 Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. This morning in my role as Acting Director-General, I addressed the first regular meeting of the Eye Board of Governors since the untimely death of Director-General Lamano. This has been a testing time for the agency. And I believe we demonstrate the strength and resilience in continuing to fulfill our responsibilities, despite the many challenges we face. I did highlight some interesting developments in the assistance we provide to countries and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, including the use of a new combination of techniques in China to suppress mosquito-despread diseases. I hope that you all as well will be attending next week's scientific forum, which starts on Tuesday. And the topic is a decade of action on constant control and the way forward. And I would say that this is a topic where interaction and engagement from the media may benefit our member states as well. You are also aware that yesterday I visited Tehran for discussions with senior Iranian officials, and we discussed the eye verification and monitoring under the joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA, as well as SEVGAT's implementation under the SEVGAT's agreement and the additional protocol. Regarding the JCPOA, the agency was informed about the latest activities decided by Iran related to centrifuge research and development. And as you know, the agency continues to verify and monitor Iran's nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. Any further relevant developments will be brought to the attention of the board. The agency also continues to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by Iran under the SEVGAT's agreement, and evaluations regarding the absence of anti-nuclear material and activities in Iran continue. Regarding the implementation of Iran's SEVGAT's agreement and additional protocol, during my discussions in Tehran, I emphasized the importance of full and timely cooperation by Iran. It is important to advance our interactions, and therefore I also stressed the need for Iran to respond promptly to agency questions related to the completeness of Iran's SEVGAT's declarations. We will continue our efforts, and we will remain actively engaged. I also highlighted in the Board of Governors that time is of the essence. That's also a good occasion for me to remind you that the agency's work related to nuclear verification is always consistent with our mandate and established SEVGAT's practice. It is an independent, impartial, factual, and professional. And as far as we are concerned, we will continue to work in the same manner. And this is, from my point of view, essential in maintaining the agency's credibility, not only now, but also in the future. And finally, the agency continues to monitor the nuclear program of North Korea using open-source information and satellite imagery. And we remain ready to play an essential role in verifying the DPRK's nuclear program if a political agreement is reached among the country's concerned. I will now be happy to take your questions. Thank you. Question, please. Identify yourself. I should press. Thank you. Lauren Snorlin at the Wall Street Journal. Thanks for the time. I have a couple of questions, and I might come round for a second round afterwards if you allow me. You said in your statement today that on Iran and the SEVGAT, the times of the essence. I'd noted it's been a year since the public revelation of the Turkish Abad site. Did the Iranian officials that you saw at the weekend promise to follow up and clarify the questions you've asked on the material we understand have been found at the site? How much time will you give Iran to respond? And if they fail to respond, what would you be prepared to do? What consequences would there be? I have a second question for you. That was just one question. That was one cluster of questions. If I may, a second cluster of questions. Please. Can we just take this for a second? No, no, please. Maybe we can... As you like. No, please, go ahead. Okay. DJ, you know the argument is better than I do, Turkish Abad, and the archive some people say suggests Iran is trying to keep it open. It's nuclear weapons options in future. How do you respond to the charge that the agency needs to be more activist in following up on people and places that have been identified as part of Iran's past nuclear work, including in the archives, and that the agency has been too cautious and slow up till now? And was today's warning about timing of the essence and your visit to Tehran a sign that the agency is becoming more focused on these concerns about Iran's past work? Thanks. I hope I got them right. First of all, as you know very well, we don't refer in our conversation with member states or with the media on the specifics of safeguards implementation. Saviour guards work and agency verification work, I think, is the result of a very rigorous technical process. There is nothing improvised in our safeguards work. Everything builds on a very solid technical and legal analysis. And I think we owe it to our safeguards inspectors. So for this reason, I will not be able to, I hope you understand to comment on the specifics of your question, but I could tell you that in general, you're asking about how much time we give to Iran in the context of our statements. Against safeguards implementation as well, there is no one size fits all. Every situation is different than another. You have to analyze technical elements, legal aspects, the different activities that are involved, and the timelines are defined at the end a very thorough process and judgment that is meant to satisfy to the best of our abilities the technical requirements under the safeguards