 So far, we have discussed countermeasures that are taken by the injured state against the responsible state. But as you know, other states than the injured state may also have a right to invoke responsibility under the conditions set out in article 48. Those other states have a rightful interest that the responsible state respects its international obligations. And those obligations protect collective interests. And this is most notably the case when the internationally wrongful act is continuing and that it consists in a serious breach of an erga omnes obligation that exists under a peremptory norm of general international law. When a serious breach of an obligation under a use against norm is ongoing, the injured state is of course entitled to protect its rights by resorting to countermeasures. But in such a situation, because all the other states are already entitled to invoke the responsibility of the author of the violation and claim cessation, should they not also be entitled to resort to countermeasures? So as to add pressure on the responsible state and to bring that serious breach sooner to an end. Of course, as a matter of principle, and as we shall see during the last week of this course, such situations could justify that sanctions be taken by the UN Security Council. But what if the Security Council is vetoed? If a genocide or ethnic cleansing is ongoing, that the Security Council is blocked, must the rest of the world pay lip service to the prohibition of genocide or human rights, complain about it and then do nothing, stand by and watch? On the face of it, it does make sense to allow non-injured states to put pressure with non-forcible countermeasures on the state responsible for the most serious breaches. As a matter of fact, when codifying countermeasures, the ILC did not fail to take note of some practice in that direction. For instance, in 1978, the United States claimed that Idi Amindadha was committing a genocide against its own people and imposed an embargo against Uganda. In 1981, when martial law was imposed in Poland, some western states took countermeasures against Poland for the alleged violations of human rights. In 1982, when Argentina took military control of the Falkland Islands or Malvinas, some non-injured states showed solidarity with the United Kingdom and also took trade sanctions against Argentina. In 1990, some countries took measures against South Africa that went beyond the sanctions imposed by the Security Council. And the same year, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the US and the European Union members froze Iraqi assets and adopted trade embargoes before the Security Council took extensive sanctions. A few years later, in 1998, European states also took countermeasures in the form of the suspension of aviation and trade agreements against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Those measures were additional to UN sanctions and have been justified as a reaction to gross human rights violations or on the basis of a fundamental change of circumstances. And closer to us, the US and the European Union took a series of measures against Russia for its alleged involvement in the crisis in Ukraine. All those cases allowed to put in perspective the seemingly good idea of what can be called universal countermeasures. I say seemingly good idea because things are, of course, a little bit more complicated than just coming to the rescue of fundamental norms through other breaches. Indeed, how can one be certain that a series breach of a use against obligation has indeed occurred and is continuing? And how can one be sure that the countermeasure in response to such a breach, when taken by a non-injured state, is generally pursuing the cessation of such breach and does not have any other political objective? Furthermore, and as all those examples show, why is it that universal countermeasures are nearly only used by non-injured Western states? If international law were to tolerate countermeasures by non-injured states, would it not amount to giving even more power to those states that are already powerful? And if common values are indeed at stake and must be rescued, is it acceptable that some states, and besides always the same Western states, is it acceptable to offer to those states the legal entitlement that they take the common interest in their own hands and pretend to protect it by resorting to measures that are as such in breach of international law? In 1996, on the basis of the practice I mentioned earlier and because of the desirability of seeing basic norms protected, the International Law Commission adopted a draft article according to which all states would have been entitled to take countermeasures in case of an ongoing crime of a state that is in case of a serious breach of an obligation under a use-cogents norm. The UN member states were called to comment on this proposal, but the reactions were extremely divisive and the Western powers fairly isolated in their stance in favor of universal countermeasures. As a result, the ILC had to tune down its draft and find a compromise. It did so by inserting a without prejudice clause. And today Article 54 of the Articles on State's Responsibility is entitled measures, not countermeasures, measures taken by states other than an injured state. Non-injured states that are entitled to invoke the responsibility of another state under Article 48 are said to have also, I quote, the right to take lawful measures against that state. And of course, what does that mean? If the measures are retortion measures, that is, measures that are intrinsically lawful, well Article 54 is just a tautology, non-injured states have of course the right to take measures that are not in breach of any of their international obligations. Commenting on Article 54, the International Law Commission writes that because, I quote, the current state of international law on countermeasures taken in general, in the general or collective interest is uncertain, end of quote, Article 54 is to be viewed as, I quote again, a saving clause which reserves the position and leaves the resolution of the matter to further development of international law. The ILC adds, I quote again, the article speaks of lawful measures rather than countermeasures. So as not to prejudice any position concerning measures taken by states other than the injured state in response to breaches of obligations for the protection of the collective interest or those owed to the international community as a whole, end of quote.