6,500 men was regarded as sufficient. The time of starting was not definitely arranged but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of December, if not before. Learning on the 30th of November that Bragg had gone to Georgia taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, I deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its destination before the return of Bragg and directed General Butler to make all arrangements for the departure of Major General Weitzel, who had been designated to command the land forces so that the Navy might not be detained one moment. On the 6th of December the following instructions were given. City Point, Virginia, December 6, 1864. General, the first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this the second will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable grounds to hope for success. If advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in Georgia, the directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of entrenching tools to be taken. The object of the expedition will be gained by affecting a landing on the mainland between the Cape Fear River and the Atlantic north of the north entrance to the river should such landing be affected while the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river then the troops should entrench themselves and by cooperating with the Navy affect the reduction and capture of those places. These in our hands the Navy could enter the harbor and the port of Wilmington would be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing then it will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march and surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition the second will become a matter of after duration. The details for execution are entrusted to you and the officer immediately in command of the troops. Should the troops under General Wiesel fail to affect a landing at or near Fort Fisher they will be returned to the Army's operating against Richmond without delay. U.S. Grant Lieutenant General, Major General B. F. Butler. General Butler, commanding the Army from which the troops were taken for this enterprise and the territory within which they were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go through him. They were so sent. But General Wiesel has since officially informed me that he never received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their existence until he read General Butler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure with my endorsement and papers accompanying it. I had no idea of General Butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from Bermuda Hundred and then did not dream but that General Wiesel had received all the instructions and would be in command. I rather formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder boat. The expedition was detained several days at Hampton Roads awaiting the loading of the powder boat. The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without any delay, with or without the powder boat, had been urged upon General Butler and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter. The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December and arrived at the place of rendezvous off New Inlet near Fort Fisher on the evening of the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having put in at Buford to get ammunition for the monitors, the sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Buford to replenish. This, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. The powder boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th before the return of General Butler from Buford, but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the southern newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion until they were informed by the northern press. On the 25th a landing was affected without opposition and a reconnaissance under Brevet Brigadier General Curtis pushed up towards the fort. But before receiving a full report of the result of this reconnaissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarcation of the troops and the return of the expedition. The re-embarcation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th. On the return of the expedition officers and men, among them Brevet Major General, then Brevet Brigadier General, N. M. Curtis, First Lieutenant G. W. Ross, 117th Regiment New York Volunteers, First Lieutenant William H. Walling, and Second Lieutenant George Simpson, 142nd New York Volunteers, voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were finally into the fort, and in their opinion it could have been taken without much loss. Soon after the return of the expedition I received a dispatch from the Secretary of the Navy and a letter from Admiral Porter informing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. The natural supposition with me was that when the troops abandoned the expedition the Navy would do so also. Finding it had not, however, I answered on the 30th of December advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. This time I selected Brevet Major General, now Major General, A. H. Terry to command the expedition. The troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former with the addition of a small brigade numbering about 1,500 and a small siege train. The latter it was never found necessary to land. I communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the following instructions. City Point, Virginia, January 3, 1865. General, the expedition entrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, North Carolina, and Wilmington, ultimately, if the fort falls. You will then proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River and report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest therefore that you consult with Admiral Porter freely and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service so that there may be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole program laid down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I would therefore defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. The first object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. You want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters. My own views are that if you affect a landing the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River while the balance of it operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher or cut it off from supplies or reinforcements while the river is in possession of the enemy. A siege train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe in readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be drawn from Buford as you need them. Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. When you find they can be spared, order them back or such of them as you can spare to Fort Monroe to report for orders. In case of failure to affect a landing bring your command back to Buford and report to these headquarters for further instructions. You will not debark at Buford until so directed. General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to Baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops will be brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. Should you require them they will be sent to you. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, Brevet Major General A.H. Terry, Lieutenant Colonel C.B. Comstock, aide de camp, now Brevet Brigadier General, who accompanied the former expedition was assigned in orders as chief engineer to this. It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those given for the first expedition and that in neither instance was there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer. The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the sixth arriving at the rendezvous off Buford on the eighth, where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the twelfth when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. Under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the thirteenth and by three o'clock p.m. was completed without loss. On the fourteenth a reconnaissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher and a small advance work, taken possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort. This reconnaissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the afternoon of the fifteenth the fort was assaulted and after most desperate fighting was captured with its entire garrison and armament. Thus was secured by the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war. Our loss was killed one hundred and ten wounded five hundred and thirty six. On the sixteenth and the seventeenth the enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Casswell and the works on Smith's Island, which were immediately occupied by us. This gave us entire control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River. At my request Major General B. F. Butler was relieved and Major General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of Virginia and North Carolina. The defense of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation for General Thomas's surplus troops, fields from which they would cooperate with other movements. General Thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications at Eastport in readiness for orders. On the seventeenth of January General Thomas was directed, if he was assured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. This direction was promptly complied with and the advance of the corps reached Washington on the twenty-third of the same month, whence it was sent to Fort Fisher and New Bern. On the twenty-sixth he was directed to send General A. