 This is a LibriVox recording, all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, recording by Robert Scott. The Anti-Federalist Papers, Section 49, The Impartial Examiner, Letter 1. The Impartial Examiner, Virginia Independent Chronicle, Letter 1, 20 February, 1788. To the free people of Virginia, countrymen and fellow citizens, that the subject which has given rise to the following observations is of the highest consequence to this country requires not the aid of logical proof that it merits the most serious attention of every member of this community is a fact not to be controverted. Will not a bare mention of the new folderal constitution justify this remark? To foreigners or such whose local connections form no permanent interest in America this may be totally indifferent, and to them it may afford mere matter of speculation and private amusement. And such advert to the high indistinguished characters who have drawn up and proposed a set of articles to the people of an extensive continent as a form of their future government, an emotion of curiosity may induce them to examine the contents of those articles, and they may perhaps from having contemplated on a former situation of those people that they had struggled against a potent enemy, that they had by their virtuous and patriotic exertions rescued themselves from impending danger, that they had used like endeavors to establish for themselves a system of government upon free and liberal principles, that they had in pursuance of those endeavors chosen a system as conducive to the great ends of human happiness. The preservation of their natural rights and liberties, that this system has prevailed but few years, and now already a change, a fundamental change therein is meditated. Strangers I say having contemplated on these circumstances may be led to consider this nation as a restless and dissatisfied people whose fickle, inconsistent minds suffer them not to abide long in the same situation, whose perpetually seeking after new things throw away one blessing in pursuit of another. And while they are thus indulging their caprice lose all, ere any can ripen into maturity. If the unconcerned part of those among us entertain themselves in this manner, can any good American be content to deserve such reflections? Will not all rather feel an honest indignation if they once perceive their country stamped with a character like this? And yet, may we not justify such conceptions if we thus precipitate ourselves into a new government before we have sufficiently tried the virtues of the old? So incident is error to the human mind that it is not to be wondered at indeed if our present constitution is incomplete. The best regulated governments have their defects, and might perhaps admit of improvement, but the great difficulty consists in clearly discovering the most exceptional parts and judiciously applying the amendments. A wise nation will therefore attempt innovations of this kind with much circumspection. They will view the political fabric which they have once reared as the sacred palladium of their happiness. They will touch it as a man of tender sensibility toucheth the apple of his own eye. They will touch it with light, with a trembling, with a curious hand, lest they injure the whole structure in endeavoring to reform any of its parts. In small and trivial points alterations may be attempted with less danger, but where the very nature, the essence of the thing is to be changed when the foundation itself is to be transformed and the whole plan entirely new-modeled. Should you not hesitate, O Americans? Should you not pause and reflect awhile on the important step you are about to take? Does it not behoove you to examine well into the nature and tendency of the constitution now proposed for your adoption? And by comparing it with your present mode of government, endeavor to distinguish which of the two is most eligible, whether this or that is best calculated for promoting your happiness, for obtaining and securing those benefits which are the great object of civil society? Will it be consistent with the duty which you owe to yourselves as a nation or with affection which you ought to bear for your posterity, if you rashly or inconsiderately adopt a measure which is to influence the fate of this country for ages yet to come? How will it accord with your dignity and reputation as an independent people? If either, through an overweening fondness for novelty, you are suddenly transported on the wings of imagination and to hastily make up your thoughts on this great subject, or by sinking into a listless inactivity of mind, view it as an indifferent matter unworthy of any deliberate consideration. Will any respect, will any honor, will any veneration be due to the memory of yourselves as ancestors, if millions of beings who have not yet received their birth when you are all moldered into dust should find themselves fixed in a miserable condition by one injudicious determination of yours at this period? If you see no impropriety in these questions, the suggestions contained in them will not appear altogether unworthy of attention. One moment's reflection, it is humbly presumed, will render it obvious that on this occasion they are not impertently propounded. In pursuing this address, I beg, leave to premise that the only true point of distinction between arbitrary and free governments seems to be that in the former the governments are invested with powers of acting according to their own wills, without any other limits than what they themselves may understand to be necessary for the general good, whereas in the latter they are entrusted with no such unlimited authority, but are restrained in their operations to conform to certain fundamental principles. The preservation whereof is expressly stipulated for in the civil compact, and whatever is not so stipulated for is virtually and impliedly given up. Societies so constituted invest their supreme governors with ample powers of exerting themselves according to their own judgment in everything not inconsistent with or derogatory to the principles, and so long as they adhere to such restrictions their deeds ought not to be rescinded or controlled by any other power whatsoever. Those principles are certain inherent rights pertaining to all mankind in a state of natural liberty, which through the weakness, imperfection, and depravity of human nature cannot be secured in that state. In therefore agree to enter into society that by the united force of many the rights of each individual may be protected and secured. These are in all just governments laid down as foundation to the civil compact, which contains a covenant between each and all that they shall enter into one society to be governed by the same powers establishes for that purpose the frame of government, and consequently creates a convention between every member binding those who shall at any time be entrusted with power to a faithful administration of their trusting according to the form of the civil policy which they have so constituted and obliging all to do obedience therein. There can be no other just origin of civil power but such mutual contract of all the people, and although their great object in forming society is an intention to secure their natural rights yet the relations arising from this political union creates certain duties and obligations to the state which require a sacrifice of some portion of those rights and of that exuberance of liberty which obtains in a state of nature. This however being compensated by certain other adventitious rights and principles