 Hi, we're so happy we're in a new year, a happier year here on Stink Tech, and we're doing global connections today with our regular guest, General Dan Leif, Dan Figleaf. Welcome to the show, Dan, and happy new year. Aloha, Jay. Thank you very much, and Feliz Nuevo Año, as they say in the Pacific part of Latin America. Ah, okay. I'm going to write that down. So today, we're going to talk about ASEAN, and we're going to talk about growing in on ASEAN, the reference being to Joe Biden when he gets to be president here soon, and to see what kind of policies he should consider in foreign relations with ASEAN and the nations that, 10 member nations, I believe, of ASEAN. So we need to understand what ASEAN is today. We need to understand what it means to the United States, what it means to China, of course, and what its current economic status, political status, social status is, and what its expectations are. And we only have nine hours for this show, so we have to really hurry. Not enough. Not enough, Jay. There are 10 member nations. One of them will be shorted, and that's not the ASEAN way. So what is ASEAN? I guess it's Asia of something, association or alliance of Southeast Asian nations, or ASEAN. That's easy. And so what has the 10 members, which are mostly in Southeast Asia or around Southeast Asia? Yeah, they're notionally in Southeast Asia, but they're very diverse. And I mentioned that first, I think, because they're in an Asia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore, and Brunei, and yes, I did just read that, but I could have done it off of my memory, because I've been to all 10 member states. Having been to them, they are very diverse, and that's part of the beauty in the quandary of Asia. They don't have the same interests necessarily. They're built to be a consensus, reaching organization, and how do you reach a consensus with those diverse nations and interests that they have? And because of that... It would be in their interest to join up. I mean, it's nice that they have this economic agreement. I'm not sure how effective it is just now, but... And that, you know, it's a security pact as well, I guess. The query, is it the first step along the way to having a kind of EU in Asia? Well, no, it's not the first step to an EU, or a NATO, or a Warsaw Pact, or any name any other, CERC, any other organization, ASEAN, I think is truly unique. And the skepticism that you kind of implied in your... It's nice that they have. I think it's matched in a lot of our more experienced and more knowledgeable than I am diplomats and big thinkers and things like that. Because ASEAN is not in a, we have done this, typically effective organization. They don't always accomplish much because they can't reach consensus, and they're torn in different directions, internally and externally, and there always are frictions big and small between the members. But there's a stability to that lack of movement. And one way I like to express it is ASEAN doesn't always make things better, but they almost never make things worse. And they, I guess, were formed in the late 60s. And one of their bull points in their CV, if you will, is that the Southeast Asia is far more stable and less conflict torn than it was in the early 60s and 70s. Yeah, it's the only question of the ghost of Christmas future. I mean, if there was no ASEAN, things would not be as good. And I'm thinking, you know, that they must have participated in APCSS, which you've commanded for several years. And I wonder what, how they presented to you as participants there. Well, we had participants from all 10 member states, of course, representing their countries. But we also brought U.S. people affiliated with ASEAN and ASEAN staff members in that capacity. And so ASEAN was represented. And it is an organization of considerable standing because so many countries outside that 10 member circle want to influence them and they want a part of the business and they want the geopolitical influence. So it has significant standing and is well regarded throughout the region. You know, it's a point of pride for the 10 member states. And they never make things worse. I'll give you an example of where I saw the influence of ASEAN and that's with our engagement with Myanmar, also known as Burma. And that is as we began to haltingly become engaged with Myanmar and APCSS was the lead DOD organization. It is a Department of Defense organization for official engagement with Burma. Me and Mark choose one. The ASEAN member states, not just in within the ASEAN official circles, but in the states themselves very much encouraged us to do that because they wanted to help a fellow member state that was coming out of a period of extraordinary darkness. And there is a sense of making their region better and making each other better and getting beyond bilateral relationships. So any of the countries that listed have their bilateral relationships just as the U.S. has more treaty L as in the Pacific than anywhere else. But those are easy to have other sides against. And a not unified but integrated ASEAN or they are working together and they have regular forms and economic efforts and climate efforts and some security and security and sense of peace and stability efforts doesn't pit one against the other. Go ahead. What about new members? What about for example, because geographically they are all kind of around in and around Southeast Asia. But what about Taiwan? Could Taiwan ever join? Is it a geographical limitation so that countries outside of a certain, you know, a certain parameter around Southeast Asia cannot join? Is there a likely expansion of ASEAN going forward? Well, let me start with the first question