 Patrick, a member of the Institute. Mr. Question, specifically about Bombardier and the DUP. As a hard test case for a lot of the, what you're describing, as chaotic and mutually contradictory positions have been taken up, how do you interpret what's happening with Bombardier in the light of what you've just been saying about evolving trade policy in the UK? Well, Bombardier reveals an administration compared with which the British are a model of coherence and unity. The US administration is pulling in endless numbers of different directions, and I think the issue over Bombardier and over the wider issues of the aircraft sector as a whole and trade in it is subject to quite remarkable differences of interest. So if I find it difficult to read the British government for a coherent and simple answer to your question, I find at least they've got the excuse there that they don't know which bit of the Trump administration they should best be talking to. So I am not the best place to answer the question on how this experience is or might affect attitudes in the North. I don't know. I think that one thing is problematic for the government's immediate management of things. The 1 billion pounds that have been earmarked for the DUP can't actually be delivered. So it's because of the impasse in the North, in Northern Ireland, over the executive and so on. So I ask myself the question. We know that in the referendum there was a clear remain majority in Northern Ireland, and we know that that could not happen without there being a significant section of Unionist opinion who voted that way, even if it wasn't the majority of Unionist opinion. Would all of this, the longer it go on, make the position of the leave supporters more difficult in Northern Ireland to be able to justify to their own voters? I'm talking about their own voters. It's a question that people here would probably be able to answer. It's all overshadowed by the wider question of the border. And gosh, I wish I knew something new to say. There may be something new in Dublin to say about this. I hope there is, but I don't really know what it is. Thanks, Don. Colm? Colored after Retired Foreign Affairs. John, thank you very much for your honest insights. Would you current comment on the attitude and approaches of the EU 27 Commission and Barnier? Have they managed things well? Have they managed these attention? As far as I'm aware, they have. I had the advantage of a briefing from Barnier and some of his team on two occasions in the last few months. I was, I mean, I've known Michel Barnier for some time in his different incarnations. He's a very able, cool customer. And my impression is that he enjoys and the Commission enjoy thus far the confidence of the Council. The most recent meetings of the Council didn't indicate any serious questioning of the way the Commission have handled the negotiations thus far. Might it emerge in future? I guess it might. But something we discussed before this meeting, and it relates to the Northern Ireland question. How can I put this? Ireland is in probably a stronger position to influence events at this stage, even than it would be when we moved to the second stage. Because the conduct of the second, if and when we do move to the second stage, the conduct of the second stage will be subtly different. Instead of just occasional reports back by the Barnier team, the Commission, I think there would be much more ongoing invigilation of the negotiations in the second stage, which allows for the earlier expression of maybe national interest divisions to emerge over trade, over a variety of issues. In theory, that might make a satisfactory settlement of the border question a bit more difficult than it would be at this stage. On the other hand, it's difficult to question the logic of the UK when they say, but we can't give you that answer until we know the nature of the relationship we'll have with the Customs Union and the single market, et cetera. Then we can put flesh and blood, they imply, on the bones of a no-hard border, maximum freedom of travel trade, et cetera, et cetera. So I think so far they've handled it very well. I have no reason to think that will change, but it will be more difficult for the Barnier-Yonker team and so on. I mean, they've also got to watch the Parliament, though. I don't think the Parliament's role should be over-exaggerated when it comes to the final decision, where there has to be a qualified majority of member states, and in those circumstances that affects the kind of majorities that the Parliament can produce that are different. But so far, so good. Thank you, John. Oric? Thank you for the important member of the issue. It seems to me that the United Kingdom has never regarded itself as a third country like other third countries, and indeed Theresa May has been quite explicit about it. There's going to be no Norway-type arrangement. There's going to be no Canada-type arrangement. There's going to be some kind of tailor-made arrangement which, in London's eyes, will take account of the very special position in their eyes that the UK has not only in the European system, but in the world system. And it seems to me that it's quite conceivable that the agenda of the British government is to bring about a situation where the European Union itself will modulate in a direction which is more acceptable to the UK. We all know that all that is ever wanted was a large free trade area in Europe. And for the purpose of doing this, do you not think that they will be playing with a certain number of member states we have seen recently, members of the Royal Family being sent to Warsaw, for instance? One could see prospects of certain things being done in Hungary, not to speak of our own near country here and you have yourself adverted to the kind of leverage that the United Kingdom could bring to bear on a country like this in order to resolve