obligations. So when I highlighted today the need for timely and full cooperation and also the need for saying that time is of the essence, it is meant as an indication that our ongoing interactions need to advance even further and it's part of the process and I think we made it very clear from the agency side, we continue to stay very much engaged in exploring all the options and making sure that we address all the remaining, all the available options. Now, I also heard the number of adjectives, you know, agency being cautious or slow. I will have to, with your indulgence, to dispute that notion. Simply because I think we are very proud of the work that the agency is doing. The credibility is very important and I think the international community couldn't have a better defender of the international peace and security in this area. What I can assure you of is that we are doing our work based on the very solid infrastructure of legally binding obligations but also practices that we have developed over the decades. And well, one other point, what we are following now and the discussions that we have with Iran, this is no different than what we are pursuing with in our efforts in other parts. So the expression of my comments in the statement to the board show indeed the need to advance further these ongoing interactions and I would not agree that we are cautious or we are slow. We are very, let's say, rigorous, meticulous and we are faithful to our mandate. It couldn't be differently, simply because you also have to understand the director general acting or not of the agency operates and fulfill its mandate under the authority of the board of governors. So there is no, let's say, notion that could encourage an artificial progress or process. If the board in any particular situation is not convinced that a savory agreement or an additional protocol or the pass that we have chosen is not the one that serves our mandate, of course the board will react to that. So we are very mindful of all these arrangements and we take our job very seriously, I have to say. Jonathan Tyrone with Bloomberg, Mr. Faruta, you referred to the specific word of completeness in your introductory statement. As you know, completeness has specific safeguards, relevant usage. That is, countries are required to provide correct and complete information about their fissile material inventories. Were you trying to suggest something specific to Iran by using that word completeness in your statement? Once Iran completes its provision of information, how long will the IAE require to make sure that it is correct? And then I have a second, just a very brief question about how you are pursuing South Korea's request to assess the safety risk of Japan's Fukushima water release into the ocean. Thank you very much. You are inviting me to go beyond what I have been saying in the Board of Governors. And again, I cannot go into specifics, but I think you mentioned yourself, completeness refers to declared activities. And this is a concept that we operate with in our safeguards implementation. Starting a debate on hypothetical scenarios, how long or what may happen, I'm not very much inclined to do that, simply because it will mean I presume or assume a certain course of action. We are now in a process. It's ongoing. It's not the end of it. We've been having conversations, and we are ready to continue. That's the sense of my statement. And of course, from this point of view, I will not speculate on how long this could take, but it is obvious we identified, we spelled out the needs for a timely cooperation to advance these ongoing interactions, and in a way that's what it means. Taking the question on the communication from, you mentioned the communication from the Republic of Korea, we do not provide details of our bilateral communications with member states, but the specific issue that you mentioned is very well known to the agency because we've been involved and provided a number of, we deployed a number of expert missions to Japan at the request of the Japanese authorities related to the commissioning efforts for the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, including water treatment. The last mission took place in November 2018. A report is already public. It has been published in January, I think, this year. And that also contains advice to the Japanese authorities on how to treat this path of discharge. I hope this addresses your question. Sorry, are you planning to follow up the last mission with a new mission? Are you in conversation about that? Well, as you know, issues related to safety and security are very much triggered by requests from member states, and these are national responsibilities. If there is an interest, if there is a request, we will engage with our member states at any point in time. We have a number of peer review services and technical advice that we could provide in such areas. François Murphy from Reuters. Digi, if you can't go into specifics on Iran, perhaps you could provide us with a general sense of how your meeting went, because all we've really heard is what you said to the Iranians, and it's almost as if they weren't there. How did the meeting go? What did they tell you? What sense did you get from the Iranians? And secondly, your update to the board on the centrifuges that are being installed and the modifications that are being made, the lines at Natanz. Even the nerdies among us is struggling to sort of bottom line what that means in terms of outputs. Could you give us a sign? Realize that going into specifics again is difficult, but perhaps you could give us some sense of how, if Iran does everything it has told you it is going to do, what that does to its potential output, roughly, relative to now. Thank