which are acquired by the social connection. It follows that the advantages derived from a government are to be estimated by the strength of the security which is attained at once with the least sacrifice and the greatest acquired benefits. That government therefore which is best adapted for promoting these three great ends must certainly be the best constituted scheme of civil policy. Here then it may not be improper to remark that persons forming a social community cannot take too much precaution when they are about to establish the plan of their government. They ought to construct it in such a manner as to procure the best possible security for their rights. In doing this they ought to give up no greater share than what is understood to be absolutely necessary. And they should endeavor so to organize, arrange, and connect its several branches that when duly exercised it may tend to promote the common good of all and contribute as many advantages as the civil institution is capable of. It has been before observed that the only just origin of civil power is a contract entered into by all the people for that purpose. If this proposition be true, and I dare presume it is not controverted at least in this country, right reason will always suggest the expediency of adhering to the essential requisites in forming that contract upon true principles. A cautious people will consider all the inducements to enter into the social state from the most important object down to the minutest prospect of advantage. Every motive with them will have its due weight. They will not pay a curious attention to trifles and overlook matters of great consequence. And in pursuing these steps they will provide for the attainment of each point in view with a care, with an earnestness proportionate to its dignity and according as it involves a greater or lesser interest. It is evident therefore that they should attend most diligently to those sacred rites which they have received with their birth and which can neither be retained to themselves nor transmitted to their posterity unless they are expressly reserved. For it is a maxim, I dare say, universally acknowledged that when men establish a system of government in granting the powers therein they are always understood to surrender whatever they do not expressly reserve. This is obvious from the very design of the civil institution which is adopted in lieu of the state of natural liberty wherein each individual being equally entitled to the enjoyment of all natural rights and having equally a just authority to exercise full powers of acting with relation to other individuals in any manner not injurious to their rights must when he enters into society be presumed to give up all those powers into the hands of the state by submitting this whole conduct to the direction thereof. This being done by every member it follows as a regular conclusion that all such powers where of the whole were possessed so far as they related to each other individually are of course given up by the mere act of union. If this surrender be made without any reservation the conclusion is equally plain and regular that each and all have given up not only those powers which relate to the others but likewise every claim which pertain to themselves as individuals for the universality of the grant in this case must necessarily include every power of acting and every claim of possessing or obtaining anything. Except according to the regulations of the state now a right being properly defined quote a power or claim established by law to act or to possess or to obtain something from others end quote for every natural right is such a power or claim established by the law of nature thus it is manifest and in a society constituted after this manner every right whatsoever will be under the power and control of the civil jurisdiction. This is the leading characteristic of an arbitrary government and whenever any people establish a system like this they subject themselves to one which has not a single property of a free constitution. Hence results the necessity of an express stipulation for all such rights as are intended to be exempted from the civil authority. Permit me now my countrymen to make a few observations on the proposed fogeal constitution. In this attempt the subject as it is arduous and difficult naturally impresses the modest mind with diffidence. Yet being of the last importance as involving in it the highest interest that free men can have all that is dear and valuable to the citizens of the United States a consciousness of the strong claim which this subject has to a free and general discussion has prevailed over that discouraging idea so far as to produce the present address to you. This is done with a reliance on that benevolence and liberality of sentiment with which you have hitherto been actuated. From these benign qualities it is hoped the most favorable indulgence will be granted and that the zeal with which this is written will be allowed in some measure as excuse for its defects. However imperfect therefore this may be. However inadequate to your own ideas or to the wishes of him who offers it to your consideration you are hereby entreated to let the perusal with which you may think proper to favor it be serious, candid, dispassionate as it relates to a common cause in which we are all concerned. Suffer me then in the first place to advert to a point of the sixth article in this constitution. It may perhaps appear somewhat irregular to begin with this article since it is almost the last proposed yet if it be considered that this at once defines the extent of congressional authority and indisputably fixes its supremacy every idea of impropriety on this head will probably vanish. The cause alluded to contains the following words, quote, this constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof and all the treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby. Anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding, end quote. If this constitution should be adopted here the sovereignty of America is ascertained and fixed in the foedral body at the same time that it abolishes the present independent sovereignty of each state. Because this government being general and not confined to any particular part of the continent but pervading every state and establishing its authority equally in all its superiority will consequently be recognized in each and all other powers can operate only in a secondary subordinate degree. For the idea of two sovereignty existing within the same community is a perfect solicism. If they be supposed equal their operation must be commensurate and like two mechanical powers of equal momenta counteracting each other. There the force of the one will be destroyed by the force of the other and so there will be no efficiency in either. If one be greater than the other they will be similar to two unequal bodies in motion with a given degree of velocity and impining each other from opposite points. The motion of the lesser in this case will necessarily be destroyed by that of the greater and so there will be efficiency only in the greater. But what need is there for a mathematical deduction to shoo the impropriety of two such distinct co-existing soverities? The natural understanding of all mankind perceives the apparent absurdity arising from such a supposition. Since if the word means anything at all it must mean that supreme power which must reside somewhere in state or in other terms it is the united powers of each individual member of the state collected and consolidated into one