because that's a different answer. Taiwan's unique status, not seen as a nation by most of the world, including the U.S., as an entity would prevent it from being included ASEAN, not to mention the apoplectic reaction that one would get from China. In fact, I'm surprised. I haven't gotten an email yet. Now that you've said that about that for including what they see as a renegade province. And that's not for today's show, but someday we'll debate the merits of that. So Taiwan, no. More members beyond that I think are unlikely, not so much a geography, but as I said, they've already got a kind of a tough enough challenge. There are a couple of observer nations. East Timor is one of them and I'll think of the other in a second. I don't think it would enhance things. It's not an expansive approach. They aren't trying to rule the broad Indo-Asia Pacific region or anything else. They're trying to make the region more stable, more secure. But they've got a big enough biscuit. They rotate the leadership of ASEAN annually amongst the 10 member states. And I don't think it would enhance things. First of all, it's not an expansive approach. They aren't trying to rule the broad Indo-Asia Pacific region. They're trying to make the region more stable, more secure. What about trade? I mean, are there trade incentives here? Like, you know, reduce tariffs or tariff free relations between the members? They have a strong focus on trade and generally promote free trade. That's always complex. But that really was part of the basis of the founding of ASEAN. So very active in trade. As I said, climate in the security realm, there was an initiative back in the 90s to create a nuclear free ASEAN. And that is as complex as all nuclear issues in nine member states. I agree that the ASEAN region Southeast Asia would be a nuclear free zone, but Singapore abstained in that case from the vote. So they didn't reach that consensus, but it didn't break the organization or the initiative. And we can speculate why Singapore chose to abstain, but I don't speak for that country. There could be any number of reasons, including reasons that are external to ASEAN, you know, political like the US relationship and port calls and things like that. So I don't know that that was the issue, but it's complex. And ASEAN in my mind is sufficiently loosely chartered to live with the complexities. And it became more rigid. Look at Brexit and the challenges that the rigidity of European Union regulations, et cetera, have led to in that organization and also the expansion in size. So if I was in the ASEAN secretary, I'd look to Europe, you know, now we're good. We're not going to do what they did. So the other thing that comes to mind is you mentioned, you know, these countries and some of these countries are bigger. Some of them are economically powerful. Some of them are more militarily powerful. Some of them have better, more robust global relations. You know, I mean, Singapore is not the same as Laos. And so, you know, and you also mentioned that the chairmanship, so to speak, is rotated around the members. But some members then must be more influential than others. Am I right about that? I think that logic and simple math would say that's the case. But I think the truth is it's a pretty balanced organization. The bigger, more powerful, more developed countries to influence the other countries, but also they try to help. And that was the, you know, the push behind a strong desire for many of the ASEAN citizens that I talked to. Citizens of ASEAN member states who wanted us to assist in the transition to true civilian government and Myanmar to get it right. I'll give you another case. Laos, a very small country in population and not with a lot of economic throw weight, was going to be the ASEAN, the leader of ASEAN for a year when I was going, when I was at APCSS. And so with encouragement from other member states, APCSS held a workshop. And I've got a picture of that. So the purpose of the workshop was to assist the Laos government in properly executing a big event. And because the U.S. is the way the U.S. is, and I say that in a straight line back from a long time ago. So I'm not making political discrimination. That was our altruistic goal. Laos was going to host a very important meeting of nine other member states. And if they were going to get anything out of it, they had to be able to do the governance of the event, the logistics of the event, all of those things properly. And so we held a several-day workshop in Vientiane, a lovely city, by the way, and it will allow Laos to exercise their one-year leadership role pretty well, I think. And it varies. But there is no single big dog. A couple of the member states might like to think they are the largest canine in the crowd. But it's asia. And jealous better than cement sometimes. Yeah. Well, democracy among them, that's admirable. But so many of them depend on the Mekong. 