you. OK, thank you. And I appreciate because you helped me correcting a show coming in my comments here. Indeed, we did have very substantial discussions with Iranian senior officials. I was grateful to Vice President Salehid, to Foreign Minister Zarif. I was grateful to other senior officials in the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Foreign Ministry for the very substantial exchanges covering a full range of issues in our cooperation. And I was pleased with the tone and the input that we received in those conversations. That shows, as a matter of fact, that the relationship between the agency and Iran is a very mature relationship where we can discuss all issues. And sometimes, of course, we need to express the need for more and to pace up, probably. But I think that was the message very well understood back in Tehran. And as I say, the visit was very timely to have the chance to go through a number of issues with the Iranian authorities. So thank you for allowing me to make this correction. The report that we provided last night reflects in a very clear, let's say, way, at least technically, the developments and the decisions that Iran took as part of the JCPOA. It's not about our, let's say, hesitation to comment on hypothetical, but it's simply that the output is not a simple matter that you calculate the figure, and that's the output. And at the same time, the output that we'll be having in, let's say, a few weeks is probably less important than the output that we have now or the arrangements that exist now in place. Not only that we don't work with apothecals, but I think the notion and the concept that we are working with in our work, looking both at the issues that we have to handle, are not that much linked to the issue that you are alluding to. We are making sure that we can detect timely any effort or any activity that may favor a course of action that we don't foresee. I'm really sorry, but again, can you give any sense of an order of magnitude in terms of how much further this brings Iran in terms of being able to accelerate its output, its in return output? Well, I think, again, the role of the agency is not to judge what these actions will bring. I think at some point, if there was some public comments on what is the expected impact of those measures, not from the agency. So you will understand that going into this direction, I think, oversteps our mandate and our role in the monitoring and verification of the JCPOA. As you know, we made it very clear throughout the last almost more than three years, I would say. We made it very clear that the role of the agency is to provide the facts to allow members of the JCPOA, but also to the board, journalists as well, the reports at some point become public, to comment in the way they wish to and to pass the necessary judgment. So I hope you understand that. Albert Auti, German Press Agency, DPA. I have one more follow up to your statement that time is of the essence. I don't quite understand why in the past the IEA said when asked about following up on certain things in Iran that it would take its own time. This late DiGi Amano stressed again and again and again that it's the IEA's own prerogative. The IEA will not be pressured into doing anything. Now all of a sudden time is of the essence. Why is time of the essence now? And it wasn't before. Well, we probably see it simply strictly from our safeguards angle and verification angle. There may be a temptation for you, of course, to see it in the context of other developments. Why now? It's simple because that's where the safeguards effort, that's when the safeguards effort became, let's say, mature enough to try to clarify potential aspects that are linked to the implementation of the safeguards agreement. But again, you're also linking to issues that I'm not linking them. Saga's implementation in general, as I explain, is a very complex, technical, but rigorous process. And what is timely for us may not be timely for others, but that's the reason, let's say, that for which member states trust the IEA's work. And we heard these expressions in the Board of Governors in the past as well. And this is the time when, of course, we also prepare a report to the Board of Governors, which was issued some week ago, and then the statement that you see today. So the Board is going to look at all these issues, and we will see how they develop. Hello, Homaleski from Press TV. You have in your report the sentence, Iran should cooperate full and timely, full and timely cooperation by Iran. And this has been interpreted by some media as meaning that Iran should have some kind of better cooperation with the agency, because on the face of it, it looks like Iran is giving all the necessary access or information that the agency requires. So when you use the sentence, what are you actually referring to? Do you think that Iran should be cooperating better? Do you think that the cooperation now is not enough? Can you just elaborate on that, please? Thank you. Well, I have to remind you that in Iran, we have probably the most robust verification mechanism that we have developed anywhere in the world. JCPOA activities, measures, but also the Comprehensive Saviors Agreement and the additional protocol make what is probably the most robust. Timely and proactive cooperation means exactly what it says in implementing the Saviors Agreement in Iran. We always have to be mindful of the obligations that derive from that agreement. And we also need to make sure that certain matters, certain aspects that derive from those obligations are addressed in a timely manner. And that full cooperation is of the essence from this point of view. They've not been in a timely manner, are you saying? I didn't say that. I