body. This collection, this union, this supremacy of power can therefore exist only in one body. This is obvious to every man and it has been very properly suggested that under the proposed constitution each state will dwindle into, quote, the insignificance of a town corporate, end quote. This certainly will be their utmost consequence and as such they will have no authority to make laws even for their own private government any further than the permissive indulgence of Congress may grant them leave. This Virginians will be your mighty, your enviable situation after all your struggles for independence. And if you take the trouble to examine you will find that the great, the supereminent authority with which this instrument of union proposes to invest the fojral body is to be created without a single check, without a single article of convention for the preservation of those inestimable rights which have in all ages been the glory of free men. It is true, quote, the United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a Republican form of government, end quote. Yet they do not guarantee to the different states their present forms of government or the bill of rights thereto annexed or any of them and the expressions are too vague, too indefinite to create such a compact by implication. It is possible that a, quote, Republican form, end quote, of government may be built upon as absolute principles of despotism as any oriental monarchy ever yet proposed. I presume that the liberty of a nation depends not on planning the frame of government which consists merely in fixing and delineating the powers thereof, but on prescribing duty limits to those powers and establishing them upon just principles. It has been held in a northern state by a zealous advocate for this constitution that there is no necessity for, quote, a bill of rights, end quote, in the fojral government, although at the same time he acknowledges such necessity to have existed when the constitutions of the separate governments were established. He confesses that in these instances the people, quote, invested their representatives with every power and authority which they did not in explicit terms reserve, end quote, but, quote, in delegating fojral powers, end quote. Says he, quote, everything which is not given is reserved, end quote. Here is a distinction I humbly conceive, without a difference at least in the present inquiry. How far such a discrimination might prevail with respect to the present system of union it is immaterial to examine? And had the observation been restrained to that alone perhaps it might be acknowledged to contain some degree of propriety. For under the confederation it is well known that the authority of Congress cannot extend so far as to interfere with or exercise any kind of coercion on the powers of legislation in the different states. But the internal police of each is left free, sovereign and independent, so that the liberties of the people being secured as well as the nature of their constitution will admit, and the declaration of rights which they have laid down as the basis of government having their full force and energy any further stipulation on the head might be unnecessary. But surely when this doctrine comes to be applied to the proposed fojral constitution which is framed with such large and extensive powers as to transfer the individual sovereignty from each state to the aggregate body, a constitution which delegates to Congress an authority to interfere with and restrain the legislatures of every state, invests them with supreme powers of legislation throughout all states annihilates the separate independency of each and in short swallows up and involves in the plenitude of its jurisdiction all other powers whatsoever. I shall not be taxed with arrogance in declaring such an argument to be felicitous, and insisting on the necessity of a positive unequivocal declaration in favor of the rights of free men in this case even more strongly than in the case of their separate governments. For it seems to me that when any civil establishment is formed the more general its influence the more extensive the powers with which it is invested. The greater reason there is to take the necessary precaution from securing a due administration and guarding against unwarrantable abuses. End of Section 49, the impartial examiner, Letter 1. Recording by Robert Scott. June the 20th, 2007. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Robert Scott. The Anti-Federalist Papers, Section 50, Impartial Examiner, Letter 2. Impartial Examiner, Letter 2, 27 February, 17. 1888. Continued from our last. Section 8 of the first article gives the Congress a power to, quote, lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, end quote. If it be a true maxim that those who are entrusted with the exercise of the higher powers of government ought to observe two essential rules. First, in having no other view than the general good of all without any regard to private interest. And secondly, to take equal care of the whole body of the community, so as not to favor one part more than the other. It is apparent that under the proposed Constitution this general confederate society made up of 13 different states will have very little security for obtaining an observance either of the one or of the other rule. For being different societies, though blended together in legislation and having as different interests, no uniform rule for the whole seems to be practicable. And hence it is to be feared that the general good may be lost in a mutual attention to private views. From the same causes we may lament the probability of losing the advantage of the second rule. For it may be expected, in like manner, that the general care of the whole will be lost by separate endeavors of different legislators to favor their own states. So long as mankind continues to be influenced by interest, the surest means of affecting a union of councils in any assembly is by a union of interests. Now, if it be considered that it is this concert that it is this union in promoting the general good which alone can preserve concord in this great republic and secure its success and glory, unhappy will be the situation of America if she once precludes the beneficial effects of such a good understanding. Yet I apprehend that these evils may result in a great measure from an exercise of that branch of legislative authority which respects internal direct taxation. For in this it is scarcely probable that the interest, ease, or convenience of the several states can be so well consulted in the Fodrell Assembly as in their own respective legislatures. So different are many species of property, so various the productions, so unequal the profits arising even from the same species of property in different states that no general mode of contribution can well be adopted in such a manner as it wants to affect all in an equitable degree. Hence may arise disagreeable objects of contention, a diversity of interests will produce a diversity of schemes. Thus each state as it is natural will endeavor to raise a revenue by such means as may appear least injurious to its own interest. A source of dissension manifestly detrimental to the harmony which is necessary to support the confederation. I cannot conceive it impracticable to reform the Fodrell system in such a manner as to ensure a compliance with the necessary requisitions of Congress from the different state legislatures. Then all the several states being left to raise their own share of the revenue and being the only proper judges of the mode most