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to General Canby. By the seventeenth of February the whole force was en route for its destination. The state of North Carolina was instituted into a military department and General Schofield assigned to command and placed under the orders of Major General Sherman. The following instructions were given him. City Point, Virginia, January 31, 1865. General, your movements are intended as cooperative with General Sherman's through the states of south and north Carolina. The first point to be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro will then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or New Bern or both, as you deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro, you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea coast as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects. The first is to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north, the second to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march, as soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or New Bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer has received some instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army. You will learn what steps he has taken and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary. Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me at city point. Communicate with me by every opportunity and, should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe from which point you can communicate by telegraph. The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required for your own command. The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative duty to cut loose from your base and strike for the interior to aid Sherman. In such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting for instructions. You will report, however, what you propose doing. The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro any time from the 22nd to the 28th of February. This limits your time very materially. If rolling stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be supplied from Washington. A large force of railroad men have already been sent to Buford, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, Major General J. M. Schofield. Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher, accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself the condition of things and personally conferring with General Terry and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done. Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah, his army entirely footloose, hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, the southern railroads destroyed so that it would take several months to re-establish a through line from west to east. And, regarding the capture of Lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the rebellion, I sent orders to General Sherman on the 6th of December that, after establishing a base on the seacoast with necessary garrison to include all his artillery and cavalry to come by water to city point with the balance of his command. On the 18th of December, having received information of the defeat and utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over two months to transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from where he was, I wrote to him to that effect and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. A few days after this, I received a communication from General Sherman of date 16 December, acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th and informing me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. Also, that he had expected upon reducing Savannah instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, dense to Raleigh, and dense to report to me, but that this would consume about six weeks time after the fall of Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of January. The confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and without waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, I directed him on the 28th of December to make preparations to start as he proposed without delay, to break up the railroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as he could. On the 21st of January, I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the 23rd Corps, Major General Schofield Commanding, east, that it numbered about 21,000 men that we had at Fort Fisher about 8,000 men at New Bern about 4,000, that if Wilmington was captured, General Schofield would be sent there, if not, he would be sent to New Bern, that in either event all the surplus force at both points would move to the interior towards Goldsboro in cooperation with his movement, that from either point railroad communication could be run out and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communication with them. In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduce Wilmington, North Carolina, in cooperation with the Navy under Admiral Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape River. Fort Anderson, the enemy's main defense on the west bank of the river was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it. After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on the morning of the 22nd, the enemy having retreated towards Goldsboro during the night. Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro in two columns, one from Wilmington and the other from New Bern, and to repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply General Sherman by Cape Fear River towards Fayetteville, if it became necessary. The column New Bern was attacked on the 8th of March at Wise's Forks and driven back with the loss of several hundred prisoners. On the 11th, the enemy renewed his attack upon our entrance position, but was repulsed with severe loss and fell back during the night. On the 14th, the Noose River was crossed and Kingston occupied, and on the 21st Goldsboro was entered. The column from Wilmington reached Cox's Bridge on the Noose River, ten miles above Goldsboro on the 22nd. By the 1st of February, General Sherman's whole army was in motion from Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina on the 17th, thence moved on Goldsboro, North Carolina, via Fayetteville, reaching the lighter place on the 12th of March, opening up communication with General Schofield by way of Cape Fear River. On the 15th, he resumed his march on Goldsboro. He met a force of the enemy at Averysboro, and after a severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in this engagement was about six hundred. The enemy's loss was much greater. On the 18th, the combined forces of the enemy under Joe Johnston attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it back upon the main body. General Slocum, who was in the advance, ascertaining that the whole of Johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the defense. He entrenched himself and awaited reinforcements which were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st, the enemy retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. From there, Sherman continued to Goldsboro, which place had been occupied by General Schofield on the 21st, crossing the Neust River ten miles above there at Cox's Bridge, where General Terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon bridge on the 22nd, thus forming a junction with the columns from New Bern and Wilmington. Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston, South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th of February and occupied by our forces on the 18th. On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was directed to send a cavalry expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee to penetrate South Carolina well down towards Columbia to destroy the railroads and military resources of the country and return, if he was able, to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing our prisoners there, if possible. Of the feasibility of this ladder, however, General Stoneman was to judge. Sherman's movements, I had no doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could collect and facilitate the execution of this. General Stoneman was so late in making his start on this expedition and Sherman, having passed out of the State of South Carolina, on the 27th of February I directed General Thomas to change his course and order him to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he could. This would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the enemy. I regarded it not impossible that, in the event of the enemy being driven from Richmond, he might fall back to Lynchburg and attempt a raid north through East Tennessee. On the 14th of February the following communication was sent to General Thomas. City Point Virginia, February 14, 1865. General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about 20,000 men besides a J. Smith's command. The cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward in cooperation. Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. I take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn, it is so asserted in the Richmond papers, and a member of the Rebel Congress said a few days since, in a speech, that one half of it had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman. This being true, or even if it is not true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy and leave the advance from your standpoint easy. I think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be threefold. First, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible to ensure success to Canby. Second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications and military resources. Third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above. Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what number of men you can put into the field. If not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out or even a week. I do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn. If you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received. To ensure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon train as possible relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight horses. Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think you will be able to send under these directions. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, Major General G. H. Thomas. On the fifteenth, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the twentieth as he could get it off. I deemed it of the utmost importance. Before a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond, that all communications with the city north of James River should be cut off. The enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah Valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent from Richmond and desiring to reinforce Sherman if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least and possibly the latter of the objects. I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan as follows. City Point, Virginia, February 20, 1865, 1 p.m. General, as soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with the cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the streams in Virginia to the westward of Danville and push on and join General Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or five thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry, can be from Mobile Bay with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops. These three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday 1st. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, Major General P.H. Sheridan. On the twenty-fifth I received a dispatch from General Sheridan inquiring where Sherman was aiming for and if I could give him definite information as to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of Charlotte, North Carolina, in answer the following telegram was sent him. City Point, Virginia, February 25, 1865. General, Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed he may possibly have to fall back to Georgetown South Carolina and fit out for a new start. I think however all danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed. I believe he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on his way to Goldsboro. If you reach Lynchburg you will have to be guided in your after movements by the information you obtain. Before you could possibly reach Sherman I think you would find him moving from Goldsboro towards Raleigh or engaging the enemies strongly posted at one or the other of these places with railroad communications opened from his army to Wilmington or New Bern. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, Major General P.H. Sheridan. General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February with two divisions of cavalry numbering about five thousand each. On the first of March he secured the bridge which the enemy attempted to destroy across the middle fork of the Shenandoah at Mount Crawford and entered Staunton on the second, the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro. Thence he pushed on to Waynesboro where he found the enemy in force in an entrenched position under General Early. Without stopping to make a reconnaissance an immediate attack was made. The position was carried and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery with horses and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teens loaded with subsistence and seventeen battle flags were captured. The prisoners under an escort of fifteen hundred men were sent back to Winchester. Thence he marched on Charlottesville destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went which place he reached on the third. Here he remained two days destroying the railroad towards Richmond and Lynchburg including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the Ravonna River and awaited the arrival of his trains. This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg. On the morning of the sixth dividing his force into two columns he sent one to Scottsville whence it marched up the James River Canal to Newmarket destroying every lock and in many places the bank of the canal. From here a force was pushed out from this column to DeWigesville to obtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that place but failed. The enemy burned it on our approach. The enemy also burned the bridge across the river at Hardwicksville. The other column moved down the railroad towards Lynchburg destroying it as far as Amherst Courthouse sixteen miles from Lynchburg. Thence across the country uniting with the column at Newmarket the river being very high his pontoons would not reach across it and the enemy having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the south side railroad about Farmville and destroy it to Appomattox Courthouse. The only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or strike a base at the White House. Fortunately he chose the ladder. From Newmarket he took up his line of march following the canal towards Richmond destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever practicable to a point eight miles east of Goochland concentrating the whole force at Columbia on the tent. Here he rested one day and sent through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes and a request for supplies to meet him at White House which reached me on the night of the twelfth. An infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of the White House and supplies were forwarded. Moving from Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond to near Ashland Station he crossed the Annas and after having destroyed all the bridges and many miles of the railroad proceeded down the north bank of the Pamunkey to White House which place he reached on the nineteenth. Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas City Point Virginia March 7 1865 9 30 a.m. General I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in East Tennessee and throw a good force up to Bulls Gap and Fortify there. Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward as required. With Bulls Gap fortified you can occupy as outposts about all of East Tennessee and be prepared if it should be required of you in the spring to make a campaign towards Lynchburg or into North Carolina. I do not think Stoneman should break the road until he gets into Virginia unless it should be to cut off rolling stock that may be caught west of that. U.S. Grant Lieutenant General Major General G. H. Thomas. Thus it will be seen that in March 1865 General Canby was moving an adequate force against Mobile and the Army defending it under General Dick Taylor. Thomas was pushing out two large and well appointed cavalry expeditions, one from Middle Tennessee under Brevet Major General Wilson against the enemies vital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee under Major General Stoneman towards Lynchburg and assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to commence offensive operations from East Tennessee, General Sheridan's cavalry was at White House, the armies of the Potomac and James were confronting the enemy under Lee in his defenses of Richmond and Petersburg, General Sherman with his armies reinforced by that of General Schofield was at Goldsboro, General Pope was making preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith and Price west of the Mississippi and General Hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia to guard against invasion or to operate offensively as might prove necessary. After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads it was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would leave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of uniting with Johnston and before he was driven from them by battle or I was prepared to make an effectual pursuit on the 24th of March General Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River at Jones's Landing and formed a junction with the army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg on the 27th. During this move General Ord sent forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.