the seemingly impossible problems of the border on this island. So perhaps the British agenda has never changed very much and they're really aiming through another route to achieve a kind of result that they always wanted. Trading on that also on the apparent non-commissionedness of many of the others to the more integrationist objectives of the Union as set out in the treaties. Yeah, thank you for that. That's a very complex and difficult question. I'm not sure I can give you an entirely satisfactory answer. There's always been the sense of the UK being a bit different. We should be treated with a bit more respect because we're a bigger power with more outreach and all the rest of it. That has been the inspiration of the skeptical attitude all along. However, even among the skeptics, there is now an awareness of the much diminished status of the great power. Look, we have some of the symbols of external power status in the United Kingdom. Armed forces, regarded as professional, et cetera and so on. But they're now having to handle state-of-the-art aircraft carriers that can't actually handle any of the planes that the British armed forces fly in. I'm saying this is kind of like a revealing symptom of a decline. The decline has been economic. The decline has been in the area of power and influence projection. So this is not the Britain of Enoch Powell when he launched his opposition to UK membership, which of course failed in the referendum, 75. This is a much more diminished. It's also an internally diminished, a large part of the UK has an ambivalent relationship to the rest of it, Scotland. And not to speak of the problems here in this island and even questions elsewhere. So, and also power centers are shifting in Britain. One of the interesting things that's happening in England, I have to say, this is nothing direct to do at Brexit, but it will make itself felt eventually is power is moving to the cities, the big city regions. I mean, really serious power. I mean, funnily enough, it was begun by a conservative in a sense of a former Chancellor of the Exchequer Osborne, but it's much more has a life of its own now. And I think we're going to see a debate about the constitution in Britain becoming less London centric. I'm only saying all of that because the picture of the great power isn't quite any longer where they're at. Though they talk the talks, they can't deliver on the results very easily. So all of that, I think, complicates it. However, that said, undoubtedly on intelligence, criminal terrorist intelligence, the British have resources and sources that many other EU countries do not have. They also need Europol. I mean, of course, when you look at the way the government talks about our participation, we will remain in your atom, they say. Of course, there's no alternative. We will remain part of Europol. Yeah, nobody thinks we should set up a separate one. We will remain as yet not fully clearly determined a partner in science, education, research. I could go on. There are other things. So what some of the hard line skeptics say is, hang on, what kind of an exit is this? And if you add to that a slightly indeterminate transition, I think it looks like we remain with all, many, most of the obligations that you would judge membership by, but we've no vote and no voice. And when I discussed this with somebody in the opposition, I said it will invite from me and for many others the slogan, no taxation without representation. So, I mean, all of these things are happening. Yes, they will try to play, they have to be careful with their European allies. Orban is still largely untouchable in Budapest. The Warsaw is also, I mean, the Poles have a, I mean, they have to defend their people. They are the main people who've migrated for work and so on and so forth. They're in quite a strong position to say, to demand much. So they're not, they would in the past been allies against Brussels, but they're not on the same side of the actual immediate issues in Brexit. That's the thing. So, they will try, of course, that will be a major part of the British diplomatic effort in the final stages of these negotiations. They will use every trick. Thus far, they've been disappointed, they had assumed that they'd have these allies beginning to mobilize and that they would have words of comfort from the federal chancellor. And they've not had that. I wouldn't always rule out that they wouldn't get something at it, but she's not going to give it now. The British have not accepted their status, the real truth and the reality of their status. So neither she and certainly not Macron are going to give that. And without that, you know, the odd speech from a Danish minister or a Lithuanian minister is not going to be enough. Thank you, John. I have five hands up. I'll take them in the order. I saw them. Donald. Thank you, Dohy. Thank you for a very interesting perspective. Donald Adam, I'm a member of the Institute. It's interesting and, of course, not at all surprising that much of the focus, especially in the media today, it has been on British positions. And Mr. Barnier, whenever he's interviewed, comes up with the question, will we need to know more, tell us more, give us more detail, et cetera. But the one clear consistent line from Brussels from the very beginning has been that Britain should not get as good a deal outside membership of the European Union as it had as a member. Now, does that not imply, at the very least, a poor deal for Britain? I mean, the short answer to that is yes, absolutely. I cannot see how it can be comparable, let alone identical. I can't see it. So part of the game is perhaps to disguise for as long as they can that the deal isn't going to be a great one. And it's going to be subject, that's why I talk about the fragmentation of the whole debate in Britain. The more a possible consensus emerges, if it emerges, the more it begins