200 million people, their lives are dependent on the Mekong. They could shut the Mekong off on any given Tuesday. And that must be, they are the big dog, except they're not necessarily a member, but they certainly, much like, say, held in awe or in fear by the members of ASEAN. They're both simultaneous. How does that work? I mean, what is the general relationship of the member nations around the Mekong, I suppose? And the relationship of ASEAN as an organization with China. Okay, so I am not privy to it. I haven't done research on Mekong river initiatives specifically. But I'd say to our viewers who are probably even less informed or aware, but that's a hugely important waterway for all of the states of China, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, in particular, Myanmar, to some degree. And that's a lot of people and a lot of livelihood and a lot of ecology there. So it depends, is the answer, of course. ASEAN's role is to reach consensus and not disadvantage any member states to horribly, but while the Lao government may be very concerned about what China is doing with dams and stuff, the Thai government also is naturally concerned with what the Lao government is doing to counter or deal with not just any Chinese interaction on the waterway, but their own interaction in waterway management. So without having read up on the specifics, there are several, it's not just ASEAN, there's a more specific Mekong river initiative that's important to it, but ASEAN's role is bound to be reaching consensus and balancing the competing interest needs and concerns of the member states so that nobody gets flooded. Yeah, it reminds me too that when COVID first started, I want to say February, March and it became, you know, threatening. Vietnam, which has had a pretty good record in dealing with COVID, they have really minimal cases all this time. They, you know, they aren't to be complimented. They shut their border with China, which is contiguous. And, you know, I wonder how that plays into this because China may not have agreed, may not have wanted them to shut the border, but Vietnam for its own protection shut the border. How does that work on an international relations basis? Well, let me check my resume. No, I do not yet have the Nobel Peace Prize. If I knew, if I could answer in our nine hours today exactly how that works, I'm sure that I'd be hanging on the wall here somewhere instead of gun barrels and airplane pictures. But that's a good example of some of the value of ASEAN and the Confederation or whatever the best description of this organization is because Vietnam, government and people all know that they have to balance things and walk a tightrope with China. And, and there are some loyalties to, to China and some strong historical animosity and current animosity. It's a, you know, it's a conundrum for them. And Vietnam has been quite successful, one of the most successful countries in dealing with COVID and closing the borders part of it. But if they, if let's imagine ASEAN didn't exist and we were in an ASEAN pre-war and it was just Vietnam. Any incursion on Vietnam would have been an incursion on Vietnam, but now it's an incursion, whether it's, it's coercion or some military action, which it's kind of unimaginable, but the Chinese have done it before with regard to Vietnam. And it's an affront to ASEAN. Does it necessarily mean that there's going to be a military response because this isn't NATO. There's no Article 5, the self or the mutual defense element of NATO. There's no Article 5 of the ASEAN Charter. But if China were to do anything truly appalling with regard to Vietnam, they would incur, incur a negative response from all of the ASEAN member states. And I'd, I'd even include some of those like Cambodia that are a little more likely to lean China's way because it's ASEAN. And it's an important bit of fabric that links the region together and makes it a little more stable. Yeah, yeah. Oh, beneficial for sure. The other thing is, you know, here's an organization and I'm just going on logic without really knowing. Here's an organization which isn't really the heart of Asia. I'm outside of China. A very important organization of states, a complex organization. And it would seem to me that the United States would have a great interest in participating with them, supporting them, helping them, providing encouragement in every which way to them. It's a counterbalance to the power of China. But it's also a statement that we like you and that you, you know, you'll be better off if you, you know, remain friendly with us. So we could achieve a huge soft power benefit in, in ASEAN if we played it right. So query, how have we been playing it over the years? Yes, generally we have played it right. And it's, it's very cost effective. Not that we ever think about that in the US government. But, you know, again, through the, through ASEAN, you can reach, engage and perhaps influence 10 countries in a way that you may not necessarily be able to in the capitals of those countries. You can show interest in the region and kind of diplomatic collegiality. But also interest and provide assistance were appropriate as a PCSS did with Laos and later I believe with the Philippines after I left district in, in their, in the functioning of ASEAN. And we've done that as, as I said, maybe off camera before we started the interview, the US was first to provide a fully credentialed ambassador to ASEAN. I believe that was in 2008. And we have a fully credentialed ambassador and Nina Hachigin, just a tremendous diplomat and professional who was there up until 2017, I believe, like some, like too many posts. And this is not a political statement as, as I think I said in our last talk, though, I were the president, not happening. The one of my top priorities coming into office would to be to get, to get qualified ambassadors into confirmed and credentialed into posts around the world. And one of the ones that might sort of philosophically fall into a lower priority might be ASEAN. But the odds of getting an ASEAN ambassador nominated and confirmed and credentialed quickly are probably greater than getting all 10 of the states done, the member states. So get that done first. Right now we have a chargeried affairs, an acting, if you will, very qualified and previously served as the acting chief of mission in Singapore. So, but, but there's something very different about having somebody who's a full-fledged