only said that full and timely cooperation is needed. That's Goyinaki from Nepal television. Hello. I just have two questions on two different topics. So shall I just give you one? And then, after the first answer, the second one? No, I think you can address the two of them. OK, OK. So the first one is a bit of a clarifications about the report which just came out. Without going into the details, because it sort of mentions that the new assembled one has not been tested. And that came as a confusion to my reading that is that means that on the third measures are Iranians actually adding on top of what you had reported on August 30. Are the Iranians adding additional those numbers, which is like 52, in addition to what you had reported in August 30? Just because of the technicality that I read, the one in August, some of them has been tested. And in a new one, none of them has been tested. So it is for me to very simple to assume that those are new ones. And I don't want any confusions in my understanding. And then also that sort of gives quite a difference because that's a big number. So I think for that, just without going into details, I just want a simple answer to whether it's on top or no, it's included. The second question is a follow up from Jonathan's question regarding the ROK's request. You had already answered very clearly, but I just wanted to make sure that are you saying that if ROK requests some cooperation or some active involvement of IAEA on this issue, that IAEA will pick up the request and act upon it. Thank you. Yeah, I have to remember the new and senior question. The report and the communication also issued today on the centrifuges reflects the new developments. So it's on top. The new developments and the numbers that our inspectors monitored. Max, maybe could correct me if. Max, can you correct me? The new request for the new figures that we included in the text this morning, last night. The only update. The set that also covered in the regular report. Sure. The new development, the third step, include the additional centrifuge that were being installed or already installed with respect to what we have reported in the previous report. So it's in addition. In addition. Thank you. In addition, there is also additional US6, additional testing with uranium being performed. So yeah, that report was meant to cover new developments. And you mentioned that some of them were not tested. So I think this is work in progress. And as we monitor the developments, and as I was also communicating, relevant developments will be brought to the attention of the board of governors. Regarding the second question, my reference to the national responsibility is linked to the request from the respective member states to utilize peer review services or missions in its own territory. So country X could request missions or peer review missions in its own territory because it's a national responsibility and confines the decision to the national authorities that are supposed to take the decision. I hope this answers. So that means that then what happens that because the ROK in this case is requesting IAEA's involvement in the area which is nobody's territory. It's an open sea. So what is the procedure then? Because they are concerned about the radiation, and then they want IAEA to involve in the monitoring, not just Fukushima, you're doing it already, but more on a broader scale, which is sort of not ROK's territory, nor the Japanese territory. I think the question may be based on information that I don't have, but as I said, communication that we have member states on any matter, whether it's on safety security or safeguards, is part of our ongoing activities, and we don't expose those communications to third parties. But I have to say that the agency will remain faithful to its own role in those areas. Nuclear safety and issues related to nuclear safety will be treated exactly in the same way as before at the request of a member state for peer review mission. On the territory of the respective member state, of course we'll do it. It's based on decision on a voluntary basis, let's say, making use of those efforts. We'll continue to do so. For the rest, if that opens a new territory for us, I think you may have a different information on that matter. Naif Nofir from Ichbari News. An American security advisor mentioned two days ago that IAEA has informed the Council about the possibility of hiding nuclear materials. How would you comment on this? May I ask you to be a bit more specific so I understand nuclear material where? And hiding nuclear material from the inspectors of the IAEA. John Bolton has mentioned that on his content Twitter two days ago that IAEA informed the Council about the possibility of being hiding nuclear material in Iran. Is that true? The comment that I could make is that evaluations regarding the absence of anti-clinical material and activities in Iran remain ongoing. As I was saying today as well in the Board, and that's part of our message that we send to member states in the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors, I apologize, but the Board of Governors already started at 3 o'clock. So thank you so much for coming. Thank you. In general term, in a report, we provide the total number of centrifuge that are installed. At the moment, we perform the verification. If you compare this total number of centrifuge, a different type of centrifuge that are presently installed, we expect of what has been provided before, you will see that for certain type of centrifuge, there is no increase. While for other type of centrifuge, there is an increase. In addition, what is also changed is that the number of centrifuges being tested with UF6 is in general increase. It's a clear.