to emerge, the more it will be subject to the critique on both sides. It will not suit the pro-Europeans and it certainly won't suit some anti-Europeans. That leaves you with a very fragile power base with which to carry through such a deal. And already, when she made the speech yesterday about the Court of Justice, they were all out, the usual suspect, saying this is absolutely out of the question that we should accept in advance. The whole idea of getting out of the European Union was to get out of the Court of Justice, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So, you can't. I agree with your belief, Colin. Thank you. Tom Ferris, member of the Institute. Very brief question, and it is fragmentation. Do you see any significance in the fact that the two position papers published on trade and customs are not from the Department of EU exit, but from Department of International Trade and the Treasury today? It's a good point. I hadn't fully reflected on that, but it is. I mean, under Hammond, the Treasury has tried to insert itself as where possible because the Treasury want an agreement, and they want an agreement that is viable because they know already, no, I mustn't exaggerate, the wheels are not coming off the economy, but it's creaking. Productivity levels are down, real incomes are falling. Still, trade balance is dodgy, investment rates are beginning to tail off. That's before we've got to the serious stage. So they are trying, and I think that's part of the reason why the Prime Minister has brought a chunk of the trade negotiating team, answerable Hitherto to Davis, away from him into her. I can't see any reason for doing it other than that. Thanks, Jess. John, given what you described as the political confusion in the Conservative Party, we're likely to be faced with some sort of a general election maybe before the date set, do you see any scope for a better dialogue with the British Labour Party on a kind of an agenda that strikes me could be saleable, and that is a remain and reform kind of agenda, and the fact that Macron has made the speech he's made and a number of other people that said that they hire all over the European Union, recognised the disaffection of many citizens, Spain, Greece, so on, and it would seem to me that it might be timely for a better dialogue with the British Labour Party, maybe through civil society, I know governments can't do it, I'm sticking to trade unions maybe myself and through civil society organisations to get a fair more grip in the British Labour Party on a remain and reform kind of agenda. Now, they have a legitimacy, you're right about the post-war perspective, most citizens have legitimacy which is not racism about cheap labour being coming in to take their jobs, so it's perfectly reasonable for big areas of working class Britain to worry about that. I think it was more affected by the Middle East incident than European workers, which was a fact that that's a reality, and also there's a lot of disillusionment over the way Greece was handled, the way Cyprus was handled, about how solidarity Europe that most people signed up to doesn't appear to have a lot of meaning, so is there a time where you see scope for a better dialogue made with British Labour? Now, I'm also thinking Jeremy Corbyn is elected in Irish constituency, my own family vote for him, they live in Islington, you know, and Corbyn must be, he certainly was interested in the Northern issue, but I think the East-West relationship with Britain is even more important than the North's outcome, they forget the number of jobs are affected by the industry in commerce and so on, so I'd be interested to live with more, I know you have a good insight into that in what's going on in Labour. Well, there's one surprise you to know that I agree. I think I kind of tried to imply, and what I said earlier on, that the debate in the Labour Party itself is only beginning to move now out of a state of paralysis, and this is being brought about by the remarkable election result, which is not to be underestimated, and it is generating a wider debate than the narrow remain leave formula allowed to happen. Secondly, discussions between the institutions and the Labour leaders have begun. I know they've begun, I know that Stammer, here Stammer, the official shadow minister, has had extensive briefings from the Barnier team and others, and that he's also met with Jeremy Corbyn and so on. Some of us are very active in precisely arguing that there is a remain and reform strategy, which is a, not just convenient, it may not be convenient, if it is actually necessary. I wouldn't exaggerate the extent to which the leave voted was motivated by a subtle analysis of the failings of the European Union, which, by the way, are many, many. I think that the immigration issue, people saw pictures, nothing to do with the European workers, by the way, they saw pictures of millions and millions of desperate people fleeing from war and dictatorship and persecution and worse horrors and said, this is all what the European Union brings us. That was the mindset. So, if you said to people, I know this because I took part in part of the candidacy, in the Rwanda, which you will know was so solid for Labour that you couldn't ever have it. But there was a big leave vote there, and they were talking about this, they said, well, we don't want all these Middle East people coming in, they have mixed up that with the whole question of the free movement of workers. And there is no doubt about it. More generally, I have long believed and written, and it's public, the need for drastic changes in the way the European Union handles some issues. At the core, my main complaint has been the quite needlessly excessive obsession, doctrinal obsession with austerity, which I'm afraid to say the blame must be put on the door primarily of the government in Berlin, and in specifically with