ambassador and is credentialed and accepted by the host, in this case, the host organization of those nations. So step one, find somebody who is ready to be a killer, not in a bad way, diplomat and lead our mission ASEAN. What would that person look like? I mean, can you profile what you think would be an ideal candidate? Well, it's hard to say because we've, we've, you know, we have ambassadors who've been exceedingly capable of come from business who are simply friends of the president, name a president, who are career diplomats and might come from an economic advisor background or a policy by, so there, there's no cookie cutter, but I'd say the broader experience they had in the region, and ideally with as many of the member states as possible. The, you know, that broad experience in, and I think my first question, if I were the president asking if they wanted a job would be, what do you think of ASEAN? And if they gave a lukewarm answer, not too much. You know, because there are a lot of people who give a lukewarm answer to ASEAN because, you know, it's not NATO, it's not the future in my mind. The population of the ASEAN countries is only 661 million people. That's kind of... Yeah, when you compare that with India at 1.4 and China at 1.5, it's really small. But it's the, it's the core of world trade. All of the important trade in the world, one way or another, Straits of Malacca, other waterways, other sources, it is, it's essential. The ASEAN region is essential to global trade. And peace and stability there is important for the world. Good relations and having influence to, to help promote a free and open Indo-Asia Pacific. There is a central, not secondary to American goals, goals that are unlikely to change later in January. Well, I thank you for what you said that it is far better for the United States to have a credentialed ambassador in a given country or group of countries than not. But, you know, what, what are the risks of not having a credentialed ambassador? You know, what are the, what's the dark side of that? And second part of my question is, you know, is there a good diplomatic reason to avoid appointing someone? I'll answer the second question first, no, there's no good reason. Why might somebody not be appointed? Well, it could be lack of the right person within the circle of the nominator, the president. You know, they're all, it's, they're not, they're not a, you know, 240 million ambassador type people in the U.S. They have a bunch of folks like me who aren't, it wouldn't be, but, but the risk is twofold. The risk to the U.S. broadly and altruistically is we have a chance to properly influence an organization that is generally committed to the greater good, peace and stability in a very important region of the world. And I still think 661 million is a lot of people. And which, and which has some say on one of the most sensitive waterways and trade. The conduits in the world. Absolutely. And includes two treaty allies. And of an importance, a couple of important strategic partners. So, you know, that, that we want to influence in proper way for peace and stability. And nature absorbs a vacuum and that gets to your first question. The risk is, if we're not there and appear disinterested, they may be drawn to another power source, China. And by necessity, because if we're not balancing Chinese ambitions to change the nature of the international order in the Indo-Asia Pacific, then well, you know, if you're, if you live in a neighborhood where there are only drug dealers and gangsters, other now contends and miscreants. And there is no order of those. They provide the order and that's not a direct analogy for anybody in China who's viewing it's not a direct analogy, but China has executed his exercise in very coercive diplomacy, economic diplomacy. And it's quite contrary, frankly, to the ASEAN way. So, so we need to provide a balance and work with China. I mean, there are times where we might be able to work with China with regard to ASEAN. So what would be fair to say, Dan, that China has designs on ASEAN and it is spending some time and diplomatic capital in dealing with ASEAN. It attends their meetings, as I understand it. It sidles up to them. It wants to have some influence with them, whether it's, you know, a soft power influence or maybe even a coercive influence, but as you said. But it is attending and trying to enhance its relationship and the reflection of its power on ASEAN. And it seems to be what China does everywhere, but query though, how does that compare with what the United States has been doing with ASEAN? Has the United States been meeting that competition? Do we spend the time? Do we, you know, express our power and our, we want to call it our soft power, our morality, our encouragement and global kindness there. Are we there as much as they are? No, but for a reason. First of all, ASEAN engaged China and Japan's South Korea early on to expand cooperation, specifically economic cooperation within the region. We are very present and have been for centuries in the Indo-Asia Pacific region. And, but I would say that generally we have focused more on the bilateral relationships with 10 member states, especially those who are our treaty allies, Thailand and the Philippines. We put a lot of effort into Vietnam as you and I have discussed. All that's good, but there's a unique value to the broader engagement with ASEAN. And we should put an emphasis on that, recognize its value. Well, I take it then we're getting to the end of our discussion, but it takes nine hours already. See how fast the time goes by. Wow. That we, you know, we, we have a new administration coming in a couple of weeks. And