convenient to themselves, it is highly probable that this important branch of government would be carried on more generally to the satisfaction of each state and would tend to promote a spirit of concord between all the parts of this great community. Because each being thus accommodated and participating the advantages of the Union, none subjected to any inconvenience thereby, all would consequently concur in nourishing and affection for the government which so cemented them. I believe it is acknowledged that the establishment of excise has been one of the greatest grievances under which the English nation has labored for almost a century and a half. Although this may seem an economical tax arising out of manufactures from which the industrious may derive advantages and whereof the wealthy by consuming the greatest share will of course contribute the largest proportion of the tax. Yet the nature of it being such as requires severe laws for its execution, it has justly become an object of general detail attestation. This has induced Judge Blackstone to declare that, quote, the rigor and arbitrary proceedings of excise laws seems hardly compatible with the temper of a free nation, end quote. While therefore you are free men, while you are unused to feel any other power, by such as can be exercised within the bounds of moderation and decency, it doubtless behooves you to consider whether it is an eligible step to subject yourselves to a new species of authority which may warrant the most flagrant violations of the sacred rights of habitation. If this branch of revenue takes place, all the consequent rigor of excise law will necessarily be introduced in order to enforce a due collection. On any charges or offense in this instance you whip-see yourselves deprived of your boasted trial by jury. The much admired common law process will give way to some quick and summery mode by which the unhappy defendant will find himself reduced, perhaps to ruin, in less time than a charge could be exhibited against him in the usual course. It has ever been held that standing armies in times of peace are dangerous to a free country, and no observation seems to contain more reason in it. Besides being useless as having no object of employment they are inconvenient and expensive. The soldiery who are generally composed of the dregs of the people, when disbanded or unfit for military service, being equally unfit for any other employment become extremely burdensome, as they are a body of men exempt from the common occupations of social life, having an interest different from the rest of the community they want in the laps of ease and indolence without feeling the duties which arise from the political connection, though drawing their subsistence from the bosom of the state, the severity of discipline necessary to be observed reduces them to a degree of slavery, the unconditional submission to the commands of their superiors, in which they are bound, renders them the fit instruments of tyranny and oppression. Hence they have, in all ages, afforded striking examples of contributing, more or less, to enslave mankind, and whoever will take the trouble to examine will find that by far the greater part of the different nations who have fallen from the glorious state of liberty owe their ruin to standing armies. It has been urged that they are necessary to provide against sudden attacks. Would not a well-regulated militia duly trained to discipline afford ample security? Such, I conceive, to be the best the surest means of protection which a free people can have when not actually engaged in war. This kind of defense is attended with two advantages superior to any other. First, when it is necessary to embody an army they at once form a band of soldiers whose interests are uniformly the same with those of the whole community, and in whose safety they see involved everything that is dear to themselves. Secondly, if one army is cut off another may be immediately raised already trained for military service. By a policy somewhat similar to this the Roman Empire rose to the highest pitch of grandeur and magnificence. The Supreme Court is another branch of foedal authority which wears the aspect of imperial jurisdiction, clad in a dread array and spreading its wide domain into all parts of the continent. This is to be co-extensive with the legislature, and like that is to swallow up all other courts of judicature. Four, what is that judicial power which, quote, shall extend to all cases in law and equity, end quote, in some having, quote, original, end quote, in all others, quote, appellate jurisdiction, end quote, but an established universal in its operation. And what is that, quote, appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, end quote, but an establishment which may in effect operate as original jurisdiction? Or what is an appeal to inquire into facts after a solemn adjudication in any court below but a trial de novo? And do not such trials clearly imply an incompetency in the inferior courts to exercise any kind of judicial authority with rectitude? Hence, will not this eventually annihilate their whole jurisdiction? Here is a system of jurisprudence to be erected no less surprising than it is new and unusual. Here is an innovation which bears no kind of analogy to anything that Englishmen or Americans, the descendants of Englishmen, have ever yet experienced. Add to all that this high, pre-rogative court establishes no fundamental rule of proceeding except that the trial by jury is allowed in some criminal cases. All other cases are left open and subject, quote, to such regulations as the Congress shall make, end quote. Under these circumstances I beseech you all as citizens of Virginia to consider seriously whether you will not endanger your solemn trial by jury which you have long revered as a sacred barrier against injustice, which has been established by your ancestors many centuries ago and transmitted to you as one of the greatest bulwarks of civil liberty, which you have to this day maintained inviolate. I beseech you, I say, as member of this commonwealth to consider whether you will not be in danger of losing this inestimable mode of trial in all those cases wherein the Constitution does not provide for its security. Nay, does not that very provision which is made by being confined to a few particular cases almost imply a total exclusion of the rest? Let it then be a reflection deeply impressed on your minds that if this noble privilege by which long experience has been found the most exquisite method of determining controversies according to the scale of equal liberty should once be taken away, it is unknown what new species of trial may be substituted in the trial in its room. Perhaps you may be surprised with some strange piece of judicial polity, some arbitrary method, perhaps confining all trials to the entire decision of the Magistrate and totally excluding the great body of the people from any share in the administration of public justice. After the most deliberate reflections on this important matter permit me, my dear countryman, to declare to you in the most unfaigned manner that not perceiving anything in the proposed plan of government which is the most unethical and unethical of the law of law. This seems calculated to ensure the happiness of America. I could not as a fellow citizen resist the inclination to impart these sentiments to you. Unmoved by party, rage, unassailed by passion, uninfluenced by any other interest but the genuine effusal of zeal for this our common country, I confess to you in the language of sincerity and