the finance ministerium, with Herr Scheuble, who pursued this doctrine to an extent that has been massively, massively counterproductive. There is a, he's now being moved out of that job. We know whoever else takes it, we don't know, whether it's any better or not, we remain to be seen. I agree with you about what I have called publicly the crucifixion of Greece on not that there weren't massive problems of the Greek system, and above all taxation and corruption and all the rest of it. But it's, when you get the IMF saying, this can't continue, these debts should not be maintained on the Greek, they are ultimately debts which have to be shared by those responsible for which were the banks, and particularly in the case of Greece, the German and French banks in the first place. So all of that now is part of a new discussion that's emerging, and there is a lot of debate. And by the way, the commission has finally come out of a long period of almost monk-like silence with quite important new proposals for recovery, for massive investment, infrastructure, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. It's all gotta be seen, I'm not in a position to make any judgment about how this will end up, but there is a new framework. I've mentioned the European Labour Authority. It's worth it, people haven't seen it, it's worth looking at the details of this. This is a much stronger, if it's passed, and it's got both Berlin and Rome and Madrid and Paris strongly behind it, so difficult to see, won't pass, is a bit of a game changer for some of the issues that people have had on social policy and so on. So all of those things are going on and they have to play some role. I have to say that I'm not sure how much that poisoned the British debate. It didn't help, but I think there were other more historic issues which have long played in the British public debate about Britain's place in Europe, et cetera. And I mean, it's very interesting, Scotland voted overwhelmingly for Romain. And by the way, the cities voted Romain everywhere in Britain. The big cities all voted Romain. Working class city like Liverpool voted by a massive majority Romain. So it's not a, but it's the areas that were left deserted like in America, I'm sorry, the left behind have taken their revenge. And the left behind are the responsibility of the center of political life, both in the United States and in Europe and above all in Britain, where two generations after the mines disappeared and the shipyards disappeared and the steel industry disappeared, very little ever done to replace it or to provide comparable economic opportunities. And that has hit some of the traditional labor vote, particularly hard. It's only now coming back as a result of recent changes. So, I agree. Thank you, John. There are two down at the back, but before I go down to the back, I'd just like to ask the supplementary to this. Where do the British trade unions fit into this debate? They were very active before the referendum, but I've heard very little from them since. Most of the unions in Britain are for Romain. I can't immediately think of any, somebody will correct me now, but I can't think of any that have official position of leave, none. Unison and Unite, which are the two biggest unions, certainly the GNM, the general and municipal, they got what they call themselves now, the names have changed, and others are very strongly pro. Something that you may not know, which is quite important to know. This is not a left-right issue. The body, which is the main partisan body for Jeremy Corbyn is called momentum, and they have hundreds of thousands of members. They are overwhelmingly Romain. So they're not coming at it from the traditional. They're coming at it more Romain and reform, if you like. So that has affected some of the position of the union, the fire brigade union, very left-wing union, very strongly pro-Romain. So it doesn't fit into the traditional. 1975 was a totally different story. Then a large part of the Labour Party and the trade union movement was on the anti-side, as were other currents in this country at that time who changed, and they've changed in Britain too. Thank you, Brendan. Brendan Lynch, I have a question just about the transition period. The Reuters has a story today that Theresa May, she was addressing a group of business leaders, and she told them that a transition period was certain in her words, and she also, Reuters are saying that she said that there would only be one change in the trading relationships, if you like. The business would have to only deal with one change in the relationship between the UK and the EU. Do you have a comment on that report? And secondly, what are the chances of all of the 27 other member states agreeing to a long transition period, or is the agreement of all 27 necessary? Well, certainly the agreement of all 27 is necessary. That's right. I think the final vote is a qualified majority, but it would have to be a pretty overwhelming majority, I think, in the final terms of the deal, if I remember correctly, at the level of the European Council. I haven't seen that particular statement, but it fits in with what I'm saying, that we're talking about a transition period, as one of the ministers said. Hammond said, it'll be a transition where you'll not really notice anything has changed. That means the change will come only when we exit the transitional period. So that brings us back to the point, well, when would that be? Two variables, when will it start? It should start in 2019 to 2019. If it has to be delayed, then that will affect its duration, and it may be extended, there's talk of three years, there's talk of this comes back, and then you have a much bigger change. So this is all about defer. What's the expression they use? You know, where you put it on the long finger. You put it on the long finger, that's right, that's right. I think