he's going to have to figure out, you know, how to deal with this and a lot of other farm relations issues. He's got a pretty Akamai secretary of state. But still, you know, Asia is very complex. And people who have been close to Asia like you, you know, you know a lot that you could, you could help him with or at least point him to. And I wonder what your thoughts are on what Joe Biden should be doing with respect to, you know, ASEAN and for that matter, the members of ASEAN in order to improve our, you know, our position there, our influence there. You know, one, of course, as you mentioned, would be to appoint a credentialed ambassador right away. Find one. I mean, surely. They're out there. They're out there. I mean, look at the universities. Look at the retired military like you. There must be a lot of people who could qualify if he opens his door. He'll have a flood of possibilities. But the question is, what else, what else do we do? How else do we play the card because we have a card. They like us, I think, from what you say, they like us. And we like them. APC SS, you know, has been part of that connection. I think. Absolutely. And so my advice would be, I mean, this is not a political statement. Every administration is different. And they're, they all have good points and bad points. And I shy away from politics, except when I go vote. But as an observer, I'll first, I'll talk about a Republican administration. I thought George W. Bush did an extraordinary job of finding qualified career diplomats and friends and businessmen. And I think it's a great opportunity to be investors throughout Asia Pacific. And I saw that. And they're very impressive. And he did it really expeditiously. I thought the Obama administration. Was very excellent at getting into the region. By doing that hard work of going to meetings. And that sounds a little silly, but they were present in the room. They're aggressively present in the room. That. That, that mere presence. When people are talking about important things and unimportant things. Is extraordinarily valuable. So get a qualified ambassador. And be in the room. On that point, you know, with it this morning. The, the house adopted new rules. And they also. Re-elected Nancy Pelosi as, as the leader as the speaker. But one of the rules they adopted, which I find really, really interesting in this context. Is to allow voting in the house of representatives by, by, by virtual voting by zoom and the like. And I think that's probably going to change the way congress functions. And I think it's probably a good thing. It's a facilitating change. But likewise, there have been a number of meetings in which the United States has participated, maybe sometimes by officials who are too low level as against the officials from the members of ASEAN, which is I think one thing we ought to consider. But, but now. Given that. Sounds to me like the meetings you're talking about the presence you're talking about the, you know, on the ground, the presence of a virtual meeting. And I think that's one of the things that we need to do is. To speak relationships that we need to have with ASEAN and its members and so many other countries in the world. Can be our being facilitated. By virtual meetings or virtual attendance at meetings. What do you think. Yeah, I'm throwing a flag on that. The virtual presence is better than no presence at all. But. Virtual presence is actual absence. So you and I can have the kind of conversations we have because we know each other from being in the same room. If we just met. This way, I don't think it would be the same. And I'd cite a political example. Going back to your rule change in the House of Representatives, you know, I had. The pleasure of extraordinary honor of. Seeing Senator Daniel Kay in a way. In person many times on an official capacity. And. More times than not. He was with Senator Ted Stevens. Senator Inouye, of course, Democrats, Senator Stevens, of course, the Republicans. And they had a relationship that was. And it really an exemplar. Of how legislators from either side of the aisle. Should work together and be collegial, even when they strongly discreet and there were times they strongly disagreed. You don't get to that on Zoom or Facebook. So, so yeah, with a balance. Better than better than nothing. Yes. Better than being in the room. No. So I. You know, it's, it hopefully will work well for the House of Representatives. We'll see. But we should remember that with people and all of us, I think during the pandemic. It had something of a sense of loss of our interpersonal interaction. And. Now I don't think that should become the norm. Let me go back before the nine hours for us to. I think there's something you said about the level of the U.S. represented in the room. So the diplomatic equivalent of a major is in with a Brigadier General equivalent. A diplomat from a host country somewhere else. Is that idea? Nope. Is it better than nothing? Absolutely. And it's a wonderful opportunity. It's a wonderful opportunity. Equivalent. But it also shows that we're at least sending somebody. Yeah. That's what we've got to do so many things to do. Starting. There always are. There always are. Yeah. It's an exciting time we live in. It's a time for reconsideration, reimagination, re-invention. It's very exciting going forward. Well, thank you, General. I'm going to have a quick brief. Always enjoyed talking to you. We'll, if you don't mind, we'll, we'll pick through these countries in later shows. And we'll examine them one by one and learn so much about them from you. Yeah, I'll try to get more float photos together to keep it interesting for my side. Absolutely. Thank you.