candor that after the first reading of this new code I could not behold it but with an eye of disapprobation. Unwilling, however, to reject at first sight an object of such high moment I resolved to distrust the propriety of a construction passed on so early a period. This led me to pursue it with the utmost diligence I was capable of, and, believe me, the foregoing observations have risen from the fullest conviction that the system involves in it the most dangerous principles. And so far from exalting the standard of American liberty I fear that, should it be adopted, this glorious work which already has cost the lives of many worthy patriots will ere long be leveled with the dust. Let it not be conjectured from hence that any illiberal conceptions are formed by the writer hereof respecting the intentions of those gentlemen who have offered this plan of fogeal government. He knows no circumstance inducing him to suppose they had any other object in view but the good of their country. When we contemplate the great, the magnanimous hero who has conducted our armies through all the trying vicissitudes of danger and difficulty there is no man so disingenuous. There is no man so ungrateful as to impute any transactions of his to sinister motives. Every true American is well assured that steadiness of virtue, that benignity of soul, have the chief rule in all his actions. Yet every American and every other person are satisfied also that there is no infallibility in human nature. To be man is to be subject to error. The best, the greatest, the wisest are liable to commit mistakes. Let it be remembered then that this code of government is solemnly proposed to every free man in America. For what? For the purpose of binding them without their approbation? No. For an implicit acceptance? No. For their adoption merely and complement to the general convention? No. What then? Every man's duty to his country points out to him the end of this proposition. Every man knows that it is for a free, a candid, and impartial discussion and determination thereon. Whether they will approve and adopt it or whether they will disapprove and reject it. Can any citizen therefore be so weak? Can any be so timid? So pusillanimous as to acknowledge that he has no right to exercise his own judgment with regard to this matter? If there should be any haughty spirits among us who think that this subject ought to be handled by none but a few persons of eminent character, let such recollect that the dignity, the importance of their country, should inspire sentiments more exalted than the highest characters. Sentiments that should correspond with the worth of America, not with the consequence of any mere individuals. Will you then, Virginians, erogate too much by boldly asserting the privilege to judge for yourselves in what so nearly concerns the cause of liberty? No, no, my countrymen, you will not erogate too much. You will not. I avow it by the souls of those brave patriots who fought for the same cause in the late war. You will in this affair act as becomes you. The rank you hold amongst the nations of the earth requires this of you. And you will forfeit that rank. You will forfeit the character of free men and shoe that you deserve to be enslaved if you decline that privilege. The happiness of a multitude of people is certainly the highest advantage. And if you will contribute a full share of duty to effect this, so shall you obtain a due share of glory. No pomp of character, no sound of names, no distinction of birth, no preeminence of any kind should dispose you to hoodwink your own understandings. And in that state suffer yourselves to be led at the will of any other men whatsoever. The part you have acted here to fore, the brave, the noble efforts you have made, are proof enough of your fortitude and totally exclude every idea of pusillanimity. Herein you have evanced the highest sense of public virtue. Herein you have manifest to the whole world that the cause of liberty has hitherto had the prevailing influence over your hearts. And shall men possessed of these sentiments shall those valiant defenders of their country who have not feared to encounter toil and danger in a thousand shapes who have not startled even at the prospect of death itself. Shall you, O Virginians, shall you I say, after exhibiting such bright examples of true patriotic heroism suddenly become inconsistent with yourselves, and were failed to maintain a privilege so incontestably your due? No, my countrymen, by no means can you and I conceive that the laudable vigor which flamed so high in every breast can have so far evaporated in the space of five years. I doubt not, but you will in this trying instance acquit yourselves in a manner worthy of your former conduct. It is not to be feared that you need the force of persuasion to exercise a proper freedom of inquiry in the merits of this proposed plan of government, or that you will not pay a due attention to the welfare of that country for which you have already so bravely exerted yourselves. Of this I am well assured, and do not wonder when imagination presents to my view the idea of a numerous and respectable body of men reasoning on the principles of this foedral constitution. If herein I conceive that you are alarmed at the exceedingly high and extensive authority which it is intended to establish, I cannot but see the strongest reasons for such apprehensions, for a system which is to supersede the present different governments of the states, by ordaining that, quote, laws made in pursuance thereof shall be supreme, and shall bind the judges in every state, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding, end quote, must be alarming indeed. What cannot this omnipotence of power affect? How will your bill of rights avail you anything? By this authority the Congress can make laws which shall bind all, repugnant to your present constitution, repugnant to every article of your rights, for they are a part of your constitution, they are the basis of it, so that if you pass this new constitution you will have a naked plan of government unlimited in its jurisdiction, which not only expunges your bill of rights by rendering ineffectual all the state governments, but is proposed without any kind of stipulation for any of those natural rights the security, whereof, ought to be the end of all governments. Such a stipulation is so necessary that it is an absurdity to suppose any civil liberty can exist without it, because it cannot be alleged in any case whatsoever that a breach has been committed, that a right has been violated, as there will be no standard to resort to, no criterion to ascertain the breach, or even to find whether there has been any violation at all. Hence it is evident that the most flagrant acts of oppression may be inflicted yet, still there will be no apparent object injured, there will be no unconstitutional infringement. For instance, if Congress should pass a law that persons charged with capital crimes shall not have a right to demand the cause or nature of the accusation, shall not be confronted with the accuser or witnesses, or call for evidence in their own favor, and a question should arise respecting their authority therein. Can it be said that they have exceeded the limits of their jurisdiction when that has no limits, when no provision has been made for such a right, when no responsibility on the part of Congress has been required by the Constitution? The same observation may be made on any arbitrary or capricious imprisonments contrary to the law of the land. The same may be made if excessive bail