that's the best the government thinks it can get in its political horizon, which is limited by the factors I described. Okay, I think it's time, is it at the back, and then the last one will be up here, Tom. Thank you very much, Chairman, and thank you for a fascinating presentation. First, a very quick observation. There isn't a snowball's chance in hell that the Irish issue will be dealt with anytime soon. We had debates going back to early 2015, I think here with some leaders of the Conservative Party, where we said the only workable Brexit border would be in the Irish Sea, and with Arlene Foster supporting the government, that seems like a pretty remote possibility. Secondly, I'd just like to say, perhaps as a member of the Institute, this may color my position, but the discussion in the UK, viewed from this side of the Irish Sea, is characterized by ignorance. We hear ministers making comments that seem to be unbelievably uninformed. We hear even people from the business community speaking in a relatively uninformed way, and this is hard to accept when such a huge decision is in play, which will also affect us here. But finally, in terms, it's not a free trade area, it's an internal market, and you can't have a game without rules. You can't play the game without a referee to enforce the rules and linesmen and all the other officials you need. You can't have an internal market without the commission. You can't have challenges to the rules without the ECJ. So if that's a red line issue for the UK, it's extremely difficult to see where we can come out the other end. When somebody said earlier on that maybe a Norway-type agreement is the best they could get, which the British say is not acceptable, it's got to be custom-made for the UK, Norway has one or two exceptions to the single market being given fishing, and I think some aspects of agriculture, I'm not sure I know all of them, but other than that, they are fully in, but no vote, no voice, no vote. They're told what the decisions are. Something like that is about the best that I can see, but this is for a country which has had a voice and had a vote, so it makes absolutely no sense. It is a hallmark of the desperation of a party that knows its foundations are rocking, so it is driven to one more fanciful extemporization after another, it's the only way I can put it with the best will in the world, and they're going to try and dodge the bullets from both sides of this debate, but increasingly their horizon gets shorter and shorter, which I think is about becoming almost a question of this week, next week, few months time kind of thing. Thank you, this will have to be the last one. William Scali, member of the Institute, thank you for everything. Just two points, and you did touch on the Irish, I've been an issue a couple of times, I'm sort of left behind there, but if you were a half competent British negotiator, wouldn't you do what they are now doing? I mean, of course, you can have an all-in-all, you can have the Good Friday Agreement, you can have your common travel area, but how in the name of any logic can we agree a final solution on that issue without getting into trade, single market, customs unions and issues? I mean, if the British weren't saying that, they would be arguably totally incompetent, but how you get that sort of addressed and advanced, now it's a very difficult question, but I'm just throwing it out to you. The second one is that from someone looking at this from a distance, and you did talk about spies and that sort of world, but is there any serious plan in either the European Union, which of course, because apart from countries like Ireland to mean the effects are more diffuse unless if the whole thing breaks down, but certainly obviously great for Ireland, but is there any master plan that is, apart from being theoretical or on paper, is in any way capable of implementation if the whole thing breaks down? I mean, you were sort of implied maybe there is, looking at it, I don't know, but it doesn't look as if there is. Listen, before I directly answer your question, there's something I should have said earlier on. Quite rightly, the previous question raised the question of the border controls on the Irish Sea, and that doesn't look as though it's going to fly in the North and therefore in London. I think there may be some parts of West Whitehall that might have viewed it with something we could live with. And of course, people forget, everybody here I'm sure knows, it existed, 1941 to 1950. 54. 54, 52, there we are, so it has a precedent. It doesn't look as though it's going to fly with the DUP and so that's not there. But on what you say about the kind of what, how would they begin to tackle if this breaks down? I don't know, in her statement yesterday, she said, we are beginning now, preparations, we don't want them, it's not what we want, it's not what we're expecting, but it might happen for a failure of the negotiations. So among the, God knows what list of issues the civil service have given, the number 10 Downing Street, no deal will involve, home office, et cetera, missed ministry that many, ports, airports, travel, will the planes fly, et cetera. How are they going to do it? I haven't a clue and more to the point, nor have they. They haven't a clue and in a way this is, I come back to my, if there's one thing that I'm saying, the name of the game now is by tomorrow or next week, by a transition where the minimum changes from our present status has kept the loss of vote and the loss of membership, but everything else, the obligations of business arrangements remain in place because the whole ship of status too fragile for anything else, and let somebody else deal with the future. I think that's what it's amounts to. On that note, John, may I thank you for a very, very interesting comments, but also for stimulating a very interesting debate. Thank you, John.