should be required, if excessive fines should be imposed, if cruel and unusual punishment should be inflicted, if the liberty of the press should be restrained. In a word, if laws should be made totally derogatory to the whole catalog of rights which are now secured under your present form of government. You will doubtless consider whether the inconveniences may not be very disagreeable and perhaps injurious to which this country may be subjected by ex-ice laws, by direct taxation of every kind, by the establishment of foedral courts. You will advert to the dangerous and oppressive consequences that may ensue from the introduction of standing armies in times of peace, those baneful energies of ambition against which free nations have always guarded with the greatest degree of caution. You will determine likewise as to the propriety of being excluded from keeping ships of war without the consent of Congress. This situation of these states renders a naval force extremely desirable, being bounded on one side by the sea. Their coasts are accessible to every lawless adventurer and without ships to guard them, they are subject to continual depredations. The expediency of this species of defense is manifest. The great advantages to be derived from it, the strength, the consequence, which it adds to a nation, are such that every well wiser to this country would rejoice to see a large navy established, as the circumstances of the state can at any time admit of, this therefore seems to be a very improper restraint upon the states, a restraint which may perhaps eventually prove very injurious. Upon the whole, my fellow citizens, if you judge this proposed constitution to be eligible or ineligible, you will accordingly instruct your delegates when they are about to meet in convention. The wisdom of the legislature has judged it advisable to fix the time for deciding on this momentous business at the distance of several months, that you may become thoroughly acquainted with the subject which so nearly concerns your greatest interests. I know it is a favorite topic with the advocates for the new government, that it will advance the dignity of Congress and that the energy which is now wanting in the fogeal system will be hereby rendered efficient. Nobody doubts, but the government of the Union is susceptible of amendment. But can anyone think that there is no medium between want of power and the possession of it in an unlimited degree, between the imbecility of mere recommendatory propositions and the sweeping jurisdiction of exercising every branch of government over the United States to the greatest extent? Between the present feeble texture of the confederation and the proposed nervous ligaments, is it not possible to strengthen the hands of Congress so far as to enable them to comply with all the exigencies of the Union to regulate the great commercial concerns of the continent, to superintend all affairs which relate to the United States in their aggregate capacity, without devolving on that body the supreme powers of government in all its branches? The original institution of Congressional business, the nature, the end of that institution events the practicability of such reform and shoo that it is more honorable, more glorious, and will be more happy for each American state to retain its independent sovereignty, for what can be more truly great in any country than a number of different states in the full enjoyment of liberty? Exercising distinct powers of government yet associated by one general head, and under the influence of a mild, just and well organized confederation duly held in equilibria? Willstall derives those external advantages which are the greatest purpose of the Union? This separate independency existing in each, this harmony pervading the whole, this due degree of energy in the fogeal department altogether will form a beautiful species of natural grandeur. These will add luster to every member and spread a glory all around. These will command the admiration of mankind. These will exhibit a bright specimen of real dignity far superior to that immense devolution of power under which the sovereignty of each state shall shrink to nothing. It requires no great degree of knowledge and history to learn what dangerous consequences generally result from large and extensive powers. Every man has a natural propensity to power, and when one degree of it is obtained, that seldom fails to excite a thirst for more. A higher point, being gained, still the soul is impelled to a further pursuit. Thus step by step in regular progression she proceeds onward until the lust of domination becomes the ruling passion and absorbs all other desires. When any man puts himself under the influence of such a passion it is natural for him to seek after every opportunity and to employ every means within reach for obtaining his purpose. There is something so exceedingly bewitching in the possession of power that hardly a man can enjoy it, and not be affected after an unusual manner. The pomp of superiority carries with it charms which operate strongly on the imagination. Nay, it is a melancholy reflection that too often the very disposition itself is transformed, and for the gratification of ambitious views the mild, the gentle, humane, the virtuous becomes cruel and violent, losing all sense of honor, probity, humanity, and gratitude. Hence should it not be a maxim never to be forgotten that a free people ought to entrust no set of men with powers that may be abused without control, or afford opportunities to designing men to carry dangerous measures into execution without being responsible for their conduct, and as no human foresight can penetrate so far into future events as to guard always against the effects of vice, as the securest governments are seldom secure enough. Is it not the greatest imprudence to adopt a system which has an apparent tendency to furnish ambitious men with the means of exerting themselves, perhaps to the destruction of American liberty? It is, next to impossible, to enslave a people immediately after a firm struggle against oppression, while the sense of past injury is recent and strong. But after some time this impression naturally wears off. The ardent glow of freedom gradually evaporates. The charms of popular equality, which arose from the Republican plan, insensibly declined. The pleasures, the advantages derived from the new kind of government, grow stale through use. Such declension in all these vigorous springs of action necessarily produces a supineness. The altar of liberty is no longer watched with such attentive acidity. A new train of passion succeeds to the empire of the mind. Different objects of desire take place, and if the nation happens to enjoy a series of prosperity, voluptuousness, excessive fondness for riches, and luxury gain admission and establish themselves, these produce veniality and corruption of every kind, which open a fatal avenue to bribery, hence it follows that in the midst of this general contagion a few men, or one, more powerful than all others, industriously endeavour to obtain all authority, and by means of great wealth or embezzling the public money, perhaps totally subvert the government, and erect a system of aristocratical or monarchic tyranny in its room. What ready means for this work of evil are numerous standing armies and the disposition of the great revenue of the United States. Money can purchase soldiers, soldiers can produce money, and both together can do anything. It is this deprivation of manners, this wicked propensity, my dear countrymen, against which you ought to provide with the utmost degree of prudence and circumspection. All nations pass this parochism of vice, at some period or another, and if at that dangerous juncture your government is not secure upon a solid foundation, and well guarded against the machinations of evil men, these liberties of this country will be lost, perhaps, for ever. Let us establish a strong, foldral government which shall render our Congress a great and eminent body, says one. By all means, replies another, and then they will command the attention of all Europe. Who pray, what will it avail you in the hour of distress, in the midst of calamity, though all Europe should pay attention to the Congress? What advantage will it be to the citizens of America, should they elevate Congress to the highest degree of grandeur? Should the sound of that grandeur be wafted across the Atlantic and echo through every town in Europe? What will the pomp, the splendor of that dignified body, profit you, I say, if you place yourselves in a situation which may terminate in wretchedness? Of what consequence will that state of Congressional preeminence be to you, or to your posterity, if either the one or the other should thereby be reduced to a mere herd of, O great God, avert that dreadful catastrophe? Let not the day be permitted to dawn which shall discover to the world that America remains no longer a free nation. O let not this sacred asylum of persecuted liberty cease to afford a resting place for that fair goddess. Reanimate each spirit that languishes in the glorious cause, shine in upon us, and illuminate all our councils, suffer thy bright ministers of grace to come down and direct us. And hovering for a while on the wings of affection, breathe into our souls true sentiments of wisdom, that in this awful, this important moment we may be conducted safely through the maze of error, that a firm basis of national happiness may be established and flourish in undiminished glory through all the succeeding ages. End of section 51. Recorded by Robert Scott. June the 23rd, 2006. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Robert Scott. The Anti-Federalist Papers. Section number 52. Letter number 4. A Farmer. A Farmer. Baltimore, Maryland, Gazette. Letter 4. March 18, 1788. The opposite qualities of the First Confederation were rather caused by than the cause of two parties, which from its first existence began and have continued their operations, I believe, unknown to their country and almost unknown to themselves. Israeli but few men have the capacity or resolution to develop the secret causes which influence their daily conduct. The old Congress was a national government and a union of states. Both brought into one political body as these opposite powers. I do not mean parties were so exactly blended and very nearly balanced, like every artificial, operative machine where action is equal to reaction. It stood perfectly still. It would not move at all. Those who were merely confederal in their views were for dividing the public debt. Those who were for national government were for increasing of it. Those who thought any national government would be destructive to the liberties of America assisted those who thought it our only safety to put everything as wrong as possible. Requisitions were made which everybody knew it was impossible to comply with. Either in 82 or 83, ten millions of hard debt dollars, if not thirteen, were called into the Continental Treasury, when there could not be half that sum in the whole tract of territory between Nova Scotia and Florida. The states neglected them in despair. The public honor was tarnished and our governments abused by their servants and best friend. In fine it became a can't word, things are not yet bad enough to mend. However, as a great part of the important objects of society were entrusted to this mongrel species of general government, the sentiment of pushing it forward became general throughout America. And the late convention met at Philadelphia under the uniform impression that such was the desire of their constituents. But even then the advantages and disadvantages of national government operated so strongly, although silently, on each individual, that the conflict was nearly equal. A third or middle opinion, which always arises in such cases, broke off and took the lead. The national party, thus assisted, pursued steadily their object. The federal party dropped off, one by one, and finally, when the middle party came to view, the offspring which they had given birth to, and in a great measure reared, several of them immediately disowned the child. Such has been hitherto the progress of party, or rather of the human mind, dispassionately contemplating our separate and relative situation, and aiming at that perfect completion of social happiness and grandeur, which perhaps can be combined only in ideas. Every description of men entertain the same wishes, except perhaps a very few bad men of each. They forever will differ about the mode of accomplishment, and some must be permitted to doubt them practically. As our citizens are now apprised of the progress of parties or political opinions on the continent, it is fit they should also be informed of the present state, force and designs of each, in order that they may form their decisions with safety to the public and themselves. This shall be given with all the precision and impartiality that the author is capable of. America is at present divided into three classes or descriptions of men, and in a few years there will be but two. First, the first class comprehends all those men of fortune and reputation who stepped forward in the late revolution from opposition to the administration rather than the government of Great Britain. All those aristocrats whose pride distains equal law. Many men of very large fortune who entertain real or imaginary fears for the security of property. Those young men who have sacrificed their time and their talents to public service without any prospects of an adequate, pecuniary or honorary reward. All your people of fashion and pleasure who are corrupted by the dissipation of the French, English and American armies, and the love of European manners and luxury, the public creditors of the continent whose interest has been here to foresacrifice by their friends in order to retain their services on this occasion. A large majority of the mercantile people, which is at present a very unformed and consequently dangerous interest. Our old native merchants have been almost universally ruined by the receipt of their debts in paper during the war, and the payment and hard money of what they owed their British correspondence since peace. Those who are not bankrupts have generally retired and given place to a set of young men who conducting themselves as ravishly as ignorantly have embarrassed their affairs and lay the blame on the government and who are really unacquainted with the true mercantile interest of the country, which is perplexed from circumstances rather temporary than permanent. The foreign merchants are generally not to be trusted with influence in our government. They are, most of them, birds of passage. Some perhaps British emissaries, increasing and rejoicing in our political mistakes, and even those who have settled among us with an intention to fix themselves and their posterity in our soil, have brought with them more foreign prejudices than wealth. Time must elapse before the mercantile interest will be so organized as to govern themselves, much less others with propriety. And lastly, to this class, I suppose we may ultimately add the Tory interest, with the exception of very many respectable characters, who reflect, with a gratification mixed with disdain, that those principles are now become fashionable for which they have been persecuted and hunted down, which, although by no means so formidable as is generally imagined, is still considerable. They are at present wavering. They are generally, though with very many exceptions, openly for the proposed, but secretly against, any American government. A burnt child dreads the fire. But should they see any fair prospect of confusion arise? These gentry will be off at any moment for these five and twenty years to come. Ultimately, should the administration promise stability to the new government, they may be counted on as the Janissaries of power ready to efface all suspicion by the violence of their zeal. In general, all these various people would prefer a government, as nearly copied after that of Great Britain, as our circumstances will permit. Some would strain these circumstances. Others still retain a deep-rooted jealousy of the executive branch and strong Republican prejudices, as they are called. Finally, this class contains more aggregate wisdom and more virtue than both the other two together. It commands nearly two-thirds of the property and almost one-half of the numbers of America, and has at present become almost irresistible from the name of the truly great and amiable man who, it has been said, is disposed to patronize it and from the influence which it has over the second class. The first class is nearly at the height of their power. They must decline or moderate, or another revolution will ensue. For the opinion of America is becoming daily more unfavorable to those radical changes which high-toned government requires. A conflict would terminate in the destruction of this class, or the liberties of their country may the guardian angel of America prevent both. Second, the second class is composed of those descriptions of men who are certainly more numerous with us than in any other part of the globe. First, those men who are so wise as to discover that their ancestors, and indeed all the rest of mankind, were and are fools. We have a vast over-proportion of these great men who, when you tell them that from the earliest period at which mankind devoted their attention to social happinesses, it has been their uniform judgment that a government over governments cannot exist. This is two governments operating on the same individual. Assume the smile of confidence, and tell you of two people traveling the same road, of a perfect and precise division of the duties of the individual. Still, however, the political apathogen is as old as the proverb that no man can serve two masters, and whoever will run their noodles against old proverbs will be sure to break them however hard they may be. And if they broke only their own, all would be right. But it is very horrible to reflect that all our numbskills must be cracked in concert. Second, the tremors who from sympathetic indecision are always united with, and when not regularly employed, always fight under the banners of these great men. These people are forever at market, and when parties are nearly equally divided, they get very well paid for their services. Thirdly, the indolent that is almost every second man of independent fortune you meet in America. These are quite easy, and can live under any government. If men can be said to live, who scarcely breathe, and if breathing was attended with any bodily exertion, would give up their small portion of life in despair. These men do not swim with the stream as the tremors do, but are dragged like mud at the bottom. As they have no other weight than their tat flesh, they are hardly worth mentioning when we speak of the sentiments and opinions of America. As the second class never can include any of the yeomanry of the union, who never affect superior wisdom, and can have no interest but the public good, it can only be said to exist as the birth of government, and as soon as the first and third classes become more decided in their views, this will divide with each and dissipate like a mist, or sink down into what are called moderate men, and become the tools and instruments of others. These people are prevented by a cloud from having any view, and if they are not virtuous, they at least preserve the appearance, which in this world amounts to the same thing. Third, at the head of the third class appear the old rigid Republicans, who although few in number, are still formidable. Reverence will follow these men in spite of detraction, as long as wisdom and virtue are esteemed among mankind. They are joined by the true Democrats, who are in general fanatics and enthusiasts, and some few sensible, charming madmen. A decided majority of the yeomanry of America will, for length of years, be ready to support these two descriptions of men. But as this last class is forced to act as a residuary legate, and receive all the trash and filth, it is in some measure disgraced, and its influence weakened. Thirdly, the freebooters and plunderers who infest all countries, and ours perhaps, as little as any other whatever. These men have that natural antipathy to any kind or sort of government, that a rogue has to a halter. In number they are few indeed. Such characters are the offspring of dissipation and want, and there is not that country in the world where so much real property is shared so equally among so few citizens. For where property is easily acquired by fair means, very few indeed will resort to foul. Lastly, by the poor mob in Follick's Pachus, the property of whoever will feed them and take care of them. Let them be spared. Let the burden of taxation sit lightly on their shoulders. But alas, this is not their fate. It is here that government forever falls, with all its weight. It is here that the proposed government will press where it should scarcely be felt. In this third class may be counted men of the greatest mental powers, and of as sublime virtue as any in America. They at present command nearly one-third of the property, and above half the numbers of the United States. And in either event they must continue to increase in influence by great desertions from both the other classes. If the proposed government is not adopted, theirs will be the prevalent opinion. The object of this class either is or will be purely federal, a union of independent states, not a government of individuals, and should the proposed federal plan fail from the obstinacy of those who will listen to no conditional amendments, although such as they cannot disapprove, or should it ultimately, in its execution upon a fair trial, disappoint the wishes and expectations of our country. Then a union purely federal is what the reasonable and dispassionate patriots of America must bend their views to. My countrymen, preserve your jealousy, reject suspicion. It is the fiend that destroys public and private happiness. I know some weak, but very few, if any wicked men, in public confidence. And learn this most difficult and necessary lesson, that on the preservation of parties, public liberty depends. Whenever men are unanimous on great public questions, whenever there is but one party, freedom ceases, and despotism commences. The object of a free and wise people should be so to balance parties, that from the weakness of all, you may be governed by the moderation of the combined judgments of the whole, not tyrannized over by the blind passions of few individuals. The End of Letter No. 4, Section No. 52, recorded by Robert Scott, June 18, 2007.